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Assessing the Contextual Effect of Autobiographical and Media Memory

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ASSESSING THE CONTEXTUAL EFFECT OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL AND MEDIA MEMORY

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The media frames events through a lens looking toward the past often comparing events in order to create a reference. However, because of this framing, the media also develops a media memory based on its interpretation of events that can impact the collective. This study analyzes whether people with distinct memories of an event will agree with the media comparison involving that same event utilizing the inclusion/exclusion model. The inclusion/exclusion model suggests that distinct experience lends towards a contrasting view of two events while an interpretative experience lends toward a similar view of two events. Because the media frequently compares the Iraq War to the Vietnam War, Vietnam veterans were surveyed regarding their perspective on each war as a distinct event as well as whether the two conflicts were viewed as similar. In addition, three specific demographics within the sample were analyzed in regards to the likelihood of perceived similarity of the two conflicts. The results of the study indicate Vietnam veterans did feel the two wars were similar and yet somewhat distinct, results not in line with the theory behind the inclusion/exclusion model. Additional research is required to further test the inclusion/exclusion model with events having occurred more recently thus limiting the possible exposure to media memory as well as to determine how assimilation and contrast effects impacted social judgment of these veterans.

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One would think this is the easiest part of the dissertation to write, and yet, there's so much to be thankful for and so many people to acknowledge that it has been quite the challenge to put into words exactly how I'm feeling at this time.

This degree has been a long journey, prior to my ever deciding to enter the program. There have been so many people throughout the many stages of my life that have told me I wasn't the most academically gifted student. And yet, here we are. There were the naysayers who said having a family would deter my own personal accomplishments, but I note that I was accepted into this program while eight-months pregnant with my second child, and here we are. I've been perceived as so many things from the ditz and flake to the troublemaker and rebel rouser, yet here we are. Clearly, I don't take kindly to judgments of whom I am or who I am meant to be.

As I cross this personally significant milestone, there are numerous people that I need to acknowledge. First, I would be remiss to not thank my committee chair, Dr. Mary Beth Leidman for her tireless work and complete candor. I always knew she would be blatantly honest even when I didn't want to hear it, knowing all too well it probably needed to be said. My committee members, Dr. Jay Start and Dr. Zachary Stiegler provided critical feedback and critique of my work, making my committee enjoyable to work with. Dr. Anthony Moretti, my unofficial mentor, was always available for advice, proofing, and general motivation. He remains the consummate professional and a genuinely kind person, which is often difficult to find these days.

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My parents are pretty darn remarkable. I was probably the only kid who thought it was normal to have a Ph.D. mother and a M.D. father. They have lead by example in their professional accomplishments and successes, but they have also always supported my choices whether they agreed with them or not.

Their compassion for others is contagious and their love for their children unconditional. My siblings, Martha and Seth, have always pushed me to aspire to be as wise as them both academically and through life's lessons. I respect their choices and admire their constant perseverance no matter the obstacle. They are both inspirational in their own right.

My husband is my foundation. Through humor, understanding, and patience he makes me want to be a better person. His love of learning has inspired me and contributed greatly to my desire to pursue this degree, which is still in my view higher than his measly J.D. Ultimately, without his love and support, this degree wouldn't have even been a possibility. For so many nights he served as both mother and father to our children and it didn't go unnoticed. My children, Hudson and Cole make me want to pull my hair out, but with their idiosyncrasies also make me laugh every day. I only hope that when they are old enough to understand they will be proud of their mom. And yes, now we can go to Disney World.

Finally, this research was purposefully written on the subject of memory. Many of my direct ancestors made the ultimate sacrifice during the Holocaust so that I may be here today. You are gone, but not forgotten.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Dr. Sharon B. Covitz. As a child, being like you was the worst thing I could have possibly imagined and thus I strove to be so very different. And now, as I complete this degree, I couldn't be prouder to resemble you in some small way. I aspire to be half the wife, mother and professional you are.

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"No event in American history is more misunderstood than

the Vietnam War. It was misreported then, and it is misremembered now."

~Richard Nixon, *No More Vietnams, 1994*

CHAPTER 1

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Introduction

On August 31, 2010 President Obama formally declared an end to the combat mission of the Iraq War. Future historians will grapple to understand and convey all facets of the conflict from multiple ethical, political, and scholarly perspectives. Mass media will continue to replay the events that unfolded in an attempt to aid the public in making sense of what occurred while giving interpretive meaning to the cost of war.

It is within this context that mass media often utilizes the past to evoke an understanding of the present. As social scientist Michael Schudson explains, "a past experience provides the 'frame' or 'metaphor' through which the world is viewed" (Schudson, 1993 pg. 2). The media has often utilized historical analogy in reporting numerous events, such as the comparison of the 1992 Los Angeles race riots to the 1965 Watts riots and the Columbia space shuttle crash to that of the Challenger shuttle disaster seventeen years earlier (Edy, 2011).

More than any other news event, war lends itself to a comparison with the past because there is so much at stake and war conflicts in general tend to evolve similarly. The Iraq War is no exception, often being compared to past wars. In a Lexis-Nexis search of the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* and *USA Today* from September 2002, when President George W. Bush requested authorization to go to war with Iraq, until September 2007, when he outlined his plan for troop withdrawal, the proportion of stories each month that contained explicit references (not including subtle language indirectly alluding to Vietnam) to Iraq and Vietnam was 1 in 12, or over 8 percent (Edy, 2011).

This study is concerned not only with mass media's predisposition toward comparing current conflicts to past wars, but also with whether autobiographical memory tolerates mass media's interpretation of events. Specifically, the following research assesses whether Vietnam War military service impacts veteran acceptance of the Iraq War analogy evoked by the media. In effect, the inquiry examines whether preexisting autobiographical memory, memories established from firsthand experience, can influence approval of the media's memory. The inclusion/exclusion model (IEM), which assesses the impact on social judgment of comparing two separate events, will be expanded upon in order to evaluate the context effects of how knowledge is obtained on opinion. Specifically, the current study looks at the impact on judgment of accessible knowledge gained through interpretation versus accessible knowledge gained through comparison of first-person experience. The intended purpose being, to test whether distinct memory will align more with assimilation rather than memory created through interpretation by the media plotting a continuum found on the IEM. Expounding on the IEM, the testing demonstrates the ability of the press to alter past, present and future memory through priming with the exception of those that personally experienced the event.

Need for the Study

Journalists trained to examine the present tend to look for clarity in the past when explaining convoluted and nuanced situations. Schudson (1993) found that journalists predominantly use the past as a means for framing the current world. Extensive scholarly evidence indicates that American mass media has significant interpretive freedom to explain the past in order to understand the present (Neiger, Meyers, & Zandberg, 2011). In fact, Zelizer (1992) contends that the story of America's past will remain the story as the media chooses to retell it, as further mass media memory of an event becomes the collective memory of the country. Journalism regularly draws on historical memory to add perspective through commemoration, historical analogies, and the presentation of historical context (Edy, 1999).

The 'irresistible' historical analogy in debates of military involvement or conflict is that of Vietnam (Edy, 2011). Every war following Vietnam has lived in that war's shadow to some extent, and has thus faced some level of comparison. Ingrained in the belief that accessibility of information helps the public to make sense of its world; journalists often compare current military conflict to the Vietnam War. Kalb & Kalb (2011) have even claimed the Vietnam War has impacted every American president from Gerald Ford to Barack Obama.

However, when mass media choose to use past events as an anchor with which to compare the present, repercussions impacting past, present and future collective memory are inevitable. According to Edy (1999), one of the greatest dangers is the media's overestimation of the similarities between the past and present as well as the connection between the perceptions of the present and Americans' expectations for the future. Past incidents demonstrate that misperceptions of foreign affairs can have crippling consequences and even can lead to war (Jervis, 1976).

The American mass media, as the "Fourth Estate," was established centuries ago to have a responsibility to inform the public. Yet the misrepresentation of events through false interpretation or leading suggestions by evoking past events transforms the actuality of current conflicts; judgments based on misinformation significantly influence the memory of past events and future courses of action. What social scientist Andrew Hoskins terms "media memory" can influence the perception of what really occurred in both the past and present (Hoskins, 2011a). Thus, media memory is defined as "the systemic exploration of collective pasts that are narrated by the media, through the use of the media, and about the media" (Neiger et al., 2011).

Purpose of the Study

This study focuses on the relationship between media memory and a cohort's shared experience in order to extend the inclusion/exclusion model. The IEM was developed in order to address determinants of how people relate context to target information (Schwarz & Bless, 1992); this study

seeks to determine whether the method through which people gain knowledge impacts their utilization of that knowledge to make judgments.

The hypothesis is that the present research will demonstrate media memory and autobiographical memory of the Iraq and Vietnam Wars supports an extension of the IEM. Knowledge obtained through interpretation will be viewed through an assimilative context and will lead to the belief that two separate events are similar, while knowledge obtained through comparison will be viewed through a contrasting context and will more likely lead to the impression that two events are in fact dissimilar.

It is believed that within this study, media memory (interpretation) will increase the likelihood of the judgment of similarities in the Iraq and Vietnam Wars while autobiographical memory (comparison) will increase the likelihood of judgment of the events as dissimilar. Furthermore, specific traits within autobiographical memory (age, rank and time served) will be evaluated in regard to their influence on the likelihood of Vietnam veterans' perceived contrast between the Iraq and Vietnam Wars. These variables are more thoroughly explained below and in the review of literature.

Explanation of Variables and Theoretical Context

This study examines perceived distinctness between the Vietnam War and Iraq War by Vietnam veterans as the dependent variable, in terms of the independent variable or priming trait (as it is commonly referred to in social psychology studies) of cohort veteran autobiographical experience. The following section serves to synthesize the major conceptual contributions of the literature in order to provide underlying context and a theoretical framework. Additionally, secondary independent variables of time served during the Vietnam War, military rank during Vietnam War service and age during Vietnam War service are evaluated in relation to perceived distinctness. As Herr (1986) concluded, both assimilation and contrast effects can impact social judgment. The current research asserts what others (Mussweiler, 2003; Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004; Mussweiler & Strack,

2000) have alluded to; whether information obtained as distinct or ambiguous will increase the likelihood of an assimilative or contrasting effect on judgment, but in this case, distinct information is obtained from personal experience while ambiguous information from the media's framing of events.

Distinctness

Distinct items are typically utilized in comparisons because they embody a strong sense of understanding and awareness. Perceived distinctness refers to the clarity of information or a concept-consistent standard in which a target event or idea is compared (Mussweiler, 2003; Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008). As Murphy & Zajonc (1993) explain, less defined information can simply 'spill over' into consciousness. Therefore, distinct priming traits lead to contrast effects (Philippot, Schwarz, Carrera, De Vries, & Van Yperen 1991).

Demographic independent variables, including the time, age and military rank during which veterans served, are believed to impact the level of perceived distinctness among a cohort. Longer deployments undoubtedly extends the autobiographical exposure level; deployment length has been proven to negatively impact soldier cognition and actually change brain circuitry (Wingen et al., 2012). Length of deployment has also been directly related to higher levels of depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and alcohol consumption among soldiers (Adler, Huffman, Bliese, & Castro, 2005). A younger age during time of service is suspected to increase the indelible impression of Vietnam War events and thus overall distinction (Seal, Bertenthal, Miner, Sen, & Marmar, 2007). Soldiers 25 or younger were found to have the highest levels of stress among active duty personnel across all military branches (Hourani, Williams, & Kress, 2006). Lower military rank typically results in a greater presence of soldiers on the front lines more commonly associated with combat stress. However, a recent study conducted by Baker et al., (2009) of Iraq War veterans suggests that branch of military service and whether the soldier was wounded during combat weighs more heavily on impact of trauma. Though their research, the authors concluded there is no relationship between age, gender, race, or rank

and PTSD (Baker et al., 2009), but their conclusion does not take into consideration overall impression outside of mental health.

Ambiguity

Ambiguous and unfamiliar information or events can impact both interpretation and judgment of a target and thus acceptance of past-present analogies (Mussweiler, 2002; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000). The proximity of distinctness to abstract concepts creates a need for interpretation. The frequency and recency of exposure to an event affects subsequent judgments differently (Uleman & Bargh, 1989). Because there are less concrete concepts to compare, interpretation lends more toward assimilation (Mussweiler, 2002; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000). As a result, it is hypothesized that media memory, based heavily on interpretation and gatekeeping principles, will more heavily influence perceived similarities among past-present analogies than autobiographical memory.

Journalism Frames

Journalism is often faulted for constructing a collective identity through its attempt at historical analysis, which in the end recreates history rather than merely portraying it in a new light (Robinson, 2006). Specifically, a new narrative emerges from the lessons being learned from the Vietnam War that are funneled into our consciousness and, inevitably, into our historical perspectives on Iraq (Robinson 2006). These reflections on the nontraditional fighting that occurred during the Vietnam War and the perceived suspect motivations for going to war in both Iraq and Vietnam have had a lasting impact on the country's perception of conflict (Robinson, 2006). Research investigating the impact of media memory on collective memory, especially in comparison to autobiographical recollection, has rarely been conducted. The need to better understand the role of media in shaping collective memory of past and present wars by evoking the past is thus great.

Mass media seek a frame of reference which places news events in context for the public (Zelizer, 2008). However, some studies suggest that media references to the past actually harm a

journalist's credibility in the eyes of the audience (Winfield, Leshner, Kononova, & Jung 2009). Winfield et al. (2009) found a significant relationship between historical reference and credibility, newsworthiness and story comprehension. Due to the time constraints, television news coverage typically compares present day events with those of the past in order to make complex scenarios more relatable for the masses, thereby constructing a new reality (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson 1992; Robinson, 2006). It has been argued that (Robinson, 2006) one of the basic tenets and foundations of journalism is to utilize the past in order to create a new reality. In fact, journalism and media reports have become two of the most influential modes of communicating historical events (Robinson, 2006). While the press may make sense of events for a general audience, they also run the risk of making inaccurate comparisons while not only presenting flawed stories, but in effect changing the collective memory of the past event as well (Joslyn, 2003). In fact, media exposure combined with trust in the government can increase one's vulnerability to misremembering Joslyn (2003). Media metaphors have always been seductive to the media and damaging to public understandings of memory at the same time (Draaisma, 2001; Hoskins, 2009a, 2011a; Neisser, 2008). This phenomenon as collapsing the past and the present; Hoskins explains that the realities of the past are vulnerable to the creation and recreation of the past by American media, especially the visual imagery disseminated (Hoskins, 2004).

Media framing of the Iraq War has been extensively evaluated (Christie, 2006a; Dimitrova, Kaid, Williams, & Trammell, 2005; Esser, 2005; Harmon & Muenchen, 2009; Kang, 2006; Kolmer & Semetko, 2009; Melkote, 2009; Schwalbe, 2006a; Schwalbe, Silcock, & Keith, 2008a). As previously noted, the framing of current news through the lens of the past is not uncommon (Edy & Daradanova 2006; Waugh Jr. 2006). Examples including the NASA space program (Edy & Daradanova 2006) and natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina are often viewed in terms of past events (Waugh Jr. 2006). Debate continues as to whether the media's practice of creating reference through past events causes

more harm than good, particularly when examining the social responsibility of the press (Christians 2004). While research such as that of Kornprobst (2007) and Noon (2004) has documented why references to the past assist in the explanation of the current events in general, and research has been conducted pointing out the analogies (Edy, 1999; B. H. Winfield, Friedman, & Trisnadi, 2002; Zelizer, 1997), little analysis has been done on the specific impact of this mass media reframing and in particular the effect of such media analogies on the memory of war. The communication discipline has yet to fully evaluate the ripple effect caused by news coverage of war that evokes the past; few if any scholars in the field have extensively studied the impact this practice has on past, present and future memory of both the present and the past event being referenced.

New Memory

Hoskins (2010) explains that new media memory is crafted in terms of human relationship to the past through individuals' capacity to shape, extend, store, organize and delete occurrences from individual and social memories. Godfrey & Lilley (2009) also refer to this phenomenon as a "regime of memory" that is as much about the present as it is about the past. Memories are not fixed representations of the past in the present, but instead exist on a continuum; the same memory will be different tomorrow, today and yesterday (Hoskins, 2001a). For the purpose of this and other social psychology studies, memory is defined as a cognitive method of retaining information and reconstructing past experiences, while media memory as defined by media studies is the press's interpretation and recollection of past events.

Often, an interpretation and comparison mindset is inadvertently used by society, and not just the press, in order to understand ambiguous circumstances in terms of past distinctive events. Morris-Suzuki (2005) asserts that there is actually a growing reluctance among Americans to form an independent opinion of the past because of their preference for a reliance on shared memory. But when it comes to past events and the way in which they infiltrate our collective consciousness, as in

the case of Vietnam, Americans despite their individual experiences have a collective memory of the Vietnam War even if they were not alive during the conflict (Wertsch, 2002). Hoskins (2011a) investigates the ways in which the mediated memory of Vietnam is transformed into a tangible form by the American media. Nguyen & Belk (2007) also performed a visual analysis of online war photos posted by Vietnam veterans, looking at individual memory versus the collective, and found that most people do not remember their true past, but instead recreate their past to form new memories, identities and social ties.

According to Jespersen (2005), mass media often uses the Vietnam analogy to create a new historical context for the Iraq War. Because of its potency and malleability, this stands to reinforce the media's tendency to do the same with most news events too complex to endure or stand on their own within the minds of the American public. Others argue it is the media's main function to normalize extraordinary and abstract events, serving as a cognitive filter, and any comparison to Vietnam has been shown to raise the public's level of fear and paranoia due to its overwhelmingly negative association with that particular conflict (Link & Schulte-Sasse 1991). According to Tierney (2007a), Americans suffer a "quagmire mentality" due to recurring cycles of nation building followed by disillusionment as in both the case of Vietnam and Iraq, which adds merit to the newsworthiness of negative stories for the media.

Explanation of Terms

Terms defined

The following terms are defined in order to provide the necessary scaffold for evaluating the research presented hereafter.

Autobiographical memory. Within the discipline of cognitive psychology, autobiographical memory is defined as memory of events and issues pertaining to oneself.

Cohort. Glenn (2005) defines cohort in terms of sociological research as, "people within a delineated population who experience the same significant event within a given period of time."

Collective memory. The idea forwarded by Maurice Halbwachs that memory can only exist in collective context (Halbwachs, 1925, 1950, 1992). In social science research, it generally refers to shared memories of a group. It is a static base of knowledge (Wertsch & Roediger, 2008).

Cultural memory. Used synonymously with collective memory (Erll & Nünning, 2010).

Collective remembering. The process or action of recalling the past by a group or culture (Wertsch, 2002). Repeated reconstruction of representations of the past, it is more of an active process than collective memory and emphasizes social and political interpretation (Wertsch & Roediger, 2008).

History. The aspiration to provide an accurate account of the past, unlike collective memory taking into consideration identity and cultural factors (Wertsch & Roediger, 2008).

Identification-inference model. Social psychology model developed by Yaacov Trope in 1978, analyzing how memory processes create input and thus contribute to inference.

Individual memory. Memory in regard to the individual's experience as opposed to being distributed among a group sharing cultural characteristics (Wertsch & Roediger, 2008).

Inclusion/exclusion model. A model developed by Schwarz and Bless in 1992 to predict not only the conditions in which context effects occur, but also whether they are more likely to lean toward assimilation or contrast.

Interpretation priming. Judgments are determined by the context in which they are made, thus can be primed by manipulating interpretation. Interpretation primes are manipulated variables within an experiment to test influence of context on opinion.

Iraq War. The conflict that began in 2003 with an air campaign; said to be a preemptive strike against Iraq's growing supply of weapons of mass destruction (Altheide & Grimes, 2005;

Hiebert, 2003; S. L. John, Domke, Coe, & Graham, 2007; Kushner & Gershkoff, 2004) and came to a close with President Obama declaring an end to combat in 2010.

Media memory. The systemic exploration of collective pasts that are narrated by the media (Neiger et al., 2011). Also explained as, the press's interpretation and recollection of past events.

Memory. It is a cognitive method of retaining information and reconstructing past experiences.

New memory. Coined by Andrew Hoskins, it's defined as manufactured, mediated and media manipulated memory (Hoskins, 2001b).

Perceived distinctness. In social cognition studies, when stimuli such as memories provide unique and clearly bounded information in which to form an opinion, the memories are said to be distinct.

Person memory model. Created by Srull and Wyer in 1989, the model evaluates storage and retrieval of information and its impact on current behavior.

Primed effect. In the field of social psychology, manipulated variables within an experiment to test influence of context on opinion are primed effects.

Public memory. Used synonymously with collective memory.

Quagmire. Narrowly defined as a difficult or precarious situation, the term gained an association with the Vietnam War when the conflict was believed to be inescapable and unending. The term has a negative connotation in terms of foreign policy.

Remembering. The process or action of recalling the past, it is considered to be less passive than memory (Wertsch, 2002).

Selective accessibility model. Social psychology model developed by Mussweiler in 2001, it predicts how a person, concept or idea will affect how individuals perceive themselves.

Shared Memory. Interchangeable with collective memory, the idea that memory spans a group rather than simply individuals.

Target. The event or information being assessed through comparison to the past, in the case of this research the target is the Vietnam War and Iraq War analogy.

Vietnam War. The conflict began in 1965 with the deployment of U.S. troops and came to an end with the capture of Saigon by the North Vietnamese in 1975.

Research Questions

In conducting this current research, data were gathered via a quantitative survey presented to a national Vietnam veteran organization, the Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA). The researcher constructed a survey instrument via the online survey creation and distribution software Qualtrics, and then worked with the VVA to disseminate the survey electronically. The research aims to identify whether autobiographical memory impacts agreement with the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy as proposed by the media. Additionally, specific traits such as length of service, highest military rank obtained and age during service are analyzed in order to determine impact on level of assimilation or contrast.

The current study argues that unlike previous anchoring social cognition studies, the sample is already primed due to service during the Vietnam War and the existence of each participant's autobiographical memory. Therefore, while a similar methodology to previous inclusion/exclusion model research will be utilized, individual primes serving as independent variables will be the specific traits within a Vietnam veterans demographic (length of service, highest military rank obtained, and age during service) while the target or dependent variable will be identification with or against the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy in the form of distinctness. In this study, the prime cannot be manipulated

for a desired outcome. Instead, the intention is to show a relationship between the prime effects (independent variables) and the target effects (dependent variables) utilizing chi-square correlation.

The following research questions driven by the IEM guide the inquiry:

Research Question 1: Does being a Vietnam veteran (prime effect) increase the likelihood of assimilation or contrast to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy (target)?

Research Question 2: Does length of military Vietnam War service (prime effect) increase the likelihood of assimilation or contrast to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy (target)?

Research Question 3: Does highest military rank obtained during Vietnam War military service (prime effect) increase the likelihood of assimilation or contrast to the media's Iraq analogy (target)?

Research Question 4: Does age range during Vietnam War military service (prime effect) increase the likelihood of assimilation or contrast to the media's Iraq analogy (target)?

Hypothesis

The study's hypotheses are anticipated outcomes stemming from the aforementioned research questions and are framed in accordance with context provided by the review of literature.

Hypothesis 1: Being a Vietnam veteran (autobiographical memory) will increase the likelihood of contrast (perceived distinctness) to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy; according to the IEM, it will pull away from assimilation.

Hypothesis 2: Longer length of military Vietnam War service will increase the likelihood of a greater contrast (perceived distinctness) to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy; according to the IEM, it will pull away from assimilation.

Hypothesis 3: Lower military rank obtained during Vietnam War military service will increase the likelihood of a greater contrast (perceived distinctness) to the media's Iraq analogy; according to the IEM, it will pull away from assimilation.

Hypothesis 4: Younger ages during Vietnam War military service will increase the likelihood of a greater contrast (perceived distinctness) to the media's Iraq analogy; according to the IEM, it will pull away from assimilation.

Assumptions

It is primarily assumed that Vietnam veterans were impacted by the events they experienced while serving their country between 1965 and 1975. Additionally, the literature (Edy, 2011; Hayden, 2007) demonstrates a clear trend in news reporting of the Iraq War in regard to the media's utilization of the analogy without an additional content analysis being conducted within this study.

Limitations of the Study

The following conditions serve to describe and define the general confines of the study in terms of representativeness and method in order to clarify the scope and significance of the findings.

Population. The population chosen for the study is limited to a single veteran organization which limits generalizability and transferability. It was selected because it is one of the largest organizations representing Vietnam veterans in the U.S. While VVA has over 50,000 members, often Vietnam veterans suffer from emotional trauma or post-traumatic stress disorder, causing them to resist any formal affiliation with a veterans group. Additionally, there are no known figures regarding the number of VVA members without Internet access. The results will be generalizable to Vietnam veterans across the country, but particularly those affiliated with a national support organization.

Procedures. Data collected regarding veterans' perceptions are based on self-reports through veteran responses to survey items. Therefore, there is the potential for respondent bias; steps have been taken in the development of the survey instrument to counteract potential biased responses. These

steps include question order, order of response and review of questions from similar studies (Marsden & Wright, 2010). Additionally, surveys can be seen as impersonal, artificial and inflexible (Babbie, 2010). Because convenience sampling will be used in the study, the researcher cannot say with confidence the sample will be representative of the population (Creswell, 2008). Determinations about the pervasiveness of the mass media's analogy cannot be determined from this data and is beyond the scope of this study, as is comparison appropriateness.

Delimitations

The following aspects serve to describe factors chosen to limit the scope of the study in order to clarify the direction and intentions of its methods.

Apolitical. The proposed study will examine the autobiographical memory of a cohort in relation to media memory in order to better understand the interpretive power of the press. The study is not intended to establish support for or against either the Vietnam or Iraq War.

Scope of the study. A quantitative methodology was selected in order to obtain a larger sample size and to more uniformly test the hypotheses involving the inclusion/exclusion model. The quantitative method also serves to limit what could become an unruly qualitative undertaking based on numerous narratives. There are a number of interesting research questions that could be asked but are not being pursued, such as, "Do Vietnam veterans agree with the decision to go to war in Iraq?" or, "Do Vietnam veterans see a comparison in the media coverage of the Iraq War to the Vietnam War?" or, "Do Vietnam veterans see the American public's treatment of Iraq War veterans as similar to that of Vietnam war veterans upon their return?" These questions will not be pursued in this particular study because (a) the focus of the inquiry is on testing the IEM, (b) the purpose is not to assess support for or against the war and (c) the intention is not to compare war reporting or treatment and portrayal of returning military.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

Evidence detailed within this review of the literature indicates that the American mass media have frequently compared the most recent Iraq War to the Vietnam War in print, broadcast and online public reports. In fact, as will be demonstrated through epistemological review, journalists have claimed similarities in the length of the wars and continued surge announcements, the procedure for withdrawal of troops, the evolving public opinion on the war, the ways in which the war is perceived, the manner in which the enemy is depicted and the effects of post-traumatic stress on returning soldiers (Krepinevich, 2004; Record & Terrill, 2004). It is of critical note that the utilization of analogy is not a new journalistic practice, particularly within the context of international conflict; this phenomenon will be analyzed and detailed in regard to the current research. Additionally, the impact of media framing on collective memory has been extensively researched and is outlined in respect to the enormity of its impact on the current study and the emerging specialty of media memory.

As far back as World War I, historical analogies have been used to justify conflict. A noteworthy example is when President Woodrow Wilson reflected on similarities between his own predicament with Great Britain in World War I and that of President James Madison's during the War of 1812 until Great Britain became a clear ally (Kirkpatrick 2007). Typically, the current war will most often be compared to the conflict that is most fresh in the collective consciousness. For example, the Johnson administration employed World War II and the Munich appeasement of 1938 to justify the Vietnam War (Jespersen, 2005). Therefore, it is not uncommon for historical analogy to not only shape the underlying message presented to the American people, but also to influence policy makers' deliberations, choices and rhetoric (Brändström, Bynander, & Hart, 2004; Neustadt & May, 1988). During times of crisis, political leaders use historical analogies in order to garner a sense of

understanding and to better weigh their options (Khong, 1992; May, 1973). May (1973) states, "Framers of foreign policy are often influenced by beliefs about what history teaches … [T]hey [sometimes] perceive problems in terms of analogies from the past." Lakoff (1991) contends that there is a set of metaphors that has been utilized in the past and continues to be relied upon in the present. These metaphors structure our collective opinion and are often used to justify war.

Not even the commander-in-chief is immune to the temptation to compare the past to the present. President George W. Bush reportedly wrote in his diary on 9/11 that America had seen this generation's Pearl Harbor (Jespersen 2005). His speechwriter, David Frum, elaborated on the analogy for future presidential speeches, eventually coining the term "Axis of Evil," which is derived from "Axis powers," a terminology employed during World War II ("David Frum" 2012). The Bush administration even likened the collapse of the World Trade Center towers to the mushroom cloud of the atomic bomb (Baglione, 2006). The inclination to compare the past and present was not unique to President George W. Bush; in fact, his father, President George H.W. Bush, compared the Gulf War to Vietnam when he proclaimed in 1991, "We have finally kicked the Vietnam Syndrome" (Rowe 1991).

The Analogy

According to Ivor Richards, one of the founders of the contemporary study of English literature, metaphors are not merely stylistic devices, but a critical component of creating meaning in human communication (Richards, 1996). In regard to historical analogy, Richards postulates that there are two communication building blocks: tenor and vehicle. In his view, the vehicle is an interpretation of an historical event and the tenor the phenomenon that we want to make intelligible to ourselves (Kornprobst, 2007). Philosopher Max Black elaborated on Richards' work, furthering the interactionist theory of metaphor, which views metaphor as a cognitive phenomenon. But Vertzberger (1986) notes the difficulty in meeting scientific methodological standards of logic and inference that is instigated by historical analogy. He also asserts that history does not contain an inherent and reliable

truth. Additional research points to the emotional and subconscious associations that are created when one employs historical analogy (Noon, 2004). As Noon (2004) explains, analogy under the guise of historical memory turns past experience into a form of myth that legitimizes the present as an outcome of the perceived past. Meanwhile, Wander (1984) concluded that foreign policy rhetoric is often based on, "lies, half-truths, and macabre scenarios," and that even the facts of foreign affairs can be easily manipulated depending on point of view.

In discussing the Iraq War, analogy is used to draw parallels to the Vietnam War more than any other past conflict (Hayden, 2007). In fact, Hayden (2007) found Vietnam to be referenced in American newspaper reports almost 3 to 1 over the Persian Gulf War and 10 to 1 over World War II. Politicians, depending on party, have been either quick to embrace or avoid a Vietnam analogy, but continue to publicly discuss the implications of both. While politicians often believe evoking the past can support their partisan stance, a study conducted by Taylor & Rourke (1995) found that these analogies do not serve as independent variables within the policy process and merely bolster existing ideology. The report studies comparisons of the 1938 Munich Conference fallout and Vietnam to the Persian Gulf War and finds that political party and ideology are more central to decision making than analogy (Taylor & Rourke, 1995). Hemmer (2007) suggests that proponents of the use of historical analogies will continue to encourage the practice within American foreign policy for years to come. Essentially, the competition to win the argument and thus define public memory is strong, and American politicians will persist (Baglione, 2006) despite criticism regarding the accuracy of their claims.

In addition to political pundits, academics have espoused analysis of both similarities and differences between Vietnam and Iraq. For example, Carpenter (2007) notes differences between the two conflicts in question, arguing that the conflict in Iraq was much less well-defined than was Vietnam. He also states that troop deployment figures are incongruous, with 530,000 deployments in

Vietnam and 160,000 in Iraq (after the surge). Additionally, he notes that the two conflicts are incomparable because Vietnam soldiers were drafted while soldiers in Iraq were volunteers. Goldberg (2010) also acknowledges the gap in death and injury rates amongst U.S. soldiers serving in Vietnam and Iraq, with Vietnam having a death rate 5.4 times higher and an injury rate 3.7 times higher.

But Carpenter (2007) also notes similarities within both conflicts in U.S. officials' assumptions and policy errors. The assumption that victory would be easy in both conflicts, the desire of policy makers and supporters to find scapegoats for perceived failures, the belief that the conflicts themselves were more important than the collateral damage caused , and the assumption that the political and strategic stakes each country represented were insurmountable (Carpenter, 2007). Olsen (2009) also surmised similarities such as weak political support among U.S. voters during both wars, a government that was perceived as ineffective by the opposing country, a perceived ineffective senior U.S. political leadership, whole government approach to the conflict, opposition within the State Department, and the establishment of flawed stability phase initiatives. A focus on counterinsurgency and nation building in both conflicts is also posited as a similarity by Fitzgerald (2010), Gilbert (2004) and Krepinevich (2004).

Additional analysts, Dobbins (2006), Kagan (2005) and Record (2007), cannot seem to reconcile the overwhelming desire to compare the two wars. While Dobbins (2006) feels that post-Cold War Yugoslavia is a better analogy than that of Iraq, Kagan (2005) contests that insurgency in both countries is similar, acknowledging the flaws in attempting to employ historical analogy; Record (2007) points out the military contradictions between Vietnam and Iraq. In addition to these scholars, some government officials who served during the Nixon administration and Vietnam War do not see the similarities. For example, former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird contests the negative connotation associated with a Vietnam comparison and insists the country must learn from the mistakes of Vietnam rather than attempt to find similarities that do not exist in order to discredit the

current conflict (Laird, 2005). Several veterans of both wars have also questioned the comparison. In interviews with *USA Today* and Los Angeles Times, Vietnam veterans serving in Iraq only saw the differences in the two conflicts, which included a clearer understanding of the mission as well as better amenities and improved morale (Komarow, 2005; Morin, 2004). No statistics have been released by the military regarding how many Vietnam veterans have served in Iraq.

However, reporters who covered the Vietnam War are equally torn, typically noting similarities rather than differences between the two conflicts. For example, Pulitzer Prize winning magazine and newspaper reporter Stanley Karnow, who covered Vietnam from 1959 to 1975 for multiple publications such as *Time* and the *Washington Post*, feels the two conflicts are analogous (Karnow, 2003). In his *Los Angeles Times* commentary, "Vietnam's Shadow Lies Across Iraq," he details similarities in the way in which the invasion was justified, the deployment of sophisticated weaponry, and positive propaganda foisted upon the media by the military and politicians. In summary, politicians, scholars and the media are quite divided in their view regarding the similarities between the conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq; however, the analogy remains prevalent within discourse and media representation (Edy, 2011; Hayden, 2007).

Media Coverage

Mass media coverage and press reports of the Iraq War consistently evoke the Vietnam War analogy, so much so that researchers have labeled the comparison the "irresistible past" (Edy, 2011). As previously referenced, Edy (2011) conducted a Lexis-Nexis search of the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* and *USA Today,* not taking into consideration allusions to a "quagmire" or other indirect references to the Vietnam War, showcasing the minimum number of references. From September 2002 to September 2007, over 8 percent (about 1 in 12) of the news stories contained references to both Iraq and Vietnam (Edy, 2011). Within four-month intervals, the references rose and held above 10 percent: July-October 2004 (17.39 percent) and October 2006-January 2007 (12.7

percent). During both four-month instances, the U.S. was suffering significant setbacks (Edy, 2011). In another study, Hayden (2007) evaluated two dozen American newspapers archived in Lexis-Nexis between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2004, including 13,000 stories and editorials. The content analysis also included a qualitative review of 2,070 articles in which four frames were established: casualties, quagmire, atrocities and credibility, with each generating a negative connotation (Hayden, 2007). The study found as casualties in Iraq increased, atrocities came to light, and credibility of the mission waned, so too did the utilization of the term "quagmire" and both direct and indirect references to Vietnam (Hayden, 2007). Examples of such media coverage include *Newsweek's* featuring "The Vietnam Factor" on its April 12, 2004 cover and *The Economist* in 2004 referring to Iraq body count as the "Vietnam count" ("Lexington," 2004).

The experience of covering the Iraq War as a journalist has also been compared to reporting during the Vietnam War. In 2008, Ganey interviewed three Associated Press reporters who covered the Vietnam War and seven newspaper journalists who reported from Iraq; he concluded that journalists during the current Iraq War faced greater physical dangers and encountered a less helpful military in regard to coverage, despite the new practice of embedding.

While politicians are believed to manipulate historical analogy in order to support a specific position, foreign policy decision makers also attempt to control media messages by employing analogy. Leaders within the George W. Bush administration are believed by media scholars and political analysts to have skillfully managed the media, "not only with the seizing of historical agency but with creating reality itself" (Bradley 2007), thus blurring an already fine line between journalism and history (Bradley 2000).

Quagmire Mentality

The term "quagmire" in American history and foreign policy is most often associated with the Vietnam War (Emery, 2002). In 1971, the U.S. was embroiled in a conflict once believed to be a quick

and easy victory in the name of democracy. Instead, American forces were caught in an unwinnable and controversial war that became labeled a "quagmire." Campbell (2007) argues both the Vietnam War and Iraq War share the quagmire characteristic despite other differences.

Since the Vietnam War, scholars such as Tierney (2006, 2007b) have suggested that Americans are quick to succumb to a "quagmire mentality," seeing only the negative consequences of attempted nation building abroad. In fact, between 1981 and 2004, average American public approval for humanitarian operations was 61 percent while approval for peacekeeping missions was only 47 percent (*Transatlantic Trends*, 2004). In addition, since the Cold War the U.S. spearheaded six nation-building missions with five of these being viewed as unsuccessful by the American public (Tierney, 2007b). Tierney (2007b) claims that the quagmire mentality is a product of American ideals, elite rhetoric, memories of Vietnam, and the media.

As a result, when the operation in Iraq shifted from a quick invasion to a prolonged nation-building mission, the Vietnam quagmire analogies were more frequently adopted. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld mocked reporters while fielding questions, saying, "All together now: Quagmire!" continuing, "It's a different era, it's a different place" (Elliott, 2006). The response did not quell the skepticism of others such as Sen. Edward Kennedy who claimed, "Iraq has developed into a quagmire" ("The Vietnam Syndrome," 2004; Thomas et al., 2004). Others maintained the utilization of the term was merely a tactic by the left to condemn the ongoing war (Bradley, 2007).

It was not the first time that a foreign conflict had been compared to Vietnam in order to push party politics. What scholars termed the "Vietnam Syndrome" has had a prolonged effect on the nation. "Vietnam Syndrome," according to Baglione (2006), refers to the fear of intervention in the lesser developed world.

Cohort

Varying characteristics can impact interpretation and utilization of analogy including cohort makeup and experience. Cohort is defined in terms of sociological research as, "people within a delineated population who experience the same significant event within a given period of time" (Glenn 2005). Generation is one of the leading determining characteristics.

Mannheim's 1923 generational theory is considered a seminal approach to the understanding of ge nerations as a sociological phenomenon. Generational differences were found to be significant in determining public perception. One's age during a foreign conflict impacts one's understanding of the situation and also influences future courses of action (Holsti & Rosenau 1980). Mannheim said, "Only knowledge personally gained in real situations . . . sticks" (Mannheim, 1928, 1970, 1993). He contended that generations could be identified by events experienced between ages 17 and 25.

For example, post-Vietnam generational attitude differs toward military involvement among varying gender, age, race and socioeconomic status (Burris 2008). Among two groups of Americans, those beginning adolescence during World War II or prior to the start of the Vietnam War and those beginning adolescence during the Vietnam War or following the Vietnam War, comparisons have differed (Schuman & Rieger 1992). When comparing attitudes toward the Persian Gulf War prior to the beginning of bombing, and during the conflict, choice between historical analogies (World War II and Vietnam to Iraq) is related to cohort operationalized by age, but that it is more prevalent to the start of the Persian Gulf War than during it when the conflict was viewed as being more or less successful (Schuman & Rieger, 1992). In fact, those alive during the Vietnam War are more likely to compare Iraq to Vietnam than to World War II (Schuman & Corning 2006).

No matter the conflict, war tends to bring remembrances of past personal experience. For the generations that experienced the Vietnam War, the current conflict in Iraq frequently brings about a sense of déja vu (Carpenter, 2007). But some could argue that this could also be said for soldiers who experienced firsthand any of the other conflicts following Vietnam on a small scale. And others have

noted that with the help of electronic media, audiences feel they are experiencing the conflict and acquiring memories in which they have no actual physical connection (Noon, 2004a).

Theoretical Framework

The use of historical analogy by the mass media evokes numerous theories spanning a variety of academic disciplines and areas of study. The following theoretical framework focuses exclusively on those theories deemed most relevant to the study of communications media within the scaffold of the current study.

The Role Played by the Media

The role of the media and freedom of the press has long been researched within media studies. The coverage of war and conflict has been most significantly evaluated, the media is referred to as the fourth branch of the military (Horten, 2011). Newspaper reports and the relationship between the media and the military are present in the United States as far back as the Civil War (Maniaty, 2008). But as BBC War correspondent Kate Adie said in 1998, "The very nature of war confuses the role of the journalist" (Adie, 1998).

The 21st century has seen an upsurge in the media's references to the past (Neiger et al., 2011). The past is often mined in order to shape new narratives capable of presenting current conflicts in familiar terms (Andersen, 2006).

Agenda setting. The theory of agenda setting dates back to the seminal work of Walter Lippman in 1922 (Lippmann, 1922). At its core, agenda setting theory explains the media's role in shaping public awareness and knowledge by focusing on a narrow breadth of issues and determining what details are important enough to relay (Kuypers, 2006). In the late 1960s, the agenda-setting capability of the media within the context of a presidential election was tested, discovering that the media has significant weight in public opinion formation (Shaw & McCombs, 1977). Even the subtlest of nonverbal cues put forth by the media can have a substantial effect on public opinion

(Anastasio, Rose & Chapman 1999). Some research postulates there is a nuanced difference between agenda setting theory and news framing, claiming agenda setting is focused on the salience of issues while framing is focused on the presentation of issues (de Vreese 2005). Agenda setting and news framing have even been combined in order to better understand the media's influence on audience (Aday 2006).

In the context of war and conflict presentation, the media's agenda setting has been thoroughly documented by evaluations of news framing (Entman, Livingston, & Kim, 2009; Fried, 2005; Harmon & Muenchen, 2009). In de Vreese & Kandyla (2009), framing a potential foreign conflict as either a "risk" or "opportunity" was shown to have an impact on public support. Meanwhile journalists have been accused (particularly in regard to their coverage of war) of only reporting negative news that is latent with skepticism, leading to a strained relationship between American media and military (Filkins, 2007). Although political pundits and some scholars have implied that the media's hesitancy to ask the tough questions of the Bush administration following 9/11, and thus the misperception of the state of conflict in Iraq, led to the public support of a U.S.-led invasion (Allan & Zelizer, 2004). CNN's Christiane Amanpour said in a 2003 CNBC interview, "It's really a question of really asking the questions. All of the entire body politic in my view, whether it's the administration, the intelligence, the journalists, whoever, did not ask enough questions, for instance, about weapons of mass destruction. I mean, this looks like this was disinformation at the highest level (Allan & Zelizer, 2004). In 2003, perhaps in spite of or because of this contentious relationship, President George W. Bush implemented a media/military embed program, which the White House believed would allow their administration to better control the message presented by the media and conversely gave the media hopes of looking at the front lines of events (Cortell, Eisinger, & Althaus, 2009). However, despite the increased access afforded the media, the Bush administration continued to keep a tight hold on specific information, including casualty data, in order to avoid a Vietnam correlation (Boettcher III

& Cobb, 2005; Boettcher III & Cobb, 2006) yet the media continued to make the comparison between Iraq and Vietnam (Minyard & Savelsberg, 2010).

Propaganda. One of the most memorable incidents of propaganda is the infamous War of the Worlds radio broadcast in 1938. In the rebroadcast of part of a H.G. Wells science fiction novel, a nationwide panic caused by the illusion of an alien attack created fodder for the belief that the media could substantially influence the mindset of the public. Hadley Cantril, Hazel Gaudet and Herta Herzog continued to study the susceptibility of listeners to the radio broadcast, therefore, the theory of propaganda.

Propaganda often has been researched with focus on its impact on public opinion and support for war (Lowery & DeFleur, 1994). World War II films, in particular the *Why We Fight* training series, have been evaluated by researchers such as Carl Hovland for their persuasive power (Stouffer, Hovland, Social Science Research Council (U.S.), & United States Army Service Forces Information and Education Division, 1949). Their research was followed up by Herman & Chomsky (1988) who developed a five-filter propaganda model to better explain media complicity. Meanwhile, more current scholarly research suggests that propaganda was utilized as a tool by the George W. Bush administration to convince the American public that Iraq was a threat due to its possession of weapons of mass destruction (Alterman, 2004; Calabrese, 2005, 2007; Cavanaugh, 2007; Christie, 2006; Cobb & Boettcher III, 2007; Ferrari, 2007; Hartnett & Stengrim, 2004; Hiebert, 2003; Johansen & Joslyn, 2008; S. John, Domke, Coe, & Graham, 2004; S. L. John, Domke, Coe, & Graham, 2007; Kushner & Gershkoff, 2004; "Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War," n.d.; Paolucci, 2009). According to Johansen & Joslyn (2008), even the most educated Americans were persuaded to lean one way or another due to political propaganda. Kellner (2004) surmises that the American press was complacent in disseminating the alleged WMD propaganda and Bradley (2007) contends that the press's failure to expose inconsistencies in the administration's reasons for going to war highlights the incongruous

relationship between history and journalism. Altheide (2009) and Altheide & Grimes (2005) would like to see evaluation of the suspected propaganda utilized during the Iraq War in order to prevent it from shaping future conflicts.

Social responsibility. A responsible U.S. press is a lasting tenet since the 1947 Hutchins Commission on Freedom of the Press (Christians, 2004). The social responsibility theory dictates a press free of regulation and with the responsibility to maintain high standards, professionalism and preservation of the freedoms afforded under the constitution (Siebert, Peterson, & Schramm, 1963). However, social responsibility theory puts the onus on the public to become media literate in order to hold the press accountable.

Objectivity in journalism is viewed as a cornerstone of the profession. Schudson (2001) traces the initial articulation of objectivity to the 19th century. The first step toward an objective press was reportedly caused by the "penny" press of the 1830s in an attempt to present opinions outside of the mainstream political parties (Mindich, 2000). In 1937 the U.S. Supreme Court held that while the Constitution does not guarantee objectivity of the press, the issue was moot where the court was concerned because objectivity was unobtainable in a subjective world (Novick, 1988). Despite the unattainable nature, journalists embrace objectivity as a professional ideology (Deuze, 2005). In a study of objective reporting during the Iraq War, Aday, Livingston, & Hebert (2005) found objectivity was influenced more by culture and ideology than the actual events themselves.

Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of the media not to relay misinformation even through interpretation (Held, 1997; Schudson, 2001; Wolfe, Swanson, & Wrona, 2008). As alluded to in reference to propaganda, the power of the media to create consent can be viewed as dangerous depending on political alignment (Hartnett & Stengrim, 2004; Kellner, 2004; Paolucci, 2009b; Robinson, 2006) and consequently does not uphold the high ideals expected of journalists. By

comparing 2005 national news agency Internet posts to the actuality of the situation in Iraq, Wolfe et al. (2008) found that American journalists did not live up to their responsibility to report accurately.

The Role Played by Memory

Collective Memory. In the field of social science research, many definitions of collective memory have been outlined, but Maurice Halbwachs' explanation is the longest precedent and most cited in regard to media and history scholarship. Halbwachs observed that memory is able only to function within a collective (Halbwachs, 1925, 1950, 1992). Collective memory is seen as a multidimensional process with movement from the present to the past and past to the present (Neiger et al., 2011). Noon (2004) asserts that people have inherent cultural, political and psychological longings that are met through collective memory. Norman Finkelstein noted that this need could be and had been manipulated for profit in a sort of "Holocaust Industry" (Finkelstein, 2001), while Le Goff (1996) contends that the fear of a possible collective amnesia drives people to invoke the past. However, it's what is done to transform memory in order to fulfill this need that can become increasingly problematic for the remainder of society. In an effort to explain the world in which we live we define and redefine the roles that we play through a frame of the past (Morris-Suzuki, 2005). Our memory becomes increasingly confused and fragmented, particularly due to the cohesiveness of groupthink (and even more so the mediated globalization of communication) (Hoskins, 2001b). Durkheim (2001) takes it a step further by claiming that individuals are incapable of remembering on their own. William Faulkner once wrote, "The past is not dead; it isn't even past" (Faulkner, 1975). As if to prove this point President Obama cited Faulkner in a 2008 speech titled "A More Perfect Union," discussing race relations in America (Obama, 2008).

Researching the evolving relationship between media, culture and public memory is a critical element of the study of mass communication (Hume, 2010). Journalists have become a key agent of memory creation and recreation, though they typically do not want to admit it (Zelizer, 2008). The

role of journalism in not only extending collective memory, but also distorting has become increasingly studied since the mid 1990s (Hume, 2010). Assmann & Czaplicka (1995) describe memory, "living through communication." Kansteiner (2002) addresses some of the methodological problems of past memory studies, including the prominence of studies evaluating what is remembered and how, but not the consequences and impact of such memories.

The paradox has been longstanding within American culture. In fact, the dichotomy between U.S. journalism and memory existed as early as the American revolution when press reports were utilized to recreate history (Hume, 2011). In a study of 2,000 19th century magazine articles, Winfield & Hume (2007) found historical references to the Civil War as well as increased references to history in order to reinforce memory. Images of and references to the Kennedy assassination permeate the media, but as Zelizer (1992a, 1992b) examines, it raises questions regarding who is authorized to address the past and what role the reference plays in popular culture.

Ebbrecht (2007) contends there is an increased interest in collective identity and public history as a frame of reference that is increasingly portrayed by television news. The trend continues and even grows exponentially among news websites (Schwalbe, 2006b; Schwalbe, Silcock, & Keith, 2008b). Collective memory can heavily influence not only news stories, but also the process of news gathering (Edy & Daradanova, 2006). There is an inherent risk in the way journalists utilize the public past because historical analogies are rarely contested and the comparison can change how the past is interpreted (Edy, 1999). Despite analysis of false memory, little research addresses the potential influence of an event's emotional impact on recollection (Porter, Taylor, & ten Brinke, 2008).

Past conflicts are often resurrected during current wars. How Americans remember the Vietnam War and how the past is applied to more recent skirmishes indicates that Americans are conflicted and hold contradictory attitudes, comparing virtually all conflicts to Vietnam, and yet feel that the government is acting in a manner unlike it did during Vietnam (Edy, 2005). Memories are

often reframed in the present in order to make them more bearable (Hoskins, 2001b). As Hoskins, (2001b) asserts, people look to the past as an anchor in an increasingly fragmented modern society.

Media Memory. Manufactured, mediated and media manipulated memory is the cornerstone of the recently adopted term "new memory" (Hoskins, 2001b). The technological transformation of collective memory has not aided in a cohesive remembrance, but instead contributes to a "broken past" (Hoskins, 2001b). The past, just as in the case of the future, becomes invisible and intangible (Nora, 1989). This new memory becomes highly contested, as what is remembered and how it is remembered is navigated across an evolving continuum of time as a process (Hoskins, 2001b).

In particular, electronic media and the instantaneous nature of news has forever changed the "space" for memory (Hoskins, 2001b). There is now a limited amount of time in which to reflect on events before they are mediated (Hoskins, 2001b). For example, television sustains and reframes the past through repeating highly selective imagery (Hoskins, 2007), making television accountable for renewal of memory (Hoskins, 2008). The media's representation of the past is articulated to form memory (Huyssen, 1994). While McLuhan surmised, "The medium is the message," Hoskins (2001b) contends the medium is in part the memory. In fact, television news has collapsed memory, creating a perpetual present (Hoskins, 2001c, 2004) by analyzing current conflicts in terms of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, events surrounding September 11 and the 2003 Iraq War. According to Hoskins (2007), television is a primary medium of new memory due to the 're-combining' of past and present into a converged present. The gatekeeping role of the media extends not only to public awareness, but also to public memory (Ito, 2002). Additionally, near constant connectivity between people and events due to computer mediated communication and television broadcasts leads to an even more unpredictable memory (Hoskins, 2009b, 2010, 2011a, 2011b). A dependency on the media for a default vision of the past can lead to what Landsberg (2004) refers to as "prosthetic memory" or a disposable and cheapened version. When journalists rely on memory to take on meaning within their reporting of

events and issues, objectivity and accuracy is in jeopardy (Zelizer, 2011). According to Chambers & Culbert (1996), public memory of war is less about remembering the past than manufacturing memory.

Model of Study

The model of focus for the current research is founded in the social psychology discipline, taking into consideration contextual influence on judgment and human thought. The cognitive accessibility construct (the belief that the mind will hold fast to the frame of reference most accessible during any given situation) is the foundation of not only IEM, but also the Identification-Inference Model, Person Memory Model and Selective Accessibility Model, which are similar to and precede IEM in existence. Previous studies utilizing these models focus on trait priming in order to gauge influence on a particular target (Bless & Schwarz, 1998; Herr, 1986; Mussweiler, 2001, 2002, 2003; Philippot et al., 1991; Srull, 1981). An understanding of these preceding models and their studies is integral in order to better relate to the model under review.

Identification-Inference Model

Trope (1978) begins to evaluate the reliability of memory and whether it is a factor in the influence of memory on judgment, concluding that the reliability of remembrances is not a determinant in whether memory affects perception. Later he formulated the Identification-Inference Model, analyzing how memory processes create input contributing to inference (Trope, 1986). The two-stage model was subsequently tested by Trope, Cohen, & Maoz (1988), who held that the ambiguity of situational context increased impact on behavior. The theoretical framework for the model evolved into a study of temporal distance (Henderson, Fujita, Trope, & Liberman, 2006; Trope & Liberman, 2003) in which spatial distance was found to produce more abstract judgments than their nearer counterparts. The Identification-Inference model is the foundation for models in the discipline of

social cognition that followed first taking into consideration the impact memory and perception can have on opinion.

Person Memory Model

Initially Srull's (1981, 1983) 'person memory' (as for the purposes of this model's creation) referred to the storage and retrieval of information and its impact on current behavior. The theoretical model evaluates the formation of a person's impressions (in particular stereotyping) based on primed information and recall (Srull & Wyer's 1989). It concludes that accessible knowledge, or memory, was more likely to impact judgment than new information; the impression of a target, relying on existing knowledge, was mediated by interpretation (Srull & Wyer, 1989). How people remember instances or events and is reflected in their future decisions, shaping their beliefs is explained through the model.

Selective Accessibility Model

The Selective Accessibility Model (SAM) predicts how a person, concept or idea will affect how individuals perceive themselves. Mussweiler (2001) concluded that a respondent's accessible knowledge of him or herself could be primed. Later studies conducted found that self-evaluative comparisons led to contrast in objective judgments and assimilation in subjective judgments (Mussweiler & Strack 2000). This assimilation is considered an anchoring effect (Mussweiler, 2002). The SAM is utilized to conclude that, in regard to target knowledge, testing selectively similarity (respondent tendency to find a similarity) makes accessible assimilation while testing selectively dissimilarity (respondent tendency to find a dissimilarity) makes accessible contrast (Mussweiler, 2003; Mussweiler et al., 2004). Thus, the priming effect of assimilation or contrast, according to SAM, depends on whether comparisons are similar or dissimilar in judgment (Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008).

Inclusion/Exclusion Model

The previous models are building blocks leading up to the development of the Inclusion/Exclusion model (IEM), which is under evaluation in the current study. The goal of IEM is to predict not only the conditions in which context effects occur, but also whether they are more likely to lean toward assimilation or contrast (Schwarz & Bless, 1992). Assuming that cognitive information or memory must be retrieved in order to make a judgment, IEM focuses more narrowly on the standard of comparison and what it evokes as a result (Schwarz & Bless, 1992). IEM asserts the difference in assimilation and contrast within comparison is the presence of a cognitive representation or ambiguity (Schwarz & Bless, 1992). When subjective temporary representative memory is brought to mind, assimilation or agreement with the target appears; when a comparative standard emerges, a contrast with the target is then present (Martin & Tesser, 1992). More importantly, the more ambiguity present when comparing a target stimulus results in less contrast (Martin & Tesser, 1992).

Advancing the Model. The current study seeks to expand upon the IEM as well as redefine its distinct and interpretive components through testing of the contrast construct. It is through this contrast that the study seeks to represent the theoretical impact of media memory on collective memory.

IEM asserts that judgments are formed based on either ambiguous or distinct knowledge leaning toward either assimilation or contrast in terms of a target. In the case of the current research, autobiographical memory is utilized as a priming contextual effect in order to increase the likelihood of either assimilation or contrast toward the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy. More specifically, while the IEM places an emphasis on ambiguous versus distinct information, the current study not only distinguishes between the categorization of information, but also how this information is amassed and the specific method of transmission as a key, integral piece of the puzzle. It was proposed previously that information garnered through interpretation is by definition more ambiguous, while comparison to a standard is more distinct causing both means of gathering information to act accordingly to a target

stimulus in terms of assimilation or contrast[1]. However, these previous studies focused on self-reflection and intrinsic interpretation or comparison while the current study will focus on the media's gatekeeping by testing the contrasting effect of autobiographical memory.

The current research is forwarding a more media specific model, taking into consideration Marshal McLuhan's groundbreaking assertion that, "The medium is the message." In the case of the past-present analogy within the construction of the IEM, the mass media is the interpretative device. The press, as gatekeeper, interprets collective memory in the form of media memory employing past-present analogies as a tactic. Meanwhile, the distinct comparison standard remains autobiographical memory. Someone that has lived an event can recall a clearer stream of occurrences in which to compare that event than an interpretative medium. A continuum of assimilation and contrast is dependent on the closeness to actual witnessed events as opposed to events as portrayed by a removed media viewing through a narrative lens. The current research is attempting to visually depict this continuum with demographic variables Vietnam soldier age, rank and deployment length between 1965 and 1975.

[1] The author has chosen not to elaborate on this research as it has been found to consist of fraudulent data and suspicious experiments. For more information: https://www.commissielevelt.nl/

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

"The meanings made of war are distinct from war itself," is an astute summation (Andersen, 2006) and the central focus of the current research. The current study theorizes that the media creates disingenuous meaning through past-present analogy of war that is rarely contested. However, when evaluated alongside distinct memories of such events, it becomes clear, interpretation priming and news framing by the media more easily finds similarities in the past and present. The current study's goal is to evaluate the likelihood the independent variable autobiographical memory war prime impacts the dependent variable perceived distinctness in an effort to further discuss the assimilation created by media memory among the collective.

The methodology chosen for the current study is unlike previous IEM and SAM studies such as (Herr, 1986; Mussweiler, 2002; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000) which performed social science experiments. In these prior studies, participants were primed with specific and manipulated information in order to pre-and post-test their recall and thus application of cognitive representation to judgment. In the current study, the author contends veterans have already been primed by their Vietnam War experiences and thus no experiment is required. Additionally, it is the author's intention to demonstrate with a memory impact on social judgment continuum, level of contrast by specific demographics within the cohort (age, rank, time served).

Testing the IEM, it is theorized that memory works on a pattern of polarization much like that of a battery (Figure 1). Memory directly formed by distinct autobiographical Vietnam War memory will pull away from assimilation and toward contrast while ambiguous media memory developed from interpretation will push toward assimilation showcasing the polarization effect.



Figure 1. Memory polarization

Selection of Subjects

To examine the cohort of perspective of Vietnam veterans, the Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA) was chosen to aid in the execution of the current study. VVA was selected because it is the only national Vietnam veteran organization congressionally chartered and exclusively dedicated to Vietnam-era veterans and their families. According to the VVA website (vva.org), the VVA has over 65,000 members and is comprised of Vietnam-era veterans and their families. For the purposes of the study, VVA made accessible via online dissemination a large nonprobablility convenience sample of Vietnam veterans.

As defined for this study, the Vietnam War began in 1965 with the deployment of U.S. troops to Vietnam and came to an end with the North Vietnamese capture of Saigon in 1975. Subjects served in the U.S. military either domestically or abroad during that time period. The VVA members' demographic profiles provided by the VVA are detailed below. The data indicates more than half (73%) of these members were 17-years-old or younger when the Vietnam War began in 1965, which also can account for 60% of members only having a high school degree.

Demographic	% of membership
Between 43-64 years old	73%
Over 65 years old	27%
Household income over $50,000	56%
Education: Bachelor's Degree or Higher	40%
Married	78%
Own their own home	72%

Figure 2. VVA Member Profile

The subjects of the study span four military branches (Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force), range in age and culminating rank either upon their retirement or while they are currently serving. According to the U.S. Census Bureau in 2008, there were 7.8 million living Vietnam veterans, having served between 1964 (outside the 1965 beginning used for this study) and 1975. In addition, Vietnam veterans made up 33 percent of all living U.S. veterans in 2008 (U.S. Census). As of the date of completion of this study, the average Vietnam veteran would be approximately between 60 and 65 but could be as young as 52, because 17-year-olds may have enlisted at the end of the conflict. The study is specific to Vietnam veterans; therefore those not having served in the military during the Vietnam War era (1964-1975) are excluded from evaluation. Also, because the Vietnam Veterans of America membership email distribution includes nonveterans, those subjects have also been excluded from the study through demographic seeing questions in the survey instrument.

A sample size calculation was performed in order to gauge the best representative sample of the Vietnam veteran population. In order to achieve a 95% confidence level, a +/– 5 confidence interval, sampling a population of roughly 7.8 million living Vietnam veterans, the sample size would have to be a minimum of 384 respondents or .64% of the 65,000 VVA membership.

Procedures

The primary structural format for this study is a self-administered quantitative survey, an effective mode of gauging opinions, behaviors or characteristics of a desired population (Buddenbaum & Novak, 2001; Creswell, 2008; Slavin, 2006). The survey is advantageous in that it's economical; can collect a great deal of data; and can sample a large population (Babbie, 2010; Berger, 2010). Additionally, the survey method lends itself to statistical analysis and thus a higher degree of precision when attempting to better understand a representative group (Berger, 2010). Additionally, the self-administering of the instrument aids in respondents' sense of privacy and anonymity (Babbie, 2010). Because the survey was administered only once to one group of individuals, it was cross-sectional in nature, meaning it is a snapshot in time of the opinions, behaviors, and beliefs of one group at one moment (Babbie, 2007). A follow up reminder for those failing to take the survey initially was sent out as recommended by Babbie (2010). A digital survey was chosen because dissemination to Vietnam veterans across the country would be possible quickly and with little disruption to the subjects' ordinary lives.

Ethics, Approval, and Informed Consent

No ethical principles were jeopardized within the course of this study. Informed consent information was included within the body of the invitation email (Appendix A) and among the first items in the online Qualtrics survey (Appendix B). The information conveyed included that respondent participation in the survey would remain anonymous, that the survey was voluntary, and that a copy of the survey results could be requested and the researcher's contact information provided.

Instrumentation

The instrument utilized in the current study is both descriptive and analytical (Berger, 2010). It was created in order to garner quantitative results evaluating both descriptive and inferential statistics during data analysis. In the process of developing the survey questions, care was taken to ensure questions were not ambiguous, leading or embarrassing (Berger, 2010). The survey primarily focused on three areas: establishing demographic and cohort parameters, predicting perceived distinctness of the Vietnam War and indicating possible external influences on judgment.

Demographic Parameters. The survey asked for demographic information including the number of years served during the Vietnam War, the highest rank achieved during the Vietnam War, and the veteran's age during their Vietnam War service. This information is required in order to plot the proposed memory impact continuum on social judgment (Figure 2).



Figure 3. Memory impact continuum on social judgment

Perceived Distinctness. The instrument clearly asks respondents whether they perceived the Vietnam War and the Iraq War as distinct events. It also addresses possible areas of ambiguity in which the veterans could see similarities between the two conflicts without broadly seeing the two as comparable. Because autobiographical memory is considered to be distinct in nature, these questions are to support the overarching premise of the study and thus contribute to the idea that memory

includes positive and negative polarization. Whether the veterans perceived Vietnam or Iraq as more successful was added for discussion and testing against the war prime of having served during Vietnam. Multiple questions gauging support for and perceived success of each war were included within the instrument in order to be combined to create an Iraq War categorical variable and Vietnam War categorical variable respectively. The variables were utilized in order to ascertain whether the veterans thought one conflict was more successful than the other and thus determine the possible impact of the war prime on perceived support and success of each war. Ultimately, support and success of each war was implemented within the instrument in order to test assimilation or contrast of the comparison of the two events among the war prime of autobiographical memory.

Both perceived distinctness and the related questions concerning support and success of each conflict utilized a Likert scale. Likert scales are advantageous in that they yield more information than nominal-dichotomous questions and provide interval level data better suited to more powerful quantitative statistical tests (Mitchell & Jolley, 2012). Likert scales also aid in summation scores (Mitchell & Jolley, 2012) such as the ones being utilized in the current study for a Vietnam War rating and Iraq War rating.

Possible External Influence. Specific questions within the questionnaire were intended to take into consideration possible external influences on judgment outside of the war prime. These influences, such as political affiliation, military volunteerism or draft and source of news media, aid in creating a more complete picture of social judgment and contribute to discussion once data analysis is complete.

Reliability and Validity

Ensuring quality within the field of research is imperative not only for credibility, but also reliability and validity. Surveys are widely used in social sciences, and especially communications research, because they can easily be proven to be both valid and reliable (Buddenbaum & Novak,

2001). However, surveys are considered by Babbie (2010) to be weak on validity and strong on reliability.

While constructing the survey instrument, the items were created logically in order to gain key demographic and prime information as well as appropriately address the hypotheses pertaining to past-present analogies. Because of this careful construction, face validity, or validity of the measure because it appeared to make sense, was acquired. Expert jury validity has also been attained through showing the survey to a panel of experts including the dissertation chair, Dr. Mary Beth Leidman, and other faculty members, including Dr. Jay Start and Dr. Zachary Stiegler. These faculty members have performed extensive research in the communications field.

To ensure reliability, the researcher constructed all questions on the basis of IEM and SAM literature. As previously referenced, several of the survey items were formatted in a Likert scale, thus increasing the consistency of the ways in which participants had to respond. During the construction of the survey, the questions were worded clearly and concisely in a non-partisan manner. When administered, each respondent took identical surveys with the same amount of understanding going into the process after reading the survey introduction. Because of this identical experience, there was no chance for the research to bias the results in any way such as skipping a question, making a mistake with the wording, or failing to record a response. The survey software Qualtrics collects and reports all data electronically through a web-based application, so it is also highly improbable for any data reporting issues to occur at that phase.

Statistical Analysis

The statistical methods necessary to answer the stated research questions include descriptive and inferential measures. Descriptive statistics such as central tendencies of the demographic information provided is computed in order to add context to the findings. Nevertheless, the bulk of the statistical analysis conducted is inferential in nature. Each research question requiring statistical

analysis, reasoning behind the test utilized and any corollary tests are detailed below. Question 1 is intended to confirm the research's base theoretical premise that respondents served in the military between 1965 and 1975, while questions 2-4 are for not only to support the theory, but also for the purpose of identifying points within the memory impact on social judgment continuum to map degrees of contrast.

Research Question 1. *Does being a Vietnam veteran (prime effect) increase the likelihood of assimilation or contrast to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy (target)?* This research question is the impetus of the current study and based on multiple statistical tests leading up to a conclusion. First, the aforementioned Vietnam War categorical variable and Iraq War categorical variable are determined in order to develop a comparison standard. The variables are created by combining responses to questions 10 and 25 for Vietnam and 12 and 24 for Iraq (Appendix D). Once both war variables are determined, the two scores are analyzed by chi-square in order to show no statistically significant relationship and essentially assimilation vs. contrast. It is also concluded whether the veterans perceived one conflict more positively than the other by utilizing comparing the mean and standard deviation of results from question 25 for Vietnam and 24 for Iraq.

Perceived distinctness of each war is then calculated by identifying the mean and standard deviation for question 22, regarding Vietnam and 23 for Iraq. The two means are compared to show Vietnam as more distinct than Iraq to Vietnam veterans. Results from the perceived distinctness of each conflict, because of the existing Vietnam War prime, provide the answer to research question one. However, perceived distinctness of Iraq is also tested against the Iraq War variable through a chi-square test while perceived distinctness of Vietnam is tested through a chi-square test against the Vietnam War rating in order to indicate whether it was in fact distinctness that impacted social judgment positively or negatively.

Research Question 2. *Does length of military Vietnam War service (prime effect) increase the likelihood assimilation or contrast to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy (target)?* Both the Iraq War variable and Vietnam War variable have been determined within evaluating research question one, thus, the research question is only in need of a chi-square test between the length of time served and perceived distinctness.

Research Question 3. *Does highest military rank obtained during Vietnam War military service (prime effect) increase the likelihood of assimilation or contrast to the media's Iraq analogy (target)?* The question calls for analysis of the highest military rank obtained during Vietnam War service and perceived distinctness through a chi-square test. In order to utilize highest military rank in this manner the variable will need to be recoded.

Research Question 4. Does age range during Vietnam War military service (prime effect) increase the likelihood of assimilation or contrast to the media's Iraq analogy (target)? Again, a chi-square test between age range during service and perceived distinctness is conducted.

An additional ANOVA is utilized to test the multiple war primes (time served, highest military rank and age range during service) as against perceived distinctness in order to establish the closest point on the memory impact continuum to contrast.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

Introduction

The use of data analysis to evaluate media memory is essential to better understand the impact of media on collective memory. This chapter provides results from testing the research questions and hypotheses set forth in this study as well as pertinent demographic data. Research questions and hypotheses are measured based on descriptive statistics, mean comparison, and chi-square statistical methods.

Demographics of the Sample

A total of 451 respondents completed the survey, .69% of the total 65,000 VVA membership. Questions 2-4 (age during Vietnam War service, branch of military service, and highest rank during Vietnam War service) are intended to identify points within the memory impact on social judgment continuum mapping degrees of contrast. The results of these questions as well as additional demographics are provided.

Age. Of the 451 respondents, the overwhelming majority of individuals were between the ages of 17 and 25 while serving in the military during the Vietnam War. Data for age was gathered via groupings of: 17-25, 26-35, 36-45, and over 45. Within those groupings, 84.3% were between 17 and 25 years old when they served in Vietnam, 12.2% were between 26 and 35, .7% were between 36 and 45, and .2% were over 45 (Table 1).

Table 1

Age served during the Vietnam War

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	17-25	380	84.3	86.6	86.6
	26-35	55	12.2	12.5	99.1
	36-45	3	.7	.7	99.8
	Over 45	1	.2	.2	100.0
	Total	439	97.3	100.0	
Missing	System	12	2.7		
Total		451	100.0		

Ethnicity. Individuals were provided five categories to describe their ethnicity. The survey was designed to allow respondents to select one of four ethnicities or an "other" box. The options provided were Caucasian (89.6%), African American (2.7%), Hispanic (3.1%), Asian (.2%), and Other (1.8%) as seen in Table 2.

Table 2

Ethnicity

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	White/Caucasian	404	89.6	92.0	92.0
	African American	12	2.7	2.7	94.8
	Hispanic	14	3.1	3.2	97.9
	Asian	1	.2	.2	98.2
	Other	8	1.8	1.8	100.0
	Total	439	97.3	100.0	
Missing	System	12	2.7		
Total		451	100.0		

Military Branch. Military branch was queried in order to better understand if branch of service impacted the Vietnam War prime. Branches were limited to Army/National Guard (58.1%), Navy (13.5%), Air Force (12.6%), and Marine Corps (12.4%) as indicated in Table 3.

Table 3

Branch of military service during Vietnam War

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Army/National Guard	262	58.1	60.1	60.1
	Navy	61	13.5	14.0	74.1
	Air Force	57	12.6	13.1	87.2
	Marine Corps	56	12.4	12.8	100.0
	Total	436	96.7	100.0	
Missing	System	15	3.3		
Total		451	100.0		

Rank. Military rank is predicted to have an influence on perceived distinctness of the Vietnam War; therefore, respondents were asked to provide their highest rank achieved during their Vietnam War service. More individuals served as Specialist (32.5%) than any other rank in the Army/National Guard (Table 4) followed by Sergeant (20.6%) and Private First Class (10.7%). More individuals served as Petty Officer 3rd Class (33%) than any other rank in the Navy (Table 5) followed by Petty Officer 2nd Class (26.4%), Seaman (12.1%), and Lieutenant, Junior Grade (8.8%). More individuals served as Senior Airman or Sergeant (30%) than any other rank in the Air Force (Table 6) followed by Airman First Class (23.8%), Staff Sergeant (22.5%), and Captain (6.3%). Finally, more individuals served as Lance Corporal (28.7%) than any other rank in the Marine Corps (Table 7) followed by Corporal (22.8%), Sergeant (17.8%), and Sergeant (15.8%).

Table 4

Army/National Guard Rank during Vietnam War

	N=428*	
	Valid	Percent
Private	16	3.7
Private 2	19	4.4
Private First Class	46	10.7
Specialist	139	32.5
Corporal	10	2.3
Sergeant	88	20.6
Staff Sergeant	17	4.0
Sergeant First Class	4	.93
Master Sergeant	1	.23
First Sergeant	0	0
Sergeant Major	0	0
Command Sergeant Major	0	0
Sergeant Major of the Army	0	0
Warrant Officer	3	.70
Chief Warrant Officer 2	3	.70
Chief Warrant Officer 3	0	0
Chief Warrant Officer 4	0	0
Chief Warrant Officer 5	0	0
Second Lieutenant	19	4.4
First Lieutenant	32	7.5
Captain	26	6.1
Major	4	.93
Lieutenant Colonel	1	.23
Colonel	0	0
Brigadier General	0	0
Major General	0	0
Lieutenant General	0	0
General	0	0
General of the Army	0	0

*While 262 respondents selected Army/National Guard the rank selection was for all that apply thus N=428

Table 5

Navy Rank during Vietnam War

	N=91*	
	Valid	Percent
Seaman Recruit	5	5.5
Seaman Apprentice	5	5.5
Seaman	11	12.1
Petty Officer 3rd Class	30	33
Petty Officer 2nd Class	24	26.4
Petty Officer 1st Class	7	7.7
Chief Petty Officer	4	4.4
Senior Chief Petty Officer	0	0
Master Chief Petty Officer	0	0
Command Master Chief Petty Officer	0	0
Fleet Master Chief Petty Officer	0	0
Force Master Chief Petty Officer Pay Scale	0	0
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard	0	0
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy	0	0
Warrant Officer	0	0
Chief Warrant Officer 2	0	0
Chief Warrant Officer 3	0	0
Chief Warrant Officer 4	0	0
Chief Warrant Officer 5	0	0
Ensign	4	4.4
Lieutenant, Junior Grade	8	8.8
Lieutenant	4	4.4
Lieutenant Commander	0	0
Commander	0	0
Captain	0	0
Rear Admiral (lower half)	0	0
Rear Admiral (upper half)	0	0
Vice Admiral	0	0

Admiral Chief of Naval Operations / Commandant of the Coast Guard Pay Scale	0	0
Fleet Admiral	0	0

* While 61 respondents selected Navy the rank selection was for all that apply thus N=91

Table 6

Air Fo*rce Rank during Vietnam War*

	N=80*	
	Valid	Percent
Airman Basic	2	2.5
Airman	4	5
Airman First Class	19	23.8
Senior Airman or Sergeant	24	30
Staff Sergeant	18	22.5
Technical Sergeant	1	1.3
Master Sergeant	2	2.5
Senior Master Sergeant	0	0
Chief Master Sergeant	0	0
Command Chief Master Sergeant	0	0
Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force	0	0
Second Lieutenant	0	0
First Lieutenant	4	5
Captain	5	6.3
Major	1	1.3
Lieutenant Colonel	0	0
Colonel	0	0
Brigadier General	0	0
Major General	0	0
Lieutenant General	0	0
General Air Force Chief of Staff	0	0
General of the Air Force	0	0

* While 57 respondents selected Air Force the rank selection was for all that apply thus N=80

Table 7

Marine Corps Rank during Vietnam War

	N=101	
	Valid	Percent
Private	3	3
Private First Class	16	15.8
Lance Corporal	29	28.7
Corporal	23	22.8
Sergeant	18	17.8
Staff Sergeant	3	3
Gunnery Sergeant	2	2
Master Sergeant	0	0
First Sergeant	0	0
Master Gunnery Sergeant	0	0
Sergeant Major	0	0
Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps	1	1
Warrant Officer 1	0	0
Chief Warrant Officer 2	0	0
Chief Warrant Officer 3	0	0
Chief Warrant Officer 4	0	0
Chief Warrant Officer 5	0	0
Second Lieutenant	2	2
First Lieutenant	3	3
Captain	0	0
Major	0	0
Lieutenant Colonel	1	1
Colonel	0	0
Brigadier General	0	0
Major General	0	0
Lieutenant General	0	0
General	0	0

*While 56 respondents selected Marine Corps the rank selection was for all that apply thus N=101

Volunteerism or Draft Service. Possible external factors impacting the Vietnam War prime include volunteerism versus draft service, length of Vietnam tour, political affiliation, and media

relationship. Despite the ongoing military draft throughout the Vietnam War the majority of individuals (75.2%) indicated (Table 8) they volunteered to serve rather than being drafted (22%).

Table 8

Drafted or voluntarily signed up for service

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Voluntarily Signed Up	339	75.2	77.4	77.4
	Drafted	99	22.0	22.6	100.0
	Total	438	97.1	100.0	
Missing	System	13	2.9		
Total		451	100.0		

Length of Service. Length of exposure to the effects of war is an important aspect of understanding veteran perception. The majority of veterans served between 1-3 years (74.7%) in contrast to less than a year (15.8%), 4-6 years (4.2%), 7-9 years (1.8%), and 10-12 years (1.1%) as shown in Table 9.

Table 9

Length of tour of duty during Vietnam War

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Less than one year	69	15.3	15.8	15.8
	1-3 years	337	74.7	76.9	92.7
	4-6 years	19	4.2	4.3	97.0
	7-9 years	8	1.8	1.8	98.9
	10-12 years	5	1.1	1.1	100.0
	Total	438	97.1	100.0	
Missing	System	13	2.9		
Total		451	100.0		

Political Affiliation. Political association is often correlated with support of or opposition to war; as a result, respondents were asked to provide this information in order to determine any impact on the war prime. Political parties were Republican (36.1%), Democrat (23.5%), Independent (31.5%), and Other (5.1%) as shown in Table 10.

Table 10

Current Political Affiliation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Republican	163	36.1	37.6	37.6
	Democrat	106	23.5	24.4	62.0
	Independent	142	31.5	32.7	94.7
	Other	23	5.1	5.3	100.0
	Total	434	96.2	100.0	
Missing	System	17	3.8		
Total		451	100.0		

Media Relationship. To better understand the participants' relationship with the media, questions involving source of news and perceived influence of the media were included in the survey. More individuals cited television (37.5%) as their primary source of news (Table 11) than the Internet (27.5%), newspaper (16.4%), and radio (2.2%). Secondary source of news was cited as newspaper (29%), television (23.5%), the Internet (18.4%), and radio (12.6%).

Table 11

Source of News

		Primary Source Percent	Secondary Source Percent
Valid	Television	37.5	23.5
	Internet	27.5	18.4
	Newspaper	16.4	29
	Radio	2.2	12.6
Missing	System	16.4	16.4
	Total	100	100

Respondents are split on whether they feel yes the media influences their opinion of war (43.5%) or no the media does not influence their opinion of war (53.7%), shown in Table 12. Regarding the Iraq/Vietnam comparison 51.7% feel the media does not compare the two conflicts while 44.3% do believe the media compares the two conflicts (Table 13).

Table 12

Perception media influences opinion of war

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	196	43.5	44.7	44.7
	No	242	53.7	55.3	100.0
	Total	438	97.1	100.0	
Missing	System	13	2.9		
Total		451	100.0		

Table 13

Perception media has compared Iraq War to the Vietnam War

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	200	44.3	46.2	46.2
	No	233	51.7	53.8	100.0
	Total	433	96.0	100.0	
Missing	System	18	4.0		
Total		451	100.0		

Participants were also able to express how they feel the media influences their opinion of war. The following are a sampling representing all perspectives as quoted from participants that felt the media does influence opinion of war.

"Military analysts on television provide a level of timely analysis not generally available in newspapers."

"They have their own liberal view...and, by selective and frequently biased reporting, attempt to influence public opinion. Unhappily, many of our fine citizens have been dumbed down...and believe some/much of the garbage they see and hear from the media and Hollywood."

"Generally, Media only shows/tells me what they want me to know. I must stay in touch with veterans and active duty folk to obtain reliable and accurate reports."

"It's hard to put in to words. They report on the war. But is it the truth. Just like Stars and Strips during Nam. It brings out the hate that Nam vets feel. We know how our new vets are going to be broken for the rest of their lives."

"Images of chaos, destruction and Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence and murder provide proof of futility of US armed intervention. What I've seen of these ongoing internal conflict, coupled with no meaningful progress in living conditions and internal political processes shows this has been another intervention failure of the US."

"Media tries to tell me what to think about the war, instead of displaying what's actually happening. Same thing the media did in 'Nam.'"

"We are always hearing what others think the talking heads that discuss everything and interject their options whether valid or not. Retired military officers explain their view and opinions as 'experts.'" "It provide visual and update information in real time."

"Any opinion they 'report' quickly becomes a 'fact' that greatly influences what another person believes (Like political outcomes)."

"I have a greater credibility in newspaper articles because television is less about in depth coverage and more about entertainment."

"Vietnam and Iraq were both TV wars; I don't think that the average person/family understands what war really means unless they have a family member involved in the conflict. Only a small percentage of families have any real 'exposure' to the 'reality of war.' In Iraq, the media was embedded with the units whereas in Nam, they only showed what they saw from the 'rear area'; not actual combat as in Iraq. I don't think that it really matters unless you have any 'exposure' in the war....do you have a family member in the war.... If not, all the media coverage in the world makes no difference."

"The media is very influential on how the public thinks; so the media has the power, over time, to alter our thinking; that is, to influence the public to support or 'side in' with the media's views. As individual consumers of the mass media, we can be swayed to think differently about supporting or NOT supporting whatever war may be current."

"Because I don't have firsthand knowledge so I must shuffle thru opposing news and biased news."

"The media influences my opinion of the war when it agrees with what I have learned independently. I discount news sources proven in my opinion to be biased."

"Use of embedded reporters gave firsthand information about battles, troops, everyday living and soldiers' feelings. Also allowed us to see more clearly than we did during Vietnam, how well trained and dedicated combat soldiers are and introduced us to the more sophisticated communication and weaponry available to troops."

"Words coupled with images are imprinted into one's psyche."

War Perception

It was determined whether participants judged the performance of the U.S. military as more successful in Vietnam than in Iraq (Table 14). Participants perceived Vietnam as more successful (M=1.85, SD=.766) than the Iraq War (M=1.68, SD=.638) indicating the war prime may have impacted perception.

Table 14

Perception of war success

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
How successful would you rate the performance of the U.S. military in Iraq?	431	1.68	.638
How successful would you rate the performance of the U.S. military in Vietnam?	430	1.85	.766
Valid N (listwise)	428		

War Categories

Two items, "How successful would you rate the performance of the U.S. military in Vietnam?" and "At any time have you not supported military action in Vietnam?" were combined in order to establish a Vietnam War categorical variable (Table 15). This new variable was utilized to test against perceived distinctness as well as compare to an Iraq War categorical variable.

Table 15

Vietnam War combined variable

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes, Very Successful	30	6.7	7.1	7.1
	Yes, Somewhat Successful	65	14.4	15.3	22.4
	Yes, Not Very Successful	43	9.5	10.1	32.5
	No, Very Successful	129	28.6	30.4	63.0
	No, Somewhat Successful	101	22.4	23.8	86.8

	No, Not Very Successful	56	12.4	13.2	100.0
	Total	424	94.0	100.0	
Missing	System	27	6.0		
Total		451	100.0		

Two items, "How successful would you rate the performance of the U.S. military in Iraq?" and "At any time have you not supported military action in Iraq?" were combined in order to establish an Iraq War categorical variable (Table 16). This new variable was also utilized to test against perceived distinctness as well as compare to the Vietnam categorical variable.

Table 16

Iraq War combined variable

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
	Yes, Very Successful	50	11.1	11.7	11.7
	Yes, Somewhat Successful	118	26.2	27.7	39.4
	Yes, Not Very Successful	31	6.9	7.3	46.7
Valid	No, Very Successful	124	27.5	29.1	75.8
	No, Somewhat Successful	93	20.6	21.8	97.7
	No, Not Very Successful	10	2.2	2.3	100.0
	Total	426	94.5	100.0	
Missing	System	25	5.5		
Total		451	100.0		

Both the Iraq War variable and Vietnam War variable are compared showing similarities in perception of success as well as a strong statistically significant relationship (Table 17) increasing the likelihood of assimilation. However, more Vietnam veterans admitted to not supporting the Iraq War at times more often than the Vietnam War.

Table 17

Iraq War variable and Vietnam War variable Crosstabulation

		Vietnam War Variable						Total
		Yes, Very Successful	Yes, Somewhat Successful	Yes, Not Very Successful	No, Very Successful	No, Somewhat Successful	No, Not Very Successful	
Iraq War Variable	Yes, Very Successful	15	6	1	23	4	1	50
	Yes, Somewhat Successful	7	52	18	6	24	10	117
	Yes, Not Very Successful	1	1	17	0	2	10	31
	No, Very Successful	5	4	1	80	21	8	119
	No, Somewhat Successful	2	1	3	14	49	21	90
	No, Not Very Successful	0	0	1	4	0	5	10
Total		30	64	41	127	100	55	417

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	402.214[a]	25	.000
Likelihood Ratio	361.206	25	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	95.519	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	417		

a. 12 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .72.

Perceived Distinctness

Participants indicated the extent to which they thought the historical conflict they were primed with, the Vietnam War, was a 'distinctive, clearly bounded' event (M=2.14, SD=.808), not at all distinctive (37.9%), somewhat distinctive (30.6%), or very distinctive (24.6%) seen in Table 18. They

also indicated to what extent they agreed with the Iraq War was a 'distinctive, clearly bounded' event (M=2.19, SD=.746), not at all distinctive (36.8%), somewhat distinctive (38.1%), or very distinctive (18.6%) seen in Table 19. Vietnam veterans ultimately viewed both conflicts as somewhat distinct, but Vietnam as slightly more distinct than Iraq.

Table 18

Perceived distinctness of the Vietnam War

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very Distinctive	111	24.6	26.4	26.4
	Somewhat Distinctive	138	30.6	32.9	59.3
	Not at all Distinctive	171	37.9	40.7	100.0
	Total	420	93.1	100.0	
Missing	System	31	6.9		
Total		451	100.0		

Table 19

Perceived distinctness of the Iraq War

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very Distinctive	84	18.6	19.9	19.9
	Somewhat Distinctive	172	38.1	40.8	60.7
	Not at all Distinctive	166	36.8	39.3	100.0
	Total	422	93.6	100.0	
Missing	System	29	6.4		
Total		451	100.0		

Research Questions and Hypotheses

In this section, the researcher presents each research question and hypothesis with data analysis and findings.

Research Question 1. *Does being a Vietnam veteran (prime effect) increase the likelihood of assimilation or contrast to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy (target)?*

Hypothesis 1. Being a Vietnam veteran (autobiographical memory) will increase the likelihood of contrast (perceived distinctness) to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy; according to the IEM, it will pull away from assimilation.

The hypothesis is proven false, Vietnam veterans (70.7%) viewed similarities between the Iraq and Vietnam War instead of dissimilarities (26.8%) as was predicted (Table 20). According to the results, autobiographical memory did not increase the likelihood of contrast. However, a chi-square test was performed indicating a strong statistically significant relationship between the Vietnam War variable and perceived distinctness (Table 21) as well as between the Iraq War variable and perceived distinctness (Table 22).

Table 20

Perceived similarities between Iraq and Vietnam War

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	319	70.7	73.2	73.2
	No	117	25.9	26.8	100.0
	Total	436	96.7	100.0	
Missing	System	15	3.3		
Total		451	100.0		



Figure 4: Autobiographical Memory did not pull toward contrast but assimilation

Table 21

Vietnam War variable and Vietnam War perceived distinctness correlation

		To what extent do you feel the Vietnam War was a distinctive, clearly bounded event?			Total
		Very Distinctive	Somewhat Distinctive	Not at all Distinctive	
Vietnam War Variable	Yes, Very Successful	5	7	17	29
	Yes, Somewhat Successful	10	21	32	63
	Yes, Not Very Successful	5	8	29	42
	No, Very Successful	49	43	33	125
	No, Somewhat Successful	31	38	30	99
	No, Not Very Successful	9	18	27	54
Total		109	135	168	412

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	43.782[a]	10	.000
Likelihood Ratio	44.218	10	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	6.834	1	.009
N of Valid Cases	412		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.67.

Table 22

Iraq War variable and Iraq War perceived distinctness correlation

		To what extent do you feel the Iraq War was a distinctive, clearly bounded event?			Total
		Very Distinctive	Somewhat Distinctive	Not at all Distinctive	
Iraq War Variable	Yes, Very Successful	8	14	27	49
	Yes, Somewhat Successful	13	50	52	115
	Yes, Not Very Successful	2	4	24	30
	No, Very Successful	39	57	22	118
	No, Somewhat Successful	20	42	31	93
	No, Not Very Successful	1	1	8	10
Total		83	168	164	415

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	64.471[a]	10	.000
Likelihood Ratio	66.747	10	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	11.651	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	415		

a. 3 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.00.

These data results indicate the Iraq and Vietnam Wars viewed as dissimilar is not supported by Vietnam veterans despite the significant relationship of perceived distinctness. Table 23 highlights specific areas in which Vietnam veterans believe there are similarities between the Iraq and Vietnam Wars.

Table 23

Perceived similarities in Iraq and Vietnam Wars

	N	
	Valid	Missing
The length of the war	256 (56.8%)	195
Surge announcements	87 (19.3%)	364
The procedure for withdrawal of troops	130 (28.8%)	321
American support for the war	116 (25.7%)	335
The depiction of the enemy	128 (28.4%)	323
The view that America is spreading democracy	132 (29.3%)	319
Rebuilding efforts in the affected country	99 (22%)	352
Reports of post-traumatic stress on returning soldiers	217 (48.1%)	234

Research Question 2. *Does length of military Vietnam War service (prime effect) increase the likelihood of assimilation or contrast to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy (target)?*

Hypothesis 2. Longer length of military Vietnam War service will increase the likelihood of contrast (perceived distinctness) to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy; according to the IEM, it will pull away from assimilation.

The hypothesis is proven false, less length of service during the Vietnam War viewed dissimilarities between the Iraq and Vietnam War instead of similarities as was predicted (Table 24). According to the results, the longer military service does not increase the likelihood of contrast. However, the overwhelming majority of respondents (74.7%) served between 1-3 years possibly skewing the data. Therefore, the variable was recoded for three categories: less than 1 year, 1-3 years, and 4 and more years for a more balanced distribution (Table 25) and then cross tabulated with perceived similarities of the two conflicts (Table 26). The recoded data more definitely indicates the hypothesis is false.

Table 24

Crosstabulation of length of tour of duty during Vietnam War and similarities between Vietnam and Iraq Wars

		Do you think there are similarities between the current Iraq War and the Vietnam War?		Total
		Yes	No	
Length of tour of duty during Vietnam War.	Less than one year	51 (16%)	18 (16%)	69 (16%)
	1-3 years	246 (77%)	90 (78%)	336 (77%)
	4-6 years	12 (4%)	6 (5%)	18 (4%)
	7-9 years	6 (2%)	1 (1%)	7 (2%)
	10-12 years	4 (1%)	1 (1%)	5 (1%)
Total		319	116	435

Table 25

Frequency of recoded length of time served

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Less than 1 year	69	15.3	15.8	15.8
	1-3 Years	337	74.7	76.9	92.7
	4 and Over Years	32	7.1	7.3	100.0
	Total	438	97.1	100.0	
Missing	System	13	2.9		
Total		451	100.0		

Table 26

Crosstabulation of recoded length of tour of duty during Vietnam War and similarities between Vietnam and Iraq Wars

		Do you think there are similarities between the current Iraq War and the Vietnam War?		Total
		Yes	No	
Combined Length Served	Less than 1 year	51	18	69
	1-3 Years	246	90	336
	4 and Over Years	22	8	30
Total		319	116	435

A chi-square test (Table 27) revealed no statistically significant relationship between the length of time served during Vietnam and perceived distinctness of the Vietnam War.

Table 27

Recoded length of time served and Vietnam War perceived distinctness correlation

		To what extent do you feel the Vietnam War was a distinctive, clearly bounded event?			Total
		Very Distinctive	Somewhat Distinctive	Not at all Distinctive	
Combined Length Served	Less than 1 year	20	19	30	69
	1-3 Years	85	107	128	320
	4 and Over Years	6	11	13	30
Total		111	137	171	419

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.619[a]	4	.805
Likelihood Ratio	1.682	4	.794
Linear-by-Linear Association	.107	1	.743
N of Valid Cases	419		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.95.

Research Question 3. *Does highest military rank obtained during Vietnam War military service (prime effect) increase the likelihood of assimilation or contrast to the media's Iraq analogy (target)?*

Hypothesis 3. Lower military rank obtained during Vietnam War military service will increase the likelihood of contrast (perceived distinctness) to the media's Iraq analogy; according to the IEM, it will pull away from assimilation.

Crosstab analysis of Army/National Guard (Table 28), Navy (Table 29), Air Force (Table 30), and Marines Corps (Table 31) show which ranks viewed similarities between the Iraq and Vietnam Wars and are addressed individually below.

Table 28

Crosstabulation of Army/National Guard rank during Vietnam War and similarities between Vietnam and Iraq Wars

	Do you think there are similarities between the current Iraq War and the Vietnam War?		Total
	Yes	No	
Private 1	9 (3%)	7 (6%)	16 (4%)
Private 2	12 (4%)	7 6%)	19 (5%)
Private First Class	30 (10%)	16 (14%)	46 (11%)
Specialist	104 (34%)	34 (29%)	138 (32%)
Corporal	7 (2%)	3 (3%)	10 (2%)
Sergeant	64 (21%)	23 (20%)	87 (20%)
Staff Sergeant	12 (4%)	5 (4%)	17 (4%)
Sergeant First Class	3 (1%)	1 (1%)	4 (1%)
Master Sergeant	1 (.3%)	0	1 (.2%)
Warrant Officer	2 (.6%)	1 (1%)	3 (.7%)
Chief Warrant Officer 2	2 (.6%)	1 (1%)	3 (.7%)
Second Lieutenant	15 (5%)	4 (3%)	19 (5%)
First Lieutenant	25 (8%)	7 (6%)	32 (8%)
Captain	18 (6%)	8 (7%)	26 (6%)
Major	3 (1%)	1 (1%)	4 (1%)
Lieutenant Colonel	1 (.3%)	0	1 (.2%)
Total	308	118	426

When Army/National Guard rank responses were reviewed utilizing a crosstabs analysis (Table 28), the ranks most viewing similarities between the two wars were: Specialist (34%), Sergeant (21%), and Private First Class (10%); however, those most not viewing similarities between the two wars were also: Specialist (32%), Sergeant (20%), and Private First Class (11%).

Table 29

Crosstabulation of Navy rank during Vietnam War and similarities between Vietnam and Iraq Wars

	Do you think there are similarities between the current Iraq War and the Vietnam War?		Total
	Yes	No	
Seaman Recruit	3 (4%)	2 (8%)	5 (5%)
Seaman Apprentice	3 (4%)	2 (8%)	5 (5%)
Seaman	9 (12%)	2 (8%)	11 (11%)
Petty Officer 3rd Class	23 (30%)	6 (25%)	29 (29%)
Petty Officer 2nd Class	19 (25%)	5 (21%)	24 (24%)
Petty Officer 1st Class	6 (8%)	1 (4%)	7 (7%)
Chief Petty Officer	3 (4%)	1 (4%)	4 (4%)
Ensign	3 (4%)	1 (4%)	4 (4%)
Lieutenant, Junior Grade	6 (8%)	2 (8%)	8 (8%)
Lieutenant	2 (3%)	2 (8%)	4 (4%)
Total	77	24	101

When Navy rank responses were reviewed utilizing a crosstabs analysis (Table 29), the ranks most viewing similarities between the two wars were: Petty Officer 3rd Class (30%), Petty Officer 2nd Class (25%), and Seaman (12%); however, those most not viewing similarities between the two wars were also Petty Officer 3rd Class (25%), Petty Officer 2nd Class (21%), and Seaman Recruit (8%), Seaman Apprentice (8%), Seaman (8%), Lieutenant, Junior Grade (8%) as well as Lieutenant (8%).

Table 30

Crosstabulation of Air Force rank during Vietnam War and similarities between Vietnam and Iraq Wars

	Do you think there are similarities between the current Iraq War and the Vietnam War?		Total
	Yes	No	
Airman Basic	1 (2%)	1 (4%)	2 (3%)
Airman	1 (2%)	3 (12%)	4 (5%)
Airman First Class	14 (26%)	5 (20%)	19 (24%)
Senior Airman of Sergeant	17 (31%)	7 (28%)	24 (30%)
Staff Sergeant	14 (26%)	4 (16%)	18 (23%)
Technical Sergeant	1 (2%)	0	1 (1%)
Master Sergeant	2 (4%)	0	2 (3%)
First Lieutenant	2 (4%)	2 (8%)	4 (5%)
Captain	3 (6%)	2 (8%)	5 (6%)
Major	0	1 (4%)	1 (1%)
Total	55	25	80

When Air Force rank responses were reviewed utilizing a crosstabs analysis (Table 30), the ranks most viewing similarities between the two wars were: Senior Airman of Sergeant (31%), Airman First Class (26%), and Staff Sergeant (26%); however, those most not viewing similarities between the two wars were also Senior Airman of Sergeant (28%), Airman First Class (20%), and Staff Sergeant (16%).

Table 31

Crosstabulation of Marine Corps rank during Vietnam War and similarities between Vietnam and Iraq Wars

	Do you think there are similarities between the current Iraq War and the Vietnam War?		Total
	Yes	No	
Private	3 (4%)	0	3 (3%)
Private First Class	12 (16%)	4 (16%)	16 (16%)
Lance Corporal	21 (28%)	8 (32%)	29 (29%)
Corporal	20 (27%)	3 (12%)	23 (23%)
Sergeant	13 (17%)	5 (20%)	18 (18%)
Staff Sergeant	2 (3%)	1 (4%)	3 (3%)
Gunnery Sergeant	1 (1%)	1 (4%)	2 (2%)
Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps	0	1 (4%)	1 (1)
Second Lieutenant	1 (1%)	1 (4%)	2 (2%)
First Lieutenant	2 (3%)	1 (4%)	3 (3%)
Total	75	25	100

When Marine Corps rank responses were reviewed utilizing a crosstabs analysis (Table 31), the ranks most viewing similarities between the two wars were: Lance Corporal (28%), Corporal (27%), Sergeant (17%); however, those most not viewing similarities between the two wars were Lance Corporal (32%), Sergeant (20%), and Private First Class (16%).

As a result, each Army/National Guard rank was coded in sequential order with the lowest rank Private =1 and the highest rank General of the Army = 29 (Table 32). The mean Army/National Guard rank was calculated to be Sergeant First Class (M=7.55). However, because the survey instrument allowed for multiple selections, 96 people selected more than one rank (Table 33). Responses with more than one rank selected were modified to only reflect the highest rank (Table 34). The largest

percentage of highest Army/National Guard rank achieved during the Vietnam War was Specialist (40.5%).

Table 32

Army/National Guard rank during Vietnam War recoded

1-Private
2-Private 2
3-Private First Class
4-Specialist
5-Corporal
6-Sergeant
7-Staff Sergeant
8-Sergeant First Class
9-Master Sergeant
10-First Sergeant
11-Sergeant Major
12-Command Sergeant Major
13-Sergeant Major of the Army
14-Warrant Officer
15-Chief Warrant Officer 2
16-Chief Warrant Officer 3
17-Chief Warrant Officer 4
18-Chief Warrant Officer 5
19-Second Lieutenant
20-First Lieutenant
21-Captain
22-Major
23-Lieutenant Colonel
24-Colonel
25-Brigadier General
26-Major General
27-Lieutenant General
28-General

29-General of the Army

Table 33

Army/National Guard rank selection frequencies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	168	37.3	63.6	63.6
	2.00	58	12.9	22.0	85.6
	3.00	19	4.2	7.2	92.8
	4.00	11	2.4	4.2	97.0
	5.00	5	1.1	1.9	98.9
	6.00	3	.7	1.1	100.0
	Total	264	58.5	100.0	
Missing	System	187	41.5		
Total		451	100.0		

Table 34

Army/National Guard highest rank selection frequencies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2.00	3	.7	1.1	1.1
	3.00	6	1.3	2.3	3.4
	4.00	107	23.7	40.5	43.9
	5.00	3	.7	1.1	45.1
	6.00	77	17.1	29.2	74.2
	7.00	14	3.1	5.3	79.5
	8.00	4	.9	1.5	81.1
	9.00	1	.2	.4	81.4
	14.00	1	.2	.4	81.8
	15.00	2	.4	.8	82.6
	19.00	2	.4	.8	83.3
	20.00	16	3.5	6.1	89.4
	21.00	24	5.3	9.1	98.5
	22.00	3	.7	1.1	99.6
	23.00	1	.2	.4	100.0
	Total	264	58.5	100.0	
Missing	System	187	41.5		
Total		451	100.0		

In order to more effectively test whether highest military rank is affected by perceived distinctness, the military ranks were recoded for three categories, classifications the military often makes by pay grade: Enlisted personnel, Warrant Officer, and Officers. Enlisted personnel were given the lowest value (10), Warrant Officers (20), and Officer (30) in order to clearly depict the higher and lower ranks (Table 35). In addition, a chi-square test of highest rank by pay grade and perceived distinctness showed no statistically significant relationship between highest Army/National Guard rank by pay grade and perceived distinctness (Table 36).

Table 35

Army/National Guard highest rank selection frequencies by pay grade

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Enlisted Personnel	215	47.7	81.4	81.4
	Warrant Officer	3	.7	1.1	82.6
	Officers	46	10.2	17.4	100.0
	Total	264	58.5	100.0	
Missing	System	187	41.5		
Total		451	100.0		

Table 36

Army/National Guard highest rank selection by pay grade and Vietnam War perceived distinctness correlation

		To what extent do you feel the Vietnam War was a distinctive, clearly bounded event?			Total
		Very Distinctive	Somewhat Distinctive	Not at all Distinctive	
Pay Grade	Enlisted Personnel	57	77	69	203
	Warrant Officers	0	1	2	3
	Officers	15	10	18	43
Total		72	88	89	249

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	5.039[a]	4	.283
Likelihood Ratio	5.926	4	.205
Linear-by-Linear Association	.040	1	.841
N of Valid Cases	249		

a. 3 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .87.

In regard to Army/National Guard rank, the hypothesis is proven false. Lower Army/National Guard rank did not increase the likelihood of perceived distinctness and thus contrast.

Each Navy rank was also coded in sequential order with the lowest rank Seaman Recruit =1 and the highest rank Fleet Admiral = 30 (Table 37). The mean Navy rank was calculated to be Chief Petty Officer (M=6.8).

Table 37

Navy rank during Vietnam War recoded

1-Seaman Recruit
2-Seaman Apprentice
3-Seaman
4-Petty Officer 3rd Class
5-Petty Officer 2nd Class
6-Petty Officer 1st Class
7-Chief Petty Officer
8-Senior Chief Petty Officer
9-Master Chief Petty Officer
10-Command Master Chief Petty Officer
11-Fleet Master Chief Petty Officer
12-Force Master Chief Petty Officer Pay Scale
13-Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard
14-Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy
15-Warrant Officer
16-Chief Warrant Officer 2
17-Chief Warrant Officer 3
18-Chief Warrant Officer 4
19-Chief Warrant Officer 5
20-Ensign
21-Lieutenant, Junior Grade
22-Lieutenant
23-Lieutenant Commander
24-Commander
25-Captain
26-Rear Admiral (lower half)
27-Rear Admiral (upper half)
28-Vice Admiral
29-Admiral Chief of Naval Operations / Commandant of the Coast Guard Pay Scale
30-Fleet Admiral

However, because the survey instrument allowed for multiple selections, 22 people selected more than one rank (Table 38). Responses with more than one rank selected were modified to only

reflect the highest rank (Table 39). The largest percentage of highest Navy rank achieved during the Vietnam War was Petty Officer 2nd Class (4.7%).

Table 38

Navy rank selection frequencies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	39	8.6	63.9	63.9
	2.00	11	2.4	18.0	82.0
	3.00	6	1.3	9.8	91.8
	4.00	2	.4	3.3	95.1
	5.00	3	.7	4.9	100.0
	Total	61	13.5	100.0	
Missing	System	390	86.5		
Total		451	100.0		

Table 39

Navy highest rank selection frequencies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	3.00	3	.7	4.9	4.9
	4.00	20	4.4	32.8	37.7
	5.00	21	4.7	34.4	72.1
	6.00	5	1.1	8.2	80.3
	7.00	4	.9	6.6	86.9
	21.00	5	1.1	8.2	95.1
	22.00	3	.7	4.9	100.0
	Total	61	13.5	100.0	
Missing	System	390	86.5		
Total		451	100.0		

In order to more effectively test whether highest military rank is affected by perceived distinctness, the military ranks were recoded for three categories, classifications the military often makes by pay grade: Enlisted personnel, Warrant Officer, and Officers. Enlisted personnel were given the lowest value (10), Warrant Officers (20), and Officer (30) in order to clearly depict the higher and lower ranks (Table 40). In addition, a chi-square test of highest rank by pay grade and perceived distinctness showed no statistically significant relationship between highest Navy rank by pay grade and perceived distinctness (Table 41).

Table 40

Navy highest rank selection frequencies by pay grade

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Enlisted Personnel	53	11.8	86.9	86.9
	Officers	8	1.8	13.1	100.0
	Total	61	13.5	100.0	
Missing	System	390	86.5		
Total		451	100.0		

Table 41

Navy highest rank selection by pay grade and Vietnam War perceived distinctness correlation

		To what extent do you feel the Vietnam War was a distinctive, clearly bounded event?			Total
		Very Distinctive	Somewhat Distinctive	Not at all Distinctive	
Navy Pay Grade	Enlisted Personnel	9	17	25	51
	Officers	0	3	4	7
Total		9	20	29	58

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.478[a]	2	.477
Likelihood Ratio	2.545	2	.280
Linear-by-Linear Association	.749	1	.387
N of Valid Cases	58		

a. 3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.09.

Each Air Force rank was coded in sequential order with the lowest rank Airman Basic =1 and the highest rank General of the Air Force =22 (Table 42). The mean Air Force rank was calculated to be Staff Sergeant (M=5.125).

Table 42

Air Force rank during Vietnam War recoded

1-Airman Basic
2-Airman
3-Airman First Class
4-Senior Airman or Sergeant
5-Staff Sergeant
6-Technical Sergeant
7-Master Sergeant
8-Senior Master Sergeant
9-Chief Master Sergeant
10-Command Chief Master Sergeant
11-Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force
12-Second Lieutenant
13-First Lieutenant
14-Captain
15-Major
16-Lieutenant Colonel
17-Colonel
18-Brigadier General
19-Major General
20-Lieutenant General
21-General Air Force Chief of Staff
22-General of the Air Force

However, because the survey instrument allowed for multiple selections, 14 people selected more than one rank (Table 43). Responses with more than one rank selected were modified to only reflect the highest rank (Table 44). The largest percentage of highest Air Force rank achieved during the Vietnam War was Senior Airman and Sergeant (4%) and Staff Sergeant (4%).

Table 43

Air Force rank selection frequencies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	43	9.5	75.4	75.4
	2.00	8	1.8	14.0	89.5
	3.00	4	.9	7.0	96.5
	4.00	1	.2	1.8	98.2
	5.00	1	.2	1.8	100.0
	Total	57	12.6	100.0	
Missing	System	394	87.4		
Total		451	100.0		

Table 44

Air Force highest rank selection frequencies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2.00	1	.2	1.8	1.8
	3.00	8	1.8	14.0	15.8
	4.00	18	4.0	31.6	47.4
	5.00	18	4.0	31.6	78.9
	6.00	1	.2	1.8	80.7
	7.00	2	.4	3.5	84.2
	13.00	3	.7	5.3	89.5
	14.00	5	1.1	8.8	98.2
	15.00	1	.2	1.8	100.0
	Total	57	12.6	100.0	
Missing	System	394	87.4		
Total		451	100.0		

In order to more effectively test whether highest military rank is affected by perceived distinctness, the military ranks were recoded for two categories, classifications the military often makes by pay grade: Enlisted personnel and Officers (the Air Force does not utilize the Warrant Officer category). Enlisted personnel were given the lowest value (10) and Officer (30) in order to clearly depict the higher and lower ranks (Table 45). In addition, a chi-square test of highest rank by pay grade and perceived distinctness showed no statistically significant relationship between highest Air Force rank by pay grade and perceived distinctness (Table 46).

Table 45

Air Force highest rank selection frequencies by pay grade

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Enlisted Personnel	48	10.6	84.2	84.2
	Officers	9	2.0	15.8	100.0
	Total	57	12.6	100.0	
Missing	System	394	87.4		
Total		451	100.0		

Table 46

Air Force highest rank selection by pay grade and Vietnam War perceived distinctness correlation

		To what extent do you feel the Vietnam War was a distinctive, clearly bounded event?			Total
		Very Distinctive	Somewhat Distinctive	Not at all Distinctive	
Air Force Pay Grade	Enlisted Personnel	13	13	22	48
	Officers	1	4	4	9
Total		14	17	26	57

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.556[a]	2	.459
Likelihood Ratio	1.643	2	.440
Linear-by-Linear Association	.241	1	.624
N of Valid Cases	57		

a. 3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.21.

Each Marine Corps rank was coded in sequential order with the lowest rank Private =1 and the highest rank General=27 (Table 47). The mean Marine Corps rank was calculated to be Sergeant (M= 4.58).

Table 47

Marine Corps rank during Vietnam War recoded

1-Private
2-Private First Class
3-Lance Corporal
4-Corporal
5-Sergeant
6-Staff Sergeant
7-Gunnery Sergeant
8-Master Sergeant
9-First Sergeant
10-Master Gunnery Sergeant
11-Sergeant Major
12-Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps
13-Warrant Officer 1
14-Chief Warrant Officer 2
15-Chief Warrant Officer 3
16-Chief Warrant Officer 4
17-Chief Warrant Officer 5
18-Second Lieutenant
19-First Lieutenant
20-Captain
21-Major
22-Lieutenant Colonel
23-Colonel
24-Brigadier General
25-Major General
26-Lieutenant General
27-General

However, because the survey instrument allowed for multiple selections, 25 people selected more than one rank (Table 48). Responses with more than one rank selected were modified to only reflect the highest rank (Table 49). The largest percentage of highest Marine Corps rank achieved during the Vietnam War was Lance Corporal (3.8%).

Table 48

Marine Corps rank selection frequencies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	32	7.1	56.1	56.1
	2.00	12	2.7	21.1	77.2
	3.00	8	1.8	14.0	91.2
	4.00	4	.9	7.0	98.2
	5.00	1	.2	1.8	100.0
	Total	57	12.6	100.0	
Missing	System	394	87.4		
Total		451	100.0		

Table 49

Marine Corps highest rank selection frequencies

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2.00	2	.4	3.5	3.5
	3.00	17	3.8	29.8	33.3
	4.00	14	3.1	24.6	57.9
	5.00	16	3.5	28.1	86.0
	6.00	1	.2	1.8	87.7
	7.00	2	.4	3.5	91.2
	18.00	1	.2	1.8	93.0
	19.00	3	.7	5.3	98.2
	22.00	1	.2	1.8	100.0
	Total	57	12.6	100.0	
Missing	System	394	87.4		
Total		451	100.0		

In order to more effectively test whether highest military rank is affected by perceived distinctness, the military ranks were recoded for three categories, classifications the military often makes by pay grade: Enlisted personnel, Warrant Officer, and Officers. Enlisted personnel were given the lowest value (10), Warrant Officers (20), and Officer (30) in order to clearly depict the higher and lower ranks (Table 50). In addition, a chi-square test of highest rank by pay grade and perceived distinctness showed a weak statistically significant relationship between highest Marine Corps rank by pay grade and perceived distinctness (Table 51).

Table 50

Marine Corps highest rank selection frequencies by pay grade

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Enlisted Personnel	52	11.5	91.2	91.2
	Officers	5	1.1	8.8	100.0
	Total	57	12.6	100.0	
Missing	System	394	87.4		
Total		451	100.0		

Table 51

Marine Corps highest rank selection by pay grade and Vietnam War perceived distinctness correlation

		To what extent do you feel the Vietnam War was a distinctive, clearly bounded event?			Total
		Very Distinctive	Somewhat Distinctive	Not at all Distinctive	
Marine Pay Grade	Enlisted Personnel	15	10	26	51
	Officers	1	3	0	4
Total		16	13	26	55

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.879[a]	2	.032
Likelihood Ratio	7.143	2	.028
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.081	1	.298
N of Valid Cases	55		

a. 3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .95.

Research Question 4. *Does age range during Vietnam War military service (prime effect) increase the likelihood of assimilation or contrast to the media's Iraq analogy (target)?*

Hypothesis 4. Younger ages during Vietnam War military service will increase the likelihood of a greater contrast (perceived distinctness) to the media's Iraq analogy; according to the IEM, it will pull away from assimilation.

The hypothesis is proven false, younger age during service (63.5%) viewed similarities between the Iraq and Vietnam War instead of dissimilarities (23%) as was predicted (Table 52). According to the results, younger age during time of military service does not predict contrast. A chi-square of age during Vietnam War service and perceived distinctness indicates no amount of perceived distinctness is explained by length of time served during the Vietnam War (Table 53).

Table 52

Crosstabulation age during Vietnam War service and similarities between Vietnam and Iraq Wars

		Do you think there are similarities between the current Iraq War and the Vietnam War?		Total
		Yes	No	
Age served during Vietnam War (If more than one age range, select the longest term during Vietnam).	17-25	277	100	377
	26-35	39	16	55
	36-45	2	1	3
	Over 45	1	0	1
Total		319	117	436

Table 53

Crosstabulation age during Vietnam War service and perceived distinctness

		To what extent do you feel the Vietnam War was a distinctive, clearly bounded event?			Total
		Very Distinctive	Somewhat Distinctive	Not at all Distinctive	
Age served during Vietnam War (If more than one age range, select the longest term during Vietnam).	17-25	4	11	17	32
	26-35	2	2	2	6
Total		6	13	19	38

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.786[a]	2	.409
Likelihood Ratio	1.561	2	.458
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.501	1	.220
N of Valid Cases	38		

a. 3 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .95.

Summary

In summary, H_1, H_2, H_3, and H_4 were all found to be false. As a result, Figure 4 plots age during Vietnam War service, branch of military service, and highest rank during Vietnam War service within the memory impact on social judgment continuum indicating all demographics pulled toward assimilation instead of contrast as was predicted.



- Less time served 1-3 years (30.5%) saw the Vietnam War as not distinct
- Vietnam veterans (37.9%) saw the Vietnam War as not distinct
- Enlisted personnel (39.2%) saw the Vietnam War as not distinct
- Age 17-25 (44.7%) saw the Vietnam War as not distinct

Figure 5: Memory impact on social judgment continuum

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

The intent of this study was to quantitatively examine the inclusion/exclusion comparison model in regards to the Iraq War and Vietnam War analogy through the perception of Vietnam veterans; the ultimate goal of the research is to be applicable to the discussion of media responsibility in regard to journalistic event analysis and utilization of analogy.

The findings indicate Vietnam veterans were not predisposed by their autobiographical memory to see dissimilarities in the Iraq and Vietnam War as predicted. However, these findings do not discount the possible influence of media memory on the collective including Vietnam veterans.

Summary

After a thorough review of the literature, historical analogy is present in media reporting, the question being whether autobiographical memory withstands mass media's interpretation of events. The current research assessed whether Vietnam War military service is distinct to the point of increasing the likelihood of veteran acceptance of the Iraq War analogy evoked by the media. Additionally, this study looked at the impact on judgment of accessible knowledge gained through interpretation versus accessible knowledge gained through comparison of first-person experience. Although, the current research does not take into consideration the influence of time lapse between events, which could be a possible contribution to the findings not proving the hypotheses true.

Demographic independent variables, including the time the soldiers in question served, age at which they served and military rank during their service, were believed to impact the level of perceived distinctness among this particular cohort. The findings indicate this was in fact the case, but not as was predicted. A social judgment continuum found on the IEM was plotted; however, all

demographics pushed positively toward media memory. It can thus be interpreted that the press may have the ability to alter past, present and future memory through priming.

Findings

Research Question One with Supporting Hypothesis

The first research question focused on being a Vietnam veteran increasing the likelihood of contrast to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy due to distinct comparison. According to the IEM, Vietnam veterans would pull away from assimilation seeing the Vietnam War as a distinct event. The findings proved this hypothesis false. Vietnam veterans not only saw the two conflicts as similar, but they did not view the Vietnam War as very distinct. Numerous data analyses were conducted to evaluate the influence of Vietnam War veteran standing on perception of the analogy. When asked, Vietnam veterans (70.7%) viewed similarities between the Iraq and Vietnam War instead of dissimilarities (26.8%) as was predicted. Correlation analysis was performed indicating a strong statistically significant relationship between the Vietnam War variable and perceived distinctness as well as between the Iraq War variable and perceived distinctness, but in both conflicts distinctness level was lower than anticipated. Specific areas viewed as similar are detailed in the results section. The results of research question one was quite unexpected. The Vietnam War has been portrayed as such a traumatic and life changing experience the idea that those that lived it would see similarities with another conflict is confounding. In addition, those that didn't live through Vietnam often feel strongly that Vietnam was unlike any other war yet the Vietnam veterans surveyed only saw the conflict as somewhat distinct. These veterans are members of a nationally organized support group; those not affiliated with such an institution may also see the conflict more distinctly.

Research Question Two with Supporting Hypothesis

The second research question focused on whether length of military service increased the likelihood of contrast to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy. According to the IEM, longer military

service would pull away from assimilation seeing the Vietnam War as distinct due to length of exposure. The findings proved this hypothesis false. Longer tour of duty increased the likelihood of assimilation. In order to evaluate the influence of tour of duty on perception of the analogy, length of military service was first recoded for a more evenly distributed variable. A crosstabulation of length of military service and similarities was conducted utilizing this recoded variable showing less time served more definitively increased the likelihood of assimilation. A correlation analysis revealed no statistically significant relationship between the length of time served during Vietnam and perceived distinctness of the Vietnam War. Again, this finding is surprising. As discovered through a review of the literature, longer exposure to an event increases the overall impact. The fact that veterans serving longer during Vietnam were more likely to see similarities with the Iraq War is difficult to explain especially since the majority of respondents didn't also serve during the Iraq War. With almost 50 years between their time of service and the present day, perhaps length of exposure to a conflit or event is less of a factor than anticipated.

Research Question Three with Supporting Hypothesis

The third research question focused on whether highest military rank obtained during the Vietnam War increased the likelihood of contrast to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy. According to the IEM, lower military rank would pull away from assimilation seeing the Vietnam War as distinct. The idea being that lower rank again would increase overall exposure to trauma or significant events. The findings proved this hypothesis false. Lower military rank increased the likelihood of assimilation. In order to evaluate the influence of military rank on perception of the analogy, each military rank was coded in sequential order. Because the survey instrument allowed for multiple rank selections, responses with more than one rank chosen were modified to only reflect the highest rank. In hindsight, the instrument should not have allowed for multiple responses, but the intent was to account for any rapid promotion, which was unlikely. In order to more effectively test whether highest

military rank is affected by perceived distinctness, the military ranks were recoded for three categories, classifications the military often makes by pay grade: Enlisted personnel, Warrant Officer, and Officers. In addition, a correlation analysis of highest rank by pay grade and perceived distinctness showed no statistically significant relationship between highest military rank by pay grade and perceived distinctness for all ranks except the Marines Corps, which had a weak relationship. Again, this is surprising as typically perception is heightened by distress as was probably the case by the lower pay grades. The findings indicate lower Army/National Guard, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps rank did not increase the likelihood of perceived distinctness and thus contrast to the Iraq War.

Research Question Four with Supporting Hypothesis

The fourth research question focused on whether age during Vietnam War service increased the likelihood of contrast to the Iraq and Vietnam War analogy. According to the IEM, younger age during service would pull away from assimilation seeing the Vietnam War as distinct. Scholarship has indicated experiences at younger ages have a lasting impression. The Vietnam War was unique in that most volunteers and draftees were between the ages of 17 and 25. Even those that volunteered did so often because they feared being drafted in a more undesirable branch or assignment. In fact, the data shows of the respondents 84% were between 17 and 25. The findings proved the hypothesis regarding age false. Despite the literature, younger age during service (63.5%) viewed similarities between the Iraq and Vietnam War instead of dissimilarities (23%) as was predicted. A correlation analysis of age during Vietnam War service and perceived distinctness indicated no amount of perceived distinctness is explained by age during Vietnam War service, a surprising turn of events.

Implications

When mass media chooses to use past events to compare the present, repercussions impacting past, present and future collective memory are inevitable, but it was believed autobiographical memory would withstand media pressure. The current research implies this may not be the reality, but that the

media through framing may override even first-hand experience. The truth being perhaps no one is immune to manufactured, mediated and media manipulated memory. With almost 50 years having past, it can't be certain, but most likely media interpretation impacted respondents even subconsciously. Other factors certainly could also have come into play, but fall outside the scope of this study.

The current research upholds the belief that the reliability of remembrances is subject to these additional external factors including media memory. The theory that autobiographical memory would remain the distinct comparison standard did not come to fruition perhaps because of time lapsed. As a result, the social responsibility of the media is considered to be even greater, especially when utilizing analogy as a frame of reference. Having served as a member of the media, it's clear this responsibility is not at the forefront of journalists' minds while reporting the news. Getting the story and reporting the facts is all consuming and while journalistic ethics are vital, the implications of creating new memory does not keep reporters up at night. It's human nature to compare events; however, comparing apples to oranges even if not apparent creates lasting repercussions.

Future Research

Collective Memory

Continued research into the role of media impact on collective memory taking into consideration autobiographical memory is needed; particularly, research evaluating two events occurring closer in time. Media influence on collective memory should be compared to level of influence by other sources of information in order to continue to discuss media social responsibility. Additionally, media impact on collective memory could be evaluated among democratic and nondemocratic societies gauging level of influence. Ultimately, the role of the press in framing the collective memory is in need of more discussion.

Media Memory

More evaluation of the characteristics of media memory, as well as the extent of pervasiveness in American mass media, is warranted. Media memory is a newer concept and has not yet been applied to many research studies. The shortened reflection time of information before being mediated increases the chance of interpretation and thus media memory. Research into the memory creating aspect of 24-7 media needs to be more thoroughly evaluated and the responsibility of the media in this regard determined. Additionally, contrasting media memory to other forms of memory is encouraged as well as the possible agenda-setting motivations of media memory and journalists as agents of manipulation. Journalists most likely do not see themselves as integral in the memory making process. An interesting follow up to the current research would be to survey Iraq War veterans regarding their perception of the Vietnam War analogy. Other media compared events are also of interest such as highly publicized kidnapping cases.

Inclusion/Exclusion Model

The overarching premise of the study (the idea that memory includes positive and negative polarization) needs further study in order to test the IEM model. While the IEM was not supported in the current research because Vietnam veterans did not view the Vietnam War as distinct, autobiographical memory in other scenarios could be perceived as distinct and thus utilized to better test the IEM. It's curious whether the Holocaust would be found to be more distinct among remaining survivors. In addition, the IEM can still be expanded to correlate media memory with assimilation in future studies due to the interpretive nature of gatekeeping.

Questions for future research

Questions for future research may include:

Does the amount of time passed since first-hand experience (onset of autobiographical memory) influence impact to media memory?

Can trauma diminish the influence of collective memory?

Does media memory impact demographics differently?

Do media practitioners knowingly create media memory?

Does media memory differ by medium such as broadcast, print or Internet?

Can media memory create memories for subjects that did not experience first-hand events?

Conclusions

This area of research is imperative as generations exposed to key conflicts in American history pass away and historical memories are left to the portrayal by the media. Future generations will only have media references in which to understand the past and inaccurate interpretations or misrepresentation through analogy could create false memories. It is the author's firm belief that only through understanding the past we can move forward unless we are doomed to repeat the mistakes of others. The author would hope their children will never forget, and yet worries about the quality of their memories due to media exposure.

Younger generations are bombarded with video games, television programming, Internet references, and marketing while media literacy is still lacking. Media messages are often taken at face value with little inquiry or initiative to uncover the truth. And while truth is also a relative term, only one side of the story is often conveyed depending on the source of information.

Historical reference is no longer only for textbooks, speculation is rampant and the World Wide Web has added to wider media dissemination. If autobiographical memory over time or with media influence can succumb to manipulation, who is to say future generations will clearly remember or memorialize the past? History could in effect be rewritten.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Statement of Validation

As an academic with a Ph.D. in Social Psychology and having conducted extensive research in the field of social cognition, I have evaluated both the selective accessibility model and inclusion/exclusion model in terms of comparison and judgment. The logic advanced within this dissertation that the two models can be utilized in order to theorize distinctness and ambiguity of past events can determine comparison contrast and assimilation respectively is valid.

Dr. David M. Marx
San Diego State University

Appendix B: E-mail to VVA members

SUBJECT LINE:
Research Study Participants Needed

MESSAGE:
You are invited to participate in a research study to examine the media's comparison of the War in Iraq to the Vietnam War from the viewpoint of those who served during the Vietnam War. The following information is provided in order to help you make an informed decision about whether or not to participate.

There is no personal risk involved in participating in this study, which requires approximately 10 minutes of your time. Your participation is voluntary. You are free to decide not to participate or to withdraw at any time without penalty. If you choose to participate, but would like to withdraw, you may do so at any time by closing your web browser. Data from incomplete surveys will be discarded.

The information obtained in the study may be published in scientific journals or presented at scientific meetings. Participants can contact the researcher to request outcome information from the study after January 31, 2013 via email at d.c.hackley@iup.edu.

If you are willing to participate in this study, please click the "**I Agree**" button below and you will be automatically directed to the survey.

Thank you, in advance, for your participation. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me via email at d.c.hackley@iup.edu.

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This project has been approved by the Indiana University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects. (Phone: 724.357.7730)

Appendix C: Informed Consent in Survey

You are invited to participate in a research study to examine the media's comparison of the War in Iraq to the Vietnam War from the viewpoint of those who served during the Vietnam War. The following information is provided in order to help you make an informed decision about whether or not to participate.

There is no personal risk involved in participating in this study, which requires approximately 10 minutes of your time.

Your participation is voluntary. You are free to decide not to participate or to withdraw at any time without penalty. If you choose to participate, but would like to withdraw, you may do so at any time by closing your web browser. Data from incomplete surveys will be discarded.

The information obtained in the study may be published in scientific journals or presented at scientific meetings.

Participants can contact the researcher to request outcome information from the study after January 31, 2013 via email at d.c.hackley@iup.edu.

If you are willing to participate in this study, please click the "**I Agree**" button below and you will be automatically directed to the survey.

Thank you, in advance, for your participation. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me via email at d.c.hackley@iup.edu.

Appendix D: Survey Instrument

1. Did you serve in the U.S. military between 1965 and 1975?
(Survey logic will thank respondents with service outside of 1965-1975 and notify them that they are not eligible to participate.)

2. **Age served during Vietnam War (*If more than one age range, select the longest term during Vietnam*)**

17-25
25-35
35-45
Over 45

3. Branch of military service during Vietnam War
(Survey logic will jump to the corresponding section within question 4 depending on response.)

a. Army/National Guard
b. Navy
c. Air Force
d. Marine Corps

4. Rank while serving during Vietnam War (*Select all that apply*)

a. Army/National Guard:
Private
Private 2
Private First Class
Specialist
Corporal
Sergeant
Staff Sergeant
Sergeant First Class
Master Sergeant
First Sergeant
Sergeant Major
Command Sergeant Major
Sergeant Major of the
Warrant Officer
Chief Warrant Officer 2
Chief Warrant Officer 3
Chief Warrant Officer 4
Chief Warrant Officer 5
Second Lieutenant
First Lieutenant
Captain
Major

Lieutenant Colonel
Colonel
Brigadier General
Major General
Lieutenant General
General
General of the Army

b. Navy/Coast Guard:
Seaman Recruit
Seaman Apprentice
Seaman
Petty Officer 3rd Class
Petty Officer 2nd Class
Petty Officer 1st Class
Chief Petty Officer
Senior Chief Petty Officer
Master Chief Petty Officer
Command Master Chief Petty Officer
Fleet Master Chief Petty Officer
Force Master Chief Petty Officer Pay Scale
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy
Warrant Officer
Chief Warrant Officer 2
Chief Warrant Officer 3
Chief Warrant Officer 4
Chief Warrant Officer 5
Ensign
Lieutenant, Junior Grade
Lieutenant
Lieutenant Commander
Commander
Captain
Rear Admiral (lower half)
Rear Admiral (upper half)
Vice Admiral
Admiral Chief of Naval Operations / Commandant of the Coast Guard Pay Scale
Fleet Admiral

c. Air Force:
Airman Basic
Airman

Airman First Class
Senior Airman or Sergeant
Staff Sergeant
Technical Sergeant
Master Sergeant
Senior Master Sergeant
Chief Master Sergeant
Command Chief Master Sergeant
Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force
Second Lieutenant
First Lieutenant
Captain
Major
Lieutenant Colonel
Colonel
Brigadier General
Major General
Lieutenant General
General Air Force Chief of Staff
General of the Air Force

d. Marine Corps:
Private
Private First Class
Lance Corporal
Corporal
Sergeant
Staff Sergeant
Gunnery Sergeant
Master Sergeant
First Sergeant
Master Gunnery Sergeant
Sergeant Major
Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps
Warrant Officer 1
Chief Warrant Officer 2
Chief Warrant Officer 3
Chief Warrant Officer 4
Chief Warrant Officer 5
Second Lieutenant
First Lieutenant
Captain
Major
Lieutenant Colonel

Colonel
Brigadier General
Major General
Lieutenant General
General

5. Ethnicity

White/Caucasian
African American
Hispanic
Asian
Other

6. Length of tour of duty during Vietnam War

Less than 1 year
1-3 years
4-6 years
7-9 years
10-12 ears

7. Where did you serve during the Vietnam War? (Select all that apply)

Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma area
The Middle East
Europe
U.S./Canada
Latin America
Other

8. Did you voluntarily sign up or were you drafted for military service?

Signed Up
Drafted

9. Current political affiliation

Republican
Democrat
Independent
Other

10. At any time have you NOT supported military action in Vietnam?
Yes
No

11. Have you served in the U.S. military during the most recent Iraq War?
Yes
No

12. At any time have you NOT supported military action in Iraq?
Yes
No

13. Rank in order 1-4 how you prefer to receive your news.

Newspaper
Television
Radio
Internet

14. **Have you been following Iraq War media coverage?**
(Respondents that answer yes will be directed to question 13)

Yes
No

15. Do you feel the media influences your opinion of war?
(Respondents that answer yes will be directed to question 15)

Yes
No

16. Explain how you feel the media influences your opinion of war.

17. Do you believe the media has compared the current Iraq War to the Vietnam War?

Yes
No

18. Do you think there are similarities between the current Iraq War and the Vietnam War? ***(Respondents that answer yes will be directed to question 18)***

Yes
No

19. If you believe there are similarities between the current Iraq War and the Vietnam War check the areas in which you view similarities. (Select all that apply)

The length of the war
Surge announcements
The procedure for withdrawal of troops
American support for the war

The depiction of the enemy
The view that America is spreading democracy
Rebuilding efforts in the affected country
Reports of post-traumatic stress on returning soldiers

20. How much do you agree with the statement, "The Iraq War is being fought for a good cause?"

Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

21. How much do you agree with the statement, "The U.S. will be successful in resolving the Iraq conflict?"

Strongly Agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

22. To what extent do you feel the Vietnam War was a distinctive, clearly bounded event?

Very Distinctive
Somewhat Distinctive
Not at all Distinctive

23. To what extent do you feel the Iraq War was a distinctive, clearly bounded event?

Very Distinctive
Somewhat Distinctive
Not at all Distinctive

24. How successful would you rate the performance of the U.S. military in Iraq?

Very Successful
Somewhat Successful
Not at all Successful

25. How successful would you rate the performance of the U.S. military in Vietnam?

Very Successful
Somewhat Successful
Not at all Successful