

1-29-2014

# Revisiting Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell's Decision not to Attack Cemetery Hill on the First Day of the Battle of Gettysburg: A Study Viewed Through the Theoretical Lenses of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the US Army Field Manual 3-0, C1

Michael S. Bednarski  
*Indiana University of Pennsylvania*

Follow this and additional works at: <http://knowledge.library.iup.edu/etd>

---

## Recommended Citation

Bednarski, Michael S., "Revisiting Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell's Decision not to Attack Cemetery Hill on the First Day of the Battle of Gettysburg: A Study Viewed Through the Theoretical Lenses of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the US Army Field Manual 3-0, C1" (2014). *Theses and Dissertations (All)*. 516.  
<http://knowledge.library.iup.edu/etd/516>

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Knowledge Repository @ IUP. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations (All) by an authorized administrator of Knowledge Repository @ IUP. For more information, please contact [cclouser@iup.edu](mailto:cclouser@iup.edu), [sara.parme@iup.edu](mailto:sara.parme@iup.edu).

REVISITING LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICHARD S. EWELL'S DECISION NOT TO  
ATTACK CEMETERY HILL ON THE FIRST DAY OF THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG: A  
STUDY VIEWED THROUGH THE THEORETICAL LENSES OF SUN TZU, ANTOINE  
JOMINI, AND THE US ARMY FIELD MANUAL 3-0, C1

A Dissertation

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies and Research

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Education

Michael S. Bednarski

Indiana University of Pennsylvania

December 2013

© 2013 Michael S. Bednarski

All Rights Reserved

Indiana University of Pennsylvania  
School of Graduate Studies and Research  
Department of Professional Studies in Education

We hereby approve the dissertation of

Michael S. Bednarski

Candidate for the degree of Doctor of Education

---

---

Robert Millward, D.Ed.  
Professor of Education, Chair

---

---

George Bieger, Ph.D.  
Professor of Education

---

---

Kelli Paquette, Ed.D.  
Professor of Education

ACCEPTED

---

Timothy P. Mack, Ph.D.  
Dean  
School of Graduate Studies and Research

---

Title: Revisiting Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell's Decision not to Attack Cemetery Hill on the First Day of the Battle of Gettysburg: A Study Viewed Through the Theoretical Lenses of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the US Army Field Manual 3-0, C1

Author: Michael S. Bednarski

Dissertation Chair: Dr. Robert Millward

Dissertation Committee Members: Dr. George Bieger  
Dr. Kelli Paquette

For over 150 years General Richard S. Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg has been debated. For 130 of those years, Ewell was vilified as a hesitant corps commander who was paralyzed by indecision. The last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century seemed to vindicate the Second Corps commander for his decision not to assault Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. However, several 21<sup>st</sup> century historians have been critical of the lieutenant general. After over 150 years of debate, we find ourselves no closer to a definitive conclusion as to Ewell's actions on July 1, 1863, until now.

The problem is that everyone appears to have an opinion on this subject. What was needed was a standard set of military principles to determine if Ewell's actions were reasonable given the circumstances on the first day of the battle. This qualitative narrative has identified 8 combined military leadership principles and two "Units of Meaning" based upon the theories of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the US Army Field Manual 3-0, C1 (USAFM). Their application to Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, provided a far more objective conclusion in determining if Ewell acted reasonably on that fateful July afternoon and evening in 1863.

The research indicated that contrary to the arguments of Ewell critics, the lieutenant general's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1 was reasonable. In fact, the Second Corps commander followed 88% of the combined military leadership principles and "Units of

Meaning” of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and USAFM on July 1, 1863. This study refuted or questioned the motives of many of Ewell’s most ardent detractors

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My friends in cohort 12 were the source of so much knowledge. I have never been associated with a group of people who were so bright. The assistance of the staff at the US Army War College, the University of Georgia, Special Collections Library, the Tennessee State archives, Dr. Richard Blake and Mr. Rae Redd of Waynesburg University's, Eberly Library, and Dr. Jenny Kline who provided much needed assistance and always greeted me with encouragement and inspiration were essential to the completion of this project.

Dr. Roy Talbert of Coastal Carolina University taught me how to write. I will be forever indebted to Dr. Talbert for his passion for history and his willingness to assist current and former students. Dr. Talbert is my inspiration for seeking a terminal degree and I could never have accomplished it without his professionalism and knowledge. I wish to thank Brigadier General, Dr. Michael Barrett of the Citadel for his assistance in the Master of Arts program and his insistence that I attempt this degree. He also provided the information that led to the utilization of Antoine Jomini in this study. I wish to thank Major General Steven Johnson (USMC ret.) for his valuable feedback concerning the combined military leadership principles and chapter IV.

Dr. Robert Millward, my chair, a consummate professional who challenged and encouraged me throughout the duration of this program, but especially through the dissertation. His guidance and assistance were invaluable and his promptness and willingness to help will always be appreciated. Dr. George Bieger brought a great historical, as well as, analytical mind to my committee and always attempted to broaden my horizons. Dr. Bieger was essential in the organizational aspects of the dissertation and how it should be structured. Dr. Kelli Paquette was so instrumental in teaching me how to write and encouraging me to think about publication. Dr. Paquette's writing expertise was invaluable in the dissertation process. A special thanks to Mrs.

Ann Hetrick of Indiana University of Pennsylvania, D.Ed. in Administration and Leadership Studies Department. Her expertise, patience, organization, professionalism, and amiability were much appreciated and irreplaceable

To my Mom and Dad who instilled a work ethic in me that did not know the meaning of the word, quit. Your love, support, and counsel throughout my life have been invaluable and you are the best parents a child could ask for. I shall try to follow your noble and superb example as I enter fatherhood, though I know that it is a lofty one.

To my sister Melissa who has had such a profound impact on my life. I always enjoy your counsel and humor. Our discussions of all things education have been spirited and enjoyable. I have gained much from your skill and knowledge as an educator and will always cherish our relationship. Your support and encouragement will always be much appreciated.

My brother John is my best friend who has endured so many trials and tribulations. You always had time for me and helped me with the most critical decisions in my life. You stared death in the face and never wavered. Thank you for always being the voice of reason and for encouraging me to attempt this.

To my beautiful wife, Dr. Elizabeth Bednarski without whose knowledge and expertise I could never have complete this endeavor. You are the source of my inspiration and the focus of my world. You saved me and gave my life meaning. You provided unwavering support and encouragement, especially when things did not go well. Thank you for giving me the greatest gift a man could have, our son Brenden. You are my sole-mate and I so look forward to spending the rest of my life with you. This labor would be meaningless without you.



## DEDICATION

To my dear Grandmother Stella Elizabeth Bednarski  
The finest person that I ever knew!

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
I	INTRODUCTION .....	1
	Theoretical Framework .....	4
	Statement of the Problem.....	8
	Purpose of the Study .....	10
	Research Questions .....	10
	Background.....	11
	Research Design.....	16
	Limitations .....	17
	Operational Definitions and Terms.....	17
	Summary .....	20
II	REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE .....	22
	Day One .....	22
	Lee Moves North .....	29
	Heth Initiates the Attack .....	35
	Rodes and Early Attack .....	40
	The Federal Army Collapses .....	42
	Cemetery Hill.....	44
	Can Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the US Army Field Manual 3-0, C1 Help?.....	46
	Missing “Stonewall”! Ewell’s Contemporaries Attitudes Concerning His Performance.....	47
	Lee is at Fault! Post-Civil War Historians Judge Ewell .....	66
	Ewell is Dilatory and Indecisive! Early to mid 20 <sup>th</sup> Century Historians Weigh In .....	69
	Vindication! Mid to Late 20 <sup>th</sup> Century Historians Impressions of Ewell.....	76
	Here we go Again! 21 <sup>st</sup> Century Historians Evaluate Ewell.....	91
	Summary .....	99
III	METHODOLOGY .....	101
	Purpose of the Study .....	102
	Theoretical Lenses .....	103
	Sun Tzu .....	103
	Antoine Jomini.....	104
	US Army Field Manual 3-0, C1.....	106
	Statement of the Problem.....	107
	Strategy vs. Tactics .....	108
	Purpose of the Study .....	109

Chapter		Page
	Research Questions.....	110
	Research Design.....	110
	Data Collection .....	111
	Data Sources .....	113
	Limitations .....	116
	Triangulation.....	116
	Summary .....	117
IV	DATA ANALYSIS.....	118
	Coding.....	121
	Presuppositions .....	122
	Analytical Categories or Combined Military Leadership	
	Principles.....	123
	Leadership.....	125
	Clarity of Orders .....	140
	Concentration.....	146
	Terrain.....	151
	Maneuver .....	161
	Offensive Operations .....	169
	Defensive Operations.....	190
	Intelligence.....	209
	“Units of Meaning” .....	221
	Security .....	221
	Initiative .....	225
	Summary .....	230
V	FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS.....	232
	Findings.....	232
	General Robert E. Lee.....	233
	Major General Isaac Trimble .....	235
	Major General Fitzhugh Lee .....	238
	Major General Winfield Scott Hancock .....	238
	Major General John Brown Gordon .....	242
	Brigadier General Eppa Hunton.....	245
	Second Corps Staff Officers .....	247
	Douglas Southall Freeman.....	249
	Clifford Dowdy.....	250
	Glenn Tucker .....	254
	Paul Casdorph .....	256
	Conclusions.....	261
	Limitations .....	282
	Implications.....	285
	Future Study.....	287
	Final Thoughts .....	288

REFERENCES .....	289
------------------	-----

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1 Richard S. Ewell .....	2
2 Ambrose Powell Hill.....	23
3 Robert E. Rodes .....	28
4 The Gettysburg Campaign .....	32
5 John Buford.....	34
6 John Reynolds.....	37
7 Battle of Gettysburg, morning July 1 .....	38
8 Oliver Otis Howard.....	39
9 Henry Heth.....	41
10 Battle of Gettysburg, afternoon July 1 .....	43
11 Jubal A. Early.....	48
12 James Longstreet.....	51
13 George Campbell Brown .....	53
14 Walter Taylor .....	62
15 Sun Tzu .....	104
16 Antoine Jomini.....	106
17 Leadership.....	125
18 Clarity of Orders .....	140
19 Robert E. Lee .....	144
20 Concentration .....	146
21 Terrain.....	151

Figure	Page
22 East Cemetery Hill.....	160
23 Maneuver .....	161
24 Offensive Operations .....	169
25 William “Extra Billy” Smith.....	182
26 Defensive Operations.....	190
27 Intelligence.....	209
28 Albert Jenkins .....	219
29 Security .....	221
30 Initiative .....	225
31 Isaac Trimble .....	237
32 Winfield Scott Hancock.....	241
33 John Brown Gordon.....	244
34 Eppa Hunton .....	246
35 General Ewell’s performance on July 1, 1863.....	284


## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Few battles in the history of the world have produced more examination, debate, or controversy than the battle of Gettysburg. Following the War Between the States, Robert E. Lee was canonized as the guardian of southern glory and honor. Hardly had the guns fallen silent on America's great Civil War when the vanquished began pointing fingers. If Lee was untouchable, someone had to be responsible for southern defeat. The battle of Gettysburg produced some of the great culprit scapegoats in American military history. Lieutenant General Richard Ewell, commander of the Confederate Second Corps, is one example. The detractors of the General contend that had he ordered and carried out an attack on Cemetery Hill on day one, days two and three would not have been necessary. Did Ewell act appropriately on that blistering summer afternoon and evening on the rolling hills of Pennsylvania? More importantly, was the fiery corps commander's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1, 1863, reasonable according to the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the US Army Field Manual 3-0, C1-Operations (USAFM)?

July 1, 1863 was an exhausting day for John Reynolds's grizzled veterans of the US I Corps. They had beaten back several attacks by Major General Henry Heth's Division of Lieutenant General Ambrose Powell Hill's Confederate Third Corps just west of Gettysburg along the Chambersburg Pike and they had sustained the loss of Reynolds. Aid came to the US I Corps, now commanded by Abner Doubleday, in the form of its sister corps of the left wing of the Army of the Potomac. Major General Oliver Howard's US XI Corps supported Doubleday's right flank and extended its line to the Harrisburg Road. Two of Howard's divisions faced north.

The third division formed a defensive position and possible rallying point on the high ground known as Cemetery Hill just south of Gettysburg.



*Figure 1.* Richard S. Ewell retrieved from the Library of Congress.

By the afternoon of July 1, 1863, a simultaneous Confederate attack had taken place. Heth renewed his assault on the US I Corps with the support of Major General Dorsey Pender's Division west of town. Lead elements of Ewell's Second Corps reached the field by early afternoon. Major General Robert E. Rodes's Division of the Confederate Second Corps attacked at the junction of Doubleday's and Howard's line while Jubal Early's Division of the same corps delivered the haymaker blow around 3:00 PM (Taylor, 1913). Early attacked Howard's exposed right flank and sent the Federals fleeing through town. Ewell gave chase but was slowed by



enemy prisoners, sharpshooters, Federal artillery fire from Cemetery Hill, and orders from the commanding general not to force major engagement (Martin, 1991).

The natural defensive position of Cemetery Hill south of Gettysburg rises some 100 feet above the town and the Yankees identified it quickly (Sears, 2003). Howard placed Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr's division of the US XI Corps on Cemetery Hill as a possible rallying point early in the afternoon (Howard, 1907/2010). The XI Corps reserve artillery occupied Cemetery Hill along with Steinwehr's division (Howard, 1907/2010). As the Federal line collapsed, survivors reformed on that strategic location.

Flushed with victory, Ewell's Corps advanced into town sometime between 4:00-5:00 PM (Collins, 2008). Both Early and Rodes's Divisions were slowed and stopped by fatigue, confusion in town, nearly 4000 prisoners, and Federal sharpshooter and artillery fire from Cemetery Hill. Ewell's generals urged him to assault Cemetery Hill if he could secure reinforcements from Hill's Third Corps (Early, 1912/2010). Ewell agreed, however, the corps commander still remembered Lee's admonition from earlier in the afternoon prohibiting a general engagement (Brown, 2001).

Lee had been on the field since 1:00 PM (Tagg, 1998). He had watched the flight of the Federals through Gettysburg from Seminary Ridge. Colonel Charles Marshall (Lee's aide de camp) recalled, "He [Lee] therefore sent orders to General Ewell to carry the hill, to which the enemy had retired from Gettysburg, known as Cemetery Hill, if practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward" (Marshall, 1927, p. 228). Major Walter Taylor (Lee's aide and future colonel) delivered the above order to Ewell between 4:00 and 5:00 o'clock (War of the rebellion, (O.R.), 1880-1901, vol. *XXVII, 1* ).

To a strict constructionist like Ewell, this order seemed impossible to execute. Any attempt to take Cemetery Hill would bring on a general engagement. The Federals had transformed the hill into a strong defensive position (Pfan, 1998). Ewell also found himself outnumbered. The Second Corps commander could muster only two brigades for an attack on Cemetery Hill. Meanwhile, this location had become the rallying point for the remnants of the entire US I and XI Corps, as well as John Buford's Cavalry Division and nearly 50 cannon (Busey & Martin, 1994). Ewell, along with his senior commanders (Rodes and Early), agreed that Cemetery Hill should have been assaulted. However, all believed that they would need assistance from Hill's Third Corps or Ewell's other division commanded by Edward Johnson which was still moving forward (Collins, 2008). Unfortunately for Ewell, neither force was available to aid the Second Corps on Cemetery Hill. It was obvious that if Cemetery Hill were to be taken on the evening of July 1, Ewell would have to plan and order another assault.

A series of events conspired to confound Ewell at this pivotal moment. With the fate of the battle and possibly the Confederacy resting on his shoulders, the inexperienced corps commander declined to attack. Ewell's inability to take Cemetery Hill on July 1 created the greatest controversy of his career. For over 150 years, participants, historians, and novices have criticized this leadership decision and claimed that it doomed the Confederacy to the ash-heap of history, however, a close examination of the variables involved and a new theoretical approach may determine the veracity of this long-held narrative.

### **Theoretical Framework**

General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg has been debated for a century and a half. Many Lost Cause writers who sought scapegoats for the disaster at Gettysburg after the war found Ewell to be an easy target.

Following mountains of research, the historiography of this topic is still divided. Early and mid-20th century historians were hard on the lieutenant general and presented Ewell as timid and unsure. The latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century represented a cooling-off period by historians concerning Ewell's actions on July 1, 1863. These historians tended to be much more forgiving, placing an emphasis on the number of variables and the uncertainty that Ewell had to account for on the evening of July 1. However, just when it looked as though Ewell would finally be vindicated for his part on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg, Casdorff's (2005) publication presented a devastating indictment of the lieutenant general's decisions concerning Cemetery Hill on day one of the battle. As a result, history is no closer to a definitive decision concerning Ewell's actions on the evening of July 1, 1863, than it was in the 1860's.

The fundamental problem concerning this issue is that many participants, historians, and novices had or have an opinion as to what Ewell should have done at that critical moment on the evening of July 1, 1863, as he contemplated the meaning of Lee's orders, a threat to his left flank, and the formidable Union position on Cemetery Hill. Some believed and still believe that the Second Corps commander should have ordered an assault up Cemetery Hill without delay while others contend that Ewell had good reasons for holding back. Of those who have passed judgment on the lieutenant general, few have based their opinion on an objective set of military standards regarding Ewell's decision. In the end, most of what has been written is opinion and conjecture (some good and some bad) which may or may not have been biased concerning "Dick" Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863.

This qualitative historical narrative will utilize the theoretical lenses of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM to determine if Ewell's decisions were reasonable on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. The three military theories listed above represent some of the most relevant

and celebrated military teachings in the history of warfare. Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM provide a snapshot of military theory from ancient history (Sun Tzu), what was for Ewell, contemporary history (Jomini), and modern history (USAFM). Military principles that are common among the three frameworks will be identified and applied to General Ewell's situation on the evening of July 1, 1863. Moreover, other principles that may not be common, but are particularly relevant to Ewell's circumstances, will be included. The principles that will be identified have the advantage of longevity in that they are common to military theory for the past 2,500 years and that their application would reveal sound or flawed judgment in a much more objective and standard evaluation.

Critics might question the appropriateness of the application of these theories to General Ewell's situation on the evening of July 1, 1863. The theories previously mentioned are considered by some, to be strategic in nature and their application to what might be considered a tactical situation (General Ewell) could be flawed. However, the US Army explains, "The levels of war define and clarify the relationship between strategy and tactical actions. "The levels have no finite limits or boundaries" (USAFM, 2011, p. 7-1). It appears that the US Army believes that in many cases, the levels of war are difficult to identify.

The situation facing General Ewell following his corps's initial assault had changed from a tactical situation to an operational and even a strategic one upon the receipt of General Lee's famous order. As a result, utilization of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM is appropriate. Moreover, it is important to note that this study is not attempting to apply any one theory to General Ewell's experience at Gettysburg. Rather, it is an attempt to identify commonalities in military thought among the theories mentioned from 450 B.C. to 2011. This study will triangulate commonalities among these theories and extrapolate the most relevant principles

from the most celebrated theorists that would presumably be universal over the last 2,500 years. In addition, principles which may not be common among the theories listed, but which may be particularly significant to General Ewell's decision on the evening of July 1, 1863, will be identified. This tactic is an attempt to triangulate proven theoretical principles of war to arrive at a more definitive and objective conclusion as to whether Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg was reasonable. Moreover, the implementation of these three theories adds breadth and depth to the study.

The overall guiding question of this inquiry is to determine if General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg was reasonable based upon the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM. Questions that are subsidiary to the guiding question and that, therefore, help in answering the guiding question include the following: Did General Ewell or was General Ewell permitted to adhere to the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863? Did General Ewell or was General Ewell permitted to act in accordance with the principles of the USAFM on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg? Did General Ewell possess adequate forces to expect a reasonable chance for success had he assaulted Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1, 1863?

Consistent with historical qualitative research, this inquiry will examine the events leading up to and including the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. Particular attention will be devoted to the research questions listed above. In keeping with a historical research approach, this study will attempt to gather as much relevant information as possible, collect, organize, validate, and draw logical conclusions based on the evidence collected (Busha & Harter, 1980). Common themes will be identified and coded concerning the theories of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM

and applied to General Ewell's decisions on the evening of July 1, 1863, to determine if the lieutenant general made a reasonable decision not to attack Cemetery Hill. The inclusion of multiple theories and methods of data collection will ensure the quality, reliability, and conclusions of the research. Moreover, the conclusions of this study will render a more objective assessment of Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. Triangulation of the data will be achieved by utilizing first-hand accounts of participants, secondary research from historians, and government records. This method of data collection highlights the historical framework of General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, and enhances the credibility of the findings of this study.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Many comprehensive studies have detailed the battle of Gettysburg. Most participants, historians, and amateurs have an opinion concerning General Ewell's refusal to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. Opinions and arguments on this topic are mixed. However, they tend to lack a standard set of military principles that would add objectivity and consistency when passing judgment on the Second Corps commander. What is needed is an objective set of military leadership principles that might be applied to the lieutenant general's situation that would produce a comprehensive, objective, and thorough understanding of General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, to determine if this action was reasonable.

Three books (biographies) directly detail Ewell's leadership on day one of the battle of Gettysburg while a fourth, *Gettysburg-Culp's and Cemetery Hill* (Pfan, 1993) and a fifth, *Gettysburg-The First Day* (Pfan, 2001) devote significant attention to Ewell on July 1, 1863. General Ewell's contemporaries were mixed concerning his decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on day one. Initially, General Lee did not find fault with Ewell's decision. However, he

changed his mind after the war (Gallagher, 1992). Lieutenant General Jubal Early's assessment was comparatively favorable while Major General Isaac Trimble was adamant that Ewell erred significantly. Most Gettysburg participants and authors who wrote in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century were critical of General Ewell's leadership decision not to assault Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863.

Through the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the criticism of General Ewell was obvious but less intense by Civil War historians. Although Hamlin's (1940) biography of Ewell, "*Old Bald Head*" (*General R.S. Ewell*) *The Portrait of a Soldier*, was brief, it was favorable to the lieutenant general. It wasn't until the late 20<sup>th</sup> century that historians began to defend Ewell's decision on July 1. Coddington (1964, 1968) was one of the first scholars to defend Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill. In three of the four detailed studies of Ewell's life and his actions on July 1, Hamlin (1940), Martin (1991), and Pfanz (1998) gave a much more favorable assessment of Ewell. Gallagher's study, *Lee and His Generals in War and Memory* (1998), paints a very favorable picture of Ewell. Following the publication of these titles, it appeared that General Ewell had finally been vindicated.

Paul Casdorff (2004) shattered any illusion that Ewell had performed reasonably on July 1 and that historians had definitively changed their 150 year indictment of the corps commander. Casdorff (2004) is vitriolic in his criticism of General Ewell and nearly delirious in his estimation of Union forces occupying Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1, 1863.

It is clear that the historiography of this topic has come full circle. For nearly 150 years, authors have criticized General Ewell. Only Hamlin (1940), Coddington (1968), Martin (1991), Pfanz (1998), and Gallagher (1998) have defended the corps commander. The latest work (Casdorff, 2004) is a complete censure of Ewell's performance on day one and strongly

criticizes his refusal to assault Cemetery Hill. A review of the research and a more objective set of military leadership principles which span 2,500 years might provide a more definitive answer to the question of whether General Ewell's refusal to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg was reasonable according to the theories of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM.

### **Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this historical narrative is to examine historical records, memoirs, biographies, government records, and other research to determine if General Richard Ewell made a reasonable decision not to assault Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. Much like the historiography of this subject in general, the latest and only detailed studies of Ewell's life and his decision not to attack Cemetery Hill are split in their assessment of the General's refusal to carry out the assault. A fresh review of the relevant data and a new approach that utilizes the theoretical lenses of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM may yield a new perspective on this age-old subject.

### **Research Questions**

1. Did General Ewell make a reasonable decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg according to the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM?
2. Did General Ewell or was General Ewell permitted to adhere to the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863?
3. Did General Ewell or was General Ewell permitted to act in accordance with the principles and "Units of Meaning" of the USAFM on July 1, 1863?



4. Did General Ewell possess adequate forces to expect a reasonable chance for success had he assaulted Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1, 1863?

### **Background**

Since “Sandie” Pendleton uttered those famous words, “Oh for the presence and inspiration of Old Jack just for one hour”, critics have been second guessing General Ewell’s decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863 (Bean, 1959, p. 139). At first, the criticism was somewhat subtle. Officers like Henry Kyd Douglas, “Sandie” Pendleton, Walter Taylor, Isaac Trimble, Fitz Lee, and others believed that Ewell should have assaulted Cemetery Hill. Lieutenant General Jubal Early, Ewell’s most trusted lieutenant, indicated that Cemetery Hill should have been attacked, however, “Old Jube” realized as did, General Robert E. Rodes and several members of Ewell’s staff that any attack on Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 required assistance from Lieutenant General A.P. Hill’s Third Corps (Early, 1912/2010). General Rodes intimated that Union artillery on Cemetery Hill was so effective that his division had withdrawn to the outskirts of town (Collins, 2008). In addition, General Early indicated that his troops were under fire from Union artillery from the time that they launched their assault from Barlow’s Knoll (Early, 1912/2010).

Captain James Power Smith, an aide to General Ewell and a former aide-de-camp to “Stonewall” Jackson, noted that at the critical moment when Cemetery Hill should have been assaulted, Ewell, according to Smith, “was simply waiting for orders” (Smith, 2011, p. 13). Smith argued that Cemetery Hill should have been attacked within an hour of the Confederate advance into town. In addition, Smith contended that Ewell erred by sending William “Extra Billy” Smith’s and Gordon’s Brigade to investigate a possible Federal threat on the York Road.

Instead, argued Smith, Ewell should have attacked Cemetery Hill with Early's entire Division which Smith stated, could have easily taken and held Cemetery Hill (Smith, 2011).

Similarly, the preeminent 19<sup>th</sup> century Gettysburg historian, Colonel John Bachelder, claimed that Ewell should have assaulted Cemetery Hill within an hour of reaching the streets of Gettysburg. He too believed that any attack by the Confederates would have been successful. Bachelder explained that after 1 hour, the Union position on Cemetery Hill had become too strong and that the shattered remnants of the two Federal corps had been reorganized and rallied. Moreover, said Bachelder, any assault after 1 hour would have met with sure defeat (Smith, 2011).

Most historians have blamed Ewell for not attacking Cemetery Hill. The real difference is the degree to which they criticize him. Many early and mid-20<sup>th</sup> century historians such as Freeman, Tucker, and Dowdy have been very critical of Ewell. Freeman, in *Lee's Lieutenants* (1944), characterized Ewell's performance in Pennsylvania as dismaying and indecisive. While Freeman identified many of the obstacles facing Ewell, he asserted that the corps commander was incapable of coming to a decision and that the Second Corps chief was unwilling to act on Lee's discretionary orders (1944, vol. III). Freeman contrasts what he considered the "old-time "Dick" Ewell" with the new corps commander who Freeman considered to be timid and unsure (1944, vol. III).

Tucker's, *High Tide at Gettysburg* (1958), stated that the Confederacy would have been better served if Major General Isaac Trimble had been given command of the Second Corps instead of Ewell. Tucker characterized Ewell's refusal to attack Cemetery Hill on day one as "disastrous" (1958, p. 186). Tucker intimated that Ewell was most ineffective at Gettysburg due to a "lack of insight" (1958, p. 189).

Dowdey's, *Death of a Nation* (1958), is particularly unkind to General Ewell. He described Ewell's performance at Gettysburg as "depressed apathy" (1958, p. 161). *Death of a Nation* (1958) painted a picture of Ewell as a miserable procrastinator who was embarrassed by his inaction, but unwilling to commit to any plan that required a definitive decision. Ewell's order to halt General Gordon's advance in Gettysburg was disturbing to Dowdey. He characterized the corps commander's behavior as suffering from a "paralytic stroke to his will" (Dowdey, 1958, p. 140). Dowdey asserted that a few rounds from Federal artillery fire on Cemetery Hill destroyed any decisiveness that Ewell may have had. Dowdey minimized the Federal fire from Cemetery Hill and came dangerously close to questioning Ewell's bravery (1958). Dowdey believed that Ewell was consumed with making the wrong decision. As a result, says the historian, Ewell did not want to make any decision and, according to Dowdey, after 5:00 PM (July 1, 1863), the corps commander was incapable of making any decision at all (1958). Dowdey asserted on more than a couple of occasions that General Ewell "needed a leader" and turned repeatedly to Jubal Early (1958). It appears that those historians who were writing in the beginning and middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century were more sweeping in their opposition to Ewell. One wonders if the effects of the Lost Cause and the virtual worship of Generals Lee and Jackson at the close of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and through the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century explain this perspective. Some of these authors suggest that Cemetery Hill was virtually devoid of Union forces on the evening of July 1 or that Ewell could have easily taken this position.

Although the criticism did not disappear, by the mid to late 20<sup>th</sup> century, historians began to appreciate the conundrum that General Ewell faced on the evening of July 1, 1863. Coddington (1968) was one of the first historians that openly exonerated General Ewell and Hassler (1970) placed the lion's share of the blame for not taking Cemetery Hill on day one on General Lee and

acknowledged that any attack after 5:00 PM would have been ill advised. However, Hassler accused Ewell of being timid and indecisive (1970). Sears (2003) is very favorable to Ewell for not attacking Cemetery Hill, but is very critical of the corps commander for not taking Culp's Hill. Gallagher (1998) characterizes Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on day one as "reasonable" (p. 181). While Gallagher is very sympathetic to Ewell, he concedes that Ewell's performance was not exceptional.

The three most recent books that specifically address General Ewell are split in their opinion of his performance at Gettysburg on day one. Martin's *Road to Glory* (1991) and Dennis Pfanz's *Richard S. Ewell* (1998) paint a much more favorable picture of Ewell's performance on the afternoon of July 1, 1863. These authors appear to weigh many of the variables involved in Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill. They paint a very different picture of Ewell than that of the Lost Cause. What emerges is a brave, capable, and lovable general who faced considerable uncertainty on July 1, 1863. Moreover, both provide insight into Ewell's personal characteristics and his success as a soldier.

Paul Casdorff's Confederate *General Richard .S. Ewell: Robert E. Lee's Hesitant Commander* (2004) is the latest book detailing General Ewell's command decisions. Casdorff is openly critical of Ewell in a variety of ways. This book attempts to describe Ewell as a hesitant commander who was not cut out for high command. The author portrays Ewell as incapable of making command decisions and lost without the guiding hand of General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. Casdorff (2004) suggests that General Lee did not want to elevate Ewell to corps command following Jackson's death but acknowledges that most of the Second Corps including Jackson wanted Ewell to succeed "Stonewall". Casdorff (2004) labels Ewell as hesitant throughout his book (hesitant is included in the title) but when the author described Ewell's first

performance as a corps commander at the battle of Winchester, he stated, “Without a moment’s hesitation Ewell made the troop dispositions that ensured not only a Confederate victory but also opened a path to speed his northward thrust” (Casdorff, 2004, p. 234). Give credit to Casdorff for drawing attention to circumstances such as this, however, this work appears to contain many contradictions.

Given the fact that Gettysburg was the largest battle ever fought on the North American continent and is one of the most researched battles in the history of the world, it is clear that much work has been done on this topic. From the evidence provided, most participants and historians after the war have criticized General Ewell for his refusal to attack Cemetery Hill on day one at the battle. While these accounts were very thorough, they described Ewell’s performance on day one in the process of writing about the entire three day battle. This study seeks to review existing data through a new theoretical lens that incorporates 25 centuries of military thought to add a more objective conclusion to determine if General Ewell’s decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, was reasonable.

The 1990’s witnessed two books (Martin, 1991 and Pfanz, 1998) that were oriented to General Ewell exclusively. These accounts were very favorable to the General. In addition, Harry Pfanz published *Gettysburg: Culp’s and Cemetery Hill* (1993). While this study was not focused exclusively on General Ewell, Pfanz was very sympathetic to the Second Corps Commander. As stated earlier, Casdorff’s book is the latest and one of the most critical in its portrayal of General Ewell’s refusal to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. It seems clear that following nearly 150 years of research, the issue has not been decided concerning Ewell’s actions on the evening of July 1, 863.

## Research Design

This qualitative, narrative includes a search of relevant primary and secondary sources. Data concerning Richard S. Ewell at the US Army Heritage and Education Center at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, The Gordon family papers, several volumes of Ewell's letters, memoirs, biographies, references, books, narratives, internet sources, periodicals (*Southern Historical Society Papers*), and government documents (*The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, and various *US Army Field Manuals*) are among the artifacts researched. Particular attention is given to sources detailing the events of the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863, forces available to General Ewell to mount an attack on Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, and if Ewell followed the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM. Principles that are common among Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM will be identified as well as principles that may not be common, but are particularly relevant to General Ewell's situation on the evening of July 1, 1863. Data was categorized and coded as themes emerged in this inquiry. Both inductive and deductive reasoning was used to analyze, synthesize, and interpret the data available.

This study identified all relevant participants based on their participation in the fighting on day one, their intimate knowledge of the events on July 1, or their contributions as Civil War historians. In addition, relevant government documents were included. This study identified those participants who left written accounts as to the events of both armies on July 1, 1863. Particular emphasis was placed on participants holding the rank of brigade commander and above. The focus was on those who participated or had intimate knowledge of the events of July 1, 1863. However, the accounts and conclusions of biographers and other secondary sources were included in this study.

## **Limitations**

This historical narrative contains several limitations. All participants of the battle of Gettysburg are deceased. The total sample size is limited to a fraction of the participants of the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. Participants had to leave a written account that detailed the events of July 1 to be included in this study. Typically, this limits the size of the sample to officers and more specifically those of the rank equal to or above a brigade commander. A number of these officers left no written account or they were wounded or killed at Gettysburg or before the war ended.

This study's conclusions are based on information from participants and historians whose motives or unknown biases cannot be completely ascertained. Many of the participants wrote their memoirs or some account of their Civil War experiences 20-40 years after the fact. Many were biased and were written in the Lost Cause tradition. Through triangulation of data and theories, this limitation might be mitigated. This study is an attempt at an educated guess with the resources available and a more objective approach based on combined military leadership principles from three theoretical lenses that encompass military leadership principles from ancient history to 2011.

## **Operational Definitions and Terms**

This study utilizes several terms that are universal. **Federal, North, Union, US, United States,** and **Yankee** all refer to forces of the United States Government. **Confederate, Confederates States of America, Rebel, South,** and **Southern** all refer to forces of the Confederate States of America.

- **ADP-3-90**-Army Doctrine Publication 3-90 (2012) that addresses tactics
- **Aide-de-camp**-A military aide of a general officer.

- **Army of Northern Virginia**-The principle Confederate Army in the Eastern Theatre.
- **Army of the Potomac**-Also known as the Grand Army of the Republic was the principle US Army in the Eastern Theatre.
- **Battery**-In this case, battery refers to field artillery. A Confederate battery usually consisted of 4 guns while their Union counterparts consisted of 6 guns.
- **Brevet**-Honorary rank. A brevet was usually given for distinguished service in war.
- **Brigade**-Refers to a force usually made up of a least two regiments and equal to about 2,000 officers and men. Union and Confederate brigades were of about equal strength. A brigade was typically commanded by a brigadier general.
- **Combined Military Leadership Principles**-8 principles or analytical categories identified in this study that are common among Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the US Army Field Manual 3-0, C1(Operations).
- **Corps**-Confederate corps were much larger than the same Federal units. Confederate Corps typically consisted of over 20,000 officers and men while their Union counterparts were between 8,000 to 14,000 officers and men. Confederate corps were usually commanded by a lieutenant-general. Union corps were usually commanded by a major-general.
- **Coup-d'oeil**-A French term that described a commander's ability to recognize the value of topography or the lay of the land and to exploit it in an instant.
- **Culminating Point**-“That point in time and space at which a force no longer possesses the capability to continue its current form of operations” (USAFM, 2011, p. G-4)
- **Division**-Refers to a unit made up of more than one brigade. Union divisions were typically smaller than their Confederate counterparts. Union divisions were usually made up of two brigades and totaled between 3,000 to 5,000 men. Confederate divisions were much larger. During the battle of Gettysburg Rodes's Division totaled about 8,000 officers and men. Early's Division numbered about 5,000 (Busey & Martin, 1994). A division was usually commanded by a major-general.
- **Epaulments**-A protective mound of dirt erected to guard against flanking fire.
- **Feint**-An operation that diverts the enemy's attention from the main attack. This operation helps to fix enemy forces and prevents the enemy from reinforcing other areas that might be weak.
- **Field Artillery**-Refers to the artillery that accompanied the armies in the field.



- **Flank**-The right or left extremity of a military formation.
- **Gun**-Refers to one artillery piece. There were many types of guns present at Gettysburg. The most common gun was the Napoleon which had a range of about 1 mile. Both sides utilized this piece. The Union Army used Parrott Rifles which had a range of about 2.5 miles. The Confederates had 1 Whitworth Rifle at the battle of Gettysburg that had a range of over 4 miles.
- **Lost Cause**-Refers to a group of Confederate veterans led by Jubal Early who wrote extensively after the Civil War. Other prominent members included Fitz Lee, Isaac Trimble, and John Brown Gordon. These veterans wrote memoirs or personal accounts that insisted that slavery was not the central focus of the war, emphasized the overwhelming power of the north, and glorified Robert E. Lee. In addition, they tended to find scapegoats for the Confederate loss at the battle of Gettysburg. According to the Lost Cause tradition, James Longstreet, Richard S. Ewell, and J.E.B. Stuart were responsible for the defeat in the Pennsylvania campaign. The Lost Cause writers influence was very extensive and continues to this day (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II).
- **Mission Command**-“is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leader’s in the conduct of full spectrum operations” (USAFM, 2011, p. 5-2).
- **Operation**-“An operation is a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. It includes the process of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing those offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations needed to gain the objectives of any engagement, battle, major action, or campaign. It also includes activities that enable the performance of full spectrum operations, such as security, reconnaissance, and troop movement” (USAFM 3-90, p. 2-8).
- **Reasonable**-The term reasonable will be operationally defined as having sound judgment, being fair and sensible.
- **Regiment**-Refers to a 1000 man unit that was usually commanded by a colonel. Both Union and Confederate regiments were of equal strength. A regiment that had been in service for a year or more and had participated in a campaign would typically number less than 500 officers and men.
- **Religion of the Lost Cause**-The Religion of the Lost Cause was a movement in the South to preserve the Confederacy after the Civil War. Perpetuated mostly by Southern ministers, the Religion of the Lost Cause emphasized the South’s own unique rituals, mythology, and theology. The Religion of the Lost Cause glorified all who served the Confederacy in the Civil War and celebrated them as fighting Christian soldiers. Robert

E. Lee and Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson were identified as the movement’s heroes (Wilson, 1983).

- **Retrograde**-“A defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy” (ADP 3-90, 2012, p. G-3).
- **Shaping Operation**- “An operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for success of the decisive operation” (USAFM, 2011, p. G-13)
- **“Units of Meaning”**-Based on Giorgi’s (1985) “Units of Meaning”, two (security and initiative) military leadership principles identified in this study as unique to the US Army Field Manual 3-0, C1 and applied to General Ewell’s actions on July 1, 1863.
- **USAFM-US Army Field Manual 3-0, C1 (Operations)** that was written in 2008 and updated in 2011. It was replaced in 2012.
- **USAFM-3-90-US Army Field Manual 3-90** was completed in 2001. This was the field manual used specifically for tactics. It was replaced in 2013.

### Summary

The purpose of this study is to determine if Lieutenant General Richard Ewell’s leadership decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863, was reasonable based on the application of the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM. This qualitative, historical narrative will consider the following questions. Was General Ewell’s decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg reasonable according to the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM? Did General Ewell or was General Ewell permitted to adhere to the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863? Did General Ewell or was General Ewell permitted to act in accordance with the principles of the USAFM on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg? Did General Ewell possess adequate forces to expect a reasonable chance for success had he assaulted Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1, 1863?

This historical narrative examined historical records, memoirs, biographies, government records, and other research to determine if General Richard Ewell made a reasonable decision not to assault Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. The latest and only detailed studies of Ewell's life and his decision not to attack Cemetery Hill are split in their assessment of the General's refusal to carry out the assault. The historiography of this subject has come full circle and it appears that after nearly 150 years of research the issue is still in doubt. A fresh review of the relevant data and a new theoretical approach may yield a different perspective on this fascinating subject.

## CHAPTER II


### REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The battle of Gettysburg stands as one of the most significant events in American history. It has attracted the attention of participants, professional historians, and ordinary citizens for centuries. The greatest battle ever fought on the North American continent has been the subject of countless volumes explaining Confederate failure and Union victory. Many Confederate officers who lost the battle of Gettysburg with the sword in 1863, attempted to win it with the pen following the war. Bitter and not so bitter recriminations were traded among the vanquished to explain southern defeat. Nearly 150 years after this monumental struggle, we are still divided as to the culpability of several key players. Many scapegoats have been offered to explain Confederate defeat, including Lieutenant General James Longstreet, Major General J.E.B. Stuart, Lieutenant General Ambrose P. Hill, and Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell. Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863, placed him squarely in the crosshairs of many officers and historians who sought to lay blame for the loss at Gettysburg after the war. A narrative of the first day of the battle of Gettysburg followed by a detailed explanation of the historiography of this battle will help to shed light on Ewell's critics and defenders.

#### **Day One**

The death of Lieutenant General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson following the battle of Chancellorsville produced a major shakeup in the command structure of the Army of Northern Virginia. Denied his "right arm", Lee set about reorganizing the South's most successful army (Freeman, vol. 2, 1935). Faced with the loss of what many considered his most brilliant subordinate, Lee discarded the two corps system of command. He divided the Confederate army

into three infantry corps. Lieutenant General James Longstreet retained command of the First Corps and Ambrose Powell Hill, leader of the famous “Light Division” was elevated to command the newly created Third Corps.



*Figure 2.* Ambrose Powell Hill retrieved from [jarosebrock.wordpress.com](http://jarosebrock.wordpress.com).

Lee selected Richard S. Ewell to command Jackson’s celebrated Second Corps. Ewell, from Virginia, was a career soldier. He graduated from West Point in 1840, 13th in a class of 42 (Thomas, 1986). Following graduation, “Old Bald Head” chose the Dragoons (cavalry) and spent much of his career fighting Indians. His service in the Mexican War was distinguished where he was brevetted for gallantry. Winfield Scott said of Ewell, “Captain Ewell, although suffering with Ague & fever, was never out of the saddle, when an enterprise was to be

undertaken or deeds of daring performed” (Casdorff, 2004, p. 66). The future corps commander resigned from the U.S. army in June 1861 and was commissioned a lieutenant colonel in the Confederate army. A determined performance in the defense of Fairfax Court House earned him a promotion to brigadier general. Ewell was promoted to divisional command in February 1862 (Warner, 1959). It was in the Valley that Ewell led a division under “Stonewall” Jackson and performed superbly. An equally fierce fight at Second Manassas coupled with Jackson’s death vaulted “Old Bald Head” to corps command.

The Second Corps commander was a very nervous person who, at times, could be difficult and unpleasant. Standing 5 feet 10 ½ inches tall and weighing 140 pounds, Ewell was never shy about his opinions which could be critical at times (Martin, 1991). One author indicated that Ewell’s scruffy beard and mustache reminded one of a terrier (Martin, 1991). While he was a staunch defender of slavery, he was not a southern radical (Ewell, 2012). The lieutenant general while a brigadier early in the war advised Jefferson Davis to free the slaves and enlist them. When the astonished chief executive responded who would command an African American brigade, Ewell offered his services (Pfaniz, 1998). He was very kindhearted and showed an unusual interest in making sure that his subordinates, particularly Early and Rodes, were advanced. In a letter to General Early during his convalescence following the amputation of his leg, Ewell confided to his subordinate, “...I think your claims to the Division, whatever length of time or hard service be considered, are fully equal, if not superior, to mine.” Ewell continued, “What is certain is that I won’t ask for any particular duty or situation, but let them do as they see proper with me” (Hamlin, 1935, p. 118). Ewell would make sure that those who served under him were given their just due, even if it meant less credit for himself (Gallagher, 2004, vol.

II). Martin noted this trait, “For example, his men captured Front Royal, but he wrote that the Rebels were victorious because of Jackson’s personal superintendence! Ewell anticipated Banks’s withdrawal from Winchester, moved on his own to obstruct the way out of town, yet acknowledged, ‘I adopted...[Trimble’s] suggestion!’ And while thrashing Fremont at Cross Keys was a personal triumph for him, Ewell lauded Elzey for “selecting the position” (Martin, 1991, pp. 92-93).

Pfanz described Ewell as a “kindhearted, generous, modest man, hardworking and truthful, who possessed a keen sense of humor and who was always upright in his dealings with others” (Ewell, 2012). Tasker Gantt, a family friend, said of Ewell, “He was one of those men who were incapable of telling a falsehood, or of coloring the truth. He could not invent or utter a lie of vanity” (Pfanz, 1998, p. 139).

Ewell’s sense of humor was well-known. When he was imprisoned at Fort Warren after the war, a guard offered to assist the lieutenant general in obtaining a new artificial leg, the former Second Corps commander quipped, “I’ll wait to see if the authorities are going to hang me, if I’m going to be hung, I do not care to go to the expense” (Martin, 1991, p. 385). At the battle of First Manassas, a teenage girl communicated intelligence to Brigadier Ewell. Fearing for her safety, the future Second Corps commander pleaded with the girl to leave at once, she refused. In disbelief, Ewell turned to a staff member nearby and quipped, “Women-I tell you sir, women would make a grand brigade-if it weren’t for snakes and spiders... women are not afraid of bullets; but one big black snake would put a whole army [of ladies] to flight” (Martin, 1991, p. 23).

Ewell developed an interest in religion after the loss of his leg in 1862. Prior to that, the general had little use for religion and was a very profane man. A chaplain at the battle of

Winchester explained to Ewell that he was of little use where he was and that he was going to seek a place of safety whereupon Ewell jabbed, “Why chaplain, you’re the most inconsistent man I ever saw...you’re anxious to get to heaven, [but] now that you’ve got the chance to go, you run away from it as if you’d rather not make the trip.” (Martin, 1991, p.10). Ewell’s correspondence throughout his life has a certain playful sarcasm, especially when corresponding to family members.

Ewell was a likable figure. Several of Ewell’s former compatriots left written remembrances of the general. The most common words used to describe Ewell were lovable, brilliant, brave, and odd (Taylor, 1973, Gordon, 1904, Alexander, 1962). Another historian stated that “There was almost nobody in the Army of Northern Virginia that didn’t like “Dick” Ewell” (Gallagher, vol. II, 13, 2004). Ewell made his mark while serving as “Stonewall” Jackson’s principle lieutenant in the Shenandoah Valley. At first, Ewell was frustrated by Jackson’s secrecy and eccentricity, but “Old Bald Head” became “Stonewall’s” biggest fan and “Stonewall” reciprocated. It was rumored that when Jackson was mortally wounded, he advised that Ewell should replace him (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II).

Never Jackson’s equal, Ewell displayed a persistence, tenacity, and ferocity that was unparalleled. Ewell left this impression on Major Alexander “Sandie” Pendleton, the Second Corps adjutant: “The more I see of him the more I am pleased to be with him. I look for great things from him, and am glad to say that our troops have for him a good deal of the same feeling they had towards General Jackson” (Pfan H. W., 1993, p. 4). Jackson admonished Ewell on several occasions for wandering too close to the front. The bird-like corps commander, known for many eccentricities was a favorite among the Second Corps rank and file (Taylor, 1973). The loss of his leg at Second Manassas did little to deter the hot tempered, hard driving, foul mouthed




Virginian (Ewell, 2012). General John Brown Gordon recalled, “Ewell, with his one leg, not only rode in battle like a cow-boy on the plains, but in the whirlwind of the strife his brain acted with the precision and rapidity of a Gatling gun” (1904, p. 129). Ewell had commanded several successful independent operations in the valley in 1862.

Despite his record, Ewell himself did not covet or seek corps command (Martin, 1991). Ewell confided to General P.G.T. Beauregard in May of 1863 that although his wound had healed, he was willing to command a small division in light of his new handicap (Ewell, 2012). The ascendancy of “Old Bald Head” to corps command was not unexpected (Pfan, 1998). General Longstreet recalled, “As the senior major-general of the army, and by reason of distinguished services and ability, General Ewell was entitled to the command of the Second Corps,…” (1984, p. 332).

The division commanders of the Second Corps consisted of Major Generals Jubal Early, Edward Johnson, and Robert E. Rodes. Jubal Early, also a Virginian and West Point graduate, was one of the most experienced commanders in the Army of Northern Virginia. Major Robert Stiles (Second Corps artillery and staff officer) noted, “After the death of Jackson, Early was undoubtedly one of the strongest and ablest of Lee’s lieutenants” (1910, pp. 188-189). However, the bachelor general could be opinionated, sharp-tongued, and abrasive (Freeman, 1944, vol. *III*). He served with the Army of Northern Virginia in every major engagement up to Gettysburg. Ewell had a very close relationship with Early and frequently sought his counsel.

Edward Johnson was somewhat new to divisional command. “Allegheny Ed” performed well in the Shenandoah Valley. Lee said of Johnson, “He is a splendid fellow” (Sorrel, 1958, p. 249). When asked of his capabilities for corps command (Longstreet was wounded at the battle of the Wilderness May 6, 1864) Colonel Moxley Sorrel said of Johnson, “His reputation is so high that

perhaps he would prove all that could be wished” (1958, p. 249). Johnson was an unknown quantity when it came to divisional command. Although Rodes was Johnson’s junior, he had forged an excellent reputation as a brigade commander and was certainly one of the rising stars in the Army of Northern Virginia (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II).



*Figure 3.* Robert E. Rodes retrieved from [www.findagrave.com](http://www.findagrave.com).

Unlike Early and Johnson, who attended West Point, Robert E. Rodes stayed at home for his military education. Attending Virginia Military Institute, Rodes was tall and dashing. The Virginian compiled a battle record as a brigadier that was impressive. He demonstrated brilliance at Chancellorsville, commanding the Second Corps until relieved by J.E.B. Stuart. In a letter to Jefferson Davis and upon the recommendation of the late “Stonewall” Jackson, Lee recommended Rodes for promotion (Lee, 1957). Ewell was blessed with one very talented division commander in Early, but Rodes and Johnson were inexperienced as the lieutenant general embarked on his first campaign as a corps commander.

## Lee Moves North

Following Lee's spectacular victory at Chancellorsville, he decided to invade Pennsylvania. A successful northern invasion would relieve the pressure on Chattanooga and Vicksburg. Lee hoped that the invasion might foil Union General Joseph Hooker's plans for the summer. Lee confided to Major General Harry Heth, "an invasion of the enemy's country breaks up all his preconceived plans, relieves our country of his presence, and we subsist while there on his resources". The general continued, "The question of food for this army gives me more trouble than everything else combined" (Tucker, 1958, p. 18).

The great southern legions departed Fredericksburg, Virginia, on June 3, 1863 (Pfan, 1998). Longstreet's First Corps took the lead, followed by Ewell. Hill's command was to observe Hooker at Fredericksburg, VA. By June 10, Lee ordered Ewell to enter the Shenandoah Valley, hoping to draw Hooker away from Fredericksburg. Through June 1863, Lee executed a series of moves from Fredericksburg to the Shenandoah Valley using the mountains to screen his movements and his respective corps to deceive Hooker and keep him off balance.

By June 27, 1863, Lee's entire army had crossed the Maryland border into Pennsylvania. By that date, Rodes and Johnson had camped at the U.S. Barracks at Carlisle, PA. Early's Division was between Greenwood, PA and York, PA and Hill and Longstreet had reached Chambersburg, PA (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1). Ewell wrote to his niece Lizzie of his reception in the Keystone State. "It is like a renewal of Mexican times to enter a captured town. The people look as sour as vinegar & I have no doubt would gladly send us all to kingdom come if they

could” (Ewell, 2012, p. 245). If part of Lee’s objective was to disrupt Yankee plans, he had succeeded beautifully. Hooker was forced to react as Lee acted.

“Fighting Joe” Hooker was a West Point graduate known more for his ability to fight than his ability to plan. The debacle at Chancellorsville had a humbling effect on the commanding general. Following that battle, Hooker explained, “To tell the truth, I just lost confidence in Joe Hooker” (Ward, 1991, p. 204). Hooker wasn’t the only one who had lost confidence in himself. The Lincoln Administration, as well as the army, became increasingly critical of the general. Lieutenant Frank Haskell (Aide-De-Camp to Union General John Gibbon) observed, “Then [after Chancellorsville], I believe, the army in general, both officers and men, had no confidence in Hooker, in either his honesty or ability” (1957, p. 2). Similarly, General Darius Couch of the US II Corps remarked, “I retired from his presence [Hooker] with the belief that my commanding general was a whipped man” (McPherson, 1988, p. 640). Hooker proposed a bold plan advocating an attack on the Rebel supply train followed by a march on Richmond. Presumably, Lee would have been compelled to abandon his invasion to address Hooker’s threat. However, Hooker was ordered to position his army between Lee and Washington. Realizing that he had lost the confidence of his men and his government and denied a free hand with the garrison at Harper’s Ferry, VA, Hooker was just as frustrated with Lincoln as the president was with him. Hooker was replaced on June 28, 1863 (Howard, 2010).

On June 28, the Lincoln Administration appointed George Gordon Meade (commander of the U.S. V Corps) to command the Army of the Potomac. Meade was a Pennsylvanian and a West Point graduate. He had a good reputation within the army. Meade commanded a brigade on the Peninsula and at Second Manassas. He capably led a division at Sharpsburg and it was Meade’s division that breached the stone wall at Marye’s Heights (Fredericksburg). Finally, the new

commanding general conducted operations of the V Corps at Chancellorsville. General George B. McClellan said that Meade was “an excellent officer; cool, brave and intelligent...an honest man” (Tucker, 1958, p. 73). Similarly, Major General John Reynolds (I Corps commander) and Major General John Sedgwick (VI Corps commander) suggested that Meade should succeed Hooker. The latter stated, “Why, Meade is the proper one to command this army” (Meade, 1913, vol. II, p. 6). The gravity of the situation was obvious by the power bestowed on Meade. General-in-Chief Henry Halleck gave Meade a great deal of latitude in his new position. Halleck informed Meade that he was in command of all forces, including the Harper’s Ferry garrison. The General-in-Chief took the unprecedented step of allowing Meade to hire and fire any commander without regard to seniority (Meade, 1913, vol. II). There was one constraint on Meade’s freedom to act. The administration made it clear that the commanding general was to safeguard Baltimore and Washington at all hazards.

Faced with this awesome responsibility, Meade began gathering information on the status of his army. His efforts did not go unnoticed. Due to the commanding general’s attention and diligence, the Army of the Potomac, badly shaken by the Chancellorsville fiasco, regained its confidence (Gibbon, 1928).

Meade believed that the Union army was too spread out (Tucker, 1958). On June 28, 1863, he ordered the Army of the Potomac to move the next day, the I Corps (Reynolds) and the XI Corps (Howard) to Emmitsburg, MD. The XII Corps under General Henry Slocum and the III Corps under General Dan Sickles were sent to Taneytown, MD. General Winfield Hancock’s II Corps was directed to Frizellsburg, MD. John Sedgwick’s mammoth VI Corps was ordered to New Windsor, MD. The V Corps under George Sykes was sent to Liberty, MD (Alexander,

1962). Meade's army was protected by three cavalry divisions. John Buford's on the left, General Irvin Gregg's in the rear, and Judson Kilpatrick's on the right.



Figure 4. The Gettysburg Campaign retrieved from the Civil War Trust.

By the afternoon of June 30, information concerning enemy dispositions began to reach Meade at Taneytown. He quickly ordered Reynolds to take command of the I, XI, and III Corps, the latter being shifted to Emmitsburg (Howard, 2010). John Buford's cavalry division had briefly engaged a Confederate brigade at Gettysburg. Realizing that the enemy infantry was

near, Meade planned a pre-emptive retreat, if necessary. He ordered his engineers to search for good defensive positions in the immediate vicinity of the Army of the Potomac. This action was taken so as to have a ready-made defensive position. This would allow the army to concentrate more easily if Lee overwhelmed Reynolds (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 3). However, Meade made it clear that this was only a contingency. If an offensive were favorable, orders would be forthcoming. The area chosen for defensive operations was behind Pipe Creek (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 3).

Meanwhile, Confederate forces continued their advance north. Ewell, with Johnson and Rodes, reached Carlisle, PA on June 27 and was ordered to take Harrisburg on the 29th. Early's division advanced to York on June 28. Also on the 28<sup>th</sup>, Hill and Longstreet entered Chambersburg (Marshall, 1927). However, on June 29 Lee received his first intelligence on the enemy position since leaving Virginia (Sorrel, 1958). The Federal army had crossed the Potomac and was advancing westward.

The Confederate commander feared that the Yankee army might cross the mountains and cut him off from Virginia. The southern army's life line for ammunition ran through the Old Dominion. As a result, Lee hoped to check the Union army east of the mountains. He promptly countermanded Ewell's orders to invest Harrisburg and ordered Hill on June 29 to Cashtown, PA. Longstreet was to follow on the 30<sup>th</sup>. The entire Confederate Second Corps was recalled from Carlisle to Gettysburg or Cashtown "...as circumstances might require" (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1, p. 317). Ewell and Rodes advanced by way of Heidlersburg, Middletown, and Gettysburg. Early marched from York to Middletown and then on to Gettysburg. Johnson was directed by a longer route from Carlisle to Greenwood to Gettysburg. Hill moved east from Chambersburg. By June 29 Major General Henry Heth's Division of Hill's Third Corps was

encamped at Cashtown. On June 30, 1863 the two armies faced each other awaiting the greatest struggle of the war. With the enemy near, Meade realized the gravity of the situation and issued this order on June 30, "...Corps and other commanders are authorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails in his duty at this hour" (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 3, p. 426).

General Heth's Division moved to Cashtown on June 29, followed by Dorsey Pender's Division on the 30<sup>th</sup>. Heth's command became the lead element of the Confederate army. Pettigrew's Brigade of Heth's Division led the way. On the morning of June 30, 1863, the dashing North Carolinian led his brigade to Gettysburg for supplies. It was rumored that the small town contained storehouses full of shoes (Heth, 1877, vol. IV). Shoes were a valuable



*Figure 5.* John Buford retrieved from [en.wikipedia.org](http://en.wikipedia.org).

commodity to the foot-sore veterans of Lee's army.



General John Buford's Union cavalry division of 2,500 men comprised the forward guard of the Army of the Potomac. A West Point graduate, Buford was an excellent cavalry officer. "Ice Cold" General John Gibbon described Buford as "...brave, vigilant, and cool-headed..." (1928, p. 132). On the morning of June 30, Buford's troopers bumped into Pettigrew's infantry about a half mile west of Gettysburg (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. *XXVII*, 1). Unaware of the Federal strength in Gettysburg, Pettigrew withdrew to Cashtown. He reported to Heth and Hill "...a large force of cavalry in the town, supported by an infantry force", however, the exact strength of the enemy could not be ascertained (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. *XXVII*, 2, p. 637). Hill had received reports of cavalry in Gettysburg but he believed that it was only a detachment to observe Rebel movements. General Heth then informed the Confederate Third Corps commander "...if there is no objection, I will take my division to-morrow and go to Gettysburg and get those shoes! Hill replied, 'None in the World'" (Heth, 1877, vol. *IV*, p. 157).

### **Heth Initiates the Attack**


The morning of July 1, 1863, dawned hot and humid. A light rain soaked the lush countryside across central Pennsylvania. Heth advanced east, down the Chambersburg Pike at 5:00 AM. Brigadier General Joseph Davis's Brigade proceeded in line of battle to the left of the Chambersburg Pike while James Archer's Brigade positioned itself to the right of the Pike. Pettigrew and Colonel John Brockenbrough were held in reserve (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. *XXVII*, 2). Davis and Archer scattered Buford's cavalry vedettes about three miles west of Gettysburg (Scott, 1862). By 9:30 AM. Heth's Division was forcing Buford's troopers back toward the town. Buford reported to Meade. "The enemy's force [Heth's Division] are advancing on me at this point, and driving my pickets and skirmishers very rapidly" (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. *XXVII*, 2, p. 924). The alert cavalry commander kept in constant contact with Reynolds, whose lead

division was only three miles south of Gettysburg. Buford hoped to occupy Heth long enough for Reynolds and the US I Corps to arrive. If successful, the Union army would hold the high ground, giving it a considerable advantage in the coming fight. Buford's contributions to the Army of the Potomac on July 1 were nothing short of spectacular. The historian M.F. Steele wrote that the I Cavalry Division's (Buford's) stand was "...the most valuable day's work done by the cavalry in the Civil War" (Grogan, 1997, p. 68).

The cavalry held stubbornly for about two hours (Howard, 2010). Colonel Thomas Devin's and Colonel William Gamble's cavalry brigades supported by Lieutenant John Calef's six guns were pushed back to McPherson Ridge. Shortly after 10:00 am, Brigadier General James Wadsworth's division of the US I Corps arrived. The I Corps commander (Reynolds) directed Wadsworth's and Doubleday's divisions superbly. Wadsworth placed one brigade north of the Chambersburg Pike. A second brigade (Iron Brigade) was directed to the south of the Pike. Doubleday's command proceeded toward the Mummasburg Road. The "Hero of Fort Sumter" aligned his left with Wadsworth's right. Doubleday received orders from Reynolds stating, "I will hold on to this road [Chambersburg Pike] and you hold on to the other [Mumasburg Road]" (Tucker, 1958, p. 109).

As Heth moved in force against McPherson Ridge, the gallant Reynolds was killed by a sniper's bullet at about 10:15 AM. Doubleday mourned, "The country sustained great loss in his death. I lamented him as almost a life-long companion" (1890, p. 131). With Reynolds dead, command of the I Corps fell to the senior division commander, Abner Doubleday. He later recalled, "The whole burden of the battle was thus suddenly thrown upon me" (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 2, p. 245).

Heth's Division continued its advance with Archer on the right and Davis on the left. Just as Archer crossed Willoughby Run, he ran directly into Union General Solomon Meredith's brigade (Iron Brigade) of Wadsworth's division. Likewise, Davis engaged Lysander Cutler's brigade (Wadsworth's division) just north of the railroad cut (Heth, 1877, vol. IV). The two brigades of



*Figure 6.* John Reynolds retrieved from [www.city-data.com](http://www.city-data.com).

Heth and Wadsworth's division were of equal strength (Pfanz, 1994). However, the forces engaged so that Heth's left overlapped Wadsworth's right and Wadsworth's left overlapped Heth's right. Consequently, Meredith's brigade flanked Archer's and Davis's Brigade drove Cutler through the railroad cut and threatened his flank. Only the charge of the 6<sup>th</sup> Wisconsin Regiment stymied Davis's advance and forced the Confederate brigade back to Herr Ridge. The gallant US I Corps under the able leadership of first Reynolds and then Doubleday had won the first major engagement on July 1.

Major General Oliver Howard's US XI Corps arrived on the field at about 11:45 AM (Doubleday, 1890). General Howard was Doubleday's senior and assumed command of the field. Howard was a West Point graduate. Although he had fought hard during the war, his XI Corps was stigmatized by its disastrous defeat at Chancellorsville. Howard's Corps was the





Figure 7. Battle of Gettysburg, morning July 1 retrieved from the Civil War Trust.

outcast of the Army of the Potomac. Soldiers of other corps joked that the common saying among the predominantly German immigrants of the XI was, “I fights mit Sigel and runs mit Schurz”, an obvious reference to former corps commander Franz Sigel and current division and future corps commander, Carl Schurz (Pula, 1972, p. 180). Under Howard's direction, the XI Corps had been disgraced. Nevertheless, Meade chose Howard to direct operations rather than Doubleday (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 2). Meanwhile, the remainder of the I Corps had

arrived. Roy Stone's second brigade of Doubleday's division positioned itself to the right of the Iron Brigade (Meredith) at about 11:15 AM (Tagg, 1998). Brigadier General John Robinson's division was held in reserve. Howard's combined strength (engaged) of the I and XI Corps was about 21,443 men (Busey and Martin, 1994, p. 16).



*Figure 8.* Oliver Otis Howard retrieved from the Library of Congress.

Realizing that Ewell's Second Corps was approaching from the north, Howard ordered the XI Corps to form on Doubleday's right. Major General Carl Schurz assumed command of the XI Corps while Howard commanded the field. Schurz's division (now commanded by General Alexander Schimmelfennig) fell in between the Mummasburg and Carlisle Roads. Brigadier General Francis Barlow's division supported Schimmelfennig on the right of the Carlisle Road. Both commands were in position by 2:00 PM (Coddington, 1968). Howard had surveyed the ridges surrounding Gettysburg and determined that Cemetery Hill (south of town) was a strong defensive position. Howard established his headquarters on this hill and as Brigadier General

Adolf von Steinwehr's division and the reserve artillery moved forward, Howard placed them on Cemetery Hill as a potential rallying point for the I and XI Corps (Howard, 2010).


Around 11:15 AM, both armies enjoyed a pause in the action (Howard, 2010). General Heth, although surprised (he never expected to find the I and XI Corps in Gettysburg), quickly recovered and got his division in hand. Once the situation stabilized, Heth returned to Hill for orders. Hill and Lee had moved to the front to confer with Heth who had orders not to force a major engagement. The latter reported, "The enemy had now been felt, and found to be in heavy force in and around Gettysburg" (O.R., 1882-1900, vol. XXVII, 2, p. 638). Eventually, Lee realized that the Confederates had an advantage with Heth (7,458 men) and Pender (6,681 men) on the right and Robert E. Rodes's Division (Ewell's Corps 7,873 men) just arriving on Heth's left (Busey, et al., 1994, pp. 163, 173, 179).

By afternoon, Ewell's lead division (Rodes) began to arrive on Oak Hill. Ewell had received orders from Lee as Rodes's attack was getting underway. Ewell's aide and stepson, Campbell Brown, reported that General Lee forbade a general engagement until the army was concentrated. Ewell was in a quandary. He realized that he had a golden opportunity. He was on the flank of the Union army with one division (Rodes) about to engage and another (Early) close at hand. Upon hearing Lee's orders, Ewell snapped, "It [is] too late." Campbell Brown remembered that Lee was displaying a 'querulous impatience, which I never saw in him before...' (2001, p. 204). Brown intimated to Ewell that Lee was furious and had accused other officers of disobeying his orders (2001).

### **Rodes and Early Attack**

As Rodes's Division prepared for an assault, General Robinson, commanding the Second Division of the US I Corps, ordered Henry Baxter's brigade to Wadsworth's right. Baxter,

recognizing the danger, executed a right oblique movement so that his brigade faced Rodes's Division (OR, 1882-1900, vol. XXVII, 1). Ewell interpreted this as an offensive movement which threatened Rodes's Division. (Fullenkamp, September 17, 2010) Presumably, the Corps commander reasoned that he could disregard Lee's instructions of not bringing on a general



*Figure 9.* Henry Heth retrieved from [www.aztecclub.com](http://www.aztecclub.com).

engagement due to the threat of one of his divisions and allowed Rodes's attack to go forward. Ewell explained "It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up, and I determined to push the attack vigorously" (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1, pp. 443-444). However, once he had driven the Yankees from their position, he would await orders and advised Rodes and Early accordingly. Rodes's attack began at 2:30 pm (Collins, 2008). His

division advanced between the Mumasburg and Carlisle Roads with General George Doles Brigade on the left, Colonel Edward O'Neil in the Center, and General Alfred Iverson on the right (O.R., 1882-1900, vol. XXVII, 1). Doubleday ordered the remainder of Robinson's division (Paul's brigade) to Schimmelfennig's left. Rodes's brigades were badly handled, uncoordinated, and checked. Rodes complained, "It was apparent that we were making no impression on the enemy" (Collins, 2008, p. 269).

### **The Federal Army Collapses**

With Lee's permission, Heth renewed his assault as Rodes's attack commenced and pushed Doubleday back to Seminary Ridge (Coddington, 1968). In some of the bloodiest fighting of the war, Heth's attack petered out near the Lutheran Seminary. Just as Heth's advance stalled, Dorsey Pender's fresh division slammed into the beleaguered I Corps. At about 3:00 pm., Rodes revived his faltering assault by committing the remainder of his division (Ramseur and Daniel) (Collins, 2008). According to Howard, by 3:45 pm., the I Corps was begging for fresh troops to stem the Confederate tide (2010).

Early's Division signaled the Yankee death knell (Taylor, W., 1913). The experienced division commander advanced down the Harrisburg Road in line of battle, the brigades of General John Brown Gordon and Harry Hays to the right of the road, with Colonel Isaac Avery on the left. General William Smith's Brigade was held in reserve (Early, 2010). Early's attack occurred as elements of both the Second and Third Confederate Corps had renewed their assault on the I and XI Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Heth and Pender had forced the US I Corps back. Rodes had assaulted the Union line at the junction of the I and XI Corps. Meanwhile, Early's assault which began around 3:00 pm. had flanked the US XI Corps (Early, 2010). The total Rebel strength (elements of the Second and Third Corps) up to this point on



July 1 included about 27,472 men (Busey, et al., 1994, pp. 157,163,173,179).

Badly outnumbered at the point of attack, and virtually exhausted, the Union army fell back through Gettysburg to Cemetery Hill. Although shaken, the Federals withdrew in good order maintaining some cohesion (Greene, 1992). Longstreet described Howard’s withdraw as “...a




Figure 10. Battle of Gettysburg, afternoon July 1 retrieved from en.wikipedia.org.

steady, orderly retreat to Cemetery Hill” (1894, p. 356). Rallying his men, Howard placed the remnants of the XI Corps to the right of the Baltimore Pike. John Buford’s cavalry was sent to the flanks (Howard, 2010). At about 3:20 PM Buford fired off a message to Meade. “At the present moment the battle is raging on the road to Cashtown, and in short cannon range of this town; the enemy’s line is a semicircle on the height from north to west. ...In my opinion there seems to be no directing person. We need help now” (Meade, 1913, p. 53)! Meade immediately dispatched Major General Winfield Scott Hancock (II Corps) Howard’s junior, to Gettysburg to

take command. The II Corps commander arrived between 3:00-4:00 PM (Howard, 2010, Hancock, 1878). After surveying the situation and placing Wadsworth's division on Culp's Hill, Hancock reported to Meade, "The battle is quiet now. I think we will be all right until tonight. I think we can retire; if not, we can fight here, as the ground appears not unfavorable with good troops" (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. *XXVII*, 2, p. 356).

### **Cemetery Hill**

Flushed with victory, Ewell's Corps advanced into town sometime between 4:00-5:00 pm (Collins, 2008). Mindful of Lee's orders, and waving aside the advice of his generals (Gordon, Hays, and Trimble), Ewell ordered a halt. Ewell grumbled to Gordon, "General Lee told me to come to Gettysburg, and he gave me no orders to go further,... I do not feel like ...making an attack without orders from him..." (Martin, 1991, p. 214). The halt order was largely unnecessary due to fatigue, confusion in town, large amounts of Yankee prisoners, and artillery and sharpshooter fire from Cemetery Hill. In addition, the Corps commander still remembered Lee's admonition prohibiting a general engagement and recognized the strong defensive position the Federals had occupied on Cemetery Hill. General Rodes described that position as a "formidable line of infantry and artillery" (Rodes, 1876, vol. II, p. 149).

Lee witnessed the Federals retreat through Gettysburg and up Cemetery Hill from his position on Seminary Ridge (Tagg, 1998). The commanding general sent this famous message to Ewell, "He [Lee] therefore sent orders to General Ewell to carry the hill, to which the enemy had retired from Gettysburg, known as Cemetery Hill, if practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward." (Marshall, 1927, p. 228) Major Taylor of Lee's staff delivered this verbal order between 4:00 PM and 5:00 PM.

As Taylor returned to Lee, Ewell was informed that General William Smith, whose brigade was covering the Second Corps rear near the York Road, had spotted the enemy in force. Early, who was not convinced, asked Ewell to delay any possible attack in order to investigate Smith's claim. The Corps commander agreed and Early directed Gordon to support and assume command of Smith's Brigade (Early., 1877, *IV*). Early explained his position to Ewell, "Genl, I don't much believe in this, but prefer to suspend my movements until I can inquire into it. 'Well Ewell replied, do so.' Meantime I shall get Rodes into position and communicate with Hill" (Pfan, 1993, p. 70).

After weighing all of the options, Ewell decided to wait for Johnson's Division to arrive which he erroneously believed was close at hand (Douglas, 1940). Lee visited the lieutenant general's headquarters and conferred with Ewell, Early, and Rodes (Early, 2010). It was agreed that the corps commander would not assault Cemetery Hill. Lee said to Ewell, "I may decide to draw off my right flank to get between the enemy and Washington, to force them to attack us in position,..." Lee turned to Ewell and continued 'Do not become so much involved as to be unable to readily extricate (your) troops'" (Martin, 1991, pp. 221-222).

Johnson's Division arrived at about sunset (Pfan, 1998). Ewell received intelligence that Culp's Hill was unoccupied (Pfan, 1993). Culp's Hill dominated the position and was located to the east of Cemetery Hill. Ewell reluctantly ordered Johnson to seize Culp's Hill earlier in the evening. The Second Corps commander was obviously concerned about the earlier conversation that he had with Lee. If Ewell allowed Johnson to attack and Lee ordered the Second Corps to the right, it might be impossible to recall Johnson's Division in accordance with Lee's order (drawing the Confederate army to the right). Nevertheless, Ewell ordered Johnson to take Culp's Hill.

Colonel Marshall arrived with orders from the commanding general. Ewell recalled, “I received orders soon after dark to draw my Corps to the right, in case it could not be used to advantage where it was,” (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1, p. 446). Realizing that the ground on which the Second Corps rested had been dearly paid for in southern blood and that Culp’s Hill, as he believed, was unoccupied, Ewell rushed to Lee to urge him not to move the Second Corps. Lee acquiesced and Ewell ordered Johnson to storm Culp’s Hill if he had not already done so (Pfan, 1998).

It was after midnight on July 2, and Johnson had not captured Culp’s Hill. His forces had encountered Federal troops in force (Brown, 2001). Moreover, a captured Union scout carried information indicating that the V Federal Corps was on the field and near Culp’s Hill. Ewell was visibly upset by Johnson’s inaction. The corps commander thundered, I will “hold that officer accountable” (Martin, 1991, p. 225). Ewell concluded, “...Day was breaking, and it was too late for any change of place” (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1, p. 446).

### **Can Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the US Army Field Manual 3-0, C1 Help?**

As a result of the variables detailed above, the heretofore (corps command), aggressive General Ewell refused to attack. Many have concluded that this action was responsible for Confederate defeat at Gettysburg and destroyed the dream of southern independence. There is no question that this decision tarnished Ewell’s reputation. Participants, historians, and interested observers have second guessed the lieutenant general for his actions on the evening of July 1, 1863, ever since. Many have expressed both positive and negative opinions concerning this subject and the Second Corps commander’s performance. Few have based their opinions on a standard set of military principles when passing judgment on “Dick” Ewell”. A review of General Ewell’s predicament and performance on the evening of July 1, 1863 through the


theoretical lens of combined military leadership principles that have been relevant for 2,500 years would produce a more objective and definitive conclusion as to how reasonable Ewell's actions were on that fateful day.

General Richard S. Ewell had a long and distinguished military career. His record at West Point was stellar. Ewell spent six years in the Dragoons (Cavalry) on the frontier. His Mexican War service was honorable and he learned the craft of war from Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott (Casdorff, 2004). Ewell spent most of his career between the Mexican War and the outbreak of the Civil War fighting Indians. On the eve of the Civil War, he had amassed an impressive military record that included a brevet for gallantry from the Mexican War and a Captain's commission in the US Cavalry (Pfanzer, 1998). Promotions in the Confederate service came quickly. Ewell showed skill as a brigade and division commander culminating in his elevation to corps command and lieutenant general following "Stonewall" Jackson's death in 1863. Ewell was wounded on several occasions, the most serious at Second Manassas resulting in the loss of his leg. He led the Second Corps for over a year and at the close of the war, he had commanded the Richmond Defenses. Despite his long, successful, and distinguished career, Ewell is most noted for his performance at the battle of Gettysburg, especially the first day. His unwillingness to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, created a firestorm of criticism. Many contend to this day that Ewell's actions on day one of the battle of Gettysburg not only lost the battle, but lost the entire war for the Confederacy.

### **Missing "Stonewall"! Ewell's Contemporaries Attitudes Concerning his Performance**

One of the early defenders of General Ewell was his principle subordinate and senior division commander, Lieutenant General Jubal Early. However, Early's steadfast defense of Lee and vitriolic criticism of James Longstreet prompted defenders of those officers to seek other

scapegoats, all of which satisfied Early's aim to preserve Lee's reputation and escape blame unscathed (Gallagher, 1998). While Early's efforts to defend Lee initially diverted attention away from himself and General Ewell, several 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century historians influenced by the Lost Cause found scapegoats in Generals Longstreet, Ewell, and Stuart. Early appeared to defend Ewell, but his arguments in favor of the Second Corps commander tacitly suggested that perhaps Ewell did share some of the blame. For example, Early wrote after the war that he couldn't understand why Ewell was alone to blame for the defeat at Gettysburg (Early, 1877, vol. IV). This statement seems to suggest to some that Ewell was at least, partially at fault for the loss at Gettysburg. Whatever the case, it does appear that Early's memory suffered from retrospective recollection



*Figure 11.* Jubal A. Early retrieved from [www.nps.gov](http://www.nps.gov).

Early, a lawyer by trade attacked James Longstreet in 1872 while speaking at a celebration of Lee's birthday. Early fired the first salvo at Longstreet and accused him of losing the battle of Gettysburg which opened criticism to Ewell and J.E.B Stuart (Early, 1877). Some have

speculated that Early's attack on Longstreet and subsequently, Ewell was to divert attention from his mistakes in central Pennsylvania (Osborne, 1993).

Whatever the reason, it is clear that Early's attack set off a debate between Confederate generals in the Southern Historical Society Papers (1877) in which they waged a war of words against one another over who was at fault at Gettysburg. Early's indictment of Longstreet represented the early stages of the Lost Cause tradition. The Lost Cause depicted Southerners as "fighting Christian soldiers" and held Lee and "Stonewall" Jackson as icons who were beyond reproach (Wilson, 1980). Early was the principle voice protecting Lee's image. Through his literary influence, many former Confederate officers trembled at the thought of running afoul of the bachelor general (Stiles, 1910).

Early's official report of the battle found little fault with General Ewell. In fact, when the corps commander suggested an attack by Early's division, Jubal balked, explaining that the Cemetery Hill position was a solid one. Early explained after the war that, if not for General Smith's report of Federals on the York Road, Early would have immediately assaulted Cemetery Hill with his division (Early, 1877, vol. IV). However, at the time "Old Jube" indicated that Cemetery Hill should have been assaulted, but he was of the opinion, much like his fellow major generals and Ewell that any assault required assistance from Hill's Third Corps. More than ten years after the war and following the death of Ewell and Lee, Early bristled at the suggestion that Cemetery Hill should have been taken on day one and that Ewell was somehow negligent, a view that was shared by many of Ewell's contemporaries (Bean, 1959). "There is no earthly reason why the failure to seize Cemetery Hill that afternoon should rest exclusively on Ewell's shoulders." (Early, 1877, vol. IV, p. 253). Early argued that the detractors of Ewell assumed, erroneously, that Ewell could have successfully assaulted Cemetery Hill and that even had the

Second Corps taken that position, it would not have accomplished the South's objective (to destroy the Army of the Potomac). According to Early, had Ewell's forces occupied Cemetery Hill on July 1, Meade would have withdrawn the Army of the Potomac to the Pipe Creek Line which was a ready-made defensive position (Early, 1877, vol. 4). Early erroneously suggested that his initial reaction on July 1 was to assault Cemetery Hill, however, ten years after the conflict Early wrote, "I must confess that, though my opinion at the time was different, subsequent developments have satisfied me that his decision [Ewell's] was right." (Early, 1877, vol. IV, p. 260).


Several officers in both the Second Corps and the Army of Northern Virginia believed that Ewell had hesitated at the critical moment (Bean, 1959). This criticism was apparent both before and after Ewell's death (1872). Early characterized the attacks of Ewell's critics as an "...injustice done the memory of as true a soldier as ever drew his sword in defense of a righteous cause." (Early, 1877, vol. 4 p. 266).

Rather than finding fault with Ewell, Early unleashed all of his venom on Lieutenant General James Longstreet (Early, 1877, vol. 4). The First Corps commander had been critical of Lee concerning the battle of Gettysburg in several publications after the war including Swinton's (1866), *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac*. In addition, Longstreet was an easy target for former Confederates. Longstreet committed the unforgivable sins after the war of criticizing Lee, registering as a Republican, accepting political patronage from a Republican administration, and having a close relationship with Ulysses Grant (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II). Sadly, Longstreet died perhaps the most hated Confederate general.

Early's rabid defense of Lee is typical of the virtues of those who ascribed to the Lost Cause tradition. Other Confederate officers who perpetuated this view were Fitz Lee, John Brown



Gordon, Isaac Trimble, and others (Gallagher, 2004). It is particularly important to understand who was writing these accounts of the battle of Gettysburg and when. According to Gary Gallagher, most of the critical evaluations of Ewell's performance on the evening of July 1 by former Confederate officers appeared after the war which suggested an influence of the Lost Cause (Gallagher, 1998). In general, the later that the book or memoir was published, the less reliable it is and the more likely that the author was pursuing an agenda or was unknowingly influenced by the Lost Cause (Gallagher, 1992).



*Figure 12.* James Longstreet retrieved from [en.wikipedia.org](http://en.wikipedia.org).

General Lee found no fault with Ewell, at least officially and before the war ended. In his official report, the commanding general revealed the reason for Confederate failure to dislodge the Union army from Cemetery Hill on July 1. Lee wrote, "...the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of

fresh troops” (Longstreet, 1984, p. 359). Lee was not given to publicly criticize anyone.

However, as we will see, he had no trouble pointing fingers in private.

Lee’s cousin, Cassius, was a childhood friend and business advisor to the general after the war. Cassius’s son, Cazenove Lee, claimed after the war that the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia had no confidence in General Ewell and that had Jackson survived, the Confederates would have won the first day at the battle of Gettysburg (Lee, 1904). Cazenove confided to Lee’s youngest son, Robert Jr. that at a meeting in which he (Cazenove) was present along with his father Cassius (after the war); General Lee openly and frankly discussed events of the war. According to Cazenove, “He [General Lee] said that Ewell was a fine officer, but would never take the responsibility of exceeding his orders, and having been ordered to Gettysburg, he would not go farther and hold the heights beyond the town” (Lee, 1904, pp. 415-416).

Other evidence suggests that Lee did indeed hold Ewell responsible for the loss at Gettysburg. In a conversation after the war with William Allen, the former chief ordinance officer of the Second Corps, Lee indicated that he “could not get Ewell to act with decision”. Allen revealed that Lee blamed the loss of Gettysburg on “the imperfect, halting way in which his corps commanders, especially Ewell, fought the battle gave victory ... finally to the foe” (Marshall, 1927 p. 251). The fact that Lee singled out Ewell is significant. Gallagher (2004, vol. I) believes that part of Lee’s scorn for Ewell is rooted in the idea that Lee created a culture in the officer corps of the Army of Northern Virginia that expected officers to be daring and to take chances and that Ewell, according to Lee, did not fit that mold. Although Lee did not criticize Ewell during the war, it appears that the commanding general had a change of heart after the conflict.

One of the few Second Corps staff officers who defended General Ewell's actions on day one of the battle of Gettysburg was his step-son and Aide-de-Camp, Campbell Brown. Brown was an extremely competent officer who became a staunch defender of General Ewell (Casdorff, 2004). Brown enjoyed an intimate knowledge of the events of July 1 by virtue of his contact with the Second Corps commander, Ewell's subordinates, and Lee. Unfortunately, Brown's memoirs were written before Ewell was widely attacked and blamed for Confederate defeat at Gettysburg.



*Figure 13.* George Campbell Brown retrieved from [www.findagrave.com](http://www.findagrave.com).

The accusations hurled at Ewell were just beginning. Brown defended Ewell and accused Ewell's critics of Monday morning quarterbacking. Brown wrote, "The discovery that this [Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill] lost us the battle is one of those frequently-recurring but tardy strokes of military genius of which one hears long after the minute circumstances that rendered them at the time impracticable, are forgotten-at least I heard nothing of it for months & months, & it was several years before any claim was put in by Early and his friends that his advice had been in favor of an attack & had been neglected" (Brown, 2001, p. 212). Although Early defended Ewell, he appears to have argued for no attack at all after his

initial suggestion that Cemetery Hill should have been assaulted as his division entered the town. After the war, Early claimed that he had advocated for an attack against the Union position throughout the evening.

The principle scapegoat of the battle of Gettysburg after 1872 was James Longstreet. Longstreet's perceived transgressions, which have been documented, after the war made him a lightning-rod for criticism. General Early led the charge to vilify the First Corps commander. Obviously, Longstreet blamed Lee for Confederate defeat at Gettysburg (Longstreet, 1984). However, he also found fault with several other commanders, most notably, General Stuart. According to Colonel Charles Marshall, Longstreet contributed to Stuart's ability to interpret his orders in a manner that allowed Stuart to ride around the Union army (Marshall, 1927). Longstreet described the Cavalier's absence at Gettysburg as "deplorable" (Longstreet, 1878 vol. V, p. 72). The First Corps commander wrote that Stuart "should not have been permitted to leave the general line of march, thus leaving us to march blindfolded into the enemy's country; to this may be attributed, in my opinion, the change of the policy of the campaign" (Longstreet, 1878, vol. V. P. 72). As for Ewell, Longstreet did not mention him or Hill by name, however, he did indicate that the inability to pursue and defeat the enemy on the first day and allowing the Federal forces to concentrate, contributed to the defeat at Gettysburg (Longstreet, 1984).

One of the loudest critics of General Ewell was Major General Isaac Trimble. The 61 year old general was, like Ewell, wounded at Second Manassas and returned to duty for the Gettysburg Campaign. Trimble, who was promoted to divisional command after his injury, was unable to accept those responsibilities and his division had been assigned to Edward Johnson of the Second Corps. Lee informed Trimble in June of 1863, upon his return to the Army of Northern Virginia, that he would command all Confederate troops in the Valley of Virginia. As

Lee's forces moved north through this area on their way to Pennsylvania, all of the troops in Trimble's department were assigned to the Army of Northern Virginia to assist in the invasion of the Keystone State. Essentially, Trimble was a Major General without a command. He functioned as a volunteer aide and eventually rode with the Second Corps.

By all accounts, Trimble was a competent, but rash commander. His service, mostly under Ewell's command, in the Civil War had been distinguished. However, he was very ambitious and at times, reckless. He once confided to "Stonewall" Jackson that he would become a Major General during this war or die trying (Tucker, 1958). This attitude did not bode well for troops serving under his command. During the Valley campaign, he had served under Ewell and his most recent service had been with the Second Corps. Perhaps that is why he joined Ewell in Carlisle, PA on June 28, 1863 (Trimble, 1898, vol. 26).

Trimble was not shy when it came to pointing fingers for defeat at Gettysburg. In a letter to John Bachelder in 1883, Trimble accused Ewell of not following up on the Confederates initial success on day one. According to Trimble, he urged Ewell to assault Culp's Hill and claimed that it was unoccupied. Ewell declined, citing General Lee's order earlier in the day to avoid a general engagement. Trimble described the corps commander as "...far from composure and under much embarrassment," (Trimble, 1898, vol. 26, p. 123).

General Trimble characterized Federal forces occupying Cemetery Hill as "signally defeated" by 2:30 PM (Trimble, 1898, vol. 26. P. 124). He indicated that the Federal I and XI Corps were demoralized and defeated and that General Winfield Hancock did not appear on the field to rally Union forces until 4:30 (Trimble, 1898, vol. 26). All of which, argued Trimble, was reason for Ewell to attack. Trimble concluded that Ewell's unwillingness to attack Cemetery or Culp's Hill

on first day of the battle of Gettysburg was the “fatal error” of July 1 (Trimble, 1898, vol. 26, p. 124).

In keeping with the theme of the Lost Cause, or perhaps unwilling to attract the wrath of Early, Trimble exonerated Lee from any blame. He described the defeat at Gettysburg as mistakes (errors in judgment) that sabotaged Lee’s plan. In fact, Trimble wrote that victory at Gettysburg would have been assured had any one of these mistakes been avoided. However, taken together, they were overwhelming and produced defeat (Trimble, 1898, vol. 26).

Trimble listed these errors in his letter to Bachelder. He accused Major General J.E.B. Stuart of disobeying orders and stated that the absence of the cavalry contributed significantly to southern defeat. Trimble repeated his criticism of Ewell several times on a list that he had prepared. The 2<sup>nd</sup> error on the list is as follows, “General Ewell not moving directly on Gettysburg early on July 1<sup>st</sup> where he could have begun the fight with Hill, made it speedily successful at an early hour of the day, and prevented the enemy from halting on Cemetery Hill” (Trimble, 1898, vol. 26, p.127). Trimble continued with the 3<sup>rd</sup> error, “Our success the first day not having been followed up by vigorous pursuit of the enemy” (Trimble, 1898, vol. 26, p. 127). The Major General mentioned Longstreet on more than one occasion as being negligent for not attacking early on July 2, which he listed twice. He also criticized Longstreet for not committing his entire force on day two (Trimble, 1898, vol. 26). This is consistent with General Early’s criticism of Longstreet. Trimble returned to Ewell and wrote, “Failure to occupy Culp’s Hill on the 1<sup>st</sup> [July], without opposition, which would have driven the enemy from Cemetery Hill” (Trimble, 1898, vol. 26, p. 128). Finally, Trimble cited the inability of the Army of Northern Virginia to coordinate its efforts on July 3 as a cause for southern defeat for which nobody ever seems to blame Lee whose responsibility it was to coordinate this attack.

General Trimble's letter is unabashed in its criticism of various general officers. He did not hesitate to list them by name. It is interesting that he did not publish this letter until after Lee, Stuart, Rodes, and Ewell were dead and while Longstreet was under attack from nearly every living Confederate officer. Trimble summed up Confederate failure at Gettysburg by stating that General Lee wished to "...push our success the first day, and to attack by daylight on the 2<sup>nd</sup>. This was prevented by the indecision of his corps commanders" (Trimble, 1898, vol. 26, p. 128). Trimble was so upset at Ewell that he refused to serve under him again which certainly did not break Ewell's heart. Trimble was prominently featured in the 1993 TNT original motion picture *Gettysburg*. Trimble's attitude, while extreme in its criticism, continued with other general officers of the Army of Northern Virginia after the war.

General Lee's nephew, Fitzhugh (Fitz), commanded a brigade in J.E.B. Stuart's Cavalry Division during the Gettysburg Campaign and explained after the war in a letter to the Southern Historical Society Papers, that in addition to Longstreet's slowness, the failure of Ewell and Hill to press their advantage on the first day of the battle resulted in Confederate defeat. Fitz Lee broke down the number of Union and Confederate troops engaged and indicated that Ewell and Hill should have made what would have been a successful assault on Cemetery Hill (Lee, 1878, vol. V).

In addition to the correspondence referenced above, Fitz Lee included a letter from General Winfield Scott Hancock who was appointed to command the remnants of the US I and XI Corps as they fled through town and up Cemetery Hill on July 1. Hancock indicated that he had arrived around 3:30 PM on July 1 (Hancock, 1878, vol. 5). Hancock intimated to Lee (Fitz) that "... in my opinion, If the Confederates had continued the pursuit of General Howard on the afternoon of the 1<sup>st</sup> of July at Gettysburg, they would have driven him over and beyond Cemetery Hill"

(Hancock, 1878, vol. 5, p. 162-194). Hancock indicated that an attempt had been made, in vain, to rally elements of the XI Corps. The II Corps commander wrote that the XI Corps could muster but 1,200 men to defend Cemetery Hill (Hancock, 1878, vol. 5). Hancock complained, “Some difficulty was experienced in forming the troops of the Eleventh Corps, but by vigorous efforts a sufficiently formidable line was established to deter the enemy from any serious assault on the position” (Hancock, 1878, vol. 5 p. 162-194). General Hancock conceded that after 4:00 PM, any Confederate attempt to take the hill with the forces at their disposal would likely have failed (Hancock, 1878, vol. V).

Another officer who had a less than flattering opinion of Ewell at Gettysburg was Brigadier General John Brown Gordon. Gordon was a citizen soldier who had not attended West Point, but was a natural born leader. The Georgian had attained the rank of corps command in the waning moments of the Civil War. On July 1, 1863, Gordon served in Early’s Division and it was Gordon’s Brigade that delivered the decisive blow against Howard’s XI Corps on the afternoon of July 1. Gordon had conversed often with Ewell during those critical moments as the Federal XI Corps fled through town. According to Gordon, he had urged for an all-out assault on Cemetery Hill in spite of receiving multiple orders to halt, several of which he ignored (Gordon, 1904). The brigade commander intimated that he reluctantly ordered the halt only after learning that General Lee did not wish to bring on a general engagement (Gordon, 1904). In fact, so sure of success was Gordon that he wrote, “On the first day neither General Early nor General Ewell could possibly have been fully cognizant of the situation at the time that I was ordered to halt” (1904, p. 153).

Gordon quoted the Rev. J. William Jones concerning remarks that General Lee allegedly made after the war concerning Gettysburg. Jones claimed that he and professor James White



witnessed General Lee state that he would have won the battle of Gettysburg had “Stonewall” Jackson been alive (Gordon, 1904). Gordon echoed these sentiments when he stated, “No soldier in a great crisis ever wished more ardently for a deliverer’s hand than I wished for one hour of Jackson when I was ordered to halt” (1904, p. 154). Gordon went on to claim that not only would Jackson have ordered him forward, but if General Lee had been present, he too would have continued the advance (Gordon, 1904). According to Gordon, he was incredibly vexed by the order to halt. “My thoughts were so harrowed and my heart so burdened by the fatal mistake of the afternoon that I was unable to sleep at night” (1904, p. 156). As late as 2:00 AM, Gordon rode to see General Ewell and General Early to urge an assault on Cemetery Hill. Needless to say, Gordon believed that an assault on Cemetery Hill on the afternoon of July 1 would have been successful. Many have shared General Gordon’s views.

Brigadier General Eppa Hunton who served as a brigade commander in Longstreet’s Corps and would be a future United States Senator from Virginia, supported General Gordon’s view that had Ewell not restrained Gordon, the Confederacy would have been victorious, not only at Gettysburg, but in its fight for independence (Hunton, 1933). Hunton also quoted the Rev. J. William Jones who indicated that General Lee believed that had Jackson commanded the Second Corps at Gettysburg, he would have secured victory and independence (Hunton, 1933). Hunton concluded, “It is pretty well settled as a fact that victory for Lee at Gettysburg would have resulted in recognition of the Confederate States by European powers, and been speedily followed by a treaty of peace” (1933, p. 94). The future senator, like most Lost Cause writers after the war, laid most of the blame for the loss at Gettysburg on General Longstreet. However, he remained an ardent critic of Ewell.

Hunton, along with 6 other generals, was imprisoned with General Ewell at Fort Warren, MA, immediately after the war. Hunton claimed that General Ewell confided in him during this time. The brigadier general explained, “He told me in person at Fort Warren, where both of us were in prison for three months after the surrender of General Lee, that it took a great many blunders to lose Gettysburg, and I [Ewell] had committed many of them” (1933, pp. 97-98). Hunton concluded that although General Ewell was gallant and brave, after the Second battle of Manassas, the loss of his leg, and his marriage to Lizinka Brown, he had lost his value as an effective officer (1933). General Hunton’s attitudes concerning Ewell’s performance, while harsh, represented the beliefs of many officers on Ewell’s staff (Bean, 1959). However, General Lee’s principle aides were less critical.


One of Lee’s most trusted aides and the man who carried the famous “take the hill if practicable” order, Walter Taylor, was more sympathetic to Ewell after the war. Taylor indicated that upon his journey to see Ewell, he had delivered Lee’s famous order and that Ewell did not raise any objection. Based on Ewell’s reaction, the major believed that Ewell would assault Cemetery Hill (Taylor, 1877, vol. 4.). Taylor seemed to give Ewell the benefit of the doubt concerning the discretionary orders that were issued from Lee to the Second Corps commander. The aide explained, “In the exercise of that discretion, however, which General Lee was accustomed to accord his lieutenants, and probably because of an undue regard for his admonition, given early in the day, not to precipitate a general engagement, General Ewell deemed it unwise to make the pursuit” (Taylor, 1877, vol. 4, p. 128). Taylor did take a parting shot at Ewell. He indicated that he had a conversation after the war with Major General Edward Johnson who commanded a division in Ewell’s Corps. When Taylor inquired as to the reason for inaction on the afternoon and evening of July 1, Johnson indicated that nothing prohibited his

advance and that he had formed his division in line of battle and inexplicably, received an order to halt (Taylor, 1877, vol. 4).

Colonel Charles Marshall was another of General Lee's closest staff officers. Marshall, who had conversed with Ewell several times on July 1, did not accuse Ewell of any wrongdoing. Marshall's, *Lee's Aide-De-Camp (1927)*, barely mentioned the Ewell controversy on July 1. The Colonel related the events of that day and described the discretionary orders from Lee to Ewell. Marshall concluded, "Under these circumstances it was decided not to attack until the arrival of General Longstreet,..." (1927, p. 228). Instead of faulting Ewell, Marshall (1927) explained in great detail General Lee's orders to Stuart and what he (Marshall) considered to be Stuart's disobedience or misinterpretation of those orders. The Colonel claimed that had Stuart been at Lee's touch, Lee could have concentrated the army much sooner and dealt a crushing blow to Meade (Marshall, 1927). It is clear that Marshall considered Stuart culpable for southern defeat at Gettysburg. The Colonel concluded, "Had all of the army been up, there is no reason to suppose that there would have been any fighting at Gettysburg after the first day, to say nothing of the other consequences to General Meade's army that might have followed the crushing defeat or destruction of its advanced corps" (1927, p. 231).

Despite the attitudes of Taylor and Marshall and in addition to the general officers listed (Confederate) above, Ewell was criticized for his conduct on the first day at the battle of Gettysburg by most of his Second Corps staff. Captain James Power Smith, an Aid-de Camp to "Stonewall" Jackson and an aid to Ewell with the Second Corps, admired Ewell, but characterized his performance on the evening of July 1 as "lacking initiative". In fact, while addressing the Historical Society of Massachusetts after the war, Smith, who was with Ewell on July 1, 1863, stated that at the pivotal moment, "Our corps commander, General Ewell, as true a

Confederate soldier as ever went into battle, was simply waiting for orders, when every moment of the time could not be balanced with gold” (2011, p. 13). Smith argued that Cemetery Hill should have been attacked within an hour of the Confederate advance into town. In addition, Smith contended that Ewell erred by sending Brigadier General William “Extra Billy” Smith’s and Gordon’s Brigade to investigate a possible Federal threat on the York Road. Instead, argued Smith, Ewell should have attacked Cemetery Hill with Early’s entire Division which Smith stated, could have easily taken and held Cemetery Hill (Smith, 2011).



*Figure 14.* Walter Taylor retrieved from [en.wikipedia.org](http://en.wikipedia.org).

Smith went on to imply that had “Stonewall” Jackson been alive, he would have charged up Cemetery Hill without hesitation and carried the position. Much like Fitz Lee, Smith cited General Winfield Scott Hancock’s account of July 1, 1863. Hancock wrote that had the

Confederates continued their pursuit of the Federal Army on the evening of July 1, they would have carried Cemetery Hill and forced the Yankees to the Pipe Creek Line (Smith, 2011).

Alexander “Sandie” Pendleton was another “Stonewall” holdover on Ewell’s staff. His early opinion of Ewell was very favorable, describing Ewell as “a grand officer, whose beginning has been auspicious” (Bean, 1959, p. 134). However, upon entering Gettysburg town square on July 1, Pendleton criticized Ewell’s unwillingness to attack Cemetery Hill almost immediately. Pendleton’s famous remarks indicating that had “Stonewall” been in command at Gettysburg, the Confederates would have carried Cemetery Hill became a common theme among Lost Cause writers after the war (Bean, 1959, p. 139). This assessment is one shared by the accomplished 20<sup>th</sup> century historian James McPherson in his epic study *Battle Cry of Freedom* (1988). Later in 1863, Ewell seemed to confirm Pendleton’s impression of him at the battle of Gettysburg. In October 1863, Pendleton wrote to his mother that “ Gen. Ewell, though he has quick military perception & is a splendid executive officer, lacks decision and is too irresolute for so large & independent command as he has” (Bean, 1959, p. 150). Comparing Ewell to the memory of Jackson was commonplace among most of Ewell’s staff officers.

Second Corps staff officer Henry Kyd Douglas appears to have taken a more respectful view of General Ewell’s first day performance than some of the other fellow staff officers. It is obvious that Douglas, like most of his compatriots, was incredibly fond of “Stonewall” Jackson. With the exception of Campbell Brown, Ewell inherited Jackson’s entire staff. Perhaps it was inevitable that most of these staff officers would compare Ewell to Jackson. It is a comparison that few officers could have lived up to. Jackson was at the apex of his career when he was killed in 1863. Most people remembered the “Stonewall” of Chancellorsville rather than the “Stonewall” of the Seven Days.

Douglas placed the blame for the Gettysburg defeat on Stuart's shoulders. However, Douglas agreed with most of the Second Corps staff, that unlike Ewell, Jackson would have assaulted Cemetery Hill and that General Lee assumed that Ewell would act with the same alacrity that he came to expect from "Stonewall". Douglas noted "...it took the battle of Gettysburg to convince General Lee that General Jackson was really dead; but that did it" (Douglas, 1940, p. 247).

Randolph McKim was a staff officer assigned to Brigadier General George "Maryland" Steuart's Brigade of Johnson's Division (Confederate Second Corps). After the war, McKim did not discriminate about who was at fault at Gettysburg. McKim claimed that all of Lee's corps commanders and J.E.B. Stuart were to blame for the disastrous defeat at Gettysburg (McKim, 1915, vol. XL). The Second Corps staff officer accused J.E.B. Stuart and A.P. Hill of disobeying Lee's orders. McKim considered Longstreet's failure at Gettysburg to be one of disloyalty in constantly challenging General Lee's orders. As for Ewell, the staff officer was no less forgiving. "Ewell failed to perceive the golden opportunity that presented itself to him, to seize Cemetery Hill..." (McKim, 1915, vol. XL, p. 277). Moreover, McKim characterized Ewell's halt order to General Gordon on the afternoon of July 1 as "a disastrous blunder" (1915, vol. XL, p. 270). Driving his point home, McKim wrote, "Here then we still find another of General Lee's lieutenants, the gallant and usually energetic Ewell failing at the critical moment to recognize what ought to be done; failing also to carry out the suggestion and conditional order of General Lee himself although urgently solicited to do so by three of his subordinate generals" (1915, vol. XL, pp. 271-272). McKim indicated that the Federal position atop Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, could easily been taken had Gordon been unleashed (1915, vol. XL). Early Civil War historians had a different take on who was at fault at the battle of Gettysburg as did Colonel Alexander.

Colonel Edward Porter Alexander served as the chief of artillery in Longstreet's First Corps during the battle of Gettysburg. Alexander produced two books after the war. One, *Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander* (1989) and *Military Memoirs of a Confederate* (1907). Both are accurate and provide valuable historical insight. *Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander* was a book written for the benefit of Alexander's children and is peppered with many personal experiences. *Military Memoirs of a Confederate* is a historical account that is well researched. According to Historian, Gary Gallagher (2004, vol. II), *Military Memoirs of a Confederate* (1907) is the superior work by any participant of the battle of Gettysburg. This work is recognized for its accuracy.

Alexander faulted Stuart and Hill for their parts in the Gettysburg saga, the Colonel did not spare Lee either. "Like Stuart's raid, Hill's venture is another illustration of an important event allowed to happen without supervision" (1907, p. 381). It is clear that Alexander believed that Lee was too free-handed with his commanders. As for Ewell, Alexander neglected to reveal all of the uncertainties that faced the corps commander. The Colonel claimed that Ewell was at fault for not informing Lee that he was not going to mount an attack on Cemetery Hill, an attack that Lee believed, according to Taylor's message, would take place (1907). According to Taylor's account, Alexander stated, "After reading this circumstantial statement, it is hard to understand Ewell's conduct." Alexander continued his indictment of Ewell, "Not only did he fail to renew the pursuit which he had previously stopped, but, by apparent acquiescence and sending messages about prisoners captured, he seems to have intentionally misled Lee into the belief that his orders were being obeyed" (1907, p. 327-328). Alexander identified this incident as another example of a lack of supervision (1907).

## **Lee is at Fault! Post-Civil War Historians Judge Ewell**

It appears as though the first historians of the battle of Gettysburg and the war were more critical of Lee than many contemporary Confederate officers. William Swinton published *Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac* in 1866. Swinton's work has been criticized by southerners who claimed that it was very partisan in its criticism of General Lee (Connelly, 1977). It is interesting to note that Swinton placed the blame for southern defeat at Gettysburg squarely on the shoulders of Robert E. Lee (Swinton, 1866). Ewell's actions on the afternoon and evening of July 1 are described as having been asked to attack, if possible, but not to force a major engagement. Swinton indicated that Ewell decided to wait for Johnson's Division, which was unexpectedly delayed (Swinton, 1866). At no time was Swinton critical of General Ewell's performance nor did he accuse Ewell of indecisiveness.

Swinton charged Lee with having reneged on a promise to fight a defensive campaign, a revelation that was the result of a consultation with General Longstreet (Swinton, 1866). Swinton dismissed Lee's explanation that he had to give battle on July 2 and 3 due to the difficulty of withdrawing through the mountains with his ammunition and supply trains. According to Swinton, Lee's argument was bogus because Lee did withdraw through the mountains with his ammunition and supply trains after the battle, a maneuver that was executed very well (Swinton, 1866). Swinton, like Longstreet, advocated moving part of the Army of Northern Virginia toward Frederick, MD to get between Meade and Washington. This action, according to Swinton, would have forced Meade to abandon the high ground of Cemetery Ridge (Swinton, 1866).

The first history of the war and the battle of Gettysburg from a southern point of view surfaced shortly after the war. Edward Pollard penned *The Lost Cause* in 1866. Pollard was a



controversial figure who served as the editor of the *Richmond Examiner* and wrote extensively during the Civil War (Connelly, 1970). Pollard claimed that Hill and Ewell were poised to deliver the knock-out blow on the evening of July 1, 1863, when General Lee, hoping to avoid a general engagement, ordered his corps commanders to halt (Pollard, 1866). It is not clear whether Pollard had evidence or was in error when he claimed that Lee ordered Hill and Ewell to halt. There is no evidence that this author is aware of that General Lee directly ordered Hill and Ewell to halt on the afternoon of July 1. More than likely, Pollard assumed that Lee's order (issued between 4:00 and 5:00pm) to Ewell prohibiting a general engagement amounted to a halt order. In any event, Pollard pointed the finger at Lee for inaction at Cemetery Hill on July 1. Pollard explained, "The failure of Gen. Lee to follow up the victory of the 1<sup>st</sup> enabled the enemy to take at leisure, and in full force, one of the strongest positions in any action of the war, and to turn the tables of the battle-field completely on the Confederates" (1898 p. 122).

One of the preeminent 19<sup>th</sup> century Gettysburg historians, Colonel John Bachelder, was perhaps the foremost authority on the battle of Gettysburg (Desjardin, 2003). Bachelder was a photographer and landscape painter who traveled with the Army of the Potomac. Although he arrived one week after the battle, Bachelder, through interviews and tours of the battlefield with commanders, was instrumental in mapping out the battlefield to determine where individual units fought (Carey, 2006). He created a comprehensive map and he interviewed countless participants of the battle of Gettysburg. The painter traveled to Virginia in 1863-64 and interviewed participants who were serving with the Army of the Potomac (Desjardin, 2003). Bachelder's map was so complete that, according to Desjardin (2003), many people considered Bachelder to be the best person to write a history of the battle. As a result, Bachelder was commissioned by the Federal Government to write a complete history of the battle of Gettysburg

(Carey, 2006). Desjardin points out that Bachelder had no training as a writer or a historian and that his efforts had a profound impact on how the battle was perceived (Desjardin, 2003). One of the criticisms of Bachelder's work is that his perception of the battle did not include any Confederate accounts until well after the war (Desjardin, 2003). His work was based on the Official Records instead of the voluminous qualitative data that he had collected. Apparently, participants on both sides were so adamant that Bachelder use or not use their version of events that he decided not to use any of them (Carey, 2006).

Desjardin does not deny that Bachelder was, perhaps, the most knowledgeable person concerning the battle of Gettysburg. However, Desjardin reveals what he considers to be the self-serving nature of Bachelder's interest in the battlefield (2003). Prior to the battle of Gettysburg, Bachelder was engaged in an endeavor to paint a picture of historical significance. He was attempting to gather information on the battle of Bunker Hill. Desjardin claims that Bachelder's inability to uncover relevant historical research concerning this battle prompted the painter to travel to Gettysburg to interview participants in the hopes that this conflict would surpass Bunker Hill in historical importance (Carey, 2006). If so, Bachelder would have volumes of data, data that he was unable to locate at Bunker Hill to paint that historic battle (Desjardin, 2003). Desjardin's criticism is harsh. He accused Bachelder of using his position as the "most knowledgeable" authority of the battle of Gettysburg, to create the belief that Gettysburg was the most pivotal battle of the war, overemphasizing the importance of Pickett's Charge and the focal point of that charge, shaping the battlefield in a way that sought to emphasize his points, and to profit from his efforts (Desjardin, 2003). Desjardin claimed that Bachelder's actions amounted to a "public relations endeavor" in which he created the terms "High Water Mark" and "Copse of Trees" to better market Gettysburg and himself (2003). In the

end, Desjardin claims that while Bachelder never produced a definitive history of the battle of Gettysburg (he produced a summary based on the Official Records), he did produce a mountain of data for future historians. Through his tireless promotion of the battle and his relentless emphasis on the “High Water Mark” according to Desjardin, “Bachelder may well be the most influential historian of a single battle in military history” (2003, p. 107).

Bachelder claimed that Ewell should have assaulted Cemetery Hill within an hour of reaching the streets of Gettysburg. He believed that any attack by the Confederates before 4:00 or 4:30 PM would have been successful. Bachelder explained that after 1 hour, the Union position on Cemetery Hill had become too strong and that the shattered remnants of the two Federal corps had been reorganized and rallied. Moreover, said Bachelder, any assault after 1 hour would have met with sure defeat (Smith, 2011).

Early historians such as Swinton, Pollard, and Bachelder were unabashed in their opinions concerning southern defeat at Gettysburg. They tended to point the finger at Lee. However, following General Early’s speech marking the anniversary of Lee’s birth in 1872, General Longstreet became the principle culprit for Southern defeat at the battle of Gettysburg (Connelly, 1977). This speech opened the door for the scapegoating of Longstreet, Ewell, Stuart, and Hill and initiated the Lost Cause tradition that was detailed by participants of the battle of Gettysburg earlier in this literature review. Twentieth Century historians were not immune to Lost Cause beliefs. Their work is testimony to how successful Early and his fellow Confederates were in shaping their perceptions of the battle of Gettysburg well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

### **Ewell is Dilatory and Indecisive! Early to Mid-20<sup>th</sup> Century Historians Weigh In**

The first biography of Ewell was “*Old Bald Head*” (*General R.S. Ewell: The Portrait of a Soldier*) which was completed in 1940. While this is an important study by Percy Hamlin, it

seems to avoid the controversy of the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. Although he is brief in his comments on day one at Gettysburg, Hamlin is favorable to Ewell. He detailed all of the variables that faced Ewell and seemed to support the lieutenant general's decision which was very unusual for the period in which Hamlin wrote. Hamlin published Ewell's letters in 1935 under the title, *The Making of a Soldier: The Letters of General R.S. Ewell*. Hamlin is unique in some ways. In his commentary of Ewell's letters, he clearly departs from the Lost Cause mantra in that he disagrees with many of Ewell's critics who sought to preserve Lee's image. Hamlin cites, poor staff work, bad luck, a lack of coordination, and a strong enemy as the primary reason for Southern defeat (1935). Hamlin explained that the best that could be said of Ewell was that the order to take Cemetery Hill was discretionary and that he could expect little assistance from Hill (1935). Hamlin concluded that Ewell failed Lee by advising him to remain in his position near Cemetery and Culp's Hill and his insistence that these two positions could be successfully assaulted. Hamlin argued that Lee's idea of shifting Ewell to the right was the correct move and that the commanding general was deterred by his corps commander (Hamlin, 1935). The historian is critical of Ewell concerning days two and three of the battle of Gettysburg. Moreover, Hamlin concluded that Ewell was not a very effective corps commander. Ironically, Hamlin devoted far more space to the Ewell controversy at Gettysburg in the commentary in Ewell's letters than he did five years later in the first biography of the general. Hamlin's publications are noteworthy because he published many of Ewell's letters and the first biography, but it is unusual in that Hamlin appears to be far more understanding of the difficulties facing Ewell than any of his contemporaries.

Perhaps the most respected Civil War historian in his day and at present is Douglas Southall Freeman. Freeman is most famous for his biography of General Lee, *R.E. Lee* (1934) and a three

volume work, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command*. (1944). Freeman's exhaustive work on the Civil War is both thorough and insightful and considered by many as the definitive work on Lee and his generals. However, he has been accused of following in the tradition of the Lost Cause (Connelly, 1977). While he stops short of total worship of Lee, it is clear that he finds little fault with the Master of Arlington. Consequently, his work tends to be critical of all of the usual suspects (Longstreet, Stuart, and Ewell) for southern defeat at the battle of Gettysburg. Freeman described Ewell as indecisive and unable to exercise discretion (Freeman, vol. III). In fact, Chapter VI of *Lee's Lieutenants* (vol. III) is entitled, "Ewell Cannot Reach a Decision" (Freeman, 1944, p.90).

Freeman described Ewell's encounter with Henry Kid Douglas (Johnson's aide) and General Gordon. Douglas intimated that General Johnson's Division was marching toward Gettysburg and would prepare for an attack as soon as he arrived. As stated earlier, Gordon desired to attack Cemetery Hill and announced to Douglas that the Yankee position could be carried before sundown (Freeman, 1944). Freeman Noted, "The old-time "Dick" Ewell' would have piped 'Yes, attack!' before the words were off of Gordon's lips" (1944, pp. 92-93). However, according to Freeman, the new corps commander calmly issued these orders to Douglas for Johnson. "Johnson should continue his advance until well to the front, then he should halt and await orders" (1944, p. 93). Freeman further detailed what he considered to be vacillation on the part of Ewell. On the evening of July 1, General Lee sent Ewell orders to prepare to move his corps to the right. Freeman described Lee's orders as follows, "Lee's one reason for deciding to shift Ewell to the right had been doubt of the ability of Ewell to make up his mind to do anything" (1944, p. 103). While Freeman clearly found Ewell's conduct on the first day

wanting, he was careful not to be overly hostile. He diplomatically described Ewell's performance on the evening of day one as "unsatisfactory" (1944, p. 106).

Ewell is not the sole target of Freeman for failure at Gettysburg. In fact, Freeman, declared that not one event alone could be blamed for ultimate defeat. He believed that the combination of Stuart, Ewell, Hill, Longstreet, and to a lesser extent, Lee combined to produce the disappointing results at Gettysburg (Freeman, 1944). Freeman admitted that Ewell had performed superbly throughout the campaign however Ewell's actions once Gettysburg was occupied were anything but. Freeman concluded "In detail, all stages of his [Ewell] hesitation can be defended and perhaps justified. Together they present the picture of a man who could not come to a decision within the time swift action might have brought victory" (1944, p. 172). Despite any arguments in Ewell's favor, Freeman expressed the verdict of many of his fellow early to mid-20<sup>th</sup> century historians. "The impression persists that he [Ewell] did not display the initiative, resolution, and boldness to be expected of a good soldier" (1944, p. 173).

Clifford Dowdy's *Death of a Nation* was published in 1958. Much like Freeman described, Dowdy and many of his contemporary authors found Ewell lacking initiative and paralyzed by uncertainty (Dowdy, 1958). *Death of a Nation* revealed that Ewell's elevation to corps command following the death of "Stonewall" Jackson was due to Ewell's popularity within the Second Corps and not the wishes of the commanding general (Dowdy, 1958). Dowdy's accusations of indecision on the part of the Second Corps commander were far worse than Freeman. Dowdy described the exchange between Ewell and his generals as they were recalled from Carlisle. General Lee's message directed Ewell to report to Cashtown or Gettysburg. Dowdy claimed that Ewell was incapable of making a decision. Moreover, the historian stated, "There in the strange, dark countryside Ewell revealed that possession of the initiative paralyzed

him” (Dowdy, 1958, p. 128).

Perhaps Ewell’s most trusted friend during the war was General Jubal Early. “Old Jube” had served as a brigade commander in Ewell’s Division for the first two years of the war. While it was well known that Ewell and Early were close, Dowdy claimed that during the advance from Carlisle to Gettysburg, Early sensed weakness in Ewell and established himself as the real brains of the Second Corps. Dowdy said of Early, “He recognized his superior officer for what he was: a subordinate who needed a leader” (1958, p. 129). Dowdy cited the meeting between Ewell, Rodes, Early, and Lee on the night of July 1 at Ewell’s headquarters as evidence that Early had asserted his will over Ewell (Dowdy, 1958). According to Dowdy, Early did all of the talking while Ewell deferred to his subordinate (Dowdy, 1958). Osborne (1992) affirmed this view, explaining, as Dowdy had, that at the Gettysburg meeting with Lee, Ewell, Early, and Rodes, Early behaved as the corps commander in Ewell’s presence. Osborne cited an incident in 1864 in which Ewell had Early arrested. The historian claims that the charge stemmed from Early’s insubordination. Lee termed Early’s actions “inexcusable”, but rescinded the charge (Osborne, 1992).

Dowdy explained that Lee’s last meeting on July 1 with Ewell and his generals was demoralizing to the commanding general. Ewell and his division commanders favored the defensive. Dowdy characterized this view as not merely a defensive attitude but “defeatism” (Dowdy, 1958). In one last parting shot, Dowdy stated that Confederate defeat on day one was the result of “the commander of the mobile Second Corps had robbed the army of its chance to win the field” (1958, p. 153).

Dowdy was equally as harsh in his appraisal of Ewell’s actions on the afternoon and evening of July 1. Faced with the decision to attack or not to attack, Ewell, according to Dowdy, had

“suffered a paralytic stroke to his will” (1958, p. 140). Dowdy indicated that the excuse that the Federal position on Cemetery hill was unknown and appeared strong was bogus (Dowdy, 1958). The author stated that the condition of the Federal position was obviously broken and that even though Hill’s Corps and Rodes’s Division had been badly damaged, Ewell possessed a “fresh” division with which to carry Cemetery Hill (Dowdy, 1958). Dowdy claimed that Early wished to attack Cemetery Hill soon after he realized that General Smith’s alarm of Federals on the York Road was false. Dowdy explained, “Seizing on any excuse to postpone the commitment to action, he told Early he would wait for Johnson’s arrival before attacking. Even the protests of his advisor [Early] could not move him out of that procrastination” (1958, p. 149).

Glenn Tucker continued the criticism of Ewell which characterized those early and mid-20<sup>th</sup> century historians that are detailed above. Tucker’s *High Tide at Gettysburg* (1958) is a very comprehensive account of the most famous battle fought on the North American continent. Tucker leveled harsh criticism at A.P. Hill. The author stated that had General Dorsey Pender been elevated to corps command instead of Hill, the south may have been victorious at Gettysburg (Tucker, 1958).

Tucker presents an interesting analysis of the failure to take Cemetery Hill or Culp’s Hill on the afternoon of July 1. The author suggests that General Early had suffered from indecision on day one. According to Tucker, Early had a golden opportunity to take the Federal position before he was ordered to halt (Tucker, 1958). Tucker charged that as Early’s three brigades moved into Gettysburg, Early hesitated and searched for Ewell instead of ordering the advance on Cemetery Hill or Culp’s Hill (Tucker, 1958). Tucker quoted Napoleon as stating something to the effect that the future of nations can rest on one brief encounter (Tucker, 1958). According to Tucker, “Never did it have more pertinent application than when Early stood on the outskirts



of Gettysburg with three fresh brigades and a fourth within reach and looked up at the eminences immediately ahead of him “ (1958, p. 174). Tucker summed up Early’s missed opportunity stating, “Early rode directly out of the arms of the fortune that had sought to embrace him, and cast himself on the irresolute corps commander, Ewell” (1958, p. 175). Tucker’s criticism of Early is unique and may be the result of the waning and distant memories of the Lost Cause.

Tucker had plenty of invective for General Ewell. The historian indicated that the Confederacy and the Second Corps would have been better served if Major General Isaac Trimble had been given command of the Second Corps instead of Ewell. Tucker detailed the heated exchange between Ewell and Trimble and concluded, “He [Trimble] had grasped in an instant what writers and historians have been speculating about for nearly a century, namely that the corps commander had grown timid” (1958, p. 177). Tucker characterized Ewell’s refusal to attack Cemetery Hill on day one as “disastrous” (1958, p. 186). The author believed that General Lee’s order of 5:00 PM (take the hill if practicable) delivered by Major Taylor made no mention of prohibiting a general engagement and that Ewell interpreted this prohibition because he lacked initiative (Tucker, 1958). Tucker intimated that Ewell’s greatest deficiency at Gettysburg was a “lack of insight” (1958, p. 189).

Ten years had little effect on Tucker’s view of General Ewell’s actions during the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. In *Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg* (1968), Tucker reiterated that Ewell was timid and irresolute (Tucker, 1968). The historian revealed that Lee should have had a tighter rein on the Second Corps commander (Tucker, 1968). Moreover, Tucker attempted to right many of the wrongs done to General Longstreet.

It is clear that many of the historians of the early and middle 20th century tended to blame almost everyone for southern defeat at Gettysburg except Robert E. Lee. While some did initiate

mild criticisms of Lee, most were tacit at best. On the other hand, this group of writers was particularly unsympathetic to General Ewell. Most of these historians painted an unflattering picture of his performance on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg, a view that would, for the most part, change among historians in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century.

### **Vindication! mid to Late 20<sup>th</sup> Century Historians Impressions of Ewell**

Although the criticism did not disappear by the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, historians began to appreciate the conundrum that General Ewell faced on the evening of July 1, 1863. Edward Coddington (1968) was one of the first historians to openly exonerate General Ewell. Coddington's, *The Gettysburg Campaign* (1968) is considered by many to be the definitive work on the battle of Gettysburg. Coddington was the beneficiary of much of the primary research that Bachelder did not utilize in his exhaustive study of the battle (Carey, 2006). Coddington argued that any attempt to take Cemetery Hill on the afternoon of July 1, required a new attack. According to the historian, it was not simply a matter of following-up success. The combined Confederate assault from Heth, Pender, Rodes, and Early had run its course and wilted on the streets of Gettysburg (Coddington, 1968). The historian believed that Lee was unsure of what action to take given his ignorance of the disposition of Federal forces and the absence of the remainder of his army (Coddington, 1968).

Coddington acknowledged the many criticisms leveled at General Ewell. The historian detailed the uncertainty and lack of guidance from superiors that faced General Ewell at that critical moment. More importantly, Coddington believed that Lee's refusal to commit Third Corps troops to Ewell for the assault and the commanding general's contradictory orders troubled the corps commander. Coddington explained, "These problems upset Ewell, for he was faced with the prospect of organizing a new attack with tired men even while he felt constrained

by Lee's injunction not to open a full-fledged battle" (1969, p. 319). Coddington emphasized the report of General Smith, who claimed that the Yankees had appeared in force on the York Road and Early's response which sent Gordon's Brigade to investigate, reducing Ewell's effective fighting strength by half (Coddington, 1968). The historian concluded, "No wonder he [Ewell] seemed perplexed and uncertain" (Coddington, 1968, p. 319).

Coddington seems to ignore Ewell's failure to assault Culp's Hill. The author mentions that Johnson's Division arrived after dark, was fatigued and that any proposed assault on Culp's Hill had been aborted. As for the inability to attack Cemetery Hill, Coddington concluded, "Responsibility for the failure of the Confederates to make an all-out assault on Cemetery Hill on July 1 must rest with Lee" (1968, p. 320). This interpretation seemed to gain momentum after the publication of Coddington's study.

Warren Hassler's *Crisis at the Crossroads* (1970), like Coddington's study, was a good example, for the most part, of what was to follow from historians concerning General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. While this study does not openly exonerate Ewell from blame, it does focus on the strength of the Federal position and the difficulty Confederate forces would have encountered to attempt any assault (Hassler, 1970). Like Bachelder and others, Hassler passionately argued that any successful Confederate assault of Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill would have to have been launched before 4:30 or 5:00 pm (1970). Hassler did indicate that Ewell's performance "...proved that he [Ewell] was by no means up to stepping into Jackson's shoes and filling them, though he was perhaps correct in not launching an attack on these eminences as the Unionists, by 5:00 o'clock, were well on their way toward rendering the elevations impregnable" (1970, p. 155). It is clear that Hassler, like Coddington, had differed from early and mid-20<sup>th</sup> century historians in their perspective concerning the

difficulty of mounting a successful attack against Cemetery Hill and the limited time available to coordinate such an assault.

By the late 1960's, Coddington, Hassler and others began to soften the heretofore, hard treatment of General Ewell by many historians. However, one must remember that criticism of the Second Corps commander continued into the 1980's as indicated by the works of Connelly and McPherson. Coddington and Hassler represent the embryonic stages of a more sympathetic view of General Ewell's performance at the battle of Gettysburg on July 1. This analysis would continue into the late 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Historian, James I. Robertson's, *General A.P. Hill* (1987) provides a very comprehensive look at General Hill and the battles that he fought. The accomplished, Robertson accused General Stuart of initiating a raid around the Federal army when he should have been providing Lee with intelligence (Robertson, 1987). Robertson questioned Heth's handling of the initial engagement. He concluded that Heth's alignment was flawed and that Heth should have halted before he engaged Buford's cavalry (Robertson, 1987).

Robertson defended the actions of Hill. The historian claimed that Hill's performance on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg was sound. While Robertson came to Hill's defense, he totally avoided any decision concerning General Ewell. He indicated that Lee asked Ewell to assault Cemetery Hill and that Ewell's refusal and Lee's lack of issuing a direct order to Ewell remain one of the wars most contentious debates (Robertson, 1987).

The last decade of the 20th century was very kind to General Ewell. Most of the major authors, including two biographies, presented the Second Corps commander in a positive light. Charles Osborne's *Jubal: The Life and Times of General Jubal A. Early, CSA*, (1992), much like its contemporaries, detailed the difficult choices that faced Ewell and the uncertainty of the

events, orders, and circumstances of the afternoon and evening of July 1. Unlike his contemporaries, Osborne claimed that Ewell and Early had become “inert” (1992, p. 195). The historian claimed that Ewell had been very aggressive to this point and that the meeting (Lee, Ewell, Early, Rodes) at Ewell’s headquarters was demoralizing to Lee (Osborne, 1992). Osborne asserted that Lee’s previous consultations with Longstreet had produced a defensive posture and that the commanding general’s meeting with the, heretofore aggressive, Second Corps staff resulted in “irresolution” (1992, p. 195). In his account of the events of July 1, Osborne appears to absolve Lee of any blame for the Confederates inability to take the high ground on day one (Osborne, 1992). Osborne implied that Lee was prone to be aggressive and that he wished prompt action on the afternoon and evening of July 1, but was deterred by the attitude of the Second Corps leadership. Moreover, the author intimated that Early and Ewell’s objections of shifting the Second Corps to the right and the condition of Hill’s Corps left the commanding general no other choice but an assault by Longstreet on July 2 (Osborne, 1992). While Osborne’s account is critical of Ewell and Early, overall, it does present all of the uncertainties that the Second Corps leadership wrestled with on that fateful day.

Martin’s (1991), *The Road to Glory* is the first definitive biography of Ewell’s life and career. This book is significant in that it is the first study that attempts to truly vindicate Ewell of his performance at Gettysburg and describe him as a brave, resourceful, and capable commander. Martin’s description of Ewell’s bravery, compassion, and self-deprecating qualities reveal an honorable commander who had been wronged by the Lost Cause tradition.

Martin claimed that Ewell was not the hesitant, meek, and vacillating commander paralyzed by discretionary orders that many historians have described. In fact, the historian recounts an incident in the Valley when both Ewell and Jackson were serving under Joseph E Johnston’s

overall command. Johnston had ordered Ewell to leave the Valley to engage Union General James Shields's division. Jackson wanted Ewell to stay in the Valley to assist in their original plan to destroy Nathaniel Banks's Federal Army. Banks's force was weak and vulnerable if Ewell stayed in the Valley and united with Jackson. Ewell quickly rode to Jackson's headquarters and to Jackson's disbelief, suggested that he (Ewell) would disobey Johnston's orders (Martin, 1991). According to Martin, Ewell explained that since Jackson was his immediate superior, if "Stonewall" would give him an order to stay in the Valley, he would obey "Stonewall" and ignore Johnston so that they could attack Shields (1991).

Martin described Ewell's desire to attack Union General Milroy at Winchester in June 1863 as proof that Ewell could be aggressive and was not weak and hesitant. According to Martin, Ewell was relentless in his efforts to secure permission to attack Winchester on his way to Pennsylvania (1991). Lee wanted Ewell and his corps to immediately begin collecting supplies in Maryland and Pennsylvania and granted Ewell permission to assault Winchester if it did not slow his progress north (Martin, 1991). In fact, the battle occupied two of Ewell's Divisions for two days. Ewell was dangerously close to disobeying Lee's orders, but the great victory at Winchester appeased the commanding general. In fact, shortly after the battle, Lee rather than being upset with his new corps commander for losing two days of what was a tight schedule, sent his heartfelt congratulations. According to Martin, Winchester is significant to Ewell. It was a splendid victory that bolstered Ewell's reputation. Several newspapers dubbed Ewell the "The New Jackson" (Martin, 1991). Martin described Ewell after Winchester as confident and eager for future battles and no longer fearful of corps command (1991). Following the battle of Winchester, the townspeople showered Ewell with praise and appreciation, to the point of embarrassing the corps commander. It appeared that Ewell had settled into corps command as

as his troops moved toward Pennsylvania.

Consistent with the story detailed above, Martin highlighted the decisiveness of Ewell's actions as he received a call for help from A.P. Hill on the morning of July 1. According to Martin, Ewell temporarily assumed command of his lead division (Rodes) in an attempt to properly place it in a position to assist Hill. From Rode's position on Oak Hill, Ewell could see Hill's Corps and the Federal position. He immediately ordered the division commander to attack while he placed the artillery (Martin, 1991). This aggressiveness is a side of Ewell that few historians have revealed over the last century and a half.

Martin described in great detail the orders that Ewell received from Lee just after he ordered Rodes to attack. Campbell Brown appeared before Ewell and indicated that the commanding general forbade a general engagement. Ewell was visibly upset and indicated that it was too late to recall Rodes even though Brown described how upset Lee was with several officers who he (Lee) claimed had violated his orders. Ewell, according to Martin, decided to let Rodes's attack proceed, but to stop any pursuit (if there was one) once he had driven the Federals from the field and into the town (1991). The corps commander was especially mindful of Lee's orders not to bring on a general engagement. He wished to emphasize that the Confederates were not to pursue the enemy if they drove him from the field. To avoid any confusion, Ewell dispatched specific orders to his subordinates. "A courier was sent to Rodes with this order; Campbell left to intercept Early and give him these same instructions. Each was told to emphasize Lee's furious mood, and that they risked his censure if they prolonged the engagement" (Martin, 1991, p. 208). This order and Lee's frustration would occupy Ewell's thought for much of the rest of the battle.

Martin argued that once Ewell's Corps had entered the town, his refusal to continue the assault was out of character given his aggressive tendencies since the campaign began. Even at the urging of Generals Gordon and Hays, Ewell not only refused to attack, but refused to listen and indicated that he had no orders from Lee to move forward. In fact, he had orders to the contrary (Martin, 1991). Martin indicated that from the very beginning, Ewell felt that the Cemetery Hill position was a formidable one and that the Confederates were in a poor position to place their artillery, but that he would make the assault if he were assisted by A.P. Hill and if Lee approved it (1991).

Martin explained in great detail the difficulties that faced Ewell in attacking Cemetery Hill. Particular emphasis was placed on the need for support from the Third Corps, General William Smith's report of Federals on Ewell's flank, the formidable Yankee position on Cemetery Hill, and the confusing and contradictory orders coming from General Lee (1991). According to Martin, Ewell realized that after Lee declined his request for reinforcements and reiterated his desire to avoid a general engagement, Ewell could not assault Cemetery Hill without violating Lee's orders and could only wait for Johnson's Division to occupy Culp's Hill (1991). Martin's play by play account of the events of the evening of July 1 demonstrated the difficulty, ambiguity, and confusion that faced the lieutenant general. The historian's detailed account of Lee's orders to Ewell on the evening of July 1 leaves one with the impression that few could have made sense of what Lee really wanted (Martin, 1991). After listing all of the reasons why General Ewell could and should not attack, Martin concluded, "In the face of this overwhelming evidence, why the disparagement of Ewell? The answer must lie in political and personal reasons, not military causes" (1991, p. 226). Martin declared that Ewell was blamed to spare Lee's reputation and that it was the Lost Cause tradition, led on by Early that was largely



responsible for the scapegoating of Ewell on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg (1991). The historian concluded that Ewell was a brilliant general who was loveable and eccentric (Martin, 1991).

The long-time historian of the Gettysburg National Battlefield, Harry Pfanz, completed a lengthy study of the action on Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill in 1993 (*Gettysburg: Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill*). Like Martin, Pfanz highlighted the inconsistency of Lee's orders to Ewell on the evening of July 1 (take the hill if practicable but avoid a major engagement). Pfanz explained that any attack on Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill constituted a new assault, one that seemed to be prohibited by Lee's orders not to force a major engagement (Pfanz, 1993). Pfanz emphasized Lee's response to Ewell's request for assistance from the Third Corps to assault Cemetery Hill as discouraging Ewell from making the attempt (Pfanz, 1993).

Pfanz, for the most part, avoided placing blame on any one commander for the inability of the Confederates to seize the high ground (Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill) and complete their victory on July 1. The historian did, like many late 20<sup>th</sup> century historians, present the difficult choices that faced Ewell which implied to the reader that he did not find Ewell to be solely responsible for the Rebels inability to take Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill (Pfanz, 1993). While Pfanz may not have believed that Ewell performed well, it is clear that he appreciated the many uncertainties that faced the Second Corps commander (1993). According to Pfanz, Ewell was confronted with, what he considered to be, a formidable force in a strong defensive position, a threat to his left flank (General Smith's report on the York Road) which reduced Early's Division by half of its strength, an attacking force at his disposal of only two brigades (Hays and Avery), a promise of no assistance from Lee, Johnson's Division not readily available, and an order from his commanding general to take a formidable position "if practicable" without forcing a major

engagement (Pfan, 1993). To those critics of Ewell who claim that an immediate attack on Cemetery Hill should have been ordered, Pfan replied, “In short, it would take time to prepare for a successful assault and help from Hill to make it. Neither of which was available to Ewell on the evening of July 1” (1993, p. 76). While Pfan did not reveal what exactly he thought of Ewell’s performance, it is clear that he appreciated the many uncertainties that faced the Second Corps commander and that he did not agree with Ewell’s critics who suggested that taking either hill was an obvious and easy undertaking (Pfan, 1993).

Little had changed over the eight years between Pfan’s two books. He reiterated the difficult situation facing Ewell and the commanding general’s confusing orders to his inexperienced corps commander in *Gettysburg: The First Day* (2001). This book (2001) represents perhaps the most meticulous account of the individual units, both Union and Confederate, of the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. Pfan is less detailed in his comments on the Ewell controversy of July 1, but he is still favorable to Ewell. This line of thinking was continued in the second major work (biography) on General Ewell by Pfan’s son.

The latest biography of General Ewell was completed in 1998 (Pfan, *Richard S. Ewell*). Pfan’s work is both thorough and fair. He presents a detailed review of Ewell’s entire life. Pfan’s study, along with Martin’s and Hamlin’s, are the only definitive and comprehensive studies of General Ewell. The former notes the constant comparisons of Jackson and Ewell by both contemporaries and historians. Pfan highlights the tremendous success of Ewell’s first action as a corps commander at Winchester and indicates that this victory was so sweeping that it was compared to Jackson’s greatest successes. Pfan explained, “(They conveniently forgot, as historians still do, that even Stonewall sometimes failed)” (1998, p. 290). Moreover, said Pfan, the close proximity of Jackson’s death (one month before the battle of Gettysburg) only

enhanced “Stonewall’s” image (Pfan, 1998). Ewell may have been better off had his victory at Winchester not been so impressive. Ewell was in a difficult position according to Pfan, “Competing with Jackson’s record was a daunting prospect; competing with his memory was a hopeless one” (1998, p. 290).

As for Cemetery Hill, Pfan claimed that Ewell had every intention of continuing the attack after his interview with Lee’s aide, Walter Taylor (if practicable order). According to Pfan, the only thing that prevented Ewell from continuing the original assault was Lee’s order not to force a major engagement (1998). Upon consultation with his division commanders, Ewell agreed that an immediate attack should take place against Cemetery Hill. However, like his subordinates, Ewell believed that they needed help from the Third Corps, help that was not forthcoming. Moreover, Lee confirmed that a major engagement should be avoided (Pfan, 1998). This information left Ewell with no reinforcements and a direct order not to force a major engagement. Pfan explained, “Lee’s message left Ewell baffled and frustrated” (1998, p. 310).

More bad news came in the form of General William “Extra Billy” Smith’s report of a Yankee force on the York Road. While Early did not believe the threat, it had to be investigated. Early detached Gordon’s Brigade to assist General Smith, as a result, Pfan believed that Ewell decided to avoid an assault on Cemetery Hill until Johnson’s Division arrived, but to entertain the idea of seizing Culp’s Hill which was thought to be undefended and would fulfill Lee’s orders of avoiding a major engagement (Pfan, 1998). Pfan suggests that Early declined the invitation by Ewell to attack Culp’s Hill while Johnson’s Division moved forward. Johnson’s Division arrived near nightfall and according to Pfan, Ewell ordered Johnson to take Culp’s Hill when he was in position (1998). In the meantime, Ewell reported to his headquarters for a parley with the commanding general. At about 10:00 PM, Lee decided to shift Ewell’s Corps to the

right and Colonel Marshall reported this to Ewell. According to Pfanz, Ewell believed that Johnson had or would soon seize Culp's Hill. Ewell immediately set out for Lee's headquarters to ask permission for the Second Corps to remain where it was. Lee agreed and Ewell rode back instructing aides to order Johnson to take Culp's Hill if had not done so (Pfanz, 1998). Johnson reported that Federal forces had occupied Culp's Hill and Ewell realized that he could not attack (Pfanz, 1998). Pfanz concluded, "Like it or not, he [Ewell] had no choice but to fight it out where he was" (1998, p. 314). Pfanz's tone and explanations are clearly sympathetic to Ewell, he stops short of laying blame for the inability to assault Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill on the commanding general or anyone else, but he clearly highlights many of the same arguments that Martin emphasized and does not blame Ewell. Moreover, he makes little mention of Lee in this account, as if Lee were an outsider.

A decade and a half did little to change Pfanz's conclusions concerning Ewell's actions on the evening of July 1, 1863. In fact, the historian was even more adamant about Ewell's performance at Gettysburg and his ability as a general officer. Pfanz edited Ewell's letters in 2012. He claimed that "Stonewall" found Ewell to be brave, energetic, and judicious. As for the claim by many Second Corps staffers that Ewell lost his fighting edge due to his wound and his marriage, Pfanz responded that the record "did not bear that out" (Ewell, 2012, p. xxxi). Pfanz claimed that contrary to the historiography, Ewell was incredibly successful when in independent command and that the lieutenant general was scapegoated to protect Lee at Gettysburg (Ewell, 2012). Pfanz concluded that Ewell was "Competent and energetic, enterprising and brave, he was worthy of the high rank he attained, a fact he demonstrated time and again at places such as Front Royal, Port Republic, Gaines's Mill, and the Wilderness" (Ewell, 2012, p. xxxiii). Pfanz's work constitutes a very favorable interpretation of Ewell's performance on July 1, 1863, one that

would continue with other late 20<sup>th</sup> century historians.

Arguably the preeminent Civil War historian of the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> century is Gary Gallagher. Gallagher appears to have changed his perception of Ewell over time. In a 1986 article, the historian was critical of the lieutenant general. Gallagher said of Ewell, “He stood in the streets of Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 1, flushed with victory and witness to a major Federal defeat.” The historian continued, “The moment demanded bold and immediate action, and Ewell was found wanting. His initial dash and promise paled in comparison to the magnitude of his ultimate failure” (Gallagher, 1986, p. 59). Apparently, the historian tempered his view of Ewell. Gallagher’s, *Lee and his Generals in War and Memory* (1998) provided a detailed view of some of the more controversial topics of the Army of Northern Virginia. In addition, Gallagher tackles the issue of Ewell and Hill during the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. The historian warns, “Modern readers should have empathy for Richard Ewell on July 1, 1863” (Gallagher, 1998, p. 113). Like other historians, Gallagher believes that Ewell suffered from a constant tendency for contemporaries and historians to compare Ewell to Jackson. Moreover, these comparisons, due to the timing of Jackson’s death (one month prior to Gettysburg), ignore any errors that “Stonewall” may have committed. As a result, Ewell always suffers from comparison (Gallagher, 1998). Gallagher admonished current and future historians to evaluate Hill and Ewell based on whether they had performed “reasonably well” and to avoid the pitfall of comparing Hill and Ewell to the memory of Jackson (Gallagher, 1998, p. 168).

In judging Ewell’s performance on day one, Gallagher, contrary to Ewell detractors, described the many variables that General Ewell contemplated and acknowledged that the Second Corps commander faced a difficult choice (Gallagher, 1998). Like Coddington and others, Gallagher believed that the Second Corps assault had petered out and that any attempt to

take Cemetery Hill required a new attack (Gallagher, 1998). The historian contends that Lee's orders were far too vague and possibly indecisive. Moreover, to Ewell critics like Douglas Southall Freeman, Gallagher responded, "Douglas Southall Freeman wrote that Ewell could not reach a decision. But Ewell did reach a decision-not to attack Cemetery Hill. Although, it was not the decision that Lee wished him to make, it certainly was reasonable given the situation" (1998, p. 180). Gallagher characterized Hill and Ewell's performance on day one of the battle of Gettysburg in the following manner, "Neither of them performed brilliantly;..." (1998, p. 181). However, the historian intimated that Hill was not responsible for disobeying Lee's orders on day one and Ewell was not responsible for losing the battle of Gettysburg on day one. Who was? Gallagher concluded, "Anyone seeking to apportion responsibility for what transpired on the Confederate side on the opening day at Gettysburg should look to the commanding general" (1998, p. 181).

Michael Palmer's *Lee Moves North: Robert E. Lee on the Offensive*, (1998) is another example of a common theme that permeated historians' views in the 1990's concerning General Ewell's refusal to attack Cemetery Hill and his performance at the battle of Gettysburg. Palmer does find fault with Ewell and the other corps commanders, but he indicates that those mistakes were the result of a complete lack of understanding of Lee's intentions (Palmer, 1998). Palmer is extremely critical of General Lee. Palmer contends that Lee's refusal or inability to communicate with any of his corps commanders produced a dysfunctional leadership situation in which Lee's senior commanders had to guess at what the commanding general's intentions were and what he wished them to do (Palmer, 1998). Palmer believed that Lee's command methods all but guaranteed defeat on July 1, 1863 (1998).

Palmer's assessment of Ewell and Hill appears to be more positive. The historian judged, "Considering the fact that both Hill and Ewell were making their debuts as corps commanders, they performed competently, if not expertly" (Palmer, 1998, p. 80). Palmer accused the commanding general of minimizing his shortcomings and continued to hammer the theme that Lee kept his subordinates in the dark (1998). The historian concluded, "Unfortunately for the Confederacy, Ewell and Hill lacked the requisite 'talent' to operate while effectively blindfolded; if Longstreet and Stuart possessed the means, they nevertheless had the bad 'luck' to choose wrong" (Palmer, 1998, p.131).

The last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century signaled a type of vindication of General Ewell. Several books that were completed in the 1990's seemed to represent a true shift in favor of the Second Corps commander. Martin's, *Road to Glory* (1991), Pfanz's, *Richard S. Ewell* (1998), and Gallagher's, *Lee and His Generals in War and Memory* (1998) painted a much more favorable picture of Ewell's performance on the afternoon of July 1, 1863. These authors appeared to weigh many of the variables involved concerning Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill.

Two of the most important books of the 21<sup>st</sup> century concerning the battle of Gettysburg and General Ewell's actions on day one are split in their opinions of the Second Corps commander. Another work, *Major General Robert E. Rodes* (Collins, 2008), is an exceptional biography of the young division commander. This work presents a complete picture of Rodes the man and soldier. However, Collins intentionally avoids the controversy of July 1. He accurately describes the events that occurred on July 1, but he declined to present an argument as to who may have been at fault for the failure to carry Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle or if the position should have been assaulted. Disappointingly, Collins concluded, "The situation is open to endless analysis, and there is no meaningful way to conclude satisfactorily when, or even

whether, such an attack would have been successful” (2008, p. 280).

Stephen Sears’s *Gettysburg* (2003) embraces the attitudes of late 20<sup>th</sup> century historians in their treatment of General Ewell on July 1, 1863. Sears was more critical of Lee and what the historian considered to be, vague orders that he (Lee) issued to Ewell. The historian argued that any attack after 5:00 PM would have “...required a major effort” (2003, p. 227). Sears detailed many of the uncertain variables facing Ewell and indicated that after conferring with Early and Rodes, Ewell instructed James Power Smith to ride to Lee and inform the commanding general the he was prepared to assault Cemetery Hill if he could obtain assistance from Hill’s Corps (Sears, 2003). According to Sears, just then Lee’s aide, Walter Taylor arrived with the famous “if practicable” order and an admonition of avoiding a general engagement (Sears, 1987). Sears indicated that “The decision was left entirely in Ewell’s hands and he was urged to start a fight but not to start a battle” (2003, p. 227).

Sears seems to reframe the argument and suggest that Lee was the General who was indecisive on July 1 not Ewell. Lee answered Ewell’s request for help from the Third Corps with a definite, no. Lee informed Ewell that Longstreet was not up and that the Third Corps was badly damaged in the fighting earlier in the day. Sears opined that by virtue of Lee’s action, he was not sure if Gettysburg was the place for a fight (Sears, 2003). Moreover, Lee’s discretionary order to Ewell to take the hill “if practicable” and his refusal to grant Ewell the use of Third Corps troops for an assault, according to Sears, was evidence that Lee was unsure of the Gettysburg position. (2003). Sears explained the commanding general’s actions as the result of “...Lee’s day-long uneasiness concerning this unwanted confrontation with an unknown fraction of Meade’s army” (2003, p. 229).



Sears did find fault with Ewell for not ordering Early to assault Culp's Hill late on the evening of July 1. Reports indicated that Culp's Hill was unoccupied. Sears concluded that Ewell should have ordered Early to attack rather than leaving the decision to Early (2003). Moreover, claimed the historian, the Second Corps commander should have been more active in monitoring Johnson's progress (Sears, 2003). However, Sears noted that Ewell became the subject of much criticism which stemmed from a comparison to "Stonewall" Jackson (2003). Sears concluded, "It is highly doubtful if even Stonewall could have conquered Cemetery Hill on July 1" (2003, p. 233).

### **Here We Go Again! 21<sup>st</sup> Century Historians Evaluate Ewell**

While Sears's study appears to reflect the findings and opinions of recent historians, the other major 21<sup>st</sup> century work on Ewell totally refutes Sears and others. Paul Casdorff's, *Confederate General Richard S. Ewell: Robert E. Lee's Hesitant Commander* (2004) is the latest book detailing General Ewell's command decisions. Casdorff is openly critical of Ewell in a variety of ways. This book attempts to describe Ewell as unsure, indecisive, and not cut out for high command (Casdorff, 2004). The author portrays Ewell as incapable of making command decisions and lost without the guiding hand of "Stonewall" Jackson. Casdorff suggests that General Lee did not want to elevate Ewell to corps command following Jackson's death but acknowledges that most of the Second Corps, including Jackson wanted Ewell to succeed "Stonewall" (Casdorff, 2004). Casdorff labels Ewell as hesitant throughout his book (hesitant is included in the title), but when the author described Ewell's first performance as a corps commander at the battle of Winchester, he stated, "Without a moment's hesitation Ewell made the troop dispositions that ensured not only a Confederate victory but also opened a path to speed his northward thrust" (2004, p. 234).

The historian describes Ewell's entrance into Gettysburg on July 1 and the commanding heights of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill which faced him. Casdorff explained, "Just about every officer and man except Ewell himself recognized the importance of these hills to Lee's army-that both needed to be seized before they were taken in force by the enemy" (2004, p. 251). Ewell's inability to carry Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1, according to Casdorff, allowed the Union troops to reinforce Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill which eventually cost the Rebels the battle (2004). The historian continued, "The argument in most camps is that the unexplained action not only cost Lee a triumph in Pennsylvania, but it also cost the war for the Confederacy" (2004, p. 252).

Casdorff emphasized the arguments of General Trimble and his heated exchange with the corps commander. In addition, Casdorff quoted Union General Winfield Scott Hancock as stating that no fortifications existed on Cemetery Hill upon his arrival at 4:00 or 4:30 PM on July 1 (2004). Casdorff believes that the Confederate attack should have been continued through the town and up Cemetery Hill without hesitation. Moreover, the historian related a story from a commissary officer in Hays's Brigade concerning Ewell's Psyche. The officer indicated that from Ewell's West Point days to the present, he liked to depend on a friend or someone else for everything (Casdorff, 2004). The historian concluded, "...it was soon apparent that Ewell had not been the man to replace Stonewall Jackson as Lee's right arm" (2004, p. 254). Although Casdorff does identify several officers and historians who have come to Ewell's defense, the historian dismissively writes, "Whatever the argument advanced by others, Ewell had it in his power to take Cemetery Hill on July 1,..." (2004, p. 255). Casdorff's assessment of Ewell is particularly harsh.

Perhaps the most damning and damaging blow to General Ewell's image, which tended to shatter much of the work that had been completed in the mid to late 20<sup>th</sup> century to rehabilitate the corps commander's reputation, was the 1993 TNT original motion picture, *Gettysburg*. This film was based on Michael Shaara's novel, *Killer Angels*. While the movie and the novel, for the most part, are entertaining and accurate, the movie is very critical of General Ewell. The movie details the claims of General Trimble. One scene depicts a meeting between Lee and Trimble in which Trimble criticizes Ewell's leadership. *Gettysburg* neglects to reveal the uncertain variables that effected General Ewell's decision. However, this motion picture is most damaging to Ewell due to the extensive audience that viewed it, not the academics who tend to be immersed in this controversy, but the many viewers who were and are novices who have a passing interest in the Civil War. The tendency among these viewers is to accept the conclusions of what took place in the movie at face value. As a result, many Civil War buffs and closet historians now have a perception that Ewell was negligent at the critical moment on July 1, 1863, and that his actions during this monumental struggle deprived the Confederacy of victory. The movie is so prejudice against Ewell that the Second Corps commander's character does not appear in the film.

It is obvious from the literature review that there is no shortage of opinions concerning this topic. Many good and bad opinions have been the result of 150 years of study. What is lacking is a standard set of military leadership principles that introduce objectivity and proven military theory to evaluate the Second Corps commander on evening of July 1, 1863. The following theories represent some of the most influential military leadership principles in human history.

The literature review of this subject highlights the fundamental problem confronting anyone attempting to determine how reasonable General Ewell's decision not to assault Cemetery Hill

on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg was. There are so many differing opinions by participants, historians, and amateurs that are based on a wide variety of factors, some good and some bad. Few if any, contain an evaluation based upon proven military leadership principles or tendencies. This qualitative historical narrative will utilize some of the most accomplished and recognized military theorists and theories to arrive at a common set of combined military leadership principles to objectively determine if General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg was reasonable. No study to date examines Civil War leadership decisions through multiple and combined theoretical lenses to produce combined military leadership principles based on the theories of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM.

Perhaps the most renowned military philosopher in history is Sun Tzu who wrote his famous work, *The Art of War* (450 or 500 b.c.) that many military historians, past and present, still reference today. Some have suggested that Sun Tzu was fictitious and that the *Art of War* was a collection of essays by various Chinese figures (Hardwick, 2011). Regardless of its author, this work remains one of the most relevant treatises of military history. In fact, this book has informed some of the most prominent military commanders of modern times, including Napoleon, Douglas MacArthur, Colin Powell, and Tommy Franks (Kuo, 2007). The *Art of War* was a short, broad set of conclusions designed for a monarch or a high-ranking military officer (Handel, 2005). However, Kuo (2007) indicates that the *Art of War* provided guidance for the tactical commander on the field as well as the strategic planner in nearly every aspect of war. The genius of this work is its clear, concise, and common-sense approach to warfare for all levels of decision-making.

Sun Tzu identified a wide range of topics including waging war, dispositions, strengths and weaknesses, offensive strategy, energy, estimates, marches, qualities of a commander, maneuver,

terrain, espionage, intelligence, the nine principles, nine varieties of ground, attack by fire, and many others in his short but important book (Tzu, 450-500 b.c.). While many of the areas identified above had a strategic emphasis, others were more tactical. Colonel Wilcoxon (2010) explained, “Sun Tzu’s theory applies to all levels of war- tactical, operational, and strategic” (P. 9). This research will use the theoretical lens of Sun Tzu’s theory to focus on General Ewell’s decision to not attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. Some have argued that there is a distinct difference between eastern and western approaches to the art of war. Handel (2005) disagrees and suggested the no significant difference exists between the two approaches. As a result, *The Art of War* will provide an excellent representation of ancient eastern and western military thought for this study and will prove to be a necessary theoretical lens to compliment the other theories that will be employed to determine if General Ewell’s decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1, 1863 was reasonable.

To gain a broad understanding of military thought in multiple centuries, this study will incorporate the theories of Antoine Jomini in addition to Sun Tzu. Jomini wrote and practiced the art of war in the nineteenth century. Swiss by birth, Jomini was fascinated by Napoleon and joined the French Army. He was promoted to various staff assignments and soon found himself as the chief of staff to Marshal Michel Ney who encouraged and financed Jomini’s first book (Ettrich, 2005). Napoleon was so impressed with Jomini that he personally promoted the Swiss born officer to his staff and a colonel’s commission (Reardon, 2012). Jomini was promoted to brigadier general in 1813, feuded with Marshal Ney and resigned from the French Army and joined the Russian service where he achieved the rank of general (Bassford, 1993). A banker by trade, Jomini is a great example of an incredibly bright officer who understood the complexities of war and became a keen observer of Napoleonic campaigns and a voracious reader and student

of military history of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Despite his accomplishments in the French and Russian service, Jomini is best known as the most prolific writer of military theory in the 19th century. His most famous work, *The Art of War*, was first published in 1836. Jomini is the most notable of the theorists among the military enlightenment of the 19<sup>th</sup> century which espoused a belief that certain immutable principles of the art of war could be identified (Reardon, 2012). To a large extent, Jominian theory and the military enlightenment of the 19th century was a shift to interpreting war as a science rather than an art.

Jomini has long been credited with influencing American Civil War commanders. The Swiss born officer's theories were the only military principles that were used by the United States Military Academy at West Point throughout most of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Many historians believe that Civil War commanders on both sides were very familiar with Jomini's principles. Reardon (2012) suggests that the impact of Jomini on Civil War commanders and West Point graduates in particular, has been greatly exaggerated by historians in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century and perpetuated ever since. Reardon notes the relative absence of military theory in the West Point curriculum prior to the Civil War and the fact that much of what was taught was translated and interpreted by Dennis Hart Mahan and Henry Halleck, both West Point professors. Reardon makes a convincing argument and even though most Civil War commanders were ignorant of any military theory, it appears that if they had been exposed or were aware of any theory, it would have been Jomini's, especially among West Point graduates. For the purposes of this dissertation, it is irrelevant whether any Civil War commanders, including General Ewell, were familiar with, or even aware of Antoine Jomini's, *The Art of War*. Jomini's theories are utilized in this study because they are most representative of 19<sup>th</sup> century military thought not because General Ewell

or any other Civil War commander had a tacit or intimate knowledge of them.

Jomini's principles that are articulated in *The Art of War* are both tactical and strategic. His theories concerning offensive battles, different orders of battle, turning maneuvers, extended movement in battle, Grand Tactics and Battles, and the surprise of armies will be particularly relevant to this study. The application of the principles above, along with other theories identified, will provide a representation of military thought from Ancient history (Sun Tzu) and what was for Ewell, contemporary history (19<sup>th</sup> century). These principles will be analyzed for commonality with the final group of military principles which are utilized by the USAFM.

The USAFM is the third theoretical lens that this study will employ. The USAFM which contains nine principles of war has a long and distinguished past. These principles (objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity) are Jominian in nature and were originally introduced into the United States military in 1921 (USAFM, Section II, 2008). They have been the foundation of United States military principles for nearly a century and their longevity spans the last two centuries. The original nine principles have changed very little in the last eight decades and they had formed the basis of organizational structures, doctrine, strategy, and tactics for the United States military in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (USAFM, Section II, 2011). Originally developed for large standing armies utilizing infantry, artillery, and cavalry in conventional warfare, these principles have proven their utility in World War II, the Korean conflict and the cold war. The nine principles have been tested in the unconventional war on terrorism in the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Cordovano, 2006).

Despite the fact that the nine principles have been deleted and reintroduced into the Field Manual over the last 80 years, their value is obvious by their inclusion in the field manuals since the 1980's. While some of the nine principles utility has eroded, most are relevant and

applicable even on the modern and unconventional battlefield of today (Ettrich, 2005). Over the years, the field manuals have been altered, deleted, changed, and tweaked, but the one constant has been the nine principles of war which have been described as “the bedrock of army doctrine” (USAFM, 2011, p. 173). The United States Army Field Manual (3-0, C1) was described as “the intellectual underpinnings that lie at the core of how this Army would organize, train, equip, and conduct operations in this new environment” (USAFM, 2011. p. 173). The nine principles can be applied strategically, tactically, and operationally and they serve as an effective instrument to examine previous battles (Langville, 2000). Of the nine principles found in the USAFM, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity will be most relevant to General Ewell’s circumstances on the evening of July 1, 1863. Suffices to say that the US Army Field manual 3-0, C1 represented what was the standard in modern military thought and theory. This manual was replaced in 2012 to account for modern unconventional warfare that emphasizes multi-national efforts. Although the nine principles of war were not included in the new Army manual, it is easy to see them in the updated principles which are more broad and unspecific. Nevertheless, the nine principles and three additions to these principles have stood the test of time and are still applicable to the modern, unconventional battlefield. As a result, the nine principles and the USAFM in general comprise the very best in modern military theory in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries.

While no general officer fights a battle according to a manual or a theory, establishing commonalities among military theorists over the span of 2,500 years would appear to establish some principles that are universal. Although there are sure to be exceptions to any of the principles that will be identified, it is reasonable to conclude that they represent sound military judgment in most strategic and tactical situations. None of the theorists mentioned, even Jomini,



would advocate a strict and unconditional adherence to all principles in the heat of battle. The common military leadership principles identified in this study have the benefit of 25 centuries of longevity and commonality. These principles should be sufficient to provide an objective and credible evaluation concerning General Ewell's situation on the evening of the first day of the battle of Gettysburg and to determine if his decision not to attack Cemetery Hill was reasonable.

### **Summary**

Given the fact that Gettysburg was the largest battle ever fought on the North American continent and is one of the most researched battles in the history of the world, it is clear that much work has been completed on this topic. From the evidence provided, most of General Ewell's contemporaries criticized the Second Corps commander for his refusal to attack Cemetery Hill on day one at the battle of Gettysburg. Few Confederate officers judged Ewell critically during or immediately after the war. Most of the criticism came after the late 1860's when many remembered their actions differently than they had in 1863. This is a clear indication of the influence of the Lost Cause tradition.

The first historians of the battle of Gettysburg tend to fault Robert E. Lee for Confederate defeat, while historians in the early to mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, perhaps guided by the myth of the Lost Cause, seek to exonerate Lee at the expense of Longstreet, Ewell, and Stuart. The mid-20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed a shift to a more favorable attitude toward Generals Ewell, Longstreet, and Hill. The last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century included two biographies of General Ewell. These accounts were very favorable to the corps commander. In addition, several studies by prominent historians openly exonerated Ewell. As the 21<sup>st</sup> century began, another study of the war openly defended General Ewell's performance on day one at the battle of Gettysburg. Just when it looked as though the Second Corps commander had finally been vindicated after more than 140

years of criticism, Paul Casdorff published his scathing indictment of General Ewell's performance at Gettysburg.

It appears that after nearly 150 years of research, the issue has not been decided and that history may benefit from a new study concerning General Ewell's actions on the evening of July 1, 1863. The incorporation of the theories of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM will yield a set of common military leadership principles that have been relevant for 2,500 years. Moreover, individual principles from each framework that may not enjoy commonality with the others, but are particularly relevant to General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, will be identified. While it is unlikely that a completely objective and definitive conclusion can be reached concerning this subject, this framework provides an avenue to arrive at a more objective and more definitive conclusion as to how reasonable the Second Corps commander's decision was not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg.

## CHAPTER III

### METHODOLOGY

Gettysburg, the very word evokes images of Union and Confederate forces trading haymaker blows on the quaint, fertile, and scenic farmland of central Pennsylvania. Many battles were fought during America's great conflict, but few were as important during and none were as significant after the war than the battle of Gettysburg. This epic struggle is widely viewed as the turning point of the war and for many people it defines not only the American Civil War, but the American military experience, in general.

As Robert E. Lee's Army invaded Pennsylvania, few in that army could have imagined the disastrous effect that this action would have on the Army of Northern Virginia. Never again was Lee capable of invading the north. Some officers and civilians immediately began pointing fingers for Confederate defeat, most waited until after the war to place blame for southern disaster at Gettysburg. Over the last 150 years, the attacks have settled on five possible culprits, General Robert E. Lee, Lieutenant General James Longstreet, Major General J.E.B. Stuart, Lieutenant General Ambrose P. Hill, and Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell.

Ewell was roundly criticized for his performance at the battle of Gettysburg, particularly on day one. Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1 and the idea, perpetuated by others, that the lieutenant general was paralyzed by indecision and that he vacillated on this occasion combined with his performance as a corps commander following the battle of Gettysburg, made Ewell an easy target for those looking to find a scapegoat. Ewell's reputation suffered greatly as a result of these attacks.

General Ewell was recognized as an effective division commander. He was a popular officer in the Army of Northern Virginia (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II). Eccentric, Ewell presented a bird-

like image according to General Richard Taylor and he was prone to profanity-laced outbursts when things did not go well (1973). He loved his men and was very generous to his subordinates (Pfan, 1998). Ewell was exceedingly willing to share the limelight with other commanders and to advance the careers of his junior officers, often at his own expense (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II). In fact, the Second Corps commander was one of the most popular and likable officers in the Army of Northern Virginia (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II).

Ewell's critics believe that his promotion to corps command may have been an example of an officer being promoted beyond his ability. However, his performance at the battle of Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 1, 1863, requires more than just a flippant response that "Dick" Ewell was a poor corps commander and the first day of the battle of Gettysburg is just another example of his inability to fulfill General Lee's expectations. The comparison of Ewell's actions to the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM will provide a more objective and definitive answer as to whether Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg was reasonable. The three theoretical frameworks referenced above include some of the most respected military theories of their day and, in some cases, of all time.

### **Purpose of the Study**

This study will determine if General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on day one of the battle of Gettysburg was reasonable. Examining Ewell's performance through the theoretical lenses of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM will provide depth and scope to the study. The theoretical frameworks mentioned represent a cross section of military theory from ancient history (Sun Tzu), what was for Ewell, contemporary history (Jomini), and modern history (USAFM). This study will identify common military leadership principles among these theories

and focus on other principles which may be unique to a single theorist, but particularly relevant to General Ewell on day one of the battle of Gettysburg. This approach will utilize commonalities of the three theories which represent 2,500 years of military thought among some of the greatest military theorists of all time.

Battles are seldom, if ever fought according to manuals or principles and every engagement assumes a different character. However, the combined military leadership principles of this group and the principles unique to each, but of great relevance to Ewell, should establish sound military leadership principles that could, generally, predict whether a commander's actions were sound given the individual circumstances of that officer. The application of these principles to General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, should be adequate to evaluate General Ewell.

### **Theoretical Lenses**

#### **Sun Tzu**

Sun Tzu is considered to be one of the most prominent military philosophers/theorists in world history. His *Art of War* (Tzu, 450 or 500 b.c.) is replete with strategic and tactical lessons that are relevant to this day. Sun Tzu's very existence is in question by many ancient military historians. Some suggest that Sun Tzu may have been an alias for another general and that his famous work, *Art of War*, was a collection of writings from numerous ancient Chinese military leaders (Griffith, 1963). What is not in question is that *Art of War* is a seminal work on military theory and that it is still relevant today. When the accomplished British officer and military theorist B. H. Liddell Hart was told that his books were prominent in Chinese military academies during WWII, he had this reaction. "I remarked that it was time that they went back to Sun Tzu, since in that one short book was embodied almost as much about fundamentals of strategy and tactics as I had covered in more than twenty books (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. vii). A critique of

General Ewell's performance at the battle of Gettysburg on day one through the theoretical lens



*Figure 15.* Sun Tzu retrieved from fineartamerica.com.

of Sun Tzu's theories will provide a more objective conclusion as to the wisdom or folly of Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863 from an ancient military historical perspective. Sun Tzu's principles concerning waging war, dispositions, strengths and weaknesses, offensive strategy, energy, estimates, marches, qualities of a commander, maneuver, terrain, espionage, and intelligence will be particularly important when considering General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863.

### **Antoine Jomini**

Antoine Jomini was a military officer who served in the French and Russian Armies. Swiss by birth, Jomini was Marshal Michael Ney's chief of staff and principle advisor (Gallaher, 2011). Jomini became, along with Carl von Clausewitz, one of the most prominent military theorists in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The inclusion of Jomini in this study is essential. Jomini's theories in his book, *The Art of War* (1836) was prominent at West Point prior to the Civil War. In fact,

Jomini's military theories were the only military works taught prior to the Civil War at West Point when Ewell was a cadet (Chambers, 1999). As late as 1862, West Point noted, "General Jomini is admitted by all competent judges to be one of the ablest military critics and historians of this or any other day" (Jomini, 1862, p. p1). According to many historians, the vast majority of West Point graduates who began the war as senior or junior military officers were inculcated with Jominian military principles (Hagerman, 1967).

Some historians dispute the degree to which Jomini's theories influenced Civil War commanders. In fact, Reardon (2012) claims that the lack of military theory in the West Point curriculum, the lack of references to Jomini in post-war memoirs and in the official reports, and the translation of Jomini's work by Dennis Hart Mahan and others indicate that Jomini had little effect on Civil War commanders. Moreover, Reardon asserts that historians have perpetuated the myth that most Civil War commanders had an intimate knowledge of Jomini's teachings (2012). However, it cannot be disputed that these future Civil War commanders were exposed almost exclusively, no matter how sparingly, to Jominian theory at West Point (Hope, 2008). In particular, Jominian themes concerning lines of operations, reconnaissance, offensive operations, interior lines, maneuver, concentration, terrain, orders, and the characteristics of a good commander will provide points of comparison to the other theoretical lenses and to the Confederate Second Corps commander on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg (1862). The results of these findings will provide a more objective 19<sup>th</sup> century perspective to determine if General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on day one at the battle of Gettysburg was reasonable.



*Figure 16.* Antoine Jomini retrieved from [en.wikipedia.org](http://en.wikipedia.org).

### **US Army Field Manual 3-0, C1**

The USAFM provides the third theoretical lens that will be used to determine if General Ewell made a reasonable decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. This study will focus on the nine principles of war according to the US Army and compare many of those and other principles found in the USAFM to General Ewell's decisions on the evening of the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. Field Manual 3-0, C1 was the operations manual and it was published in 2008, updated in February 2011, and replaced in 2012.

The nine principles of war outlined in this manual are heavily laden with Jominian theory (USAFM, 2011). These principles of war were developed shortly after WW I by the US Army (Vossler, 2011?). Throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, they have been deleted and reintroduced into the US Army field manuals. These nine principles of war were the cornerstone of US Army operations (USAFM, 2011). While the nine principles of war have proven their



usefulness, the principles most relevant to this study include, Offensive, Mass, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity (USAFM, 2011, pp. A2-A3).

Much like Jomini, the US Army realizes that officers are unable to fight every battle according to field manuals and that every engagement is unique. The US Army claims that the nine principles of war characterize successful operations and that their value lies in their educational interpretations. USAFM elaborates, “Applied to the study of past campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements, the principles of war are powerful analysis tools” (2011, p. A-1). As a result, these principles, along with the other theories, promise to provide a more objective and conclusive answer as to whether General Ewell’s decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on day one of the battle of Gettysburg was reasonable. The application of many of these principles as outlined in the USAFM to General Ewell’s decisions on July 1, 1863 will provide a more comprehensive standard due to their longevity and usefulness in both the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Officers and historians have criticized the commander of the storied Confederate Second Corps while others have defended him. The application of sound military leadership principles and standards based upon 2,500 years of theory to assess Ewell’s performance will provide a more objective and definitive evaluation of the corps commander. This study hopes to determine if Ewell acted reasonably on July 1, 1863, according to Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM. The results of this study will afford a more definitive evaluation of Ewell on day one of the battle of Gettysburg by triangulating his decisions according to ancient, contemporary, and modern military theories.

Critics of this study may argue that some of the military theories referenced above are not relevant today and that each theory represents a glimpse of military thought in the appropriate

era in which it was written. While that assertion is true, this study will establish common military leadership principles among the three theorists. This action establishes triangulation of the theories and allows the study to arrive at a set of military leadership principles that are more general and transferable, thus adding to the credibility of the study's conclusions. By virtue of the utilization of multiple theories spanning 25 centuries, the combined set of military leadership principles developed in this study were and are relevant to this day. While exceptions will always exist, these combined military leadership principles represent a useful tool to evaluate whether General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, was reasonable. In addition, principles that may not be common among the theorists, but are relevant to General Ewell on July 1, 1863, will be analyzed.

### **Strategy vs. Tactics**

The application of Sun Tzu's and Antoine Jomini's theories to General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, could be viewed by more traditional historians as inappropriate due to, what they consider to be, the strategic nature of these theorists and what the historians perceive to be the tactical nature of Ewell's situation. Several studies completed by students of the US Army War College (Wilcoxon, 2010, Kuo, 2007) and the Naval Post Graduate School (Etterich, 2005) suggest otherwise. Jomini made countless references to armies in battle and one chapter of the *Art of War* (1836) is entitled, Grand Tactics. Moreover, it is important to note that General Ewell's situation changed dramatically during the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. Late in the morning and early afternoon, the Second Corps commander functioned largely as a tactical commander directing his units to the field and placing artillery. However, once the Second Corps was halted in Gettysburg and Ewell was informed by the commanding general that he could expect no reinforcements from Hill, the decision to attack

Cemetery Hill rested squarely on Ewell's shoulders. Any attack on Cemetery Hill would have had to have been organized and planned which would have required a much more strategic and operational evaluation of the situation by the Second Corps commander. The fact that his corps represented the entire left flank of the Confederate army and the effect that a failed assault would have had on the position of the army and the invasion of Pennsylvania was much more operational and strategic. In addition, many of the military principles that will be identified in this study, are universal, they apply to the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war.

### **Purpose of the Study**

This historical narrative seeks to determine if General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on day one of the battle of Gettysburg was reasonable according to the combined military leadership principles and selected individual theories of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM. The decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on day one of the battle of Gettysburg was the most controversial decision of General Ewell's life. Many of his contemporaries and early Civil War historians found fault with the Second Corps commander for his apparent lack of aggressiveness on July 1 while others have defended the popular lieutenant general. The historiography of this subject has come full circle after nearly 150 years of debate. What is lacking is a study that compares General Ewell's performance against an objective set of military leadership principles. While many comprehensive studies have detailed the battle of Gettysburg, none have addressed the diligence or negligence of General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, through the theoretical lenses of the most prominent ancient military theorist, the most prominent contemporary (for Ewell) military theorists, and the most comprehensive theories in the US Army in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries.

## **Research Questions**

1. Did General Ewell make a reasonable decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg according to the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM?
2. Did General Ewell or was General Ewell permitted to adhere to the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863?
3. Did General Ewell or was General Ewell permitted to act in accordance with the principles and “Units of Meaning” of the USAFM on July 1, 1863?
4. Did General Ewell possess adequate forces to expect a reasonable chance for success had he assaulted Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1, 1863?

## **Research Design**

In the absence of any living participants of the battle of Gettysburg and to accurately describe General Ewell’s experiences on the first day of the battle, a qualitative research method was selected for this study (Creswell, 2012). It is reasonable to conclude that quantifying General Ewell’s decisions concerning a possible attack on day one of the battle of Gettysburg would lack depth and prove to be difficult. Moreover, traditional research of an empirical nature, while valuable, is unable to capture or adequately describe and interpret why General Ewell did not attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. This qualitative historical study will produce a better understanding of the topic and may identify variables from which future quantitative researchers might benefit (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Historical research is far more than connecting mundane chronological dates and facts. Historical narratives are informed by theoretical perspectives that reveal “...the relationship between people, events, phenomena, and the

historical situations that create history” (Berg, 2009, p. 297). Moreover, historical research differs from a simple narrative in that it attempts to connect the past with the present (Berg, 2009). A qualitative historical narrative study presents the best hope of interpreting large amounts of descriptive data through a theoretical perspective from which common themes might be identified and interpreted to determine if General Ewell acted appropriately on day one of the battle of Gettysburg.

A narrative research design allows for a comprehensive, chronological exploration of all relevant government documents, personal memoirs, biographies, and other primary and secondary sources to compare General Ewell’s actions on day one of the battle of Gettysburg to the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM to help determine if General Ewell’s decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, was reasonable (Creswell, 2007).

### **Data Collection**

Consistent with a historical narrative, the body of data identified in this study includes government documents, personal memoirs, biographies, and other primary and secondary data to identify the nuances, hidden agendas, meanings, and complicated events that influenced General Ewell’s decisions on July 1, 1863, and how they have been interpreted over the last 150 years. Data sources will be addressed in the following section of this chapter. However, credibility was established through triangulating the collection of data. Data sources have been analyzed from various time periods, of multiple participants (US and Confederate), of numerous historians from the late 1860’s to the present day, and various schools of thought (Lost Cause). According to Berg (2009), triangulation of data is more than the blending of different forms of data, although that has been accomplished in this study, triangulation is “... the attempt to relate them

so as to counteract the threats to validity identified in each” (p. 6). Moreover, Denzin (1978) suggests that triangulation can be achieved through multiple theoretical perspectives. The introduction of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM is an attempt to achieve triangulation of data collection and the results that it produces. Establishing consistency of data within a particular method is another pathway to triangulate the data (Patton, 2002). Consistency of data was achieved in this study by comparing the data from multiple sources, both primary and secondary, over the past century and a half.

As in all qualitative narrative research, data analysis seeks to identify trends, events, turning points, and themes (Creswell, 2007). To this end, this study utilized Giorgi’s (1985) “Units of Meaning.” This approach allowed for the identification of common themes, trends, and patterns to emerge from the data. As the data were reviewed, this author remained cognizant of the three military theoretical lenses used to evaluate General Ewell and the breakdown of the historiography of this subject as identified in the literature review in Chapter II of this study.

As a result of the research, certain themes began to emerge. These themes were condensed into analytical categories or combined military leadership principles that encapsulated the general content of the literature. Certain areas of the literature emerged that were relevant and essential to understanding the research questions. In order to include these relevant units of information, there is a final category entitled “Units of Meaning” (Giorgi, 1985) that contains meaningful phrases and relevant discoveries that do not fit into other categories (Giorgi, 1985). The “Units of Meaning” (Giorgi, 1985) were color coded and the data was marked with the corresponding color. To assist in the analytical conceptualization of the data, a chart was designed to highlight the specific “Units of Meaning” (Giorgi, 1985) and analytical categories to organize the data. Examples of phrases, quotations, and notes were entered into the appropriate

section of each chart to demonstrate the significance of the themes.

A system of charts was constructed (Chapter IV) to outline and organize the established analytical categories or combined military leadership principles. From this data, themes will emerge (according to Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM) that will delineate the prominent issues within the literature. These themes will be the focal point of this analysis. A constant review of both the theoretical perspectives identified and the literature review will be essential to maintaining a clear focus on the analytical categories or combined military leadership principles and “Units of Meaning” (Giorgi, 1985) which will help answer the research questions.

### **Data Sources**

This study examined relevant data concerning Richard S. Ewell at the US Army Heritage and Education Center at the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Several volumes of Ewell’s published letters. Government documents including the *War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (1882-1900)* which provide detailed orders concerning the battle of Gettysburg were included in this study. *The US Army Field Manual 3-0, C1* (2011) as well as *The US Army Field Manual 3-90* (2001), and the *Army Doctrine Publication 3-90* (2012) are of primary importance as they represent one of the theoretical perspectives of this study. Although one must acknowledge the personal agenda’s pursued by each participant and their possible bias, *The Southern Historical Society Papers (1877)* have been consulted for their post-war perspective of General Ewell’s actions at the battle of Gettysburg. These papers contain post-war accounts of the battle of Gettysburg from Second Corps staff officers, staff officers from General Lee’s headquarters, general officers who were participants of the battle, and others.

Several of General Ewell's staff officers wrote post-war memoirs which have been included in this study. Ewell's step-son and staff officer, Campbell Brown, wrote *Campbell Brown's Civil War (2001)*. As one might imagine, this work is very favorable to Ewell, but it is valuable for its intimate knowledge of the events of July 1, 1863. Other Second Corps staff officers were not so kind, but their accounts provide a post-war perspective of how Ewell was perceived. These works include Robert Stiles *Four Years under Marsh Robert* (1910) and Henry Kyd Douglas's *I Road with Stonewall* (1940). Post-war memoirs from General Lee's staff as well as staff officers from other corps have been included in this study due to their intimate knowledge of all of the participants of the battle and the events of that day. These works include Colonel Charles Marshall's *An Aide-De-Camp of Lee* (1927), *Four Years with General Lee* (1913) by Colonel Walter Taylor, and Confederate First Corps staff officer, Moxley Sorrel's *Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer* (1958).

All available accounts from Ewell's principle subordinate general officers have been included in this study. At the critical moment on the evening of July 1, 1863, when Ewell made the decision not to attack Cemetery Hill, two of his divisions were on the field and Ewell consulted both division commanders. Robert Rodes did not survive the war, but Jubal Early wrote extensively on this subject and his work, *Lieutenant General Jubal Anderson Early, CSA autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States* (1912) has been included as well as Early's articles in the Southern Historical Society Papers and various speeches by the lieutenant general. John Brown Gordon served as a brigade commander in Early's Division and subsequently rose to corps command. His memoir *Reminiscences of the Civil War* (1904) and his correspondence during the week of the battle of Gettysburg, located in his personal papers entitled, *John Brown Gordon family papers* at the University of Georgia have been consulted.



Many of Ewell's contemporaries both Union and Confederate have completed memoirs or personal recollections of the battle of Gettysburg. The following officer's memoirs have been included in this study, Edward Porter Alexander, Abner Doubleday, John Gibbon, Winfield Scott Hancock, Frank Haskell, Oliver Otis Howard, Robert E. Lee, James Longstreet, George Gordon Meade, Eppa Hunton, Charles Wainwright, and Richard Taylor.

Multiple secondary sources have been used to provide greater depth and to compensate where no written record of a participant exists. Bean's *Stonewall's Man* (1959) provides Second Corps staff officer Sandie Pendleton's views on Ewell and Collins's *Major General Robert E. Rodes* (2008) describes Rodes's actions and recollections on July 1, 1863.

Hamlin's, "*Old Bald Head*" (*R.S. Ewell: The Portrait of a Soldier*), Martin's, *Road to Glory* (1991), Pfanz's, *Richard S. Ewell* (1998), and Casdorff's *Confederate General Richard S. Ewell: Lee's Hesitant Commander* (2004) constitutes the four biographies of General Ewell. The first three are favorable while the last is extremely critical of Ewell. All have been included in this study.

Other sources include biographies of other corps, division, and brigade commanders as well as other secondary works that detail the battle of Gettysburg and military history. Sun Tzu's, *Art of War* (450-500 b.c.) is included as one of three military theories that will be used to judge Ewell's performance on July 1, 1863. Antoine Jomini's, *The Art of War* (1836) will provide the basis for the second military theory, and the *USAFM* (2011) is the third standard included in this study to determine if Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, was reasonable.

The variety of sources in this study includes government records, personal memoirs, biographies, journal accounts, and other primary and secondary sources. This information

represents a wide range of opinions concerning the events of July 1, 1863 and General Ewell's culpability for the absence of any attack on Cemetery Hill on day one of the battle. The number and diversity of sources attempts to establish triangulation of the data as well as triangulation of the theoretical frameworks referenced above

### **Limitations**

Qualitative research designs typically produce results that are limited and are not transferrable to the general population. However, qualitative research does examine, in depth, the phenomenon in question. Despite the diversity of sources in this study, the limited sample size prohibits the generalization of conclusions to other military commanders facing different strategic, operational, or tactical situations. The process and the theoretical framework, however, may be beneficial to other researchers who are examining military leadership decisions of general officers in particular battles and theatres. General officers in the heat of battle typically do not fight according to theories or manuals. The theoretical perspective and the military principles employed in this study provide another interpretation, but not a definitive conclusion concerning whether Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill was completely reasonable. Inherent in any qualitative design is the possibility of personal bias and pre-conceived notions that might skew the data despite efforts to ensure credibility.

### **Triangulation**

The reality that all of the participants of this battle are deceased presents another limitation. As a result, this study must rely exclusively on written accounts of participants and historians who may or may not demonstrate personal bias or pursue agendas that might skew the data. The literature review suggests that the conclusions of those who left written accounts pertinent to this study, both participants and historians, might be shaped according to the decade and century in

which they wrote. Researchers must attempt to mitigate source bias. Triangulation of the data and the employment of multiple theoretical perspectives represent an attempt to limit bias and ensure reliability.

### **Summary**

This historical narrative seeks to determine if General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, was reasonable according to the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Jomini and the USAFM and the "Units of Meaning" associated with them. To ensure the credibility of this study, data triangulation, as well as the implementation of three theoretical perspectives, was employed. Coded data was organized according to analytical categories or combined military leadership principles and "Units of Meaning" based on the military theories of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM. The categories and "Units of Meaning" that emerged from the data were applied to General Ewell's performance on July 1, 1863, to determine if his decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863 was reasonable.

## CHAPTER IV

### DATA ANALYSIS

The events surrounding General Ewell's performance at the battle of Gettysburg have been debated for 150 years. The most controversial aspect of this debate focuses on the first day of the battle and Ewell's refusal to assault Cemetery Hill. Critics accuse the Second Corps commander of timidity and hesitancy, while supporters counter that Ewell faced a myriad of obstacles and had sound reasons for not ordering an assault. This study will determine if the lieutenant general's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, was reasonable according to the combined military leadership principles and "Units of Meaning" of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM.

This chapter identifies eight analytical categories or combined military leadership principles (leadership, clarity of orders, concentration, terrain, maneuver, offensive operations, defensive operations, and intelligence) and two "Units of Meaning" (security and initiative). Each analytical category or combined military leadership principle contains a chart that includes appropriate quotations from each theoretician and a quotation explaining how it applies to General Ewell. A narrative follows each chart to provide depth concerning the analytical category or combined military leadership principle and its relevance to General Ewell. The "Units of Meaning" contain a similar chart. However, it includes a quotation from only one theorist (USAFM) and a narrative explanation of the "Unit of Meaning".

As evidenced by the literature review in Chapter II, the research on this topic is mountainous. A qualitative approach appears to be the most attractive method of sorting through the enormous amount of data to arrive at a satisfactory answer to determine if Ewell acted reasonably. The qualitative process allows themes to emerge that focus the research. A historical narrative seeks

to uncover events and accounts of what happened in the past and attach meaning to them as a whole to answer questions, judge individual achievements, and identify events and relationships from the past to determine how they relate to the future (Berg, 2009). The narrative aspect of this approach attempts to not only retell a story, but to retell the story through a theoretical lens or lenses. It is this aspect that differentiates a narrative from narrative research (Cathy Kaufman, personal communication, October, 2011). This study is an example of a qualitative, historical narrative that utilizes a variant of a biographical narrative format. Denzin (1989) explained that researchers should “begin biographical analysis by identifying an object set of experiences in the subject’s life (Creswell, 2007, p. 158). Denzin believed that stories and themes would emerge based on either interviews or the evaluation of documents (Creswell, 2007). This study loosely follows Denzin’s model in that an objective set of military leadership principles have been developed from Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM. These principles will be applied to General Ewell’s situation and his military leadership decisions on July 1, 1863. Context and corroboration are provided through documents of the three theoretical frameworks and primary and secondary data relating to General Ewell.

The three theoretical lenses provide great breadth and depth in that they encompass nearly 2,500 years of military leadership theory. Sun Tzu is considered by many as the greatest military theorist/philosopher of all time. While his theories and principles are relevant to this day, his monumental work, *Art of War* (450-500 BC) is an excellent example of ancient military theory.

No other military theorist was as prolific as Antoine Jomini in the 1900’s. The general became the essence of the military enlightenment of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Reardon, 2012). Jominian principles were the only military theories that were a part of the curriculum at the US Military Academy at West Point prior to, during, and immediately after the Civil War (Chambers, 1999).

While it is doubtful that Ewell or a majority of Civil War commanders were familiar with Jominian principles, Jomini was the most productive writer of military thought during this period and many of his principles form the basis of the modern principles of war (USAFM, 20011).

The USAFM was utilized as the primary operations manual as late as 2011. While this manual has been replaced (2012), the nine principles of war that formed the basis for how the US Army would fight have been relevant in both conventional conflicts and in the unconventional wars in the Middle East. The current US Army Field Manual has replaced the nine principles with a new set that reflect war in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and its multi-national tendency. However, one can see most of the Nine Principles in the new and broader framework of the current manual. Nevertheless, the original Nine Principles of war found in the USAFM are relevant on the modern battlefield (Cordovano, 2006).

While the research concerning the wisdom or folly of General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill is considerable, there appears to be no standard or objective set of military principles whereby the General is judged. The literature review in chapter II reveals the myriad of opinions by participants and historians concerning General Ewell's performance on day one of the battle of Gettysburg. However, these judgments appear to lack a foundation rooted in military leadership principles and are based more on personal opinion or a political agenda.

This study has alleviated this problem by developing a standard set of combined military leadership principles and "Units of Meaning" that span some 25 centuries and have been applied to General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill. The works of Sun Tzu (*Art of War*), Antoine Jomini (*Art of War*) and the USAFM have been analyzed and compared to determine what principles are common among them. These combined military leadership principles will be referred to in this chapter as analytical categories. An analytical category must possess

commonality among all three theoretical frameworks and be relevant to General Ewell on July 1, 1863. Military principles that appear to be particularly relevant to General Ewell's situation on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg, but are not common among all three theorists, will be referred to as "Units of Meaning". The analytical categories and the "Units of Meaning" are the result of themes that emerged in both the theoretical frameworks and the primary and secondary data concerning General Ewell's performance on day one of the battle of Gettysburg.

### **Coding**

The data for this project was color coded. The Art of War (Sun Tzu), The Art of War (Antoine Jomini), and the USAFM were reviewed independently of each other to determine what if any military principles might be relevant to General Ewell's military leadership decisions on July 1, 1863. Any principles that were germane to General Ewell in these three works were categorized with a colored (orange) label. The three works were analyzed as a whole to identify military leadership principles that were common among them. These principles were noted with a pink label as categories. In addition, the theoretical frameworks were examined for principles that were relevant to General Ewell, but were not common among all three theorists. These "Units of Meaning" were identified with a white label and another color assigned to the theorist (Sun Tzu-Red-Jomini-Green-USAFM-Blue). Primary and secondary research related to General Ewell was identified with an orange label and either a pink label (category) or a white ("Unit of Meaning") label and the corresponding theorist (Sun Tzu-Red-Jomini-Green-USAFM-Blue). A second label was added to the primary and secondary research concerning General Ewell, depending on whether the research matched an analytical category or a "Unit of Meaning".

## **Presuppositions**

Qualitative researchers attempt to identify and mitigate personal bias. This study operated under several presuppositions. The first presupposition is that General Ewell was scapegoated for his performance at the battle of Gettysburg to preserve General Lee's reputation and that this was the result of Lost Cause writers after the Civil War. With the exception of a few mid-20th century writers and historians from the last decade of that century, the literature suggests that Ewell was a timid, indecisive, unsure, and hesitant commander who was unable to make a decision on his own at Gettysburg. Further investigation and more contemporary research by Martin (1991), Pfanz, 1998), and Gallagher (1998) suggest otherwise.

The second presupposition is that this study is not suggesting that General Ewell was a first-rate corps commander for the remainder of his tenure or that he performed well during days two or three at the battle of Gettysburg. It is an attempt to analyze his performance on day one to determine if his decision not to attack Cemetery Hill was reasonable. Most of Ewell's critics contend that his inaction in front of Cemetery Hill on July 1 cost the Confederacy the battle and the war. Ewell is criticized by many historians for his performance as a corps commander during the overland campaign of 1864. This record is often used to reinforce the idea that the beleaguered commander of the Second Corps erred at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863.

The third presupposition is that most of the Ewell critics do not account for the myriad of variables involved in the lieutenant general's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg or that the corps commander did not appreciate the military value of assaulting Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill. Participants and historians who criticize General Ewell appear to consider his decision in a vacuum and ignore the fact that Ewell had to consider other variables before he ordered an assault on Cemetery Hill. The development of combined military



leadership principles and “Units of Meaning” will help to examine and consider all of the factors that the Monday morning quarterbacks of the General have avoided lo these many years.

Due to the presuppositions listed above, this researcher placed a greater emphasis on reflection and triangulation of data and theory to limit bias. As the themes for the analytical categories and the “Units of Meaning” emerged, this researcher reviewed personal notes and coding several times. The relevant themes and phrases that emerged were coded (color tab) for each theoretical framework and for General Ewell. The name of the theme or phrase was transcribed on a color-coded note which was affixed to the appropriate page in each volume that was reviewed so that this researcher could identify the codes across all of the research. The phrases and themes that emerged were grouped into analytical categories or combined military leadership principles. As the data were collected, these categories became more obvious and they were placed in a chart of analytical categories where the themes and phrases continued to develop. It was easy to see how these themes related to the literature review in Chapter II. Upon the completion of the second theoretical framework (Jomini) and the review of most of the data on General Ewell, it became obvious that a common pattern had developed. This researcher completed the data collection on the third theoretical framework (USAFM) and the related data on General Ewell to attempt to establish the accuracy of the pattern that emerged.

### **Analytical Categories or Combined Military Leadership Principles**

It became evident that after a complete review of the theoretical frameworks and the primary and secondary data concerning General Ewell, that data saturation had been reached. The data were organized into informational charts based on the themes and phrases that emerged. This tactic allows the reader to acquire a sense of the depth and breadth of the analytical categories

and how they apply to General Ewell. Moreover, the chart and the appropriate quotations highlight the longevity of the analytical categories and their relevance to military leadership theory which are applied to General Ewell’s decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. The chart is organized into 8 analytical categories or combined military leadership principles and 2 “Units of Meaning” which are listed below.

#### Analytical Category

- I. Leadership
- II. Clarity of Orders
- III. Concentration
- IV. Terrain
- V. Maneuver
- VI. Offensive Operations
- VII. Defensive Operations
- VIII. Intelligence

#### “Unit of Meaning”

- I. Security
- II. Initiative

The chart below will give the reader a sense of what military leadership principles have been consistent over the last 2,500 years. It will provide greater depth and shed light on how the analytical categories are relevant to General Ewell on the first day at the battle of Gettysburg. This chart is a means by which a more objective assessment of General Ewell’s decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, can be had. The analytical categories and “Units of

Meaning” will provide the basis for the answers to the research questions which will be addressed in Chapter V of this study.

### Leadership

Analytical Category	Relevant Theorists	Subject of Interest
---------------------	--------------------	---------------------

<u>Leadership</u>	SUN TZU	ANTOINE JOMINI	USAFM	EWELL
	<p>“By command I mean the general’s qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 65).</p> <p>“There are five qualities which are dangerous in the character of a general. If reckless, he can be killed; if cowardly, captured; if quick-tempered, you can make a fool of him; if he has too delicate a sense of honor you can calumniate him; if he is of a compassionate nature you can</p>	<p>Jomini believed that when appointing senior commanders, the following should be observed. “To give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight, and of unshaken firmness in danger” (Jomini, 1862, p. 38).</p> <p>Jomini described what he considered to be the characteristics of a commander, “The most essential qualities for a general will always be as follows:-First, a high moral courage, capable of great</p>	<p>“Leadership in today’s operational environment is often the difference between success and failure. In every operation, Army leaders clarify purpose and mission, direct operations, and set the example for courage and competence”</p> <p>“Commanders continuously lead and assess. Guided by professional judgment gained from experience, knowledge, education, intelligence, and intuition commanders lead by force of example and personal</p>	<p>A staff officer recalled that “His [Ewell’s] men were more afraid of him than of the Yankees” (Martin, 1991. P. 11).</p> <p>“Ewell’s former superior officer, General John Garland, described his performance following a raid on the Apaches in 1854. The General said that Ewell was a “well-tried, gallant, and valuable officer.” The General continued that Ewell, “...was looked upon by his comrades as the very pattern of an officer and gentleman” (Casdorff, 2004, p. 70).</p> <p>Captain William P. Snow remembered Ewell training dragoons in 1861. Snow explained, “His discipline was stern and rigid, but humane, and, out of</p>

	<p>harass him” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 114).</p>	<p>resolutions, secondly, a physical courage which takes no account of danger. His scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned characteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. Next in importance come the qualities of his personal character. A man who is gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in others instead of being jealous of it, and skillful in making this merit conduce to his own glory, will always be a good general, and may even pass for a great man. (Jomini, 1862, p. 35).</p> <p>“The first of all</p>	<p>presence. Leadership inspires soldiers (and sometimes civilians) to accomplish things that they would otherwise avoid” (USAFM, 2011, p. 5-4).</p> <p>“Effective leaders have physical presence. Commanders carefully consider where they need to be, balancing the need to inspire soldiers with that of maintaining an overall perspective of the entire operation” (USAFM, 2011, p.5 -10).</p> <p>“Decision-making includes knowing whether to decide or not, then when and what to decide, and finally, understanding the consequences”</p>	<p>raw mounted militia, he soon formed a most efficient body of troops” (Casdorff, 2004, p.105).</p> <p>“Not only had Ewell’s division tipped the balance at Port Republic (1862), but Ewell himself had also been highly visible on the field, directing his men and even firing one of the captured Federal pieces at the hightailing enemy” (Casdorff, 2004, p. 151).</p> <p>Lieutenant Colonel John Trentlen described Ewell’s conduct along Boatswain Creek at the battle of Gaines Mill (1862). Colonel Trentlen remembered that Ewell “‘displayed the most indomitable courage.’ Brown agreed and added that Ewell’s fearless ride up and down his lines was undertaken by the division commander ‘to instill a similar courage in his men’” (Casdorff, 2004, p. 164).</p> <p>“The picture of him that takes form, in a score of reports, is</p>
--	---	--	---	---

		<p>requisites for success as a leader is, that he be perfectly brave” (Jomini, 1862, p. 274).</p> <p>“By such exercises may be procured a rapid and strategic <i>coup-d’oeil</i>, -the most valuable characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put in practice the finest theories in the world” (Jomini, 1862, p. 267).</p>	<p>(USAFM, 2011, p. 5-1).</p> <p>“Good leaders inspire and elicit success. Effective leadership can compensate for difficulties in all of the warfighting functions because it is the most dynamic element of combat power. The opposite is also true; poor leadership can negate advantages in warfighting capabilities. The army defines leadership as the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. An Army leader by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and</p>	<p>that of an intelligent, trained, self-contained, and daring man, unique in personality, who had cheer and help for every fellow soldier who needed either” (Freeman, 1944, vol. I, p. 655).</p> <p>General Richard Taylor Said of Ewell, “Fighting was beyond question the ruling passion of his life. He always feared lest someone would get under fire before him” (1973, p. 39).</p> <p>Ewell’s men saw him shoulder a musket and join the front line as they neared Winchester. Ewell explained to fellow officers that his only fear was that “old Jackson would catch [me] at it” (Martin, 1991, p. 78).</p> <p>“By leading his men into combat, joining them on the front line, sharing their danger, he had earned their respect. His troops came to love him because Ewell seemed so concerned when they were wounded. And because he won</p>
--	--	---	--	--

			<p>influences people to accomplish operational goals. Army leaders motivate people to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization. They instill in soldiers the will to win. Army doctrine describes essential leadership attributes (character, presence, and intellect)” (USAFM, 2011, p. 4-2).</p>	<p>battles, Ewell gained their unquestioning support” (Martin, 1991, p. 92).</p> <p>At the battle of Gaines Mill, Ewell had to hold his position. His troops were exhausted and their rifles too hot to fire, “To encourage his uneasy soldiers to hold their post, Ewell brazenly walked his horse back and forth along their front, drawing the enemy’s fire to himself rather than his troops” (Martin, 1991, p. 109).</p> <p>Ewell gained the respect and admiration of his men following an engagement in 1862. “After the skirmish was over, Ewell had personally loaded the wounded into ambulances and accompanied to a nearby farmhouse where he tenderly put them to bed. He then dug into his meager purse and gave all his money to the farmer. The dollars were for the men’s individual needs.” Witnessing this, Colonel William Goldsborough of the Maryland Line</p>
--	--	--	--	--

			<p>stated, “I hadn’t cared [much] for Ewell before, but after this evening, my regiment will go anywhere ...for him. I love him” (Martin, 1991, p. 82)!</p> <p>“In his battle reports of the period, he credited others rather than himself. For example, his men captured Front Royal, but he wrote that the Rebels were victorious because of ‘Jackson’s personal superintendence’! Ewell anticipated Banks withdrawal from Winchester, moved on his own to obstruct the way, out of town, yet he acknowledged, ‘I adopted...[Trimble’s] suggestion.’ And while thrashing Fremont at Cross Keys was a personal triumph for him, Ewell lauded Elzey for selecting the position” (Martin, 1991, pp. 92-93)</p> <p>General Taylor said of Ewell, “with all of his oddities, perhaps in some measure because of them, Ewell was adored by officers and men” (1973, p. 38). Taylor</p>
--	--	--	---

				<p>concluded, “Dear Dick Ewell! Virginia never bred a truer gentleman, nor an odder, more lovable fellow” (1973, p. 78).</p> <p>General Gordon commented on Ewell, “Ewell, with his one leg, not only rode in battle like a cow-boy on the plains, but in the whirlwind of the strife his brain acted with the speed and rapidity of a Gatling gun” (1904, p.129).</p>
--	--	--	--	--

*Figure 17. Leadership.*

Leadership can be defined in many different ways. The theorists identified in this study certainly comment on leadership in multiple forms. Some refer to this subject, specifically as leadership while others comment on the value of certain qualities of a good general or some identify qualities that could be dangerous for a general. Whether they are describing leadership, qualities of a good general, or qualities that are dangerous for a general, this study will refer to all of these traits as leadership. It is interesting to note the three theorists that constitute the theoretical framework for this dissertation make the distinction between leadership and what this study calls clarity of orders. It would appear that Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM understood the value of good leadership, but they all commented on the importance of superior officers writing and dispersing clear and concise orders that subordinates could easily understand.

As evidenced by the quotations above, Sun Tzu does not refer to leadership, but identifies several traits of a good commander. The ancient Chinese general emphasized the qualities of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage, and strictness (450-500 b.c., p. 65). It is fairly obvious



what is meant by wisdom, courage, and strictness. However, Merriam-Webster defines humanity as, “The quality or state of being humane” and sincerity as “honesty of mind, freedom from hypocrisy” (Merriam-Webster, 2013). Sun Tzu is unique in that he also chose to highlight qualities that are very dangerous in a general. The quotation above focuses on five qualities that Sun Tzu claims are dangerous for a general, they are recklessness, cowardness, quick temperedness, having too delicate of a sense of honor, and being too compassionate (450-500 b.c.). Sun Tzu appears to contradict himself in that he indicated that humanity is a quality of a good commander. On the other hand, he reported that being compassionate can be a dangerous quality in a general. The two qualities appear to be very similar. Perhaps Sun Tzu recognized the value of humanity, but perceived that a commander who is excessively compassionate might let opportunities slip away due to this character trait or be unwilling to sacrifice the lives of his men in order to win.

Jomini also understood the value of good leadership and he noted multiple characteristics of a good general. As the quotations above make clear, Jomini believed that a good commander must be brave, bold, and demonstrate a steadfast determination in the face of danger (Jomini, 1838). Jomini continued by identifying the qualities of a general. Some of these characteristics overlap with those mentioned above. Jomini declared that a general must possess, moral courage, be capable of great resolutions, demonstrate physical courage, possess military knowledge, and be gallant, firm, just, upright, and capable of valuing the contributions of others without being jealous (1838). It is interesting to note that Jomini considered “military acquirements” to be of secondary importance to the other, what appear to be, personal qualities. For a man (Jomini) who is synonymous with the 19<sup>th</sup> century military enlightenment and its emphasis on the science

of war, the focus on personal characteristics of a general is startling. Nevertheless, Jomini's qualities of a general are not dissimilar to those identified by Sun Tzu.

Not surprisingly, the USAFM provides a much more modern and extensive example of leadership. The army defines leadership in one of the quotations above. Do take note that the Army appears to focus on motivating, directing, and influencing people to achieve mission success. The US Army highlights both personal and professional characteristics of a good commander and several actions that must be undertaken to provide good leadership. In an army that enjoys the resources of the only super-power in the world, the emphasis is on leadership not on material or logistical might and the USAFM notes that the difference between losing and winning a battle is often, leadership (2011). In fact, the Army believes that effective leadership can negate deficiencies in other operational areas (USAFM, 2011). First and foremost, the Army is adamant that all commanders must clarify the purpose and mission of an operation for subordinates and direct operations while demonstrating courage and aptitude, this is a part of what the Army believes a commander must do (USAFM, 2011). The USAFM explains that commanders use experience, education, intelligence, and intuition to make good decisions (USAFM, 2011). Army commanders lead by example and inspire troops with their presence to accomplish things that they normally might shun and commanders understand that they need to balance their physical presence to motivate with the need to maintain an overall picture of the battle (USAFM, 2011). The US Army considers character, presence, and intellect as the most important and indispensable characteristics of leadership (USAFM, 2011).

From the evidence provided, it is clear that the theoretical frameworks of this study have identified leadership or some form of it, as an important ingredient in the exercise of war. The leadership characteristics, traits, or actions of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM are very

instructive and valuable and will be discussed as to their relevance to Ewell. However, the following traits or characteristics appear to be universal among the three theorists of this dissertation. The first is what Sun Tzu calls wisdom. Jomini calls it capable or military acquirement and the USAFM terms it competence or aptitude. The second is identified by Sun Tzu as sincerity, while Jomini refers to it as a commander who is just or upright and has personal character while the USAFM calls it character. The third common leadership quality is what Sun Tzu labels humanity. This attribute is very similar to sincerity. Jomini calls it high moral courage and, much like sincerity, humanity would fall under character in the USAFM. Courage is the most prominent and universal military leadership characteristic of all three theorists. And they all identify it as such. Jomini includes bravery and boldness in the fight with physical courage. The characteristics of wisdom, sincerity, humanity, and courage are common among Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM. However, all of the leadership characteristics and other attributes identified by the theoretical frameworks are valuable and important on their own merits.

It appears from the quotations listed in the analytical category, leadership that Ewell fairs rather well as a leader. The Second Corps commander certainly possessed the combined qualities for generalship identified by Sun Tzu, Jomini and the USAFM (wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage) and most, if not all of the characteristics noted by each theorist. There can be no doubt that Ewell was a wise man. He finished in the top third of his West Point class in 1840 (Pfan, 1998). As the quotations above show, he proved himself a valuable and capable frontier officer. Ewell had a county and a city named in his honor in Arizona (Casdor, 2004). In fact, in 1856, Arizona Governor David Merriweather requested that Ewell escort him from Kansas to Santa Fe (Casdor, 2004).

As a Cavalryman, early in the Civil War, Ewell demonstrated his administrative and training skills with the Virginia Cavalry. Moreover, as the quotation above proves, he bravely faced the enemy and inspired his men with his fearless performance in his first battle for the Confederacy. Further quotations by noted historians speak to his success in the Valley campaign in 1862 with a much enhanced reputation. His performance at Gaines Mill and the Seven Days campaign, highlighted by the quotations above speak to his competence and wisdom as a division commander. In fact, Pfanz suggests that following the Seven Days battles, “of the army’s nine division commanders, Ewell alone emerged from the campaign with both his personal and professional prestige in-tact” (Pfanz, 1998, p. 236). He had become “Stonewall” Jackson’s most trusted subordinate and was seriously wounded at Groveton while leading the van of Jackson’s Army (Casdorff, 2004, p. 193). General Gordon’s quotation proves Ewell’s wisdom and ability after the loss of his leg when he commanded a corps.

The second combined leadership quality is sincerity or being upright, demonstrating personal character. There are multiple examples that speak to Ewell’s personal character in the quotations listed above. Perhaps the most striking is when Ewell helped to load wounded and provided for their care from his own pocket. Martin’s quotation speaks to Ewell’s distaste for personal praise and his willingness to give credit to subordinates at his own expense. Ewell demonstrated his sincerity or uprightness by joining the skirmish line and sharing his soldiers’ dangers. It is clear that Ewell was beloved by officers and men. Gallagher stated that nearly everyone in the Army of Northern Virginia liked the Second Corps commander (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II).

Humanity which is similar to sincerity is identified as an important attribute for commanders. Jomini labeled it, high moral courage which the USAFM considers it to be character. Humanity is an attribute that Ewell demonstrated on a regular basis. The quotation referenced concerning

Ewell personally caring for and paying for the care of his troops is a perfect example of his humanity. Captain Snow intimated in a quotation above that even though Ewell drilled his men mercilessly, he was very humane. In one of only two instances in which “Stonewall” Jackson rebuked Ewell, the subordinate ordered his men not to fire on a Union officer at Port Republic (1862) who was gallantly exposing himself by riding up and down the Yankee line. General Taylor provided a good explanation of Ewell and his humanity. Taylor remembered, “Dear Dick Ewell! Virginia never bred a truer gentleman, nor an odder, more lovable fellow” (Taylor, 1973, p. 78). Given the evidence above, it appears that “Dick” Ewell certainly possessed humanity in abundance.

The final combined attribute for a general is courage. This characteristic is mentioned again and again by all of the theorists in this study. This quality was and is absolutely necessary for a commander to exercise successful leadership. Even Ewell’s loudest critics would acknowledge his personal bravery and courage. Nearly every quotation above speaks to Ewell’s desire to get into the fight, inspire his men by exposing himself almost constantly, and appearing on the field where his inspiration was most needed. He was brevetted for gallantry in Mexico, was wounded upwards of five times (including two on frontier duty), and had multiple horses shot out from under him. Courage is without question Ewell’s strongest attribute among the four qualities identified by Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM.

In addition to the four qualities of leadership discussed above, Sun Tzu identified strictness as a necessary quality of command. The first and third quotation for Ewell in the analytical category for leadership indicates that Ewell’s troops feared his wrath more than that of the enemy and that his training style was firm and severe, but fair.

Sun Tzu revealed traits of a general that could be hazardous. The first of these characteristics is recklessness. While Ewell constantly exposed himself, he was not reckless. He was certainly courageous, but he is often accused of being hesitant. He usually consulted others that he trusted and sought their opinions if time warranted such action. Unlike A. P. Hill, who launched assaults without orders and without notifying superiors, a trait that could be considered reckless, Ewell did not display this type of behavior on a consistent basis (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II).

The second trait that Sun Tzu feared in a commander was cowardice. The quotations above and many others that were not included in this analytical category attest to the fact the Ewell was a brave and courageous man. Even Ewell's detractors would and have agreed that he was a model officer in this respect and that he was always at the front of his column.

While Ewell could exhibit a temper on occasion, he was not quick-tempered in the sense that he made precipitant decisions because he became outraged (Martin, 1991). His style was firm, measured, and profane, but he was not a hothead like A. P. Hill or Trimble. The best evidence of this is his service with Jackson in the Valley. Ewell, on multiple occasions became infuriated at Jackson for not adequately explaining what his intentions were (Martin, 1991). Jackson would often ask Ewell to take action which did not seem reasonable, given the circumstances (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II). This prompted Ewell to claim that Jackson was crazy (Taylor, 1973). This quotation is indicative of Ewell's frustration with Jackson. When members of Jackson's staff asked Ewell what they should do, the general snapped, "I'm only commanding a division, marching under orders, I don't know where..." (Martin, 1991, p. 96). Despite Ewell's frustration with his immediate superior's secrecy, Ewell did not disregard his superior or display behavior that could be considered rash.

Honor was an important attribute to all men in 19<sup>th</sup> century America. Sun Tzu cautioned against a delicate sense of honor in a commander because one could “calumniate” or belittle or denigrate him. Ewell certainly had a sense of honor as most 19<sup>th</sup> century Virginia gentleman did. However, the record is clear that unlike most of the officers who were elevated to corps command in the Army of Northern Virginia Ewell cared least about winning fame or claiming credit for victories on the field. In fact, several quotations suggest that Ewell went out of his way to praise his subordinates even at his own expense (Gallagher, 2004). Even when Ewell was wrongly accused of negligence, he rarely responded. He was accused of not advancing properly as First Manassas, not ordering an attack on Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, and for allowing Richmond to burn after he commanded the garrison that withdrew from the capital city. He rarely acknowledged any of these incidents and when he did, it was usually in a private letter, as in the case with the burning of Richmond. This incident weighed heavily on the lieutenant general. Ewell certainly did not possess a touchy sense of honor as did A.P. Hill (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II).

Sun Tzu’s final quality that was to be frowned upon in a commander was compassion. It is not certain exactly what Sun Tzu meant. It would appear that this characteristic is very similar to humanity which Sun Tzu considered to be valuable in a general. Apparently, there is a fine line between compassion and humanity. It is certain that Ewell was compassionate and humane given several of the quotations cited, especially the one in which the lieutenant general personally assisted and funded his men’s personal needs. Perhaps what Sun Tzu meant by compassion was the inability of a commander to commit his forces. It is also evident that Ewell, while compassionate was willing to commit his men and sacrifice them in order to win. One

need only consider his performances in the Valley, Gaines Mill, Groveton, Gettysburg, and the Overland campaign.

Jomini had identified a few characteristics beyond the four combined qualities (wisdom, humanity, sincerity, and courage) mentioned that were valuable to a commander. Jomini mentioned that a general must be gallant and while this characteristic is similar to bravery and courageousness, it bears mentioning that Ewell was brevetted for gallantry in Mexico and that several of the quotations in this analytical category mention gallant or gallantry in describing him. Jomini stated that a general must be able to recognize the talents of others and not be jealous of it. Ewell, more so than any other corps commander that served with him exhibited this quality. He was constantly assisting subordinates and making sure that they were properly recognized for their contributions (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II). Moreover, he frequently sought the opinion of others and praised their efforts. Jomini described the ability of a good general to recognize what he called *coup-d'oeil*. While terrain will be discussed in a subsequent analytical category, *coup d'oeil* is a French term that refers to a general's ability to determine the tactical benefits of terrain at a single glimpse (O'Brian, 1991). Ewell was quick to appreciate Rodes's position on Oak Hill and place the artillery accordingly. Moreover, Ewell acknowledged the *coup-d'oeil* of the Federal position on Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863.

Several characteristics that the USAFM considers in addition to the four combined qualities (wisdom, sincerity, humanity, courage) are for a commander to clarify purpose and mission and to direct operations. The first day of the battle of Gettysburg provides evidence that Ewell possessed these qualities. Even though Ewell had no idea what the grand mission of Lee's invasion was or his immediate mission, Ewell issued orders to his division commanders just prior to the battle that revealed that they were assisting Hill's Corps and attempting to drive the



Federals from their position along Seminary Ridge and Oak Hill. Moreover, in obedience to Lee's orders, Ewell also instructed his division commanders not to continue the engagement once the Yankees were driven into the town (Martin, 1991). So while Ewell was not really aware of what Lee's main purpose or mission was, he attempted to clarify as much as possible to his division commanders. In addition, he certainly directed operations. Upon receiving the call for help from Hill, he personally led Rodes's Division to the field and placed the artillery (Martin, 1991). When Early's Division arrived, Ewell unhesitatingly committed all of the troops at his disposal.

The USAFM indicates that officers are directed by their experience, knowledge, education, intelligence, and intuition (USAFM, 2011). Upon his promotion to corps command, Ewell was the senior major general in the Army of Northern Virginia. His knowledge of battle had been shaped by Winfield Scott, Zachary Taylor, and "Stonewall" Jackson. He had been educated at West point and graduated in the top third of the class of 1840. Ewell had a mountain of practical education from the Mexican War to frontier service, to hard service in the Civil War.

US Army commanders lead and inspire success through physical and personal presence (USAFM). Ewell's record is full of instances in which he appeared on the field, leading a unit and inspiring his men to heights they never thought possible. The quotations listed above contain several occasions where Ewell's physical presence and bravery while leading men in battle or assisting wounded after a battle inspired his men and in many cases, produced success.

It appears obvious from the evidence provided that General Ewell possessed what Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM considered essential qualities or characteristics of good leadership. While possessing these leadership qualities certainly does not translate to victory on the battlefield, Ewell demonstrated all of the combined qualities and most if not all of the individual

characteristics described by Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM. The combined military leadership principle of leadership was followed on July 1, 1863.

### Clarity of Orders

Analytical Category	Relevant Theorists			Subject of Interest
<u>Clarity of Orders</u>	SUN TZU	ANTOINE JOMINI	USAFM	EWELL
	<p>“If instructions are not clear and commands not explicit, it is the commander’s fault” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 B.C., p. 58).</p> <p>“If regulations are not clear and orders not thoroughly explained, it is the commander’s fault” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 BC, p. 58).</p>	<p>“The next most important qualification of a general, after that of knowing how to form good plans, is unquestionably, that of facilitating the execution of his orders by their clearness of style” (Jomini, 1862, p. 201).</p> <p>Jomini noted in his chapter on Offensives and Orders of Battle that a more simple maneuver offers a better chance for success. He touched on some of the reasons for failed maneuvers. “Inaccurate transmission of orders, the manner in which they will be understood and executed by</p>	<p><b><i>“Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.</i></b></p> <p>A-16. Plans and orders should be simple and direct. Simple plans and clear, concise orders reduce misunderstanding and confusion. The situation determines the degree of simplicity required. Simple plans executed on time are better than detailed plans executed late.</p> <p>Commanders at all levels weigh potential benefits of a complex concept of operations against the risk that subordinates will fail to understand or follow it.</p>	<p>“General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward” (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII,1, p. 318).</p> <p>“I may decide to draw off by my right flank to get between the enemy and Washington, to force them to attack us in position. Do not become so much involved as to be unable to readily extricate (your) troops” (Martin, 1991, p. 222).</p>

		<p>subordinates of the general-in-chief, excess of activity in some, lack of it in others, a defective <i>coup-d'oeil militaire</i>,-“ (Jomini, 1862, p.149)</p>	<p>Orders use clearly defined terms and graphics. Doing this conveys specific instructions to subordinates with reduced chances for misinterpretation and confusion. A-17. Multinational operations put a premium on simplicity. Differences in language, doctrine, and culture complicate them. Simple plans and orders minimize the confusion inherent in this complex environment. The same applies to operations involving interagency and nongovernmental organizations” (USAFM, 2008, p. A-3).</p>	<p>“General Lee directed me to say to General Ewell that he ‘regretted that his people were not up to support him on the right, but he wished him to take Cemetery Hill if it were possible; and that he would ride over and see him very soon’” (Smith, 2011, p. 13).</p>
--	--	--	--	--

Figure 18. Clarity of Orders.

Clarity of orders is another universal military principle among the three theorists. The concept that orders from superiors should be clear, concise, and easily understood is so obvious that it seems unbelievable that one would need to include it in a group of military leadership principles. However, every theorist in this study prominently mentions this principle. Sun Tzu

described an incident in which he was asked by the King of Wu to prove his ability to control and move troops in accordance with his military principles. Sun Tzu demonstrated the principle of what this study describes as clarity of orders by enlisting the Kings concubines in an exercise. He placed two of the Kings favorite concubines in command of two companies of other concubines and asked them to execute a series of maneuvers (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c.). Sun Tzu firmly believed that a commander must clearly explain his intentions and his orders to subordinates. When the concubines were unable to interpret and carry out Sun Tzu's orders, he explained the orders in detail again. When the concubines failed a second time, Sun Tzu explained the orders again. After the third failure, Sun Tzu executed the concubines and stated that a commander must make certain that orders are clear and the commander's intentions understood. However, once those orders and intentions are clearly and thoroughly explained, it is the subordinate's responsibility to carry them out. The quotations by Sun Tzu in the analytical category labeled, clarity of orders, is a reference to the story detailed above. It is obvious that Sun Tzu placed a great emphasis on delivering clear and concise orders, but also on the importance of a commander clearly communicating their intentions to subordinates.

Jomini referenced the need for clear and unambiguous orders from commanders to subordinates as well. Jomini was a huge advocate of proper staff work. In fact, he seemed to place the onus of clear orders more on staff officers rather than commanders. Perhaps his experience as a staff officer influenced his beliefs concerning clarity of orders. Nevertheless, Jomini understood the importance of distributing clear orders and the commander's responsibility to make sure that staff officers and subordinates received orders that were clear and concise. The quotation above reveals that Jomini considered this to be the second most important qualification of a commander. The second quotation reveals some of the reasons for


failed maneuvers and the importance of keeping those maneuvers simple and easily understood. Jomini lists misunderstood, inaccurate transmission of, and improperly executed orders as the main reasons for failed maneuvers. While Jomini advocated effective staff work, he realized that a battle could be decided unfavorably by unexplained or unclear orders and that one of the most important qualifications of a good commander was to ensure that his intentions and orders were clear and that he assist in expediting those orders to a successful conclusion.

One of the Nine Principles of war in the USAFM is simplicity. Simplicity is synonymous with what this study identifies as clarity of orders. The USAFM is the most detailed of the theories concerning clarity of orders. Perhaps, this is the result of 2,500 years of experience and modern leadership theory (non-military) that places an emphasis on leaders making their intentions and orders clear and concise. The quotation from the Nine Principles found in the USAFM (simplicity) is adamant about the need for simple, clear, and concise orders that are easily understood to reduce misunderstanding and confusion. The USAFM emphasizes the need to use clearly defined and commonly understood terms to diminish the chance for confusion. In fact, the USAFM asserts that it is more advantageous for a commander to develop simple plans and orders that are quickly and properly interpreted and executed on time than to advance complicated and detailed movements that are executed late or not at all. It is easy to see the value that the three theorists placed on advancing clear, concise, and simple orders. All understood that an entire battle or war could hinge on a commander's ability to clearly communicate his intentions to subordinates.

The quotations listed in Ewell's column for clarity of orders represent the orders delivered to the corps commander from Robert E. Lee on July 1, 1863. It is evident that these orders were ambiguous and contradictory. The first order directed the inexperienced corps commander to

take Cemetery Hill “if practicable” without forcing a major engagement. Lee was on the field when he gave this order. He probably did not know the strength of the Federal army on Cemetery Hill. However, he had to know that there were thousands of troops and significant Yankee artillery on that formidable position. It would have been impossible for Ewell to have ordered an assault on Cemetery Hill without forcing a major engagement. Many have argued that this order was discretionary. However, the caveat attached to this order (don’t bring on a general engagement) is not discretionary and renders the first part of the order contingent upon the second. As a result, Ewell could not have assaulted Cemetery Hill if it meant bringing on a major engagement. Troop strength and dispositions will be discussed in chapter V of this study.

The second order was delivered to Ewell on the night of July 1. Following consultations with Lee and others it became obvious that Cemetery Hill would not be assaulted. Culp’s Hill, southeast of Cemetery Hill commanded the latter position. It seemed possible that the seizure of Culp’s Hill by Ewell’s Second Corps might render the Cemetery Hill position untenable for



*Figure 19.* Robert E. Lee retrieved from [onpoint.wbur.org](http://onpoint.wbur.org).

Union forces. As Ewell’s forces reconnoitered Culp’s Hill, a Confederate scouting party declared that it was devoid of Yankee troops. Ewell ordered “Allegheny” Johnson’s Division

which was moving forward, to seize Culp's Hill. Just then, Colonel Marshall, from Lee's staff appeared and delivered the order referenced above which indicated that Lee might move Ewell's Corps to the right. Ewell was in a quandary. If Johnson had carried out the assault as ordered and discovered Federal troops on Culp's Hill, he may not be able to disengage if Lee ordered the Second Corps to the right. Moreover, Ewell did not know the nature of Lee's suggested move to the right. Depending on what Lee's intention was, Johnson's Division may have been out of reach for Lee's plan even if he had taken Culp's Hill without a fight. Ewell rushed to Lee's headquarters to get permission for Johnson to attack. By the time he returned with Lee's approval, Johnson had discovered Federal troops on Culp's Hill. This order highlights the vagueness and ambiguity in Lee's orders. The commanding general's order stated that he may decide to move Ewell's corps to the right. Implicit in this order is that he may not. Also, Lee did not communicate his intentions for Ewell's Corps if he did move it to the right, what area it would move to, for what purpose, what dispositions would need to be made? This order highlights many of the problems with Lee's orders to Ewell on July 1, 1863.

The third order was a response from Lee to Ewell when the corps commander asked Lee for assistance from Hill's Corps. The response indicated that Ewell could expect no help on his right and that General Lee would consult with Ewell soon. This order reiterates the desire to take Cemetery Hill and makes no mention of not bringing on a general engagement. However, it was delivered shortly after Major Taylor brought the famous "if practicable" order. It seems reasonable that the flurry of confusing orders from the commanding general and the promise that Lee would appear at Ewell's headquarters soon may have influenced the lieutenant general to wait for a consult with Lee. Either way, it is obvious that none of Lee's orders were clear or communicated the commanding general's intentions for the Second Corps. The combined

military leadership principle of clarity of orders was not exercised on the evening of July 1, 1863, due in large part to Lee’s failure to adequately communicate his mission and purpose to General Ewell. On the other hand, it does appear that General Ewell did effectively communicate his wishes to subordinate commanders on that fateful afternoon. Evidence indicates that Ewell communicated early and often with his division commanders, especially Early and Rodes. While the corps commander was not aware of Lee’s intentions, he attempted to keep his subordinates informed as best he could.

**Concentration**

<u>Concentration</u>	SUN TZU	ANTOINE JOMINI	USAFM	EWELL
	<p>“If I am able to determine the enemy’s dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if I can concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his. There I will be numerically superior” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 B.C., p. 98).</p> <p>“It is sufficient to estimate the enemy situation correctly and to concentrate your</p>	<p>“The guiding principle in tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of the force in hand against a part of the opposing army. And upon that point the possession of which promises the most important results” (Jomini, 1862, p. 133).</p> <p>“In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points</p>	<p>“Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. Commanders mass the effects of combat power in time and space to achieve both destructive and constructive results. Massing in time applies the elements of combat power against multiple decisive points simultaneously. Massing in space concentrates the effects of combat power against a single decisive point. Both can overwhelm opponents or</p>	<p>Ewell dispatched James Power Smith to ask Lee for reinforcements to concentrate against Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. “Smith [James Power] brought the distressing news that Lee had no troops available to support the attack” (Pfanz, 1998, p.310).</p> <p>Smith described it this way, “They [Ewell, Early, Rodes] desired General Lee to be informed that they could go forward and take Cemetery Hill if</p>



	<p>strength to capture him. There is no more to it than this” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 B.C., p. 122).</p>	<p>where it may be important to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions of the hostile army” (Jomini, 1862, p, 130).</p>	<p>dominate a situation” (USAFM, 2008, p. A-2).</p> <p>“In combat, commanders mass the effects of combat power against a combination of elements critical to the enemy force to shatter its coherence” (USAFM, 2008, p. A-2).</p> <p>“Commanders determine priorities among the elements of full spectrum operations and allocate the majority of their available forces to the most important tasks. They focus combat power to produce significant results quickly in specific areas, sequentially if necessary, rather than dispersing capabilities across wide areas and accomplishing less”. (USAFM, 2008, p. A-2).</p>	<p>they were supported on their right; that to the south of the Cemetery there was in sight a position commanding it which should be taken at once; and I was sent by General Ewell to deliver the message to the commanding general.” Smith continued, “General Lee directed me to say to General Ewell that he ‘regretted that his people were not up to support him on the right, but he wished him to take the Cemetery Hill if it were possible; and that he would ride over and see him very soon”” (2011, p. 13).</p> <p>General Early’s official report described the potential threat to the Confederate left flank, “I had at the same time sent an order to General Smith [William “Extra</p>
--	--	--	--	--

				<p>Billy”] to advance with his brigade, but he thought proper not to comply with this order, on account of a report that the enemy was advancing on the York road.” Early continued, “General Smith’s son, who was acting as his aide, came to me with a message from the general, stating that a large force of the enemy, consisting of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, was advancing on the York road, and that we were about to be flanked; and though I had no faith in this report, I thought proper to send General Gordon [John Brown] with his brigade to take charge of Smith’s also, and to keep a lookout on the York road, and stop any further alarm” (OR, 1880-, vol.</p>
--	--	--	--	--

				XXVII,1, p. 469).
--	--	--	--	-------------------

*Figure 20. Concentration.*

Concentration of forces is perhaps the most universal military principle of all of the analytical categories identified. It is clear that all of the theorists placed a great emphasis on this principle, which advocates massing ones forces at the point of attack. However, some theorists believed that commanders should mass forces and attack the most strategic point on the enemy’s line (Jomini, USAFM), while others advocated for concentration of forces on the enemy’s weakest point (Sun Tzu). Either way, all agreed that concentrating as much military force at the point of attack provides the best chance for success as evidenced by the quotations in the analytical category above.

The quotations reveal that Sun Tzu and Jomini speak of not only concentrating forces for an attack, but attacking only a portion of the enemy’s army. Both theorists believed that isolating a portion of your opponents force and concentrating your own would yield the greatest benefits. This suggests that attacking an enemy’s entire force without concentrating your own would be unwise. The USAFM advocates concentration against a decisive point or points either simultaneously or singularly. It appears that the USAFM places little emphasis on isolating a portion of the enemy army, rather it seeks to identify the decisive point or points and concentrate on those. It is obvious that the USAFM advocates concentration of forces and resources to achieve significant results and discourages the dispersing of those forces. The quotation above suggests that General Ewell appreciated the value of concentration. As the Federals were fleeing through town on July 1, 1863, Early’s and Rodes’s initial assault had petered out. Ewell consulted with both major generals and determined that Cemetery Hill should be assaulted, but that he needed reinforcements from Hill’s Third Corps or a simultaneous attack by Hill. He

inquired to General Lee of the possibility of procuring additional troops or assistance from the Third Corps. The commanding general responded in the negative to Ewell's request. Moreover, the lieutenant general had learned of a threat of Federal troops on the York Road. The investigation of this threat, which was essential for the security of the Second Corps, further eroded the strength for a potential attack on Cemetery Hill by the Second Corps. This threat of Yankees on the left made it impossible for Ewell to concentrate his forces adequately and accentuated the need for reinforcements or a simultaneous attack by Hill's Corps to assault Cemetery Hill. The absence of assistance from Hill meant that any attack on the Federal position would be undertaken exclusively by Ewell who would be at a numerical disadvantage. Therefore, had General Ewell ordered an assault on Cemetery Hill without the benefit of concentrating Rebel forces, he would have violated this combined military leadership principle. His refusal to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg meant that the lieutenant general followed the combined military leadership principle of concentration on July 1, 1863, but Lee's refusal to commit reinforcements and the absence of an attack dictated that the combined military leadership principle of concentration was not followed on July 1, 1863.

## Terrain

<u>Terrain</u>	SUN TZU	ANTOINE JOMINI	USAFM	EWELL
	<p>“Conformation of the ground is of the greatest assistance in battle. Therefore, to estimate the enemy situation and to calculate distances and the degree of difficulty of the terrain so as to control victory are virtues of a superior general. He who fights with full knowledge of these factors is certain to win; he who does not will surely be defeated” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 128).</p> <p>“Now an army may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowlands, so an army avoids strength and strikes</p>	<p>“The decisive point on a battlefield is certainly that which combines strategic and topographical advantages” (Jomini, 1862, p. 140).</p> <p>Jomini indicated that the second most indispensable trait for a general employing offensive or defensive operations is, “2d, that his <i>coup-d’oeil</i> be certain and his coolness undoubted;...” (Jomini, 1862, p. 138).</p> <p>Speaking of the Duke of Wellington, Jomini expressed the importance of using terrain on the part of the Spanish and Portuguese rifleman, “He [Duke of Wellington] chose positions</p>	<p>“The commander always takes advantage of the terrain when planning how he positions his forces and conducts operations” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 11-11).</p> <p>“A commander can overwhelm an enemy by the early seizing and retaining of key and decisive terrain that provides dominating observation, cover, and concealment, and better fields of fire to facilitate the maneuver of his forces” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 3-35).</p> <p>“The defending commander exploits the defending forces advantages of occupying the terrain where the fight will occur. The</p>	<p>General Early remembered the formidable Yankee position and how they used the terrain to their advantage, “The ascent to the hill in front of Avery [Isaac] was very rugged, and was much obstructed by plank and stone fences on the side of it, while an advance through the town would have had to be made along the streets by flank or in columns so narrow as to have been subjected to a destructive fire from batteries on the rest of the hill, which enfiladed the streets” (2010, p. 270).</p> <p>General Early described the heights of Cemetery Hill, “I could not discover if there was any</p>

	<p>weakness. And as water shapes its flow in accordance with the ground, so an army manages its victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 101).</p> <p>“If I know the enemy can be attacked and that my troops are capable of attacking him, but do not realize that because of the conformation of the ground I should not attack, my chance of victory is but half. And Therefore I say: Know thy enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know the weather; your victory will then be total” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 129).</p>	<p>difficult to approaching and covered all their avenues by swarms of Spanish and Portuguese rifleman, who were skilled in taking advantage of the inequalities of the ground;...” (Jomini, 1862, p.282).</p> <p>“By such exercises may be procured a rapid and strategic <i>coup-d’oeil</i>, -the most valuable characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put in practice the finest theories in the world” (Jomini, 1862, p. 267).</p>	<p>defending force engages the attacker from locations that give the defending force an advantage over the attacking enemy. These locations include defiles, rivers, thick woods, swamps, cliffs, canals, built-up areas, and reverse slopes” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 8-14).</p> <p>“The defending commander plans how to use key terrain to impede the enemy’s movement. He seeks out terrain that allows him to mass the effects of his fires but forces the enemy to commit his force piecemeal into friendly EA’s (Engagement Areas). This exposes portions of the enemy force for destruction without giving up the</p>	<p>infantry supporting this artillery, as the hill was much higher than the ground on which I then was” (2010, p. 267).</p> <p>Porter Alexander, widely considered the best artillerist in the Confederacy said of the Union position, “The enemy’s line, though taken hurriedly upon the natural ridges overlooking the open country, which nearly surrounded it, was unique both in character and strength” Alexander continued, “Their flanks were at once unassailable and unturnable” (1973, p. 387).</p> <p>General Lee offered this description of the terrain to which the Federals</p>
--	---	--	--	---

	<p>“There are some roads not to follow, some troops not to strike; some cities not to assault; and some ground which should not be contested” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 111).</p>		<p>advantages of fighting from protected positions” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 8-14).</p>	<p>retreated on July 1, 1863, in his official report. The General stated, “The enemy occupied a strong position, with his right upon two commanding elevations adjacent to each other, one southeast and the other, known as Cemetery Hill, immediately south of the town, which lay at its base.” Lee continued, “The ridge was difficult of ascent, particularly the two hills above mentioned as forming its northern extremity,…” (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII,1, p. 318).</p> <p>Colonel Marshall remembered the terrain that the Federal army occupied, “An examination of the ground shewed the</p>
--	--	--	--	--

			<p>difficulty of attack in that quarter. The enemy occupied a strong position with his right upon two commanding elevations, adjacent to each other, one southeast, and the other, known as Cemetery Hill immediately south of the town which lay at its base” (1927, p. 231).</p> <p>General Ewell noted the Yankee position in his official report, “Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined, with Johnson’s division, to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill” (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII,1, p. 445).</p> <p>Similarly,</p>
--	--	--	---



			<p>General Rodes said of the Federal position on Cemetery Hill, "...the enemy had begun to establish a line of battle on the heights back of town, and by the time my line was in a condition to renew the attack, he displayed quite a formidable line of infantry and artillery in my front, extending smartly to my right, as far as I could see to my left in front of Early. Rodes concluded, "To have attacked this line with my division alone, diminished as it had been by loss of 2,500 men, would have been absurd" (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII,1, p. 555).</p> <p>Historian Alan Nolan described Cemetery Hill</p>
--	--	--	---

			<p>as follows, “The terrain confronting Ewell may be seen today looking up from the area of the Culp house and the low ground immediately to the west to that house. The heights are precipitous, irregular, and complex, marked by hollows and ravines. An attacking force would have been advancing uphill against defenders with ample places from which to effect an ambush” (1992, p. 26).</p> <p>“Not only Ewell but practically the entire Second Corps, as well as A. P. Hill’s command could plainly see two prominent elevations rising some eighty feet above the town and immediately south of</p>
--	--	--	--

				<p>Gettysburg-Cemetery and Culp's Hills" (Casdorff, 2004, p. 251).</p> <p>"A position more favorable to [General Meade] and more unfavorable to General Lee (should the latter make an assault), could hardly have been selected," wrote Porter Alexander in a dispatch on July 4. "The strength of this position cannot hardly be exaggerated," (Mackowski &amp; White, 2010, p. 4).</p>
--	--	--	--	---

*Figure 21. Terrain.*

Terrain has always been of paramount important in military operations, particularly to armies prior to the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Perhaps due to technology and modern weapons systems, one might conclude that terrain may not be as important as it once was. However, the US Army places an enormous emphasis on terrain in nearly every operational endeavor. In fact, terrain is included as an element in virtually all strategic, operational, and tactical planning. Needless to say, all of the theorists consulted in this study trumpet the importance of the effective use of terrain in both offensive and defensive actions. Moreover, most would agree that terrain can often be the

deciding factor between victory and defeat.

Sun Tzu's first quotation in the analytical category entitled, terrain suggests that terrain is one of the most important elements for any commander. Moreover, this quotation suggests that knowledge of the terrain and the enemy situation are the keys to victory. To be unaware of these points virtually ensures defeat. The second quotation speaks of terrain as it relates to attacks. According to Sun Tzu, attacks should be attempted against enemy weak points which avoid strong terrain features. Therefore, attacks should be launched where the enemy is weak both numerically and topographically which will produce victory. The third quotation from Sun Tzu appears to be cautionary. Essentially, the ancient Chinese general is admonishing future commanders that even if they know the enemy can be attacked and their force is capable of launching an assault, if one is not aware of the terrain, the attack should not be made. Sun Tzu cautioned that generals should know the ground and the weather. Weather is an important factor that will be discussed later in this study. The final quotation is a warning from Sun Tzu that there are times when numbers, terrain and other variables make some assaults problematic and treacherous and that a good general will recognize these instances and realize that the consequences for potential failure are not worth the risk.

Jomini acknowledged the significance of terrain in both offensive and defensive operations. While Jomini did not specifically refer to terrain, he spoke to the decisiveness of topography on more than a few occasions. Jomini referred to terrain as *coup-d'oeil*. As stated earlier, this French term is a reference to a commander's ability to realize the benefits and shortcomings of terrain in an instant (O'Brian, 1991). Frederick the Great defined *coup-d'oeil* as, "the talent which great men have of conceiving in a moment all the advantages of the terrain and the use they can make of it with their army." (O'Brian, 1991, p. 6). From the evidence provided,

Jomini believed that a commander's ability to effectively utilize terrain in both a defensive and offensive context was a fundamental requirement for success on the battlefield. The last quotation underscores a commander's ability to recognize and exploit terrain. Jomini believed that this *coup-d'oeil* was far more important than a general's knowledge of theory as evidenced by the last quotation.

The US Army is so cognizant of the importance of terrain that it is woven throughout the USAFM, the US Army Field Manual 3-90 (USAFM 3-90), and the Army Doctrine Publication 3-90 (ADP-3-90). USAFM 3-90 is the field manual specific to army tactics and ADP-3-90 is an updated publication concerning tactics. These two publications will be discussed later in this chapter. Terrain is a vital part of most Army operations. The two quotations in the analytical category, terrain for the USAFM demonstrate the necessity of exploiting terrain when conducting offensive operations. However, the value of terrain in a tactical sense seems to take on greater importance in defensive operations. The USAFM 3-90 emphasizes the advantages of seizing key terrain to provide superior surveillance, protection, concealment, cover, and fields of fire that facilitate both offensive and defensive operations (2001). The last two quotations explain the advantages of terrain during defensive operations. Many of the advantages are the same for defensive operations as they are for offensive operations, however, the main focus of defensive operations is to obstruct the progress of the enemy army (USAFM 3-90, 2001). It is easy to see the importance of occupying and exploiting key terrain in both defensive and offensive operations. It is a military principle that has been relevant for 2,500 years as demonstrated by Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM.

The theoretical frameworks of this study are unanimous in their belief that terrain is a key principle on the battlefield. Understanding, recognizing, and exploiting terrain features are

central themes of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM. The quotations listed in the analytical



*Figure 22.* East Cemetery Hill retrieved from thomaslegion.net.

category, terrain for General Ewell highlight the importance of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill as the most dominant and vital terrain features on the battlefield on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. Several of these quotations emphasize the rugged, uneven, and difficult features of the ground. Others, like Generals Early, Rodes, and Lee highlighted the strength of the position which was bolstered by Union forces. Ewell and Porter Alexander noted the unique nature of the terrain and the unassailable flanks of the Yankee line. Even Ewell's loudest critic, Casdorph noted the imposing nature of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill and that they were clearly the most important topography on July 1, 1863.

It is important to note that Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill were not only the dominant terrain on the battlefield, but that they represented clear advantages for union forces occupying them in a defensive posture. Conversely, for Confederate troops who would assault them, this terrain signified great danger and an almost certain expectation of significant loss of life. It is essential that terrain always be considered by an attacking army, particularly when it does not possess a numerical advantage and a limited ability to maneuver. Despite all of the second guessing and Monday morning quarterbacking, it appears that General Ewell followed the combined military

leadership principle of terrain, in that, the terrain facing his corps with the troops available did not provide a good chance of success. Therefore, by not attacking, the lieutenant general followed this military leadership principle on July 1, 1863

### Maneuver

<u>Maneuver</u>	SUN TZU	ANTOINE JOMINI	USAFM	EWELL
	<p>“When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 BC, p. 67).</p> <p>“Now war is based on deception. Move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of force” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 BC, p. 106).</p> <p>“Thus, those skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him with something he is certain to take, and with lures of ostensible profit they await</p>	<p>“It sometimes happens, however, that the direct application of the main force is of doubtful utility, and better results may follow from maneuvers to outflank and turn that wing which is nearest the enemy’s line of retreat. He may when thus threatened retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if attacked by main force” (Jomini, 1862, p. 153).</p> <p>“To fight a truly scientific battle—An enemy may be dislodged by maneuvers for outflanking and turning his position” (Jomini, 1862, p. 152).</p>	<p><b>“Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power.</b></p> <p>A-11. Maneuver concentrates and disperses combat power to keep the enemy at a disadvantage. It achieves results that would otherwise be more costly. Effective maneuver keeps enemy forces off balance by making them confront new problems and new dangers faster than they can counter them. Army forces gain and preserve freedom of action, reduce vulnerability, and exploit success through maneuver. Maneuver is</p>	<p>“But a staff officer sent to him [Ewell] brought word that Hill had not advanced &amp; that Gen’l Lee who was with him [Hill], left it to Gen’l Ewell’s discretion whether to advance alone or not. It was now within an hour &amp; a half of dark—the enemy’s force on the hill already showed a larger front than the combined lines of our two Divisions—they were a mile &amp; a quarter away, &amp; the town had to be turned by our troops if any advance was made—one Divn going on each side of it &amp; in open view of an enemy superior in numbers &amp; advantageously</p>

	<p>him in strength” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 93).</p> <p>“Appear at places to which he [enemy] must hasten; move swiftly where he does not expect you” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 96).</p> <p>“When I wish to avoid battle I may defend myself simply by drawing a line on the ground; the enemy will be unable to attack me because I divert him from going where he wishes” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 97).</p>		<p>more than just fire and movement. It includes the dynamic, flexible application of all the elements of combat power. It requires flexibility in thought, plans, and operations. In operations dominated by stability or civil support, commanders use maneuver to interpose Army forces between the population and threats to security and to concentrate capabilities through movement” (USAFM, 2008, A-2).</p>	<p>posted. Hill had halted a mile further away &amp; showed no signs of moving-” (Brown, 2001, p. 212).</p> <p>“The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town, I received a message from the commanding general to attack this hill, if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it, and all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson's division (the only one of my corps that had not been engaged) was close to the town. Cemetery Hill was not assailable from</p>
--	---	--	---	---



			<p>the town, and I determined, with Johnson's division, to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up, the enemy was reported moving to outflank our extreme left, and I could see what seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction" (OR, 1880-1901, Vol. XXVII,1, p. 445).</p> <p>General Early's official report noted, "I had at the same time sent an order to General Smith [William "Extra Billy"] to advance with his brigade, but he thought proper not to comply with this order, on account of a report that the enemy was advancing on the York road." Early continued, "General Smith's son, who was acting</p>
--	--	--	---

				<p>as his aide, came to me with a message from the general, stating that a large force of the enemy, consisting of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, was advancing on the York road, and that we were about to be flanked; and though I had no faith in this report, I thought proper to send General Gordon [John Brown] with his brigade to take charge of Smith's also, and to keep a lookout on the York road, and stop any further alarm" (OR, 1880-, vol. XXVII,1,p. 469).</p> <p>Campbell Brown remembered the threat to the Confederate left this way, "Having concluded to attack, [Cemetery Hill] if [General] Hill concurred, Gen'l Ewell ordered Early &amp; Rodes</p>
--	--	--	--	--

				<p>to get ready.  Just then up  came “Freddy”  Smith, son of  ‘Extra Billy,’ to  say that a heavy  force was  reported moving  up in their rear.  Early said to  Gen’l Ewell:  ‘Genl, I don’t  much believe in  this, but prefer to  suspend my  movements until  I can send &amp;  inquire into it.’  ‘Well,’ said Genl  Ewell, ‘Do so.  Meantime I shall  get Rodes into  position &amp;  communicate  with Hill”  (Brown, 2001, p.  211).</p>
--	--	--	--	--

Figure 23. Maneuver.

The principle of maneuver is common among the three theories consulted in this study. All agree on the necessity of maneuvering ones force to gain an advantage over the enemy. Each emphasized the importance of maneuver on a battlefield. However, they have a slightly different concept of what maneuver entailed. Sun Tzu and the USAFM seem to consider maneuver to be both offensive and defensive. Certainly, the USAFM considers maneuver to be both offensive and defensive. Sun Tzu would agree with the USAFM, but to a lesser extent. Jomini suggested that maneuver can be defensive however, it is clear that he believed that maneuver was primarily

an offensive operation. Offensive and defensive operations will be examined in the next two analytical categories.

It is clear from the information listed in the maneuver section of this chart that Sun Tzu did not favor a maneuver against a strong enemy position. On the contrary, this quotation suggests that a commander utilize maneuver to avoid enemy positions that are formidable. He realized the folly of attacking a position of strength as opposed to avoiding such a position.

The second quotation appears to suggest that formidable enemy positions might be neutralized by maneuvering ones force to create confusion and potential threats which the enemy would be compelled to address. Sun Tzu believed that enemy forces could be enticed into desired positions through sound maneuver. Presumably, these maneuvers could be offensive or defensive in nature. Based on this evidence, it would appear that Sun Tzu would have certainly discouraged an attack on Cemetery Hill. He may have favored a redeployment of forces in another location or a maneuver on General Hill's end of the line. Lee's refusal of reinforcements or any assistance from Hill meant that Ewell was left with a small force that made any maneuver on the part of the Second Corps commander extremely problematic and difficult for reasons that will be addressed in the next two (offensive operations and defensive operations) analytical categories of this study.

Jomini recognized that there are multiple ways to dislodge an enemy from a particular location. He realized that assaulting strong enemy positions could be dangerous, costly, and futile. The first quotation highlights Jomini's belief that the military leadership principle of maneuver is preferable in such cases. Rather than futilely throwing ones force against a well-positioned and powerful enemy, Jomini advocated maneuver which afforded a less costly approach and the possibility that an enemy might withdraw to protect a decisive point (enemy's

line of retreat). It is obvious that the Napoleonic General understood, as did Sun Tzu, the need for maneuver, especially when confronted with an enemy in a strong position.

The USAFM is far more specific than the two theorists mentioned concerning maneuvers. While the US Army agrees with Sun Tzu and Jomini on the general principle of maneuver, it is clear that the former insists that its forces employ maneuver in both a defensive and an offensive context. The Maneuvers section of the Nine Principles of War (USAFM) places the emphasis on creating a disadvantageous situation for the enemy through the skillful deployment of troops and assets to avoid circumstances that might otherwise be costly. The implication is that this can be accomplished by moving units, without attacking, to various positions that force the enemy to react or account for increased threats. Presumably, this could also be accomplished through a feint or a demonstration against an enemy position that would support a larger attack on another part of the field. The USAFM stresses the need for flexibility and the maximum utilization of the army's assets. The theorists utilized in this study place great emphasis on maneuver to dislodge enemy forces. Moreover, they agree that these movements should, as much as possible, place the enemy at a disadvantage through redeployment or attack. Sun Tzu and the USAFM stress the importance of maneuver in both an offensive and a defensive context. While Jomini does not deny the existence of maneuvers which are defensive in nature, he, more than Sun Tzu or the USAFM, sees maneuver as an offensive operation. It is clear that the three theoretical frameworks acknowledge the necessity and value of placing an enemy in a disadvantageous position through the use of maneuver.

The two quotations listed for General Ewell in the maneuver section of this chart underscore the difficulty that faced the lieutenant general in light of the principle of maneuver. The Second Corps commander faced the realization that he confronted a powerful enemy that was well

entrenched, a threat to his left flank, and no hope of any assistance from other Confederate units. General Lee's denial of assistance from Hill's Corps severely limited Ewell's ability to effectively maneuver on the evening of July 1, 1863, which will be abundantly clear after an examination of offensive and defensive operations in the next section of this chapter. As noted above, Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM have detailed the need for maneuver, especially in the face of a powerful enemy occupying formidable terrain. Following the consultation with Early and Rodes, it is not clear if Ewell was asking the commanding general for regiments or brigades from Hill's Corps to be transferred to him for a possible assault on Cemetery Hill or if the Second Corps commander desired for Hill to attack on his end of the line. Unfortunately for Ewell, Lee's rejection of any support ended the matter and the need to investigate a threat to his left flank reduced his effective force to two brigades. The small number of troops that Ewell possessed (two Brigades) meant that any type of maneuver would have been problematic and dangerous. The principle of maneuver seeks to place an enemy at a disadvantage through movement. It is clear that General Lee's decision to deprive Ewell of reinforcements and the threat to his left flank severely limited Ewell's opportunity to maneuver in front of or around Cemetery Hill for reasons that we will be explained in the next section of this chapter. Ewell sought to maneuver. That fact is clear by his request for assistance from Hill. Lee's refusal of that request meant that Ewell's ability to maneuver was very limited. In the end, the combined military leadership principle of maneuver was not observed on July 1, 1863. Ewell sought to maneuver, but was deterred by Lee's orders that denied the lieutenant general the necessary resources to carry out this combined military leadership principle.

## Offensive Operations

<u>Offensive Operations</u>	SUN TZU	ANTOINE JOMINI	USAFM	EWELL
	<p>“Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory lies in the attack” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 85)</p> <p>“One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 85)</p> <p>“When ten to the enemy’s one, surround him; when five times his strength, attack him; If double his strength, divide him. If equally match, you may engage him. If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing; And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., pp. 79-80).</p>	<p>“As it is essential in offensive battle to drive the enemy from his position and to cut him up as much as possible, the best means of accomplishing this is to use as much material force as can be accumulated against him” (Jomini, 1862, p. 153).</p> <p>Jomini stated that any attack would benefit from additional support. The Swiss born General explained, “It is scarcely necessary to say, to make a decisive blow more certain and effectual, a simultaneous attack upon the enemy’s flank would be very advantageous” (1862, p. 155).</p> <p>“He [commander]</p>	<p>“Offensive is the decisive form of war. While strategic, operational, or tactical considerations may require defending for a period of time, defeat of the enemy eventually requires a shift to the offensive” (ADP 390, 2012, p. 7).</p> <p>“Against a larger and more prepared enemy, the commander needs more time and a larger force to succeed. If the commander determines the enemy cannot be defeated with the forces immediately at hand, the commander must determine what additional measures to take to be successful” (ADP 390, 2012, p. 4).</p> <p>“In offense, the</p>	<p>Colonel Marshall remembered, “An examination of the ground shewed the difficulty of attack in that quarter. The enemy occupied a strong position with his right upon two commanding elevations, adjacent to each other, one southeast, and the other known as Cemetery Hill, immediately south of the town, which lay at its base. His line extended thence upon the high ground along the Emmitsburg road with a steep ridge in rear, which was also occupied” (1928, p.231).</p> <p>General Lee’s official report stated, “The enemy retired to a range of hills south of</p>

	<p>“When a commander unable to estimate his enemy uses a small force to engage a large one, or weak troops to strike the strong, or when he fails to select shock troops for the van, the result is rout” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 127)</p> <p>“When senior officers are angry and insubordinate, and on encountering the enemy rush into battle with no understanding of the feasibility of engaging and without awaiting orders from the commander, the army is in a state of collapse” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 126).</p> <p>“Fight downhill; do not ascend to attack” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 116).</p>	<p>will then give his attention and efforts to this point, using a third of his force to keep the enemy in check or watch his movements, while throwing the other two-thirds upon the point the possession of which will ensure him victory. Acting thus he will have satisfied all the conditions the science of grand tactics can impose upon him, and will have applied the principles of the art in the most perfect manner” (Jomini, 1862, p. 151).</p> <p>“It is nevertheless true that the determination of this point [most important point of the battlefield] depends very much on the arrangement of the contending forces. Thus, in lines of battle too much</p>	<p>decisive operation is a sudden, shattering action against an enemy weakness that capitalizes on speed, surprise, and shock” (USAFM, 2011, p. 3-7).</p> <p>“Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative is the essence of the offense. Offensive operations seek to throw the enemy forces off balance, overwhelm their capabilities, disrupt their defenses, and ensure their defeat or destruction by synchronization and applying all elements of combat power” (USAFM, 2011, p. 3-8).</p> <p>“All offensive operations that do not achieve complete victory reach a culminating point when the balance of strength shifts</p>	<p>Gettysburg, where he displayed a strong force of infantry and artillery.” General Lee continued, “It was ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of that army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg. Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill</p>
--	--	--	---	--



		<p>extended and divided the center will always be the proper point of attack; in lines well closed and connected the center is the strongest point, since, independently of the reserves posted there, it is easy to support it from the flanks; the decisive point in this case is therefore one of the extremities of the line. When the numerical superiority is considerable, an attack may be made simultaneously upon both extremities, but not when the attacking force is equal or inferior numerically to the enemy's. It appears therefore, that all the combinations of a battle of so employing the force in hand as to obtain the most effective action upon that one of the three</p>	<p>from the attacking force to its opponent. Usually, offensive operations lose momentum when friendly forces encounter heavily defended areas that cannot be bypassed. They also reach a culminating point when the resupply of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies fails to keep up with expenditures, soldiers become physically exhausted, casualties and equipment losses mount, and repairs and replacements do not keep pace. Because of enemy surprise movements, offensive operations stall when reserves are not available to continue the advance, the defender receives reinforcements, or he counterattacks with fresh troops. Several</p>	<p>occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward" (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII,1,p. 317).</p> <p>General Rodes described his division's advance into Gettysburg, "...before the completion of his [enemy] defeat before the town, the enemy had begun to establish a line of battle on the heights back of the town, and by the time my line was in a condition to renew the attack, he displayed quite a formidable line of infantry and artillery immediately in my front, extending smartly to my right, as far as I could see to my</p>
--	--	---	--	---

		<p>points mentioned which offers the greatest number of chances of success-a point very easily determined by applying the analysis just mentioned” (Jomini,1862, p. 140).</p>	<p>of these causes may combine to halt the offense. In some cases, the unit can regain its momentum, but this only happens after difficult fighting or after an operational pause” (FM 3-90, 2001, p. 3-50).</p> <p>“In the offense, the culminating point occurs when the force cannot continue the attack and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause” (USAFM, 2011, p. 7-15).</p> <p>“If the attacker cannot anticipate securing decisive objectives before his forces reach its culminating point, he plans a pause to replenish his combat power and phases his operation accordingly” (FM 3-90, 2001, p. 3-50).</p>	<p>left, in front of Early. To have attacked this line with my division alone, diminished as it had been by a loss of 2,500 men, would have been absurd” (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII,1, p. 555).</p> <p>“In order to attack Cemetery Hill, Ewell would have had to maneuver around Gettysburg, then form his divisions beyond it or make his attack east of town. In either case his troops would be within easy range of the Union artillery on the hill. Confederate gunners on the other hand, had no position from which they could shell Cemetery Hill to advantage” (Pfan, 1998, p. 310).</p> <p>Campbell Brown stated, “But a staff officer sent to him [Ewell]</p>
--	--	---	---	---

				<p>brought word that Hill had not advanced &amp; that Gen'l Lee who was with him [Hill], left it to Gen'l Ewell's discretion whether to advance alone or not. It was now within an hour &amp; a half of dark- the enemy's force on the hill already showed a larger front than the combined lines of our two Divisions-they were a mile &amp; a quarter away, &amp; the town had to be turned by our troops if any advance was made-one Divn going on each side of it &amp; in open view of an enemy superior in numbers &amp; advantageously posted. Hill had halted a mile further away &amp; showed no signs of moving-” (2001, p. 212).</p>
--	--	--	--	---

Figure 24. Offensive Operations.

Offensive operations along with defensive operations are the two forms of maneuver. All of the military theories consulted in this study affirm that offensive operations are the most

effective way of achieving victory. Sun Tzu was particularly blunt when discussing this concept. Moreover, as stated in the second and the third quotations, Sun Tzu believed that most offensive operations require a numerical advantage of troops to expect a reasonable chance of success. Had General Ewell attacked Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, he would have been outnumbered. It is reasonable to conclude from several of Sun Tzu's quotations, but particularly, the third quotation, that he might have advised Ewell to withdraw. It appears certain that Sun Tzu would not have advised an attack, especially given the terrain advantage of the Federals.

The last two quotations from Sun Tzu speak to the folly of rashly pursuing or attacking an enemy, who has occupied a strong position and who shows a formidable front without orders. Sun Tzu considered a commander who was overly aggressive and acted in a precipitate manner to be a real danger to the army. Many of Ewell's critics believed that the corps commander should have converted the pursuit from Rodes's and Early's Divisions into an attack on Cemetery Hill. It is clear from the evidence found in this analytical category that SunTzu favored offensive operations when equal to or superior in numbers to the enemy and that he discouraged rash behavior on the part of commanding officers.

Jomini shared Sun Tzu's views on offensive operations. The quotations for Jomini clearly demonstrate that offensive operations are the preferred avenue for driving an enemy from a position and securing a significant victory. It appears that Jomini placed a greater emphasis on maneuver, in that he advocated for simultaneous attacks on one or more of the enemy flanks in conjunction with other operations. This does not preclude an attack without flank support, but it is obvious that flank attacks greatly enhance the possibility of victory. Not surprisingly, these operations typically require the maximum amount of manpower and resources available.

Jomini discussed in detail the necessity of identifying the most decisive point on a battlefield which he described as the point, the possession of which will ensure victory (Jomini, 1838). The third quotation highlights Jomini's belief that one must employ simultaneous attacks to gain the decisive point on a battlefield. It also magnifies how difficult an attack on Cemetery Hill would have been for Ewell with no reinforcements from Lee and only two of Early's brigades available for an attack. The last quotation from Jomini illuminates how devastating Lee's denial of support was to the Second Corps commander. As Jomini stated, lines that are closed and connected indicate that the center is the strong point that should be avoided (Jomini, 1838). The Federal line on Cemetery Hill was closed and connected. The Yankees enjoyed the Jominian principle of interior lines. The Federal position was short and shaped like a "U" which indicated, according to Jomini, that the center was the strong point. However, the ("U" shape) interior lines of the Union forces meant that the flanks could be easily reinforced if attacked. In these cases, according to Jomini, the flank is the best place to attack simultaneously, but only when one possesses a numerical advantage. This is significant. Ewell was facing an enemy who possessed a numerical advantage and occupied a strong position with good interior lines (Alexander, 1962). This situation, if one followed Jomini's logic, called for a simultaneous flank attack while occupying the enemy in front. Lee's refusal of reinforcements or assistance from Hill meant that a simultaneous attack was out of the question. The terrain made a single flank attack on Ewell's end of the line problematic due to the unassailable nature of the Union right. If a single flank attack or envelopment was to take place, the best location for such an attack would have been the Confederate right flank on Hill's end of the line. The terrain on the Federal left presented a far less daunting challenge to Confederate forces seeking to turn one of the Yankee flanks. Moreover, this approach, in addition to turning the Union flank on Cemetery Ridge, placed the

Emmitsburg Road, the Taneytown Road, and the Baltimore Pike within reach of Confederate forces had they successfully reached the enemy rear. These roads or avenues of approach would have denied the remaining Federal forces the most convenient route of retreat. The end result was that if Ewell were to attack Cemetery Hill, he would have been forced to attack the enemy at its strongest point from a single location with no hope of reinforcements or a simultaneous flank attack. Jomini surely would not have countenanced an attack on Cemetery Hill on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863 by Ewell.

This USAFM is the third theoretical lens of this study. This manual along with the Nine Principles of War contained in it, "...provide general guidance for conducting war and military operations other than war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are fundamental truths governing combat operations and "The principles are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine" (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 2-3). This manual was the operations manual for the US Army. While offensive and defensive operations are discussed in this manual, separate field manuals exist for offensive and defensive operations which are termed, tactics. As a result, this study consulted the US Army Field Manual 3-90 (USAFM 3-90) and the Army Doctrine Publication 3-90 (ADP 3-90). The USAFM 3-90 was published in 2001 while ADP 3-90 was published in 2012. Both of these publications focused on tactics, especially offensive and defensive operations. The USAFM 3-90 was replaced in 2013. However, this study employed USAFM 3-90 because it was developed, updated, and used in concert with USAFM. While the USAFM addresses tactics and offensive and defensive operations, it seemed reasonable to consult these tactical publications given the analytical categories of offensive and defensive operations employed in this study and the belief by some, that General Ewell's actions were purely tactical on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863.

The principle difference between the USAFM and the other two tactical publications is the degree to which they describe offensive and defensive operations. Both the USAFM 3-90 and the ADM 3-90 are quick to point out that they cannot be properly understood without a thorough knowledge of USAFM (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. xiii).

Whether it is the USAFM, the USAFM 3-90, or the ADP 3-90, the US Army places great emphasis on offensive operations to seize and exploit the initiative. As evidenced in the second quotation, the US Army, along with Sun Tzu and Jomini, stress the advantages and necessity of numerical superiority for most offensive operations and highlight the importance of concentrating men, firepower, and the necessity of synchronizing combat power. Perhaps this is a product of the superior technological advantages that the United States possesses. It is clear that the US Army favors the offensive. However, as we will see in the next analytical category in this chapter, the US Army uses defensive operations to maneuver and seek opportunities for a counterattack to regain the initiative and return to the offensive. In any event, the US Army, like Sun Tzu and Jomini, relies on offensive operations to achieve total victory.

Offensive operations as defined by all of the US Army training manuals are very helpful in evaluating General Ewell's performance on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863. General Ewell's offensive operation on the morning of July 1, 1863, comported very well with all of the US Army field manuals. During the early hours of fighting, Ewell led his corps to the battlefield in response to a call for help from General Hill (Martin, 1991). His lead division (Rodes's) which he personally took charge of appeared at exactly the right place and the right time on the battlefield. Ewell, operating in a more tactical role, seized the initiative, aggressively ordered Rodes's Division into the fight, and placed his artillery (Brown, 2001). He then committed Early's Division which proved to be the decisive attack which sent the Federals fleeing to

Gettysburg. Ewell had committed both of his divisions, rather than sending his attacks in, piecemeal, a move that the US Army would have favored (USAFM 3-90, 2001). Army tactical doctrine advocates initiating the attack, which Ewell did, then exploiting the attack which involves placing subordinate commanders in a position to follow-up possible opportunities, and finally, executing a pursuit (USAFM 3-90, 2001). Ewell ordered Rodes's Division to attack. The Second Corps commander directed Early to Rodes's right flank. With the exception of William "Extra Billy" Smith's Brigade, Early committed his entire Division. Early's attack flanked the Federal position and sent the Yankees fleeing to Gettysburg. Contrary to orders in hand, Ewell had allowed the attack to move forward and the pursuit to take place. However, the corps commander had determined that he would stop the pursuit once the attack played itself out in obedience to General Lee's orders (Pfan, 1998).

The USAFM 3-90 defines the objective of pursuit as the destruction or encirclement of the enemy (2001). Ewell's Corps pursued the Federals into Gettysburg. While the Second Corps did not completely destroy or encircle Federal forces, they did apprehend 4,500-5000 prisoners (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1). Due to Federal artillery and sharpshooter fire on Cemetery Hill, reports of Confederates breaking ranks in the town, fatigue, the prisoners mentioned above, and orders to halt, Ewell's attack reached what the US Army calls, the culminating point. As stated in the quotation above, "...the culminating point occurs when the force cannot continue the attack and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause" (USAFM, 2011, p. 7-15). Ewell chose the latter option and effectively instituted an operational pause. Ewell still intended to continue the attack either with the help of Hill's Corps or the Division of Edward Johnson, when it arrived. When Ewell was informed that Lee would not provide assistance from Hill and that Johnson's Division was not at hand, Ewell sought information on the possibility of



taking Culp's Hill. Either way, it is clear that Ewell did not choose a defensive posture for his Second Corps until the early morning hours of July 2. He instituted an operational pause until he could initiate an attack and regain the initiative, a move that the US Army would surely have approved (USAFM 3-90).

It is obvious that Ewell executed his offensive operation early on July 1 according to the theories mentioned in this analytical category and that most of the success on this day was on his end of the line. Moreover, it appears as though the only thing that restrained his aggressiveness was the lack of reinforcements and Lee's confusing order not to bring on a general engagement.

As shown above, Ewell had executed the offensive on the morning and afternoon of July 1, very skillfully and very much in-line with the US Army's modern doctrine. Once his attack reached the culminating point, he ordered an operational pause, Ewell's situation changed dramatically. Earlier in the day, he had acted as a tactical commander ordering his troops into battle. Once Lee denied the Second Corps commander reinforcements and placed the onus of an attack squarely on Ewell's shoulders, the corps commander assumed a more operational, even a strategic role. The US Army maintains that the levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) are not finite and that the boundaries between them are often blurred and may only be defined by historical study (USAFM 3-90, 2001).

As evidenced by the quotations in this analytical category (offensive operations) under Ewell, following the operational pause, any assault on Cemetery Hill would represent a new attack that would have to be planned and executed, exclusively by the corps commander. Moreover, these quotations demonstrate the difficulty of assaulting the strong position that the Federals occupied on Cemetery Hill and the lack of troops available for any attack. They further demonstrate that Ewell, far from being timid, was attempting to scrape together enough forces to continue the

attack and maintain or regain the initiative. The lack of two of his brigades, the inability of Rodes's Division to assist in any assault, and the denial of reinforcements from General Lee severely limited and even prohibited offensive operations that were most promising for driving the Yankees off of Cemetery Hill.

The US Army field manuals referenced in this study provided detailed options for conducting offensive operations in cases like Ewell's. While the three theorists in this study exhibit many similarities concerning offensive operations, the US Army field manuals are, by far, the most detailed and many of the foundational principles in the Army's offensive operations can be traced to the other theorists (USAFM, 2011). Therefore, the focus of the remainder of this analytical category will be on the US Army field manuals identified in this study. To underscore the difficulty of a potential attack on Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1, 1863, this study will identify some of the options that the US Army field manuals suggest in offensive operations and reflect on Ewell's actions and how they comport with Army doctrine.

The US Army identifies several options available to commanders when carrying out offensive operations. They are termed offensive maneuvers. The five basic offensive maneuvers according to the US Army are Envelopment, Turning Movement, Frontal Attack, Penetration, and Infiltration (USAFM 3-90, 2001). Army commanders do not usually determine a specific offensive maneuver for subordinates. "However, his guidance and intent, along with the mission that includes implied tasks, may impose constraints such as time, security, and direction of attack that narrow the forms of offensive maneuver to one alternative" (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 3-11). An envelopment seeks to avoid the enemy's strength (his front) by attacking one or both flanks at the same time by seizing objectives in the enemy's rear and destroying the enemy in his current position (USAFM 3-90, 2001). Envelopments are far more attractive to commanders than

frontal attacks or penetration maneuvers because the envelopment typically yields fewer casualties and tends to produce a psychological shock on the part of those being attacked (USAFM 3-90, 2001).


There are two kinds of envelopments, a single and a double. In either case, the attacking force executes a frontal attack as a shaping operation to fix the enemy in place. As one might imagine, envelopments, especially double envelopments, "...generally require a preponderance of force and can be difficult to control" (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 3-12). A double envelopment seeks to envelop both flanks of the enemy, simultaneously. A commander executing a single envelopment also conducts a frontal attack with 50% of his force to fix the enemy in position, but envelops only one enemy flank with the remainder of his force. Typically, a commander chooses the hostile army's flank that avoids the enemy's strength and is most assailable for the envelopment. Moreover, the enveloping force represents the decisive attack (USAFM 3-90, 2001).

In addition to the enveloping and shaping forces, the US Army advocates the deployment of troops to conduct security, reconnaissance, and reserve formations. The Army stresses the importance of obtaining detailed knowledge of enemy dispositions to enhance the chances of a successful envelopment (USAFM 3-90, 2001). The US Army revealed the keys to a victorious envelopment. "A successful envelopment depends largely on the degree of surprise the commander achieves against his opponent or the presence of overwhelming combat power" (USAFM 3-90, 2011, p. 3-14).

Much like offensive operations discussed earlier in this analytical category, overwhelming numbers of troops are necessary for success in most types of offensive operations, especially envelopments. One thing that General Ewell did not possess on the afternoon or evening of July

1, 1863, was overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. In fact, the Second Corps commander found himself at a numerical disadvantage (Busey and Martin, 1994). Due to a report of Yankees on the left flank, General Gordon's Brigade was dispatched to assist General Smith on the York Road to investigate this potential threat (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1). Moreover, Ewell's left flank represented the left flank of the entire Confederate Army. Great care had to be exercised to make sure that the Yankees did not access the Confederate rear. This action effectively reduced Early's Division by 50%. The only Brigades available for an attack on Cemetery Hill were Hays's and Avery's. Both were guarding some 5000 prisoners in town (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1).

Rodes's Division suffered nearly 30% casualties and his right flank was in the air. The US Army considers a force that has suffered 20% casualties to be combat-ineffective (Nicastro, 2013). General Pender's Division of Hill's Corps did not advance into Gettysburg. They occupied a position on Seminary Ridge which created a gap between Pender and Rodes (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1). Rodes's Division was guarding prisoners of its own and was not



*Figure 25.* William "Extra Billy" Smith retrieved from [en.wikipedia.org](http://en.wikipedia.org).

available for an attack. As a result, Ewell had but two brigades (Hays and Avery) to mount an attack against Cemetery Hill. That is precisely why the Second Corps commander asked Lee for help from Hill's Third Corps (Smith, 1905/2011). Lee's denial of reinforcements completely limited the options available to Ewell. Certainly, a double envelopment was completely out of the question. The Yankees occupied a strong position, were dug in, strategically placed with copious amounts of artillery, and could bring some 10,000 troops to bear on any attacking Confederate force (Martin, 1991).

A single envelopment was not an option either. Envelopments, as stated earlier require overwhelming numbers of troops. They also seek to avoid enemy strength. Ewell certainly did not possess enough troops to fix the enemy in position on Cemetery Hill and attack the right flank of the Federals which was anchored on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Ewell's position offered the least assailable flank and represented the strong point of the Federal line. Even with assistance from Hill, it is doubtful whether any envelopment could have been successful on July 1, 1863. Without aid from Hill, it is certain that Ewell could not have executed this type of maneuver.

The second offensive maneuver as defined by the US Army is a turning movement. Turning movements differ from envelopments in that they seek to dislodge an enemy by avoiding his defenses and seizing objectives in the enemy's rear to compel him to withdraw from his current position (USAFM 3-90, 2001). Unlike the envelopment, the turning movement seeks to dislodge the enemy without directly engaging him. According to the US Army, the commander typically divides his forces into a turning force a main body and a reserve, but also employs units to conduct security and reconnaissance operations (USAFM 3-90, 2001). A turning movement is usually executed by a division size force that operates outside of supporting range of the main

line of the army (USAFM 3-90).

While a turning movement is an attractive option to avoid enemy defenses and achieve tactical success through offensive maneuver, it requires a significant force that is highly mobile and capable of operating independently. This option was obviously not available to Ewell. With only two brigades available for an attack and a potential threat to his left flank, Ewell's forces were not capable of executing a turning movement without jeopardizing Hill's Corps to a potential Yankee attack from Cemetery Hill. Moreover, the terrain on Ewell's end of the line did not favor such a maneuver. If any sort of turning maneuver were to take place, Hill's end of the line provided the best opportunity. The terrain was far more inviting (flat) and Hill's position was closer to the key Union supply and reinforcement arteries of the Emmitsburg and Taneytown Roads and the Baltimore Pike. However, neither Hill's nor Ewell's corps was mobile on the evening of July 1, 1863. Both commands had been heavily engaged throughout the day and had sustained serious casualties. Had either corps attempted a turning movement, they would have subjected their sister corps to the potential of a Federal attack that could have destroyed the Confederate force in detail. The absence of reliable Confederate cavalry made a turning movement dangerous for either Corps. It is obvious that neither Ewell nor Hill could have executed a turning movement on July 1, 1863.

Infiltration is another form of offensive maneuver used by the US Army. This maneuver seeks to move an attacking force in and amongst enemy units undetected (USAFM 3-90, 2001). As one might imagine, Infiltration maneuvers are incredibly time intensive. The infiltrating unit attempts to gain a positional advantage in the enemy's rear. Infiltration maneuvers must execute their mission undetected which limits their size and strength. As a result, Infiltration maneuvers are typically small and usually incapable of defeating an enemy. To be effective, Infiltration

maneuvers must be used in conjunction with other offensive maneuvers (USAFM 2-90, 2001). Infiltration maneuvers are particularly attractive when the enemy's line contains gaps through which an infiltration force might gain access to the enemy's rear.

It would appear that infiltration maneuvers would not have been a reasonable option for General Ewell's Second Corps on the evening of July 1, 1863. Ewell's forces were dispersed and his attacking strength consisted of two brigades of Early's Division. Infiltration maneuvers would have reduced this force further and taken significant time to bear fruit. Until Johnson's Division arrived, Ewell would be outnumbered and his enemy would strengthen himself. As stated above, infiltration maneuvers require gaps in the enemy's line to be successful. There were few gaps in the Federal line which stretched from Culp's Hill to Cemetery Ridge. Moreover, attacking forces must proceed undetected into the enemy's position. Ewell's position at the base of Cemetery Hill offered little chance of executing any movement undetected (Brown, 2001). Nearly all movements of Ewell's Corps on the evening of July 1 would have been observed, a complaint that Ewell and others made repeatedly (Brown, 2001). The denial of reinforcements or any assistance from Hill meant that few, if any other offensive maneuvers would be attempted. Infiltration maneuvers offered few attractive advantages to Ewell and his Confederates on July 1, 1863.

At first glance, a Penetration maneuver might have offered the best hope for Ewell's forces against Cemetery Hill. A commander utilizes a penetration maneuver when neither enemy flank is assailable (USAFM 3-90, 2001). The aim in penetration operations is to pierce the enemy's line on a narrow front from the skirmish lines through the main line and into his rear (USAFM 3-90, 2001). However, penetration maneuvers require overwhelming numbers of troops in the area of attack and combat superiority to maintain momentum (USAFM 3-90, 2001). According to the

US Army, commanders of penetration maneuvers designate a reserve to deal with contingencies and additional forces to fix enemy reserves in place (USAFM 3-90, 2001).

The position on Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill that Ewell faced was a formidable one. This position represented the Federal right flank. It was anchored on the two hills mentioned with ample artillery that was well placed. Moreover, Ewell was outnumbered. The Federal right flank facing Ewell was far less assailable than the Federal left flank facing A.P. Hill. The Second Corps commander could have brought considerable force to bear at the point of attack had he chosen a penetration movement. However, he would have had to commit much of his corps to the penetration maneuver which would have exposed the remainder of his corps and that of A. P. Hill to possible counterattacks. The real problem for Ewell had he chosen a penetration maneuver was that he could never have penetrated the Federal line and achieved the Yankee rear with the troops available. Any movement that Ewell would have made would have been exposed and in the open and the idea of executing a penetration maneuver and establishing a reserve and other forces to fix the enemy reserve was completely out of the question for Ewell. More importantly, infiltration and penetration maneuvers provide little chance of defeating the enemy and are best employed in conjunction with other maneuvers. As a result, neither represented a favorable option for General Ewell on July 1, 1863.

The final offensive maneuver as defined by the US Army is a frontal attack. "A frontal attack is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to destroy a weaker enemy force or fix a larger enemy force in place over a broad front" (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 3-30). Frontal attacks are commonly employed as shaping operations in conjunction with other offensive maneuvers (USAFM 3-90, 2001). Commanders typically use frontal attacks to "Clear enemy security forces. Overwhelm a shattered enemy during a pursuit. Fix enemy forces in place as part of a



shaping operation, conduct a reconnaissance in force” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 3-31). Frontal attacks might be considered when the enemy presents no assailable flank. The frontal attack differs significantly from the penetration maneuver. While the penetration maneuver is a very focused attack on a narrow front designed to breach the enemy line, the frontal attack is broad and seeks to exert constant pressure along the entire enemy position to achieve a breach or to force the enemy line back (USAFM 3-90, 2001). Not surprisingly, frontal attacks require a considerable advantage in men and firepower. The US Army explained, “Frontal attacks conducted without overwhelming combat power are seldom decisive. Consequently, the commander’s choice to conduct a frontal attack in situations where he does not have overwhelming combat power is rarely justified unless the time gained is vital to the operations success” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 3-31). A drawback of a frontal attack is that casualties tend to be extreme.

Clearly, the frontal attack was not an option for the Second Corps commander. While the Yankee position facing him on Cemetery Hill did not present an assailable flank, it is clear that a frontal attack would have required overwhelming numbers of troops, something that the Second Corps commander did not enjoy. As stated earlier, the threat to Ewell’s left flank obliged him to investigate its authenticity. This action reduced his force by half. Even if Ewell could have employed part of Rodes’s Division in a possible assault on Cemetery Hill, his force would still have been outnumbered. Iverson’s and O’Neil’s Brigades were heavily damaged and incapable of any assault (Busey & Martin, 1994). Daniels’s, Ramseur’s, and O’Neil’s brigades were heavily engaged and had fought the entire afternoon. The Federals employed the remnants of the I and XI Corps and Buford’s Cavalry Division. They occupied a position of strength with ample artillery and excellent fields of fire. The Confederate position was exposed and offered little

protection for an assaulting force.

The quotation cited by the US Army reveals further reasons that Ewell would not consider a frontal attack. The Confederates were not attempting to clear a security force. There was no need for Ewell to fix forces in place for a shaping operation because no other Rebel offensive maneuvers were going to be executed. Similarly, no reconnaissance in force was necessary. While more intelligence would have been welcome, especially on Ewell's flank, nobody needed a reconnaissance in force to determine that the Federal position was formidable. Some might suggest that Ewell should have employed a frontal attack to overwhelm a shattered enemy. While the Federal force that withdrew through Gettysburg was in some cases, shattered, it should be remembered that an entire Yankee infantry Division (Steinwehr's) had occupied Cemetery Hill early in the afternoon of July 1 and had dug-in. Moreover, the reserve artillery of the XI Corps bolstered Steinwehr's position. Even if one concedes that the Yankee forces were shattered, Steinwehr's Division represented a strong anchor for Union forces to rally. Certainly a most unwelcome sight to Rebel forces who had fought hard all day. Even if Ewell had allowed Early's Division to continue the advance, it is not certain that the Rebels would have had a numerical superiority, let alone an overwhelming advantage in men and firepower. It was clear that the Second Corps assault had played itself out and that Ewell's original attack had reached its culminating point.

General Ewell conducted what was in many ways, a text book example of how to fight offensive operations early on July 1, 1863. He quickly got his force to the perfect point on the battlefield where they would be most effective and committed all of the forces at his disposal. Per US Army doctrine, he initiated the attack and exploited it by placing Early in a strategic position to attack the Federal flank. Ewell then executed a pursuit of the enemy into Gettysburg.

When his attack reached the culminating point and in obedience to orders from the commanding general, the Second Corps commander ordered an operational pause to explore ways to maintain or regain the initiative.

General Lee's denial of reinforcements or any assistance from General Hill's Corps placed Ewell in an extremely difficult position. While Lee presumably wanted Ewell to take Cemetery Hill, he provided no direct support and no hope of assistance on Hill's end of the line. This action severely limited Ewell's options to seize the initiative through a new offensive maneuver. A double envelopment by Ewell and Hill would have been most attractive, but lack of troops prohibited that option. A single envelopment was favorable on Hill's end of the line, but not impossible. Infiltration and penetration maneuvers were nearly as prohibitive, in that they diverted precious few Confederate forces to operations that, even if successful, are not typically capable of defeating the enemy. Finally, the frontal attack represented a very unattractive option for Ewell and would have most likely, according to US Army doctrine, resulted in considerable Rebel casualties and accomplished little. An ill-considered attack by Ewell's Second Corps may have jeopardized the entire Confederate left flank, especially given the possible Union threats to this area which Ewell was investigating. Even a fixing action or a feint by Hill's Corps would have provided a better chance for success had Ewell ordered an attack. The lack of the possibility of any movement by Hill meant that the entire Union force on Cemetery Hill could concentrate exclusively on Ewell if he ordered an attack.

It appears that Lee's refusal to provide any type of assistance to Ewell was, among other things, the critical action that limited the lieutenant general's ability to move his corps from an operational pause to an attack which would have regained the initiative. Moreover, Lee's confusing orders further deterred Ewell's efforts to launch an offensive. Based on a review of

the evidence provided, General Ewell observed the military leadership principle of offensive operations by not initiating an attack on Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. Any attack that the Second Corps commander would have committed would have been in contravention of the combined military leadership principle of offensive operations listed in this study. However, the lack of any offensive operations on the part of Ewell and Hill given the fact that fresh troops were available represented a violation of this combined military leadership principle for which General Lee must bear responsibility.

### Defensive Operations

<u><i>Defensive Operations</i></u>	SUN TZU	ANTOINE JOMINI	USAFM	EWELL
	<p>“Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory lies in the attack” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 85).</p> <p>“One defends when his strength is inadequate; he attacks when it is abundant” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 85).</p> <p>“When ten to the enemy’s one, surround him; when five times his strength, attack him; If double his strength, divide him. If equally</p>	<p>“An Army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a positive inferiority” (Jomini, 1862, p. 51).</p> <p>“Points to be observed to fight a truly scientific battle. 7. The object of the defense being to defeat the plans of the attacking party, the arrangements of a defensive order should be such as to multiply the difficulties of approaching the position, and to keep in hand a strong reserve,</p>	<p>“While the offense is the most decisive type of combat operation, the defense is the stronger type” (ADP-390, 2012, p. 10).</p> <p>“Generally, the defending forces have the advantage of preparing the terrain by reinforcing natural obstacles, fortifying positions, and rehearsing operations. First, they prepare the ground to force the piecemeal commitment of enemy forces and their</p>	<p>General Howard remembered the strength of his position, “Under my orders Osborn’s [Colonel Charles] batteries were placed on The Cemetery Ridge and some of them covered by small epaulements. General Steinwehr’s division I put in reserve on the same heights and near the Baltimore pike” (2010, p. 413).</p> <p>Howard continued, “Steinwehr had then at my</p>

	<p>matched, you may engage him. If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing; And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., pp. 79-80).</p> <p>“Generally, he who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at ease; he who comes later to the scene and rushes into the fight is weary” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 96).</p>	<p>well concealed, and ready to fall at the decisive moment upon a point where the enemy least expect to meet it” Jomini, 1862, p. 153).</p> <p>“In fact, a general who occupies a well[-]chosen position, where his movements are free, has the advantage of observing the enemy’s approach; his forces, previously arranged in a suitable manner upon the position, aided by batteries placed so as to produce the greatest effect, may make the enemy pay very dearly for his advance over the space separating the two armies; and when the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself strongly assailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in</p>	<p>subsequent defeat in detail. Second, they prepare the ground to force the enemy to fight where he does not want to fight, such as in open areas dominated by terrain that offers adequate cover and concealment for the occupying friendly forces. The defending force tries to guard or entice the enemy into prepared EA’s (Engagement Area). Units employ and continuously strengthen obstacles and fortifications to improve the natural defensive strength of the position, which has a direct bearing on the distribution of forces, frontages, and depth of the defense” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 8-15).</p> <p>“The commander first able to see the battlefield, understand the</p>	<p>instance put one brigade-Coster’s-in the edge of town, behind barricades and in houses, prepared to cover the anticipated retreat” (2010, p. 417).</p> <p>I Corps Colonel Charles Wainwright described the union retreat to Cemetery Hill, “The streets of the town were full of the troops of the two corps [Federal]. There was very little order amongst them, save that the Eleventh took one side of the street and we the other; brigades and divisions were pretty well mixed up. Still the men were not panic stricken; most of them were talking and joking” (1962, p.236).</p> <p>Wainwright described his arrival and the disposition of his</p>
--	--	---	---	--

		<p>his hands, the advantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the moral effect of such a counterattack upon the part of an adversary supposed to be beaten is certainly enough to stagger the boldest troops” (Jomini, 1862, p. 138).</p> <p>“8. We must endeavor in a defensive position not only to cover the flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on other points of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack upon the center. Such a position will always be one of the most advantageous for defense,” (Jomini, 1862, p. 136).</p> <p>“Moreover, the party advancing upon the enemy has against him all the disadvantages</p>	<p>common operational picture’s implications, and take effective action will defeat his opponents combined arms team, shatter his cohesion, degrade his strength and ability to concentrate, and destroy his exposed forces” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 8-12).</p> <p>“The purpose of defensive operations is to retain terrain and create conditions for a counteroffensive that regains the initiative. The area defense does this by causing the enemy to sustain unacceptable losses short of his decisive objectives” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 9-23).</p> <p>“The commander’s keys to a successful area defense are- Capability to concentrate</p>	<p>guns on Cemetery Hill, “On the ridge General Howard placed Von Steinwehr’s division, and three of his batteries, so soon as he came up. These had not been at the Cemetery itself, so as to command the direct approach from the Seminary Hill on the south side of the town. Four of Stewart’s guns I planted to fire directly down the road. At the angle or corner of the hill I found Wiedrich with his four guns, and left him there, only throwing his guns well in echelon so that he could fire either to the west or north. Around the corner of the hill and facing north was Cooper, a stone wall between him and Wiedrich; on his right Stewart’s other section, and then</p>
--	--	--	---	--

		<p>arising from accidents of the ground that he must pass before reaching the hostile line; and however flat a country might be, there are always inequalities of the surface, such as small ravines, thickets, hedges, farm-houses, villages, &amp;c., which must either be taken possession of or be passed by. To these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy's batteries to be carried and the disorder which always prevails to a greater or less extent in a body of men exposed to a continued fire either of musketry or artillery. Viewing the matter in the light of these facts, all must agree that in tactical operations the advantages resulting from taking the</p>	<p>effects. Depth of defensive area. Security Ability to take advantage of the terrain, such as intervisibility lines. Flexibility of defensive ops. Timely resumption of offensive actions” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 9-7).</p> <p>The key to an area defense is the integration and synchronization of all available assets (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 9-6).</p> <p>The area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying the enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. An area defense capitalizes on the strength inherent in closely</p>	<p>Reynolds five guns, Breck commanding. They were twenty yards farther back than Cooper's, owing to the nature of the ground. On the neck of Culp's Hill I posted Stevens, who thus had a fire along my north front” (Wainwright, 1962, p. 238).</p> <p>General Early commented on Cemetery Hill, “On the hill in rear of Gettysburg, known as Cemetery Hill, was posted some artillery so as to sweep all the ground on the enemy's right flank, including the Heidlersburg or Harrisburg road, and the York pike. I could not discover if there was any infantry supporting this artillery, as the hill was much higher than the ground on which I then was” (2010, p. 267).</p>
--	--	---	--	---

		<p>initiative are balanced by the disadvantages” (Jomini, 1862, p. 137).</p>	<p>integrated defensive organization on the ground” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 9-1).</p> <p>“The defending force is more effective if it can locate and attack enemy forces while the enemy is stationary and concentrated in assembly areas or advancing along LOC’s (Line of Communication), as opposed to when he is deployed in combat formations within the MBA (Main Battle Area). (USAFM 3-90, 2001. P. 8-18).</p> <p>Retrograde operations are designed to, “Reduce the enemy’s strength and combat power. Provide friendly reinforcements. Concentrate forces elsewhere for attack. Prepare stronger defenses elsewhere within</p>	<p>“Avery, after reaching the outskirts of town, moved to the left, and crossed the railroad into open fields, on the left of town, while exposed to a heavy fire from batteries on Cemetery Hill, and took a position confronting the rugged ascent to the hill,..” )Early, 1912, p. 268).</p> <p>General Early described units of the XI Corps retreat, “While Hays and Avery were driving the enemy so handsomely, I saw a large force to the right of Gordon, falling back in comparatively good order, before Rodes’s advancing brigades..” (2010, p. 269).</p> <p>“The ascent to the hill in front of Avery was very rugged, and was much</p>
--	--	--	--	---



			<p>the AO (Area of Operations. Lure or force part or all of the enemy force into areas where it can be counterattacked” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 8-45).</p> <p>“Terrain features that favor defensive operations include— A series of parallel ridges across the line of hostile advance. Unfordable streams, swamps, lakes, and other obstacles on the front and flanks. High ground with good observation and long-range fields of fire. Concealed movement routes immediately behind defensive positions. Limited road network in front of the line of contact to confine the enemy to predictable avenues of approach. Good road</p>	<p>obstructed by plank and stone fences on the side of it, while an advance through the town would have had to be made along the streets by flank or in columns so narrow as to have been subjected to a destructive fire from batteries on the rest of the hill, which enfiladed the streets. I therefore could not make an advance from my front with advantage, and thought it ought to be made on the right” (Early, 2010, p. 270).</p> <p>General Lee described the Union position on Cemetery Hill in a letter to President Jefferson Davis on July 4, 1863. “He [enemy] took up a strong position in rear of the town, which he immediately began to fortify, and where his</p>
--	--	--	---	--

			<p>network behind the line of contact that allows the commander to reposition his forces as the battle progresses” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 8-15).</p>	<p>re-enforcements joined him” (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII,1,p. 298).</p> <p>General Early’s official report noted the Federal withdraw toward Cemetery Hill, “I saw, farther to my right, the enemy’s force on that part of the line falling back and moving in comparatively good order on the right of the town toward the range of hills in the rear, and I sent back for a battery of artillery to be brought up to open on this force and the town, from which a fire was opened on my brigades, but before it got up, my men had entered the town, and the force on the right had retired beyond reach” (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII,1,p. 469).</p> <p>General Gordon</p>
--	--	--	---	---

				<p>described the multi-layered defense of the XI Corps. “The enemy made a most obstinate resistance until the colors on portions of the two lines were separated by a space of less than 50 paces, when his line was broken and driven back, leaving the flank which this line had protected exposed to the fire of my brigade. An effort was here made by the enemy to change his front and check our advance, but the effort failed, and this too, was driven back in the greatest confusion,...” (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII,1,p. 492).</p> <p>General Daniel’s (Rodes’s Division) official report explained his apprehension of continuing the battle. “My command</p>
--	--	--	--	---

				continued to move forward until it reached the outskirts of town, where, agreeably to instructions received through Major [H.A.] Whiting, I halted” (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1,p. 567).
--	--	--	--	--

*Figure 26. Defensive Operations.*

Defensive operations are identified as an analytical category in this study due to the unanimity of their importance among the three theorists that make up the theoretical framework of this dissertation. These operations constitute a fundamental combined military leadership principle to evaluate any general’s performance on a battlefield. Defensive operations were not relevant to the Confederate Second Corps as Ewell’s forces did not assume a defensive posture until the wee hours of July 2, 1863. However, Federal forces facing Ewell on July 1, 1863, did execute defensive operations throughout the day. In fact, their actions were very consistent with defensive operations identified by the three theories in this study.

It is clear from the quotation above that Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM asserted that defensive operations should be temporary and usually executed when outnumbered. As Sun Tzu said, assume a defensive posture when you are weak (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c.). Moreover, all of the theorists agree that decisive victories can be had through offensive operations and that the possibility of a decisive decision is rarely the result of defensive operations. Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM suggest that inferiority in troop numbers, more often than not, forces one into a defensive posture. Sun Tzu is the most adamant of the theorist on this point, as evidenced by the

quotation above. Another point of agreement among the theorists identified in this study is the belief that he who occupies the ground first possesses a marked advantage over an opponent who is unfamiliar with the area of the battlefield and its features. It is interesting to note that all of the quotations listed for Sun Tzu in the analytical category of defensive operations are universal among Jomini and the USAFM.

As stated earlier, Jomini, like Sun Tzu and the USAFM was a proponent of assuming the defensive when outnumbered and utilizing the defensive as a temporary operation. In addition, Jomini acknowledged the advantages that a defending force enjoys when it reaches the field first and is able to identify and prepare strong points as evidenced by the quotations above. Jomini identified the benefits of utilizing various features to compel the enemy to attack the center of a defensive line. Essentially, Jomini stressed that forces assuming a defensive posture should protect the flanks by anchoring them on a river or mountain or hill. Thus, producing a situation in which the defensive party presents no assailable flanks which compels the offensive party to attack the center of the defensive line (Jomini, 1838).

While Jomini was a proponent of seizing the initiative and realized that one typically produced decisive results while on the offensive, he also acknowledged some of the difficulties and disadvantages of the attacking force (Jomini, 1838). The last quotation in the analytical category labeled, defensive operations for Jomini indicates that Jomini appreciated the difficulty that an attacking force has in simply traversing the ground. The little obstacles (small ravines, thickets, streams) that in the normal course of events seem inconsequential, can present real problems for an attacking force (Jomini, 1838). Jomini realized like the USAFM, the necessity of bringing as much available artillery to bear and covering all avenues of approach of the enemy when assuming a defensive posture. Jomini also admitted the various levels of confusion among

an attacking force that results from troops exposed to significant musket and artillery fire (Jomini, 1862). The Swiss born general, as evidenced in the final quotation, understood that in some cases, the combination of difficult and not so difficult terrain, traversed by an attacking force, significant artillery that utilizes fields of fire to cover the avenues of approach, and the confusion and disorder that results from such fire can equalize the advantages of taking the initiative.

The USAFM and its component manuals (ADP 3-90 and USAFM 3-90) are very consistent with Sun Tzu and Jomini concerning defensive operations. It is easy to see from the quotations in the analytical category, defensive operations, under USAFM that the US Army believes that strength lies in the defensive while decisive results can be had through offensive operations. The USAFM, like Sun Tzu and Jomini, share the belief that defensive forces enjoy a significant advantage when they fortify a strong position that is occupied prior to hostilities (USAFM 3-90, 2001). The USAFM 3-90 explains how defensive forces fortify and enhance obstacles to entice attacking enemy units into fortified areas or areas that are unattractive to the enemy (USAFM 3-90, 2001). According to the US Army, defensive operations are designed to possess key terrain and develop opportunities for a counterattack.

While they agree on many defensive operational concepts, the US Army provides a more detailed and comprehensive explanation of defensive operations than Sun Tzu or Jomini, perhaps because the USAFM 3-90 is the most contemporary. The USAFM 3-90 identifies a retrograde movement as one of three types of defensive operations (the other two are area defense and mobile defense). The US Army defines a retrograde movement as follows, “The retrograde movement is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 8-4). This movement might be voluntary or involuntary, but it is transitional in nature and is designed to protect friendly forces and regain the initiative at a

later time (USAFM 3-90, 2001). The list below explains when a commander would execute a retrograde movement.

The commander executes retrogrades to—

Disengage from operations.

Gain time without fighting a decisive engagement.

Resist, exhaust, and damage an enemy in situations that do not favor a defense.

Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation or extend his lines of communication (LOCs).

Preserve the force or avoid combat under undesirable conditions, such as continuing an operation that no longer promises success.

Reposition forces to more favorable locations or conform to movements of other friendly troops.

Position the force for use elsewhere in other missions.

Simplify the logistic sustainment of the force by shortening LOCs.

Position the force where it can safely conduct reconstitution.

Adjust the defensive scheme, such as secure more favorable terrain.

(USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 11-1).

There are three types of retrograde operations, delay, withdrawal, and retirement (USAFM 3-90, 2001). All types of retrograde operations recommend a predetermined rallying point.

Delaying actions typically trade space for time. The primary objective is not to defeat the enemy, but to gain time by slowing the enemy advance and allowing friendly troops to redeploy and establish a formidable defense (USAFM 3-90, 2001).

Another form of retrograde movement is a withdrawal. The US Army explains, “A withdrawal is a form of retrograde, is a planned operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force (FM 3-0). The commander may or may not conduct a withdrawal under enemy pressure and subordinate units may withdraw without the entire force withdrawing” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 11-18). The US Army discourages a withdrawal as a result of enemy operations, but acknowledges that it is not always possible and that a commander may be compelled to take such action to save his command. This action is most common following a

tactical reverse (enemy launching an effective attack) or upon the obvious degradation of friendly forces (USAFM 3-90, 2001).

The final form of a retrograde movement is a retirement. “A retirement is a form of retrograde in which a force out of contact with the enemy moves away from the enemy (JP 1-02). A retiring unit organizes for combat but does not anticipate interference by enemy ground forces.

Typically, another unit’s security force covers the movement of one formation as the unit conducts a retirement” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 11-24). The US Army indicates that the retiring forces might experience fire from enemy units which the commander is attempting to withdrawal and that the retirement begins after the retiring force breaks contact with the enemy (USAFM 3-90, 2001). The retiring force moves to an area that supports further operations.

Another type of defensive operation as defined by the US Army is an area defense. The US Army says, “The area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright (FM 3-0). “An area defense capitalizes on the strength inherent in closely integrated defensive organization on the ground” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 9-1). The list below details when the US Army believes an area defense would be most beneficial.

A commander should conduct an area defense when the following conditions occur:

When directed to defend or retain specified terrain.

When he cannot resource a striking force.

The forces available have less mobility than the enemy.

The terrain affords natural lines of resistance and limits the enemy to a few well-defined avenues of approach, thereby restricting the enemy’s maneuver.

There is enough time to organize the position.

Terrain constraints and lack of friendly air superiority limit the striking force’s options in a mobile defense to a few probable employment options (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 9-1).



Retrograde movements and an area defense constitute two of the three types of defensive operations. The third type of defensive operation is a mobile defense which is not relevant to this study.

There can be little doubt that Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM and the other field manuals consulted agree on most of the principles that make up defensive operations and that the US Army provides the most detailed and comprehensive examples of the complexities of defensive operations. In the following section, this study will examine how these defensive operations were relevant to General Ewell on July 1, 1863.

Federal forces facing General Ewell and General Hill on July 1, 1863, had assumed a defensive posture from the opening of hostilities. General Buford's cavalry division sought to hold the high ground while the remainder of the Army of the Potomac arrived (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 2). The arrival of the US I Corps temporarily stemmed the Confederate tide, but the introduction of fresh Rebel reinforcements forced the Yankees back (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1). Even the introduction of Union reinforcements in the form of Howard's XI Corps, were not enough to produce a Federal advantage in numbers. However, they did protect the right flank of the I Corps and extended the Union right to the Harrisburg Road. Howard noted in his official report that his aim was to hold the high ground while the other corps of the Army of the Potomac arrived. Howard determined that the men of the I and XI Corps had "secured and held the remarkable position which, under the able generalship of the commander of this army, contributed to the grand results of July 2 and 3" (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 2, p. 705). Howard's statement is a clear indication that his efforts on July 1 were defensive in nature.

It is clear that the Federal army exploited the advantages of defensive operations and the strength that these operations afforded. Buford assumed a defensive posture out of necessity due

to the lack of forces that he had at his disposal. While the arrival of the US I Corps limited the Confederate advantage in numbers of troops, Union forces sought to hold the high ground until the remainder of the US Army arrived. Union troops sacrificed the possibility of a decisive action and remained on the defensive in an effort to exploit their strength and maintain the high ground.

United States commanders certainly enjoyed the advantage of occupying the ground first. From the time that General Buford's cavalry occupied McPherson Ridge, to the close of battle on July 1, Federal forces exploited the advantages of occupying, preparing, strengthening, and fortifying the ground on which they fought, a point that is made clear by several quotations under the analytical category, defensive operations under Ewell. General Buford described his advantages as the opening shots were fired, "The two lines soon became hotly engaged, we having the advantage of position, he of numbers" (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 2 p. 297). The fighting that took place in the early afternoon was somewhat of a draw, but Union troops did not seek to initiate offensive operations. By late afternoon, Howard was compelled to stay on the defensive as Early's Division of Ewell's Corps threatened to flank the Union position. Nevertheless, it appears that at no time during July 1, 1863, did Federal forces contemplate a significant offensive operation designed to defeat the Confederate force facing them. Instead they were attempting to remain on the defensive and hold the high ground until a larger United States force arrived.

Perhaps the most important advantage that was procured by Federal forces on July 1, 1863, was the occupation of the ground and Cemetery Hill early in the afternoon as evidenced by several quotations above. General Howard's decision to place General von Steinwehr's division on Cemetery Hill as a potential rallying point is evidence that Federal forces planned to remain

on the defensive until significant reinforcements arrived which more than likely, saved the battle for the United States.

The US I and XI Corps executed what the USAFM 3-90 calls, a retrograde movement. Howard's decision to post von Steinwehr's force on Cemetery Hill was a prerequisite for this type of defensive maneuver. Howard's actions were consistent with the USAFM 3-90 concerning when a commander should execute a retrograde movement and demonstrates the soundness of the Union commander's actions. Obviously, Howard hoped to disengage Confederate forces following the devastating attack by Early's Division and the renewal of the assault by Hill's Third Corps. The Federal's hoped to gain time for the Army of the Potomac to arrive from the opening guns until the close of battle on July 1. In the course of the fight to gain time which the federals did by advancing to Barlow's Knoll on the right and McPherson's Ridge on the left, Union forces never mounted any kind of significant offensive that would have suggested that they sought a decisive defeat of the Confederate Army. Yankee troops of the I and XI Corps occupied themselves the entire day of July 1, attempting to resist, exhaust, and damage Rebel forces. It is debatable whether Federal forces were attempting to draw the Confederates into an unfavorable position. More likely, the Union troops under Howard were fighting to survive and the excellent position selected by Howard on Cemetery Hill placed the Rebels in an unfavorable position. It is absolutely clear that Howard was attempting to preserve his force from destruction and that by the afternoon of July 1, their position north and west of Gettysburg afforded no hope of success. Certainly a retrograde movement repositioned the US I and XI Corps in a better position to defend themselves and Cemetery Hill which offered excellent terrain for defensive operations. A review of Howard's actions confirm that he executed what the US Army currently calls a retrograde movement and that his decision met

nearly all of the criteria set forth by the USAFM 3-90.

Federal forces executed all three retrograde movements (delay, withdrawal, retirement) on July 1, 1863. Howard's troops executed a delaying action throughout the day on July 1. They continually traded space for time to slow the Rebel advance from Mcpherson's Ridge on the left to Barlow's Knoll on the right. The delaying action progressed to a withdrawal by the afternoon of July 1. Federal forces conducted their withdrawal under pressure, but as an organized force that mounted strong resistance, depending on who one believes. As stated in the quotations above by Generals Early, Gordon, and Colonel Wainwright, the withdrawal was conducted in "comparatively good order," the Union troops not "panic stricken". Gordon and Early commented on the stubborn resistance of Federal troops. Moreover, Howard explained that he had ordered Doubleday to resist as long as possible, but to withdraw to Cemetery Hill before he was overrun (2010). The retirement operation is debatable. Certainly Union forces were in such close proximity to Confederate troops that they would have to have assumed that they might be molested during their retirement. However, Howard, under pressure from Doubleday and Schurz, ordered several regiments and Coster's Brigade to the outskirts of town to cover the retreat of the I and XI Corps. This action is completely consistent with a retirement operation that employs other units to cover its retreat. In any case, it is clear from the evidence provided that Howard's actions constituted a very good example of a retrograde movement. Once the Yankee forces completed their delay, withdrawal, and retirement to Cemetery Hill, they executed what the USAFM 3-90 calls an area defense.

The area defense is best suited for a force that is attempting to deny the enemy a key piece of terrain for a period of time, as opposed to defeating the enemy. The focus of this defensive operation is on maintaining key terrain until friendly forces arrive (USAFM 3-90, 2001). The

actions of the I and XI Corps once they reached Cemetery Hill comport very well with the area defense. Howard had been superseded in overall army command by General Winfield Scott Hancock, but the former was instrumental in placing units of the XI Corps which he assumed command of on Cemetery Hill. The US Army details when a commander should execute an area defense which was listed above.

When comparing the list mentioned above to United States military action on the afternoon and evening of July 1, it is obvious that the I and XI Corps were charged with defending the key terrain of Cemetery Hill. This position saved the Union Army on July 1, and provided an anchor for Federal forces as detailed in several of the quotations in this analytical category. As Union forces were nearly flanked by Early's Division and Hill's second effort that committed the balance of his Corps, Union forces were overwhelmed which meant that no striking force, other than the reserve on Cemetery Hill (Steinwehr's Division), was available. Certainly Confederate forces enjoyed an edge in mobility. Although Rebel forces were exhausted, they were far more able to execute mobile operations than their Federal counterparts. Once Confederate troops reached the city of Gettysburg, Cemetery Hill afforded excellent terrain to defend, fortify, and to restrict enemy avenues of approach. General Ewell detailed the difficulty of placing his artillery against Cemetery Hill (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1). General Early in the quotations above explained the effective artillery fire of Union forces on Cemetery Hill and detailed the difficulty of the terrain which had been augmented by Union forces. Colonel Wainwright's quotation provides an excellent example of how Federal forces covered all avenues of approach and forced Rebel forces, should they attack, into areas conducive to Union artillery fire. General Daniel's report above is evidence of the fatigue of Rebel troops and the formidable Yankee position on Cemetery Hill. General Lee confirmed the strength of the Federal position and the Union efforts

to fortify it in the quotation listed in the defensive operations section of this study. Due to the alert actions of General Howard, United States forces had plenty of time to organize the Cemetery Hill position which was occupied in the early afternoon. Steinwehr's Division and the reserve artillery of the XI Corps dug in and were capable of covering the Union line from Cemetery Ridge on the left to Culp's Hill on the right (Pula, 1973). General von Steinwehr described his position on Cemetery Hill, "Our position now was quite strong, the infantry being placed partly behind stone fences, and forming with our batteries a front fully able to resist an attack of even greatly superior forces. The occupation of this hill by our corps had great influence upon the further progress and the final result of the battle" (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 2, p. 722).

Although the analytical category of defensive operations is not as relevant to the actions of General Ewell's Second Corps on July 1, 1863, it is easy to see how well the Federal forces facing Ewell executed most, if not all, of the defensive operations identified by the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the US Army Field manuals. As a result, Ewell's task of regaining the initiative was made all the more difficult by the alert and professional actions of the US Army under General Howard.

## Intelligence

<u><b>Intelligence</b></u>	SUN TZU	ANTOINE JOMINI	USAFM	EWELL
	<p>“Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 84).</p> <p>“Therefore, determine the enemy’s plans and you will know which strategy will be successful and which will not; agitate him and ascertain the pattern of his movement. Determine his dispositions and so ascertain the field of battle. Probe him and learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 100).</p> <p>“Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they</p>	<p>“A general should neglect no means of gaining information of the enemy’s movements, and, for this purpose, should make use of reconnoissances [sic], spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capable officers, signals, and questioning deserters and prisoners” (Jomini, 1862, p. 213).</p> <p>“There are four means of obtaining information of the enemy’s operations. The first is a well-arranged system of espionage; the second consists in reconnoissances [sic] made by skillful officers and light troops; third, in questioning prisoners of war; fourth, in</p>	<p>“Information collected from multiple sources and analyzed becomes intelligence that provides answers to commanders’ information requirements concerning the enemy and other adversaries, climate, weather, terrain, and population. Developing these requirements is the function of Intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR)” (USAFM, 2011, p.4-8).</p> <p>“The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the operational environment, enemy, terrain, and civil</p>	<p>Gallagher stated that General Lee perfectly defined the function of cavalry when he said of General Stuart sometime after the battle of Antietam, “During all of these operations, the cavalry under General Stuart rendered most important and valuable service. It guarded the flanks of the army, protected its trains, and gave information of the enemy’s movements” (2004, vol. I, L 6).</p> <p>General Lee described the lack of cavalry assigned to Ewell’s Second Corps leading up to the battle of Gettysburg. The commanding general</p>

	<p>move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 144).</p> <p>“What is called ‘foreknowledge’ cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation” (Sun Tzu, 450-500 b.c., p. 145).</p>	<p>forming hypotheses of probabilities” (Jomini, 1862, p. 210).</p> <p>“Spies will enable a general to learn more surely than by any other agency what is going on in the midst of the enemy’s camps; for reconnoissances [sic], however well made, can give no information of any thing [sic] beyond the line of the advanced guard” (Jomini, 1862, p. 210).</p> <p>“An extensive system of espionage will generally be successful: it is, however, difficult for a spy to penetrate to the general’s closet and learn the secret plans he may form: It is best for him, therefore, to limit himself to information of what he sees with his own eyes or hears</p>	<p>considerations. It includes tasks associated with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations” (USAF, 2011, p. 4-7).</p> <p>“Leadership based on relevant information enables the commander, at all levels, to make informed decisions on how best to apply combat power” (USAFM, 2011, p. 4-3).</p> <p>“Before occupying any position, leaders at all echelons conduct some type of reconnaissance’ (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 9-13).</p> <p>“The commander uses his ISR assets to study the terrain and confirm or deny the enemy strengths, dispositions,</p>	<p>explained, “The cavalry force at this time with the army, consisting of Jenkins brigade and [E.V.] White’s battalion, was not greater than was required to accompany the advance of General Ewell and General Early, with whom it performed valuable service, as appears from their reports” (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII,1, p. 316).</p> <p>Lee eluded to the lack of cavalry on June 28, “In the absence of cavalry, it was impossible to ascertain his [enemy] intentions; but to deter him from advancing farther west, and intercepting our communication with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate</p>
--	--	---	--	---



		<p>from reliable persons” (Jomini, 1862, p. 210).</p> <p>“By multiplying the means of obtaining information, for, no matter how imperfect and contradictory they may be, the truth may often be sifted from them” (Jomini, 1862, p. 213).</p> <p>“As it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods mentioned, a general should never move without arranging several courses of action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relative situation of the armies enables him to make, and never losing sight of the principle of the art” (Jomini, 1862, p. 213).</p>	<p>and likely intentions, especially where and in what strength the enemy will defend” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 3-34).</p>	<p>the army east of the mountains” (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII,1, p.316).</p> <p>Lee revealed the intelligence that the Rebels relied on during July 1, “It was ascertained from prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker,…”</p> <p>Lee continued, “Without information as to its [Federal army] proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops” (OR, 188, vol.</p>
--	--	--	---	---

			<p>XXVII,1, pp. 317-318).</p> <p>In a letter to Ewell on June 23, 1863, General Lee advised Ewell to use Jenkins' cavalry to collect supplies and gather intelligence. Lee warned Ewell, "If necessary, send a staff officer to remain with General Jenkins;..." (Marshall, 1929, p. 200).</p> <p>Colonel Marshall concluded that the lack of intelligence concerning the enemy on July 1 was "Owing to the absence of cavalry, he [Lee] was without definite information as to the position of the enemy" (1927, p. 228).</p> <p>Colonel Marshall said of General Stuart, "He [Stuart] left General Lee</p>
--	--	--	--

				<p>without any information as to the movements of the enemy from the time he crossed the Potomac river until July 2<sup>nd</sup>” (1929, p.223).</p> <p>Campbell Brown remembered how upset Lee was with Stuart for the absence of intelligence on the morning of July 1. Brown explained, “...he [Lee] asked me with a peculiar searching, almost querulous impatience, which I never saw in him before &amp; but twice afterwards, (at Wilderness, abt Heth &amp; at Ashland, when sick &amp; riding in an ambulance) whether Gen’l Ewell had heard anything from Gen’l Jeb Stuart, &amp; on my replying in the negative, said</p>
--	--	--	--	--

				that he had heard nothing from or of him for three days- & that Gen'l Stuart had not complied with his instructions" (2001, p. 204).
--	--	--	--	--

*Figure 27. Intelligence.*

Intelligence which includes reconnaissance is of paramount importance strategically, operationally, and tactically to any army. The means of obtaining information on one's enemy is considered to be vital to any commander in any century (Taylor, 1994). The military theorists that are consulted in this study agree that intelligence is critical to fighting at all levels of war. Intelligence usually includes reconnaissance and in modern armies, surveillance has been added. All of the theorists acknowledge the absolute need for obtaining information on enemy dispositions and terrain.

Sun Tzu is no exception. He separates intelligence into what one might call reconnaissance and espionage. Reconnaissance is typically associated with tactical operations. As evidenced in the quotations above, Sun Tzu stresses the need for information on enemy dispositions. In fact, the ancient Chinese general believed that it was the key to victory (450-500 b.c.). Sun Tzu detailed and advocated for an elaborate system of espionage based on an intricate organization of spies. He revealed five types of secret agents and explained the benefits and drawbacks of each. These secret agents provided both intelligence and reconnaissance information for army commanders and heads of state. As indicated in the second quotation above, Sun Tzu encouraged probing operations that would force the enemy to react to the probes thus revealing

his dispositions and strength. While Sun Tzu was not completely clear, it seems reasonable to conclude that intelligence was the function of the top military commander and the sovereign.

Jomini's beliefs concerning the importance of obtaining relevant intelligence are no less emphatic than Sun Tzu's. Jomini also trumpeted the virtues of obtaining as much information on one's enemy as possible. Fortunately, Jomini was a bit more specific on how to obtain such information. The Swiss born general explained that reconnaissance and intelligence should be acquired from spies, deserters, prisoners, and bodies of light troops (Jomini, 1838). Jomini stressed the significance of gaining the maximum amount of information from multiple sources which can often produce bits of data from which a commander might be enlightened to the enemy's intentions and prepare multiple courses of action. Jomini acknowledged the difficulty of spies to penetrate the inner circle of enemy army commanders. Nevertheless, he considered information from spies to be superior for determining what was happening in the enemy camp. Jomini considered reconnaissance to be the purview of light troops as well as interrogation of deserters and prisoners.

The USAFM echoes the sentiments of Sun Tzu and Jomini regarding the need for credible information concerning the enemy. The USAFM includes weather, climate, and population in its intelligence gathering. The US Army expects its commanders at all levels to conduct some type of reconnaissance before they occupy any position. Moreover, the army insists that commanders are dependent on intelligence and reconnaissance to effectively apply combat power. Like Sun Tzu and Jomini, the US Army places great emphasis on the intelligence functions ability to deliver information concerning terrain, enemy dispositions, strength, and what and where the enemy might defend or attack. Not surprisingly, all of the theorists consulted are unanimous in their belief that intelligence and reconnaissance are vital functions that every army must employ.

The experts are united in their insistence on the need for acquiring copious amounts of intelligence and reconnaissance. In a 19<sup>th</sup> century Civil War context, reconnaissance was clearly a function of the cavalry. Secret agents, spies, prisoners, and deserters were important in both the gathering of intelligence and reconnaissance, but the cavalry was charged with gathering information on enemy locations, strength, dispositions, and intentions as indicated in the first quotation (Gallagher, 2004). Certainly, interviewing prisoners, deserters, and employing cavalry is within the purview of a corps commander. What is not so clear is whether the employment of spies and an elaborate system of espionage was a function of a corps chief. Some corps commanders employed spies and some did not. General Longstreet employed perhaps the most famous spy, Harrison, who was instrumental in providing Confederate forces with the only reconnaissance information that they had received leading up to the battle of Gettysburg. It does not appear that General Ewell employed any spies leading up to or during the battle of Gettysburg. Moreover, one might assume that, like Ewell, Lee did not utilize any spies during this period. If he did, they certainly did not do their job.

It is important to examine what General Ewell's responsibility for intelligence was as a corps commander. If establishing a system of spies was the function of a corps chief, Ewell surely failed. However, other than General Longstreet, no other corps commander or even the commanding general produced any significant reconnaissance information through the use of spies, leading up to the Battle of Gettysburg. It is certain that Ewell was responsible for gathering as much data as possible from prisoners and deserters. On multiple occasions during the afternoon and evening of July 1, Ewell or Ewell's subordinates interrogated prisoners and acquired bits of information concerning Federal dispositions (Martin, 1991). Ewell also utilized small scouting parties usually consisting of staff officers to reconnoiter and determine Union

strength and the whereabouts of the Yankee army facing him (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1, p. 446). A fact that is often lost or forgotten is that the Second Corps commander did have the benefit of a cavalry force.

As noted in the quotation above, reconnaissance during the Civil War was surely the function of cavalry. Confederate troopers were among the best in the war, particularly early in the conflict (Gallagher, 2004, vol. I). The Rebels enjoyed the services of Major General J.E.B Stuart as their cavalry commander. Stuart was arguably the best cavalry commander of the war. The Rebel cavalry was refitted and ballooned to some six brigades for the Gettysburg campaign. In a similar controversy involving clarity of orders, Stuart was unavailable to Lee for most of the Gettysburg campaign, arriving on the field on July 2. As a result, neither Lee nor most of the Army of Northern Virginia was aware of enemy intentions or dispositions leading up to the battle. The culpability for this mishap has been debated, much like Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill, for nearly 150 years. The quotations in this analytical category demonstrate the complete lack of intelligence during the Gettysburg campaign. Regardless of whose fault it was, it is clear that there was a complete breakdown of the gathering of intelligence and reconnaissance during this period.

Stuart's veterans were detailed to guard the mountain passes and to screen the right flank of the Confederate Army, a task in which they failed miserably (Marshal, 1927). As stated earlier, Ewell's Corps constituted the van of the Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania. Lee assigned Albert Jenkins' Brigade and E.V. White's Battalion of cavalry to the Second Corps. Several historians have referred to Jenkins' cavalry as partisan rangers rather than cavalry (Wittenberg, 2010). Bowden & Ward dubbed Jenkins troopers as "poorly disciplined raiders" (2001, p. 45). They were from western Virginia and were raised as more of a home guard to protect the local


area (Miller, 2010). Whatever the case, they were surely not up to the standards of J.E.B. Stuart's troopers. It is interesting that General Lee would have assigned such a force to his inexperienced Second Corps commander who would require adequate screening and reconnaissance as the vanguard of the Rebel invasion.

Jenkins' Brigade joined Rodes's Division of the Second Corps on June 12 and was subject to his orders (Pfanzen, 2001). Despite General Lee's official report which claimed that Jenkins' Brigade performed valuable service, General Rodes's report criticized Jenkins' force on at least six occasions. While Rodes did note several individual acts of gallantry, the major general referred to Jenkins's leadership style as "impetuous" and indicated that Jenkins' cavalry's best attribute was collecting supplies (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, p. 549). According to Miller, Rodes was so exasperated by Jenkins that Ewell interceded and issued orders to Jenkins personally (2010). Ewell's report contains very tepid praise and some criticism of General Jenkins and his command (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1). Ewell's assessment of Jenkins' force could be termed, uneventful.

Ewell did not convey the impression that the cavalry under Jenkins performed well. In fact, Coddington, noted that Jenkins' cavalry was "worthless" to Ewell during the march back from Carlisle to Gettysburg" (1968, p.191). The historian noted that Jenkins' force lagged back and did not lead the way or guard the flank on the journey back to Gettysburg from Carlisle (Coddington, 1969). Colonel William French's and Colonel E.V. White's battalion from Jenkins' Brigade was assigned to General Early's Division. Early's assessment of this cavalry force was mixed. It offered some criticism and detailed several activities that this cavalry was engaged in (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1). Early's account was certainly not praiseworthy of the cavalry, a trait that would continue throughout most of "Old Jube's" military career



(Gallagher, 2004). French's and White's troopers did appear to be functioning better than Jenkins's. The cavalry with Early did reach Gettysburg early on July 1, according to Wittenberg (2010). However, it appears that the majority of Jenkins' cavalry, especially the force with Ewell and Rodes did not reach Gettysburg until late afternoon of July 1 and once they reached the field, their whereabouts are mostly unknown (Wittenberg, 2010).



*Figure 28.* Albert Jenkins retrieved from [en.wikipedia.org](http://en.wikipedia.org).

From the evidence provided, it appears that General Jenkins' cavalry was not up to the standards of the regular forces serving under J.E.B. Stuart. Ewell received the order from Lee to return from Carlisle on June 29. Miller claimed that Ewell apparently forgot to notify Jenkins of this change (2010). As a result, most of Jenkins' cavalry did not reach Gettysburg until after 5:00 PM on July 1 (Miller, 2010). Moreover, it is not clear exactly where Jenkins' cavalry was during the first day's action (Wittenberg, 2010). Perhaps Ewell considered Jenkins more of a hindrance than a help and decided that the cavalry would just get in the way. There is ample evidence to suggest that Jenkins and his brigade were sub-par. Coddington speculated that Ewell

may have intended for Jenkins force to cover his rear as the Second Corps marched toward Gettysburg. However, the historian thought better of it, “More likely this was another instance of Jenkins’ cavalry not reaching the usual standard of performance of the Army of Northern Virginia” (1968, p. 191).

The quotation above from General Lee to General Ewell instructing the corps commander to send a staff officer to assist Jenkins is evidence that neither Lee nor Ewell had any confidence in Jenkins’s abilities. Regardless of Jenkins’s faults or perceived faults, it was inexcusable if true, that Ewell did not notify or order Jenkins to Gettysburg with the remainder of his corps. Other historians support most of Miller’s story, but none that were consulted claimed that Ewell failed to order Jenkins to Gettysburg. Even if one assumes that Jenkins’ brigade was unfit, they surely were capable of guarding prisoners, which they did on July 2, or scouting the York Road (Miller, 2010). Had Jenkins’s entire force been at Gettysburg and properly managed early on July 1, they could have assumed the role of General Smith’s Brigade which would have freed Smith and Gordon to participate in an assault on Cemetery Hill.

Ewell did perform several of the vital functions of intelligence. He and his corps did interrogate prisoners and deserters. Ewell and his subordinate commanders did organize and launch several scouting parties. On the other hand, perhaps due to his long absence from the army during his convalescence and the fact that he had only been in command of the Second Corps for a few months, he did not organize any system of spies that we are aware of. As stated earlier, the Gettysburg campaign was an intelligence failure of monumental proportions for the Confederates. It is difficult to criticize Ewell and not Lee. However, Ewell’s negligence, if true, in failing to order the cavalry (Jenkins’s) subject to his orders, to accompany him to Gettysburg is deplorable. Even if Miller’s claim that Ewell did not order the cavalry to Gettysburg is false,

the complete lack of control of the wayward troopers on the part of Ewell, who had been a cavalryman for the better part of his life and understood the importance of such a force, constituted a gross violation of the combined military leadership principle of intelligence.

**“Units of Meaning”**

**Security**

“Unit of Meaning”	Relevant Theorist	Subject of Interest
<u>Security</u>	USAFM	Ewell
	<p>“Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. A-14. Security protects and preserves combat power. Security results from measures a command takes to protect itself from surprise, interference, sabotage, annoyance, and threat surveillance and reconnaissance” USAFM, 2011, p. A-3).</p> <p>“Commanders must provide for the protection of their force. The primary physical means for providing security is by the use of a security force” (ADP 3-90, 2012, p. 12).</p> <p>“The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so that the commander can apply maximum combat power” (USAFM, 2011, p. 4-11).</p> <p>“The protection warfighting function facilitates the commander’s ability to maintain the force’s integrity and combat power. Protection determines the degree to which potential</p>	<p>General Ewell explained in his official report, “Before Johnson [Edward] got up, the enemy was reported moving to outflank our extreme left, and I could see what seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction” (OR, 1880-, vol. XXVII,1, p. 445).</p> <p>General Early’s official report noted, “I had at the same time sent an order to General Smith [William “Extra Billy”] to advance with his brigade, but he thought proper not to comply with this order, on account of a report that the enemy was advancing on the York road.” Early continued, “General Smith’s son, who was acting as his aide, came to me with a message from the general, stating that a large force of the enemy, consisting of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, was advancing on the York road, and that we were about to be flanked; and though I had no faith in this report, I thought proper to send General Gordon [John Brown] with his brigade to take charge of Smith’s also,</p>

	<p>threats can disrupt operations and then counters or mitigates these threats” (USAFM, 2011, p. 4-11).</p> <p>“The commander usually allocates security forces to provide early warning and protect those forces, systems, and locations necessary to conduct his decisive operation from unexpected contact” (USAFM 3-90, 2001, p. 9-2).</p>	<p>and to keep a lookout on the York road, and stop any further alarm” (OR, 1880-, vol. XXVII,1, p. 469).</p> <p>Campbell Brown (2001) remembered the threat to the Confederate left this way, “Having concluded to attack, [Cemetery Hill] if [General] Hill concurred, Gen’l Ewell ordered Early &amp; Rodes to get ready. Just then up came “Freddy” Smith, son of ‘Extra Billy,’ to say that a heavy force was reported moving up in their rear. Early said to Gen’l Ewell: ‘Genl, I don’t much believe in this, but prefer to suspend my movements until I can send &amp; inquire into it.’ ‘Well,’ said Genl Ewell, ‘Do so. Meantime I shall get Rodes into position &amp; communicate with Hill” (p. 211).</p> <p>Early explained why he detailed Gordon’s Brigade to Smith’s aid. Early remembered, “Reports were being constantly received of the enemy’s advance in force on the York road, and it was necessary to keep my two brigades in that direction to prevent a panic and protect our flank and rear, if there should be any truth in the reports” (1912/2010, p. 256).</p>
--	--	---

*Figure 29. Security.*

It seems obvious that security would be a military principle for which any commander would be responsible. While one might infer that the principle of security is shared by Sun Tzu and Jomini, this study, as stated earlier, has placed the most conservative interpretation on common

military principles among the three theorists consulted. As a result, security is listed as a “Unit of Meaning.” The USAFM clearly identifies and articulates the principle of security. It is easy to see how important security might be to any army. The USAFM is clear that it is the commander’s responsibility to protect his force from expected and unexpected threats. Moreover, as the quotations above demonstrate, the commander protects his assets with a security force. It is hard to imagine that any commander would not view security as the most important or one of the most important functions of leadership.

As stated in the literature review in Chapter II of this study, General Ewell faced multiple variables on the evening of July 1, 1863, when considering General Lee’s famous “if practicable” order. Just as the Second Corps commander was waiting for word of Lee’s response to his request for help from Hill, Ewell received news that General Smith of Early’s Division had spotted the enemy in strength on the York Road as the quotations above describe. Obviously, this report constituted a threat not only to General Ewell’s Second Corps, but to the entire Confederate force on the battlefield as Ewell’s Corps occupied the left flank of the Rebel army at Gettysburg. Ignoring this threat, resulting in the compromise of Ewell’s left flank could have meant the destruction in detail of both Ewell and Hill’s Corps.

Even though Early suggested that he did not believe that the threat was credible prudence demanded that he take it seriously and adequately investigate, an action that Ewell concurred with as demonstrated in the third quotation above. It is difficult to understand why Early ordered Gordon to Smith’s aid to address a threat which he deemed, groundless, a move which effectively reduced his force available for an assault by half. Ewell personally reported to the York Road to see for himself if the Yankees were near. (Pfan, 1998) Early claimed that the reports of Yankees on the York Road delayed the arrival of Johnson’s Division (OR, 1880-, vol.

XXVII, 1). In light of the absence of both Jenkins's and Stuart's cavalry and continued reports of Federals on the left flank, Ewell decided to leave Smith and Gordon where they were. The result was that the only troops available for an attack on Cemetery Hill, were Early's other two brigades (Hays and Avery). This action may have seemed reasonable given the fact that Henry Kidd Douglas reported to Ewell that Johnson's Division was close at hand (Douglas, 1940). Perhaps Ewell reasoned that he could leave Smith and Gordon on the York Road in case of trouble because he expected Johnson momentarily. In fact, Johnson's Division, while close, was stuck behind a wagon train and would not arrive until near dark, a fact that many Ewell critics choose to ignore (Pfan, 1998).

Although General Early always contended that Smith's reported threat was false, Mackowski and White claim that Smith actually witnessed units of the Major General Henry Slocum's US XII Corps (2010). In fact, these authors contend that Brigadier General Alpheus Williams's Division of the US XII Corps had occupied a position from which they observed the Confederate officers (Ewell, Early, and Rodes). General Williams explained, "I accordingly directed [Brigadier General Thomas] Ruger to deploy his brigade, under cover of the woods, and charge the hill, [most likely Benner's Hill] supported by the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade under Col. [Archibald] McDougall." Williams continued, "I had with me two batteries of artillery, which were put in the road, and directed to follow the assault, come into battery on the rest of the hill, and open on the enemy's masses" (Mackowski & White, 2010, p. 38). Williams was ordered to withdraw from this position and redeploy near the Baltimore Pike (Mackowski & White, 2010). This provides strong evidence that the US XII Corps was very close at hand and in fact, did represent a potential threat to Ewell's left flank.

It appears obvious that whether credible or not, there was a threat to Ewell’s left flank on the afternoon and evening of July 1. New information suggests that the threat may have been much more credible than originally perceived. It would have been totally inappropriate for the lieutenant general to have ignored this potential threat and precipitately ordered an assault on Cemetery Hill. Ewell’s actions were consistent with the USAFM in that he investigated the threat and dispatched a security force (Smith and Gordon’s Brigades) to protect the left flank of the Second Corps and the Army of Northern Virginia. This action reduced the force available to him for an attack on Cemetery Hill by 50%, making such an assault unwise. However, General Ewell certainly satisfied the requirements for the “Unit of Meaning” described as security.

**Initiative**

“Unit of Meaning”	Relevant Theorist	Subject of Interest
<i><b>Initiative</b></i>	USAFM	Ewell
	<p>“Commanders encourage the leadership and initiative of subordinates through mission command. Commanders accept setbacks that stem from the initiative of subordinates. They understand that land warfare is chaotic and unpredictable and that action is preferable to passivity. They encourage subordinates to accept prudent risks to create opportunities, while providing intent and control that allow for latitude and discretion” (USAFM, 2011, p. 5-4).</p> <p>“All Army operations aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. Operational initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout an operation.</p>	<p>General Ewell described his actions on Oak Hill on the afternoon of July 1, “It was too late to avoid an engagement without abandoning the position already taken up, and I determined to push the attack vigorously” (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1, p. 444).</p> <p>“Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined, with Johnson’s division, to take possession of the wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill” (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1, p. 445).</p> <p>“They [Ewell, Early, Rodes] desired General Lee to be informed that they could go forward and take Cemetery Hill</p>

	<p>Initiative gives all operations the spirit, if not the form, of the offensive. It originates in the principle of the offensive” (USAFM, 2011, p. 3-3).</p> <p>“Seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative depends on individual initiative-the willingness to act in absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise” (USAFM, 2011, P. 3-3).</p> <p>“Subordinates who act first (within the commander’s intent) and report later often achieve far more than those who delay action to wait for the commanders confirmation” (USAFM, 2011, p. 5-8).</p>	<p>if they were supported on their right; that to the south of the Cemetery there was in sight a position commanding it which should be taken at once; and I was sent by General Ewell to deliver the message to the commanding general.” (Smith, 2011, p. 13).</p> <p>Early said to Gen’l Ewell: ‘Genl, I don’t much believe in this, but prefer to suspend my movements until I can send &amp; inquire into it.’ ‘Well,’ said Genl Ewell, ‘Do so. Meantime I shall get Rodes into position &amp; communicate with Hill” (Brown, 2001, p. 211).</p> <p>“After ordering Johnson to advance on Culp’s Hill, Ewell received Colonel Marshall who arrived at Ewell’s headquarters with a message from Lee to move his Second Corps out of Gettysburg and to the right in preparation for a July 2 attack. Pfanz stated that “Ewell opposed the idea. At 10 P.M., after discussing the matter with Early, he rode with Marshall to Lee’s headquarters to persuade him to keep the Second Corps in town. Ewell predicated his argument on his belief that Johnson had seized, or would soon seize, Culp’s Hill” (Pfanz, 1998, p. 313).</p>
--	---	---

Figure 30. Initiative.

The US Army places a huge premium on seizing and maintaining the initiative. Although that typically means utilizing offensive operations, as discussed earlier in this chapter, it includes



defensive operations as well. According to the US Army, commanders initiate defensive operations, with an eye to regain the initiative (USAFM, 2011). The quotations listed above warn commanders to expect unpredictable situations, to encourage subordinates to take the initiative, and to expect setbacks as a result of subordinate error. Moreover, the US Army desires action as opposed to inaction (USAFM, 2011). However, this is predicated on effective mission command, control, and intent (USAFM, 2011) The third quotation listed above focuses on commanders and stresses “-the willingness to act in absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise” (USAFM, 2011, P. 3-3). The final quotation admonishes commanders to “act first and report later” (USAFM, 2011). It is easy to see how initiative is the primary objective for nearly every operational maneuver that the US Army undertakes. The last quotation indicates that commanders should act first and report later.

At first glance, one might imagine that Ewell would not fare well when considering the “Unit of Meaning”, initiative. Ewell’s loudest critics would have one believe that the lieutenant general was paralyzed by indecision and desperately looked for opportunities not to act (Dowdy, 1958). Moreover, some of those critics insinuated that Ewell, somehow, did not appreciate the importance of Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill and preferred anything to action (Casdorff, 2004). The quotations listed above for General Ewell appear to tell a very different story. Ewell, in fact, during the morning and afternoon of July 1, was incredibly aggressive. His actions speak to seizing and retaining the initiative. He boldly led Rodes’s Division to the exact place on the battlefield where it would be most effective and committed it to the fight. Upon receiving Lee’s orders not to bring on a general engagement, the Second Corps commander realized that it was too late to obey and allowed the fight to continue, but clearly notified the two division

commanders on the field to halt the action once they pushed the Federals from their position in obedience to Lee's orders. Ewell unhesitatingly committed Early's Division as well. In fact, Ewell had committed the entire force at his disposal to the fight.

Once the Second Corps had driven the Federals from the field, confusion reigned supreme. Artillery fire, sharpshooter fire, thousands of prisoners, and fatigue most likely made Ewell's halt order unnecessary. Nevertheless, Ewell attempted to mount an assault on Cemetery Hill, but was deterred by a lack of reinforcements from Lee and the continued admonition not to bring on a general engagement. Erroneously told that Johnson's Division would appear on the field shortly, and that the commanding general intended to ride over to see him, Ewell decided to wait for Johnson. Ewell had intended for Johnson to take Culp's Hill and his meeting with Early, Rodes, and Lee confirmed that Cemetery Hill would not be attacked. Ewell ordered Johnson to occupy Culp's Hill, but Johnson was delayed. When the major general was in position, another confusing order came from Lee to withdraw the Second Corps to the right. With an eye to regain the initiative, Ewell rode to Lee to secure permission for Johnson to attack Culp's Hill if he had not already done so. By the time he returned with Lee's blessing, the Federals had occupied Culp's Hill in force.

Some might conclude that Ewell relinquished the initiative and failed to regain it. However, as demonstrated in the analytical category entitled, offensive operations, forces initiating offensive operations sometimes reach what the army calls, a culminating point, this is the point at which a force is no longer capable of continuing its current operation. Ewell's Second Corps clearly met this definition as it entered the town of Gettysburg on July 1. The US Army indicates that commanders can among other things, assume a defensive posture or institute an operational pause which gains time to explore ways to regain the initiative (USAFM, 2011). It is

clear that Ewell's halt represented an operational pause. He spent the remainder of July 1, attempting to gather forces to assault either Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill and regain the initiative. The notion that he did not wish to act is refuted by his actions and his persistence in attempting to find ways to regain the initiative.

Several quotations above speak of a commander acting in the absence of orders or realizing when existing orders are no longer valid. The last quotation advises commanders to favor action rather than inaction. Ewell had orders in hand which did not order him to assault Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill. More importantly, he had orders not to bring on a general engagement which were repeated several times according to Lee's official report and based on comments that Ewell made to other officers on the evening of July 1. The direct order not to force a major engagement was in effect after Ewell's Corps seized the town. According to Martin, the prohibition of a general engagement was repeated several times that evening when Lee ordered Ewell to draw his corps to the right (Martin, 1991). The first part of the quotation speaks of acting in the absence of orders. Ewell had orders. The second part indicates that commanders should realize when existing orders are no longer valid. Many critics accuse Ewell of violating this principle. They contend that by virtue of the action earlier in the day, a major engagement had already taken place. However, they fail to realize that Lee was on the field and reiterated the admonition of avoiding a general engagement several times. In effect, Lee, by repeating the order, was reinforcing that the existing order was still valid.

The last quotation indicates that commanders should act first and report to commanders second (USAFM, 2011). It is important to observe the caveat in this quotation. Within this quotation, the Army warns that "acting first and reporting second" is permissible only when acting "within the commander's intent" (USAFM, 2011, p. 5-8). For those who contend that

Ewell should have “acted first and reported second”, they might consider that no one, including Ewell was sure of what the commander’s (Lee) intent really was. He was to assault Cemetery Hill if possible, but to avoid a general engagement. What was Lee’s intent? Was it to take Cemetery Hill or to avoid significant contact with the enemy? Ewell couldn’t be sure.

In the end, Ewell was deterred from regaining the initiative by Lee’s ambiguous orders and unwillingness to provide reinforcements. Another issue that severely complicated Ewell’s ability to regain the initiative through an attack was the threat on his left flank detailed in the “Unit of Meaning”, security. It appears clear that Ewell did everything possible to regain the initiative, but was foiled by a threat to his left flank and Lee’s ambiguous and confusing orders. If the “Unit of Meaning”, initiative was violated on Ewell’s end of the line on the evening of July 1, 1863, it was not because Ewell sought to be passive and avoided action it was due primarily to Lee’s ambiguousness. While Ewell did all that he could to follow the combined military leadership principle of initiative, no attempt was made to regain it due to the confusing orders from general Lee and the denial of reinforcements from Hill’s Corps, all of which were deficiencies of the commanding general and constituted a violation of the “Unit of Meaning”, initiative.

### **Summary**

The data collected for this study revealed eight analytical categories which represent the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM and two “Units of Meaning” from the USAFM. The combined military leadership principles (leadership, clarity of orders, concentration, terrain, maneuver, offensive operations, defensive operations, and intelligence) were applied to General Ewell’s actions on July 1, 1863, to determine if his decision not to assault Cemetery Hill was reasonable. In addition, the two “Units of Meaning”

which include security and initiative from the USAFM were included in this study as well.

The research indicated that defensive operations would not be part of the analysis because the Second Corps did not assume a defensive posture until July 2. Of the remaining seven combined military leadership principles, only two were followed on July 1, 1863. However, the research demonstrated that the failure to adhere to five of the remaining seven principles was not General Ewell's responsibility. In fact, the data suggests that of the five combined military leadership principles that were not followed (clarity of orders, concentration, maneuver, offensive operations, and intelligence), Ewell actively sought to comply with four of those principles (the lone exception is intelligence), but was deterred by General Lee. Ewell did not follow the combined military leadership principle of intelligence. Two "Units of Meaning" (security and initiative) were identified in this study. The research showed that the "Unit of Meaning" identified as security was followed by Ewell, but that the other "Unit of Meaning", initiative was not. Much like the combined military leadership principles, the data revealed that General Ewell repeatedly attempted to regain the initiative, but was thwarted by other circumstances and General Lee's confusing orders. In the final analysis, it appears that even though five combined military leadership principles and one "Unit of Meaning" were not followed on July 1, 1863, the failure to adhere to these principles rests with General Lee and that General Ewell was in compliance with six of the seven military leadership principles and all of the "Units of Meaning" identified in this study. The conclusions of this data will be discussed in the following chapter (Chapter V) of this dissertation.

## CHAPTER V

### FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

#### **Findings**

The battle of Gettysburg still captures the attention and imagination of many Americans some 150 years after the fact. Despite monumental struggles in several world wars and other conflicts, it is this 19<sup>th</sup> century clash on the rolling hills of central Pennsylvania that has defined the American military experience for many citizens. The first day of the battle of Gettysburg attracts the least amount of academic interest of the three day conflict in July 1863.

Major General J.E.B. Stuart and Lieutenant General A.P. Hill had been the subject of much of the finger pointing among many participants and historians for defeat in Pennsylvania on the first day of the battle. However, Lieutenant General Richard Ewell bears most of the burden associated with the failure of Confederate arms on July 1, 1863. While that day taken alone was one of the most successful in the history of the Army of Northern Virginia, the lieutenant general's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on day one of the battle is often seen as the pivotal mistake that cost the south the battle and the war.

Several officers painted a post-war portrait of Ewell on July 1 that perpetuated the idea among historians to this day that the general was timid, indecisive, and incapable of making a decision without assistance from others. In addition, they ignored many of the variables that the Second Corps commander had to consider if he was to launch an attack on that fateful afternoon and evening (Hamlin, 1935). These claims tend to be the result of opinion rather than sound analysis. Significant evidence suggests that these opinions were inaccurate and were shaped by the Lost Cause tradition which sought to protect General Lee from any blame. Needless to say, these opinions are very critical of General Ewell. The development and application of combined

military leadership principles based on the theories of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM which are supported by 25 centuries of military thought seem to be at odds with the critics of the commander of the Second Corps.

Triangulation of the data yielded some interesting information that is particularly relevant to the literature review detailed in Chapter II of this study. As a result, it appears necessary to review several of the claims of Ewell's detractors which often reveal personal bias, avoidance of blame, outright fabrication, bitterness toward Ewell, and self-aggrandizement, all of which are obvious in their post-war, retrospective, writings.

### **General Robert E. Lee**

General Lee's post-war comments concerning General Ewell are quite perplexing. The Lost Cause tradition has edited nearly all human elements away from Lee to create a flawless figure that was perfection in every possible way (Connelly, 1977). Lost Cause writers never detail Lee's temper or how difficult it was to serve him on a day to day basis, a fact highlighted by several of Lee's staff officers (Walter Taylor and Charles Venable) during the war. (Krick, 2004). As a result, it is difficult to believe that the commanding general was so critical of his subordinates following the war. As stated in the literature review in Chapter II of this study, Lee intimated to a staff officer after the war that he held Ewell particularly responsible for the defeat at Gettysburg and that he appointed the Second Corps commander to that position knowing of his deficiencies as a commander. In effect, Lee claimed after the war that he believed that Ewell had a propensity to hesitate (Marshall, 1927). Lee's comments after the war were corroborated by two separate sources.

It is important to understand that Lee communicated these feelings about Ewell retrospectively. This revelation poses a problem and begs several questions. If Lee was unsure

of Ewell as a corps commander, why did he select him for that position? Perhaps the belief that “Stonewall” Jackson might have chosen Ewell to succeed him played a role (Casdorff, 2004, vol. II). If Lee had serious doubts about Ewell, as he claimed after the war, why did he support the promotion? More importantly, if the commanding general was so certain of Ewell’s tendency to vacillate, why would he issue an order (“if practicable”) that allowed for so much latitude? Hamlin echoed this sentiment when he criticized Lee for “not himself supervising the execution of his order, when he was dealing with a lieutenant, who had so recently undertaken fresh responsibilities (1935, p. IV). Moreover, why would Lee allow a man that he claimed to have serious concerns about, lead perhaps the most important invasion of the war? One can appreciate the difficulty of rearranging the positions of a body of men the size of an infantry corps. However, if Ewell’s Corps happened to be the most strategically located to launch the invasion, why did the commanding general not accompany his inexperienced and, according to Lee, hesitant corps commander if he had such reservations concerning his abilities?

It appears that General Lee, contrary to his comments after the war, made no preparations to compensate for, what he considered to be Ewell’s deficiencies. The lack of action on Lee’s part makes one wonder if the commanding general had a case of selective memory concerning Ewell after the war. If Lee did indeed believe that Ewell was so wanting as a corps commander prior to his appointment, then Lee is certainly negligent for not taking steps to mitigate what he considered to be Ewell’s faults as a military commander.

Lee’s comment after the war, referenced in Chapter II of this study indicated that he believed that if “Stonewall” Jackson had been at Gettysburg, the Confederacy would have been victorious. Moreover, Lee indicated that he believed that Ewell would never exceed his orders without some type of confirmation from a superior (Lee, 1904). This is a very interesting



comment on the part of the commanding general. Many might contend that if Lee had issued clear and concise orders, there would have been no need for Ewell to exceed them. It is surprising to learn that the commanding general of his nation's most powerful army was apparently expecting and hoping that his subordinate commanders should exceed their orders, something that many, including Lee accused J.E.B. Stuart of doing after the battle of Gettysburg.


It seems clear that General Lee held Ewell largely responsible for the defeat at Gettysburg. He was certainly more critical of Ewell than the other corps commanders (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II). Lee's comments after the war do not comport with his actions during the battle of Gettysburg and at the very least, seem incredibly self-serving and questionable.

### **Major General Isaac Trimble**

Much credence has been given to the accounts of perhaps Ewell's loudest critic, Isaac Trimble. Trimble's post-war accounts of his experiences, particularly late on July 1, with Ewell have been severely critical of the lieutenant general and are largely unchallenged. The 1993 TNT original motion picture, *Gettysburg* illustrated this point. Trimble appears in a dramatic scene with Lee in which the major general claimed that there were no troops on Culp's Hill and few troops on Cemetery Hill. Trimble described Ewell's inaction and intimated to the commanding general that he asked Ewell for one brigade and he would take the hill. When Ewell refused, Trimble claimed that he then asked Ewell for one good regiment and he would take the hill (Esparza & Katz, 1993). The obvious implication from this account was that Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill could have been easily taken which should have been obvious to anyone and that the all-knowing Trimble was the only commander on the field who realized the value of these key positions.

The story that is never revealed is the one concerning Trimble. He was a major general who had not yet commanded a division. He was rash and had never commanded a force larger than a brigade and yet he was pontificating to The Second Corps commander, who had commanded a division for most of the war, on how Ewell should command a corps. More than likely, he had no idea or didn't care of the other factors that influenced Ewell's decision, the threat on the York Road, no reinforcements from Lee, and the formidable position that the Yankee's had occupied. The record is replete with examples of Trimble's impetuosity in which he prematurely acted and became lost or out of touch while he was a brigade commander under Ewell (Marti, 1991). Ewell would frequently have to dispatch a staff officer to corral the wayward subordinate. Campbell Brown noted that Trimble had "A talent for mistakes" (Martin, 1991, p. 106).

As for Trimble's claim of taking Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill with a brigade or a regiment, it is worth noting that the major general made the same plea concerning the cities of Baltimore and Harrisburg during the campaign (Pfan, 2001). While it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of troops present at any one time in Baltimore during the Gettysburg campaign, Scott Sheads, an author and historian at Fort McHenry National Monument claimed that there were never less than about 5,500 men protecting the city and garrisoning its forts (Scott Sheads, personal correspondence, June 13, 2013). The largest brigade in Ewell's Corps was Daniel's (Rodes's Division) and it contained 2,157 men (Petrucci & Stanley, 2012). The average size of a brigade in Ewell's Corps was 1,240 men (Petrucci & Stanley, 2012). As one might imagine, it would have been a rather daunting task for a single brigade to assault and occupy a city protected by a system of forts and 5,500 men. The city of Harrisburg provides a more startling example of Trimble's bravado. The Federal forces occupying Harrisburg while Ewell's Corps was near that city was about 16,000 troops under the command of Major General Darius Couch (Coddington,



*Figure 31.* Isaac Trimble retrieved from the Library of Congress.

1964). The suggestion, by Trimble, that Harrisburg could have been secured with a single brigade is further evidence of the major general's bluster. In a similar incident in 1862, Trimble pleaded for Ewell to attack Port Republic. When the latter refused, General Taylor remembered, "Like a spoiled child, he [Trimble] continued to argue his point, even going so far as to make the absurd suggestion that the brigade attack Fremont's Army alone" (Pfan, 1998, p. 214). At Freeman's Ford in 1862, Trimble described the massive amount of casualties. Pfan characterized Trimble's report. The historian stated, "With typical overstatement he [Trimble] reported inflicting ten casualties for every one he received on a foe three times his size" (1998, p. 246). Martin said of the major general, "Trimble was capable, a dandy in his dress, but not a man for details. His brigade was loosely trained" (1991, p. 35). These accounts, while seldom

communicated, paint a very different picture than the one presented of General Trimble in the 1993 TNT original motion picture, *Gettysburg*. His penchant for hyperbole is seldom included in his scathing accounts of Ewell's actions during the Pennsylvania campaign.

There are other reasons to question the veracity of Trimble's claims. It is no secret that when Trimble was meddling in Ewell's affairs on July 1, to the point of being disrespectful, that the corps commander lost his temper with Trimble. At one point after Trimble's badgering, Ewell snapped, "When I need advice from a junior officer, I generally ask for it" (Pfan, 1998, p.310). This was an obvious rebuke of Trimble. Moreover, it is not clear if Trimble was aware that Ewell did not support his bid for promotion (Pfan, 1998). As stated in Chapter II of this study, Ewell was notoriously generous and willing to support the efforts of subordinates for advancement. However, he specifically did not write a recommendation on Trimble's behalf for promotion to major general. Given the evidence provided, it is reasonable to question General Trimble's criticism of Ewell and his motives for doing so.

### **Major General Fitzhugh Lee**

Fitz Lee's criticism of Ewell in the Southern Historical Society papers has been noted in Chapter II of this study. The cavalryman's comments are typical of what one might expect from one of Stuart's lieutenants. It seems clear that Fitz's comments were designed to deflect criticism away from his chief and direct it elsewhere. Lee [Fitz] did not single out Ewell. He had plenty of venom for Longstreet as well. Lee's comments are not extraordinary, but they are significant because he introduced correspondence from Major General Winfield Scott Hancock.

### **Major General Winfield Scott Hancock**

Hancock was sent by Meade to take command of Union forces on Cemetery Hill. The major general arrived on Cemetery Hill at 3:30 PM (Lee, 1878, vol. V). In a letter to Fitz Lee,

Hancock claimed that the Confederate force could have overrun the Cemetery Hill position. Hancock remembered, that "... in my opinion, if the Confederates had continued the pursuit of General Howard on the afternoon of the 1<sup>st</sup> of July at Gettysburg, they would have driven him over and beyond Cemetery Hill" (Hancock, 1878, vol. 5, p. 162-194). The major general made some disparaging remarks concerning the US XI Corps and indicated that he had experienced difficulty in reforming XI Corps units (Hancock, 1878, vol. V). The II Corps commander wrote that the XI Corps could muster but 1,200 men to defend Cemetery Hill (Hancock, 1878, vol. 5). Hancock concluded that any Rebel assault after 4:00 PM would likely have failed (Hancock, 1878, vol. V). The remarks concerning the vulnerability of Cemetery Hill from a soldier as celebrated and respected as Hancock were used by many Ewell critics to highlight, what they considered to be, Ewell's incompetence.

At first glance, the comments made by General Hancock seem to be evidence that Ewell should have attacked. However, it is well known that Hancock, as well as most of the Army of the Potomac, had a very low opinion of the US XI Corps and were skeptical of its largely German immigrant members (Pfan, 2001). Hancock's claim that the XI Corps could muster only 1,200 men is extremely hard to believe (Hancock, 1878, vol. 5). It has been established that Colonel Orland Smith's Brigade of Steinwehr's Division contained 1,644 men and it covered the retreat to Cemetery Hill on July 1 (Petrucci & Stanley, 2012). Moreover, Colonel Charles Coster's Brigade of the same division contained 1,215 men (Petrucci & Stanley, 2012). Hancock's claim assumes that of the 9,268 men of Howard's XI Corps, only 1,200 were present on Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1 (Petrucci & Stanley, 2012). One wonders if this was an attempt by the commander of the US II Corps to overstate how impressive his performance was. Although Hancock claimed that he had a difficult time reforming the XI Corps, other

evidence does not support Hancock's claim. Colonel Wainwright, a member of the I Corps indicated that the retreat to Cemetery Hill was calm (Wainwright, 1962). Howard indicated that Hancock saw to the dispositions of the I Corps while Howard posted units of the XI corps. If this was the case, how could Hancock have experienced problems with reforming a corps that he was not directing? Moreover, General Doubleday, in his official report, remembered that the troops of the I and XI Corps had been placed by Howard and that Hancock arrived after this event (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 2). All agreed that Hancock placed Wadsworth's Division on Culp's Hill. Both Howard's and Hancock's official reports suggested that Howard placed most of the troops, but that Hancock handled dispositions of the I Corps and Wadsworth's repositioning on Culp's Hill (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 2).

General Hancock referenced an attempt by the Rebels to attack the Union right flank east of the Baltimore Pike as they were pursuing the XI Corps to Cemetery Hill. The Federal commander indicated that "it was easily checked by the fire of our artillery." (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 2, p. 368). This statement, corroborated by Howard's official report, seems to contradict Hancock's claim that Cemetery Hill could have been successfully attacked had the Confederates continued the assault (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 2). According to Hancock, the Rebels did in fact continue their assault and were checked by Yankee artillery. Most of the Federal artillery on Cemetery Hill had been placed early on July 1, 1863. If it was solely, as Hancock claimed, the artillery that beat back this Rebel assault, how could Hancock make the claim that Cemetery Hill could have been overrun had the Confederates continued their assault?

Perhaps Hancock should have been more specific as to the size of the attacking force that would have been required to overrun Howard's position on Cemetery Hill. When he made his claim, did the major general mean to suggest that the two brigades of Early's Division could

have pushed the Federals off of Cemetery Hill or did Hancock intend to suggest that a concerted Confederate effort which would have included all Rebel troops under both Ewell's and Hill's command could have overrun Cemetery Hill? The latter claim makes more sense given the evidence of the impact of Yankee artillery fire referenced above. It is important to remember what Hancock did not write. The major general did not contend that the two brigades of Early's Division, available to Ewell, could have pushed Howard's forces over and beyond Cemetery Hill. Perhaps General Hancock's response to Fitz Lee would have been very different had he known that Ewell could muster but two brigades for an attack. Critics of Ewell choose to



*Figure 32.* Winfield Scott Hancock retrieved from the Library of Congress.

interpret Hancock's comments in this light.

Hancock's claims seem to be very self-serving. This might appear to be insignificant lest we forget that the General had political aspirations and in fact, ran for the presidency on the Democrat ticket in 1880 (Jordan, 1988). In fact, Hancock received several votes for the Democrat nomination for president in 1876 (Jordan, 1988). Hancock's letter to Fitz Lee detailing how all was chaos and how the Rebels could have overrun the position until he arrived and brought order out of confusion was written in 1878 and was surely a resume enhancer. Hancock's services to the United States on July 1-3, 1863, were exemplary. It is certain that his presence on Cemetery Hill had a positive effect and conveyed confidence to the weary soldiers of the US I and XI Corps. However, it is easy to see how the general's comments could be misinterpreted or embellished. Finally, Hancock claimed in the letter to Fitz Lee that he arrived at 3:30 PM, but in his official report he said 3:00 PM (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 2). He then stated that the position was secure and formidable and that any Confederate attack would have been defeated after 4:00 PM (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 2). This is a window of at most, one hour or a half hour. Given the circumstances facing Ewell on July 1, it seems difficult to find fault with the Second Corps commander for failing to act within a half hour window considering all of the variables affecting his decision.

### **Major General John Brown Gordon**

John Brown Gordon claimed that he advised Ewell on several occasions to assault Cemetery Hill without delay and that in his opinion, neither Ewell nor Early could have understood the importance of the order to halt which he claimed to have disobeyed multiple times before he finally complied (Gordon, 1904). The brigade commander intimated that he reluctantly ordered the halt only after learning that General Lee did not wish to bring on a general engagement (Gordon, 1904). Gordon further stated that had General Lee been on the scene, he would have




ordered him forward and that the mighty “Stonewall” surely would have advanced (1904). In typical dramatic fashion, Gordon concluded, “My thoughts were so harrowed and my heart so burdened by the fatal mistake of the afternoon that I was unable to sleep at night” (1904, p. 156). Gordon asserted that he returned to Early and Ewell in the wee hours of July 1 urging an assault on Cemetery Hill (1904).

Gordon’s claims may indeed be true. However, the brigadier general had a reputation for embellishment that was exceeded by few Confederate veterans. Gallagher explained that Gordon’s retrospective accounts must be interpreted with great caution (1992). The historian also noted that “Few witnesses matched Gordon in his egocentrism or his willingness to play fast and loose with the truth, and his recollections leave unwary readers with the distinct impression that the South would have triumphed if only misguided superiors such as Ewell and Early had acted on his advice” (1992, p. 39).

In his post war reminiscences as stated above, the brigade commander intimated that he reluctantly ordered the halt only after learning that General Lee did not wish to bring on a general engagement (Gordon, 1904). It is interesting that Gordon admitted that he ordered a halt when he realized that it came from Lee. If true, why does Gordon criticize Ewell? Ewell ordered the halt in obedience to Lee’s orders. It seems reasonable that Gordon would find fault with the commanding general not Ewell. Gordon claimed to be so upset with the lost opportunity of assaulting Cemetery Hill that he was unable to sleep, yet the brigadier, in a letter to his wife on July 7, just six days after the battle, made no mention of the incredible blunder of Ewell or the missed opportunity to take Cemetery Hill. Further, Gordon who was so vexed by the halt order that it denied him sleep, but he never mentioned any of these points to Mrs. Gordon. In fact, Gordon explained to his wife that the enemy occupied a formidable position

and received reinforcements (Gordon, 1841-1879). In fairness to Gordon, his papers indicate that the remainder of this letter is missing. Perhaps he communicated his frustration, but in two different letters that he wrote on July 10, he does not mention these issues. Gordon's claim that Lee would have urged him forward is interesting. Lee was on the field and it was Lee's orders that prompted Ewell to restrain his aggressive subordinate.


Gordon was an accomplished soldier whose retrospective writing was at odds with the facts. He may indeed have urged Ewell to attack Cemetery Hill and been as upset as he claimed at the Confederates failure to launch an assault. However, there is sufficient evidence to question Gordon's recollection of events.



*Figure 33.* John Brown Gordon retrieved from [www.thelatinlibrary.com](http://www.thelatinlibrary.com).

## **Brigadier General Eppa Hunton**

Brigadier General Eppa Hunton joined the chorus of criticism after the war. Hunton was not on the field on July 1, and while he laid most of the blame for Confederate defeat on Longstreet, he was very critical of Ewell as well (1933). Hunton served as a brigade commander in Longstreet's Corps. In fact, Hunton was responsible for an often quoted statement by Ewell critics which was, according to Hunton, allegedly made by Ewell after the war at Fort Warren. The brigadier general claimed that, "He [Ewell] told me in person at Fort Warren, where both of us were in prison for three months after the surrender of General Lee, that it took a great many blunders to lose Gettysburg, and I [Ewell] had committed many of them" (1933, pp. 97-98). As one might imagine, this appears to be very damning evidence against the lieutenant general. However, Hunton's criticism deserves more scrutiny. As stated above, Hunton was captured and imprisoned with Ewell at Fort Warren. On the journey to the Massachusetts prison, Hunton claimed that Ewell went out of his way to curry favor with Yankee officers from Grant's army, something Hunton vehemently disapproved of. Hunton explained, "We had not gone far before we were halted by a squad of Grant's army, in which Ewell met some of his West Point acquaintances of the Federal army. He seemed bent on making himself popular with them" (1933, p. 125). The brigadier general went on to accuse Ewell of suggesting that the Rebels had devastated US property more than the Federals and that Yankee prisoners were mistreated under Confederate supervision (1933). Hunton remembered his response to these claims, "I said, General Ewell, you know that is not true". The brigadier general continued, "I was very indignant with General Ewell" (1933, pp. 125-126).



*Figure 34.* Eppa Hunton retrieved from [www.history.army.mil](http://www.history.army.mil).

Hunton became sick with chronic diarrhea on the journey to Fort Warren. His frustration with Ewell continued because, according to Hunton, the lieutenant general did not assist Hunton who he had known for most of his life. Hunton explained, “General Ewell had provided himself with five or six hundred dollars in gold, and had it about him at the time”. Hunton continued, “He knew I was sick. I had to lie down on the floor where the Yankee guard had spit their tobacco juice, and eat the rations, sick as I was. General Ewell went to the table and slept in bed, and never offered to help me at all” (1933, pp. 128-129).

Another incident that incensed Hunton was Ewell’s decision to draft a letter to General Grant following the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. The Second Corps commander declared that the Rebel generals with him were “not assassins” and that they unanimously condemned the assassination (Martin, 1991). Without their permission, Ewell added the names and states of the generals with him and suggested that they held similar views. Before mailing the letter the lieutenant general conducted a one hour meeting in which several of his compatriots disagreed with his correspondence to Grant (Martin, 1991). Hunton was so upset at Ewell that he snapped,

“I asked General Ewell where the leg he lost at Second Manassas was buried; that I wished to pay honor to that leg, for I had none to pay to the rest of his body” (1933, pp. 137-138). Despite the objections of some of his fellow Confederates, Ewell mailed the letter to Grant without removing the names of the generals who objected.

It is clear that General Hunton had a healthy dislike for Ewell after the war. Whether his claims are valid or not is hard to say. It does appear that Ewell was very concerned about the action the Federal government might take against his wife who had very large land holdings in Tennessee. On the other hand, Ewell’s claims of mistreatment of prisoners and southern depredations were not falsehoods. As for Ewell’s supposed fraternization with West Pointers, Hunton was not a West Point graduate and perhaps did not appreciate the bonds that were formed there and in later service in the US Army. Although Ewell mailed the letter to Grant without some of his fellow prisoners support, he felt that the worst thing that could befall Confederate veterans was to be considered assassins. There is evidence that Ewell’s letter to Grant had a favorable effect and expedited the release of Ewell and some of his fellow compatriots (Martin, 1991). It is startling that Ewell would have confided in Hunton that he had made so many mistakes at Gettysburg given the sour nature of their relationship at Fort Warren. While Hunton’s claim may be true, there is certainly ample reason to question the source and motives of this damning statement.

### **Second Corps Staff Officers**

Chapter II of this study referenced many depreciating remarks on the part of staff officers concerning Ewell’s actions on July 1. James Power Smith, Randolph McKim, Alexander Pendleton, and Henry Kyd Douglas all compared Ewell to “Stonewall” Jackson. Most of the complaints from these staff officers suggested that had “Stonewall” Jackson been present on July

1, 1863, the south would have won the day and perhaps the war. It should be remembered that Ewell inherited Jackson's entire staff at Lee's insistence. The only new member of Ewell's staff that did not serve Jackson was Campbell Brown. Perhaps these comparisons were inevitable, but they were certainly not fare to Ewell. Moreover, Jackson was killed at the pinnacle of his career just a few months prior to the battle of Gettysburg. Those that compare him and Ewell often forget his poor performances at the Seven Days or Cedar Mountain.

Most of Ewell's staff disliked the lieutenant general's wife, Lizinka Campbell Brown, who travelled with the Second Corps in the winter of 1863-64. Mrs. Ewell was a person of great wealth and influence in Tennessee and nation-wide. She enjoyed personal wealth and was unhappily married to James Percy Brown until his death in 1844 (Carmichael, 2001). Brown's and Lizinka's fortune made her an incredibly wealthy person valued at some five hundred thousand dollars (Carmichael, 2001). Brown's excessive cheating produced great distrust in Lizinka and a desire to control events which manifested itself, according to Ewell's staff, in his wife's control of the general and her desire to seek promotion for her son (Carmichael, 2001). Moreover, several staff officers charged that Linzinka attempted to protect her son and constantly admonished Ewell not to expose himself to danger (Carmichael, 2001). Many Confederate veterans concluded that Ewell was a changed man and of little value after his marriage in May of 1863 (Hunton, 1933). Pfanz vehemently disagrees with this claim and suggests that Mrs. Ewell had little effect on the Second Corps commander's performance or his propensity to expose himself to danger (2012).

Whether Mrs. Ewell influenced her husband in late 1863 or 1864 while travelling with the army is debatable, however, there is little evidence that she had much impact on the lieutenant general during the Pennsylvania campaign. She did not accompany the Second Corps

commander to the Keystone State and Ewell was hit several times with gunfire from Winchester to Gettysburg. Moreover, the lieutenant general had several horses shot out from under him suggesting that he did not hold back due to his recent nuptials.

### **Douglas Southall Freeman**

Douglas Southall Freeman's reputation as a Civil War historian is second to none. His partisanship towards the Lost Cause tradition is well known. The title of chapter VI of his famous work, *Lee's Lieutenants* is "Ewell Cannot Reach a Decision". This claim is preposterous. Ewell had no trouble reaching a decision. It has been well documented that Ewell had to contend with contradictory orders, threats to the security of his corps, and no assistance from Lee or Hill. Ewell stopped the assault in obedience to Lee's orders, when it looked as though he could not attack Cemetery Hill he shifted his focus to Culp's Hill. Ewell ordered Johnson's Division which arrived later than expected, to take Culp's Hill. The commanding general then issued another round of confusing orders suggesting that he might move the Second Corps to the right (Martin, 1991). Ewell immediately sought permission to remain where he was. When he received it, he again ordered Johnson to attack if he had not done so. When Ewell was informed that Johnson had not assaulted Culp's Hill and that Federal troops occupied it in force, he was visibly upset with Johnson (Martin, 1991). In the series of events just described, what decision could Ewell not reach? It seems clear that Ewell repeatedly sought to carry-out some offensive action to acquire the heights and was foiled at every turn by either circumstances or the commanding general.

Freeman summarized Ewell's performance on day one. The historian concluded "In detail, all stages of his [Ewell] hesitation can be defended and perhaps justified. Together they present the picture of a man who could not come to a decision within the time swift action might have

brought victory” (1944, p. 172). This quotation is astonishing. Freeman stated that Ewell’s decisions could be defended and justified yet he condemns the lieutenant general. The second part of this quotation, not surprisingly, ignores any part that Lee and others played in Ewell’s decision not to attack Cemetery Hill. The idea that Ewell could not come to a decision is a fallacy perpetuated by the Lost Cause tradition.

### **Clifford Dowdy**

Clifford Dowdy’s indictment of Ewell follows the Lost Cause tradition. As revealed in Chapter II of this study, Dowdy recounted the frustration that Ewell experienced when he received the recall order from Lee to advance to Cashtown or Gettysburg. The historian wrote, “There in the strange, dark countryside Ewell revealed that possession of the initiative paralyzed him” (Dowdy, 1958, p. 128). Dowdy severely criticized Ewell for deferring to Early on several occasions. Dowdy suggested that Ewell could not make a decision without Early and that Early sensed this weakness and asserted his authority over Ewell (Dowdy, 1958). As evidence of Early’s preeminence, Dowdy cited the meeting between Lee, Ewell, Early, and Rodes on the Evening of July 1, 1863. The historian suggested that Early did all of the talking and that Ewell acted as the subordinate while early acted as the corps commander (1958).

Dowdy claimed that when pondering the possibility of an attack on the evening of July 1, Ewell “suffered a paralytic stroke to his will” (1958, p. 140). Dowdy doubted that the Federal position on Cemetery Hill was unknown and appeared strong (Dowdy, 1958). He suggested that the Yankees were broken and that Cemetery Hill could have been easily taken. The historian indicated that Ewell had Early’s “fresh” Division with which to attack Cemetery Hill and that Early wished to attack this position as soon as he realized that General Smith’s claim of Federals on the York Road was false. According to Dowdy, Ewell would not act. Dowdy explained,



“Seizing on any excuse to postpone the commitment to action, he told Early he would wait for Johnson’s arrival before attacking. Even the protests of his advisor [Early] could not move him out of that procrastination” (1958, p. 149).

Dowdy’s claims are particularly harsh and unfair. In Dowdy’s first quotation above, he claimed that the “possession of the initiative paralyzed him [Ewell]”. What initiative did Ewell possess? He was moving his corps to a different location and the orders were, as usual, confusing and open-ended. In fact, Ewell moved with great alacrity and one could argue that if not for Ewell’s swift and competent action, the Confederate Third Corps might have been destroyed at Gettysburg on day one.

It is no secret that Ewell and Early were close and that Ewell frequently sought the advice of his commanders throughout his career (Martin, 1991). Ewell acted similarly when he exercised divisional command. After all, many of his subordinates were very talented military officers who, in Early’s case, became a very competent corps commander. It was his nature to seek the advice of capable subordinates, but to ultimately make the final decision. Many modern leadership theories (Morgan, Senge, and Pink) applaud this collaborative action. General Meade employed this strategy at Gettysburg and was widely criticized. Consulting one’s subordinates in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century was frowned upon and considered to be a sign of weakness and indecision. However, it appears that both Meade and Ewell were ahead of their time. Moreover, if Dowdy’s claims of Ewell’s deference to Early were true, and that Early was calling the shots for the Second Corps, why does the historian fail to hold Early responsible for the failure to assault Cemetery Hill or Culp’s Hill. It should be noted that Ewell asked Early to occupy Culp’s Hill on the evening of July 1 and the division commander declined.

As for the meeting with Lee, Ewell, Early, and Rodes, it is true that Early did most of the talking. However, there are several explanations for Early's actions and Ewell's deference. First, Early's Division and Gordon's Brigade had passed through Gettysburg a few days before. Moreover, Early had the benefit of what limited cavalry reconnaissance existed on July 1. It makes sense that Early would have been more familiar with the Cemetery Hill position than either Ewell or Rodes. More importantly, Ewell had been awake for some 40 straight hours (Martin, 1991). As for Rodes, he was suffering from chronic diarrhea (Collins, 2008).

Carol Reardon identified the effects of fatigue and sleep deprivation in the Army of the Potomac during the overland campaign in her study, *With a Sword in One Hand and Jomini in the Other* (2012). Reardon claims that any reduction in sleep time produces what she refers to as "sleep debt" (Reardon, 2012). The historian explains that "Modern sleep-deprivation studies have shown that a lack of sleep for twenty-four hours can produce results on physiological and physical reaction-time tests equivalent to those registered by test substances who were legally drunk." Reardon concluded, "Restorative time for even one night's interrupted sleep can be measured in days" (2012, p.108). According to Reardon's information, one can only imagine the effects of 40 hours without sleep. It is reasonable to conclude that, contrary to Dowdy's claims, Ewell's silence may have been the result of sleep deprivation.

The claim that the Federal position on Cemetery Hill could have been easily taken and that the Federals were broken is astonishing. It has been well documented by both Union and Confederate veterans that this position was a strong one and that any suggestion to the contrary simply flies in the face of all of the credible evidence that exists concerning this topic.

The fact is that only Avery's (1,242 men) and Hays's (1,292 men) Brigades were available for an attack and Hays was guarding prisoners in Gettysburg while Gordon had been ordered to

Smith's aid (Petruzzi & Stanley, 2012). Rodes's Brigades were badly shot up, had suffered some 30% casualties and only Ramseur's and Doles's commands who were heavily engaged, were capable of assisting in an assault. Moreover, Union Colonel Charles Wainwright and his twenty-three guns along with the reserve artillery of the entire XI Corps occupied Cemetery and East Cemetery Hill, and the Iron Brigade of the I Corps positioned itself on Culp's Hill (Pfanzen, 1993, p. 57). If Ewell had ordered an attack, Rebel troops would have had to form within point blank range of Wainwright's artillery. Colonel A.L. Long of Lee's staff, scouted Cemetery Hill and advised that "...an attack made at that time [5:00 pm], with the troops at hand, would have been hazardous and of very doubtful success." (Pfanzen, 1993, p. 420). Contrary to those who suggest that Cemetery Hill was lightly defended, the evidence is clear that the Federals occupied a strong position in considerable force.

Prior to the arrival of Johnson's Division, Ewell believed that his force was inadequate to assault Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill. Moreover, a captured dispatch indicated that the lead element of the US XII Corps was close at hand (O R, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII,1). In fact, Slocum's command (US XII Corps) had arrived by 5:25 PM and Sickles III Corps had arrived by 6:00 PM. (Meade, 1913, p. 56). While opinions vary, it appears that the Federal force occupying Cemetery Hill ranged from a low of 7,000 Federal soldiers to a high of 12,000. This study will utilize Martin's number which splits the difference. Martin indicated that there were 10,000 Union troops on Cemetery Hill on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863 (1991, p. 226). Moreover, Buford's cavalry protected both flanks of the Federal position. As stated earlier, Hill's entire Corps and Rodes's Division were not positioned in the town of Gettysburg. Hill's troops had withdrawn to Seminary Ridge to escape Federal Artillery fire. As a result, Union forces on Cemetery Hill could have focused all of their attention on an attack from Ewell as the

Yankee cavalry would have kept a close eye on Hill's forces which were, clearly in no position to attack. This is significant because all 10,000 Federal soldiers could have engaged to defeat any assault that Ewell might have launched. In either case, a triumphant assault on Cemetery Hill required time to plan and assistance from Hill, neither of which were available to Ewell.

Dowdy claimed that Early wished to attack, but as stated in Chapter II of this study, Early specifically asked Ewell to delay any attack to investigate General Smith's concern of Yankees on the left flank. After Smith's claim had been addressed, the Federal position had swelled in numbers of men and artillery and made any attack ill considered.

The claim that Ewell had a "fresh" Division is misleading and inaccurate. It has been demonstrated that Ewell had, at most two brigades available for an attack on Cemetery Hill. Dowdy's final quotation neglects to mention that Ewell was denied reinforcements from Lee and that the Second Corps commander shifted his attention to Culp's Hill and Johnson's Division only after the meeting with Lee, Early, and Rodes. Prior to this meeting Ewell did everything possible to organize an assault on Cemetery Hill.

### **Glenn Tucker**

Glenn Tucker suggested that Isaac Trimble would have been a much better choice as a corps commander than Ewell. Tucker explained, "He [Trimble] had grasped in an instant what writers and historians have been speculating about for nearly a century, namely that the corps commander [Ewell] had grown timid" (1958, p. 177). The historian continued this line of thought when he asserted that Lee's order (if practicable) on the evening of July 1, delivered by Major Taylor, made no mention of the prohibition of bringing on a general engagement and that Ewell interpreted the order in such a way because he was timid and hesitant (Tucker, 1958). Tucker's *Lee and Longstreet* (1968) referenced an interview between General Ewell and W.W.

Goldsborough in 1866. Goldsborough did not publish the interview until 1900. In the interview, Goldsborough claimed that Ewell blamed James Longstreet and J.E.B. Stuart for the defeat at Gettysburg. Goldsborough served in Edward Johnson's Division. It is curious that he did not publish his interview with Ewell until 1900 when he reported for the *Philadelphia Record*.

Tucker claimed that Goldsborough was certain of his remembrances of this interview (1968).

It is interesting that Tucker would advocate for Trimble as a corps commander given the fact that Trimble had never commanded a unit larger than a brigade and that Early did succeed Ewell and performed very well. Moreover, this study has detailed the many shortcomings of Trimble as a commander. It is easy to suggest bold, daring, and impetuous moves when one is not responsible for the consequences, something that Trimble never tired of. Perhaps Tucker's advocacy for Trimble was the result of perceptions about the major general that were similar and largely unsubstantiated to the ones shared by the 1993 TNT original motion picture *Gettysburg*. As for the "if practicable" order carried by Major Taylor, we can only take General Lee at his word and he stated in his official report (1864) that he included the prohibition of a general engagement which was seconded by Colonel Marshall.

Tucker is correct in the sense that Taylor did not indicate that he reiterated Lee's caveat to Ewell that prohibited major contact with the enemy. Taylor explained that he communicated to Ewell the commanding general's desire that the corps commander attack the hill if he could (Taylor, 1913). The major never addressed whether he advised Ewell not to force a general engagement. Many of Taylor's writings concerning this subject were written long after Lee and Ewell were deceased. It is astonishing that Taylor never revealed that he specifically did not tell Ewell to avoid a general engagement if he in fact, did not. Taylor was at the vortex of the post-war Lost Cause tradition. He was frequently called upon to serve as a type of referee among

dueling Confederate veterans. Perhaps he was influenced by the Lost Cause tradition and sought to protect Lee. Rather than indicating that he delivered the message to Ewell not to bring on a general engagement which was not beneficial to the Lee apologists, the major simply did not mention it either way. It is certainly possible that Taylor did not communicate Lee's caveat to Ewell. However, both General Lee and Colonel Marshall thought otherwise and it is clear that Ewell believed that he was under that restriction (Pfanz, 2001).

### **Paul Casdorff**

The most ardent 21<sup>st</sup> century critic of Richard Ewell is Paul Casdorff. Casdorff's *General Richard S. Ewell: Lee's Hesitant Commander* (2004), is a complete condemnation of the lieutenant general on July 1, 1863. The historian echoes Lee's claim after the war that the commanding general had serious concerns about Ewell's elevation to corps command (2004). The historian elaborated "My serious interest in Ewell surfaced while working on an earlier book about Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson during the 1980's when I began to wonder why a man with such defects of character should reach a high station at a time of national crisis" (2004, p. xi). Casdorff suggested that Ewell was incapable of making decisions without a guiding hand (2004).

Casdorff accused Ewell of failing to realize the importance of Cemetery Hill. The historian fumed, "Just about every officer and man except Ewell himself recognized the importance of these hills to Lee's army-that both needed to be seized before they were taken in force by the enemy" (2004, p. 251). Casdorff concluded, "The argument in most camps is that the unexplained action not only cost Lee a triumph in Pennsylvania, but it also cost the war for the Confederacy" (2004, p. 252).

Casdorph posited the notion that Cemetery Hill could have been easily taken. The historian claimed that General Hancock stated that when he reached Cemetery Hill, there were no fortifications (2004, p. 254). While Casdorph acknowledged the arguments of Ewell's supporters, he concluded, "Whatever the argument advanced by others, Ewell had it in his power to take Cemetery Hill on July 1,..." (2004, p. 255).

Casdorph asserted that Ewell was hesitant from the time that he met with Early and Rodes. The historian stated that Ewell dispatched James Power Smith to Lee's headquarters to inform the commanding general that the Second Corps would await the arrival of Johnson's Division and that Major Taylor arrived with the famous (if practicable) order shortly after Smith departed (2004). The historian asserted that "As the two aids crossed paths, Ewell was fixed in his determination to remain in place" (2004, p. 257). Casdorph referenced all of the usual characters, Trimble, Hunton, and Hancock in an effort to make Ewell look bad.

The claim by Casdorph that Ewell possessed serious character flaws simply does not hold up under scrutiny as proven in Chapter IV of this study. The analytical category, leadership thoroughly addressed this point and found that the historian is sadly mistaken in his views that Ewell was a man who had serious issues as a leader. In fact, Ewell performed no worse than A.P. Hill, Lee's darling, and in some cases, performed superior to the Third Corps commander, yet Hill's capacity at corps command is never challenged. Casdorph, like Lee, suggested that the commanding general was aware of Ewell's deficiencies prior to his appointment to corps command. The historian writes of this claim as though General Lee were not part of the decision making process and that he had no choice but to elevate Ewell. This issue has been refuted in the opening paragraphs of Chapter V of this study.

Perhaps Casdorph's most astonishing claim is that Ewell did not realize the importance of Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill as the historian claimed in the quotation above. This suggestion is preposterous. Ewell was the first officer along with Early and Rodes who identified Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill as key positions that needed to be seized with the help of Hill and yet it was the commanding general who denied Ewell assistance with which to do it. How important could Lee have believed that Cemetery Hill was if he refused to lend even a brigade of Hill's Corps to Ewell for an attack? This quotation is a perfect example of reframing the argument in contravention to the facts to make Ewell look guilty, something that Lost Cause writers became quite adept at.

The notion that Ewell's inaction cost General Lee the battle and the war is as erroneous as the idea that Ewell didn't understand the importance of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill. The first day of the battle of Gettysburg taken alone was one of the most successful in the history of the Army of Northern Virginia. If the situation was so unfavorable after Ewell's supposed blunder, why didn't the commanding general redeploy to a position far more favorable to the Rebels? It was Lee who ordered the army to attack on July 2 and 3, neither of which was forced on the commanding general. To suggest that Ewell's actions of July 1 lost the battle is sophomoric. Perhaps more absurd is the idea that Ewell's actions on July 1 lost the war for the Confederacy. Had the Rebels been successful on all three days of the battle, the likely result would have been that the remainder of Meade's army would have imposed itself between Lee and Washington and another battle would have ensued somewhere closer to Washington, but the suggestion that the war would have ended on the spot if the Confederates had been successful at Gettysburg is extremely unlikely (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II).



Casdorph's assertion that Ewell had it in his power to capture Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle is another bit of wishful thinking on the part of the historian. The forces and artillery arrayed against Ewell and the troops at his disposal, without assistance from Hill make this statement very flimsy.

In another bit of reframing the argument in contravention to the facts on the part of Casdorph, the historian described James Power Smith's ride to General Lee on the evening of July 1, to inform the commanding general, according to Casdorph, that Ewell would await the arrival of Johnson's Division (2004). The historian explained that this was about the time that Major Taylor arrived with the famous ("if practicable") order and that the two officers probably passed one another. Casdorph's account of Smith's mission was used to demonstrate that Ewell was hesitant and resolute in his desire to remain in place from the start. Casdorph's description of these events is totally at odds with every other recollection of the accounts of that day, especially Smith who reported to Lee. As stated on multiple occasions in this study, Ewell dispatched Smith to request support from Hill so that an attack could go forward. Ewell, Early, and Rodes favored an attack if they received assistance from Hill. There was never any mention of waiting for Johnson at this point. The meeting later in the evening between Lee, Ewell, Early and Rodes at Ewell's headquarters adjourned with the impression of most, if not all of the participants that the Cemetery Hill position was too strong and that the Second Corps would focus on Culp's Hill (Early, 1912). Perhaps the historian was confused as to the order of events and their conclusions.

Casdorph's arguments, while entertaining, are one contradiction after another. For example, the historian noted "Richard Ewell's Civil War performance and even his duty on the Indian frontier indicated that serious offensive campaigning on his own account was never part of his military makeup" (2004, p. 18). Describing Ewell in an 1857 fight against the Apaches,

Casdorph asserted that Ewell was “freely acknowledged as the hero of the day; his unhesitating leap to action crushed the Western Apaches and forced them to sue for peace. Ewell’s aggressiveness in the Gila River fight was yet another laurel that attracted notice in Santa Fe and Washington” (2004, p. 81). At Gaines Mill in 1862, Casdorph said, “He [Ewell] demonstrated plenty of gumption at Gaines Mill and Bottom’s Bridge, when he wanted to lunge across the Chickahominy and engulf Porter’s [Fitz John] northern flank” (2004, p. 174). Casdorph continued that the victory at Cross Keys was “entirely Ewell’s work”. Ewell complained that he wanted another chance against Fremont, but Casdorph explained that “it was Jackson who restrained him” (2004, p. 150). Casdorph described Ewell’s performance at Second Winchester. “Without a moment’s hesitation Ewell made the troop dispositions that insured not only a Confederate victory but also opened a path for Lee to speed his northward thrust.” The historian stated that Ewell was anxious to prove himself since he had not seen combat in nearly a year and that Lee was interested to see how Ewell would perform. The historian concluded, “The moment of truth had arrived-far in the advance of Lee, A.P. Hill, and Longstreet, Ewell ascertained the necessity for immediate action, and in no doubt his finest hour as a corps commander he plunged headlong into Milroy’s regiments” (2004, p. 234). Henry Kidd Douglas stated, “The movement of Ewell at Winchester was quick, and effective-in fact, Jacksonian” (Pfan, 1998, p. 290). Several newspapers had dubbed Ewell “the new Jackson” (Martin, 1991, p. 189). There are other examples and this is but one of the areas that Casdorph tends to assert an opinion only to disprove it with evidence to the contrary.

Deppen’s book review of Casdorph’s, *Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell: Lee’s Hesitant Commander* is revealing. Deppen noted, “Despite his obvious prejudice toward Ewell, the author cannot help but point out Ewell’s various successes as a combat leader, grudgingly

admitting that Ewell could act when the occasion demanded.” (Deppen, n. d.). Casdorff’s account of Ewell’s performance is very harsh and contains many inconsistencies.

It is easy to see that many of Ewell’s critics over the last 150 years have been, for the most part, unchallenged and that the effects of the Lost Cause tradition may have influenced much of the rhetoric associated with the lieutenant general’s performance on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. Most of the critical accusations leveled at the Second Corps commander either do not comport with the evidence or were submitted by individuals whose motives or honesty could be questioned. To achieve a more objective opinion as to whether General Ewell’s decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, was reasonable, the following section of Chapter V will discuss the data collection in Chapter IV of this study.

### **Conclusions**

The identification and of eight combined military leadership principles and two “Units of Meaning” based upon the theories of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM and their application to General Ewell on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863, have produced results that are very enlightening. Based on the data collected in Chapter IV of this dissertation, the following conclusions have been observed.

That General Richard S. Ewell possessed most, if not all of the characteristics of a good leader as identified by Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM under the combined military leadership principle, leadership. Not only did Ewell possess most of these qualities, but many were on display on July 1, 1863. Moreover, the research demonstrated that Ewell did not possess any of the leadership characteristics that Sun Tzu identified as dangerous in a commander. Perhaps had General Lee followed what the US Army calls, mission variables or METT-TC, the outcome may have been very different for the Confederacy? METT-TC refers to mission, enemy, terrain

and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations. These factors are used by commanders to focus and analyze variables for a mission. Applying METT-TC to General Ewell on July 1, 1863 is very revealing in order to comprehend the difficulties that the Second Corps commander faced (USAFM, 2011).

No Confederate officer was sure what the mission was on July 1, especially Ewell. The famous (“if practicable”) order that Ewell received at the pivotal moment on the afternoon of July 1 did not reveal the mission to Ewell. What was more important, taking Cemetery Hill or avoiding a general engagement? Ewell had very little information on the enemy. As stated earlier in Chapter IV of this study, the Army of Northern Virginia experienced a complete intelligence breakdown during the Pennsylvania campaign. Ewell was unsure as to the security of his left flank and he was unaware of the exact number of Federal troops facing him. He was aware that the Union position on Cemetery Hill was a formidable one and that any assault by his troops would require assistance by other units outside of the Second Corps. Terrain is another variable that has been well documented in Chapter IV of this study. It is clear that the terrain facing Ewell’s troops was perfectly situated for defensive operations to thwart any attempted assault by the lieutenant general. The weather is a mission variable that has not been considered. However, it certainly played a factor as it was very hot and humid on July 1, 1863 (Pfanz, 2001). In addition, Ewell’s corps had marched and fought for some 12 hours (O.R., 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1). It is very clear that Ewell had at most, two brigades (Hays’s and Avery’s) available for an assault on Cemetery Hill and that he could expect no assistance from the commanding general. As for the time available, Ewell, Early, and Rodes, most likely realized that time was of the essence to secure the heights. However, they also realized that this formidable eminence had already been occupied and that it would require a significant force, one far more powerful than

what was at their disposal, to realistically take Cemetery Hill. It would appear that there were few civil considerations that Ewell would have experienced on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863.

The reality of Ewell's situation was, if one utilized the US Army's mission variables or METT-TC, that Ewell did not know the mission, Ewell was unsure of the enemy in terms of intelligence, but he knew that the enemy occupied a strong position, the Second Corps commander realized that the terrain did not favor and was in fact, a real impediment to him, the weather was hot and humid which fatigued his men, he had a small number of troops with which to achieve a goal that required significantly more men, and he had according to General Hancock, less than 30 minutes to make the decision. Is it any wonder that Ewell did not order an assault on Cemetery Hill?

It appears obvious that Ewell followed the combined military leadership principle of leadership as identified by Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM. It is reasonable to conclude that, according to the USAFM, General Lee failed to provide Ewell with any assistance concerning mission variables and that Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1, 1863, was reasonable and consistent with the combined military leadership principles.

The combined military leadership principle under the analytical category, clarity of orders was not followed on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. The famous "take the hill if practicable, but don't bring on a general engagement" order was indicative of many of the orders that General Lee issued to his subordinates (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1, p. 318). Many have contended that "Stonewall" Jackson or James Longstreet would have interpreted this order to mean, take the hill. They neglect to mention that both Jackson and Longstreet were senior commanders in what would become the Army of Northern Virginia when Lee was riding a desk

in Richmond. Both of these officers had become very familiar with Lee's style of command and realized how far they could stretch the spirit of their orders.

One of the most profound problems for Ewell was that he and Lee did not know each other very well (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II). Ewell, with the exception of a brief time on the peninsula during the Seven Days campaign, served on detached duty with Jackson. Ewell was detached with Jackson again for the Second Manassas campaign where he was wounded. The reality of the situation was that when Ewell assumed command of the Second Corps for the Pennsylvania campaign, he and Lee were not well acquainted. Ewell had no idea what type of latitude he had within Lee's orders. Moreover, the visit with Campbell Brown early on July 1 indicated that Lee was very upset due to other (Stuart) officers disobeying his orders. This information must have had a significant impact on the commander of the Second Corps. Ewell was in his first campaign as a corps commander while Lee was revered at this stage of the war as a fearless and brilliant commander of the Rebel's most successful army. A quick review of Lee's accomplishments up to the battle of Gettysburg makes this point obvious. Lee had pushed the mammoth Federal Army off the Virginia peninsula in 1862, he had won the battle of Second Manassas, had invaded Maryland and fought the Union to a stalemate at Sharpsburg, crushed the Army of the Potomac at Fredericksburg, and won what his biographer called his greatest victory at Chancellorsville. Is it any wonder that General Ewell, faced with the possibility that he might fall afoul of the commanding general sought to obey Lee's orders? Moreover, Ewell had no idea of Lee's intentions. Perhaps Lee wished to fight elsewhere or perhaps Lee had more intelligence on the position of the rest of the Federal Army? Ewell had no idea. According to General Trimble, Ewell was under the impression that the commanding general wished to avoid a major fight (Casdorff, 2004). Had Ewell launched an assault on Cemetery Hill and Lee ordered a

withdrawal, it would have been a useless effusion of blood for which Ewell would surely have been censured.

The accusation that Lee had a staff that was woefully inadequate for the task has been suggested by many (Alexander, 1962). Moreover, Lee's aversion to military correspondence and staff work was well known. James Power Smith wrote after the war, "General Lee-we may almost say, loathed the routine of headquarters correspondence" (1916, p. 83). This dislike manifested itself as a contributing factor to the confusing nature of the orders that were disseminated from his headquarters. Following the debacle of special orders number 191 during the Maryland campaign in which a copy of Lee's battle plan was lost and recovered by the Federals, Lee took to a habit of issuing verbal orders. Pfanz claimed that the famous ("if practicable") order delivered to Ewell from Major Taylor was verbal (2001). In fact, Major Taylor reported after the war that when he delivered the order to Ewell, the commander of the Second Corps made no objection, reported the capture of prisoners, and left the major with the impression that the hill would be taken (1913).

This account highlights the importance of written orders, something that Porter Alexander insisted was necessary (1962). Not surprisingly, a verbal order can communicate different or unintended meanings. Body language, voice inflection, and other non-verbal communication can suggest or communicate messages that were never intended (David Piper, personal correspondence, July, 2012). A person can verbalize a communication using the exact same words, but through voice inflection and other non-verbal meanings communicate an entirely different message. Perhaps this accounts for Taylor's experience with Ewell? If Taylor stressed the importance of not bringing on a general engagement and casually mentioned the possibility of taking Cemetery Hill, Ewell, who was aware of the prohibition of avoiding major contact with

the enemy would naturally assume that he would not assault the hill and communicate a non-verbal meaning to Taylor that suggested that he understood the order. We can never be sure of what non-verbal messages were communicated and interpreted by Major Taylor or General Ewell. This highlights the importance of written orders.

Unclear and confusing orders were common from the commanding general. His staff was pitifully small and battlefield communication remained a constant problem throughout the war (Krick, 2004). It is interesting that General Lee, a voracious reader of Napoleon, did not employ a larger staff. The French had perfected staff work through the theories of Pierre-Joseph Bourcet. Napoleon had incorporated his ideas when creating the French Imperial General Staff which became a model for effective staff work (Bowden & Ward, 2001). Napoleonic staffs were enormous and usually utilized a permanent corps of trained men. Bowden and Ward claimed that at the battle of Austerlitz (1805), Napoleon had an army of nearly 75,000 men and he employed a staff of 200 (2001). Napoleon's *Grande Armee* utilized 30 staff members for each corps and 20 staff members for each division (Bowden & Ward, 2001). Contrast these figures with Lee's staff for the Army of Northern Virginia. As stated earlier, a Napoleonic division commander who was responsible for about 9,000 troops had a staff of 20 men. Lee who was responsible for the 70,000 man Army of Northern Virginia had a staff of 5 men. Bowden & Ward called this deficiency "...arguably the gravest weakness of the army" (2001, p. 22). While the Army of the Potomac did not match Napoleonic numbers for the size of its staff, it was much larger than Lee's.

The order that recalled Ewell from Carlisle to report to either Gettysburg or Cashtown is an excellent example and prompted Ewell to complain. "Why can't a commanding general have someone on his staff who can write an intelligible order (Krick, 2004, p. 106)? The famous take



the hill if practicable, but avoid contact with the enemy is another example (OR, 1880-1901, vol. XXVII, 1). Lee's order to Ewell late in the evening that suggested that he might move the Second Corps to the right is more evidence of the vague and unclear orders that faced Ewell on July 1 (Pfanz, 1998). The orders that were promulgated to General Stuart at the opening of the Pennsylvania campaign were just as confusing and ambiguous as those submitted to Ewell and spawned a controversy of their own. In both cases confusion reigned and Lee somehow escaped blame.

There is an incredible double standard that exists among Lost Cause writers and Lee apologists when it comes to Lee's orders. It must be stated that General Lee enjoyed the services of subordinates (corps commanders) that were the finest or among the finest of the war on either side. The Confederates put some 900,000 soldiers in the field during the war and according to Gallagher, only 4 men (Jackson, Longstreet, Early, and Stuart-who was included even though he was not a corps chief) proved that they possessed the skills to be effective corps commanders (2004, vol. II). In fact, they were not only effective, but they were the best in the Confederacy and perhaps the best of the war (Gallagher, 2004). The Federals had some corps commanders who were, perhaps as good, but none who were better.

Lee issued unusually vague and confusing orders and his talented subordinates were very successful despite this handicap. Ewell, who was brand new to corps command, not as talented as those referenced above and completely unfamiliar with Lee's style was expected to perform at the level of the best commanders of the war with virtually no help and arguably a hindrance from Lee.

The double standard existed with how Lee and his apologists reacted to Ewell and Stuart who were issued orders that were very vague, confusing, and discretionary. Stuart placed the most

liberal interpretation on his orders and Lee and his supporters accused the major general of exceeding those orders. Ewell, on the other hand, placed the most conservative interpretation on his orders and Lee and his enthusiasts reproached Ewell for not exceeding those orders. If you were a corps commander in Lee's army, you could not win. Lee, whether intended or not, issued orders that were sufficiently vague enough so that whatever action was taken by a corps commander, the order contained plausible deniability for Lee if things went awry. On the other hand, if the corps commander performed well, Lee and his friends appeared willing to accept credit for the corps commander's successes.

Another double standard that existed and still exists is the commanding general's willingness to hold his corps commanders responsible for the action and coordination of the divisions of their corps, and their decisions as corps chiefs while Lee assumed no responsibility for his corps commanders as the army commander. Lee claimed after the war that "the imperfect, halting way in which his corps commanders, especially Ewell, fought the battle gave victory, finally to the foe" (Marshall, 1927, p. 251). There were rumors that Lee also blamed Ewell for Rodes's failure to attack on July 2 with other units of Early's and Johnson's Divisions (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II). During the battle of the Wilderness, General Gordon discovered an opportunity and suggested an attack. Early, his division commander disagreed and Ewell deferred to Early who was the commander on the field. Lee learned of the opportunity and ordered it forward. The attack was successful, but would have been more so had it taken place earlier in the day. Lee, even though Early stopped that attack blamed Ewell because, as Lee claimed, Ewell was the officer in overall command (Gallagher, 2004, vol. II).

It has been suggested by participants (Taylor and Alexander) and many historians that Ewell did Lee a disservice because he discouraged the commanding general from moving the Second

Corps to the right. The detractors of Ewell applauded Lee's suggestion of moving the Second Corps to the right as the correct move but blame the corps commander for discouraging Lee from taking this action. The assumption is that Lee had to defer to the wishes of his corps commander on the field. Yet Lee was ultimately responsible for making the decision and if he was so certain that it was correct, it was the commanding general's responsibility to overrule his corps chief as Lee expected his corps commanders to overrule their division commanders.

Culp's Hill provides another example of a double standard in Lee's favor. The one decision that Ewell can perhaps be justly criticized for on July 1 is the failure to occupy or attempt to occupy Culp's Hill. The lieutenant general suggested that Early occupy this position on the evening of the first day (Martin, 1991). The division commander declined explaining that his men were tired and had done much of the fighting, a comment that infuriated General Johnson (Martin, 1991). Rather than ordering Early to occupy Culp's Hill, Ewell decided to wait for Johnson who was believed to be close by, but was delayed due to congestion on the Chambersburg Pike (Pfaniz, 2001). It should be noted that Culp's Hill was in fact, occupied by Wadsworth's Division early on July 1 (Howard, 2010). However, Ewell believed that Culp's Hill was vacant. In the end, it is reasonable to conclude that Ewell believed that Johnson would occupy the position momentarily. Moreover, the lieutenant general may have feared that a repositioning of Early in the absence of Johnson might be dangerous to the Confederate left flank. . Essentially, Ewell bowed to the wishes of his division commander on the field and did not order Early to occupy Culp's Hill

To Ewell detractors and Lee apologists, this action was reprehensible. Many contend that Ewell should have realized the importance of Culp's Hill and ordered its occupation early in the day. In fact, General Meade indicated to Ewell after the war that the occupation of Culp's Hill

early on July 1 would have prompted the evacuation of the Federal position. (Tucker, 1968). If Culp's Hill was unoccupied and so important, why did the commanding general not specifically order Ewell to take that position immediately?

Many participants and historians who are favorable to Lee have suggested that Ewell's insistence of maintaining the Second Corps position on the left flank and the corps commander's lobbying to discourage Lee from moving Ewell to the right was a fatal flaw attributable to Ewell. The implication is that Lee had it right, but that Ewell obstructed the commanding general. Essentially, Lee had deferred to his corps commander on the field just as Ewell had deferred to his division commander (Early) when Early declined to occupy Culp's Hill. There is absolutely no difference between Ewell's deference to Early and Lee's deference to Ewell yet Ewell is held accountable for not ordering Early to occupy Culp's Hill because Ewell exercised command over Early. On the other hand, Lee exercised overall command of Ewell, but Ewell is blamed for dissuading Lee from moving his corps to the right and the commanding general is excused for not making the final decision.

It is interesting that Lee held Ewell and other commanders accountable for their subordinate units and in fact, blamed them for the loss at Gettysburg. It would seem that if Lee held his subordinates responsible for their divisional commanders' decisions, because they exercised corps command, that Lee would assume responsibility for his corps commanders as he was the army commander. Lee made no effort to coordinate the three corps under his charge on either day of the battle of Gettysburg. It is astonishing that he would point the finger at his subordinates and claim no liability for himself, although he did admit his guilt for the failure of the Pickett-Pettigrew assault on July 3. .

The combined military leadership principle, clarity of orders was not followed on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863. It is obvious that Lee's confusing orders were largely responsible for not only the absence of Rebel cavalry, but significantly contributed to Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill. The failure of this military leadership principle rests exclusively with the commanding general.

Concentration is a military principle that appears to be common among nearly all military theorists. Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM are no exception. Whether it is massing combat power at the most strategic location as suggested by Jomini and the USAFM or bringing that force to bear on the enemy's weakest point (Sun Tzu), the importance of concentrating the maximum amount of combat power at the point of attack is paramount to success.

It is apparent that General Ewell appreciated the value of the military leadership principle of concentration. Ewell realized that even with Early's Division, he did not possess enough combat power at the point of attack to launch an assault on Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. General Smith's claim of Yankees on the left flank further eroded Ewell's strength and threatened to further dilute the forces available to concentrate on the Federal position. In an effort to either bolster his own force or maneuver in conjunction with A.P. Hill's Corps, the Second Corps commander asked Lee for help from Hill. When it was refused, Ewell realized that with the threat to his left and no assistance from Hill, he would be at a numerical disadvantage and unable to adequately concentrate the forces at his disposal.

The research presented in Chapter IV of this study clearly indicates that the combined military leadership principle of concentration was not followed on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863. It is also clear that General Ewell not only appreciated the value of concentration, but that he attempted to remedy his deficiencies so that he could attempt an assault to secure the

high ground. Ewell realized that any attack would have been rash and doubtful of success. It was General Lee's refusal to provide assistance that prohibited Ewell from following the principle of concentration.

Perhaps one of the most timeless military leadership principles is terrain. This principle advocates utilizing the lay of the land or the makeup of the landscape to one's advantage and to the enemy's disadvantage. It is certain that the terrain facing Ewell was problematic. The two most dominant terrain features on the entire battlefield (Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill) faced Ewell's Corps. Moreover, Union forces exploited these terrain features to their fullest. Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill were rugged, and littered with rail fences and stone walls. Federal forces dug in and occupied this formidable terrain with ample infantry and plentiful artillery.

Even with a numerical advantage, assaulting Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863 would have been a bloody contest due to the difficult terrain facing the Confederates and the abundance of Yankee artillery. Assaulting this famous hill with a numerical disadvantage would have been ill-advised, reckless, and produced serious casualties. General Ewell certainly followed the combined military leadership principle of terrain by refusing to order an assault on Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863. Any attack without significant reinforcements or a favorable maneuver on Hill's end of the line would have constituted a violation of the principle of terrain.

For General Ewell, maneuver and terrain were closely related. The terrain and Ewell's inferiority in numbers prohibited a direct assault. The combined military leadership principle of maneuver promised to provide a possible remedy. Maneuver utilizes the movement of one's forces to place the enemy at a disadvantage. Ewell undoubtedly believed, although we cannot be certain, that when he asked for assistance from Hill it would have been in the form of some type of attack or feint on Hill's end of the line which would have constituted an offensive maneuver.

This action would have compensated for Ewell's inability to maneuver on his end of the Federal line which presented an unassailable flank and may have forced the Federals to move troops from Ewell's position to check a proposed assault by Hill.

Lee's failure to provide any assistance from Hill is very curious. Brigadier General James Lanes's Brigade casually skirmished with Buford's cavalry and Edward Thomas's Brigade, both of Pender's Division, were never committed (Sears, 2003). Lane's and Thomas's Brigades represented some 3,000 troops that were not employed (Sears, 2003). Moreover, Richard Anderson's Division, which was ordered to Gettysburg on the morning of July 1, and arrived, but two miles from Ewell's position, was ordered to stand down by the commanding general (Pfan, 2001). So confused was Anderson by the order that he appeared at Lee's headquarters to make sure that it was not a mistake (Sears, 2003). Lee stated that Anderson's Division, was the only fresh troops and that they would be used as a reserve. Lane's and Thomas's Brigades along with Anderson's Division represented 10,000 troops that were available and not committed on July 1. So much for the commanding general's claim that he had no troops to support Ewell. Apparently, Lee was not willing to launch an assault by committing Hill's troops, due to fatigue and his concern that Anderson's Division represented the only reserve. Ironic that Lee criticized the Second Corps commander for a lack of aggressiveness and his failure to launch an assault after the war when the commanding general balked when the onus for an attack was placed on him. Essentially, Lee had criticized Ewell for refusing to commit to an assault on Cemetery Hill, something that he was unwilling to do himself.

It is clear that the combined military leadership principle of maneuver was not followed on the afternoon or evening of July 1, 1863. Again, it appears that Ewell realized the necessity of

implementing this combined military leadership principle, but was denied the ability to comply with the principle of maneuver by the inaction of the commanding general.

Offensive operations are favored as the most decisive form of maneuver to achieve total victory among Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM. All of the theorists referenced advocated numerical advantage to properly employ offensive operations. The three theoretical frameworks of this study express similar views concerning offensive operations and Sun Tzu and Jomini provide the foundation for the USAFM. However, the USAFM is far and away the most detailed in its description of what offensive options are available to commanders.

The five basic offensive maneuvers as identified by the USAFM are envelopment, turning movement, frontal attack, penetration, and infiltration (USAFM 3-90, 2001). Because most offensive operations require multiple simultaneous attacks, General Lee's denial of reinforcements or assistance from General Hill dictated that the only offensive operation available to Ewell was a frontal attack. Obviously, frontal attacks require a considerable numerical advantage, particularly when launched against an enemy who enjoys all of the benefits of terrain and numbers. Moreover, casualties as a result of frontal attacks tend to be extreme.

Because there was no offensive operation on the part of the Second Corps on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863, the combined military leadership principle of offensive operations was not followed. It is obvious that, like concentration and maneuver, the fault rests with Lee for not providing or even attempting to provide additional help for Ewell. However, it is certain that General Ewell followed the combined military leadership principle of offensive operations. The Second Corps commander attempted to locate a force capable of securing the heights the entire afternoon and evening. Ewell's refusal to commit a senseless and costly frontal assault with the forces at his disposal represented obedience to the combined military leadership principle of



offensive operations which discourages attacks that are not properly supported. Either way, it appears that General Ewell had a healthy appreciation for the combined military leadership principle of offensive operations, but General Lee's action prohibited compliance with this military leadership principle.

Although Ewell's Second Corps did not assume a defensive posture until the early morning hours of July 2, defensive operations have been included in this study. The Federal army under General Reynolds and General Howard did assume a defensive position and fought defensively throughout July 1. It is clear that the entire Union effort on the first day of the battle focused on holding the high ground until the remainder of the Army of the Potomac arrived. Federal forces performed very deftly in this endeavor. Although defensive operations were significant because Ewell's opponent utilized them to the fullest, the Second Corps commander did not adopt a defensive bearing on July 1. Therefore, it is impossible to conclude whether or not Ewell complied with the combined military leadership principle of defensive operations. As a result, defensive operations will not be included in the final analysis of General Ewell on July 1, 1863.

Another reason that defensive operations were included in this study is that they are very appropriate for evaluation purposes. While this study focuses on General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, defensive operations have been included to strengthen the methodology so that this model may be utilized by other researchers who are studying other generals in other battles.

It has been demonstrated that intelligence is of paramount importance to a commander on any battlefield. Chapter IV of this study revealed that the Army of Northern Virginia suffered a complete intelligence breakdown during the Pennsylvania campaign. Although Ewell was assisted by a brigade (Jenkins) of cavalry, the quality of that unit was very questionable and was

certainly not up to the standards of Stuart's troopers. In fact, it appears as though certain units of Jenkins Brigade were more of a hindrance than a help. It has been revealed that General Rodes was very frustrated with this unit and actively sought to rid himself of their burden.

While the quality of Jenkins Brigade left much to be desired and it is not certain what responsibility Ewell had as a corps commander to employ spies, Ewell's failure to inform Jenkins of his journey to Gettysburg or make certain that the wayward troopers were present, was inexcusable. Had Jenkins been available early on July 1, his brigade could have guarded prisoners or investigated the threat to the Confederate left which would have made Smith's and Gordon's Brigades available for an attack. As a result, the combined military leadership principle of intelligence was not followed on afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863, and Ewell must bear the responsibility for this failure.

"Units of Meaning" refers to military principles that were particularly relevant to General Ewell on July 1, 1863, but were not common among Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM. Two "Units of Meaning" were identified in this study and both were referenced from the USAFM. The "Units of Meaning" identified in this study consist of the military principles of security and initiative.

Security is arguably the most important responsibility of any commander. Protecting ones force from any threat or perceived threat is a hallmark of command, according to the US Army. The research in Chapter IV of this study indicated that Ewell's Corps was the subject of what was formerly considered a perceived threat and now may be classified as a credible threat on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863.

General William Smith's report of Yankees on the York Road and his belief that the Second Corps was about to be flanked demanded action. The fact that Early claimed that he did not

believe General Smith, but detached an entire brigade to investigate, with Ewell's acquiescence, revealed the importance of the military principle of security. Both Ewell and Early realized the potential disaster that could befall not only the Second Corps, but the entire Confederate force present if Smith's information was accurate as Ewell's Corps represented the entire Confederate left flank.

The timing of the threat to the Confederate left could not have been worse. Just as Ewell was contemplating an attack on Cemetery Hill, General Smith's threat and Ewell and Early's response, reduced the manpower available to Ewell for an assault on Cemetery Hill by 50% at perhaps the most critical moment of the afternoon. However, Ewell correctly realized that his first responsibility was to see to the security of his corps and the Confederate left flank before he launched an attack on Cemetery Hill which could have seriously compromised his force and the position of the Rebel army if Smith's claims were true. As a result, the "Unit of Meaning", security was followed by General Ewell on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863.

Initiative is perhaps one of the most important military principles espoused by the US Army. It is interwoven, much like terrain, in nearly every strategic, operational, and tactical operation that is undertaken. Even on the defensive, the US Army advocates seeking opportunities to initiate action or regain the initiative (USAFM, 2011). The US Army indicates that action is preferable to passivity and that commanders must act when orders in hand do not conform to the situation or when the commander is without orders.

Ewell has been vehemently criticized for timidity and not only relinquishing the initiative, but failing to attempt to regain it. This argument simply does not comport with the research identified in Chapter IV of this study. In fact, the lieutenant general spent the afternoon and evening attempting to identify forces that could seize the high ground. Threats to his left flank,

denial of assistance from Hill, and the absence of Johnson's Division thwarted the Second Corps commander. To suggest that he did not seek remedies to his situation to regain the initiative is in contravention of the facts. The US Army advocates action when commanders are not in possession of orders. However, despite Ewell's critics, the lieutenant general had orders in hand that did not mandate an attack on Cemetery Hill and specifically prohibited major contact with the enemy.

Many have argued that the prohibition of bringing on a general engagement was no longer valid and that Ewell should have realized that the action earlier in the day made Lee's order to avoid major contact with the enemy null and void (Trimble, 1898). According to Lee, he reiterated this prohibition through Major Taylor after Ewell asked for reinforcements. It is also worth noting that although the USAFM advocates action over passivity and action when orders are no longer valid, a prerequisite to this action is a subordinate's knowledge of the commanders mission, control, and intent, something that Ewell was totally ignorant of (USAFM, 2011). The "Unit of Meaning", initiative was not observed by Ewell's Second Corps on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863. Ewell spent the afternoon, evening, and night of July 1, seeking ways to regain it, indicating that the lieutenant general realized the value of regaining the initiative, but the threat to the left flank and Johnson's late arrival were hindrances. More importantly, Lee's confusing orders and denial of reinforcements foiled General Ewell's attempts to act.

It appears that the data collection in Chapter IV of this study has provided conclusive answers to the research questions described in chapter I. The first research question asked if General Ewell made a reasonable decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg according to the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM? The research demonstrated that indeed Ewell did make a reasonable decision

not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle. The combined military leadership principles identified revealed that not only did Ewell act reasonably, but he most likely made the correct decision not to attack.

The second research question was did General Ewell or was General Ewell permitted to adhere to the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Antoine Jomini, and the USAFM on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863? The combined military leadership principle of defensive operations was included in this study to highlight the skill with which Federal forces executed these operations and for the benefit of future studies that may choose to adopt this model. Ewell's Second Corps did not assume the defensive until the morning of July 2. As a result, the Second Corps commander was not evaluated according to the defensive operations identified in this study. Therefore, the total number of combined military leadership principles used to evaluate General Ewell was seven and the total number of "Units of Meaning" was two.

The data in Chapter IV of this study demonstrated that two of the combined military leadership principles (leadership and terrain) were observed on the afternoon and evening of July 1. On the other hand, five of the military leadership principles (clarity of orders, concentration, maneuver, offensive operations, and intelligence) or analytical categories were violated on the first day of the battle. However, the research clearly shows that clarity of orders was the responsibility of the commanding general, not Ewell. Moreover, Ewell understood the necessity of concentrating and maneuvering his forces, but it was Lee's denial of reinforcements or assistance from Hill that made both concentration and maneuver unworkable. On multiple occasions throughout the afternoon, evening, and night, General Ewell attempted to identify a

unit that could assume the offensive and regain the initiative. However, the commanding general foiled him at nearly every turn.

Although this study has correctly concluded that the combined military leadership principles of concentration, maneuver, and offensive operations were not followed, one could argue that General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill constituted adherence to these principles. If Ewell had recklessly attacked without concentrating his forces, without maneuvering, and launched what would most likely have been a frontal assault against Cemetery Hill, he surely would have been in violation of these principles. If one chooses to contend that the combined military leadership principles listed above (concentration, maneuver, offensive operations) were followed due to Ewell's refusal to attack, then one can conclude that Ewell followed five of the combined military leadership principles (leadership, concentration, terrain, maneuver, and offensive operations). Clarity of orders represents a sixth military leadership principle that Ewell was not responsible for, but clearly followed as evidenced by his communication with subordinates on July 1, 1863. If one chooses to conclude that these combined military leadership principles (concentration, maneuver, offensive operations) were not followed, one must also realize that the commander of the Confederate Second Corps understood their value and sought to carry them out only to be deterred by the commanding general. In short, Ewell was not in violation of these principles. As a result this study can conclude that General Ewell followed six of the seven military leadership principles identified in this study.

Although there was a complete breakdown of the intelligence apparatus on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia during the Pennsylvania campaign, Ewell's failure, if true, to notify and utilize Jenkins cavalry, no matter how inadequate, was a grave error. The failure to exercise

control over the cavalry forces assigned to his corps constituted a violation of the combined military leadership principle of intelligence.

Another research question identified by this study was did General Ewell or was General Ewell permitted to act in accordance with the principles and “Units of Meaning” of the USAFM on July 1, 1863? The two “Units of Meaning”, both from the USAFM are security and initiative. Ewell certainly provided for the security of his corps and the Confederate flank by dispatching a security force (Gordon’s Brigade) to investigate threats to his left flank for which he has been criticized. Moreover, contrary to many of Ewell’s critics, the research clearly demonstrated the lieutenant general’s prudence in ordering an operational pause and his diligence in attempting to identify an attacking force to regain the initiative. This is evidence that Ewell understood the value of initiative. However, only Lee’s confusing orders and lack of support foiled the Second Corps commander which produced a situation in which the initiative was never regained.

This study posited the question, did General Ewell possess adequate forces to expect a reasonable chance for success had he assaulted Cemetery Hill on the evening of July 1, 1863? While some of Ewell’s critics, particularly mid -20<sup>th</sup> century historians, have suggested that Cemetery Hill was lightly defended and that the lieutenant general possessed an entire fresh division with which to attack, the evidence suggests otherwise. It has been well documented that Ewell’s detractors conveniently forget that the lieutenant general had to address a threat to his left flank and dispatched a brigade to bolster General Smith’s force. Rodes’s Division was badly damaged and was guarding prisoners from the earlier fight. In fact, according to the US Army, Rodes’s Division would have been considered combat ineffective (O’Brian, 1991). As a result, only Hays’s (1,292 men) and Avery’s (1,242 men) Brigades were available for an attack. Hill’s Corps as well as Rodes’s Division had withdrawn outside of the town and back to Seminary

Ridge to escape Federal artillery fire from Cemetery Hill (Petruzzi & Stanley, 2012, p. 126). Ewell possessed only two brigades to assault a position in which the terrain was an impediment, the enemy boasted nearly 50 guns and 10 thousand soldiers which were protected by Federal cavalry on the flanks. It is obvious that Ewell did not possess adequate forces to expect a reasonable chance for success.

Based on the data collection in Chapter IV of this dissertation, the following can be concluded. That General Ewell adhered to 85% of the combined military leadership principles identified in this study on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863. Moreover, the lieutenant general followed 100% of the “Units of Meaning” on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. Finally, General Ewell observed 88 % of both the combined military leadership principles and “Units of Meaning” on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863. The chart below (Figure 25) helps to explain the analysis of the combined military leadership principles and “Units of Meaning”. This study provides conclusive evidence that General Ewell acted reasonably when he refused to order an attack on Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863.

On the afternoon of July 3, as Pickett’s, Pettigrew’s, and Trimble’s shattered divisions were fleeing back to Seminary Ridge, the commanding general rode out and consoled General Cadmus Wilcox, Lee stated, “Never mind General, all this has been my fault—It is I that have lost this fight, and you must help me out of it in the best way you can” (Sears, 2003, p. 458). Truer words have never been spoken and they are appropriate for the action on July 1 as well. In the end, the failure to assault Cemetery Hill must rest with General Lee not General Ewell.

### **Limitations**

The conclusions of this study suffer from several limitations. Like all qualitative researchers, authors introduce personal bias, whether known or unknown, to their research. This study



attempted to limit and counteract personal bias through triangulation of the data. As a result, both primary and secondary data was utilized. In addition, primary research that represented both Union and Confederate veterans accounts of the events of July 1, 1863, was included. Secondary data that included research from a century and a half and various schools of thought on this subject were used to triangulate the data.

This study developed a theoretical framework that included three military theorists that represented 2,500 years of military thought. The utilization of multiple theoretical frameworks represents another example of triangulation that should strengthen and enhance the conclusions of this study.

With any historical narrative, the reality that all of the participants of the event under research consideration are deceased presents an unavoidable limitation. In the absence of living primary resources, great care was taken to understand when research was published, as demonstrated in this study. The era in which research was written likely had a profound impact on how the author viewed General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1. Moreover, this study sought to understand the nuances of the research and potential bias of primary and secondary data. Triangulation of both research and theoretical frameworks was an attempt to mitigate this limitation.

The conclusions posited by this study, while conclusive, are unique to General Ewell on the afternoon and evening of July 1, 1863. These conclusions cannot be generalized to the population at large or even to other generals on other battlefields as every situation and battle is different and requires a complete evaluation based on the circumstances that are unique to every individual situation.


Combined Military Leadership Principle	Was the Principle Followed?	If not, who was at Fault?
<i>Analytical Category</i>	Yes =  No = 	<i>Lee vs. Ewell</i>
<b>1. Leadership</b>		
<b>2. Clarity of Orders</b>		<b>Lee</b>
<b>3. Concentration</b>		<b>Lee</b>
<b>4. Terrain</b>		
<b>5. Maneuver</b>		<b>Lee</b>
<b>6. Offensive Operations</b>		<b>Lee</b>
<b>7. Defensive Operations</b>	_____	_____
<b>8. Intelligence</b>		<b>Ewell</b>
<b>9. Units of Meaning</b>		
<b>(a) Security</b>		
<b>Units of Meaning</b>		<b>Lee</b>
<b>(b) Initiative</b>		

Figure 35. General Ewell's performance on July 1, 1863.

## **Implications**

The conclusions of this study demonstrate that General Ewell's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863, was reasonable, based on the combined military leadership principles of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM. This is significant because these conclusions are based on sound analysis that utilized 2,500 years of military theory to reach this verdict. Although the results of this study are substantial, it is unlikely that they will be conclusive to the point that it will end the discussion of Ewell's performance on July 1. However, this study represents solid evidence that, contrary to Ewell detractors, the lieutenant general's decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on the first day of the battle was reasonable. Moreover, the veracity of past claims used to disparage the general and questionable sources that have damaged Ewell's reputation have been exposed by the results of this dissertation.

Perhaps the most significant implication of this study is not the conclusions concerning General Ewell on July 1, or the results of any of the research questions proposed. The most important implication may be the methodology developed by this dissertation. The utilization of three theoretical frameworks to identify combined military leadership principles based on 2,500 years of military thought is profound. The combined military leadership principles of leadership, clarity of orders, concentration, terrain, maneuver, offensive operations, defensive operations, and intelligence along with appropriate "Units of Meaning" developed by this study represent an avenue by which other researchers examining other generals in other wars might employ to arrive at objective conclusions concerning the performance of other subjects. While these eight principles are not profound and have been individually identified elsewhere, this study has united them and identified them as commonalities among Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM which attaches the credibility of 25 centuries of military thought.

This study represents a discussion in military leadership theory. In fact, Chapter IV is focused primarily on the theories of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM and the development of a methodology to evaluate military leadership decisions. While military leadership is emphasized, the combined military leadership principles based on the theories of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM are transferrable to any organization or business leadership model. Leadership, clarity of orders, concentration, terrain, maneuver, offensive operations, defensive operations, and intelligence which were identified in this study are relevant to any business or organization. Leadership is necessary at any organizational level and the ability of a leader to adequately communicate what this study called, orders, but what organizational leadership might call, goals is paramount to any organizations success. This study refers to terrain as a principle that is critical to nearly every military operation. Organizational leadership could refer to terrain as the business environment within which an organization must operate. Businesses and organizations concentrate their buying power, cash flow, investments, and resources in areas that they deem most likely to succeed. Businesses and organizations maneuver to place their competition at a disadvantage. They might acquire smaller companies or underbid a contract in order to gain market share. A company or organization might assume the offensive when they see an opportunity to destroy the competition or corner the market. Offensive operations are the stuff that decisive victories are made of. On the other hand, that same company may choose the defensive in times of recession or uncertainty as the defense is a maneuver of strength. Every organization or business always hopes for intelligence on how the competition, market, or government might react to any eventuality. It is easy to see how applicable the combined military leadership principles identified in this study are to organizational leadership.

## **Future Study**

As stated earlier, the methodology of this study which identified and developed eight combined military leadership principles based on the theories of Sun Tzu, Jomini, and the USAFM served this project well. However, this methodology would benefit from future studies who utilized these methods to test its usefulness and perhaps tweak it to individual needs. The “Units of Meaning” can and are designed to be adjusted, depending on the subject and the theorist employed.

The body of research concerning General Ewell’s decision not to attack Cemetery Hill on July 1, 1863 is voluminous. However, a study of General Lee’s performance on the first, second, and third day that utilized this methodology would be most helpful. In addition, much might be gained from a study of A.P Hill based on this model. Hill is frequently forgotten during most of the battle of Gettysburg. A study that investigated the frequency and extent of General Hill’s and General Ewell’s injuries and absence from command, not only at Gettysburg, but for the rest of the war would be interesting. It appears that Hill seems to always enjoy the benefit of the doubt concerning his performances due to illness, Gettysburg is no exception. On the other hand, Ewell experienced considerable pain and frequent absence as a result of his amputated leg, but is never granted the same latitude due to his injuries. Hill is always portrayed as lacking due to illness while Ewell seems to be depicted as lacking due to incompetence.

Perhaps the subject that requires, in fact, begs for further study is Lee’s refusal to provide reinforcements or assistance from Hill to bolster a proposed Ewell attack. Evidence suggests that several of Hill’s brigades in Pender’s Division were lightly engaged or not engaged at all (Sears, 2003). Moreover, the fact that Anderson’s Division, was close at hand on the afternoon of July 1, and that the commanding general did not send any part of it to Ewell or maneuver in

Ewell's favor is astonishing (Gallagher, 1992). Lee denied Ewell assistance when he was aware that the entire leadership of the Second Corps wanted to attack Cemetery Hill, but indicated that they needed assistance. Such a study would perhaps shed light on Lee's thoughts at this critical moment

### **Final Thoughts**

It is interesting that critics have accused General Ewell of being hesitant, unsure, timid, and unable to commit to a decision concerning Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill on July 1, 1863. The research in Chapter IV of this study refutes that claim and the claims of many Confederate veterans whose post-war accounts seem to be at odds with the facts. Moreover, the evidence suggests that General Lee's confusing orders, inability to issue a direct command to Ewell to assault either hill, refusal to commit reinforcements from Hill's Corps to secure the heights, and his uncertainty of moving the Second Corps to the right demonstrates that it was the commanding general who was hesitant, unsure, and unwilling to commit to an attack on either hill, something for which he and others have censured Ewell for 150 years. Until now, General Lee was the beneficiary of multiple double standards that his subordinates did not enjoy. The commanding general was not held to the same military standard that supporters have held Ewell and Stuart in the monumental Pennsylvania campaign. In the end, Ewell said it best after the war, "Yes, I know I have been blamed for not having pressed my advantage the first day at Gettysburg, but then, I can't see why I should be censured." The corps commander continued, "General Lee came upon the ground before I could have possibly done anything, and after surveying the enemy position, he did not deem it advisable to attack until reinforced" (Tucker, 1968, p. 209). General Ewell's comments are absolutely correct and they highlight the commanding general's hesitance and the retrospective criticism of Richard S. Ewell.

## References

- Alexander, E. P. (1962). *Military memoirs of a Confederate*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Bassford, C. (1993). Jomini and Clausewitz: Their interaction. *Consortium of Revolutionary Europe*. Atlanta: Georgia State University. Retrieved from <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/bassford/jomini>
- Bean, W. G. (1959). *Stonewall's man: Sandie Pendleton*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Berg, B. L. (2009). *Qualitative research methods*. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
- Bowden, S., & Ward, B. (2001) *Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg campaign: Last chance for victory*. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press.
- Brown, C. (2001). *Campbell Brown's Civil War*. T.L. Jones (Ed.). Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press
- Busey, J. W. (1994). *Regimental strengths and losses at Gettysburg*. Hightstown, NJ: Longstreet House.
- Busha, C, & Harter S. P. (1980). *Research methods in librarianship: Techniques and interpretations*. New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Carey, J. E. (2006). The man who mapped Gettysburg battlefield. *The Washington Times*. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from <http://web.ebscohost.com.wueproxy.waynesburg.edu/ehost/>
- Carmichael, P. S. (2007). "All say they are under petticoat government": Lizinka Campbell Brown and Richard S. Ewell. In C. Bleser & L. Gordon (Ed.) *intimate strategies: Military marriages of the Civil War*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

- Casdorph, P. D. (2004). *Confederate general Richard S. Ewell: Robert E. Lee's hestitaant commander*. Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press.
- Chambers, J. W., & Anderson, F. (1999). *The Oxford companion to American military history*. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from [http://books.google.com/books?id=\\_Rzy\\_NMkbc&pg=PA720](http://books.google.com/books?id=_Rzy_NMkbc&pg=PA720)
- Coddington, E. B. (1964). Pennsylvania prepares for invasion, 1863. *Pennsylvania History*, 31,(2) 157-175).
- Coddington, E. B. (1968). *The Gettysburg campaign*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
- Collins, D. L. (2008). *Major general Robert E. Rodes*. New York, NY: Savas Beatie.
- Connelly, T.L. (1977). *The marble man*. Baton Rouge, LA: The Louisiana State University Press.
- Cordovano, J. (2006). Tf 1-21 infantry applies the nine principles of war in Kirkuk. *Infantry*, 95(1), 37-40.
- Creswell, J. W. (2007). *Quality inquiry & research design*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Creswell, J. W. (2012). *Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating quantitative and qualitative research*. Boston, MA: Pearson.
- Dean, D. T. (2008). Shifting strategies: Military theory in the American Civil War. *Military History Online*. Retrieved from <http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/civilwar/articles/militarytheory.aspx>
- Denzin, N. K. (1978). *The research act*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
- Department of the Army. (2001). *Us Army field manual 3-90, tactics*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.



- Department of the Army, Operations. (2011). *Us Army field manual 3-0, c1, operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Department of the Army. (2012). *Army Doctrine Publication 3-90, tactics*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Deppen, J. E. (n.d.). *Book review of lieutenant general Richard S. Ewell: Lee's hesitant commander*. Retrieved from <http://www.civilwarnews.com/reviews/bookreviews.cfm?ID=629>
- Desjardin, T. A. (2003). *These honored dead*. Cambridge, MA: DaCapo Press.
- Doubleday, A. (1890). *Chancellorsville and Gettysburg*. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Douglas, H. K. (1940). *I road with Stonewall*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Dowdey, C. (1958). *Death of a nation*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Early, J. A. (2010). *Lieutenant general Jubal Anderson Early, C.S.A. autobiographical sketch and narrative of the war between the states*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott. (Original work published in 1912)
- Early, J. A. (1877). Letter from general J. A. Early to J. W. Jones. In J. W. Jones (Ed.), *Southern Historical Society papers* (Vol. IV, pp. 50-66). Richmond, VA: Southern Historical Society.
- Ettrich, B. B. (2005). The principles of war: Are they still applicable (Master's thesis)? Retrieved from [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA435689](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA435689)
- Esparza, M., & Katz, R. (Producer), & Maxwell, R. F. (Director). (1993). *Gettysburg*. [Motion Picture]. United States: Turner Broadcasting.

- Ewell, R. S. (1935). *The making of a soldier. The letters of General R. S. Ewell*. P. G. Hamlin (Ed.). Gaithersburg, MD: Van Sickle Military Books.
- Freeman, D. S. (1935). *R. E. Lee, (4vols)*. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Freeman, D. S. (1944). *Lee's lieutenants, (vol. III)*. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Fullenkamp, L. (2010, September 17). A leadership walk at Gettysburg. Gettysburg, PA.
- Gallagher, G. W. (1986). In the shadow of Stonewall Jackson: Richard S. Ewell in the Gettysburg campaign. In Kent Brown (Ed), *Virginia Country's Civil War*. V, 54-59. Richmond, Virginia: Virginia Country's Civil War.
- Gallagher, G. W. (1992). Confederate corps leadership on the first day at the battle of Gettysburg. In G.W. Gallagher (Ed.), *The first day at Gettysburg* (pp. 30-56). Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Gallagher, G. W. (1998). *Lee and his generals in war and memory*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.
- Gallagher, G. W. (2004). Robert E. Lee and his high command. On *The Great Courses* [CD] Chantilly, VA: The Teaching Company.
- Gallaher, J. G. (2011). Jomini, General Antoine-Henri, Baron de (1779–1869). In G. Martel (Ed.), *The encyclopedia of War*. doi:10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow327
- Gibbon, J. (1928). *Personal recollections of the Civil War*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Giorgi, A. (1985). *Phenomenology and psychological research*. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.
- Gordon, J. B. (1841-1879). *John Brown Gordon family papers* (Box 3). University of Georgia Special Collections Libraries, Athens, GA.
- Gordon, J. B. (1904). *Reminiscences of the Civil War*. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons.

- Greene, A. W. (1992). From Chancellorsville to Cemetery Hill: O. O. Howard and the eleventh corps leadership. In G.W. Gallagher (Ed.), *The first day at Gettysburg* (30-56). Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.
- Grogan, M. S. (1997, June). Buford's valiant stand at Gettysburg. *Military History*, pp. 63-64.
- Hagerman, E. (1967). From Jomini to Dennis Hart Mahan: The evolution of trench warfare in the American Civil War. In John Hebbell (Ed), *Civil War History*, 12 197-220.
- Hamlin, P. G. (1935). *The making of a soldier*. Richmond, VA: Whittet & Shepperson.
- Hancock, W. S. (1887). *Reminiscences of Winfield Scott Hancock*. New York, NY: Charles Webster and Company.
- Hancock, W. S. (1878). General Hancock's letter to general Fitz Lee. In J.W. Jones (Ed.), *Southern Historical Society papers* (Vol. V, pp. 162-193). Richmond: VA: Southern Historical Society.
- Handel, M. I. (2005). *Masters of war*. New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis.
- Hardwick, N. A. (2011). Is Clausewitz or Sun Tzu more relevant to understanding contemporary war? *E-International Relations*, Retrieved from <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=7857>
- Haskell, F. (1957). *The battle of Gettysburg*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Haskell, F., & Oates, W. (1992). *Gettysburg*. New York, NY: Bantam Books.
- Hassler, W. W. (1970). *Crisis at the crossroads*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
- Heth, H. (1877). Letter from general H. Heth to J.W. Jones. In J.W. Jones (Ed.), *Southern Historical Society papers* (Vol. IV, pp. 50-66). Richmond: VA: Southern Historical Society.

- Hope, I. (2008). Finding Dennis Hart Mahan the professors place in military history.  
(Master's thesis). Retrieved from <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?ADA482462>
- Howard, M. (2002). *Clausewitz*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Howard, O. O. (2010). *Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard*. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger  
(Original work published 1907)
- Hunton, E. (1933). *Autobiography of Eppa Hunton*. Richmond, VA: The William Byrd Press.
- Jomini, A .H. (1862). *The art of war*. G. H. Mendall and W. P. Craighill (Trans.) Lexington, KY:  
El Paso Norte Press.
- Jordan, D. M. (1988). *Winfield Scott Hancock: A soldier's life*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana  
University Press, 1988.
- Keegan, J. (2009). *The American Civil War*. New York, NY: Knopf.
- Krick, R. E. (2004). "The great tycoon" forges a staff system. In P.S. Carmichael (Ed.),  
Audacity Personified: The generalship of Robert E. Lee (pp. 82-106). Baton Rouge, LA:  
Louisiana State University Press.
- Kuo, L. A. (2007). *Sun Tzu's War Theory in the Twenty First Century* (Master's thesis).  
Retrieved from [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470026](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470026)
- Langville, W. H. (2000). An evaluation of Lee's application of the nine principles of war during  
the Seven Day's battle. *Military and Naval History Journal*, 11, 33-42.
- Lee, F. (1878). General Fitz Lee's review of the first two days operations at Gettysburg and a  
reply to general Longstreet. In J.W. Jones (Ed.), *Southern Historical Society papers* (Vol.  
V, pp. 162-193). Richmond, VA: Southern Historical Society.
- Lee, R. E. (1957). *Lee's dispatches*. R. E. Lee, Jr. (Ed.). New York, NY: G.P Putnam's Sons.

- Longstreet, J. (1878). General Longstreet's full account of the campaign and battle of Gettysburg. In J. W. Jones (Ed.), *Southern Historical Society papers* (Vol. V, pp. 54-85). Richmond, VA: Southern Historical Society.
- Longstreet, J. (1984). *From Manassas to Appomattox*. Secaucus, NY: The Blue and the Grey Press.
- Mackowski, C., & White, K. D. (2010). Second-guessing "DICK" EWELL. *Civil War Times*, 49(4), 34-41.
- Marshall, C. (1927). *An aide-de-camp of Lee*. F Maurice (Ed.). Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
- Martin, S. (1991). *The road to glory*. Indianapolis, IN: Guild Press.
- McKim, R. H. (1915). The Gettysburg campaign. In James Power Smith (Ed.), *Southern Historical Society papers* (Vol. XL, pp. 253-300). Richmond, VA: Southern Historical Society.
- McPherson, J. M. (1988). *Battle cry of freedom*. New York, NY: Ballantine Books.
- Meade, G. G. (1913). *The life and letters of George Gordon Meade*. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Miller, J. A. (2006). A short history of Jenkins' brigade during the Pennsylvania campaign. *Emmitsburg Area Historical Society*. Retrieved from [http://www.emmitsburg.net/archive\\_list/articles/history/civil\\_war/jenkins\\_brigade.htm](http://www.emmitsburg.net/archive_list/articles/history/civil_war/jenkins_brigade.htm)
- Nicastro, A. M. (2013). Why Gettysburg? An analysis of the command decisions and intelligence failures that led to Gettysburg. *National Park Service, History E-Library*. Retrieved from [http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online\\_books/Gettysburg\\_seminars/10/contents.htm](http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/Gettysburg_seminars/10/contents.htm)
- O'Brian, J.J. (1991). *Coup d'Oeil: Military geography and the operational level of war* (Master's

- thesis). Retrieved from [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA243343](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA243343)
- Osborne, C. C. (1992). *Jubal: The life and times of Jubal A. Early, CSA*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.
- Palmer, M. A. (1998). *Lee moves north: Robert E. Lee on the offensive*. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
- Patton, M. Q. (2002). *Qualitative research and evaluative methods*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Petruzzi, J. D. & Stanley, S. A. (2012). *The Gettysburg campaign in numbers and losses*. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie.
- Pfanz, D. (1998). *Richard S. Ewell*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Pfanz, H. (1994). *The battle of Gettysburg-National Park Civil War series*. Washington,DC: Eastern National
- Pfanz, H. W. (1993). *Gettysburg-Culp's & Cemetery Hill*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Pfanz, H.W., (2001). *Gettysburg: The first day*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Pollard, E. A. (1866). *The lost cause*. New York, NY: E. B. Treat.
- Pollard, E. A. (1898). *Great Epochs in American History*. In F. W. Halsey (Ed.)  
The battle of Gettysburg (Vol. VIII, pp. 121-130). New York, NY: Funk & Wagnalls
- Pula, J. S. (1973). *Na polu chwaly: The life and times of Wlodzimierz Krzyzanowski (Polish immigrant, Civil War general, federal agent)* (Doctoral dissertation). Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 7315853).

- Reardon, C. (2012). *With a sword in one hand and Jomini in the other*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Robertson, J. I. (1987). *General A. P. Hill: The story of a Confederate warrior*. New York, NY: Random House.
- Rodes, R. E. (1876). General R.E. Rodes report of the battle of Gettysburg . In J. W. Jones (Ed.), *Southern Historical Society papers* (Vol. II, pp. 135-158). Richmond: VA: Southern Historical Society.
- Scott, C. H. (1862). *Military dictionary*. New York, NY: Trubner.
- Sears, S. W. (2003). *Gettysburg*. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin.
- Sincerity and Humanity. (2013). In *Merriam-Webster's online dictionary* . Retrieved from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sincerity?show=0&t=1376138285>
- Sorrel, G. M. (1958). *Recollections of a Confederate staff officer*. Jackson, MS: McCowat-Marcer Press.
- Smith, J. P. (2011, April). General Lee at Gettysburg. Paper read before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts (Original speech presented in 1905)
- Smith, J. P. (1916). Colonel Walter Taylor, A. A. G. *Southern Historical Society Papers*, XLI (111), 82-87. Richmond, VA.
- Stiles, R. (1910). *Four years under marse Robert*. New York, NY: The Neal Publishing
- Struass, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). *Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedure and techniques*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Swinton, W. (1866). *Campaigns of the army of the Potomac*. New York, NY: Charles B. Richardson.
- (Sun Tzu, trans. 1963)

- Taylor, C. T. (1994). The transformation of reconnaissance: Who will fight on the future battlefield (Master's thesis)? Retrieved from [www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a437613.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a437613.pdf)
- Taylor, R. (1973). *Destruction and reconstruction*. New York, NY: Arno Press.
- Taylor, W. (1877). Memorandum of colonel Walter Taylor. In J. William Jones (Ed.), *Southern Historical Society Papers* (Vol. IV, pp. 124-139). Richmond, VA: Southern Historical Society.
- Taylor, W. (1913). *Four years with general Lee*. New York, NY: Bonanza Books.
- Thomas, D. S. (1986). *Civil war commanders*. Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications.
- Trimble, I. R. (1898). The battle and campaign of Gettysburg. In R.A. Brock (Ed.), *Southern Historical Society Papers* (Vol. XXI, pp. 116-128). Richmond: VA: Southern Historical Society.
- Tucker, G. (1958). *High tide at Gettysburg*. New York, NY: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Tucker, G. (1982). *Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg*. Dayton, OH: Morningside House.  
(Original work published in 1968)
- Tzu, S. (450-500b.c.). *The art of war*. S. B. Griffith (Ed. & Trans.). London, UK: Oxford University Press.
- United States War Department. (1880-1901). *The war of the rebellion: A compilation of the official records of the Union and Confederate armies*. (128 vols.). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
- Vossler, T. (2011). The opening fight at Gettysburg: A modern military analysis. *National Park Service*. Retrieved from [http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online\\_books/gettysburg\\_seminars/9/essay2.pdf](http://www.nps.gov/history/history/online_books/gettysburg_seminars/9/essay2.pdf)



- Wainwright, C. S. (1962) *A diary of battle: The personal journals of colonel Charles S. Wainwright*. New York, NY: Harcourt.
- Ward, G. C. (1991). *The Civil War*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Warner, E. (1959). *Generals in grey*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.
- Waugh, J. C. (1994). *Class of 1846*. New York, NY: Warner Books.
- Wilcoxon, G. L. (2010). Sun Tzu: Theorist for the Twenty-First century (Master's thesis).  
Retrieved from [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470026](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470026)
- Wilson, C. W. (1980). *Baptized in blood: The religion of the lost cause, 1865-1920*.  
Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press.
- Wittenberg, E. J., (2010). Albert Jenkins' Brigade at Gettysburg. *Confederate Cavalry*.  
Retrieved from <http://civilwarcavalry.com/?p=2137>