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Adam K. Matz

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ENHANCING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION:
A UNIFIED VOICE FOR COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS CONCERNING
POLICE-PROBATION/PAROLE PARTNERSHIPS

A Dissertation

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies and Research

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

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Title: Enhancing Community Supervision: A Unified Voice for Community Corrections
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Formalized police-probation/parole partnerships reached prominence in the mid-to-late 1990s elevated by the perceived successes of Boston's Operation Night Light, a component of the larger gun violence initiative known as CeaseFire (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001; Corbett, 1998). Despite limited empirical evidence to confirm their impact on crime trends, Night Light programs were replicated elsewhere throughout the U.S. (International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP], 2007a, 2007b, 2012; Matz & Kim, 2013). At the time, federal funding was plentiful; however, by the mid-2000s, many programs such as Texas' Project Spotlight would cease formal operations as the U.S. entered into a time of economic instability (Beto, 2005). Later research would show partnerships would continue informally, as they had existed previously for decades (Kim, Gerber, & Beto, 2010; Kim, Gerber, Beto, & Lambert, 2013; Kim, Matz, Gerber, Beto, & Lambert, 2013).

While considerable research on partnerships had been levied concerning police officer perceptions and operations, few studies examined probation/parole perceptions, with one qualitative study conducted in an unnamed Pennsylvania county the exception (Alarid, Sims, & Ruiz, 2011). This study fills this gap in the empirical literature, utilizing the American Probation and Parole Association (APPA) membership as a national proxy, by surveying probation/parole leaders and officers across the U.S. concerning their favorableness to partnerships with law enforcement in relation to a variety of important concepts derived from the empirical literature

(Chrislip & Larson, 1994; Hughes, 2000; Jones & Sigler, 2002; Kim et al., 2010; Parent & Snyder, 1999; Rojek, Smith, & Alpert, 2012; Weiss, Anderson, & Lasker, 2002). Results reveal, similar to the law enforcement literature (Kim et al., 2010), that informal information sharing partnerships are the most prevalent across probation/parole agencies. Those in leadership positions and in frontline officer positions displayed considerable interest in partnerships with law enforcement. Probation/parole leaders' partnership favorability was influenced by partnerships' potential to reduce recidivism as well as buy in from agency executives and supervisors. Officers' partnership favorability was influenced by perceived leadership support, the notion that probationers/parolees benefit from a balance of services and accountability, and *stalking horse* concerns.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There is a high likelihood an arrest will involve an individual under community supervision. A study conducted by the Justice Center (2013) in four California cities revealed one in five arrests involve individuals under probation or parole supervision. This trend of arrestees being under community supervision has also been demonstrated in many large cities elsewhere in the U.S. including Boston and Chicago with around 50% of homicide offenders (and victims as well), often gang-affiliated, found to have been under community supervision at the time of the crime (Braga, 2008; Braga et al., 2001; Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, 2007). Given the realization that law enforcement and probation/parole are working with many of the same individuals, consistent with the *pulling levers* ideology (i.e., inter-agency collaboration) (Braga, 2008; Corsaro & McGarrell, 2009; Kennedy, 1997; McGarrell, Chermak, Wilson, & Corsaro, 2006), there has been a continued and increasingly intensive interest in police-probation/parole partnerships over the past two decades. Police-probation/parole partnerships are not a new phenomenon, yet the majority of partnerships remain informal endeavors. However, in recent decades when federal funding was available they became increasingly more official and formalized, until funding waned in association with economy in the mid-to-late 2000s (Kim et al., 2010, 2013a, 2013b).

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention (OJJDP) generally regard these partnerships, such as the Youth Violence Reduction Partnership (YVRP), as *promising* programs. Unlike evidence-based practices that are supported by a strong body of empirical literature, police-probation/parole partnerships have shown promise (e.g., Worrall & Gaines, 2006) but lack systematic evaluation. Although

partnership outcomes have not been systematically evaluated and their effectiveness remains enigmatic (IACP, 2012; Worrall & Gaines, 2006), a body of research has developed around law enforcement leaders' views and favorability of partnerships (Kim et al., 2010, 2013a, 2013b). However, outside of two qualitative studies (Alarid et al., 2011; Murphy, 2003, 2005), to-date there has been little attempt to gather probation and/or parole officers' perceptions of partnership (Matz, DeMichele, & Lowe, 2012; Matz & Kim, 2013). This dissertation research proposes to fill this gap in the empirical literature. The study, utilizing a survey of the nationally represented American Probation and Parole Association (APPA) membership, examines probation/parole leaders and officers' favorability towards partnerships with law enforcement in relation to variations in rehabilitative ideology, availability of training, funding, leadership support, extrinsic benefits (e.g., recidivism reduction, improved compliance), intrinsic benefits (e.g., receipt of helpful information), perceived increase in respect from probationers/parolees, and issues concerning *stalking horse* incidents, mission creep, and role conflict.

Statement of the Problem

While past research has examined the benefits and concerns from the police perspective (Kim et al., 2010, 2013a, 2013b), qualitatively discussed the nature of partnerships (Alarid et al., 2011), and made attempts to tie partnerships to crime rates (Corbett, 1998; Worrall & Gaines, 2006), none have attempted to systematically solicit the input and feedback of probation and parole; clearly, a large stakeholder within these initiatives. Apparently the *dark horse* of the justice system, probation and parole continues to be neglected and receives considerably less support than police and institutional corrections (Pew, 2009). Some researchers have even recommended money be diverted away from institutions and a greater emphasis placed on community corrections or law enforcement (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011), a poetic gesture that may

lack significant political bite but further supports the cause and importance of this research. Probation and parole perspectives are important, and this research aims to give a collective voice to this profession as it pertains to partnerships with law enforcement.

Theoretical Framework

Partnerships are often the result of pragmatic needs and the availability of funds for justice agencies, as Dan Richard Beto, former founding executive director of the National Association of Probation Executives (NAPE), has lamented. When the funding is gone, little remains of the partnership (personal communication, December 17, 2013). Though this study makes no attempt to test theory, some theories are informative in understanding the basis from which partnerships have formed and the underlying assumptions that have guided their practice. Deterrence and rational choice theories associated with the classical school of thought are the most obvious. However, themes relevant to social disorganization are also relevant.

The central themes of deterrence and rational choice are reiterated in the implementation and pragmatic messages of various police-probation/parole partnerships. Most notable, these programs target specific high-risk probationers/parolees, per the tenets of specific deterrence (Urban, 2005), and rarely make any attempt to communicate these enhanced measures publicly (for say general deterrence purposes), with exception to Project Exile and Project Safe Neighborhoods' outreach efforts (O'Shea, 2007). Further, these programs are typically established with randomized home visits and patrols, and long-term in nature or as funding allows. The primary goal is to increase public safety by reducing the likelihood that these individuals will recidivate (i.e., re-arrest, reconviction, revocation). Many restrictions are placed on probationers and parolees that prohibit them from loitering on the streets or associating with antisocial peers, important for staving off further criminality and their potential for

victimizations per routine activities theory. Ideally, probation supervision allows the offender to maintain pro-social community ties while providing a barrier and prohibition from negative influences. For those with a split-sentence of jail/probation or parole, supervision aims to re-establish community ties and put probationers/parolees on a conventional, noncriminal, path for success. In partnerships, the presence of law enforcement re-asserts the authority of the probation/parole officer and communicates that the police and probation/parole are cooperating. If police officers witness probationers/parolees on the street, they will report the instance to the probation/parole officer. Repeated joint home visits and patrols reaffirm that the partnership is long-term, ideally lengthening the initial and residual, specific, deterrent impact.

In terms of social disorganization, many of the high-risk probationers/parolees are residing in the same crime-ridden jurisdictions depicted by Shaw and McKay (Vold, Bernard, & Snipes, 2002). Indeed, a large proportion of intercity violence is committed by a small proportion of youthful minority offenders, many of whom have been under probation/parole supervision at some point (Braga, 2008; Braga, McDevitt, & Pierce, 2006; Braga, Piehl, & Hureau, 2009; Kennedy & Braga, 1998; Kennedy, Piehl, & Braga, 1996). This knowledge is particularly useful for joint patrols in which probation/parole officers can assist police in identifying active probationers/parolees. Collectively, this allows the justice system to be more proactive in supervision and swift in response to supervisory violations. While partnerships focus on the individual, they also emphasize the need for community resources for offenders and do make attempts to encourage probationers/parolees to utilize them. That said, macro-level community interventions are beyond the scope of police-probation/partnerships, but may exist within some larger interagency initiatives (e.g., Ceasefire, Compstat) that include police, probation, and parole as stakeholders.

Current Study

The current study utilizes the many anecdotal accounts of the benefits and problems mentioned about partnerships to create a comprehensive survey that targets both probation/parole leaders and frontline probation/parole officers. Like Kim et al.'s (2010) prior research of law enforcement leaders in Texas, this survey will distinguish the extent to which police-probation/parole partnerships are present. Guided largely by the typologies espoused by Parent & Snyder (1999), the presence of partnerships will be further differentiated in terms of enhanced supervision, information sharing, fugitive apprehension, specialized enforcement, interagency collaborations, and a variety of combinations thereof. Such partnerships will also be distinguishable as either formal or informal in nature, as characterized by Kim et al. (2010). While the typologies provide context in terms of partnership goals and objectives, the formality (or lack of) speaks to the maturity and structure of a given partnership.

In addition to the types of partnerships, this study gathers information concerning several concepts, drawn from prior literature, concerning common benefits and problems. One commonly cited benefit has been the notion that probationers/parolees treat their supervising officers with greater respect when accompanied by police officers (Corbett, 1998; Minor & Matz, 2012; Matz & Kim, 2013). It has further been stated that police officers and probation/parole officers often have a newfound respect and appreciation for each other's role in the criminal justice process through the interactions in the partnership. There are also other intrinsic benefits to each respective agency. This may include increased safety for the supervising officer when conducting home visits with potentially dangerous probationers/parolees and added intelligence information for the police when on regular patrol (Corbett, 1998; Matz & Kim, 2013). Further, partnerships have supposedly contributed to greater

community satisfaction (Anonymous, 1999), and in some limited examples partnerships have impacted the prevalence of crimes such as burglary, assault, and theft (Worrall & Gaines, 2006).

However, greater focus has been placed on the potential pitfalls of partnerships. The most commonly cited problems include mission distortion, mission creep, organizational lag, and *stalking horse* incidents. Given the inherent role conflict in probation, there has continually been a concern that working with law enforcement may inevitably sway officers from their rehabilitative role as change agents to purely compliance enforcers. However, despite being a common talking point, there is little evidence to suggest it is a major problem (Murphy, 2003, 2005). One of the most telling revelations of Alarid et al.'s (2011) qualitative research was the overriding impact of leadership support. Simply put, without strong leadership support partnerships were often viewed as formalities, lacking clear direction or substance.

Organizational lag is closely tied to this concept of leadership, though perhaps a bit broader in scope. Lag refers to an inability of an agency as a whole to be open to new ideas and innovations (Matz & Kim, 2013; Murphy, 2003, 2005). Partnerships represent a new means of doing business, which requires flexibility and a willingness to try new approaches. Not all agencies are capable or receptive to such changes in protocol. *Stalking horse* incidents refer to instances in which law enforcement may abuse their partnership with probation/parole agencies by inappropriately targeting and harassing probationers/parolees (Adelman, 2002; Matz, Turner, & Hemmens, 2015; Turner, Hemmens, & Matz, 2014). Though the concern was termed by the U.S. Supreme Court, there are no known examples of these events actually occurring. Other common problems associated with partnerships include loss of funding or lack thereof, lack of training, and a lack of interest from the law enforcement or community supervision agencies.

To determine the prevalence of these benefits and issues this study examines the involvement of probation/parole leaders and officers in police-probation/parole partnerships and their perceptions of their outcomes and problems. The APPA membership, comprised of probation/parole professionals and national in scope, was surveyed using both web-based and paper-based procedures. Over 900 leaders of probation/parole agencies were identified, representing 36 states. In addition, over 100 probation/parole agencies containing more than 3,000 total probation/parole officers were identified as possessing a complete sampling frame, representing over 30 states. While all 907 leaders were included for the survey, a stratified random sample of 1,080 probation/parole officers by agency size was extracted for the study. A total of 1,987 probation and parole leader and officer contacts were selected for inclusion.

Research Questions

Given the presence of many informal partnerships, the desire for evidence-based practices in the field, and a need to better understand the perceptions of probation and parole leaders and officers in the field, this study aims to answer four overarching research questions;

- 1) What partnership typologies are the most prevalent between police and probation/parole agencies?
- 2) To what extent are those in leadership positions in probation/parole agencies favorable to engaging in these partnerships?
- 3) To what extent are those in frontline officer positions favorable to engaging in these partnerships?
- 4) What variables, informed by the empirical literature, most influence these perceptions?

Questions two and three concern how amenable and supportive leaders and officers are towards partnerships with law enforcement agencies. Further, is there any discrepancy between

the two? Indifference? As Alarid et al. (2011) noted, partnerships were unlikely to succeed if lacking executive level buy-in and support. In addition, why are leaders or officers more or less favorable to partnership? To answer question four, a variety of concepts were adapted from the literature and operationalized within the survey instrument. Deficiencies in training, lack of funding, and lack of interest are all variables that could prove insightful to organizations such as APPA and the International Community Corrections Association (ICCA). Further, the lack of clear goals or objectives (i.e., leadership) could prove informative for future trainings and information sessions hosted by these respective organizations.

Significance of the Study

In addition to providing a unified voice for community corrections, this research will provide guidance to training organizations, such as APPA and the Community Corrections Institute (CCI), concerning the most pressing problems and concerns related to police-probation/parole partnerships. Ideally, research should guide policy, policy should inform training, and training should impact practice. Though criminal justice policies are commonly influenced by interest groups and public opinion (Marion & Oliver, 2012; Benekos & Merlo, 2006), partnerships have developed primarily as a result of necessity. Specifically, probation/parole officers lacked the street presence of law enforcement, and law enforcement lacked knowledge of who these potentially dangerous individuals were (Corbett, 1998). A legal review of warrantless searches of probationers/parolees by law enforcement by Turner et al. (2014) further demonstrates that when police are aware of these individuals under probation or parole supervision they can respond differently, more swiftly, to suspected crimes than when confronted with an otherwise free citizen. In many states, police officers can search a probationer/parolee on the basis of a *reasonable suspicion* (i.e., without a warrant or probable

cause). However, at previous training institutes conducted by APPA several active probation and parole leaders and officers voiced concerns over what, exactly, the law permitted or prohibited in relation to police-probation/parole partnership engagements with offenders.

There may be many more unanswered questions for probation and parole leaders and officers either involved in or planning to participate in a partnership. While several issues have been highlighted in the literature such as mission distortion (Corbett, 1998; Matz & Kim, 2013), there is limited evidence to suggest the extent to which this dilemma, as well as others, is an actual issue. Aside from less than a handful of qualitative studies (Alarid et al., 2011; Murphy, 2003, 2005), the prevalence of mission distortion has not been adequately substantiated for probation/parole officers. This study will examine not only mission distortion but also a lengthy list of other problems including mission creep, organizational lag, *stalking horse* incidents, funding issues, and leadership support. The best method to expose these questions is to ask the leaders and officers directly if they encounter these issues and to what extent they are a problem. While prior qualitative studies have provided a comprehensive framework, the quantitative study contained herein will provide substantive evidence as to their prevalence or lack thereof on a much larger scale, effectively building on the prior research. This can serve multiple purposes for organizations such as APPA. First, it can isolate the true problems encountered by probation/parole leaders/officers involved in partnerships. Second, in the case there are numerous issues it can help prioritize the most pervasive problems. Organizations such as APPA, or federal agencies such as the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), can then focus their efforts on providing training and/or technical assistance to address the most pressing matters as they relate to partnerships.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

To understand the genesis of formalized partnerships it is informative to have a basic understanding of the history of policing, probation, and parole. Policing is intimately tied to the development of probation and parole functions as they are seen today (Jones & Sigler, 2002). However, changes in policing ideology and goals over time have shifted policing towards or away from working with the communities in which they patrol. It will become apparent this oscillation pattern largely has dictated when police would be in a position to work more proactively with probation and parole, as well as a variety of other community organizations (Marion & Oliver, 2012). Further, history demonstrates that many of the problems faced by probation and parole have remained constant, with partnerships yet another means of potentially overcoming their shortfalls, namely excessive caseloads and understaffed departments (Jones & Sigler, 2002; Matz, 2013; Worrall & Gaines, 2006).

The chapter continues with an overview of the *pulling levers* ideology (Kennedy, 1997), a key catalyst for formalized partnerships, followed by a discussion of police-probation/parole partnership typologies (Parent & Snyder, 1999). In addition to describing the typologies, several real-world examples of partnership are introduced. These are followed by a brief discussion of limited empirical endeavors, as well as the most common benefits and problems associated with these partnerships.

Origins of Policing and the Advent of Community Policing

Policing in the U.S. originated in colonial America and was originally derived from the English form of policing in the 1600s (Marion & Oliver, 2012). Policing practices of the early days were dictated largely by geographic settlement. For instance, northern colonies tended to

utilize constables whereas southern colonies relied on sheriffs while large bustling urban areas relied on watches (i.e., patrols). Policing started out as a voluntary position, a form of civic duty at one time, and eventually evolved into a low-paid full-time position. Positions were tied closely to political figures and were often corrupt and inefficient (Marion & Oliver, 2012). The number of officers was too low to enact adequate patrols, and officers were paid too little to attract working professionals and counteract bribery (Marion & Oliver, 2012). Once free, the U.S. populace rejected the authority of these English relics, stripping away much of their power and placing greater emphasis on individual rights. As such, sheriffs and constables were minimized and local police forces prioritized in order to ensure local communities maintained greater autonomy and control over how their neighborhoods would be policed.

However, responding to rising crime problems rooted in immigration, in 1838, Boston created the first police department in the U.S., followed shortly thereafter by New York in 1845. Ironically, the U.S. modeled its police after the first ever police force created, the London Metropolitan Police Department, by Robert Peel, who is considered the father of modern policing (Langworthy & Travis, 2003). That said, police forces in the U.S. tended to be considerably smaller and less official than their English counterparts due to reservations about government control.

Three historical eras of policing in the U.S. have been characterized in the literature. These include the *political era*, *reform era*, and *community era*, with some suggesting modern day policing has entered into a *homeland security era* (Marion & Oliver, 2012). The political era covers roughly the time period from 1840 to 1900. This time period was fraught with intense immigration which contributed to cultural conflicts and persistent social unrest. Several major riots during the 1830s necessitated the presence of law enforcement to maintain public order.

During its infancy, police officers were closely tied to politicians. In fact, they were appointed by politicians and could be just as quickly removed. Further, there was no standardization or procedures (or protocol) for the hiring of police officers. Nonetheless, these officers would assist immigrants in locating work, shelter, and food. In return, immigrants would support politicians during elections. While corruption was a common problem, police were well known to their respective communities due, in part, to conducting regular foot patrols.

The early 1900s to the 1970s has been referred to as the reform era (Marion & Oliver, 2012). During this time period, police became increasingly more professional and less politicized. The civil rights movement and advances in technology also motivated change in policing. Police officers were no longer hired on the basis of political affiliations, but on the results of civil service tests and other requirements of the job (e.g., physical tests). Interestingly, the social service role of policing displayed with immigrants in the former era was generally abandoned in favor of pure law enforcement (i.e., crime fighting). Further, it was during this era of policing that police departments adopted a militaristic disposition, with clearly established chains of command. Police also began to rely on marked cruisers for patrols. Many have reiterated the use of police cruisers, while increasing responsiveness to calls for service, has had a negative impact on community-police relations (Benekos & Merlo, 2006; Marion & Oliver, 2012). Specifically, the car patrols have isolated police officers from the community compared to the foot patrols of the former generation. Despite the de-politicization of police and increased professionalism crime rates began to rise in the 1960s and would continue throughout the 1900s. Further, inner city residents lamented police were heavily biased and handled incidents with minorities (e.g., African Americans) different from those with Whites. Tensions between police

and African Americans in particular hit a boiling point in the 1960s when a series of riots occurred.

The community era (post 1970s) developed in response to declining police-community relations (Marion & Oliver, 2012). In 1968, the Johnson administration was able to get Congress to enact the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. As a result, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was formed under the U.S. Department of Justice. This new entity provided federal grants to state and local police agencies, many of which focused on improving relations with local communities through sensitivity training for police officers (e.g., working with juveniles, elderly, special needs), specialized task forces, and neighborhood watch programs. Despite the funding, however, many agencies continued to operate predominantly under a militaristic model, with a handful of officers assigned to the grant project and separated from the department's overarching routine. Many practices assumed to be effective (e.g., random patrol, rapid response, more detectives) were demonstrated to have little long-term impact. Indeed, crime rates continued to rise despite policing's best efforts of that time. Frustrated by the "nothing works" outcomes, community policing was introduced as a philosophical shift from the reactive military-style policing to a new proactive, community-informed, model of law enforcement (Marion & Oliver, 2012).

While community policing lacks a single cohesive definition, it generally implies a few core recommendations for positive changes in police departments based on the premise that police cannot address social problems without engaging the community in which it serves (Hess & Wroblewski, 2006; Hunter, Mayhall, & Barker, 2000; Langworthy & Travis, 2003; Peak & Glensor, 1999). First and foremost, police departments were encouraged to interact more with local residents in the community (Marion & Oliver, 2012). One method of achieving this was to

assign officers to foot patrols, harkening back to the origins of police in America. In addition to foot patrols some jurisdictions created storefront police stations (e.g., in malls), conducted public perception surveys of crime, sponsored youth activities, reinvigorated more active neighborhood watch programs, and developed youth prevention programs such as G.R.E.A.T. (Gang Resistance Education and Training) (see Esbensen & Osgood, 1999; Esbensen, Osgood, Peterson, Taylor, & Carson, 2013; Esbensen, Osgood, Taylor, Peterson, & Freng, 2001; Peterson & Esbensen, 2004; Sellers, Taylor, & Esbensen, 1998; Winfree, Lynskey, & Maupin, 1999) and D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) (see Clayton, Cattarello, & Johnstone, 1996; Dukes, Stein, & Ullman, 1997; Dukes, Ullman, & Stein, 1995, 1996; Ringwalt, Ennett, & Holt, 1991; Rosenbaum, 2007; Rosenbaum & Hanson, 1998; Rosenbaum, Flewelling, Bailey, Ringwalt, & Wilkinson, 1994; Telep & Weisburd, 2012). The biggest impetus of community policing has been the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) under the U.S. Department of Justice which originated from the passing of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Marion & Oliver, 2012). COPS has provided federal support to agencies to implement community policing with grants supporting new officers, equipment, and training.

While community policing has encouraged police agencies to work with the communities and be more engaged in community-level partnerships, such as those with probation and parole (Matz & Kim, 2013), it should be noted that the level of buy-in from agencies across the country varies and many continue to operate under a traditional, militaristic, model (Benekos & Merlo, 2006). Further, some argue that policing has moved beyond the community era and has entered into an era of homeland security (Marion & Oliver, 2012). In response to the traumatic events of 9/11, the Office of Homeland Security was created in conjunction with the passing of the USA

PATRIOT Act. While the U.S. government has increased funding for grants targeting national security concerns, it had likewise reduced COPS funding during the Bush administration before being reinstated under President Obama (Marion & Oliver, 2012).

Clearly, community policing represented a distinct opportunity for police-probation/parole partnerships to flourish (Byrne & Hummer, 2004), especially in the late 1990s and early 2000s when COPS was at its peak capacity to provide funding support. Formalized partnership programs developed rapidly with funding in the late 1990s but many, such as Texas' Project Spotlight, ceased operation or became a shadow of its former self after federal funding opportunities ended in the mid-2000s (Beto, 2005). Nonetheless, partnerships continue to exist, sometimes informally, long after a given program has lost funding (Kim et al., 2010). Indeed, partnerships between law enforcement and probation/parole officers had existed informally for decades prior to the 1990s as well.

Origins of Community Supervision

Community supervision in the U.S. originated as a volunteer occupation instigated by John Augustus in the mid-1800s, considered the father of probation (Petersilia, 1997). Augustus was a successful and religious Boston boot-maker that frequented the Boston Police Court. Initially, he posted bail for a common drunkard. At sentencing, Augustus made a unique proposal to the court that the man be given three weeks under Augustus' supervision to reform himself. When the court reconvened, the judge was convinced of the drunkard's improvement and the concept of probation and community supervision (as well as pretrial supervision) was born.¹

¹ The term "probation" was coined by John Augustus and is derived from the Latin term *probatio*, which stands for "period of proving or trial" (Petersilia, 1997).

Augustus met some resistance early on in his philanthropic endeavors from law enforcement and the community that was interested in seeing offenders punished (Petersilia, 1997). However, his persistence was rewarded as the court gradually accepted community supervision as a viable alternative to incarceration. Augustus posted bail for over 1,800 individuals at the Boston courts during his lifetime. It should be noted Augustus selected his participants carefully, focusing on those he likely felt were most amenable to rehabilitation. Specifically, he tended to approach those that were visiting the court for their first offense, often indicted for minor city violations or offenses, and showed considerable promise for intervention (see Augustus, 1939).

In response to the successes of Augustus' voluntary supervision, the state of Massachusetts experimented with providing children services that closely resembled probation supervision in 1869, followed by a formal juvenile probation mandate in 1878 (Petersilia, 1997). Though not without controversy, by 1956 every state would adopt laws concerning probation supervision for adults and juveniles.² Community supervision today remains heavily rooted in the practices of Augustus; presentence investigation, supervision conditions, casework, revocation, court reports. While initially made up of volunteers from the community (see also Tanenhaus, 2004), increasing demands eventually resulted in paid staff positioned under the judiciary or executive branches of government (see also Dressler, 1962). In some cases, law enforcement officers were re-assigned to serve as probation officers temporarily. Recently, the juvenile curfew check partnership program in Palm Bay, Florida for example allowed police officers to serve as volunteer probation officers to conduct and monitor curfew compliance (Jones & Sigler, 2002). The use of police officers as supplemental probation personnel often has

² See *Table 1: Significant Events in the Development of U.S. Probation* from Petersilia's article (1997, p. 158) for a detailed timeline of developments in probation supervision.

occurred in light of resource-strained probation departments unable to meet their supervisory responsibilities (Matz, 2013).

The history of parole is less straight forward, with roots tracing back to the seventeenth and eighteenth century in England (Giardini, 1957).³ The concept of parole was largely predicated on the issue of overcrowding. In those centuries, definitive sentences could only be shortened by executive powers and conditional pardons of the governor. The New York law of 1817 represented the first “good time” law (i.e., commutation law) in which one’s length of incarceration could be reduced in exchange for good behavior. Once released, the individual could be immediately returned to prison if a new crime was committed. As Giardini explains, parole represents the early release of an inmate for good behavior and the completion of treatment. Ideally, the timing of such release must be appropriate for preserving public safety and promoting desistance, including continued supervision and guidance. Alexander Maconochie, a warden of Norfolk Island Prison in the 1840s, has generally been regarded as the father of parole. Though his place in history as the founder of parole has been debated (White, 1976), it was his mark or ticket system that laid the groundwork for early release and parole supervision in the future. Specifically, the ticket system allowed inmates to gain credits for work and good behavior that could be exchanged for an earlier release. This token economy provided both motivation for inmates and a means to methodically reduce crowding.

Parole in the U.S. can be traced back to the Elmira Reformatory, which opened in New York in 1876, where volunteers provided supervision for early prison releases (Giardini, 1957). By 1910, over 30 states had adopted adult parole laws and over 16 states had adopted indeterminate sentences. By 1916, all states had passed good-time laws as well. Despite such

³ Parole is a French term for “word,” or *promise* to refrain from further criminality.

progress, very few states had actual parole supervision officers. At the time states such as Illinois and Idaho, for example, placed the duty of parole supervision on sheriffs while others often utilized law enforcement officers in lieu of hiring parole officers. Further, the authority of state parole boards across the country varied considerably with some possessing decidedly more autonomy than others in terms of early release decisions. In the mid-1900s, parole agencies began to develop more professionally by improving the number of supervision officers, improved funding, and the requirement of higher standards for personnel. However, in the 1980s, the public and political perception of parole became more critical and negative, and some states such as Washington, and the federal government, abolished parole completely from its services.

Role conflict has been a pervasive problem for the field of community supervision (i.e., pretrial, probation, parole). The role of probation and parole has been in a state of constant flux as law enforcement and rehabilitative philosophies clash (i.e., cognitive dissonance) with one taking precedent in one jurisdiction but not the other (Clear & Latessa, 1993; Lewis, 2011). Further, the number of defendants, probationers, and parolees under supervision, along with continual mission creep (i.e., increase scope of responsibilities), has continued to increase amid stagnant resources and funding (Petersilia, 1997).

In the 1970s, community supervision and rehabilitation programs were heavily criticized, their impact on recidivism questioned by Martinson's (1974) now infamous article and later used by the media as well as political pundits to proclaim *nothing works*. Though Martinson's criticisms were later reexamined by a variety of authors and contested (Farabee, 2000; Lipsey & Cullen, 2007), politically and publically much of the damage had been done and for the next three-to-four decades conservative ideologies of lengthy imprisonment (i.e., punishment) were largely hailed as the primary means of addressing criminal populations.

Today, about seven million adults and about one million juveniles are under some form of correctional supervision (Glaze & Herberman, 2013; Livsey, 2012), dubiously leading all industrialized nations in incarceration and correctional control (Garland, 1990; 2001; Pettit, 2012; Tonry, 1999, 2009). Community supervision comprises the bulk of the correctional population. Specifically, about four million adults are under probation supervision, with another 850,000 on parole supervision (Glaze & Herberman, 2013). About 500,000 juveniles are on probation. Of the roughly eight million individuals under correctional supervision, about 5.5 million are being supervised in the community, which is nearly 70% of the correctional population. Yet the disparity between resources for community corrections agencies and institutions is appalling (Pew, 2009).

Some authors have recommended, though an over-simplification of governmental budgetary processes, the reallocation of financial resources from prison to law enforcement and community corrections agencies (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011). For many states, especially during the financial crisis of the late 2000s, institutional corrections became a substantial budgetary burden, sometimes exceeding the cost of Medicare, and in some cases, such as California, they have been forced to make reductions to their populations (Pew, 2008). While institutions attempt to release inmates with alternatives such as probation or parole to cut costs, recidivism continues to be a prominent problem for probation and parole agencies which are already stretched thin and now must contend with increased caseloads as a result of budgetary issues from penal institutions (Justice Center, 2012; Pew, 2011; Wright & Rosky, 2011). This is also referred to as *Criminal Justice Thermodynamics*, a phrase coined by Wright and Rosky (2011) to describe the shifting of problems from one justice organization down the line to the next, in this case institutional corrections to probation and parole agencies.

Finally, probation and parole agencies rely heavily on the risk-needs-responsivity (RNR) principles, found to be effective in guiding probation and parole practice and reducing recidivism (Andrews, Bonta, & Hoge, 1990; Latessa, 2004; Latessa & Allen, 2003; Looman, Dickie, & Abracen, 2005; Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Holsinger, 2006; Taxman & Thanner, 2006; Taxman, Soule, & Gelb, 1999). Risk refers to the probability an offender will commit an additional offense while under supervision. The greater the risk, the more intensive the supervision and treatment required (Taxman & Thanner, 2006). Needs concern specific problems or issues (such as antisocial attitudes) known to contribute to an individual's criminal behavior. Needs can be characterized as dynamic (alterable) or static (e.g., age, race, gender). Dynamic needs can be targeted for intervention through available social service programs (e.g., anger management, family counseling). Finally, responsivity concerns the notion that services will be most effective when matched to the unique learning styles of the individual. Agencies rely on a variety of actuarial risk assessment instruments, often validated by an external entity, to determine risk and needs classification (e.g., COMPAS, LSI-R, ORAS, SAQ) (Desmarais & Singh, 2013).⁴ Research has shown that accurate classification of individual risk and needs is important (Looman et al., 2005). Misclassification of low-risk individuals or grouping such individuals with high-risk offenders can lead to adverse effects. In other words, increasing supervision of low-risk offenders or grouping them with high-risk offenders in treatment programs can increase their likelihood of recidivism rather than decrease it (i.e., dosage).

It has been reiterated multiple times that the impetus for probation and parole agencies to partner with law enforcement is often in response to a lack of resources and an inability to provide the level of supervision appropriate for high risk, perhaps gang affiliated,

⁴ For a complete list of risk assessment instruments please see Table 3 of Desmarais & Singh's report (2013, p. 14).

probationers/parolees (Jones & Sigler, 2002; Matz, 2013; Worrall & Gaines, 2006). That said, some have noted anecdotally the enhanced legitimacy supervising officers perceive from probationers/parolees when they are accompanied by law enforcement officers (Corbett, 1998; Minor & Matz, 2012). No longer confined to the supervision of an officer behind a desk, the justice system is now perceived to be mobilized and capable of observing technical violations in the community through the eyes of the police, greatly reducing the offender's perceived anonymity. Further, one must also consider the implications of added surveillance as it relates to the probationer/parolee's risk/need classification. Namely, enhancing supervision with law enforcement officers should be reserved for those at greatest risk of recidivism. In practice, however, the target population for a given partnership may vary by geographic region. In some cases, such as Boston's Operation Night Light, they may focus solely on active youthful gang members (Corbett, 1998; Minor & Matz, 2012); but in others, such as juvenile curfew check programs, they may include surveillance of status offenders (Jones & Sigler, 2002).

Pulling Levers

The *pulling levers* ideology takes a simple premise, multiagency collaboration, and puts it into action through, most notably, the Boston Gun Project's Operation CeaseFire (Braga & Pierce, 2005; Braga, Pierce, McDevitt, Bond, & Cronin, 2008; Kennedy et al., 1996). With *pulling levers* Kennedy (1997) argued the criminal justice system knows who the most violent and high-risk offenders are in the community. What is lacking, he poignantly reiterates, is proper coordination and collaboration between the various justice agencies and social service providers to work together in the supervision, intervention, and removal of these violence-prone youth and young adults (see also Braga, 2008; McGarrell et al., 2006). Essentially, to *pull* all available resources to address the pressing gang problem that had plagued Boston during the 1990s. He

(Kennedy) criticized the lack of communication between community supervision agencies and law enforcement as well as the lack of integration with key community- and faith-based organizations. Perhaps accidentally, Kennedy (1997) applied Moffit's (2006) life-course persistent and adolescent-limited concepts to criminal justice practice by focusing justice and community efforts on a small proportion of youth (ages 14-24), often gang-affiliated, found to be responsible for a majority of inner city violence, homicide specifically. Many of the offenders, as well as the victims, were under community supervision at the time of the crime and possessed extensive criminal histories, a sign that justice agencies were not communicating effectively.

The response to this lapse in coordination was to bring representatives of each justice agency (i.e., police, probation, parole, prosecution, courts) together along with social service, community- and faith-based representatives. Together, they would meet with soon-to-be released, or present in the community, high-risk probationers and explain that continued violence would not be tolerated. In addition to a stark message of deterrence, suspected gang-affiliated probationers would be offered a variety of services in the community to address housing, employment, substance abuse, and education needs. Modern programs that have adopted the pulling levers/CeaseFire model use what is known as *offender notification meetings* to collectively send a message to probationers/parolees. Examples of related programs include the Boston Reentry Initiative (BRI) (Braga et al., 2009), Chicago's Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) (Papachristos et al., 2007), and Pittsburgh's One Vision One Life (Wilson & Chermak, 2011). Though programs such as CeaseFire, Compstat, and Exile's effectiveness were questioned recently, CeaseFire continues to be recognized as a promising intervention (Rosenfeld, Fornango, & Baumer, 2005). It should be noted, while BRI and PSN have demonstrated some

success in reducing firearm-related homicides, Pittsburgh's program had no impact on homicide and experienced an increase in other forms of criminality (e.g., burglary).

Finally, considered the first formal police-probation partnership, Boston's Operation Night Light evolved as a component of the larger CeaseFire initiative (Corbett, 1998). As such, the influence of the pulling levers ideology espoused by Kennedy and supported by others has continued to impact federally funded anti-gang and –gun initiatives, including the support of police-probation/parole partnerships, such as PSN through the perceived successes of CeaseFire. Further, it supports the collaborative themes championed in many anti-gang models such as the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's (OJJDP) Comprehensive Gang Model (OJJDP, 2009), the Bureau of Justice Assistance's (BJA) SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment) model (BJA, 1997a), and the American Probation and Parole Association's (APPA) C.A.R.E. (Collaboration, Analysis, Reentry, Evaluation) model (DeMichele & Matz, 2012). More detailed descriptions of these many programs will be provided in the following sections of this chapter.

Police-Probation/Parole Partnership Typologies and Programs

While the previous sections of this chapter aimed to provide a philosophical and historical basis for the development of formalized police-probation/parole partnerships, the following sections provide an overview of the many programs that have developed over the past two decades, many modeled after Boston's Operation Night Light. While every attempt has been made to exact an exhaustive search, many programs across the country may not be well documented or retrievable in any systematic way. In some cases, agencies may conduct internal reports that are never published in an academic outlet such as a peer-reviewed journal, periodical, or other government report. Further, many partnerships may exist as informal

relationships between individual police and supervision officers (Kim, Gerber, & Beto, 2007a; 2007b; Kim et al., 2013a, 2013b). Nonetheless, the following descriptions inform the inquiries posed within this dissertation and provide insight into the many promises and problems associated with the partnering of police and community supervision agencies. The discussion will cover examples of enhanced supervision, information sharing, fugitive apprehension, specialized enforcement, and interagency problem solving partnerships as defined by Parent and Snyder (1999), followed by an overview of specific benefits and problems.

Note, these five “typologies” (enhanced supervision, information sharing, fugitive apprehension, specialized enforcement, and interagency problem solving) were the result of research produced on behalf of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) by Parent and Snyder (1999). Formalized partnerships grew in number exponentially across the country in the mid-to-late 1990s, and upon documenting the existence of several, the authors found five common categorizations in terms of their goals and functions. Such groupings made it easier to discuss the various nuances of partnerships that shared similar goals; regardless of the region of the country they were present in. These groupings would be used in subsequent research concerning partnerships (Kim et al., 2010), and to inform the research conducted for this dissertation.

According to research conducted on police perceptions of partnerships with probation, information sharing partnerships were found to be the most common followed by specialized enforcement, interagency problem-solving, enhanced supervision, and fugitive apprehension (Kim et al., 2010). Law enforcement perceptions of partnerships with parole agencies were very similar (Kim et al., 2013a). Interestingly, in both cases, most partnerships were found to be overwhelmingly informal (i.e., formed through individual relationships between personnel), with very few formalized (i.e., possessing operational agreements, memorandums of understanding

[MOU]). Finally, it should be stressed that many partnerships comprise functions or goals that encompass multiple typologies. For example, an enhanced supervision partnership is often accompanied by an information sharing component. As such, these typologies are not mutually exclusive. The following subsections examine each individual typology while also providing real-world examples of their use.

Enhanced Supervision

Enhanced supervision partnerships are the most involved of all partnership types including direct, sustained, and repeated contact between the police, probation/parole officers, and probationers/parolees (Anonymous, 1999; Corbett, 1998; Corbett, Fitzgerald, & Jordan, 1998; Parent & Snyder, 1999). Unlike other partnership typologies, enhanced supervision fosters a more intimate and direct relationship between officers and the former offender. As such, one can theoretically presume the potential for lasting impact should be exponentially greater and results more forthcoming in terms of offender reintegration, reentry, and desistance. Enhanced supervision is characterized by joint patrols involving police and probation/parole officers in which plain-clothed officers conduct home visits of select probationers/parolees and patrol high risk neighborhoods at peak hours for criminal activity, typically non-traditional hours in the evening (Corbett, 1998). The goals of enhanced supervision include deterring former offenders from future criminality and noncompliance with their conditions of supervision as well as providing more support and opportunities for accessing needed community services. Simply stated, desistance from further criminality is the goal (Huebner, Varano, & Bynum, 2007), with deterrence and rehabilitation the means (see Cullen & Agnew, 2006; Kubrin, Stucky, & Krohn, 2009; Williams & McShance, 2004).

There are many examples of enhanced supervision partnerships across the U.S. including Boston's Operation Night Light in Massachusetts; Minneapolis Anti-Violence initiative in Minnesota; Clark County Anti-Gang Unit in Vancouver, Washington; Project One Voice in New Haven, Connecticut; Nightlight in San Bernardino, California; Juvenile Intensive Supervision Team (JIST) in Kentucky; Youth Violence Reduction Partnership (YVRP) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency's (CSOSA) Accountability Tours in Washington, D.C.; Wisconsin's Proactive Gang Resistance Enforcement, Suppression, and Supervision (PROGRESS) project; Anchorage's Coordinated Agency Network (CAN) in Alaska; and Texas' Project Spotlight (Anonymous, 2002; Benekos & Merlo, 2006; Giblin, 2002; Jones & Sigler, 2002; Jordan, 1998; Jucovy & McClanahan, 2008; Kim et al., 2010; Lowe, Dawon-Edwards, Minor, & Wells, 2008; McClanahan, 2004). Some, such as Texas' Project Spotlight, have since lost centralized funding but may continue independently at the local level (Kim et al., 2013b). The following briefly introduces each respective program, the basis for its formation, and how it operates.

Boston's Operation Night Light. At the start of the 1990s, Boston was plagued by an ever growing street-level gang problem (Concannon, 1996; Corbett, 1998; Minor & Matz, 2012). A component of the larger Boston Gun Project and considered the first formal police-probation partnership, Operation Night Light was an enhanced supervision program that involved joint patrols and home visits by police and probation officers of high risk gang-affiliated youth and young adults, typically between the ages of 17-25 (Anonymous, 1999; Concannon, 1996; Corbett, 1998; 2006; Corbett et al., 1998; Evans, 1997a; Jordan, 1998; Kennedy et al., 1996; Minor & Matz, 2012).

The partnership between police and probation officers developed from a chance encounter at the court between the District Court probation officers and Boston Police Department Anti-Gang Violence Unit (Corbett, 1998; Minor & Matz, 2012; Jordan, 1998). The officers were working with the same individuals and their conversations would later lead to a variety of brainstorming sessions to further promote dialogue and interagency collaboration. Officially recognized as a program beginning November 12, 1992, the first formal joint patrol was conducted by two probation officers, Bill Stewart and Rich Skinner, and two police officers, Bobber Merner and Bobby Frataglia using a police cruiser.

In Boston's Night Light program probation officers would target 10-to-15 of their most high-risk gang-affiliated youth (Corbett, 1998; Minor & Matz, 2012; Jordan, 1998). Together probation and police officers, plain-clothed and using unmarked cruisers, would visit each probationer at his home, school, or workplace while also driving through hotspot locations known for loitering and criminal activity. In addition to checking compliance (i.e., illegal substances, firearms), officers also were known to discuss the availability of community services as they relate to the individual's needs (i.e., treatment options).

Officers also conducted visits between 7:00pm and midnight when youth were more active and at greatest risk. This represented a shift in probation officers' standard business practice of working 8-5. In addition, police officers became more aware of the probationers in the neighborhood and could provide added surveillance in the community. Finally, police intelligence on gangs and gang members was used by probation officers to justify specific conditions of supervision to the judge (e.g., curfew, geographic restrictions).

San Bernardino's Nightlight. Modeled after Boston's police-probation partnership, San Bernardino's enhanced supervision program was known as "Nightlight" (Worrall & Gaines,

2006). Unlike Boston, however, the San Bernardino program focused exclusively on juveniles. It officially began operation in January 2001, nearly a decade after the Boston program, with funding assistance from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). However, in July 2003, the program was unable to sustain or locate new funding sources and largely ceased operations with less than a handful of staff remaining thereafter.

Nightlight targeted medium- and high-risk juvenile probationers and operated under the assumption that these individuals could be more effectively deterred with enhanced supervision (Matz, 2013; Worrall & Gaines, 2006). Further, probation officer caseloads were deemed excessive and adequate supervision was perceived to be lacking. The program involved the partnering of juvenile probation and police officers in five teams consisting of one police officer and one probation officer. The pairings would conduct joint home visits to each new probationer which involved an explanation of the conditions of their supervision, and a search of his/her residence for illegal substances or weapons. Follow-up home visits, curfew checks, school visits, and further monitoring were also conducted. Note, officers were not confined to a specific caseload and could check on the status of any relevant juvenile probationer, not just the ones under supervision by a specific probation officer. As was the case in Boston, police officers continued to operate as additional eyes for probation during the course of their regular patrols as well. If police officers witnessed probationers violating curfew or other restrictions (e.g., do not associate with negative peers) they would notify the juvenile probation officer.

Project One Voice (New Haven, CT). Starting in 1997, the New Haven Police Department partnered with adult and juvenile pretrial, probation, and parole agencies to provide intensive supervision of high-risk gang-affiliated defendants/probationers/parolees (Anonymous, 1999). Two probation officers were given offices at police stations in two distinct

neighborhoods. Officers worked in teams to conduct joint neighborhood patrols and unannounced home visits about twice a week. The officers, comprised of one police officer and one supervision officer, would patrol neighborhoods and stop probationers on the street that they believed may be violating the conditions of their supervision. Teams also conducted unannounced home visits to check curfew compliance.

In addition, police officers carried notebooks of information on defendants/probationers/parolees while on individual patrol (Anonymous, 1999). These notebooks included four distinct sections for state probationers, state parolees, defendants under pretrial supervision, and juvenile probationers. Profile sheets on each defendant/probationer/parolee included a photograph on the individual, name, aliases, criminal history, supervisory conditions, and a list of individuals they are prohibited from associating with (e.g., gang members, antisocial peers, victims).

The goal of the program was to improve the likelihood of individuals completing their supervision. However, it was believed that to improve success rates more, not less, supervision was necessary. While increasing surveillance may increase the likelihood of revocation, the program aimed to use graduated sanctions that would not result in immediate discipline. For example, if police officers witnessed an individual violating curfew, they would stop the individual and hand him/her a card that warns him/her of the offending behavior. The officer would also instruct the individual to report to his/her supervising officer the next day. In addition to handing the warning card to the offender, the police office will also contact the supervising officer and brief him/her on the incident. The supervision officer would then decide on the appropriate course of action.

Minneapolis Anti-Violence Initiative (MAVI). Initiated in mid-1997, in response to persistent youth gang violence of the mid-1990s, the Minneapolis Anti-Violence Initiative (MAVI) consisted of a partnership between the Minneapolis Police Department's Gang Strike Force and the Hennepin County Department of Community Corrections involving intensive supervision, joint home visits, and joint neighborhood patrols targeting violent gang-affiliated adult and juvenile probationers (Anonymous, 1999). The initiative was built largely on the *pulling levers* ideology and Boston Ceasefire/Night Light initiatives (Kennedy & Braga, 1998). Officers conducted joint home visits two nights per week. The individuals subjected to the search were selected based on the recommendation of the assigned probation officer for that particular night. When conducting the visit, the probation officer makes a request of the probationer to allow the officers to enter. Assuming the probationer complies, the officers review the conditions of the individual's release with the individual and the family. For juvenile probationers, the parents are more involved in this process. In some cases, the probation officer may request to search the individual's room or check the individual for illegal substances or weapons. In addition, officers may provide recommendations to the probationer and the family concerning employment assistance, health services, and other community-based services. Finally, joint patrols of high-crime areas of the city and surrounding jurisdictions were also conducted.

Initially, the partnership included 12 police officers and 14 probation officers and involved evening home visits that were outside of the probation officers 8-5 workweek (Anonymous, 1999). As such, officers involved in the partnership accrued overtime pay for the extra hours. To spread the workload, each probation officer would rotate so that he/she would conduct an evening home visit about once every two weeks.

Smart Partners (Bellevue & Redmond, WA). Beginning in 1994, Smart Partners was initially a partnership between the Redmond Police Department and the Washington Department of Corrections Regional Community Corrections office in Bellevue, but had expanded to more than 50 jurisdictions across the state by 1998 (Anonymous, 1999). In this partnership, police officers were trained as volunteer probation officers who could conduct curfew checks and home visits for a small high-risk caseload. The partnership also included the continual sharing of probationer supervision information. The collaboration aimed to increase surveillance of high risk probationers and to improve information sharing.

The SMART Partners partnership shares more in common with the curfew check program of Florida (Jones & Sigler, 2002) than the Night Light program of Boston (Corbett, 1998). In this partnership, police officers conduct random curfew checks of high-risk probationers released from the Department of Corrections (DOC) (Anonymous, 1999). Referred to as *community custody*, this enhanced supervision program grants police officers the ability to act as pseudo volunteer probation officers. Each assigned police officer is given a small caseload with details on the probationer's criminal history, residence, family situation, and court-ordered conditions of supervision. Home visits are conducted about once or twice a week to check for curfew compliance. Note the police officer must request permission and obtain consent from the probationer to enter the residence. However, refusal is considered a violation of the conditions of the offender's release and can be punished with a warning up to having one's community supervision revoked. If a refusal occurs, the police officer notifies the official DOC-assigned community corrections officer. The corrections officer must determine the appropriate course of action. Assuming the probationer consents, the police officer is free to observe the residence and make a determination of any violations of one's conditions of supervision. While evidence of a

crime (firearm possession, drug possession) can lead to an arrest, other violations must be reported to the community corrections officer.

In addition to enhanced supervision, Smart Partners also includes a separate information sharing component (Anonymous, 1999). If police officers stop and question an individual under DOC supervision, the corresponding supervision officer is notified. This occurs through the police department's crime analyst who runs a check through the Washington State Crime Information System (WASCIS) for each patrol officer's field interview reports (FIR) to determine if the individual in question is under supervision. If so, the supervision officer is contacted.

While individuals may have been released, the FIR may expose violations of the individual's conditions of supervision. Of the 480 FIRs issued in 1997, 23% (110) involved individuals under supervision and 80 of these individuals would later have their supervision revoked and be returned to prison. Finally, arrestees are also crosschecked with WASCIS by jail staff. If it is found an individual is under supervision, the supervising officer will be notified. Depending on the seriousness of the charge, the DOC can take measures to ensure the individual is not released on bail.

Neighborhood Based Supervision (NBS) (Spokane, WA). During the 1980s and 1990s the Washington State Department of Corrections faced many failures in preserving public safety. Most notably, the DOC was unable to adequately supervise adult probationers released to the community and public trust had been greatly diminished.⁵ To reinvigorate public perceptions, the DOC sought new means and practices of conducting community supervision. Borrowing from

⁵ Note, adult parole in the state of Washington was abolished after June 30, 1984 pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act. Today, only those adults convicted of a felony prior to that date, and some sex offenders convicted after 2001 under *determinate plus* sentences, are eligible for parole release (American Correctional Association [ACA], 2012).

the perceived success of community policing and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office with the Spokane Police Department (SPD), the agency began developing a program in 1993 known as Neighborhood Based Supervision (NBS) (Murphy, 2003, 2005). Like COPS, NBS would involve probation officers working closely with the community.

To do this, the DOC needed to place officers in offices that were geographically closer to the clients they were supervising while also encouraging greater collaboration with local community and social service organizations, citizens, and other justice agencies. This included developing caseload assignments that were geographically sensitive, and clustered, as opposed to random and widespread. With the COPS-Shops being developed under community policing, it was a natural fit for the NBS community corrections officers to be placed in these community offices. Of the 10 COPS-Shops across the city during the early 2000s, six had a pair of NBS supervision officers. This placement fostered collaboration between NBS officers and the Neighborhood Resource Officers (NRO) of SPD.

These COPS-Shops, as they were known, were not fully funded or maintained by the SPD. Rather, COPS shops were community driven endeavors. Predicated on the community outrage from the murder of two young girls in 1991, COPS-Shops started as a quest from local business owners and activists to encourage greater police presence and collaboration in a specific West Central neighborhood of Spokane (Murphy, 2003, 2005). As such, the offices were built around two goals; 1) serve as a substation for SPD officers, and 2) serve as a community center for citizens and volunteers concerned about crime. Though the SPD did not own the facilities, it would partially fund the rent and provide some limited administrative support. Many neighborhoods conducted fundraisers to earn the revenue to maintain their facilities. Each of the COPS-Shops developed under unique agreements and expectations. Many of the COPS-Shops

also depended on community volunteers for their day-to-day operations, from a low of 19 in one location to a high of 75 in another. Volunteers assisted with calls, referrals, filing complaints, and other coordinating tasks for non-emergency situations. NROs are sworn police officers from SPD who are assigned to COPS-Shops in their respective neighborhoods.

Designed to serve as liaisons between the larger SPD and the community, NROs and the COPS-Shops were a natural home for the NBS program (Murphy, 2003, 2005). NBS officers (NBSO) would come into contact with NROs and patrol officers, naturally forming a closer working relationship. While the NBS program involves a broader collaborative effort to work with community organizations in addition to law enforcement (see *Interagency Problem Solving*), Murphy's (2003, 2005) work focused on the partnership between adult probation and law enforcement specifically. There was, however, no direct guidance provided to the officers on what exactly to do at the COPS-Shops. Generally speaking, it was recognized that NROs and patrol officers could assist in the monitoring of adult probationers by reporting witnessed activity to the supervising officer.

Murphy (2003, 2005) insightfully noted the tendency of NROs and NBSOs to view each other as a tool that could be used to further one's own goals. Indeed, while the goals and mission of community policing and neighborhood based supervision were to increase collaboration and reform practices, it was observed that officers mostly continued to operate under traditional means (see also Drapela & Lutze, 2009), albeit while supplementing these standard roles with benefits that could be gained from others at the COPS-Shops. In addition to joint operations, officers also engaged in a great deal of information sharing. In fact, joint operations were not characterized as a standard practice. According to Murphy, NBSOs only occasionally took NROs or other law enforcement officers with them on routine field visits with probationers. Law

enforcement involvement in the field was often limited to instances in which an arrest or search was expected, roughly a couple times in a given month. As Murphy explains, such practices of using law enforcement as back-up are far from innovative, and have no substantive bearing on the goals of the partnership to change traditional practices.

Nonetheless, NROs viewed assisting with searches and arrests as beneficial to their crime control efforts. Namely, NBSOs were helping them keep trouble-individuals off the streets and preventing further crime. For law enforcement, NBSOs have information and access to individuals that police may perceive as a problem in the community but were otherwise helpless to confront until a crime had been committed. NBSOs were seen as instrumental to making more arrests and keeping these problem-individuals off the street.

Some community corrections officers assigned to NBS commended the program for allowing them to actually get to know a specific neighborhood, the people, the streets, and their nuances (Murphy, 2003, 2005). In particular, both NBSOs and NROs were able to get to know each other and their respective roles more intimately. Though the program mostly served to enhance traditional practices, it did increase the amount of information shared and the frequency of partnership in the field in terms of arrests and joint searches of probationers and residences.

St. Louis' Nightwatch. Predicated on the issues of high juvenile crime, often gang/gun-related, in the 1990s and funded through the federal Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG), which supported interagency partnerships, with SafeFutures (a program already in existence at the time) serving as the foundation and support, Nightwatch was a juvenile curfew check program pioneered by the St. Louis City Family Court Juvenile Division (Urban, 2005). To meet the programmatic prerequisites for JAIBG funding, in 1998 a Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalition (JCEC) was formed which included a variety of stakeholders; St. Louis

City Family Court, St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), Office of Neighborhood Stabilization (ONS), Department of Human Services; St. Louis Public School, faith-based, community-based, social service, child advocacy agencies, and University of Missouri - St. Louis (UMSL). Nightwatch was one of seven different programs implemented by the JCEC in 1999.

In Nightwatch, MPD and court-appointed probation officers would randomly select juvenile probationers based on risk score to conduct joint home visits to check curfew compliance, per the court ordered conditions of their probation (Urban, 2005). The program was not, however, exclusive to high risk juveniles, rather it could include unofficial or truancy referrals but with limitations placed on sanctions for noncompliance (i.e., truants were not court-ordered and therefore could not be sent to detention). However, for those under a court-order to participate, graduated sanctions were utilized and a court order was used by the supervising officer to have noncompliant youth returned to detention. It should be noted JAIBG funding required every instance of non-compliance be met with a sanction. This was a departure from past practice in which many violations went undetected or unpunished. Further, graduated sanctions were a new concept and there were few options available to the supervising officer that would align with their rehabilitative goals as opposed to being purely punitive.

Typically, the first violation was met with a warning (i.e., a phone call from the supervising office); the second resulted in an additional office visit, and the third violation would lead to detention. In addition to being more punitive, these processes were also more taxing on the officers' workloads, a commonly voiced frustration. As the program evolved, more varied sanctions were introduced. Rewards were also utilized to promote positive behavior and

compliance. Specifically, juveniles who were subject to five or more home visits with perfect compliance were rewarded with various small rewards such as a fast-food gift certificate.

The goals of the program, in addition to curfew compliance, were to reduce violence and victimization, and to increase school attendance and performance. However, the program generally lacked centralized leadership, management, and monitoring and was mostly left in the hands of individual unit supervisors (Urban, 2005). Support was provided by the Special Services Department (SSD) and oversight increased during an organizational restructure in 2004. Nonetheless, consistency in program implementation and practices likely varied by unit. Program procedures dictated three groups of police and probation officers visit up to 20 homes per night, excluding Friday and Saturday nights. Note the probation officer conducting the home visit may not be the juvenile's assigned probation officer due to the randomized nature of the program. While the probation officer conducting the visit may vary, the responsibility for following up with the probationer on any issues of noncompliance returned to their originally assigned supervising officer. Though curfew compliance was of primary concern, the home visits also inquired as to problem behaviors experienced or observed by the parents. Due to the program's nontraditional work times (i.e., late evenings), officers were provided overtime pay through JAIBG.

A *double-back* visit procedure was implemented later in the program's life cycle (Urban, 2005). These return visits were based on information obtained from the assigned probation officer, parent, or other individuals in which it was suspected the juvenile may leave home after the home visit (i.e., after curfew). Funding reductions in 2004 forced the curfew checks program to be reduced to four instead of five nights a week, and rewards for compliance were extended to eight successful home visits instead of five.

Neighborhood Probation (Maricopa County/Phoenix, AZ). Three neighborhood probation partnerships under the Maricopa County Adult Probation Department were organized around maintaining a strong relationship with local law enforcement (Anonymous, 1999; Crawford & Talucci, 2000). The first partnership, with the Phoenix Police Department in the Coronado District, was established in 1996. The goals of the partnership were two-fold; 1) reduce recidivism, and 2) engage probation in community-based problem-solving.

In these partnerships police officers' assisted in connecting probationers to community events and services (Crawford & Talucci, 2000). Unlike normal caseload assignments in which probationers are assigned an officer by risk/need classification, this program matched probation officers with probationers within a designated geographic jurisdiction (or community). By assigning supervision officers to probationers within a designated geographic region, it was reasoned that the officers could establish closer ties with the community, including churches and community-based organizations. Probation officers regularly attended, for example, community board meetings. Further, probation officers would occasionally run errands for the elderly in the hope of attaining valuable insight and intelligence information on a given neighborhood. Finally, it was also believed that place-based probation would be superior because it would allow the supervision officers to spend more substantive time with their clients because of the closer physical proximity and reduced transportation needs.

Police officers served as back-up support for probation officers, which included conducting joint home visits and serving as additional eyes on the street (Crawford & Talucci, 2000). In addition, police and probation officers worked together to coordinate community service activities (e.g., cleaning up a lot, home) for probationers. In exchange, probation supported police investigations, when possible, through community contacts as well as the use of

probation officers' broader search discretion with supervisees. The doors of the probation offices were open to police and community residents for discussion of probation and probationers in the community.

Texas' Project Spotlight. Project Spotlight was formed in 1999 by the Criminal Justice Division of the Governor's Office, supported by the Texas Legislature (Anonymous, 2002). The program, like Night Light, promoted the creation of formalized partnerships between law enforcement, juvenile probation, and adult probation agencies (Beto, 2005, 2007; Beto & Kester, 2001; Beto, Corbett, & DiIulio, 2000; Gerber, Kim, & Beto, 2006). Funded by the Office of the Governor, seven Texas counties received annual grants from 2000 to 2003 (Bexar, Dallas, El Paso, Harris, Nueces, Tarrant, and Travis). In each county, three teams comprised of three individuals were formed to provide intensive supervision (e.g., joint home visits, joint patrol, information sharing, electronic monitoring, curfew checks, drug testing) to juvenile and adult probationers in high-crime jurisdictions. The teams consisted of one juvenile probation officer, one adult probation officer, and one police officer. Joint patrols and visits (e.g., home, school, work) were conducted in the evening and often integrated. In the course of conducting up to 15 home visits in a given night, officers also patrolled areas in which probationers and delinquent youth were likely to congregate (e.g., parks).

Though focus was on the partnership between policing and community supervision, community involvement (e.g., community organization, churches) was encouraged to assist in addressing probationer and family problems (Anonymous, 2002). Needs varied based on the individual probationer, but common services included counseling (individual, group, family), substance abuse treatment, mental health treatment, transportation assistance, education, and employment.

Consistent with Night Light, Project Spotlight consisted of random contacts at non-traditional hours (i.e., evenings) to ensure compliance with the probationers' conditions of supervision (e.g., curfew) (Anonymous, 2002). Once placed on probation in the Spotlight supervision program by the court, the high-risk individual was provided with an orientation outlining the Project Spotlight program and subjected to a thorough home visit within 24 hours of release. The program was intensive, with up to five contacts per week during the first 30 days of supervision. The number of contacts thereafter was reduced contingent on continued risk assessment.

To maintain this level of supervision Spotlight supervision officers were given caseloads of no more than 15 at a given time. The program itself had a maximum capacity of 75-90 probationers during a given six-month period. A Center for Project Spotlight was also developed which provided specialized training, reports (Anonymous, 2002; Beto & Kester, 2001; Jermstad, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Kalmbach, 2003; Myers, 2001; Paulsen & del Carmen, 2001), newsletters, and technical assistance.

Operation Night Light (Pennsylvania). An Operation Night Light (ONL) program was developed in an undisclosed Pennsylvania County as described by Alarid and colleagues (2011). The program, clearly influenced by the work in Boston, involved an interagency collaboration between probation, police, and community-based organizations. Youth were selected for participation in the program by the juvenile court judge based on neighborhood (i.e., economic distress) and individual factors (e.g., criminal history, family violence, gang activity). Police and probation focused specifically on curfew compliance, community service, and random drug testing. Once assigned to ONL, youth would be subjected to random home visits by a pair of officers (one police and one probation officer). During the visits the probation officer would

reiterate the importance of maintaining compliance with the conditions of supervision, in addition to ensuring curfew compliance and engaging the parents or guardians in the supervision process. The selection of which probationers to visit on a given night was determined by the probation officers. In some cases, fellow probation officers could put in a request for a colleague to conduct a visit on an individual on his/her caseload and conduct a random drug test. Police officers involved in the joint visits were excused from responding to dispatch calls for service while engaged with probation in ONL. That said, they could be called for backup in cases of an emergency.

In this particular county, the juvenile probation officers (JPO) were unarmed and lacked the authority to arrest (Alarid et al., 2011). As such, the presence of the police and the sharing of information (e.g., on warrants for absconders) were vital to their effectiveness in holding probationers accountable for noncompliance. Finally, the partnership also included direct involvement of community- and faith-based organizations that provided crisis intervention, retreats, and mentors for the justice-involved youth.

One of the greatest benefits of ONL was the ongoing information sharing with police (Alarid et al., 2011). Whereas previously police were not privy to the probation status of juveniles, they were now well informed. As reported by JPOs, the police were able to expose hotspots around the neighborhood where youth congregated. In essence, the supervision of juvenile probationers was enhanced as a result of ONL. It should be stressed that the partnership did not achieve optimal implementation from the start, but rather required time and repetition to develop trust between the agencies and the individual officers. However, as trust permeated the partnership information sharing increased and both sides developed an appreciation for their respective roles in the justice system. Namely, police were described as more “well-rounded”

and the relations between law enforcement and probationers, as well as probationers' families, reportedly had improved.

Youth Violence Reduction Partnership (YVRP). An example of one, of likely many, programs largely neglected by the literature on partnerships would be the Youth Violence Reduction Partnership (YVRP) conducted in Philadelphia (Jucovy & McClanahan, 2008; McClanahan, 2004). This is likely due to the name under which it is referred as well as to the larger interagency scope it purports. While, Boston's Night Light existed as a component of the larger Ceasefire initiative, the Philadelphia initiative included collaboration with the judiciary and it also possessed a strong police-probation/parole partnership component. Formed in 1999, and still in operation in 2013, YVRP targets violent high-risk youth (ages 14 to 24) in crime-ridden neighborhoods borrowing heavily from the model of what McClanahan (2004) calls the "Boston Miracle" (p. 2). Officials even made site-visits to Boston in hopes of replicating the program. The program received support from the William Penn Foundation and Public/Private Ventures (P/PV) that assisted in organizing the opportunity for leadership in policing, community-based organizations, the judiciary, probation, and parole to meet.

Realizing that adult and juvenile probation officers historically must contend with excessively large caseloads (up to 250 per adult probation officer), it was realized early in the program that probation would not be able to provide the increased level of supervision needed for this specialized youth population without assistance from partner agencies (McClanahan, 2004). The program employed the assistance of street workers and police to provide the additional oversight and mentoring of youth in the community needed to help youth move toward desistance. In addition to reducing probation officer caseloads for those involved in YVRP, police and probation also began participating in joint patrols and probationer contacts

(i.e., enhanced supervision). While standard probationers may receive one-to-two contacts per month, YVRP probationers were expected to receive up to 25 contacts. In addition, street workers often made up of denounced gang members, provided mentoring and referrals for service to the targeted youth.

Other Programs. Many other enhanced partnerships exist including the Juvenile Intensive Supervision Team (JIST) in Kentucky (Lowe et al., 2008), and what are commonly known as Accountability Tours in Washington, D.C. Further, there are partnerships outside the borders of the U.S. and overseas including the Burnley-Dordrecht Initiative (BDI) in the Borough of Burnley in Lancashire (Evans, 2000). The listing of partnerships included may not be exhaustive but constitutes the breadth of the literature to date dedicated to enhanced supervision programs.

Information Sharing

Information-sharing partnerships are likely the most varied and may result for a variety of reasons. For example, police and corrections agencies may exchange information concerning individual gang affiliations, high-risk probationers/parolees, and hotspot locations for delinquency. Information sharing is often integrated with the other types of partnerships, but in this case, the focus is on partnerships in which the information sharing is the primary focus and officers from the respective agencies may not have any direct contact. Examples of partnerships specifically aimed at the exchange of information include the Boston Region Intelligence Center (BRIC) (Beto, 2007), the Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx) (Matz, 2012), the ICAOS' Offender Transfer Notification Service (OTNS) (Matz, Hageman, Brewer, & Chawla, 2014), and the Prison Gang Intelligence Unit and Sex Offender Notification programs in Washington state (Parent & Snyder, 1999).

BRIC was initiated in 2005, and it is comprised of sworn police officers and crime analysts that provide intelligence information to local law enforcement agencies (Beto, 2007). More than 70 fusion centers have been developed across the country since 9/11 (Matz et al., 2014). This particular fusion center includes representation of probation and parole at their daily crime briefings (Beto, 2007). Probation and parole share information on the latest releases of incarcerated offenders in addition to photographs and identifying information. Information provided at the daily briefings is later disseminated to the law enforcement community at large.

N-DEx, developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is a national data sharing system designed for federated search capabilities and information on specific offenders of interest or other sensitive but unclassified information (Matz, 2012). N-DEx is a free system designed to allow for greater cooperation and coordination in the sharing of information between federal, state, local, and tribal justice agencies. This system includes access and cooperation with probation and parole agencies, and it is not exclusive to law enforcement. Data elements contained within the system include arrest, missing persons, booking, holding, incarceration, pretrial investigation, presentence investigation, supervised release, and warrant information.

The Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS) represents an agreement between states to standardize and monitor the process of transferring supervisory duties of probationers/parolees from one state to another (Matz et al., 2014). The movement of probationers/parolees across state lines can occur for various personal or economic reasons. ICAOS ensures that their supervision is maintained from one state to the next. OTNS is an exchange that was supported by APPA, and funded by BJA, to share state transfer information with state fusion centers. State fusion centers that receive notification of potentially dangerous probationers/parolees transferring into their state would be able to notify local law enforcement

agencies of the impending relocation. The New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) served as the initial pilot site for the project and has received notifications on a weekly basis since September 2013. APPA intends to expand the exchange to additional fusion centers in the near future. The goals of the exchange were 1) to improve officer safety and 2) support greater collaboration between police and probation/parole agencies. Each notification includes the identifying information for the probationer/parolee (including a picture) and contact information for the supervising probation/parole officer.

Finally, the Prison Gang Intelligence Unit and Sex Offender Notification programs in Washington State concern notifying law enforcement and the community about the release of sex offenders as well as the sharing of intelligence information concerning gang affiliations and behavior (Parent & Snyder, 1999). The sex offender notification program can be traced back to the Community Protection Act of 1990, which was instituted by the Washington Legislature. Community notification meetings are held for the release of high-risk sex offenders. In addition, police are required to perform periodic checks of the sex offender's residency. Coincidentally, the proliferation of gangs on the street and imported to the institutions motivated the creation of a Gang Intelligence Unit in 1990. The partnership established between the Washington DOC and law enforcement was predicated on the need for intelligence information to identify and classify gang members. In addition, the release of a high-profile gang member is shared with law enforcement.

Fugitive Apprehension

The most specific and distinct partnership typology is the fugitive apprehension unit. These partnerships are formed between police and corrections entities for the sole purpose of apprehending absconders, probationers/parolees who have abandoned their supervision

responsibilities and fled from the purview of the justice system (Parent & Snyder, 1999). Note, regardless of the presence of a formalized partnership, law enforcement is always engaged in the apprehension of absconders because the court issues a warrant for their arrest. Effective partnership, however, can expedite the expediency and efficiency of this process. There are few specific programs discussed in the literature. Three examples include the Parolee-At-Large (PAL) project in Sacramento, the Fugitive Recovery Enforcement Team (FRET) in San Francisco, and the Fugitive Apprehension Program (FAP) in Minneapolis (Crawford & Talucci, 2000; Parent & Snyder, 1999).

PAL developed as a response to the inability and lack of resources available for the parole agency to recapture absconding parolees (Crawford & Talucci, 2000; Parent & Snyder, 1999). Further, while absconding parolees were considered inactive, funding of the agency was based on active caseloads. As such, a high number of absconding parolees cost the agency financially. In response, the California Parole and Community Services Law Enforcement Consortium was developed in 1996. The consortium received funding from the legislature and created PAL Apprehension Teams which increased collaboration between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to assist in the apprehension of parole absconders, especially high risk parolees. In its first year of operation, over 2,125 absconders were arrested and 300 illegally owned firearms were seized (Parent & Snyder, 1999). FRET was similar to PAL but focused on parolees in San Francisco. From 1993 to 1997, over 5,000 absconding parolees had been arrested (Parent & Snyder, 1999).

Finally, FAP involved the Hennepin County Department of Community Corrections, the Hennepin County Sheriff, and the Minneapolis and St. Paul Police Departments (Parent & Snyder, 1999). Together, they targeted the apprehension of absconding probationers and

parolees. Similar to PAL and FRET, the initiative prioritized the arrest of high-risk probationers/parolees. Unlike those programs, however, the probation/parole officer is sworn and authorized to perform the arrest. In fact, they direct the execution of the arrest once the subject has been located. The probation and parole officers are equipped with bullet-proof vests, police radios, and pepper spray. When resistance is expected, probation/parole officers conduct the arrest jointly with law enforcement. Otherwise, the probation/parole officer can attempt the arrest independently. Though the program has been in operation for more than 15 years and is considered standard operating procedure, it has not been formally evaluated.

Specialized Enforcement

Specialized enforcement partnerships represent units organized, much like a task force, to address a very specific problem. These typically center on a specific type of offender or group of offenders such as gang members, sex offenders, and/or domestic violence units based on the needs of a given community. These are also the least documented in the literature. Parent and Snyder (1999) provide one example: Operation Revitalization in Vallejo, California. Operation Revitalization was a grant-funded initiative from the California Office of Criminal Justice Planning. Thirteen organizations formed a large inter-agency collaboration that targeted specific violent street criminals. These organizations included law enforcement, probation, the district attorney's office, school district, and many community-based organizations. However, such a program can similarly fit within *interagency problem solving* partnerships. Further, many of the enhanced partnerships focus on gang members and could consequently be considered *specialized*.

Interagency Problem Solving

Interagency problem-solving partnerships represent large collaborations that not only include police and corrections entities but also public service providers, treatment centers, advocacy groups, and more. Examples of such large-scale initiatives include Boston's Gun Project (i.e., Ceasefire, Cure Violence), the Boston Reentry Initiative (BRI), and Chicago's Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) (Braga et al., 2001, 2009; Decker, McGarrell, Perez, & Hipple, 2007; McGarrell, Hipple, & Corsaro, 2007; McGarrell, et al., 2009; Papachristos et al., 2007). In some cases, an interagency problem-solving partnership may include many, if not all, of the other partnership categories. For example, Boston's Ceasefire included an enhanced supervision partnership known as Night Light (Howell & Young, 2013). Ceasefire has become a widely recognized program for its promising impact on reducing gun violence in Boston (Rosenfeld et al, 2005). As such it has been replicated, in whole or in part, in many other jurisdictions.

Ceasefire and *Ceasefire-esque* programs share several core components in common. Chicago's PSN, for example, provides notification forums, increased penalties for illegal gun possession, increased federal penalties, and aggressive gun seizure operations (Papachristos et al., 2007). Fueled by a large multiagency collaboration including law enforcement, the judiciary, corrections, community corrections, and several community organizations, the program targeted randomly selected high-risk gang-affiliated parolees. On a monthly basis, a set of 10-15 new parolees were selected and requested to attend a notification forum. There, parolees were reminded of their conditions of supervision by the many justice agencies involved. It was stressed that the agencies were working together and would be watching them. In addition to the

overt deterrence message, social service providers were present and provided an opportunity to discuss community resources and public assistance available to help them.

Because the connection between probation/parole and law enforcement is not the direct focus of large interagency initiatives a full discussion of each program's operation is not provided. Nonetheless, a large number of these initiatives have been well documented and evaluated including the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) (Engel, Tillyer, & Corsaro, 2013), Pittsburgh's One Vision One Life (OVOL) (Wilson & Chermak, 2011), the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership (IVRP) (Chermak & McGarrell, 2004; McGarrell, Chermak, Weiss, & Wilson, 2001; McGarrell et al., 2006, 2009), the Gun Project in Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga et al., 2006), and even the Reducing Offending Partnership (ROP) in Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland) (Doherty & Dennison, 2013).

Finally, other partnership programs not previously mentioned or clearly classified under a given typology include Project ARC (Addressing Repeat Criminality) in the south-west region of England (Chui, Tupman, & Farlow, 2003), the Shawnee County Reentry Program (SCRP) in Kansas (Breyne, 2006), the Baytown Experience in Texas (Beto, 2005), the Federal Probation and Brazos County Assignment in Bryan and College Station of Brazos County, Texas (Beto, 2005), Nightwatch in Nassau County, New York (Domash, 1999), the Integrated Police-Parole Initiative (IPPI) in Canada (Axford & Ruddell, 2009), the Prolific Offenders Project (POP) and the Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) in Britain (Axford & Ruddell, 2009; Mawby & Worrall, 2004; Nash, 2004; Nash & Walker, 2009), and the Coordinated Agency Network (CAN) Program in Anchorage, Alaska (Giblin, 2002).

Benefits associated with Partnerships

As indicated in the prior discussion, anecdotal comments from practitioners and others involved in enhanced supervision partnerships have noted a variety of benefits (Anonymous, 2002; Corbett, 1998; Matz et al., 2012; Minor & Matz, 2012). From the community corrections perspective, the police can offer additional protection and legitimate authority to the probation/parole officer. Further, police possess more advanced telecommunications devices and a greater street presence. Police can serve as additional eyes on the street for the supervision officer. Likewise, police officers can benefit from added intelligence information on probationers/parolees. In addition, knowledge of former offenders deemed high risk could improve the safety of police officers by preparing them for potentially dangerous encounters. Project Spotlight in Texas, for example, specifically noted the added safety and security law enforcement provided to the team in conducting home visits with high-risk probationers (Anonymous, 2002). Further, police officers are very familiar with the community and potential threats. As such, working together provides enhanced safety to the probation/parole officer in addition to the sharing of resources and pertinent information. Though clearly it is beneficial for officers on patrol to know who the probationers/parolees are in the community, law enforcement's knowledge of hotspots for crime and gang activity can also be valuable to probation/parole (Anonymous, 2002).

Though enhanced supervision partnerships have not been systematically evaluated, there have been several attempts to quantify their effectiveness in reducing crime; specifically concerning Boston's Operation Night Light and San Bernardino's Nightlight programs. Some authors, such as with Boston's Night Light, have found rudimentary crime counts to lend some support to a given partnership's impact (Corbett, 1998; Leitenberger, Semenyina, & Spelman,

2003), though later research has demonstrated such crime rates have decreased nationwide irrespective any single location or its associated crime-reduction programs; effectively nullifying any substantive conclusions (Rosenfeld et al., 2005). While more rigorous research conducted by Worrall and Gaines (2006) in San Bernardino gives one more confidence, the results do not examine homicide or take into account the presence of adjacent jurisdictional programming. Further, the Worrall and Gaines research may also suffer from the same criticism presented by Rosenfeld and colleagues (2005). Nonetheless, the researchers found a significant, though limited, reduction in burglary, assault, and theft when comparing the experimental city with that of Fontana (i.e., the control city) during the time of the partnership. Despite the limited evidence, police-probation/parole partnerships remain a *promising program* in need of further empirical examination. That said, there are no reported accounts of police or probation/parole officers discounting the potential impact of partnership on probationer/parolee outcomes.

Finally, many sources have highlighted the partnerships ability to increase law enforcement and probation's appreciation of each other's roles in the justice system (Alarid et al., 2011; Anonymous, 2002; Corbett, 1998; Matz & Kim, 2013). More specifically, it has been asserted that police officers develop a greater appreciation for community problems and the need for services and interventions for probationers and their families. It has also been asserted that probationers/parolees, when witnessing the coordination between law enforcement and probation/parole, take their supervision conditions more seriously and display a greater respect for their supervising officer.

Problems associated with Partnerships

Partnerships have been associated with several concerns. These issues include increased offender monitoring, *stalking horse* incidents, *turfism*, mission distortion, mission creep, and

organizational lag (Matz & Kim, 2013). Increased offender monitoring can lead to unintentional consequences such as increased technical revocations, which, as highlighted by the risk/needs/responsivity principle, may do more harm than good (Andrews et al., 1990; Latessa, 2004; Looman et al., 2005). Of legal concern, there is a danger that law enforcement may use intelligence gathered from probation and parole to unethically harass and infringe on the rights of probationers/parolees (i.e., *stalking horse*) (Adelman, 2002, 2007; Colbridge, 2003; Jermstad, 2002b, 2003). Though former offenders under supervision forfeit the right to be free of *unreasonable* searches from probation/parole officers, this right is not necessarily extended to law enforcement unless explicitly written within the conditions of their supervision or under applicable state law (Turner et al., 2014).

Mission distortion, primarily a concern for probation/parole officers, concerns the abandoning of one's social work orientation for that of purely enforcement as influenced by the presence of law enforcement (Corbett, 1998; Murphy, 2003, 2005; Murphy & Lutze, 2009; Murphy & Worrall, 2007). Ideally, probation and parole officers must strike a balance between compliance monitoring and rehabilitation (Lewis, 2011). Though each agency may possess a unique philosophy and cultural disposition, this duality may induce what is known as internal role conflict or cognitive dissonance. Such internal conflicts may prove debilitating and impede officer performance. Though likely a more significant issue for probation/parole mission distortion can impact police officers as well by luring them into more social-work oriented tasks such as assisting with community treatment referrals.

Mission creep, closely related to mission distortion, concerns the adoption of roles and responsibilities outside the purview of the criminal justice system and may include officers serving as referral agents and coordinating partnership activities (Corbett, 1998; Matz & Kim,

2013; Murphy, 2003, 2005). Turfism concerns agencies ulterior motives for participating in or avoiding partnerships which may include protection of one's jurisdictional turf or competition for scarce funding (Corbett, 1998; Giacomazzi & Smithey, 2001; Matz & Kim, 2013). Turfism also refers to the dominance of one organization of a collaborative endeavor. The East Bay Public Safety Corridor Partnership, for example, was unsuccessful in gathering community support because residents reported the police had already devised the problem and response, without input from community partners (BJA, 1997b).

Organizational lag, on the other hand, refers to the incapacity of an agency to proactively engage in partnerships due to a lack of support from leadership and an overly rigid organizational structure that stifles innovation (Alarid et al., 2011; Corbett, 1998; Matz & Kim, 2013; Murphy, 2003, 2005). As reported by Alarid and colleagues, frontline officers made it clear that without leadership support their involvement would be little more than a symbolic gesture of cooperation, not collaboration. In some cases, officers may be haphazardly dropped into partnership meetings with no guidance or training. To move a partnership forward required strong leadership support, planning, and the deliberate assigning of appropriate frontline officers. Both law enforcement and probation/parole officers stressed this emphasis on leadership.

Empirical Examinations of Partnerships

Previous empirical studies on partnerships can generally be categorized as either outcome-based or perception-based research. Outcome studies attempt to attribute changes in crime rates to a given partnership. Alternatively, perception-based studies involve surveys or interviews of officers involved in partnerships and their thoughts and concerns, information on how the partnership works, and impressions of effectiveness. This section will start with a discussion of the perceptions-based literature, followed by attempted outcome studies.

Murphy (2003, 2005) conducted a qualitative process assessment of the Spokane police-probation partnership. Using semi-structured interviews, along with participant observation (e.g., ride alongs), police and probation officers were asked about their experiences in the partnership. Notable benefits from the collaboration included coordinated facilitation of arrests and added surveillance of probationers, additional back-up for probation officers in the field, improved relations between law enforcement and probation agents, and increased information sharing. Finally, it was reported that police officers engaged in more activities beyond their traditional roles (i.e., mission creep) and lacked clear guidance and leadership to stave off mission distortion. Probation officers often continued to experience high caseloads that limited the number of probationer contact visits (i.e., organizational lag).

After being operational for eight months, researchers conducted a series of 1-hour face-to-face interviews with the chief juvenile probation officer, deputy chief juvenile probation officer, ten police officers, one school truant officer, one law enforcement research coordinator, four ministers, and four individuals from a family intervention center concerning the Operation Night Light (ONL) program in Pennsylvania (Alarid et al., 2011). Their interviews revealed that partnerships were not new to the jurisdiction, previously a recipient of *Weed & Seed* federal grant funds. As such, ONL was in many ways a continuation of the prior partnership. In addition to attesting to the essential support of the respective police chief and chief probation officer, it was also imperative to have the cooperation of the prosecutor and judge. JPOs emphasized their role had remained largely unchanged as a result of the partnership, but the impact on police was much greater. Specifically, police recognized ONL as a form of community policing in so far as they were not only interacting with probationers, but the family of probationers and other neighborhood residents. Further, police officers were given more insight into the local

community problems residents faced such as difficulties finding employment and lack of community services. Interestingly, the interviews with probation officers revealed mission distortion was not perceived to be a problem. Further, it was demonstrated that the probation officer maintained leadership in home visits, quelling concerns of *stalking horse* incidents (e.g., police using probation to gain entry to a probationer's residence).

Though an evaluation component was included as a condition of the grant funding provided by the Office of the Governor concerning five fundamental areas of need in Texas' Project Spotlight; 1) increase number of placements, 2) tighten team and location, 3) use risk assessment to focus on more high risk probationers, 4) increase referrals for community services, and 5) improve data collection (Beto & Kester, 2001), such an evaluation was never completed or made available. The Center for Project Spotlight worked with each county to respond to these needs and improve program implementation. A survey was conducted after the program ended in 2003 that looked at the prevalence and types of partnerships that persisted between police, probation, and parole agencies in Texas (Gerber et al., 2006; Kim et al., 2007a, 2007b, 2013a, 2013b). This line of inquiry revealed partnerships continued to exist despite Project Spotlight's formal demise. As discussed previously, they found information sharing was the most prevalent goal of the mostly informal relationships reported by law enforcement agencies, followed by specialized enforcement, multi-agency collaborations, enhanced supervision, and fugitive apprehension units.

Boston's Night Light is highly regarded by the practitioner community as a success and has been replicated in many other jurisdictions (e.g., San Bernardino's Nightlight), it was not systematically evaluated (Anonymous, 1999; Minor & Matz, 2012). However, with the exception of San Bernardino's Nightlight (Worrall & Gaines, 2006), most of the police-

probation/parole partnership programs introduced within this dissertation have not been empirically examined (IACP, 2012; Matz & Kim, 2013). In addition to Boston's Night Light, this includes programs such as Connecticut's Project One Voice, MAVI, Washington State's Smart Partners, Spokane's NBS, St. Louis' Nightwatch, Maricopa's Neighborhood Probation, Texas Project Spotlight, and Pennsylvania's Operation Night Light (Anonymous, 1999; Alarid et al., 2011; Murphy, 2003, 2005; Urban, 2005; Beto & Kester, 2001). Note Spokane's NBS and Pennsylvania's Night Light were subjected to qualitative assessments (Alarid et al., 2011; Murphy, 2003, 2005), and attempts were made by the St. Louis Nightwatch program to collect relevant data for internal use (Urban, 2005). Finally, revocation data were compiled in relation to YVRP, but changes were not controlled for in terms of influences outside of the partnership (McClanahan, 2004), similar to early examinations of Boston's Night Light program (Corbett, 1998). The following briefly discusses the anecdotal reports presented in support of these programs, as well as any relevant data.

In relation to Boston's Night Light, Corbett (1998) reported 93 homicides in 1993 compared to 39 through November 1997 and 65 firearm-related homicides in 1993 compared to 21 through November of 1997 (Minor & Matz, 2012). Firearm-related assaults reportedly dropped dramatically from a high of 799 in 1995 to 126 through November of 1997. There were no juvenile firearm-related homicides from 1995-1997, and curfew compliance had doubled to 70% from 1990 to 1997. Corbett reports more than 5,000 contacts were made between police, probation, and gang-affiliated probationers as a result of the program. While homicide rates may or may not have been influenced by Night Light, anecdotal accounts of its success are quite abundant. Practitioners who worked in the program stated the program had a profound impact on probationers (Minor & Matz, 2012). Specifically, gang-affiliated probationers took their

conditions of supervision more seriously as a result of the program. Family members and the probationers reiterated this notion as well.

Further, tougher surveillance meant preventing these high-risk youth from being the next victim of street violence as well (Evans, 1997a). In addition, police and probation officers expressed a newfound respect for their justice brethren and the role that each can play in enhancing public safety and promoting desistance. Concerns of the program included mission distortion, organizational lag, and *stalking horse* incidents (Corbett, 1998). While Corbett provided changes in homicide rates for a comparison in relation to Boston's Night Light, Rosenfeld and colleagues (2005) would later demonstrate the entire U.S. experienced a decrease in homicides at that time.

In the first 7 months, the Minneapolis Anti-Violence Initiative (MAVI) reportedly made 729 home visits (Anonymous, 1999). Homicide rates declined 30% in Minneapolis in 1997, reaching the lowest rate since 1994. Other weapons and assault offenses also allegedly decreased slightly. Interestingly, overtime estimates were estimated to be \$27,000 for MAVI during the initial 7 months, expected to be around \$40,000 per year. Finally, police officers valued the chance to interact with probationers and families in a non-confrontational/non-investigative setting, and police officers also felt they were more respected by probationers and their co-habitants.

Though no formal evaluation could be located on Smart Partners in Bellevue and Redmond in Washington State, it was reported that about 480 FIR cards were checked in 1997. Of those checked 110, or 23%, involved individuals under supervision (Anonymous, 1999; Evans, 1997b). Of those 110, eighty (73%) would have their supervision revoked.

Anecdotally, a 45% decrease in crime in one neighborhood was reported in relation to Maricopa's Neighborhood Probation program, but the results were not substantiated with verifiable data (Anonymous, 1999). Nonetheless, probation and police officers reportedly believed their contacts with probationers were more productive and they developed greater rapport with their probationers and the community as a result of the program, with the coordination resulting in communities being more supportive (even assisting) in offender reintegration. Finally, the probation department also asserted that it experienced fewer turnovers with neighborhood probation officers compared to traditional probation officers, although again, no verifiable data were provided to back-up this assertion.

As a function of JAIBG funding, the St. Louis' Nightwatch program collected data concerning each home visit using a central database, initially by individual unit secretaries and later a centralized JAIBG liaison at the SSD (Urban, 2005). Information gathered included juvenile compliance and, if applicable, sanctions imposed. Data were shared with UMSL and aggregated analyses were conducted to provide feedback to program supervisors and stakeholders through monthly JAIBG meetings conducted at the court. In addition, the court conducted a variety of satisfaction surveys with juveniles and their parents in the program. However, these surveys were conducted by supervisors or police officers and lacked consistent methodology or a centralized collection point. Initially, in 2000, police officers would distribute the surveys to the parents while conducting a home visit. Later, in 2002, the surveys were conducted through telephone calls made by probation supervisors. It seems such research should also fall under the purview of UMSL, yet Urban (2005) provides no clear explanation as to why this was not the case.

From 1999-2003, YVRP reportedly provided oversight for over 800 probationers, with up to 9 home visits per month and 5 or 6 in the community or other location (McClanahan, 2004). An early examination of youth homicide rates reported a significant decline, showing a decrease of about 4 homicides per year. Of the two districts included in the program, one saw a decrease from an average of 5.8 youth homicides to 3.4 post-YVRP intervention. Street workers and probation officers reported most YVRP participants steered clear of violence while under supervision, only 5% committed a violent crime while actively under supervision. Nonetheless, about one-third of YVRP probationers were eventually re-arrested during the program's first four years. About half of the YVRP caseload had committed a violation of their supervision such as violating curfew or committing a new offense (e.g., drug possession), however 38% were formally reprimanded for a probation violation.

San Bernardino's Nightlight is the most thoroughly evaluated police-probation/parole program to date (Matz, 2013). Worrall and Gaines (2006) utilized interrupted time series/diffusion analyses to examine the impact of the program on juvenile crime rates. Their analyses included juvenile arrest rates for felonies, misdemeanors, and status offenses (e.g., curfew violations). Unlike Corbett (1998), they did not examine homicide rates. They found a statistically significant reduction in burglary, assault, and theft but no impact on misdemeanors or status offenses. To control for fluctuations in crime trends outside of the program the authors compared San Bernardino crime rates to Colton, Highland, and Rialto. With the exception of Highland, their evidence suggested that the change in crime trends was unique to San Bernardino and criminal activity was not displaced to the other regions. That said, the impact of Nightlight was deemed to be relatively weak; and the authors concluded that some limited general deterrent effect might exist in relation to the San Bernardino partnership.

Note large multi-agency collaborations have been largely omitted from consideration in this section. Though programs such as Ceasefire have been highly regarded as a success, police-probation/parole partnerships are not the primary means of achieving outcomes in those initiatives. Therefore, it is not appropriate to equate their successes with these specific partnerships. Such initiatives often involve community and faith-based organizations, community outreach, and the use of violence interrupters (Braga et al., 2001).

Nonetheless, a recent example does show favorable outcomes for these large-scale endeavors. In particular, Papachristos and colleagues' evaluation (2007) of the Chicago's Project Safe Neighborhoods program found a 12% overall decline in gang homicide rates. They also reported notification forums were the strongest component of the program; increasing the number of parolees who attended a meeting by one percent was associated with a decrease of about 13% in homicide rates. Gun seizures had a smaller impact on homicide with roughly a 2% decrease for every 10 guns seized. Finally, the number of federal prosecutions and increased sentence lengths were found to have no substantive impact. That said, other such initiatives have not had the desired impact. Pittsburgh's One Vision One Life program, for example, had a null impact on homicide rates and experienced an increase in burglary offenses (Wilson & Chermak, 2011).

Limitations of Prior Studies

As revealed by Kim et al. (2010), many partnerships persist as informal affairs based on existing relationships between individual police and probation or parole officers. Given the relative paucity of formalized partnerships, the lack of formal evaluations (e.g., Worrall & Gaines, 2006), to some extent, is understandable. Hence, such partnerships continue to be regarded as promising, short of evidence-based. Two qualitative studies gathered perceptions

from police and community supervision officers (Murphy, 2003, 2005; Alarid et al., 2011), yet they lack generalizability to the larger field (a common criticism of qualitative research). Further, several professional magazines and sources make claims about the benefits of partnership while providing limited or little-to-no data to verify their claims (e.g., Anonymous, 1999). Finally, while Kim et al. (2010)'s research focused exclusively on the perceptions of law enforcement leaders in Texas, the perceptions of probation and parole leaders and officers on a larger scale have been neglected and this research aims to address this gap. Clearly, probation and parole officers are important stakeholders in these partnerships and deserve to have a voice. This dissertation research will not address the issue of program evaluation, an area in which further work will continue to be needed. The following chapter discusses the methodology used in this study to gather a nationally informed perspective of probation/parole officers' views concerning partnerships with law enforcement.

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This research project provides a collective voice for probation/parole in terms of their perspectives on police-probation/parole partnerships. Specifically, this research determines the prevalence of partnership, compared between probation and parole leaders and officers as well as across agencies, the extent to which leaders or officers are favorable towards partnering with law enforcement, and what variables most influence these perceptions. A two-stage research strategy, utilizing a hybrid web-/paper-based survey methodology, was utilized to solicit perspectives from the leadership (e.g., chief probation/parole officer, director) and probation/parole officers represented within the APPA membership. This chapter includes a brief description of the research questions, sample selection and response rates, research design, a summary of each survey measure, procedures, analysis plan, and a brief note on human subjects concerns.

Research Questions

This study examines differences in the perceptions of partnerships with police agencies between those in leadership positions and those in frontline officer positions in probation/parole agencies and the predictors that influence those perceptions. That is, the findings of this study are expected to answer four overarching research questions; 1) what partnership typologies are the most prevalent, 2) to what extent are those in leadership positions in probation/parole agencies favorable to engaging in these partnerships, 3) to what extent are those in frontline officer positions favorable to partnerships, and 4) what variables most influence leaders/officers' favorableness towards partnership.

Derived from the empirical literature on probation/parole – police partnerships (summarized further in Table 3), relevant predictors to perceptions of leaders and frontline

officers include respect for officers' role, benefits to officers and their departments' operations (i.e., intrinsic), crime reduction potential (i.e., extrinsic), mission distortion, mission creep, leadership support, *stalking horse* incidents, rehabilitative ideology, funding and related barriers to partnership formation, and training needs (Chrislip & Larson, 1994; Hughes, 2000; Jones & Sigler, 2002; Kim et al., 2010; Rojek et al., 2012; Weiss et al., 2002).

Sample Selection

To date no clear authoritative sampling frame has been identified for the field of probation and parole in the U.S. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and Office of Juvenile Delinquency and Prevention (OJJDP) have been developing a sampling frame for their respective census for adult and juvenile probation/parole over the last decade. However, it has not been completed nor made available for public use. APPA, a non-profit organization representing a membership of over 35,000 individuals provides a comprehensive source for obtaining a proxy for a national sampling frame of probation and parole staff across the nation (see also Miller, 2014). This study involves the use of two sampling frames of leaders and frontline officers in probation/parole agencies derived from the APPA membership. It must be recognized that though the APPA membership may serve as the best proxy at this time, it cannot be assumed to be representative of that population, but rather represents a unique population of its own.

The first sampling frame consists of leaders (e.g., chief probation/parole officers, directors) identified in the APPA membership. A total of 907 chief adult/juvenile probation/parole officers and directors representing 36 states were identified (see Table 1 and Figure 1 for represented states). Omitted states include Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,

Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The reason for a lack of representation in these states is unknown, but could be attributed to APPA's marketing strategies (or lack thereof) or even APPA's reputation, asserted by some, as a social work oriented association. It could further be the work of a complex network of social relationships that drive the leadership of the association. Historically, APPA has had a strong relationship with Multnomah (CO), Maricopa (AZ), and Cook County (IL) probation/parole departments in particular. Note the structure and working culture of probation and parole vary by state and locality. In some states probation and/or parole may exist under a unified statewide system, while in others it may be county-based (Kim et al., 2010). Further, some may have a consolidated agency that covers probation and parole supervision, adult and juvenile supervision, or various bifurcations thereof (see Hanser, 2014, pp. 30-36, for a more complete breakdown).

Of the 907 leaders identified, the membership list included 585 contacts with email addresses and 322 possessing solely a physical mailing address. Note, APPA members may have requested that they not be contacted via email (or not provided the information), accounting for the bifurcation in missing contact information. Given the number of independent variables in the research models and the need for adequate statistical power, a hybrid survey methodology was utilized that attempted to survey all available contacts (see Cohen, 1992). Considering the costs associated with mail-based survey administration, email addresses were prioritized initially using a web-based survey constructed in *Qualtrics*. Respondents were given the option to request a paper-version and non-respondents to the web-version would later receive a paper-based follow-up copy of the survey (note all contacts with an email address also possessed mail address information). The 322 contacts in which only a physical address was available received paper-based versions of the pre-notice, the survey, and follow-ups via physical mail as those with

emails were receiving their final electronic follow-up. Those receiving the pre-notice by mail were able to request the survey by email, if desired. Otherwise, respondents received a print copy of the survey several weeks later.

Of the 585 leaders contacted electronically, two entries were found to be duplicative and removed, 11 refused participation, and 163 email addresses were invalid (undeliverable). There were 100 valid respondents to the web-based version of the survey resulting in an initial 24% response rate (100/420). After three electronic reminders were disseminated through *Qualtrics* at two-week intervals, the remaining 309 nonrespondents were provided a paper-based copy of the survey as a final follow-up attempt. Forty-three of 309 were undeliverable and marked as return to sender (RTS). However, 51 additional responses were gathered from the mail-based final follow-up. In total, of the 377 valid contacts provided by APPA with both email and mail addresses, 151 responses were collected. However, an attempt was also made to solicit input from the 322 contacts that only possessed a mail address. Respondents received a pre-notice letter, followed by the survey, and a final follow-up letter. 78 of the 322 contacts proved to be invalid (undeliverable), including four duplicates. There were only 26 respondents from the remaining 244 mail-only contacts (11%). When combined the total response rate for leadership is 177 out of 621 successful contact attempts (29%). All survey distributions were conducted between February and May of 2015.

Table 1

APPA Membership Sampling Frame of Chiefs/Directors of Probation/Parole by State

State	Representation	State	Representation
Alabama	4	Montana	1
Alaska	1	Nebraska	19
Arizona	31	Nevada	5
Arkansas	5	New Hampshire	4
California	76	New Jersey	5
Colorado	42	New Mexico	4
Connecticut	8	New York	1
Delaware	0	North Carolina	20
Florida	13	North Dakota	0
Georgia	73	Ohio	274
Hawaii	0	Oklahoma	1
Idaho	8	Oregon	0
Illinois	26	Pennsylvania	28
Indiana	96	Rhode Island	1
Iowa	0	South Carolina	0
Kansas	1	South Dakota	0
Kentucky	0	Tennessee	0
Louisiana	2	Texas	26
Maine	1	Utah	21
Maryland	0	Vermont	0
Massachusetts	40	Virginia	19
Michigan	3	Washington	5
Minnesota	3	West Virginia	9
Mississippi	0	Wisconsin	0
Missouri	2	Wyoming	0




Figure 1. States represented in the APPA membership of chiefs/directors of probation/parole.

The second sampling frame of the frontline officers is derived from the list of agencies that possess a full-agency membership with APPA and, hence, contain a potential full roster of probation/parole officers. A total of 116 probation/parole agencies possessing 3,346 probation/parole officers were identified under this criterion. Table 2 provides a complete list of these agencies and the number of probation/parole (i.e., community corrections, surveillance, community supervision, court services) officers, total number of staff (includes all staff), city, state, and region as defined by APPA. Fifteen regions, 32 states and the District of Columbia (D.C.), are represented. Because the sampling frame of the frontline officers is derived from the list of only agencies that possess full-agency APPA memberships and not all agencies contained within a given state or region, a multi-stage cluster sampling strategy based on region or state would be inappropriate (Babbie, 2007; Maxfield & Babbie, 1998). It should be understood that individual officers are nested within the 116 agencies and those agencies are nested within the APPA membership (or APPA-designated regions). Further, partial agency memberships or individual memberships prove too unwieldy for inclusion and have been omitted.

Table 2

Agencies with Agency-level Membership Represented in APPA

State	City	Region	Organization Name	P/POs	Staff
AK	Anchorage	15	Alaska Department of Corrections	68	78
AL	Birmingham	7	Jefferson County Family Court	38	53
AL	Montgomery	7	Montgomery County Community Corrections (AL)	4	6
AZ	Phoenix	14	Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections	7	31
AZ	Tucson	14	Arizona Superior Court-Pima County	47	95
AZ	Bisbee	14	Cochise County Adult Probation	7	19
AZ	Bisbee	14	Cochise County Court	7	29
AZ	Flagstaff	14	Coconino County Adult Probation	23	41
AZ	Globe	14	Gila County Probation	12	44
AZ	Phoenix	14	Maricopa County Adult Probation	156	314
AZ	Phoenix	14	Maricopa County Juvenile Probation	76	168
AZ	Florence	14	Pinal County Probation Department	68	119
AZ	Yuma	14	Yuma County Adult Probation	31	49
AZ	Yuma	14	Yuma County Juvenile Justice Center	25	37
CA	Oakland	16	Alameda County Probation	23	51
CA	El Centro	16	Imperial County Probation Department	9	14
CA	Napa	16	Napa County Probation	6	7
CA	Sacramento	16	Sacramento County Probation	13	61
CA	San Jose	16	Santa Clara County Probation	6	22
CO	Thornton	13	Colorado Division of Probation Services	140	266
DC	Washington	4	Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (CSOSA)	235	668
FL	Orlando	7	Orange County Corrections	29	68
GA	Atlanta	6	Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles	19	118
GA	Forsyth	6	Georgia Department of Corrections	159	288
GA	Columbus	6	Judicial Alternatives of Georgia	19	24
ID	Sandpoint	15	Bonner County Justice Services	2	3
IL	Chicago	9	Cook County Adult Probation	125	230
IL	Wheaton	9	DuPage County Probation & Court Services	16	29
IL	Woodstock	9	McHenry County Probation & Court Services	10	14
IL	Bloomington	9	McLean County Court Services	10	17
IL	Danville	9	Vermilion County Probation	6	10
IN	Fort Wayne	8	Allen County Adult Probation	23	29
IN	Columbus	8	Bartholomew County Court Services	16	23
IN	Marion	8	Grant County Community Corrections	4	9
IN	Noblesville	8	Hamilton County Probation Services	68	76
IN	Danville	8	Hendricks County Superior Court	13	18
IN	Kokomo	8	Howard County Adult Probation (IN)	7	12
IN	Anderson	8	Madison County Unified Courts Adult Probation	9	12
IN	Bloomington	8	Monroe Circuit Court Probation Department	53	61
IN	Martinsville	8	Morgan County Court Services	12	17
IN	Albion	8	Noble County Probation	12	17
IN	Crown Point	8	Superior Court of Lake County	6	8
KS	Salina	11	28th Judicial District Community Corrections	12	18
KS	Ottawa	11	4th Judicial District Court Services	6	8
KS	Emporia	11	Fifth Judicial District Community Corrections	9	16
KS	Olathe	11	Johnson County Department of Corrections	23	37
KS	Olathe	11	Johnson County District Court Services	23	34
KY	Frankfort	8	Kentucky Department of Corrections	27	68
KY	Lexington	8	Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government /Division of Youth Services	10	13
LA	Baton Rouge	7	LA Division of Probation and Parole	12	33
MD	Baltimore	4	Maryland Division of Parole and Probation	71	157
MI	Ann Arbor	8	15th District Court Probation	3	4
MI	Grandville	8	59th District Court	3	4
MI	St. Joseph	8	Berrien County Trial Court (Family Division)	7	8
MN	Hastings	10	Dakota County Community Corrections	26	51
MN	Rochester	10	Dodge-Fillmore-Olmstead (DFO) County Community Corrections	16	30
MN	St. Paul	10	Minnesota Department of Corrections	18	165
MN	White Bear Lake	10	Ramsey County Community Corrections	10	44
MN	Crookston	10	Tri-County Community Corrections	3	11
MN	Buffalo	10	Wright County Court Services	6	14
MO	Jefferson City	11	Missouri Division of Probation and Parole	57	119

Table 2

Agencies with Agency-level Membership Represented in APPA (continued)

State	City	Region	Organization Name	P/POs	Staff
MT	Helena	15	Montana Department of Corrections Probation and Parole Bureau	34	48
ND	Bismarck	13	ND Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation	36	50
NJ	Trenton	3	New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts Probation Services	3	21
NY	Poughkeepsie	2	Dutchess County Office of Probation and Community Corrections	15	26
NY	Malone	2	Franklin County Probation	8	12
NY	New York	2	New York City Department of Probation	89	209
NY	Albany	2	New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services Office of Probation	8	14
NY	Carmel	2	Putnam County Probation	12	15
NY	Troy	2	Rensselaer County Probation	6	13
NY	Canton	2	St. Lawrence County Probation	11	16
NY	Bellport	2	Suffolk County Probation	35	55
NY	White Plains	2	Westchester County Probation	59	99
OH	Hamilton	5	Butler County Adult Probation	16	21
OH	Cleveland	5	Cleveland Municipal Court	23	58
OH	Lancaster	5	Fairfield County Adult Probation	6	9
OH	Xenia	5	Greene County Adult Probation	16	25
OH	Findlay	5	Hancock County Adult Probation	2	4
OH	Marietta	5	Marietta Municipal Court	4	10
OH	Dayton	5	Montgomery County Adult Probation (OH)	9	19
OH	Columbus	5	Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction	19	35
OH	Mansfield	5	Richland County Adult Court Services	8	22
OH	Akron	5	Summit County Adult Probation	41	57
OK	Oklahoma City	11	Oklahoma County Community Sentencing	19	33
OK	Oklahoma City	11	Oklahoma County Juvenile Bureau	16	34
OK	Oklahoma City	11	Oklahoma Department of Corrections	44	119
OR	Klamath Falls	15	Klamath County Community Corrections	9	14
OR	Portland	15	Multnomah County Community Justice	74	286
OR	Pendleton	15	Umatilla County Community Corrections	6	12
OR	Hillsboro	15	Washington County Community Corrections	10	21
PA	Philadelphia	3	1st Judicial District of Pennsylvania	57	90
PA	Philadelphia	3	Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole	69	193
PA	Greensburg	3	Westmoreland County Adult Probation	7	10
SC	Lexington	6	South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services	2	16
TN	Jackson	7	Madison County Community Corrections	20	21
TN	Clarksville	7	Montgomery County Adult Probation - TN	4	6
TN	Nashville	7	Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole	8	34
TX	Dumas	12	69th Judicial District Community Supervision and Corrections Department	4	8
TX	Belton	12	Bell/Lampasas Counties Community Supervision and Corrections Department	13	61
TX	San Antonio	12	Bexar County Adult Probation	14	36
TX	Angleton	12	Brazoria County CSCD	22	65
TX	McKinney	12	Collin County Community Supervision and Corrections Department	46	80
TX	Lamesa	12	Dawson County Community Supervision and Corrections Department	11	13
TX	Galveston	12	Galveston County CSCD	6	14
TX	Houston	12	Harris County Community Supervision and Corrections Department	155	230
TX	Cleburne	12	Johnson & Somervell Counties Community Supervision and Corrections Department	19	26
TX	Terrell	12	Kaufman County Community Supervision and Corrections Department	5	6
TX	Corpus Christi	12	Nueces County CSCD	56	82
TX	Fort Worth	12	Tarrant County CSCD	80	171
TX	Abilene	12	Taylor County CSCD	14	20
TX	Austin	12	Travis County CSCD	42	78
UT	Salt Lake City	14	Salt Lake County Probation	4	21
VA	Williamsburg	4	Colonial Community Corrections	7	13
VA	Charlottesville	4	VA Department of Criminal Justice Services	9	41
WA	Olympia	15	WA Department of Corrections	52	115
WY	Cheyenne	13	Wyoming Department of Corrections	22	40




Figure 2. States with at least one agency containing a full-agency APPA membership.

A stratified random sample was used to select 1,080 officers stratified by agency size (Babbie, 2007). This sampling strategy was utilized in anticipation of cases needed for statistical power overall and also to ensure representation from as many of the agencies listed in Table 2 as possible. Similar to the leadership survey administration, an attempt was made to solicit responses via email initially for those contacts that possessed a valid email address. Non-respondents and those who possess a mailing address (but no email) were contacted via a later pre-notice, mail dissemination, and a final follow-up letter (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2009; Leeuw, Hox, & Dillman, 2008).

Of the 1,080 contacts sampled, 722 possessed email addresses. As was done with leadership, an email distribution using *Qualtrics* was attempted first, followed by a final follow-up attempt using a mail-administered survey. There were 85 respondents to the online questionnaire. However, a total of 201 email addresses were found to be invalid, one duplicate

entry was removed, and there were 13 refusals, resulting in an initial response rate of 16% (85/521). A final attempt was made to reach the other 423 contacts through a paper-based dissemination and final follow-up letter. Though 99 proved to be undeliverable, an additional 40 responses were collected. The remaining 358 contacts possessed only mail addresses. A total of 31 responses were collected, but 98 were undeliverable. When combined the overall response rate for the sample of officers was 23% (156/682). All survey distributions were conducted between February and May of 2015.

Procedures

First, the survey instruments were reviewed, as well as by the dissertation committee, at a workgroup meeting at the 39th annual training institute of the American Probation and Parole Association (APPA) on August 3rd, 2014 in New Orleans. This provided an opportunity to get feedback from practitioners and probation/parole leadership involved in the APPA membership. Feedback gathered from the institute was used to further ensure the instrument and its many measures are valid representations of the concepts derived from the literature (i.e., face validity) (Babbie, 2007; Carmines & Zeller, 1979). The final survey instrument was approved by the university Institutional Review Board (IRB)

Survey dissemination, for both leadership and officers, began with a pre-notice (online for valid emails, paper-based for those possessing only an address) that outlined the goals of the study and the need for input. It further reiterated the confidentiality of the information obtained via the survey, its importance to completion of this dissertation, its benefit to APPA and the field, the expected duration for completion (about 15-30 minutes), and voluntariness of its completion.

In terms of consent it was explained that by completing the survey the respondent consents to participate and that information contained therein may be used for research purposes. Individual respondents could request their information be redacted but only if the corresponding identification numbers linking individuals to a given survey had not yet been destroyed (making identification impossible). It was also explained that any such identification numbers are for the purposes of survey administration and that the master list linking individuals to a given identification number would be destroyed once data collection had been completed. Finally, it was explained that all data would be compiled and reported aggregately and no single respondent would be attributed to any specific response. Those choosing not to participate were able to request that their information be removed from the email/mail list using the contact information provided for the lead researcher. In addition, those who received an email invitation but preferred a paper-based version were able to make a request accordingly. Alternatively, those that received a mail pre-notice but wished to receive correspondence via email were also provided with contact information to make such a request.

Survey administration largely followed the traditional survey approach outlined by Dillman and colleagues (2009), but with a slight modification to allow for a hybrid web (*Qualtrics*)/mail survey design. The entire staggered online/mail hybrid process was expected to take 12 weeks to complete. One week after the pre-notice the survey was to be disseminated. Note the survey was to be staggered separately for those receiving web-based correspondence from those receiving only mail communication. However, non-respondents to the online survey would receive a follow-up reminder two weeks later and a second follow-up reminder with a paper version of the survey another two weeks later that coincided with the mail-only dissemination's initial survey administration. From there the online contacts were to receive one

final reminder while the mail-only sample would receive three total follow-ups, with the second containing a new copy of the survey. Figure 3 provides an overview of the originally proposed survey administration process. In practice, the financial costs of paper-based surveys proved cost-prohibitive, with the mail portion of the survey administration being reduced to the pre-notice (for new contacts only), the actual survey dissemination (as a final follow-up for email non-respondents also), and a final follow-up letter to the mail-based nonrespondents.

<i>Week:</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>Web</i>	PN	S1	»	F1	»	F2/S2**	»	F3**				
<i>Paper</i>					PN	S1	»	F1	»	F2/S2	»	F3

* PN = Pre-Notice, S = Survey Dissemination, F = Follow-up

** Web method changes to mail-method

Figure 3. Survey administration schedule.

Research Design

This research is cross-sectional in nature, through it required officers to retrospectively discern observations of partnerships with law enforcement and make prospective assertions of their willingness to partner in the future. This design is advantageous given the aims of the research questions. Specifically, the study aims to provide a voice to probation and parole officers and leadership concerning their experiences and favorability towards partnerships with law enforcement, likely quite stable over time. Two separate surveys were deployed, first for leadership and the second for officers. The surveys are similar but individual questions are tailored for the given audience and the leadership survey contains a section on barriers to establish the partnership with law enforcement not included in the officer survey. The following

is an explanation of the survey instruments' structure, and a detailed summary of each concept and its measurement.

Survey Instruments

Two survey instruments were created to ascertain leaders' and officers' experiences and favorableness towards partnership. Though several studies possess items relevant to this inquiry, none have produced previously validated scales. The following sections represent concepts of interest, followed by their operationalization within the survey. A quick reference chart is provided in Table 3, which includes references to relevant literature from which items were derived. The survey is divided into six subsections pertaining to Section I) partnerships with law enforcement, Section II) experiences with law enforcement, Section III) barriers to partnership with law enforcement (leadership survey only), Section IV) organizational culture, Section V) agency demographics, and Section VI) personal demographics. The following covers the survey's structure, then, a breakdown of each individual concept is provided, several of which extend across multiple sections of the survey. A copy of each survey is provided in Appendix A and B.

Section one of the surveys, partnerships with law enforcement, concerns tasks commonly associated with a variety of partnership typologies as defined by Parent and Snyder (1999). As displayed in Table 3, the survey items were largely adapted from Kim et al. (2010), with additional items created to cover partnership tasks not previously captured within the literature. Such tasks include joint home visits and joint patrols, discussed as key components of several partnerships including the well-known Boston Night Light program (Corbett, 1998). Section two of the survey, experiences with law enforcement, includes references to several concepts including favorability to partnership, respect for officer role, perceived intrinsic benefit,

perceived outcomes (i.e., extrinsic benefits), the experiences of role conflict and mission distortion, mission creep, leadership support, partnership funding and longevity, and training needs (Chrislip & Larson, 1994; Hughes, 2000; Jones & Sigler, 2002; Kim et al., 2010; Rojek et al., 2012; Weiss et al., 2002).

Table 3

*Item Reference by Concept**

Concept	Section(s)	Item(s)	Source(s)
Favorability to Partnership	II	9, 20	Kim et al. (2010); [20] Original
	IV	2-3, 7, 10-12	Kim et al. (2010); [7, 10-12] Original
Partnership Typology	I	1-20	Kim et al. (2010); [20] Original
<i>Enhanced Supervision</i>		4-9	Kim et al. (2010); [8-9] Original
<i>Information Sharing</i>		1	Kim et al. (2010)
<i>Fugitive Apprehension</i>		18	Kim et al. (2010)
<i>Specialized Enforcement</i>		10-17	Kim et al. (2010)
<i>Interagency Partnerships</i>		2, 19	Kim et al. (2010); [19] Original
Respect for Officer Role	II	1, 5, 15-17, 24	[15-17] Hughes (2000); [1, 5] Kim et al. (2010); [24] Original
Intrinsic Benefit	II	2, 7, 10, 14	[14] Jones & Sigler (2002); [2, 7, 10] Kim et al. (2010)
Outcome/Extrinsic Benefit	II	4, 12-13, 23	[12-13] Jones & Sigler (2002); [4] Kim et al. (2010); [23] Original
Role Conflict/Mission Distortion	II	3, 6, 8	Kim et al. (2010)
Mission Creep	II	11	Original
Leadership Support	II	18, 19, 21, 22, 25	[18, 19, 21, 25] Weiss et al. (2002); [22] Chrislip & Larson (1994)
	IV	4, 5, 6	Kim et al. (2010)
Stalking Horse	IV	8, 9	Original
Rehabilitative Ideology	IV	1	Kim et al. (2010)
Barriers to Partnership	III	1-8	Rojek et al. (2012); [7] Original
Funding and Longevity	II	28-29	Rojek et al. (2012)
Training Needs	I	3	Kim et al. (2010)
	II	27	Original
Demographics	V, VI	N/A	N/A

* Based on Leadership Survey, for Officer Survey omit Section III. Section titles are as follows: I) Partnerships with Law Enforcement, II) Experiences with Law Enforcement, III) Barriers to Partnership with Law Enforcement, IV) Organizational Culture, V) Agency Demographics, VI) Personal Demographics.

Section three of the survey is unique to leadership and concerns barriers to partnership.

All of the items were adapted from Rojek et al.'s (2012) study of practitioner-researcher partnerships with exception to an open response item that was added to provide additional opportunities for feedback. Section four examines the respondents' perceptions of organizational culture at their agency in terms of favorability to partnership, leadership, perceptions of *stalking horse* abuses, and rehabilitative ideology. Items were adapted predominantly from Kim et al.

(2010) with several original items created to capture concepts such as *stalking horse* and other partnership abuses. Sections five and six concern agency and personal demographics and were newly created based on the authors prior experiences with conducting surveys with the probation/parole profession population and at the behest of the author's advisor. The following subsections cover each concept in further detail.

Measures

Dependent Variable

Favorability to Partnership. Eight items were asked concerning respondents' favorability to partnerships with police, the dependent variable of this study. Three items were adapted from Kim et al. (2010), "I would be in favor of the partnership with law enforcement agencies becoming standard operating procedure in my department" (Section II: Item #9), "Our organization's core culture is in alignment with the ideas which are at the core of a successful inter-agency public safety alliance" (Section IV: Item #2), and "The personal beliefs, principles, and values of our organization's executives are in alignment with the ideas which are at the core of a successful inter-agency public safety alliance" (Section IV: Item #3). However, five original items were created including "Our agency's executives and supervisors strongly support partnership(s) with law enforcement" (Section IV: Item #12), "Agency staff have strongly supported the partnership(s)" (Section II, Item #20), "Our agency's executives and supervisors are currently seeking new partnership opportunities with law enforcement agencies" (Section IV: Item #7), "Our agency's executives and supervisors would be open to joining a partnership with law enforcement if they approached them" (Section IV: Item #10), and "Our agency's executives and supervisors are interested in any new partnerships with law enforcement agencies" (Section IV: Item #11). All items were accompanied by a 5-point Likert scale response

set ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The favorability to partnership index is associated with respectable internal reliability for both samples with a Cronbach's alpha of .795 for leadership and .791 for officers.

Independent Variables

Partnership Typology. To determine the prevalence of prior partnership experiences a series of 20 items, contained in Section I, were posed that concern activities involved in enhanced supervision, information sharing, fugitive apprehension, specialized enforcement, and interagency partnerships (Parent & Snyder, 1999). Respondents were given the option of selecting which activities they or their department has engaged in, in terms of formal or informal partnerships. Formal partnerships refer to situations in which there are operational agreements, protocols, contracts, and/or memoranda of understanding (MOU) (Kim et al., 2010). Informal partnerships refer to programs and initiatives forged on relationships between personnel. Enhanced partnerships are defined as partnerships in which law enforcement and correctional agencies perform joint supervision of probationers/parolees (Kim et al., 2010; Parent & Snyder, 1999). Relevant activities include ride-along options, beats/districts based on geographical assignment, targeted high crime areas, joint home visits, and joint patrols. Items concerning joint home visits and joint patrols were newly created based on their prevalence within the literature; the other three items were adapted from Kim et al. (2010). Information sharing partnerships involve the exchange of intelligence on probations/parolees. One activity is included in the survey that mirrors this definition (Kim et al., 2010). Fugitive apprehension partnerships involve law-enforcement and probation/parole agencies working together to locate absconders (Parent & Snyder, 1999). One activity is included in the survey that is reminiscent of this definition (Kim et al., 2010). Specialized enforcement concerns collaborations between law enforcement and

probation/parole agencies aimed at specific criminogenic problems (Parent & Snyder, 1999). For this typology, involvement in sex offender, domestic violence, bar checks, gun removal, gang interdiction, drug possession and trafficking, and quality of life issues partnerships were included, with all items adapted from Kim et al. (2010). Finally, interagency problem-solving partnerships involve larger multi-agency collaborations that involve law enforcement and probation/parole but also many other justice and community organizations. Further, these partnerships aim to identify and target specific mutual community problems (Parent & Snyder, 1999). Two items were included, one adapted from Kim et al. (2010) and the other newly developed, each mirroring the definition provided. Finally, another category enables respondents to highlight other activities not captured in the survey.

Respect for Officer Role. The concept of respect is derived from the notion that probation/parole officers perceive greater legitimacy from their supervisees when a police officer is present (Corbett, 1998; Matz & Kim, 2013). It also correlates to the respect, or appreciation, probation/parole officers perceive from law enforcement officers in relation to their partnership, as well as the probation/parole officers perception of the role of police (Alarid et al., 2011). Two items were adapted from Kim et al. (2010), which include “Working with law enforcement agencies has given me a greater appreciation for their job” (Section II: Item #1), and “I was comfortable working with law enforcement agencies” (Section II: Item #5). Other items were adapted from Hughes (2000) including “Police have been respectful during street contacts in association with our partnership(s)” (Section II: Item #15), “Police have been respectful during home visits in association with our partnership(s)” (Section II: Item #16), and “Police have been respectful during arrests of probationers/parolees in association with our partnership(s)” (Section II: Item #17). One original item was created; “Probationers/parolees treated their supervision

officer with more respect when in the presence of a police officer” (Section II: Item #24). All items were accompanied by a 5-point Likert scale response set ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The six-item index possessed respectable internal reliability at .809 for the leadership sample and .766 for the officer sample.

Intrinsic Benefit. Intrinsic benefit refers to procedural benefits to the probation/parole or law enforcement agency/officer as a result of the partnership including improved offender supervision and intelligence gathering (Jones & Sigler, 2002; Kim et al., 2010). Three items were adapted from Kim et al. (2010) including “Working with law enforcement agencies has been a positive experience” (Section II: Item #2), “The information received from law enforcement as a result of the partnership(s) is helpful” (Section II: Item #7) and “The partnership with law enforcement agencies is an effective method for supervising offenders” (Section II: Item #10). One item was adapted from Jones & Sigler (2002); “Police have become more familiar with the probationer/parolee population because of the partnership(s)” (Section II: Item #14). All items were accompanied by a 5-point Likert scale response set ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The 4-item index possessed respectable internal reliability ratings at .749 for the leadership sample and .746 for the officer sample.

Outcome/Extrinsic Benefit. Outcome or extrinsic benefits represent perceived positive outcomes directly attributable to the partnership. Essentially, this concept is concerned with the ability of partnerships to impact public safety (Jones & Sigler, 2002; Kim et al., 2010). One item was adapted from Kim et al. (2010); “The field activities with law enforcement agencies have reduced crime” (Section II: Item #4). Two items were adapted from Jones & Sigler (2002) including “The partnership(s) have had a positive impact on the community” (Section II: Item #12) and “The partnership(s) have had a positive impact on the probationers/parolees” (Section

II: Item #13). One original item was created, “The partnership(s) with law enforcement have impacted recidivism rates in our jurisdiction(s)” (Section II: Item #23). All items were accompanied by a 5-point Likert scale response set ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The four-item index was associated with very good internal consistency ratings of .830 for the leadership sample and .817 for the officer sample.

Role Conflict/Mission Distortion. Role conflict is an often-discussed issue in community supervision as probation/parole officers are required to balance surveillance goals with rehabilitation needs (Clear & Latessa, 1993; Lewis, 2011). This dissonance can be exacerbated in partnerships with law enforcement given police officers clear surveillance focus (i.e., mission distortion). Three items adapted from Kim et al. (2010) include “The roles of law enforcement agencies and my department working in partnership complement each other” (Section II: Item #3), “The roles of law enforcement agencies and my department working in partnerships were often confused” (Section II: Item #6), and “There were conflicts in the roles of police and my department” (Section II: Item #8). All items were accompanied by a 5-point Likert scale response set ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The three-item index was associated with minimally acceptable reliability ratings at .641 for the leadership sample and .636 for the officer sample.

Mission Creep. Mission creep refers to instances in which officers become engaged in activities that are beyond their original scope of work (Matz & Kim, 2013). Such activities, for example, could include coordinating partnership meetings. An original item was developed “Because of partnership(s), our role has been continually expanding to tasks outside of probation/parole work (e.g., coordinating meetings)” with a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree (Section II: Item #11).

Leadership Support. Alarid et al. (2011) demonstrated the importance of leadership support in the ability of partnerships to grow and thrive. Four items were adapted from Weiss et al. (2002) including “The partnership(s) include common goals that are supported by law enforcement and our department” (Section II: Item #18), “The partnership(s) possess clear goals and objectives” (Section II: Item #19), “The partnership(s) have done a good job of documenting the impact of its actions” (Section II: Item #21), and “There was resistance by agency executives and supervisors to the goals and activities of the partnership(s) with law enforcement agencies” (Section II: Item #25). One item was adapted from Chrislip & Larson (1994) which included “My agency had concrete measureable goals to judge the success of our partnership(s)” (Section II: Item #22). Three items were adapted from Kim et al. (2010) including “Our agency’s executives and supervisors know what it will take to create and maintain an inter-agency public safety alliance in our jurisdiction, and they are committed to doing so” (Section IV: Item #4), “Our agency’s executives and supervisors look beyond our short term interests and make important decisions (e.g., budget requests or resource allocations) based on what will make our community safer” (Section IV: Item #5), and “Our agency’s executives and supervisors will encourage and support our own employees to work together with employees of law enforcement when dealing with the issues or problems confronting an inter-agency public safety alliance” (Section IV: Item #6). All items were accompanied by a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. An eight-item index revealed respectable internal reliability ratings at .737 for the leadership sample and .765 for the officer sample.

Stalking Horse. *Stalking horse* refers to the concern that law enforcement officers may use a probation/parole officers’ ability to search probationer/parolees without a warrant or probable cause as a means to gain entry into their residence or access to information, through the

partnership, about their whereabouts in order to stalk and harass them (Adelman, 2002, 2007; Colbridge, 2003; Corbett, 1998; Jermstad, 2002b, 2003; Matz & Kim, 2013). Two original items were created to operationalize this concept, “Our agency’s executives and supervisors are concerned about potential legal ramifications of bringing police officers into a probationer/parolee’s residence during a home visit” (Section IV: Item #8), and “Our agency’s executives and supervisors believe police officers are likely to use knowledge of a probationer/parolee’s supervision status to conduct warrantless searches of their person/property” (Section IV: Item #9). Both items were accompanied by 5-point Likert scales ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The two-item index possessed poor reliability at .569 for the leadership sample, but respectable reliability at .746 for the officer sample.

Rehabilitative Ideology. One item, adapted from Kim et al. (2010), attempts to discern the probation/parole officer/department’s predisposition towards a rehabilitative perspective, “The majority of employees in our organization believe that selected groups of offenders can change their behavior and life styles and that a balanced combination of sanctions, supervision, and services can assist them in doing so.” The item is accompanied by a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

Barriers to Partnership. A section, specific to leadership only, comprised of eight items was provided in an attempt to understand what barriers may inhibit partnerships from developing. These items, six adapted from Rojek et al. (2012), include “We do not have the funding/resources (e.g., staffing) to engage in a partnership with a law enforcement agency” (Section III: Item #1) “We have not been approached by a law enforcement agency” (Section III: Item #2), “We approached law enforcement to build a partnership, but the response was negative” (Section III: Item #3), “I do not think partnering with a law enforcement agency would

be of much use to my agency” (Section III: Item #4), “I had a bad experience with law enforcement in the past” (Section III: Item #5), and “I heard of other agencies having negative experiences in partnerships with law enforcement” (Section III: Item #6). An original item was added, “Law enforcement agencies compete with our department for funding” (Section III: Item #7). Each item is associated with 5-point Likert scales ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. An open response item is also provided, “Please indicate any other barriers to partnership with law enforcement in the space provided” (Section III: Item #8). Note, these items were only available if the respondent indicated that he/she had not participated in any partnerships. The seven-item index, unique to the leadership sample, possessed a minimally acceptable internal reliability rating of .664.

Funding and Longevity. One item is included which attempts to quantify the overall duration of partnerships, if respondents indicate their existence. Adapted from Rojek and colleagues (2012), the item asks “How long, in years, has *your department* [or have you] been engaged in any formal partnership(s) with law enforcement?” (Section II: Item #29) Respondents were provided a space to insert a numeric value.

Another item was included concerning funding source, also adapted from Rojek et al. (2012). The item asks the respondent to “Please describe the funding source(s) for the partnership(s) (Mark all that apply)” (Section II: Item #28). Respondents can mark multiple options including a) partner agency(ies) provides funding, b) my agency provides funding, c) external grant(s), d) partnership(s) operates without funding, and e) other source(s).

Training Needs. One item was included concerning interagency training initiatives, adapted from Kim et al. (2010), as it pertains to formal or informal partnerships (Section I: Item #3). In addition, a newly developed item asks, “Does your department provide training for

officers engaged in partnership with law enforcement?” (Section II: Item #27). The item was accompanied by a response set of Yes/No, with a response box for additional comments if indicated in the affirmative (Section II: Item #27a) and a separate item for those indicating the alternative. For those who indicate that they do not receive training, respondents are asked to “Please indicate the extent to which you feel training is needed” (Section II: Item #27b). A scale of 1 (no need at all) to 10 (extremely needed) is provided along with an open-response box for additional comments.

Control Variables

Agency Characteristics. Several agency characteristics were requested including geographic regions represented within an agency’s jurisdiction (urban, suburban, rural), supervision field (pretrial, probation, parole), jurisdiction level (local, county, state, federal), branch of government (judiciary, executive), clientele (adult, juvenile), estimated number of officers, estimated number of probationers/parolees, sworn officer status, and weapons use (Section V).

Individual Demographic Characteristics. In addition, respondents were asked about position title, gender, years of experience in their current position, years of experience at the department, years of experience in probation/parole, and years of experience in criminal justice (Section VI). Table 4 contains a summary of all the variables included, their role in the study, level of measurement, and coding.

Table 4

Variable Summary

Variable Type	Concept	Measurement Level	Coding	Items
DV	Favorability to Partnership	Interval/Ratio	Numeric Index	8
	<i>Partnership Typology</i>			
IV	Enhanced Supervision	Nominal	Formal Partnership (1), Informal Partnership (2), No Partnership (0) [Dummy coded]	6
IV	Information Sharing	Nominal	Formal Partnership (1), Informal Partnership (2), No Partnership (0) [Dichotomous recode]	1
IV	Fugitive Apprehension	Nominal	Formal Partnership (1), Informal Partnership (2), No Partnership (0) [Dummy coded]	1
IV	Specialized Enforcement	Nominal	Formal Partnership (1), Informal Partnership (2), No Partnership (0) [Dummy coded]	8
IV	Interagency Partnership	Nominal	Formal Partnership (1), Informal Partnership (2), No Partnership (0) [Dummy coded]	2
IV	Respect	Interval/Ratio	Numeric Index	6
IV	Intrinsic Benefit	Interval/Ratio	Numeric Index	5
IV	Outcome/Extrinsic Benefit	Interval/Ratio	Numeric Index	4
IV	Role Conflict/Mission Distortion	Interval/Ratio	Numeric Index	3
IV	Mission Creep	Interval/Ratio	Dichotomous Recode	1
IV	Leadership	Interval/Ratio	Numeric Index	8
IV	Stalking Horse	Interval/Ratio	Numeric Index	2
IV	Rehabilitative Ideology	Interval/Ratio	Dichotomous Recode	1
IV	Barriers	Interval/Ratio	Numeric Index	7
IV	Funding/Longevity	Ordinal/Interval/Ratio	Partner agency(ies) provides funding (1), My agency provides funding (2), External grant(s) (3), Partnership(s) operates without funding (4), Other source(s) (5)/Numeric (Years)	2
IV	Training	Nominal/Ordinal	(0)/Yes (1), No (0)/No Need at All (1) - Extremely Needed (10)	2
	<i>Agency Demographics</i>			
Control	Geographic Area	Nominal	Urban (1), Suburban (2), Rural (3) [Coded as individual items]	1
Control	Supervision Field	Nominal	Pretrial (1), Probation (2), Parole (3), Other (4) [Coded as individual items]	1
Control	Jurisdiction Level	Nominal	Local/Municipal (1), County (2), State (3), Federal (4), Other (5) [Dichotomous recode]	1
Control	Branch of Government	Nominal	Executive (1), Judiciary (2), Other (3) [Dichotomous recode]	1
Control	Clientele	Nominal	Adult Only (1), Juvenile Only (2), Adult and Juvenile (3) [Dichotomous recode]	1
Control	Probation/parole Officers	Ratio	Numeric	1
Control	Probationers/parolees	Ratio	Numeric	1

DV = Dependent Variable

IV = Independent Variable

Table 4

Variable Summary (continued)

Variable Type	Concept	Measurement Level	Coding	Items
Control	Sworn Status	Nominal	Yes (1), No (0), Other (2) [Dichotomous recode]	1
Control	Armed with Firearms	Nominal	Required (1), Optional (2), Not Permitted (0) [Dichotomous recode]	1
Control	Armed with Nonlethal Weapons	Nominal	Required (1), Optional (2), Not Permitted (0) [Dichotomous recode]	1
<i>Personal Demographics</i>				
Control	Position Title	Nominal	String	1
Control	Years in Position	Ratio	Numeric (Years)	1
Control	Years in Department	Ratio	Numeric (Years)	1
Control	Years in Probation/parole	Ratio	Numeric (Years)	1
Control	Years in Criminal Justice	Ratio	Numeric (Years)	1
Control	Sex	Nominal	Male (1), Female (0)	1

Analysis Plan

Results of the survey were examined at the univariate, bivariate, and multivariate level. Exploratory factor analysis was utilized to examine the grouping of concepts and operational measures outlined previously and ensure they measure the underlying latent constructs they purport to measure (DeVellis, 2012). Note, the coefficient alpha was used to assess reliability of a given scale, as reported previously. Alpha levels range from 0-1 with those below .60 considered unacceptable, .60-.65 undesirable, .65-.70 minimally acceptable, .70-.80 respectable, and .80-.90 very good (DeVellis, 2012). In addition to descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations, multiple regression analyses were utilized to examine several predictors of community corrections leaders' and officers perceptions towards partnership (Berry, 1993; Lewis-Beck, 1980; Menard, 2002; Pampel, 2000).

Note, hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) is a type of mixed model that takes into account differences between and within nested data at multiple levels (i.e., state, agency, individual) (Garson, 2013; Luke, 2004). To determine the applicability of HLM for the current study a null model (unconditional model, one-way ANOVA with random effects) was

constructed. This model was used to predict the level 1 intercept of the dependent variable as a random effect of the level 2 grouping variable (i.e., state, agency) with no other predictor variables included in the model. The resulting intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) comparing states across all respondents, repeated for leadership and officer samples, was not statistically significant. This result held true at the agency level as well, indicating that there was no issue of a clustering effect associated with the dependent variable. Given there were no significant group differences, HLM proved not to be appropriate and multivariate analyses were continued using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Garson, 2013).

The following formula represents the multiple regression equation (Lewis-Beck, 1980).

$$Y = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 \dots + b_kX_k + e$$

As written, Y represents the dependent variable and X the independent variable(s), The intercept or constant is represented by a , followed by the slope or unstandardized coefficient b and the error term e . The coefficient of determination (R^2) is used to provide insight into the ability of the regression model to account for variations in the dependent variable.

$$R^2 = \text{RSS}/\text{TSS}$$

$$\text{TSS} = \text{RSS} + \text{ESS}$$

R^2 is calculated by dividing the regression sum of squared (RSS) deviations by the total sum of squared (TSS) deviations (Lewis-Beck, 1980). The TSS reflects the combination of RSS and unexplained deviation or the error sum of squared deviations (ESS). R^2 , provided as a range from 0 to 1, provides the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. Simply put, if $R^2 = 1$, then the independent variables account for all the variation in the dependent variable. Alternatively, $R^2 = 0$ is associated with the independent variables having no influence on the dependent variable.

To address concerns of statistical power (Cohen, 1992), hierarchical multiple regression procedures were utilized (see Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006; Lee, Chronister, & Bishop, 2008; Miller, Mire, & Kim, 2009; Nosek, Hughes, Taylor, & Taylor, 2006). Hierarchical multiple regression is a variant of multiple regression that allows the researcher to specify a fixed order of entry for independent variables. This multi-stage approach allows for the examination of specified blocks of variables while controlling for the effects of certain predictors independent of the others. In addition, the change in R^2 can be examined to determine the predictive power added to a model as the result of the addition of variables in a subsequent block, as well as if the change is statistically significant. By removing irrelevant variables through hierarchical multiple regression statistical power can be improved (Miller et al., 2009).

Several assumptions were considered including the absence of perfect multicollinearity, the error term as uncorrelated with each of the independent variables, specification error (i.e., using the wrong independent variables), the mean of the error term should be zero, the independent variables are quantitative or dichotomous, the dependent variable is quantitative, continuous, and unbounded, error-free measurement, linearity and additivity, homoscedasticity and lack of autocorrelation, and the error term is normally distributed (Berry, 1993). The issue of perfect multicollinearity is rare, requiring one independent variable to share an exact linear relationship with another independent variable. An uncorrelated error term with the independent variables ensures, for example, there is not a reciprocal relationship in which the dependent variable influences the independent variables. Specification error concerns the inclusion of irrelevant variables or the exclusion of important variables from a regression equation. Given the exploratory nature of the study, and the lack of theory, it would be difficult to truly assess specification error, though every effort was made to be as exhaustive as possible using concepts

derived from the available literature. When the mean of the error term is not zero, biased estimates are produced by the regression model. Measurement error, likewise, can lead to biased estimates. Scale items, for example, lack precision which may result in nonrandom measurement errors. Finally, heteroscedasticity is more likely to be an issue in cross-sectional research than autocorrelation typically associated with time-series data.

Human Subjects Concerns

There was minimal potential for harm to participants in this study. The survey was online/paper-based and the confidentiality of any identifiable responses/statements was protected by the researcher. Once data collection was completed, all subsequent datasets utilized an identification number, but the record of who each number was associated with was destroyed. Further, the items contained within the survey are not personally sensitive, but rather focus on perceptions of operational procedures and goals. All paper surveys that were collected were stored in a locked filing cabinet in the dissertation chair's faculty office and will be destroyed in five years. Participation was voluntary, no incentives were provided, and there was no penalty for officers that refused to complete the survey.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

Sample Demographics

Table 5 displays a state-by-state breakdown for leadership and officer samples. Figures 4 and 5 provide a graphic display of the representation across the country for the leadership and officer sample, respectively. The leadership sample includes representation from 25 states and the officer sample includes representation of 24 states and the District of Columbia (DC). Despite similar numbers, representation differed for the two groups. The leadership sample uniquely represented Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, Rhode Island, Utah, and West Virginia compared to the officer sample which uniquely included representation from DC, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, North Dakota, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Combined, the two samples together represent 34 states and DC. It should also be noted that large pockets of respondents came from Indiana and Ohio. Nearly a third of the respondents for each sample were from the two states, consisting of county-based probation services. Specifically, Ohio represents 37% (N=66) of the leadership sample, suggesting a potential bias may exist. Recall the leadership sampling frame consisted of 36 states and the officer sampling frame included 32 states (see Table 1, Figure 1, Table 2, and Figure 2). Eleven states were nonresponsive to the leadership survey including Arkansas, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and Oklahoma. Eight states were nonresponsive to the officer survey including Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Utah. There is no apparent pattern to those states that did respond compared to those that did not.

Table 5

State Representation of Leadership/Officers Within Study Samples

State	Leadership		Officers	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Alaska (AK)	1	1%	2	1%
Alabama (AL)	1	1%	3	2%
Arizona (AZ)	9	5%	18	12%
California (CA)	14	8%	5	3%
Colorado (CO)	5	3%	5	3%
Connecticut (CT)	2	1%	0	0%
District of Columbia (DC)	0	0%	2	1%
Florida (FL)	2	1%	0	0%
Georgia (GA)	7	4%	2	1%
Idaho (ID)	5	3%	0	0%
Illinois (IL)	9	5%	12	8%
Indiana (IN)	25	14%	19	12%
Kansas (KS)	0	0%	1	1%
Kentucky (KY)	0	0%	2	1%
Louisiana (LA)	1	1%	0	0%
Massachusetts (MA)	5	3%	0	0%
Missouri (MI)	1	1%	3	2%
Minnesota (MN)	1	1%	7	5%
Montana (MT)	0	0%	2	1%
North Dakota (ND)	0	0%	4	3%
Nebraska (NE)	6	3%	0	0%
Nevada (NV)	2	1%	0	0%
New York (NY)	0	0%	12	8%
Ohio (OH)	66	37%	7	5%
Oklahoma (OK)	0	0%	6	4%
Oregon (OR)	0	0%	10	6%
Pennsylvania (PA)	3	2%	4	3%
Rhode Island (RI)	1	1%	0	0%
Tennessee (TN)	0	0%	2	1%
Texas (TX)	2	1%	19	12%
Utah (UT)	6	3%	0	0%
Virginia (VA)	1	1%	3	2%
Washington (WA)	1	1%	2	1%
West Virginia (WV)	1	1%	0	0%
Wyoming (WY)	0	0%	4	3%




Figure 4. State representation of leadership sample.




Figure 5. State representation of probation/parole officer sample.

Table 6 displays agency characteristics concerning geographical representation, departmental function, jurisdiction level, branch of government, population served, sworn status, firearms use, nonlethal force use, estimated number of probation/parole officers, and estimated number of probationers/parolees under supervision. Respondents were free to choose multiple geographical representations including urban, suburban, or rural. Interestingly, respondents from the officer sample appeared to be more balanced in their representation of geographic regions but respondents from the leadership sample possessed a greater proportion of rural representation at 65% ($N=115$). Departmental functions were examined including pretrial, probation, parole, and/or other types of supervision. Respondents from both samples were predominantly associated with probation supervision at 91% ($N=161$) and 83% ($N=130$), with a considerably smaller proportion representing pretrial or parole supervision. Recall the state of Ohio, which is overrepresented in the leadership sample, is a state in which probation is a county-based function under the judiciary, while parole exists under a state-level executive agency. Notable differences were observed between leadership and officer respondents in regards to the prevalence of pretrial and parole supervision functions. About 34% ($N=60$) of the leadership sample indicated pretrial supervision was under the purview of their agency compared to the officer sample at 21% ($N=32$). Alternatively, officers indicated parole supervision fell under their purview at 25% ($N=39$) compared to 6% ($N=11$) for leadership respondents.

Most notable in terms of jurisdiction level, twenty-seven (15%) of the leadership sample indicated their agency represented local government, compared to 5 (3%) for officers. However, representation was similar for all other levels of government, most strongly representing county-level jurisdictions at 61% ($N=107$) and 64% ($N=99$).

To briefly preface the discussion of government branch it should be understood that, unlike law enforcement or institutional corrections which are clearly executive functions, community corrections agencies may exist under the executive or judicial branches of government. Generally speaking, state-level agencies tend to be located under the executive branch and associated with a state-run Department of Corrections (DOC), whereas county-level probation agencies tend to be associated with the judiciary and a function of the court. Within these samples a large majority of respondents indicated their agency operates under the judiciary compared to the executive branch of government at 85% ($N=150$) and 56% ($N=88$). Again, note the overrepresentation of Ohio in the leadership sample. Nonetheless, this is unsurprising given the high number of respondents that indicated their agency operated at the county-level. That said, there were considerably more officer respondents that indicated their agency was situated under the executive branch of government at 24% ($N=38$) than for the leadership sample at 6% ($N=11$). Finally, a very small number of respondents from both samples marked other. In this sample, the other category generally represented those officers that worked for a private probation agency.

In terms of population served, noticeable differences were observed between leadership and officer samples. A greater prevalence of juvenile supervision was associated with the leadership sample (19%, $N=34$) compared to that of the officer sample (10%, $N=16$). Adult supervision was the norm for both samples at 41% ($N=73$) and 55% ($N=86$), though a good proportion of each sample noted supervising both adults and juveniles at 32% ($N=57$) and 23% ($N=36$). In effect, respondents from the leadership sample were more likely to be working for an agency that included juvenile supervision, though adult supervision was the most common across the two samples.

Table 6

Agency Characteristics and Leadership/Officer Comparison

Variable	Leadership		Officers	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Geographical Representation				
Urban	58	33%	70	45%
Suburban	57	32%	85	55%
Rural	115	65%	87	56%
Departmental Functions				
Pretrial	60	34%	32	21%
Probation	161	91%	130	83%
Parole	11	6%	39	25%
Other	15	9%	16	10%
Jurisdiction Level				
Local/Municipal	27	15%	5	3%
County	107	61%	99	64%
State	24	14%	30	19%
Federal	1	1%	1	1%
Other	5	3%	2	1%
Missing	13	7%	19	12%
Branch of Government				
Executive (i.e., DOC)	11	6%	38	24%
Judicial (i.e., courts)	150	85%	88	56%
Other	2	1%	11	7%
Missing	14	8%	19	12%
Population Served				
Adult	73	41%	86	55%
Juvenile	34	19%	16	10%
Both	57	32%	36	23%
Missing	13	7%	18	12%
Officers Sworn				
Yes	88	50%	81	52%
No	71	40%	49	31%
Other	5	3%	8	5%
Missing	13	7%	18	12%
Officers Armed with Firearms				
Required	39	22%	23	15%
Optional	50	28%	53	34%
Not Permitted	75	42%	61	39%
Missing	13	7%	19	12%
Officers Armed with Nonlethal Force				
Required	49	28%	61	39%
Optional	85	48%	53	34%
Not Permitted	29	16%	24	15%
Missing	14	8%	18	12%
Estimate of Officers	158	<i>M</i> =402.22 <i>SD</i> =3996.92	134	<i>M</i> =424.78 <i>SD</i> =2591.44
Estimate of Probationers/Parolees	159	<i>M</i> =3051.77 <i>SD</i> =13927.23	127	<i>M</i> =8287.02 <i>SD</i> =18661.99

About half of the respondents from each sample indicated their agency's officers are sworn at 50% ($N=88$) and 52% ($N=81$), meaning they possess at least limited arrest powers to apprehend a probationer/parolee if warranted. For the 40% ($N=71$) and 31% ($N=49$) of respondents from the respective samples that indicated they do not possess sworn status, officers lack arrest powers. In such instances, probationer/parole officers would work with their local police department, by working with the court to issue a warrant for their arrest, to apprehend a probationer/parolee for a supervision violation (e.g., drug possession, failed urinalysis).

In terms of being armed with a firearm, 42% ($N=75$) and 39% ($N=61$) from each sample indicated they are not authorized to carry, 28% ($N=50$) and 34% ($N=53$) indicated it was optional, and 22% ($N=39$) and 15% ($N=23$) noted it was a requirement of the agency.

Differences between samples in terms of nonlethal force was minimal as well with a larger proportion of respondents from the leadership sample (48%, $N=85$) noting the use of nonlethal force was optional compared to 34% ($N=53$) of the officer sample. Finally, officers provided significantly higher estimates in terms of probationers/parolees under supervision ($M=8,287$, $SD=18,662$) than leaders ($M=3,052$, $SD=13,927$), despite reflecting similar estimates in terms of the number of officers in their agency at an average of about 400 for both samples.

Table 7 contains demographic information concerning the respondents' gender and experience levels. About half of the respondents in each sample were male at 56% ($N=99$) and 46% ($N=72$). Note, a small number of respondents chose not to identify their gender at 7% and 12%, respectively. In terms of experience, respondents were asked four questions that looked at years in current position, years at the department, years in probation/parole, and years in criminal justice. On average respondents for both samples had worked in their current position for about ten years. Leadership respondents had worked slightly longer at their department with an average

of about 19 years compared to officers at 16 years. Intuitively, these differences are reflected further in the level of experience in the probation/parole field and criminal justice as well.

Leaders on average had worked in the field of probation/parole 23 years and in the field of criminal justice for 25 years. Officers, on the other hand, had worked on average 20 years in probation/parole and 22 years in criminal justice.

Table 7

Demographical Leadership/Officer Sample Comparison

Variable	Leadership		Officers	
	N	%	N	%
Gender				
Male	99	56%	72	46%
Female	64	37%	65	42%
Missing	13	7%	19	12%
Years at Current Position	161	<i>M</i> =10.61 <i>SD</i> =7.90	138	<i>M</i> =9.85 <i>SD</i> =6.78
Years at Department	163	<i>M</i> =18.79 <i>SD</i> =9.37	138	<i>M</i> =16.20 <i>SD</i> =7.53
Years in Probation/Parole	163	<i>M</i> =22.62 <i>SD</i> =8.71	138	<i>M</i> =16.88 <i>SD</i> =7.98
Years in Criminal Justice	161	<i>M</i> =24.93 <i>SD</i> =8.34	138	<i>M</i> =19.32 <i>SD</i> =7.68

Note, for further bivariate and multivariate analyses, the response set for geographic representation and departmental function are treated as unique items, respectively. In the survey respondents were provided the option to *mark all that apply* to these questions meaning overlap exist among the items, they are not dummy codes. Due to low variation, other was removed from further analysis under departmental function for each sample. In addition, parole was removed from the leadership sample, but retained for the officer sample. Alternatively, Branch of government was reduced to a dichotomous measure for each sample, with 1 representing whether the respondent's agency resided under the judiciary. Jurisdiction level was reduced to a dichotomous measure with 1 representing county-based jurisdictions. Population served was recoded as a dichotomous measure with 1 representing those agencies that solely supervised

juveniles. Sworn status was recoded as dichotomous measure with 1 representing those agencies that possessed sworn status for its officers. Firearms use and nonlethal force use were each collapsed to a dichotomous measure with 1 representing those respondents in which their agency permitted their use.

Research Question #1

The remaining findings are organized by research question. The first research question asked, “What partnership typologies are the most prevalent between police and probation/parole agencies?” There are five overarching typologies including enhanced supervision, fugitive apprehension, information sharing, interagency problem solving, and specialized enforcement (Parent & Snyder, 1999). To reiterate, these partnership types are not mutually exclusive and a single partnership may represent several of these archetypes. Nonetheless, six sub-types were included in the study. First, enhanced supervision partnerships involve ride alongs, targeted beats/districts (geographical assignment), targeted high crime areas, targeted high risk probationers/parolees, joint home visits, and/or joint patrols. Fugitive apprehension units represent a very specific type of partnership aimed at securing absconding probationers or parolees. Information sharing partnerships represent the broadest category of partnership and include any exchange of intelligence information. Interagency problem solving partnerships or multiagency initiatives concern large partnerships such as CeaseFire. Varieties of specialized enforcement partnerships can exist that pertain to a specific crime problems or concerns such as sex offender supervision. Finally, respondents were asked about partnerships in training and other initiatives not captured within these typologies.

Looking at the leadership sample results in Table 8, it is apparent that enhanced supervision partnerships are rarely formalized. Interestingly, over 60% of respondents indicated

they possess informal partnerships designed to target high risk probationers/parolees and conduct joint home visits. However, fewer indicated they conduct joint patrols, ride alongs, or target high crime areas in a collaborative manner with law enforcement.

Fugitive apprehension and information sharing partnerships possessed the greatest formalization at 23% ($N=41$) and 19% ($N=33$). Over 50% of the respondents also noted each typology was represented by informal partnerships. Very few noted *not* possessing a fugitive apprehension or information sharing partnership with law enforcement.

Interagency problem solving partnerships were, like enhanced supervision, prevalent but predominantly informal at 64% ($N=114$). Specialized enforcement partnerships were generally rare across all subtypes with 38%-67% noting no such partnerships existed within their agency. Less than 10% in any single category were formal, though a large number of informal partnerships were noted for sex offender supervision (53%, $N=93$), drug possession (51%, $N=90$), and drug trafficking (48%, $N=85$). Finally, other partnerships were rarely noted but over 50% of the respondents indicated they possess partnerships pertaining to training collaboration needs.

Table 8

Police-Probation/Parole Partnership Prevalence (Leadership)

Partnership Type	Formal		Informal		No Partnership		Missing	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Enhanced Supervision								
Ride Alongs	18	10%	75	42%	81	46%	3	2%
Beats/Districts	7	4%	48	27%	118	67%	4	2%
Targeting High Crime Areas	16	9%	75	42%	84	48%	2	1%
Targeting High Risk Probationer/Parolees	29	16%	107	61%	38	22%	3	2%
Joint Home Visits	25	14%	112	63%	37	21%	3	2%
Joint Patrols	9	5%	54	31%	109	62%	5	3%
Fugitive/Absconder Apprehension	41	23%	98	55%	34	19%	4	2%
Information and Intelligence Sharing	33	19%	131	74%	9	5%	4	2%
Interagency Problem Solving								
Interagency Problem Solving	24	14%	114	64%	36	20%	3	2%
Multi-agency Initiatives	22	12%	64	36%	87	49%	4	2%
Specialized Enforcement								
Sex Offender Supervision	9	5%	93	53%	71	40%	4	2%
Domestic Violence Supervision	7	4%	73	41%	93	53%	4	2%
Gang Interdiction	16	9%	53	30%	104	59%	4	2%
Bar Checks	5	3%	49	28%	119	67%	4	2%
Gun Removal	10	6%	69	39%	93	53%	5	3%
Drug Possession	16	9%	90	51%	67	38%	4	2%
Drug Trafficking	15	9%	85	48%	73	41%	4	2%
Quality of Life Issues	5	3%	62	36%	105	59%	5	3%
Other								
Interagency Training Initiatives	20	11%	106	60%	48	27%	3	2%
Other	13	7%	27	15%	73	41%	64	36%

Note, to streamline interpretation going forward and reduce the number of variables contained within the study each of the subtypes were collapsed so they represent one overarching typology. The results for the leadership sample are displayed in Table 9. It should be noted that the study, as designed, only considers the presence, or lack thereof, of a given partnership typology. It does not speak to the number of individual partnerships or law enforcement agencies engaged in a partnership. As reflected previously, informal partnerships were prevalent across all typologies ranging from 55%-74% and formal partnerships were rare but present as indicated by 18-24% of respondents. When collapsed, it is clear that the majority of agencies represented within the leadership sample engage in each type of partnership at similar levels. Similar patterns were recorded for the officer sample, as demonstrated in Tables 10 and 11.

For use in further bivariate and multivariate analyses each typology was dummy coded according to formal or informal partnership prevalence, with the lack of partnerships representing the reference category. Due to low variation, the enhanced supervision and information sharing typologies were reduced to dichotomous measures with 1 representing the presence of formalized partnerships, respectively.

Table 9

Police-Probation/Parole Partnership Prevalence by Typology (Leadership)

Partnership Type	Formal		Informal		No Partnership		Missing	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Enhanced Supervision	42	24%	119	67%	14	8%	2	1%
Fugitive/Absconder Apprehension	41	23%	98	55%	34	19%	4	2%
Information and Intelligence Sharing	33	19%	131	74%	9	5%	4	2%
Interagency Problem Solving	39	22%	107	61%	29	16%	2	1%
Specialized Enforcement	38	22%	117	66%	18	10%	4	2%
Other	32	18%	100	56%	42	24%	3	2%

Table 10

Police-Probation/Parole Partnership Prevalence (Officers)

Partnership Type	Formal		Informal		No Partnership		Missing	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Enhanced Supervision								
Ride Alongs	21	14%	49	31%	83	53%	3	2%
Beats/Districts	8	5%	29	19%	117	76%	2	1%
Targeting High Crime Areas	13	8%	32	21%	107	69%	4	3%
Targeting High Risk Probationer/Parolees	27	17%	78	50%	49	31%	2	1%
Joint Home Visits	35	22%	70	45%	50	32%	1	1%
Joint Patrols	4	3%	31	20%	119	76%	2	1%
Fugitive/Absconder Apprehension	54	35%	63	40%	36	23%	3	2%
Information and Intelligence Sharing	58	37%	88	56%	10	6%	0	0%
Interagency Problem Solving								
Interagency Problem Solving	42	27%	69	44%	43	28%	2	1%
Multi-agency Initiatives	29	19%	30	19%	94	60%	3	2%
Specialized Enforcement								
Sex Offender Supervision	36	23%	59	38%	60	39%	1	1%
Domestic Violence Supervision	13	8%	47	30%	94	60%	2	1%
Gang Interdiction	25	16%	46	30%	83	53%	2	1%
Bar Checks	4	3%	29	19%	121	79%	2	1%
Gun Removal	15	10%	51	33%	88	56%	2	1%
Drug Possession	12	8%	65	42%	77	49%	2	1%
Drug Trafficking	10	6%	43	28%	101	65%	2	1%
Quality of Life Issues	4	3%	32	21%	118	76%	2	1%
Other								
Interagency Training Initiatives	35	22%	63	40%	55	35%	3	2%
Other	11	7%	11	7%	83	53%	51	33%

Table 11

Police-Probation/Parole Partnership Prevalence by Typology (Officers)

Partnership Type	Formal		Informal		No Partnership		Missing	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Enhanced Supervision	53	34%	79	51%	23	15%	1	1%
Fugitive/Absconder Apprehension	54	35%	63	40%	36	23%	3	2%
Information and Intelligence Sharing	58	37%	88	56%	10	6%	0	0%
Interagency Problem Solving	55	35%	61	39%	39	25%	1	1%
Specialized Enforcement	57	37%	65	42%	33	21%	1	1%
Other	43	28%	56	36%	54	35%	3	2%

However, to definitively answer the first research question requires a slightly different approach. Recall we are interested in the number of *agencies* engaged in partnerships. Table 12 displays the results when the data is aggregated by agency across both samples. When aggregated, 231 agencies were represented across the 333 respondents. About 36% ($N=83$) of these agencies possessed formal enhanced supervision partnerships, 33% ($N=76$) formal fugitive apprehension units, 30% ($N=69$) formal information sharing partnerships, 33% ($N=77$) interagency problem solving partnerships, 34% ($N=78$) specialized enforcement partnerships, and 27% ($N=63$) other partnerships. About 56% ($N=130$) possess informal enhanced supervision partnerships, 50% ($N=116$) informal fugitive apprehension units, 65% ($N=150$) informal information sharing partnerships, 50% ($N=116$) informal interagency problem solving partnerships, 54% ($N=124$) informal specialized enforcement partnerships, and 47% ($N=109$) other informal partnerships. Simply put, about a third of the agencies reported possessing formal partnerships and about half reported possessing informal partnerships with law enforcement. Once collapsed by agency, it is apparent that few agencies do *not* engage in a given partnership type.

Table 12

Police-Probation/Parole Partnership Prevalence (collapsed) by Agency Across Both Samples

Partnership Type	Formal		Informal		No Partnership		Missing	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Enhanced Supervision	83	36%	130	56%	16	7%	2	1%
Fugitive/Absconder Apprehension	76	33%	116	50%	34	15%	5	2%
Information and Intelligence Sharing	69	30%	150	65%	9	4%	3	1%
Interagency Problem Solving	77	33%	116	50%	36	16%	2	1%
Specialized Enforcement	78	34%	124	54%	25	11%	4	2%
Other	63	27%	109	47%	56	24%	3	1%

Research Questions #2 and #3

Eight items were included in the survey that measured respondents' openness and desirability for partnering with law enforcement agencies. Recall the second and third research questions asked, "To what extent are those in leadership [or frontline officer] positions in probation/parole agencies favorable to engaging in these partnerships?" Tables 13 and 14 display the frequency distribution for each respective item for each sample. Note all items are positively worded and associated with a 5-point Likert scale. With exception to item QIV_7, "our agency's executives and supervisors are currently seeking new partnership opportunities with law enforcement," the highest proportion of respondents agreed or strongly agreed to all items for both the leadership and officer sample, indicating there is considerable interest in partnerships with law enforcement. In the case of QIV_7, over 40% of the leadership sample and 30% of the officer sample indicated they neither agreed nor disagreed that new partnerships with law enforcement were being actively sought after. Further, 16% of the leadership sample and 33% of the officer sample disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. This distinction is noteworthy and implies that even though there is an interest in partnerships, it is perhaps a passive interest. In other words, individual officers and their respective agencies appear to be open to partnerships, but only if initiated by law enforcement. Note item QIV_10 indicates, with over 70% of the leadership sample and 50% of the officer sample in agreement, that agency

executives and supervisors would be interested in partnerships if approached by a law enforcement agency.

Note, for further bivariate and multivariate analyses, these eight items were summed to create a favorability to partnership index ranging from 8 to 40, with a mean of 31.19 and a standard deviation of 3.86 for the leadership sample and a mean of 29.18 and a standard deviation of 4.72 for the officer sample.

Exploratory factor analysis, using principal component analysis, was conducted to assess the validity of the index and its ability to approximate the construct in question (DeVellis, 2012). Eigenvalues and scree plots were examined for each sample. For the leadership sample, three components were extracted which accounted for 72% of the variance (43%, 16%, 13%), possessing eigenvalues of 3.447, 1.297, and 1.013. Using varimax rotation, two items possessed loadings in excess of .700 (QIV_11, QIV_12), though all items were .460 or higher, for the first extracted component. The second component possessed loadings in excess of .600 for two items (QIV_2, QIV_3), and the final component possessed loading over .550 for two items (QII_9, QII_20). For the officer sample, two components were extracted which accounted for 60% of the variance (46%, 14%), possessing eigenvalues of 3.704 and 1.146. Using varimax rotation, three items loaded above .700 (QIV_10, QIV_11, QIV_12) on the first component. However, no items loaded above .700 for the second component.

Table 13

Favorability to Partnership Item Frequencies (Leadership)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QII_9	I would be in favor of the partnership with law enforcement agencies becoming standard operating procedure in my department	41	23%	86	49%	29	16%	8	5%	1	1%	3	2%	9	5%
QII_20	Agency staff have strongly supported the partnership(s).	27	15%	89	50%	32	18%	7	4%	0	0%	10	6%	12	7%
QIV_2	Our organization's core culture is in alignment with the ideals which are at the core of a successful inter-agency public safety alliance.	39	22%	92	52%	27	15%	4	2%	2	1%	0	0%	13	7%
QIV_3	The personal beliefs, principles, and values of our organization's executives are in alignment with the ideals which are at the core of a successful inter-agency public safety alliance.	44	25%	92	52%	26	15%	1	1%	1	1%	0	0%	13	7%
QIV_7	Our agency's executives and supervisors are currently seeking new partnership opportunities with law enforcement agencies.	16	9%	41	23%	78	44%	22	12%	7	4%	0	0%	13	7%
QIV_10	Our agency's executives and supervisors would be open to joining a partnership with law enforcement if they approached them.	24	14%	107	61%	32	18%	2	1%	0	0%	0	0%	12	7%
QIV_11	Our agency's executives and supervisors are interested in any new partnerships with law enforcement agencies.	25	14%	93	53%	46	26%	1	1%	1	1%	0	0%	12	7%
QIV_12	Our agency's executives and supervisors strongly support partnership with law enforcement.	43	24%	83	47%	33	19%	6	3%	0	0%	0	0%	12	7%

Table 14

Favorability to Partnership Item Frequencies (Officers)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QII_9	I would be in favor of the partnership with law enforcement agencies becoming standard operating procedure in my department	52	33%	61	39%	21	14%	6	4%	1	1%	2	1%	13	8%
QII_20	Agency staff have strongly supported the partnership(s).	17	11%	66	42%	28	18%	13	8%	5	3%	8	5%	19	12%
QIV_2	Our organization's core culture is in alignment with the ideals which are at the core of a successful inter-agency public safety alliance.	25	16%	76	49%	28	18%	7	5%	3	2%	0	0%	17	11%
QIV_3	The personal beliefs, principles, and values of our organization's executives are in alignment with the ideals which are at the core of a successful inter-agency public safety alliance.	25	16%	69	44%	22	14%	20	13%	3	2%	0	0%	17	11%
QIV_7	Our agency's executives and supervisors are currently seeking new partnership opportunities with law enforcement agencies.	12	8%	25	16%	51	33%	37	24%	14	9%	0	0%	17	11%
QIV_10	Our agency's executives and supervisors would be open to joining a partnership with law enforcement if they approached them.	20	13%	70	45%	34	22%	9	6%	4	3%	0	0%	19	12%
QIV_11	Our agency's executives and supervisors are interested in any new partnerships with law enforcement agencies.	14	9%	60	39%	48	31%	13	8%	3	2%	0	0%	18	12%
QIV_12	Our agency's executives and supervisors strongly support partnership with law enforcement.	20	13%	65	42%	37	24%	13	8%	2	1%	0	0%	19	12%

Research Question #4

Up to this point the findings have revealed that partnerships, especially informal partnerships, are very prevalent for probation/parole agencies, and the majority of those in leadership and frontline officer positions remain, albeit with some apparent passiveness, interested in working with law enforcement. The final research question asked, “What variables, informed by the empirical literature, most influence these perceptions?” To answer this question numerous concepts were included in the study. These concepts are each examined individually across the leadership and officer samples, and then their association with favorableness towards partnership perceptions examined at the bivariate and multivariate level.

Respect for Officer Role

Six items were included that pertained to increased respect for the police officer, respect from the police officer, as well as potential respect earned from probationers/parolees in association with a police-probation/parole partnership. As presented in Tables 15 and 16, respondents agreed heavily with the notion that they had a greater appreciation for the role of law enforcement and that police were respectful when conducting home visits or arrests associated with a partnership. Less than 10% from each sample disagreed with these sentiments. Interestingly, respondents had mixed opinions concerning the impact of law enforcement presence to influence the respect provided by probationers/parolees towards their supervising officer. Results were similar across samples, about 26% ($N=46$) of the leadership sample and 18% ($N=28$) of the officer sample agreed or strongly agreed, while another quarter roughly for the leadership sample (27%, $N=47$) and officer sample (29%, $N=45$) disagreed or strongly disagreed.

For further bivariate and multivariate analyses, these six items were summed to create a respect for officer role index ranging from 6 to 30, with a mean of 23.87 and a standard deviation of 3.28 for the leadership sample and a mean of 23.54 and a standard deviation of 3.18 for the officer sample.

Exploratory factor analysis was conducted to assess the validity of the index. For the leadership sample, one component was extracted which accounted for 56% of variance, possessing an eigenvalue of 3.353. Two components were extracted from the officer sample which accounted for 71% of the variance (54%, 17%) with eigenvalues of 3.240 and 1.010. Varimax rotation revealed all items with exception of one (QII_24) loaded at .699 or higher for the first component. Only that one item loaded above .700 for the second component.

Table 15

Respect for Officer Role Item Frequencies (Leadership)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QII_1	Working with law enforcement agencies has given me a greater appreciation for their job.	70	40%	75	42%	20	11%	1	1%	0	0%	2	1%	9	5%
QII_5	I was comfortable working with law enforcement agencies.	68	38%	84	48%	10	6%	3	2%	2	1%	0	0%	10	6%
QII_15	Police have been respectful during street contacts in association with our partnership(s).	36	20%	83	47%	33	19%	4	2%	1	1%	9	5%	11	6%
QII_16	Police have been respectful during home visits in association with our partnership(s).	40	23%	84	48%	21	12%	1	1%	1	1%	19	11%	11	6%
QII_17	Police have been respectful during arrests of probationers/parolees in association with our partnership(s).	42	24%	91	51%	21	12%	4	2%	1	1%	7	4%	11	6%
QII_24	Probationers/parolees treated their supervision officer with more respect when in the presence of a police officer.	12	7%	34	19%	60	34%	42	24%	5	3%	13	7%	11	6%

Table 16

Respect for Officer Role Item Frequencies (Officers)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QII_1	Working with law enforcement agencies has given me a greater appreciation for their job.	56	36%	70	45%	14	9%	2	1%	2	1%	1	1%	11	7%
QII_5	I was comfortable working with law enforcement agencies.	54	35%	72	46%	10	6%	3	2%	1	1%	4	3%	12	8%
QII_15	Police have been respectful during street contacts in association with our partnership(s).	27	17%	70	45%	28	18%	2	1%	0	0%	10	6%	19	12%
QII_16	Police have been respectful during home visits in association with our partnership(s).	32	21%	68	44%	17	11%	4	3%	0	0%	15	10%	20	13%
QII_17	Police have been respectful during arrests of probationers/parolees in association with our partnership(s).	34	22%	81	52%	15	10%	2	1%	0	0%	5	3%	19	12%
QII_24	Probationers/parolees treated their supervision officer with more respect when in the presence of a police officer.	8	5%	20	13%	54	35%	32	21%	13	8%	10	6%	19	12%

Intrinsic Benefit

Four items concerned respondent perceptions of benefits internal to their agency including intelligence information, the ability to more proactively supervise probationers/parolees, as well benefits to the partner agency (Tables 17 and 18). Results were very positive with less than 7% from either sample disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with a given item and less than 18% feeling indifferent.

These four items were summed to create an intrinsic benefit index ranging from 4 to 20, with a mean of 16.62 and a standard deviation of 2.20 for the leadership sample and a mean of 16.31 and a standard deviation of 2.38 for the officer sample.

Exploratory factor analysis revealed one component that accounted for 58% of the variance associated with this combination of items within the leadership sample, possessing an eigenvalue of 2.328. These results were similar for the officer sample, with one component extracted and accounting for 58% of the variance and possessing an eigenvalue of 2.320.

Outcome/Extrinsic Benefit

Four items measured respondents views towards outcomes derived from partnerships with law enforcement including reduced crime, reducing recidivism and positively impacting the community and the lives of probationers/parolees (Tables 19 and 20). Again, few (less than 12%) from either sample disagreed with any of the statements. However, there appears to be a clear sense of uncertainty in regards to partnerships' impact on reducing recidivism and crime. Specifically, 45% ($N=79$) of the leadership sample and 51% ($N=80$) of the officer sample could neither agree nor disagree that partnerships with law enforcement impact recidivism, while 36% ($N=63$) of the leadership sample and 39% ($N=60$) of the officer sample could neither agree nor disagree that partnerships help reduce crime.

These four items were summed to create an extrinsic benefit index ranging from 4 to 20, with a mean of 15.27 and a standard deviation of 2.39 for the leadership sample and a mean of 13.98 and a standard deviation of 2.58 for the officer sample.

Exploratory factor analysis resulted in the extraction of one component, with an eigenvalue of 2.663, which accounted for 66% of the variance for the leadership sample. Again, similar results were found for the officer sample with one component extracted with an eigenvalue of 2.592 that accounted for 65% of the variance associated with this combination of items.

Table 17

Intrinsic Benefit Item Frequencies (Leadership)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QII_2	Working with law enforcement agencies has been a positive experience.	53	30%	98	55%	14	8%	1	1%	0	0%	2	1%	9	5%
QII_7	The information received from law enforcement agencies as a result of the partnership was helpful.	47	27%	96	54%	17	10%	1	1%	0	0%	7	4%	9	5%
QII_10	The partnership with law enforcement agencies is an effective method for supervising offenders.	49	28%	92	52%	15	9%	4	2%	2	1%	3	2%	12	7%
QII_14	Police have become more familiar with the probationer/parolee population because of the partnership(s).	42	24%	94	53%	24	14%	2	1%	0	0%	4	2%	11	6%

Table 18

Intrinsic Benefit Item Frequencies (Officers)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QII_2	Working with law enforcement agencies has been a positive experience.	47	30%	78	50%	16	10%	2	1%	2	1%	1	1%	10	6%
QII_7	The information received from law enforcement agencies as a result of the partnership was helpful.	36	23%	88	56%	10	6%	5	3%	1	1%	4	3%	12	8%
QII_10	The partnership with law enforcement agencies is an effective method for supervising offenders.	43	28%	71	46%	22	14%	3	2%	1	1%	4	3%	12	8%
QII_14	Police have become more familiar with the probationer/parolee population because of the partnership(s).	30	19%	66	42%	27	17%	6	4%	3	2%	5	3%	19	12%

Table 19

Outcome/Extrinsic Benefit Item Frequencies (Leadership)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QII_4	The field activities with law enforcement agencies have reduced crime.	26	15%	61	35%	63	36%	3	2%	0	0%	13	7%	11	6%
QII_12	The partnership(s) have had a positive impact on the community.	42	24%	85	48%	33	19%	0	0%	0	0%	6	3%	11	6%
QII_13	The partnership(s) have had a positive impact on the probationers/parolees.	35	20%	82	46%	41	23%	3	2%	1	1%	4	2%	11	6%
QII_23	The partnership(s) with law enforcement have impacted recidivism rates in our jurisdiction(s).	15	9%	50	28%	79	45%	6	3%	2	1%	14	8%	11	6%

Table 20

Outcome/Extrinsic Benefit Item Frequencies (Officers)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QII_4	The field activities with law enforcement agencies have reduced crime.	12	8%	48	31%	60	39%	8	5%	2	1%	12	8%	14	9%
QII_12	The partnership(s) have had a positive impact on the community.	28	18%	68	44%	31	20%	3	2%	1	1%	6	4%	19	12%
QII_13	The partnership(s) have had a positive impact on the probationers/parolees.	16	10%	56	36%	49	31%	9	6%	1	1%	6	4%	19	12%
QII_23	The partnership(s) with law enforcement have impacted recidivism rates in our jurisdiction(s).	6	4%	21	14%	80	51%	11	7%	6	4%	12	8%	20	13%

Role Conflict/Mission Distortion

Three items measured perceptions of role conflict and mission distortion. In essence, these items concern the extent to which respondents felt they were experiencing pressure to adopt a more policing orientation and to what extent the partnerships were leading to conflicts resulting from the goals of the respective agencies (Tables 21 and 22). Note the first item possesses a positive orientation whereas the subsequent items are negatively worded. Most agreed or strongly agreed working with law enforcement complimented their agency's goals. Most disagreed or strongly disagreed with the notion that the roles between police and probation/parole were confused. These results, consistent across samples, imply mission distortion is generally not a problem with partnership, but the differing mission and goals of the respective agencies does lead to some conflicts.

These three items were summed to create a role conflict/mission distortion index ranging from 3 to 15, with a mean of 11.26 and a standard deviation of 2.08 for the leadership sample and a mean of 10.94 and a standard deviation of 2.21 for the officer sample.

Exploratory factor analysis resulted in the extraction of one component for the leadership sample with an eigenvalue of 1.751 that explained 58% of the variance. Results were similar for the officer sample with one component extracted with an eigenvalue of 1.737 that explained 58% of the variance.

Table 21

Role Conflict/Mission Distortion Item Frequencies (Leadership)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QII_3	The roles of law enforcement agencies and my department working in partnership compliment each other.	62	35%	90	51%	12	7%	3	2%	0	0%	1	1%	9	5%
QII_6	The roles of law enforcement agencies and my department working in partnerships were often confused.	2	1%	27	15%	33	19%	75	42%	24	14%	6	3%	10	6%
QII_8	There were conflicts in the roles of police and my department.	2	1%	36	20%	36	20%	60	34%	24	14%	9	5%	10	6%

Table 22

Role Conflict/Mission Distortion Item Frequencies (Officers)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QII_3	The roles of law enforcement agencies and my department working in partnership compliment each other.	41	26%	76	49%	20	13%	6	4%	0	0%	1	1%	12	8%
QII_6	The roles of law enforcement agencies and my department working in partnerships were often confused.	6	4%	23	15%	31	20%	59	38%	18	12%	6	4%	13	8%
QII_8	There were conflicts in the roles of police and my department.	4	3%	29	19%	27	17%	57	37%	19	12%	7	5%	13	8%

Mission Creep

A single item measured the issue of mission creep. Respondents were asked, “Because of the partnership(s), our role has been continually expanding to tasks outside of probation/parole work (e.g., coordinating meetings).” About 14% ($N=26$) of the leadership sample and 17% ($N=26$) of the officer sample agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, while 23% of the leadership sample and 25% ($N=39$) of the officer sample were indifferent, and 48% ($N=89$) of the leadership sample and 40% ($N=63$) of the officer sample disagreed or strongly disagreed. This item was recoded as a dichotomous measure with 1 representing those respondents that indicated they felt they were experiencing an issue of mission creep.

Leadership Support

Eight items concerned the theme of sound leadership and clear goals (Tables 23 and 24). A majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their partnership(s) included common goals that were supported by law enforcement. However, fewer indicated their partnership(s) possessed clear goals and objectives. A sense of uncertainty permeates the responses to items QII_21, QII_22, and QII_25, with nearly a third neither agreeing nor disagreeing with statements concerning the presence of measureable goals, clear documentation to measure achievement, or resistance to forming concrete goals. Generally about a third of respondents felt they lack clear quantifiable goals and objectives. The final three items (QIV_4, QIV_5, QIV_6) pertain specifically to leadership’s interest and support of partnerships. Across all three items the majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the respective statements, looking favorability towards agency leadership. These patterns hold true for each sample, though a greater proportion of the officer sample tended to disagree with the notion that leadership held an interest in and supported partnerships.

These eight items were summed to create a leadership support index ranging from 8 to 40, with a mean of 29.08 and a standard deviation of 4.00 for the leadership sample and a mean of 26.80 and a standard deviation of 4.88 for the officer sample.

Exploratory factor analysis resulted in the extraction of three components for the leadership sample. The components accounted for 71% of the variance (38%, 21%, 13%) with eigenvalues of 3.001, 1.639, and 1.069. Using varimax rotation three items loaded above .700 on the first component (QII_19, QII_21, QII_22), three above .700 on the second component (QIV_4, QIV_5, QIV_6), and one above .700 on the third component (QII_25). For the officer sample, two components were extracted that accounted for 63% (40%, 22%) of the variance with eigenvalues of 3.229 and 1.783. Using varimax rotation three items loaded above .700 for the first component (QIV_4, QIV_5, QIV_6), and three above .700 for the second component (QII_19, QII_21, QII_22).

Stalking Horse

Two items inquired as to the respondents' perceptions of *stalking horse* situations in which police might abuse the partnership (Tables 25 and 26). Item QIV_8 indicates that there is some perceived concern that there may be legal implications associated with bringing law enforcement into a probationer/parolees resident during a home visit. About a third of respondents from each sample agreed with this statement, a third were indifferent, and another third disagreed. Though there may be legal concerns for home visits, the majority of respondents from each sample were not concerned with police actually abusing the partnership by using it as a means to conduct warrantless searches.

The two items were summed to create a *stalking horse* index ranging from 2 to 10, with a mean of 5.17 and a standard deviation of 1.63 for the leadership sample and a mean of 5.88 and a standard deviation of 1.95 for the officer sample.

Exploratory factor analysis revealed a single component that accounted for 70% of the variance with an eigenvalue of 1.402 for the leadership sample. The officer sample was associated with a single component that accounted for 80% of the variance with an eigenvalue of 1.601.

Rehabilitative Ideology

One item was included that asked respondents to rate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statement, “The majority of employees in our organization believe that selected groups of offenders can change their behavior and life styles and that a balanced combination of sanctions, supervision, and services can assist them in doing so.” An overwhelming majority from each sample agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. The item was recoded as a dichotomous measure for further bivariate and multivariate analyses.

Table 23

Leadership Support Item Frequencies (Leadership)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QII_18	The partnership(s) include common goals that are supported by law enforcement and our department.	38	22%	83	47%	27	15%	6	3%	2	1%	10	6%	11	6%
QII_19	The partnership(s) possess clear goals and objectives.	15	9%	56	32%	58	33%	21	12%	2	1%	14	8%	11	6%
QII_21	The partnership(s) have done a good job of documenting the impact of its actions.	14	8%	34	19%	60	34%	40	23%	0	0%	17	10%	12	7%
QII_22	My agency had concrete measureable goals to judge the success of its actions.	6	3%	25	14%	56	32%	55	31%	5	3%	18	10%	12	7%
QII_25	There was resistance by agency executives and supervisors to the goals and activities of the partnership(s) with law enforcement agencies.	3	2%	12	7%	45	25%	66	37%	19	11%	20	11%	12	7%
QIV_4	Our agency's executives and supervisors know what it will take to create and maintain an inter-agency public safety alliance in our jurisdiction, and they are committed to doing so.	40	23%	63	36%	51	29%	5	3%	3	2%	0	0%	15	9%
QIV_5	Our agency's executives and supervisors look beyond our short term interests and make important decisions (e.g., budget requests or resource allocations) based on what will make our community safer.	46	26%	72	41%	35	20%	7	4%	4	2%	0	0%	13	7%
QIV_6	Our agency's executives and supervisors will encourage and support our own employees to work together with the employees of law enforcement when dealing with the issues or problems confronting an inter-agency public safety alliance.	50	28%	91	51%	19	11%	2	1%	2	1%	0	0%	13	7%

Table 24

Leadership Support Item Frequencies (Officers)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QII_18	The partnership(s) include common goals that are supported by law enforcement and our department.	27	17%	75	48%	19	12%	6	4%	2	1%	9	6%	18	12%
QII_19	The partnership(s) possess clear goals and objectives.	11	7%	48	31%	44	28%	19	12%	5	3%	10	6%	19	12%
QII_21	The partnership(s) have done a good job of documenting the impact of its actions.	9	6%	25	16%	50	32%	29	19%	11	7%	13	8%	19	12%
QII_22	My agency had concrete measureable goals to judge the success of its actions.	3	2%	17	11%	49	31%	34	22%	20	13%	14	9%	19	12%
QII_25	There was resistance by agency executives and supervisors to the goals and activities of the partnership(s) with law enforcement agencies.	7	5%	18	12%	46	30%	32	21%	20	13%	14	9%	19	12%
QIV_4	Our agency's executives and supervisors know what it will take to create and maintain an inter-agency public safety alliance in our jurisdiction, and they are committed to doing so.	15	10%	52	33%	35	22%	23	15%	11	7%	0	0%	20	13%
QIV_5	Our agency's executives and supervisors look beyond our short term interests and make important decisions (e.g., budget requests or resource allocations) based on what will make our community safer.	19	12%	63	40%	27	17%	25	16%	5	3%	0	0%	17	11%
QIV_6	Our agency's executives and supervisors will encourage and support our own employees to work together with the employees of law enforcement when dealing with the issues or problems confronting an inter-agency public safety alliance.	25	16%	65	42%	28	18%	15	10%	6	4%	0	0%	17	11%

Table 25

Stalking Horse Item Frequencies (Leadership)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QIV_8	Our agency's executives and supervisors are concerned about potential legal ramifications of bringing police officers into a probationer/parolees residence during a home visit.	6	3%	34	19%	48	27%	56	32%	19	11%	0	0%	14	8%
QIV_9	Our agency's executives and supervisors believe that police officers are likely to abuse knowledge of a probationer/parolee's supervision status to conduct warrantless searches of their person/property.	4	2%	18	10%	45	25%	82	46%	16	9%	0	0%	12	7%

Table 26

Stalking Horse Item Frequencies (Officers)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		N/A		Missing	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
QIV_8	Our agency's executives and supervisors are concerned about potential legal ramifications of bringing police officers into a probationer/parolees residence during a home visit.	17	11%	36	23%	40	26%	32	21%	14	9%	0	0%	17	11%
QIV_9	Our agency's executives and supervisors believe that police officers are likely to abuse knowledge of a probationer/parolee's supervision status to conduct warrantless searches of their person/property.	11	7%	17	11%	51	33%	50	32%	9	6%	0	0%	18	12%

Barriers to Partnership

A series of items concerning barriers to partnerships were provided only to leadership respondents. Table 27 provides a breakdown of the responses for each of the seven items. In general, a large proportion of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with each statement, ranging from 36% to 82%. The most prominent issue was the lack of funding as noted by 38% of respondents, followed by not having been approached by law enforcement (33%), knowledge of other agencies having a negative experience (18%), having a had a bad experience previously (11%), having approached law enforcement previously but receiving a negative response (8%), not viewing a partnership as valuable (6%), and having to compete with law enforcement for funding (6%). These seven items were summed to create a barriers to partnership index ranging from 7 to 35, with a mean of 16.50 and a standard deviation of 3.96.

Exploratory factor analysis resulted in the extraction of two components that accounted for 51% of the variance (34%, 16%) with eigenvalues of 2.408 and 1.151. Using varimax rotation, two items loaded above .700 for the first component (QIII_5, QIII_6), and one item for the second component (QIII_1).

Table 27

Barriers to Partnership Item Frequencies (Leadership only)

Item #	Description	Strongly Agree		Agree		Neither Agree nor Disagree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		Missing	
		<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
QIII_1	We do not have enough funding/resources (e.g., staffing) to engage in a partnership with a law enforcement agency.	19	11%	43	24%	43	24%	50	28%	8	5%	14	8%
QIII_2	We have not been approached by a law enforcement agency.	11	6%	43	24%	28	16%	60	34%	21	12%	14	8%
QIII_3	We approached law enforcement to build a partnership, but the response was negative.	5	3%	8	5%	42	24%	77	44%	32	18%	13	7%
QIII_4	I do not think partnering with a law enforcement agency would be of much use to my agency.	3	2%	6	3%	18	10%	88	50%	49	28%	13	7%
QIII_5	I had a bad experience with law enforcement in the past.	2	1%	16	9%	20	11%	79	45%	47	27%	13	7%
QIII_6	I heard of other agencies having negative experiences in partnerships with law enforcement.	1	1%	27	15%	30	17%	73	41%	33	19%	13	7%
QIII_7	Law enforcement agencies compete with our department for funding.	2	1%	8	5%	21	12%	96	54%	37	21%	13	7%

Bivariate and Multivariate Analyses

A correlations matrix pertaining to the leadership sample is provided in Table 28. At the bivariate level, leadership perceptions of favorableness to partnership with law enforcement agencies were most strongly influenced by executive support with a direct association ($r = .706$, $p < .01$), followed by perceived intrinsic benefits ($r = .618$, $p < .01$), extrinsic benefits ($r = .617$, $p < .01$), respect for officer's role ($r = .582$, $p < .01$), an indirect association with barriers to partnership ($r = -.471$, $p < .01$), mission creep ($r = .388$, $p < .01$), role conflict/mission distortion ($r = .381$, $p < .01$), an indirect association with *stalking horse* concerns ($r = -.338$, $p < .01$), experience with formal enhanced supervision partnership ($r = .301$, $p < .01$), formal specialized enforcement ($r = .259$, $p < .01$), and possessing a rehabilitative ideology ($r = .241$, $p < .01$).

Unsurprisingly, multicollinearity appears to be a threat as reflected in the high correlations between the four experience variables. Therefore, only the most inclusive measure, years worked in criminal justice, was included in further analyses. In addition, respect for officer role possessed high correlations with intrinsic and extrinsic benefits, negatively impacting the regression model, and was removed from further analysis.

In response to the limited statistical power associated with a relatively small sample size and given the large number of independent variables (Cohen, 1992), hierarchical multiple regression procedures were utilized to examine sets of variables based on agency characteristics (urban, suburban, rural, pretrial, probation, if county-based, if agency is under judiciary, if agency supervises only juveniles, if officers possess sworn status, if firearms are permitted, if nonlethal force is permitted, estimated number of officers, estimated number of probationers/parolees) and personal demographics (if male, years worked in criminal justice), partnership engagement (formal enhanced supervision, formal fugitive apprehension, informal fugitive apprehension, formal information sharing, formal interagency partnership, informal

interagency partnership, formal specialized enforcement, formal other partnership, informal other partnership), and organizational culture (rehabilitative ideology, intrinsic benefit, extrinsic benefit, role conflict/mission distortion, mission creep, leadership support, *stalking horse* concerns, barriers). Three models and a final model were run, with each model retaining variables found significant in the prior model beginning with agency characteristics and personal demographics, then to partnership engagement, and finally organizational culture variables. Individual variables that were not significant or failed to improve the model were removed at each step. By removing irrelevant variables the concerns of statistical power were addressed (see Hair et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2008; Miller et al., 2009; Nosek et al., 2006). Table 29 reveals the results of the hierarchical multiple regression analyses for the leadership sample.

The first model included agency characteristics and personal demographics resulting in a nonsignificant model ($F = 0.466$, $df = 15$, $p = .945$) and no significant predictors, explaining less than 14% of the variance in partnership favorability ($R^2 = .137$). The second model examined the impact of partnership engagement on partnership favorability. The model was found to be significant ($F = 3.054$, $df = 9$, $p = .001$), explaining about 17% of the variance in the dependent variable ($R^2 = .167$, adjusted $R^2 = .112$) with two significant variables including formal enhanced supervision partnerships ($B = 2.561$, $\beta = .289$, $p = .005$) and informal interagency partnerships ($B = 2.205$, $\beta = .272$, $p = .031$). These variables were entered first in the third model to control for their association with partnership favorability and followed by eight organizational culture variables. Model 3 as a whole resulted in a significant model ($F = 16.275$, $df = 11$, $p = .001$), explaining up to 63% of the variance ($R^2 = .628$, adjusted $R^2 = .590$), with two significant predictors including extrinsic benefit ($B = 0.349$, $\beta = .229$, $p = .019$) and leadership support ($B = 0.447$, $\beta = .494$, $p = .001$). The organizational culture variables significantly increased the

prediction of partnership favorability by 51% ($\Delta F [8, 106] = 18.169, p = .001$). Note the partnership engagement variables did not retain significance and were removed from the subsequent model. The final model consisted of two significant variables, extrinsic benefit ($B = 0.490, \beta = .318, p = .001$) and leadership support ($B = 0.490, \beta = .536, p = .001$), and resulted in a significant model ($F = 82.176, df = 2, p = .001$) explaining 58% of the variance in partnership favorability ($R^2 = .576, \text{adjusted } R^2 = .569$).

Finally, several assumptions were checked (Berry, 1993). For each model it was confirmed that there was an error term zero mean, the error term was uncorrelated with the independent variables, and the dependent variable approximated a normal distribution. Though data appeared to be somewhat heteroskedastic across models it was not fatal.

Table 28

Pearson's r Correlations Matrix for Leadership Sample

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Favorability to Partnership	1												
2. Formal Enhanced Supervision	.301**	1											
3. Formal Information Sharing	.153	.449**	1										
4. Formal Fugitive Apprehension	.110	.449**	.356**	1									
5. Informal Fugitive Apprehension	-.003	-.194**	-.154*	-.612**	1								
6. Formal Specialized Enforcement	.259**	.485**	.421**	.430**	-.223**	1							
7. Informal Specialized Enforcement	-.145	-.330**	-.301**	-.286**	.365**	-.730**	1						
8. Formal Interagency Partnership	.120	.537**	.586**	.516**	-.290**	.419**	-.282**	1					
9. Informal Interagency Partnership	.028	-.337**	-.325**	-.323**	.343**	-.252**	.397**	-.657**	1				
10. Other Formal Partnership	.104	.290**	.265**	.299**	-.198**	.434**	-.315**	.317**	-.160*	1			
11. Other Informal Partnership	.072	-.073	-.107	-.139	.335**	-.152*	.359**	-.111	.316**	-.535**	1		
12. Rehabilitative Ideology	.241**	.042	.055	.099	.016	.070	-.048	.070	-.001	-.043	.070	1	
13. Respect for Officer Role	.582**	.340*	.185*	.182*	.037	.246**	-.101	.118	.062	.035	.110	.246**	1
14. Intrinsic Benefit	.618**	.257**	.133	.146	-.036	.188*	-.059	.094	.079	.057	.161*	.256**	.761**
15. Extrinsic Benefit	.617**	.384**	.217**	.251**	.009	.170*	-.041	.262**	.029	.107	.187*	.260**	.716**
16. Role Conflict/Mission Distortion	.381**	.191*	.021	.065	.046	.216**	-.096	.033	.024	-.015	.115	.205*	.435**
17. Mission Creep	.388**	.264**	.176*	.178*	-.034	.195*	-.151	.212**	-.049	.045	.179*	.082	.360**
18. Leadership Support	.706**	.403**	.206*	.249**	-.113	.354**	-.241**	.164	-.014	.180*	.051	.225*	.599**
19. Stalking Horse Concerns	-.338**	-.059	-.099	.038	-.139	-.102	-.033	-.110	.006	-.018	-.139	-.138	-.326**
20. Barriers to Partnership	-.471**	-.209**	-.068	-.121	-.046	-.165*	-.002	-.077	-.076	.017	-.132	-.136	-.377**
21. Urban	.129	.148*	.129	.244**	-.075	.163*	-.059	.181*	-.051	.141	.006	.113	.073
22. Suburban	.046	.070	-.051	.051	-.062	.111	-.094	.013	-.110	.022	-.078	-.003	.059
23. Rural	.001	.048	-.044	-.018	-.016	-.020	-.025	-.095	.109	-.117	.025	-.085	.028
24. Pretrial	-.032	-.035	-.067	.031	.019	.003	.084	.051	.091	.005	.027	.151	.038
25. Probation	-.068	.037	-.001	.033	-.085	.117	-.101	-.023	.027	-.057	.002	-.008	-.094
26. If County-based Jurisdiction	-.170	-.026	-.038	.098	-.047	.061	.040	.071	.062	.073	.047	.112	.038
27. If Agency is under Judiciary	-.024	-.023	-.136	-.023	.001	-.096	.068	-.041	.042	-.076	-.032	-.038	-.052
28. If Agency Supervises only Juveniles	.015	.100	.108	-.153	.172	-.135	.038	.000	.027	-.092	.104	-.015	.071
29. If Officers possess Sworn Status	.077	.118	.031	.236**	-.153	.093	.000	.098	.034	.158*	.016	.003	-.168
30. If Firearms are Permitted	.084	.024	-.072	.197*	-.179*	.144	-.156*	.030	-.096	.124	.024	-.063	-.076
31. If Nonlethal Force is Permitted	-.027	.029	-.077	.029	-.038	.093	-.033	-.038	.065	.084	.050	.020	-.061
32. If Male	-.012	.101	.029	.072	-.018	.109	-.173*	-.004	-.025	.169*	-.120	-.058	.027
33. Estimated Number of Officers	.024	.165*	.195*	.144	-.085	-.021	.040	.175*	-.113	.184*	-.086	-.081	.015
34. Estimated Number of Probationers/parolees	.103	.224**	.259**	.226**	-.146	.130	-.076	.066	-.003	.199*	-.084	-.025	.091
35. Years worked in Current Position	-.060	.017	.042	.040	.011	-.022	-.020	.009	-.053	-.047	-.067	.093	.072
36. Years worked at Department	.044	.113	.003	.055	-.092	.074	-.090	.012	-.010	-.005	.004	.176*	.111
37. Years worked in Probation/parole	-.015	.155*	.090	.139	-.083	.092	-.041	.140	-.064	.043	.057	.181*	-.045
38. Years worked in Criminal Justice	.070	.059	.036	.095	.001	.156*	-.090	.111	-.024	.071	.035	.186*	-.067

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 28

Pearson's r Correlations Matrix for Leadership Sample (continued)

Variable	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
1. Favorability to Partnership													
2. Formal Enhanced Supervision													
3. Formal Information Sharing													
4. Formal Fugitive Apprehension													
5. Informal Fugitive Apprehension													
6. Formal Specialized Enforcement													
7. Informal Specialized Enforcement													
8. Formal Interagency Partnership													
9. Informal Interagency Partnership													
10. Other Formal Partnership													
11. Other Informal Partnership													
12. Rehabilitative Ideology													
13. Respect for Officer Role													
14. Intrinsic Benefit	1												
15. Extrinsic Benefit	.688**	1											
16. Role Conflict/Mission Distortion	.592**	.375**	1										
17. Mission Creep	.426**	.449**	.228**	1									
18. Leadership Support	.555**	.536**	.476**	.396**	1								
19. Stalking Horse Concerns	-.411**	-.328**	-.434**	-.140	-.313**	1							
20. Barriers to Partnership	-.477**	-.365**	-.429**	-.176*	-.482**	.435**	1						
21. Urban	.102	.144	.070	.188*	.178*	-.078	-.148	1					
22. Suburban	.109	-.025	.131	.024	.165	-.005	-.122	.189*	1				
23. Rural	-.063	-.006	-.100	.005	-.070	.069	-.034	-.194**	-.077	1			
24. Pretrial	.032	.056	.018	-.046	.001	.109	-.064	.034	.094	.126	1		
25. Probation	-.102	-.115	-.025	-.051	.003	-.008	.050	.136	.091	.347**	.226**	1	
26. If County-based Jurisdiction	.061	-.027	.035	-.091	-.160	-.076	.062	.156	.157	-.125	-.100	-.191*	1
27. If Agency is under Judiciary	-.127	-.043	-.021	.024	-.128	.061	.100	-.112	-.061	-.069	.104	.327**	-.308**
28. If Agency Supervises only Juveniles	-.061	.106	-.098	-.062	-.101	-.034	-.131	-.042	-.134	.108	-.220*	-.006	-.012
29. If Officers possess Sworn Status	-.106	.052	-.030	-.047	.002	-.086	-.157*	.133	-.012	-.095	.076	-.125	.054
30. If Firearms are Permitted	-.010	.011	-.045	.188*	.137	-.002	-.063	-.012	.002	.069	.011	-.034	-.262**
31. If Nonlethal Force is Permitted	-.059	-.042	-.010	-.081	-.110	-.094	-.048	-.157*	-.103	.087	.056	-.064	-.051
32. If Male	.014	.095	.049	-.034	.131	.038	-.029	.182*	.042	.016	-.109	-.018	.156
33. Estimated Number of Officers	-.012	.104	-.078	-.087	-.017	-.073	.040	.113	-.061	-.116	-.054	.010	.197*
34. Estimated Number of Probationers/parolees	.070	.074	.047	.076	.184*	-.113	-.054	.194*	.119	-.017	-.054	.023	.243**
35. Years worked in Current Position	.014	.007	-.031	.015	-.046	.000	.030	-.107	-.013	.119	.118	.046	-.012
36. Years worked at Department	.114	-.036	.059	-.066	.010	-.015	.062	.011	.055	-.004	.029	-.042	.217*
37. Years worked in Probation/parole	.018	.015	.029	-.089	.018	-.016	.066	.094	.020	-.045	.003	.015	.242**
38. Years worked in Criminal Justice	-.006	-.034	.075	-.094	.090	-.051	-.073	.119	.083	-.006	.103	.054	.181*

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 28

Pearson's r Correlations Matrix for Leadership Sample (continued)

Variable	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38
1. Favorability to Partnership												
2. Formal Enhanced Supervision												
3. Formal Information Sharing												
4. Formal Fugitive Apprehension												
5. Informal Fugitive Apprehension												
6. Formal Specialized Enforcement												
7. Informal Specialized Enforcement												
8. Formal Interagency Partnership												
9. Informal Interagency Partnership												
10. Other Formal Partnership												
11. Other Informal Partnership												
12. Rehabilitative Ideology												
13. Respect for Officer Role												
14. Intrinsic Benefit												
15. Extrinsic Benefit												
16. Role Conflict/Mission Distortion												
17. Mission Creep												
18. Leadership Support												
19. Stalking Horse Concerns												
20. Barriers to Partnership												
21. Urban												
22. Suburban												
23. Rural												
24. Pretrial												
25. Probation												
26. If County-based Jurisdiction												
27. If Agency is under Judiciary	1											
28. If Agency Supervises only Juveniles	-.013	1										
29. If Officers possess Sworn Status	.007	-.060	1									
30. If Firearms are Permitted	-.049	-.541**	.289**	1								
31. If Nonlethal Force is Permitted	.070	-.118	.181*	.440**	1							
32. If Male	-.122	-.024	-.107	.032	-.046	1						
33. Estimated Number of Officers	-.020	-.067	.066	-.093	.045	.071	1					
34. Estimated Number of Probationers/parolees	-.288**	-.118	.135	.071	.067	.038	.294**	1				
35. Years worked in Current Position	.113	.057	-.159*	-.092	.081	-.035	.064	-.075	1			
36. Years worked at Department	-.081	.086	-.243**	-.251**	.078	-.045	.117	.094	.534**	1		
37. Years worked in Probation/parole	-.029	.051	-.038	-.127	.150	-.023	.090	.097	.469**	.708**	1	
38. Years worked in Criminal Justice	.026	-.068	.001	-.035	.137	.034	.116	.081	.456**	.567**	.805**	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 29

Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Partnership Favorability (Leadership)

Variable	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Final Model		
	B	β	p	B	β	p	B	β	p	B	β	p
<i>Agency Characteristics</i>												
Urban	1.093	0.150	0.394									
Suburban	0.691	0.092	0.582									
Rural	-0.157	-0.020	0.908									
Pretrial	-1.019	-0.142	0.403									
Probation	0.186	0.009	0.963									
If County-based Jurisdiction	-1.960	-0.229	0.266									
If Agency is under Judiciary	0.310	0.028	0.886									
If Agency Supervises only Juveniles	0.124	0.017	0.937									
If Officers possess Sworn Status	0.759	0.107	0.575									
If Firearms are Permitted	-0.783	-0.111	0.644									
If Nonlethal Force is Permitted	-0.842	-0.081	0.635									
Estimated Number of Officers	0.000	-0.008	0.962									
Estimated Number of Probationers/Parolees	0.000	0.159	0.391									
<i>Personal Demographics</i>												
If Male	0.174	0.024	0.887									
Years worked in Criminal Justice	-0.013	-0.032	0.842									
<i>Partnership Engagement</i>												
Formal Enhanced Supervision				2.561	0.289	0.005	-0.379	0.047	0.559			
Formal Fugitive Apprehension				0.130	0.013	0.890						
Informal Fugitive Apprehension				0.005	0.001	0.996						
Formal Information Sharing				0.259	0.033	0.758						
Formal Interagency Partnership				1.013	0.111	0.450	-1.038	0.121	0.246			
Informal Interagency Partnership				2.205	0.272	0.031	-0.988	-0.129	0.209			
Formal Specialized Enforcement				1.387	0.154	0.130						
Formal Other Partnership				0.713	0.072	0.514						
Informal Other Partnership				1.097	0.139	0.181						
<i>Organizational Culture</i>												
Rehabilitative Ideology							0.488	0.067	0.299			
Intrinsic Benefit							0.335	0.178	0.068			
Extrinsic Benefit							0.349	0.229	0.019	0.490	0.318	0.001
Role Conflict/Mission Distortion							-0.263	0.151	0.052			
Mission Creep							0.769	0.106	0.136			
Leadership Support							0.447	0.494	0.001	0.490	0.536	0.001
Stalking Horse Concerns							0.026	0.012	0.866			
Barriers							-0.095	0.103	0.160			
R^2	0.137			0.167			0.628			0.576		
Adjusted R^2	0.000			0.112			0.590			0.569		
F	0.466			3.054			16.275			82.176		
p	0.945			0.002			0.001			0.001		

Note. Each partnership type was transformed into a series of dummy coded variables (formal, informal, none) with exception to enhanced supervision, information sharing, and specialized enforcement which lacked adequate variation (10% or less indicated *not* possessing a partnership of this type) and was treated as single dichotomous variables (coded 1 for formal partnership). For Fugitive apprehension, interagency, and other, two variables were included for each with 1 representing formal or informal partnership using no partnership as the omitted reference category. In addition, rehabilitative ideology and mission creep were each transformed into dichotomous measures with 1 representing those who agreed or strongly agreed with the respective single-item ordinal measures. All other organizational culture variables were comprised of multi-item numeric indexes. Finally, all agency characteristics were each treated as distinct dichotomous measures with exception to the estimated number of officers and probationers/parolees which were continuous variables.

Table 30 displays the correlations matrix for the officer sample. Nine variables were found to share a significant association with favorableness to partnership in the bivariate analysis. The strongest association, as was the case for the leadership sample, was with leadership support ($r = .769, p < .01$) followed by rehabilitative ideology ($r = .471, p < .01$), extrinsic benefit ($r = .389, p < .01$), intrinsic benefit ($r = .337, p < .01$), role conflict/mission distortion ($r = .321, p < .01$), respect for officer role ($r = .303, p < .01$), an indirect association with *stalking horse* concerns ($r = -.252, p < .01$), mission creep ($r = .223, p < .05$), and experience with formal specialized enforcement ($r = .200, p < .05$).

Parole supervision, if county-based, and if under the judiciary were highly correlated. Parole is most associated with state-level executive agencies, essentially the opposite of county-based probation which is typically associated with the judiciary. As such, parole was retained while county-based and the judiciary variables were excluded from further analyses. Similar to the leadership sample regression model, only years worked in criminal justice was retained in relation to individual experience.

As was the case with the leadership sample, hierarchical multiple regression procedures were utilized to examine sets of variables based on agency characteristics (urban, suburban, rural, pretrial, probation, parole, if agency supervises only juveniles, if officers possess sworn status, if firearms are permitted, if nonlethal force is permitted, estimated number of officers, estimated number of probationers/parolees) and personal demographics (if male, years worked in criminal justice), partnership engagement (formal enhanced supervision, informal enhanced supervision, formal information sharing, formal fugitive apprehension, informal fugitive apprehension, formal specialized enforcement, informal specialized enforcement, formal interagency partnership, informal interagency partnership, formal other partnership, informal

other partnership), and organizational culture (rehabilitative ideology, respect for officer role, intrinsic benefit, extrinsic benefit, role conflict/mission distortion, mission creep, leadership support, *stalking horse* concerns). Three models and a final model were run, with each model retaining variables found significant in the prior model. Table 31 reveals the results of the hierarchical multiple regression analyses for the officer sample.

The first model included agency characteristics and personal demographics resulting in a nonsignificant model ($F = 0.445$, $df = 14$, $p = .952$) and no significant predictors, explaining less than 10% of the variance in partnership favorability ($R^2 = .099$). The second model examined the impact of partnership engagement on partnership favorability. The model was found to be significant ($F = 1.541$, $df = 11$, $p = .128$), explaining about 14% of the variance in the dependent variable ($R^2 = .138$, adjusted $R^2 = .048$) with two significant variables including formal interagency partnerships ($B = 3.239$, $\beta = .336$, $p = .036$) and informal interagency partnerships ($B = 3.456$, $\beta = .361$, $p = .012$). These variables were entered first in the third model to control for their association with partnership favorability and followed by eight organizational culture variables. Model 3 resulted in a significant model ($F = 22.478$, $df = 10$, $p = .001$), explaining up to 76% of the variance ($R^2 = .755$, adjusted $R^2 = .721$), with three significant predictors including rehabilitative ideology ($B = 1.820$, $\beta = .176$, $p = .007$), leadership support ($B = 0.797$, $\beta = .792$, $p = .001$), and *stalking horse* concerns ($B = -0.409$, $\beta = .168$, $p = .008$). The addition of the organizational culture variables lead to a significant increase in the prediction of partnership favorability of up to 63% ($\Delta F [8, 73] = 23.521$, $p = .001$). Note the partnership engagement variables did not retain significance and were removed from the subsequent model. The final model consisted of three significant variables, rehabilitative ideology ($B = 2.115$, $\beta = .212$, $p = .001$), leadership support ($B = 0.670$, $\beta = .681$, $p = .001$), and *stalking horse* concerns ($B = -$

0.491, $\beta = -.199$, $p = .001$), resulting in a significant model ($F = 68.421$, $df = 3$, $p = .001$) explaining 68% of the variance in partnership favorability ($R^2 = .679$, adjusted $R^2 = .669$).

Finally, several assumptions were checked (Berry, 1993). For each model it was confirmed that there was an error term zero mean, the error term was uncorrelated with the independent variables, and the dependent variable approximated a normal distribution. Though data appeared to be somewhat heteroskedastic across models it was not fatal.

Table 30

Pearson's r Correlations Matrix for Officer Sample

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Favorability to Partnership	1												
2. Formal Enhanced Supervision	.152	1											
3. Informal Enhanced Supervision	-.154	-.727**	1										
4. Formal Information Sharing	.153	.400**	-.328**	1									
5. Formal Fugitive Apprehension	.075	.474**	-.306**	.416**	1								
6. Informal Fugitive Apprehension	-.022	-.259**	.368**	-.282**	-.599**	1							
7. Formal Specialized Enforcement	.200*	.608**	-.396**	.408**	.399**	-.272**	1						
8. Informal Specialized Enforcement	-.067	-.359**	.444**	-.247**	-.150	.205*	-.641**	1					
9. Formal Interagency Partnership	.169	.519**	-.372**	.460**	.422**	-.252**	.527**	-.324**	1				
10. Informal Interagency Partnership	.064	-.242**	.344**	-.209**	-.114	.170*	-.226**	.335**	-.591**	1			
11. Other Formal Partnership	.096	.406**	-.338**	.357**	.275**	-.157	.396**	-.259**	.416**	-.171*	1		
12. Other Informal Partnership	-.011	-.255**	.365**	-.189*	-.123	.174*	-.179*	.235**	-.133	.359**	-.462**	1	
13. Rehabilitative Ideology	.471**	.063	-.030	.071	.010	.078	.071	-.134	.063	.006	.058	.082	1
14. Respect for Officer Role	.303**	.202*	-.125	.027	.023	.056	.189*	-.055	.122	.126	.311**	-.018	.214*
15. Intrinsic Benefit	.337**	.342**	-.245**	.038	.094	.011	.282**	-.084	.291**	.024	.401**	-.119	.270**
16. Extrinsic Benefit	.389**	.264**	-.175	-.015	.033	.019	.141	-.042	.176	.047	.361**	-.050	.296**
17. Role Conflict/Mission Distortion	.321**	.014	-.033	-.034	.049	.037	.029	.030	-.021	.112	.167	-.095	.249**
18. Mission Creep	.223*	.367**	-.297**	.124	.109	-.003	.301**	-.128	.397**	-.098	.234**	-.067	.083
19. Leadership Support	.769**	.119	-.137	.075	.102	-.026	.178	-.051	.158	.069	.210*	-.020	.329**
20. Stalking Horse Concerns	-.252**	-.146	.101	-.081	-.005	-.101	-.020	-.026	-.022	.013	.016	.041	-.083
21. Urban	-.037	.115	-.140	.106	.183*	-.296**	.145	-.135	.117	-.115	.078	-.138	-.078
22. Suburban	.052	.085	-.130	-.069	-.011	.044	.052	-.168*	.028	-.059	.132	-.121	.084
23. Rural	.049	.012	-.001	-.036	.051	-.056	.086	-.085	.009	.079	.029	.021	.062
24. Pretrial	.012	.105	-.102	-.062	.031	.002	.043	-.140	-.142	.081	.077	-.115	.039
25. Probation	.031	.103	-.029	.059	.145	-.018	.018	-.041	.042	.041	.160*	-.024	.005
26. Parole	-.040	.148	-.022	.138	.171*	-.083	.177*	-.098	.163*	-.068	-.058	.062	-.016
27. If County-based Jurisdiction	-.097	.088	-.106	.127	.155	-.174*	.136	-.061	.146	-.078	-.043	.059	-.065
28. If Agency is under Judiciary	.066	-.124	.010	-.232**	-.148	.038	-.208*	.094	-.124	-.011	.044	-.030	.087
29. If Agency Supervises only Juveniles	-.021	.095	-.054	-.175	.011	-.126	-.085	.060	-.001	.178	-.030	.141	-.085
30. If Officers possess Sworn Status	.035	-.055	.079	.078	.102	.048	.090	-.110	.065	.019	.078	-.030	-.030
31. If Firearms are Permitted	.036	.117	.008	.100	.100	.031	.069	-.015	.025	.075	-.021	.100	-.182*
32. If Nonlethal Force is Permitted	-.008	.028	-.007	.034	.074	-.141	.074	.022	.061	-.010	.167	-.092	-.162
33. If Male	-.170	-.039	.052	.036	-.115	.034	.036	-.011	-.084	-.027	-.194*	.099	-.049
34. Estimated Number of Officers	-.021	.136	-.098	-.041	.137	-.088	.129	-.072	.130	-.077	.138	-.071	.089
35. Estimated Number of Probationers/Parolees	-.126	.010	-.074	.094	-.032	-.033	.007	.061	.083	-.182*	.111	-.192*	-.179*
36. Years worked in Current Position	.135	-.073	.106	.066	-.088	-.009	-.118	.110	.007	-.010	.139	.015	.104
37. Years worked in Department	.132	.007	.038	.048	-.024	-.004	.021	.046	.009	.000	.083	-.006	.067
38. Years worked in Probation/Parole	.147	.052	-.062	.092	.000	-.003	.045	.015	.041	-.002	.074	-.031	.053
39. Years worked in Criminal Justice	.153	.066	-.067	.093	.017	-.055	.064	.039	.067	-.059	.065	-.044	.060

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 30

Pearson's r Correlations Matrix for Officer Sample (continued)

Variable	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26
1. Favorability to Partnership													
2. Formal Enhanced Supervision													
3. Informal Enhanced Supervision													
4. Formal Information Sharing													
5. Formal Fugitive Apprehension													
6. Informal Fugitive Apprehension													
7. Formal Specialized Enforcement													
8. Informal Specialized Enforcement													
9. Formal Interagency Partnership													
10. Informal Interagency Partnership													
11. Other Formal Partnership													
12. Other Informal Partnership													
13. Rehabilitative Ideology													
14. Respect for Officer Role	1												
15. Intrinsic Benefit	.716**	1											
16. Extrinsic Benefit	.651**	.705**	1										
17. Role Conflict/Mission Distortion	.546**	.522**	.455**	1									
18. Mission Creep	.435**	.501**	.423**	.193*	1								
19. Leadership Support	.467**	.395**	.440**	.548**	.194	1							
20. Stalking Horse Concerns	.110	.192 [†]	-.002	-.073	.020	-.111	1						
21. Urban	-.182	-.163	-.201*	-.145	-.111	-.118	-.116	1					
22. Suburban	.005	-.025	-.033	.015	.016	-.006	-.067	.229**	1				
23. Rural	.027	.048	.084	.037	-.013	.124	.034	.051	.171*	1			
24. Pretrial	-.055	-.023	-.086	-.081	-.010	-.054	-.009	.052	.114	.293**	1		
25. Probation	.039	.131	.251**	.046	.036	-.042	-.062	.231**	.317**	.329**	.057	1	
26. Parole	.025	-.019	-.010	-.038	-.025	-.045	-.003	.223**	-.067	.186 [†]	.000	.099	1
27. If County-based Jurisdiction	.100	-.015	-.028	-.094	.058	-.112	.021	.097	-.014	.103	-.129	-.239**	.613**
28. If Agency is under Judiciary	.001	.058	.035	.019	.026	.058	.046	-.138	.187*	-.078	.113	.143	-.694**
29. If Agency Supervises only Juveniles	-.114	-.017	.077	-.146	.058	-.093	-.012	-.034	.095	-.086	.126	-.096	-.285**
30. If Officers possess Sworn Status	-.010	-.028	-.075	.052	.059	-.071	.076	.060	.025	-.105	.060	.065	.162
31. If Firearms are Permitted	.165	.127	.020	.183*	.127	.163	.120	.021	-.169*	.100	.063	.027	.240**
32. If Nonlethal Force is Permitted	.210 [†]	.260**	.071	.289**	.017	.252**	.313**	-.108	-.087	.084	.026	-.032	.118
33. If Male	-.176	-.139	-.183	-.199*	-.078	-.271**	-.043	.123	.130	-.097	-.097	-.050	.049
34. Estimated Number of Officers	.080	.074	.027	.042	-.071	.069	.060	.109	.077	.040	-.068	.021	-.044
35. Estimated Number of Probationers/Parolees	-.053	.017	-.093	-.099	.115	-.058	.073	.125	.173	-.112	-.100	.024	.005
36. Years worked in Current Position	.161	.060	.142	.058	.062	.210*	-.065	-.044	.018	-.091	-.131	.183*	-.211*
37. Years worked in Department	.092	-.013	.019	.139	-.026	.205*	-.010	.018	.026	-.064	-.126	.044	-.095
38. Years worked in Probation/Parole	.099	.020	-.004	.114	.047	.148	-.024	-.019	.103	-.027	-.129	.082	-.178*
39. Years worked in Criminal Justice	.059	.019	-.013	.097	.062	.155	-.079	.051	.085	-.023	-.155	.047	-.101

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 30

Pearson's r Correlations Matrix for Officer Sample (continued)

Variable	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39
1. Favorability to Partnership													
2. Formal Enhanced Supervision													
3. Informal Enhanced Supervision													
4. Formal Information Sharing													
5. Formal Fugitive Apprehension													
6. Informal Fugitive Apprehension													
7. Formal Specialized Enforcement													
8. Informal Specialized Enforcement													
9. Formal Interagency Partnership													
10. Informal Interagency Partnership													
11. Other Formal Partnership													
12. Other Informal Partnership													
13. Rehabilitative Ideology													
14. Respect for Officer Role													
15. Intrinsic Benefit													
16. Extrinsic Benefit													
17. Role Conflict/Mission Distortion													
18. Mission Creep													
19. Leadership Support													
20. Stalking Horse Concerns													
21. Urban													
22. Suburban													
23. Rural													
24. Pretrial													
25. Probation													
26. Parole													
27. If County-based Jurisdiction	1												
28. If Agency is under Judiciary	-.600**	1											
29. If Agency Supervises only Juveniles	-.205*	.279**	1										
30. If Officers possess Sworn Status	.121	-.131	-.195	1									
31. If Firearms are Permitted	.186*	-.265**	-.130	.368**	1								
32. If Nonlethal Force is Permitted	.084	-.049	-.102	.219*	.462**	1							
33. If Male	.020	-.067	-.018	-.010	.009	-.114	1						
34. Estimated Number of Officers	-.015	.045	-.063	-.089	-.070	.059	-.091	1					
35. Estimated Number of Probationers/Parolees	.086	.053	-.150	-.003	-.030	.091	-.055	.135	1				
36. Years worked in Current Position	-.108	.137	.148	-.036	-.113	-.052	-.057	-.056	.028	1			
37. Years worked in Department	-.053	-.048	.076	.093	.019	.202*	.021	.042	.019	.520**	1		
38. Years worked in Probation/Parole	-.105	.010	.142	.023	-.007	.143	.026	.046	.016	.454**	.899**	1	
39. Years worked in Criminal Justice	-.079	-.026	.132	-.020	-.067	.087	.092	.020	.046	.456**	.878**	.885**	1

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 31

Hierarchical Multiple Regression of Partnership Favorability (Officers)

Variable	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Final Model		
	B	β	p	B	β	p	B	β	p	B	β	p
<i>Agency Characteristics</i>												
Urban	-0.935	-0.095	0.519									
Suburban	0.083	0.008	0.953									
Rural	-0.207	-0.021	0.884									
Pretrial	1.046	0.086	0.561									
Probation	0.164	0.009	0.948									
Parole	-0.369	-0.034	0.818									
If Agency Supervises only Juveniles	-2.040	-0.154	0.290									
If Officers possess Sworn Status	-0.549	-0.055	0.709									
If Firearms are Permitted	0.653	0.066	0.705									
If Nonlethal Force is Permitted	-0.503	-0.039	0.809									
Estimated Number of Officers	0.000	-0.013	0.922									
Estimated Number of Probationers/Parolees	0.000	-0.158	0.271									
<i>Personal Demographics</i>												
If Male	-1.769	-0.180	0.194									
Years worked in Criminal Justice	0.124	0.164	0.252									
<i>Partnership Engagement</i>												
Formal Enhanced Supervision				-2.756	-0.288	0.190						
Informal Enhanced Supervision				-3.395	-0.361	0.086						
Formal Information Sharing				0.984	0.103	0.336						
Formal Fugitive Apprehension				-0.647	-0.068	0.652						
Informal Fugitive Apprehension				0.594	0.063	0.656						
Formal Specialized Enforcement				2.517	0.263	0.107						
Informal Specialized Enforcement				1.243	0.129	0.373						
Formal Interagency Partnership				3.239	0.336	0.036	0.852	0.085	0.365			
Informal Interagency Partnership				3.456	0.361	0.012	1.374	0.136	0.112			
Formal Other Partnership				-0.808	-0.079	0.510						
Informal Other Partnership				-0.223	-0.023	0.847						
<i>Organizational Culture</i>												
Rehabilitative Ideology							1.820	0.176	0.007	2.115	0.212	0.001
Respect for Officer Role							-0.079	-0.051	0.599			
Intrinsic Benefit							0.200	0.097	0.368			
Extrinsic Benefit							-0.191	-0.101	0.283			
Role Conflict/Mission Distortion							-0.328	-0.145	0.066			
Mission Creep							0.963	0.098	0.188			
Leadership Support							0.797	0.792	0.001	0.670	0.681	0.001
Stalking Horse Concerns							-0.409	-0.168	0.008	-0.491	0.199	0.001
R^2	0.099			0.138			0.755			0.679		
Adjusted R^2	0.000			0.048			0.721			0.669		
F	0.445			1.541			22.478			68.421		
p	0.952			0.128			0.001			0.001		

Note. Each partnership type was transformed into a series of dummy coded variables (formal, informal, none) with exception to information sharing which lacked adequate variation (less than 10% indicated *not* possessing a partnership of this type) and was treated as a dichotomous variable (coded 1 for those possessing a formal partnership). For the other partnership typologies the absence of a partnership was omitted as the reference category. Rehabilitative ideology and mission creep were each transformed into dichotomous measures with 1 representing those who agreed or strongly agreed with the respective single-item ordinal measures. All other organizational culture variables were comprised of multi-item numeric indexes. Finally, all agency characteristics were each treated as distinct dichotomous measures with exception to the estimated number of officers and probationers/parolees which were continuous variables.

Summary of Findings

Research Question #1: What partnership typologies are the most prevalent between police and probation/parole agencies?

As reported in Table 27, of the 231 distinct agencies across the two samples that responded to the survey, all partnership typologies were represented. The majority of partnerships reported were informal in nature ranging from 50-65% for a given typology. Alternatively, formalized partnerships ranged from 30-36% depending on the typology. Very few, ranging from 4-16%, did not engage in a given partnership type. The most common formal partnerships concerned enhanced supervision at 36% ($N=83$), followed by specialized enforcement (34%, $N=78$), interagency problem solving (33%, $N=77$), fugitive apprehension (33%, $N=76$), and information sharing (30%, $N=69$). The most common informal partnerships concerned information sharing (65%, $N=150$), followed by enhanced supervision (56%, $N=130$), specialized enforcement (54%, $N=124$), fugitive apprehension (50%, $N=116$), and interagency partnerships (50%, $N=116$). Simply put, information sharing partnerships were the most prevalent with 219 (95%) of the 231 agencies indicating they possessed a formal or informal partnership.

Research Question #2: To what extent are those in leadership positions in probation/parole agencies favorable to engaging in these partnerships?

Table 8 provides details concerning favorableness to partnerships with law enforcement as reflected by the leadership sample. Eight items asked respondents the extent to which they agreed or disagreed they or their agency would be interested in partnering with law enforcement agencies. Less than 16% disagreed or strongly disagreed with any of the statements. With

exception to a single item, more than 60% agreed or strongly agreed with a given item suggesting there is a high level of interest in partnerships. Interestingly, one item concerning leadership's willingness to seek out new partnerships was met with uncertainty as 44% neither agreed nor disagreed they were doing so. This suggests that while respondents are open to partnerships, they are not actively pursuing them.

Research Question #3: To what extent are those in frontline officer positions in probation/parole agencies favorable to engaging in these partnerships?

Table 9 provides insight into officers' perceptions of their willingness, and that of their agency and leadership, to partner with law enforcement. Results are slightly more mixed than that of the leadership sample, but overall similar patterns are apparent. First, with exception to a single item, over 40% of respondents' agreed or strongly agreed with each item pertaining to partnership favorability. That said, officers displayed uncertainty in terms of the extent to which partnerships are being sought out and the perceived interest by their agency executives and supervisors. Specifically, 33% could neither agree nor disagree that partnerships were being actively sought out, and 31% could neither agree nor disagree that agency executives and supervisors were interested in such partnerships.

Research Question #4: What variables, informed by the empirical literature, most influence these perceptions?

As reported in Table 28, twelve variables were found to significantly influence leadership's favorableness towards partnerships in the bivariate analyses. That said, as reported in Table 29, multivariate analyses revealed that only two of those variables remained significant

when controlling for the impact of other independent variables using hierarchical multiple regression. Leadership perceptions were influenced by their level of belief that agency executives and supervisors support partnerships and the perceived extrinsic benefits of partnership (i.e., recidivism, crime reduction). For officers, initially nine variables were found to be significant at the bivariate level, but only three remained when controlling for other independent variables through hierarchical multiple regression procedures. The strongest predictor, without question, was leadership support. Stronger leadership support was associated with a greater interest in partnerships by frontline officers. In addition, officers that distinguished their agency as having a rehabilitative ideology, supporting a balance of services and accountability, were more likely to be favorable to partnerships, but those who were concerned about *stalking horse* issues were less likely to be interested in partnerships. To summarize, favorableness to partnerships with law enforcement was most influenced by perceived executive support and extrinsic benefits in the leadership sample. On the other hand, frontline officer perceptions were most influenced by the presence of leadership support, possessing a rehabilitative ideology, and *stalking horse* concerns.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

About 95% of the agencies reflected across the leadership and officer samples possessed an information sharing partnership, followed by enhanced supervision at 92%, specialized enforcement at 88%, fugitive apprehension units at 83%, and interagency problem solving partnerships at 83%. Further, a third of the agencies possessed formal partnerships and about half possessed informal partnerships. Clearly, most agencies are engaged in some form of partnership with law enforcement, with informal information sharing the most common.

These results are similar with prior research conducted with police chiefs and sheriffs in Texas (Kim et al., 2010, 2013a, 2013b), in terms of the majority of partnerships existing informally. It differs, however, to the extent that nearly all probation/parole agencies are involved in some form of partnership with law enforcement. Law enforcement, on the other hand, was demonstrated to possess mostly no partnerships or informal partnerships. Though it is difficult to make any assertion when comparing one state's police experiences versus a national-level examination of probation/parole, this discrepancy is likely the result of very few community corrections agencies when compared to the numerous police departments that exist at the municipal, county, and state level. For example, Kim et al. (2013b) utilized a sample derived from 1,055 Texas police departments. For the entire national-level membership of APPA there were under 1,000 leadership contacts. As such, there is a practical limit to how many partnerships and with whom probation/parole agencies can collaborate with. It should be recognized that too much effort expended towards partnerships and increasing the number of collaborators could prove to be a distraction for the supervision agency.

That said, about three-quarters of the leadership and officer respondents agreed or strongly agreed they were favorable to partnerships with law enforcement. Clearly probation/parole agencies recognize the benefits of working with law enforcement and are interested in doing so. Perhaps noteworthy, officers appeared slightly more skeptical as to their organization's interest in building and maintaining partnerships with law enforcement. Nonetheless, respondents from each sample expressed some ambivalence towards the notion of actively seeking out partnerships, instead appearing to have a welcoming but passive disposition. This passiveness could be attributed to the large number of police agencies and their typically more complicated jurisdictional boundaries. That is not to obscure those states such as Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania that provide supervision services at the county level, but overall community supervision agencies tend to be more centralized, and smaller, than that of law enforcement agencies. This government structure, one could argue, makes it more difficult for community supervision agencies to actively pursue partnerships with law enforcement. In contrast, a given law enforcement agency will likely have a single supervision agency that represents the entirety of their jurisdiction.

The persistence of informal partnerships, as opposed to formalized partnerships, was consistent for both law enforcement studies (Kim et al., 2010, 2013a, 2013b) and this study of probation/parole. Informal partnerships are often predicated on interpersonal relations between individuals at each respective agency. One prominent issue associated with informal partnerships is the recognition that they will likely discontinue once a key individual retires, gets transferred, or gets promoted (Kim et al., 2010). The lack of formalization leads to a lack of structured succession for continuing partnerships that may benefit the agencies involved. It also inhibits evaluation research which may in turn justify, entice, or maintain funding (Matz & Kim, 2013).

The establishment of clear MOUs can help formalize partnerships, though further effective strategic planning and clear logic models are needed to develop partnerships for future evaluation.

Hierarchical multiple regression analyses revealed a small handful of variables significantly influenced leadership and officer partnership favorability. For leadership respondents, their favorableness to work with law enforcement was guided by their perceptions of the partnerships' ability to influence recidivism and crime, as well as buy in from agency executives and supervisors. Essentially the bottom-line of community supervision, reducing recidivism, including revocations and technical violations, is the primary indicator of success among probationers/parolees. Note, recidivism may be operationalized differently across states. In some cases states examine reincarceration, some include reconvictions even if they do not lead to a return to prison, and some examine rearrests even if it does not lead to a conviction. Nonetheless, most states do track recidivism and high recidivism has been a persistent issue for correctional agencies for decades, though recent reports have shown improvements in states such as Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Oregon, Texas and Vermont (Justice Center, 2012). For example, in the state of Texas recidivism rates have reportedly ranged from 24-31% during the 2000s. Alternatively, Vermont has reported recidivism rates ranging from 41-46% during the same period. Interestingly, leadership responses, as well as officer responses, were mixed in terms of their understanding of whether partnerships do in fact impact further criminality or recidivism. As reported previously in Tables 19 and 20, 36% of the leadership sample, as well as 39% of the officer sample, indicated they could neither agree nor disagree that partnerships reduced crime. In terms of recidivism reduction 45% of the leadership sample, as well as 51% of the officer sample, could neither agree nor disagree. This uncertainty is understandable when one

considers, as discussed previously, there has been relatively little empirical examination of police-probation/parole partnership outcomes (Corbett, 1998; McClanahan, 2004; Worrall & Gaines, 2006). Clearly the presence of more definitive evaluation research would go far in garnering and maintaining the long-term support of probation/parole leaders.

Officers' partnership favorability was most strongly associated with their perceptions of leadership support, a notion shared with the leadership sample. Leadership support includes the establishment of clear, long-term, goals and objectives that guide the partnerships with law enforcement. In addition, it refers to encouragement directly from the executives and supervisors of a given agency. The finding that leadership's involvement and effort impacts the productivity and interest of the officers confirms the conclusions of Alarid et al.'s (2011) qualitative research conducted in a Pennsylvania county. In their interviews with juvenile probation officers respondents noted that if the chief probation officer is not actively involved in or supportive of the partnerships then there would be little substantive progress or collaboration leading to unproductive interagency meetings.

In addition, officers were influenced by their perceived rehabilitative orientation of their department. Those who indicated that the majority of individuals in their agency shared in the belief that probationers/parolees could turn their life around given the appropriate services, resources, and a balance of incentives and sanctions showed greater interest in partnerships. Alternatively, those officers who demonstrated a greater concern for *stalking horse* abuses (Turner et al., 2014), whereby police officers use the partnership to gain warrantless access to individuals' residence or person, tended to be less favorable to partnerships.

Many notable variables were not significantly associated with leadership or officer favorability at the multivariate level. Several highly discussed variables such as mission

distortion and mission creep, were not identified as major concerns for leaders or officers and they had a negligible impact on their desire to partner with law enforcement (Matz & Kim, 2013). This should be regarded as good news as many of these potential threats to partnership have likely been overemphasized in the literature. Alternatively, the notion that the presence of law enforcement can increase the level of respect received from probationers/parolees to their supervising officer was met with mixed reactions from both leaders and officers (Anonymous, 1999; Corbett, 1998; Matz & Kim, 2013). That said, leaders and officers agreed that partnerships increased their understanding and appreciation of the role of law enforcement and police have been respectful during partnership activities, though these notions had no discernable impact on partnership favorability.

None of the agency characteristics or personal demographics proved to have a substantive influence on partnership favorability. Particularly noteworthy, whether the agency permitted the use of firearms or nonlethal force by its officers failed to have a substantive impact. This debunks the notion that more enforcement-oriented supervision agencies would be more willing to partner with law enforcement. It also debunks the notion that social service oriented supervision agencies are aversive to working with police. In addition, there was no substantive difference based on the size of the agency or any particular geographic representation. In terms of personal demographics, there were no substantive differences detected between males or females in either sample, or the experience levels of the respondents. These results suggest there are no known hidden biases preventing partnerships from developing with law enforcement.

Limitations

The current study is limited in its ability to generalize to the entire population of probation/parole leadership and officers, due to its reliance on the APPA membership. Any bias associated with the membership will be inherited in the study. To reiterate, to date there is no

accepted sampling frame for probation and parole offices/officers or their leadership in the country. BJS continues to refine and develop a sampling frame for adult probation offices/officers under the CAPSA, while OJJDP continues to do the same with its National Juvenile Probation Census Project. As a result, inferences made within this study should be regarded as representing the views of the APPA membership and not the field of probation and parole holistically. That said, representation within the study included respondents from 34 states and D.C. The sample included large unified states such as Kentucky as well as states such as Indiana and Ohio in which probation services are provided at the county level. This diversity can be taken as a sign that the sample was comprehensive and inclusive of many probation/parole viewpoints. As Miller (2014, p. 1,240) explained, “APPA members are drawn from a wide range of geographical settings and agencies...” and “...they likely provide a good guide to national tendencies in supervision practice.”

It should be recognized that the APPA membership contains a list of contacts within a database that is designed chiefly for membership coordination, not research. In working with the staff at APPA numerous nuances about the database were revealed including the recognition that no attempt is made to regularly purge the database of invalid contacts, complicating the creation of a clean sampling frame and subsequent survey administration. This resulted in a high number of kickbacks on emails and return-to-sender notices in the mail. Future research conducted using the APPA membership should take this issue into consideration. APPA should also consider updating their membership database by purging invalid or outdated records in a more systematic way as well. This would benefit the association internally in membership marketing, as well as in future research partnerships.

Finally, statistical power is a common issue that arises when a sample is too small to detect statistical significant outcomes using a given statistical procedure such as multiple regression (Cohen, 1992). In the current study, the leadership and officer samples exceeded 150 cases, an adequate number for detecting moderate to large statistical outcomes but too few to detect smaller differences (Cohen, 1992). As a result, it should be noted this study lacked the statistical power necessary to detect small differences if attempting to control for all independent variables simultaneously, putting the author at greater risk of committing a type II error. In other words, the low sample size puts the study at greater risk for failing to reject a null hypothesis (i.e., failing to detect a significant effect is present), also known as a false negative. To remedy this issue, hierarchical multiple regression procedures were utilized to remove irrelevant variables and increase statistical power (Hair et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2008; Miller et al., 2009; Nosek et al., 2006).

Implications for Future Research

While the current study provides insight into probation/parole perspectives of partnerships, future research should be directed towards the development of clear logic models and evaluation methodologies for implementing and evaluating formal partnerships and outcomes (e.g., Worrall & Gaines, 2006). It is clear that the majority of probation/parole agencies surveyed within this study have experience with partnerships, especially informal information sharing partnerships. Further, the majority of individuals working in probation and parole, as reflected within this study, strongly support working with law enforcement. Researchers should, going forward, strive to establish police-probation/parole partnerships as an evidence-based practice (EBP) (see Hanser, 2014, pp. 558-562 for a listing of current EBP practices in probation and parole).

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), for example, identifies and reviews programs and practices using an eight-step process; 1) preliminary program identification, 2) initial program screening, 3) literature search, 4) initial evidence screening, 5) selection of evidence base, 6) expert review, 7) study classification, and 8) program evidence rating. Most notable, NIJ requires programs/practices to at least be subjected to one randomized field experiment or quasi-experimental research design, though up to three of the most rigorous studies are considered for full review and evaluation. Studies are evaluated based on the strength of the research design, documentation, analytical procedures, sample size, independence of the evaluator, and year of the publication. An expert review examines the program/practice's conceptual framework, study quality, outcomes, and fidelity. Based on the findings of the review NIJ designates a given program/practice as *effective*, *promising*, or having *no effect*, the results of which are provided on crimesolutions.gov.

It should be recognized that various federal agencies set unique guidelines, though perhaps similar, for what they respectively consider evidence-based. OJJDP, for example, utilized multiple sources with varying criteria in the creation of a strategic planning program matrix listing effective prevention and intervention programs for youth involved with gangs. These sources included the OJJDP Model Program Guide, Blueprints for Violence Prevention, NIJ's crimesolutions.gov, and the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration (SAMSHA) National Registry of Evidence-Based Programs and Practices (NREPP). Some, such as SAMSHA, rely more heavily on the use of meta-analyses. Note, OJJDP's program matrix

recognizes Boston's Operation Ceasefire, a large multi-agency initiative, as an *effective program*. It also lists YVRP, a largely police-probation partnership, as a *promising program*.⁶

Practical Implications

Non-profit organizations such APPA and ICCA, as well as the federal government, can help support the community supervision field and researchers in determining if police-probation/parole partnerships are effective, to the standard of an EBP program, by emphasizing the importance of establishing formal MOUs with partner agencies, as well as reiterating the importance of empirical research often needed to procure or maintain lucrative grant projects. Further, supporting strategic planning and the development of clear logic models through training and technical assistance is necessary. Establishing clear goals, objectives, and tasks are needed to determine what the intended outcomes and how to conduct studies to determine if those goals are achieved. Such goals could go beyond the obvious intentions of crime control and recidivism reduction, but include intrinsic benefits (operational improvements) such as increased intelligence information sharing, assistance with supervision (e.g., joint home visits), and improvements in absconder apprehension. Such trainings, based on the findings of the survey, should be emphasized for probation/parole leaders. APPA, for example, hosts an annual leadership institute designed to support future leaders in community corrections, a potentially effective opportunity to engage leadership in partnership planning and sustainability (Wahl, 2011). In addition, trainings on *stalking horse* concerns or police misuse of partnership opportunities should be developed and provided for line officers interested in or engaged in partnerships. Several legalistic articles and resources have been made available to assist in this

⁶ OJJDP's program matrix can be located online at <https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/SPT/Program-Matrix>.

area (Adelman, 2002, 2007; Colbridge, 2003; Jermstad, 2002b, 2003; Matz et al., 2015; Turner et al., 2014).

Finally, it should be noted that in many jurisdictions probation/parole officers attend annual trainings hosted for and by law enforcement, including required attendance of a police academy when initially hired for some agencies. However, opportunities for law enforcement to learn about probation/parole appear to be rare. Though IACP (2012) has provided resources to law enforcement in recent years, it would seem appropriate for APPA, in partnership with an organization such as IACP, to do more to champion the aims and goals of probation/parole either through supporting greater coverage in undergraduate curriculum at the university or within the police academies.

Conclusion

Clearly, probation and parole leaders, as well as officers, support partnerships with law enforcement. In fact, most probation/parole agencies surveyed within this study have engaged in partnerships, though many were informal endeavors. Yet there persists an uncertainty concerning their effectiveness that was revealed not only by a review of the literature but also by the responses gathered from this study. Further, the extent to which probation and parole leaders support partnerships with law enforcement was revealed to be a direct function of their perceived belief they are effective in reducing recidivism and crime. In addition, officers' interests in partnerships were contingent on the support of their leadership. To sustain interest in partnerships there is a need for 1) increased education and training for law enforcement and community corrections professionals concerning work with each other and developing partnerships (including legal limits), 2) the formalization of partnerships with clear logic models,

goals, and objectives, and 3) outcome research to definitively assess partnerships' recidivism and crime reduction potential.

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APPENDIX A

Survey Instrument 1 - Leadership

Police-Probation/Parole Partnerships Survey

The following pages contain a survey concerning probation/parole interest and concerns pertaining to partnerships with law enforcement. The results of this survey will be used to help provide a unified voice to the American Probation and Parole Association (APPA) membership. It will prove informative for understanding what factors most influence interest in partnership, and what barriers are most prevalent. In order to ensure the results of the survey are as representative as possible, it is important that you read all of the instructions completely and answer all of the survey items, unless instructed otherwise. If a survey item does not have a response that you agree with, please do not leave it blank but rather select the option that comes closest to your opinion.

Please note that individual responses to the survey will be kept confidential, reported aggregately, and not attributable to a specific person.

If you have any questions about the survey please feel free to contact Mr. Adam K. Matz at amatz@csg.org or a.k.matz2@iup.edu or by phone at 859-244-8058.

Thank you for your assistance!

Partnerships Leadership Survey

The following survey concerns the extent to which police-probation/parole partnerships are prevalent among the membership of probation/parole agencies represented within the American Probation and Parole Association. The survey also inquires as to experience and perceptions of partnership with local law enforcement agencies.

SECTION I: *Partnerships with Law Enforcement*

We would like to ask you a few questions about the level of partnership your department and/or its members have with **Law Enforcement** in the following contexts. Specifically, please indicate whether your department has a **formal partnership** (refers to situations in which there are operational agreements, protocols, contracts, and/or memoranda of understanding [MOU] between organizations), **informal partnership** (refers to programs and initiatives forged on relationships between personnel), or no partnership.

Please indicate *your department's* involvement in partnerships (formal, informal, both, or no partnership) with Law Enforcement that involve the following activities.

Item	Formal Partnership	Informal Partnership	No Partnership
(1) Information and intelligence sharing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(2) Interagency problem-solving partnerships	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(3) Interagency training initiatives	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(4) Ride alongs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(5) Beats/Districts (geographical assignment)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(6) Targeting high crime rates	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(7) Targeting high risk probationers/parolees	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(8) Joint home visits	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(9) Joint patrols	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(10) Sex offender supervision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(11) Domestic violence supervision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(12) Gun removal	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(13) Bar checks	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(14) Gang interdiction	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(15) Drug possession	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(16) Drug Trafficking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(17) Quality of life issues	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(18) Fugitive/absconder apprehension	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(19) Multi-agency Initiatives (e.g., Ceasefire)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(20) Other partnership activity(ies), please specify _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

SECTION II: *Experiences with Law Enforcement*

Based on your experiences at *your current department*, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.

If your current department has not engaged in any partnership(s) with Law Enforcement (formally or informally), please skip to next Section III (page 5).

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	(N/A) Not Applicable
(1) Working with Law Enforcement agencies has given me a greater appreciation for their job.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(2) Working with Law Enforcement agencies has been a positive experience.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(3) The roles of Law Enforcement agencies and my department working in partnership complement each other.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(4) The field activities with Law Enforcement agencies have reduced crime.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(5) I was comfortable working with Law Enforcement agencies.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(6) The roles of Law Enforcement agencies and my department working in partnerships were often confused.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(7) The information received from Law Enforcement agencies as a result of the partnership was helpful.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(8) There were conflicts in the roles of police and my department.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(9) I would be in favor of the partnership with law enforcement agencies becoming standard operating procedure in my department.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(10) The partnership with Law Enforcement agencies is an effective method for supervising offenders.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(11) Because of partnership(s), our role has been continually expanding to tasks outside of probation/parole work (e.g., coordinating meetings).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	(N/A) Not Applicable
(12) The partnership(s) have had a positive impact on the community.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(13) The partnership(s) have had a positive impact on the probationers/parolees.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(14) Police have become more familiar with the probationer/parolee population because of the partnership(s)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(15) Police have been respectful during street contacts in association with our partnership(s).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(16) Police have been respectful during home visits in association with our partnership(s).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(17) Police have been respectful during arrests of probationers/parolees in association with our partnership(s).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(18) The partnership(s) include common goals that are supported by both Law Enforcement and our department.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(19) The partnership(s) possess clear goals and objectives.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(20) Agency staff have strongly supported the partnership(s).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(21) The partnership(s) have done a good job of documenting the impact of its actions.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(22) My agency had concrete measureable goals to judge the success of our partnership(s).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(23) The partnership(s) with Law Enforcement have impacted recidivism rates in our jurisdiction(s).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(24) Probationers/Parolees treated their supervision officer with more respect when in the presence of a police officer.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(25) There was resistance by agency executives and supervisors to the goals and activities of the partnership(s) with Law Enforcement agencies.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

SECTION III: *Barriers to Partnership with Law Enforcement*

The following aims to identify the most common barriers to partnering with Law Enforcement. Please indicate the extent to which *you* agree or disagree with the following statements.

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
(1) We do not have the enough funding/resources (e.g., staffing) to engage in a partnership with a Law Enforcement agency.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(2) We have not been approached by a Law Enforcement agency.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(3) We approached Law Enforcement to build partnership, but the response was negative.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(4) I do not think partnering with a Law Enforcement agency would be of much use to my agency.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(5) I had a bad experience with Law Enforcement in the past.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(6) I heard of other agencies having negative experiences in partnerships with Law Enforcement.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(7) Law Enforcement agencies compete with our department for funding.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(8) Please describe any other barriers to partnership with Law Enforcement in the space provided.					

SECTION IV: *Organizational Culture*

Based on your experiences at *your current department*, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
(1) The majority of employees in our organization believe that selected groups of offenders can change their behavior and life styles and that a balanced combination of sanctions, supervision, and services can assist them in doing so.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(2) Our organization's core culture is in alignment with the ideals which are at the core of a successful inter-agency public safety alliance.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(3) The personal beliefs, principles, and values of our organization's executives are in alignment with the ideals which are at the core of a successful inter-agency public safety alliance.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(4) Our agency's executives and supervisors know what it will take to create and maintain an inter-agency public safety alliance in our jurisdiction, and they are committed to doing so.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(5) Our agency's executives and supervisors look beyond our short term interests and make important decisions (e.g., budget requests or resource allocations) based on what will make our community safer.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(6) Our agency's executives and supervisors will encourage and support our own employees to work together with the employees of law enforcement when dealing with the issues or problems confronting an inter-agency public safety alliance.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(7) Our agency's executives and supervisors are currently seeking new partnership opportunities with Law Enforcement agencies.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(8) Our agency's executives and supervisors are concerned about potential legal ramifications of bringing police officers into a probationer/parolees residence during a home visit.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
(9) Our agency's executives and supervisors believe that police officers are likely to abuse knowledge of a probationer/parolee's supervision status to conduct warrantless searches of their person/property.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(10) Our agency's executives and supervisors would be open to joining a partnership with law enforcement if they approached them.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(11) Our agency's executives and supervisors are interested in any new partnerships with Law Enforcement agencies.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(12) Our agency's executives and supervisors strongly support partnership with law enforcement.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(13) Please provide any additional comments concerning organizational culture in the space provided.					

SECTION V: *Agency Demographics*

1. Please indicate the geographic area(s) *your department* serves (Mark all that apply).
 - Urban
 - Suburban
 - Rural

2. Please indicate the type of supervision field(s) that best describes *your agency* (Mark all that apply).
 - Pretrial
 - Probation
 - Parole
 - Other, Please specify _____

3. Please indicate the appropriate jurisdiction level of your supervision agency.
 - Local/Municipal
 - County
 - State
 - Federal
 - Other, Please specify _____

4. Please indicate under which branch of government your agency operates.
 - Executive (i.e., DOC)
 - Judiciary (i.e., courts)
 - Other, please explain _____

5. Please indicate the general age (i.e., adult/juvenile) of the population your agency serves.
 - Adult Only
 - Juvenile Only
 - Adult and Juvenile

6. Please provide an estimate of the total number of probation/parole officers in your agency at the time of the survey.

7. Please provide an estimate of the total number of probationers/parolees under supervision at your agency at the time of the survey.

8. Are officers sworn (i.e., possess peace officer status) in your jurisdiction?
 - Yes
 - No
 - Other, please explain _____

9. Are officers armed with firearms in your jurisdiction?
 - Required
 - Optional
 - Not Permitted

10. Are officers armed with nonlethal force (e.g., pepper spray) in your jurisdiction?
 - Required
 - Optional
 - Not Permitted

SECTION VI: *Personal Demographics*

Please note information provided in this section will be kept confidential.

1. What is your current position title?

2. How long, in years, have you worked at your current position at this department?

3. How long, in years, have you worked at your department?

4. How long, in years, have you worked in the field of probation/parole?

5. How long, in years, have you worked in the criminal justice field?

6. Please indicate your Sex.
 Male
 Female

Please provide any additional comments concerning the survey in the space provided.

A large, empty rectangular box with a thin black border, intended for providing additional comments.

APPENDIX B

Survey Instrument 2 – Officer

Police-Probation/Parole Partnerships Survey

The following pages contain a survey concerning probation/parole interest and concerns pertaining to partnerships with law enforcement. The results of this survey will be used to help provide a unified voice to the American Probation and Parole Association (APPA) membership. It will prove informative for understanding what factors most influence interest in partnership, and what barriers are most prevalent. In order to ensure the results of the survey are as representative as possible, it is important that you read all of the instructions completely and answer all of the survey items, unless instructed otherwise. If a survey item does not have a response that you agree with, please do not leave it blank but rather select the option that comes closest to your opinion.

Please note that individual responses to the survey will be kept confidential, reported aggregately, and not attributable to a specific person.

If you have any questions about the survey please feel free to contact Mr. Adam K. Matz at amatz@csg.org or a.k.matz2@iup.edu or by phone at 859-244-8058.

Thank you for your assistance!

Partnerships Officer Survey

The following survey concerns the extent to which police-probation/parole partnerships are prevalent among the membership of probation/parole agencies represented within the American Probation and Parole Association. The survey also inquires as to experience and perceptions of partnership with local law enforcement agencies.

SECTION I: *Partnerships with Law Enforcement*

We would like to ask you a few questions about the level of partnership you are participating in with **Law Enforcement**. Specifically, please indicate whether these partnerships are **formal** (refers to situations in which there are operational agreements, protocols, contracts, and/or memoranda of understanding [MOU] between organizations), **informal** (refers to programs and initiatives forged on relationships between personnel), or you are not involved in any such partnership activities.

Please indicate *your* involvement in partnerships (formal, informal, both, or no partnership) with Law Enforcement that involve the following activities.

Item	Formal Partnership	Informal Partnership	No Partnership
(1) Information and intelligence sharing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(2) Interagency problem-solving partnerships	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(3) Interagency training initiatives	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(4) Ride alongs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(5) Beats/Districts (geographical assignment)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(6) Targeting high crime rates	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(7) Targeting high risk probationers/parolees	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(8) Joint home visits	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(9) Joint patrols	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(10) Sex offender supervision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(11) Domestic violence supervision	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(12) Gun removal	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(13) Bar checks	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(14) Gang interdiction	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(15) Drug possession	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(16) Drug Trafficking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(17) Quality of life issues	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(18) Fugitive/absconder apprehension	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(19) Multi-agency Initiatives (e.g., Ceasefire)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(20) Other partnership activity(ies), please specify _____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

SECTION II: *Experiences with Law Enforcement*

Based on your experiences at *your current department*, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.

If your current department has not engaged in any partnership(s) with Law Enforcement (formally or informally), please skip to next Section III (page 5).

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	(N/A) Not Applicable
(1) Working with Law Enforcement agencies has given me a greater appreciation for their job.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(2) Working with Law Enforcement agencies has been a positive experience.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(3) The roles of Law Enforcement agencies and my department working in partnership complement each other.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(4) The field activities with Law Enforcement agencies have reduced crime.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(5) I was comfortable working with Law Enforcement agencies.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(6) The roles of Law Enforcement agencies and my department working in partnerships were often confused.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(7) The information received from Law Enforcement agencies as a result of the partnership was helpful.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(8) There were conflicts in the roles of police and my department.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(9) I would be in favor of the partnership with law enforcement agencies becoming standard operating procedure in my department.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(10) The partnership with Law Enforcement agencies is an effective method for supervising offenders.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(11) Because of partnership(s), our role has been continually expanding to tasks outside of probation/parole work (e.g., coordinating meetings).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	(N/A) Not Applicable
(12) The partnership(s) have had a positive impact on the community.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(13) The partnership(s) have had a positive impact on the probationers/parolees.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(14) Police have become more familiar with the probationer/parolee population because of the partnership(s)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(15) Police have been respectful during street contacts in association with our partnership(s).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(16) Police have been respectful during home visits in association with our partnership(s).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(17) Police have been respectful during arrests of probationers/parolees in association with our partnership(s).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(18) The partnership(s) include common goals that are supported by both Law Enforcement and our department.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(19) The partnership(s) possess clear goals and objectives.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(20) Agency staff have strongly supported the partnership(s).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(21) The partnership(s) have done a good job of documenting the impact of its actions.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(22) My agency had concrete measureable goals to judge the success of our partnership(s).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(23) The partnership(s) with Law Enforcement have impacted recidivism rates in our jurisdiction(s).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(24) Probationers/Parolees treated me with more respect when in the presence of a police officer.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(25) There was resistance by agency executives and supervisors to the goals and activities of the partnership(s) with Law Enforcement agencies.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

SECTION III: *Organizational Culture*

Based on your experiences at *your current department*, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
(1) The majority of employees in our organization believe that selected groups of offenders can change their behavior and life styles and that a balanced combination of sanctions, supervision, and services can assist them in doing so.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(2) Our organization's core culture is in alignment with the ideals which are at the core of a successful inter-agency public safety alliance.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(3) The personal beliefs, principles, and values of our organization's executives are in alignment with the ideals which are at the core of a successful inter-agency public safety alliance.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(4) Our agency's executives and supervisors know what it will take to create and maintain an inter-agency public safety alliance in our jurisdiction, and they are committed to doing so.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(5) Our agency's executives and supervisors look beyond our short term interests and make important decisions (e.g., budget requests or resource allocations) based on what will make our community safer.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(6) Our agency's executives and supervisors will encourage and support our own employees to work together with the employees of law enforcement when dealing with the issues or problems confronting an inter-agency public safety alliance.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(7) Our agency's executives and supervisors currently seeking new partnership opportunities with Law Enforcement agencies.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(8) Our agency's executives and supervisors are concerned about potential legal ramifications of bringing police officers into a probationer/parolees residence during a home visit.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
(9) Our agency's executives and supervisors believe that police officers are likely to abuse knowledge of a probationer/parolee's supervision status to conduct warrantless searches of their person/property.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(10) Our agency's executives and supervisors would be open to joining a partnership with law enforcement if they approached them.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(11) Our agency's executives and supervisors are interested in any new partnerships with Law Enforcement agencies.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(12) Our agency's executives and supervisors strongly support partnership with law enforcement.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(13) Please provide any additional comments concerning organizational culture in the space provided.					

SECTION V: *Agency Demographics*

1. Please indicate the geographic area(s) *you* serve (Mark all that apply).
 - Urban
 - Suburban
 - Rural

2. Please indicate the type of supervision field(s) that best describes *your position* (Mark all that apply).
 - Pretrial
 - Probation
 - Parole
 - Other, Please specify _____

3. Please indicate the appropriate jurisdiction level of your supervision agency.
 - Local/Municipal
 - County
 - State
 - Federal
 - Other, Please specify _____

4. Please indicate under which branch of government your agency operates.
 - Executive (i.e., DOC)
 - Judiciary (i.e., courts)
 - Other, please explain _____

5. Please indicate the general age (i.e., adult/juvenile) of the population you serve.
 - Adult Only
 - Juvenile Only
 - Adult and Juvenile

6. Please provide an estimate of the total number of probation/parole officers in your agency at the time of the survey.

7. Please provide an estimate of the total number of probationers/parolees under supervision at your agency at the time of the survey.

8. Are you a sworn (i.e., possess peace officer status) officer?
 - Yes
 - No
 - Other, please explain _____

9. Are you permitted to be armed with a firearm(s)?
 - Required
 - Optional
 - Not Permitted

10. Are you permitted to be armed with nonlethal force (e.g., pepper spray)?
 - Required
 - Optional
 - Not Permitted

SECTION VI: *Personal Demographics*

Please note information provided in this section will be kept confidential.

1. What is your current position title?

2. How long, in years, have you worked at your current position at your department?

3. How long, in years, have you worked at your department?

4. How long, in years, have you worked in the field of probation/parole?

5. How long, in years, have you worked in the criminal justice field?

6. Please indicate your Sex.
 Male
 Female

Please provide any additional comments concerning the survey in the space provided.

A large, empty rectangular box with a thin black border, intended for providing additional comments.