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The Political Tolerance of the "Chosen People" in the Current Contexts of Israel and the United States

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THE POLITICAL TOLERANCE OF THE "CHOSEN PEOPLE" IN THE CURRENT

CONTEXTS OF ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES

A Dissertation Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies and Research in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Title: The Political Tolerance of the "Chosen People" in the Current Contexts of Israel
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The concept of political tolerance is crucial for the existence of democratic societies. Although researchers have made important contributions, the available literature can be improved, primarily by using more complex measures of religiosity, such as those used when examining the association between religiosity and prejudice.

This study examined the effect of demographic variables and religious-based variables on the political tolerance of two heterogeneous Jewish populations in Israel and in the United States. The demographic variables are: income, education, size of community, rural/non-rural, age, and gender, and the religious-based variables are: level of religiosity, intrinsic/extrinsic religious orientation, religious fundamentalism, attitudes toward religions beliefs, religious quest, and social dominance orientation (SDO). Based on the causal model I developed, twelve hypotheses were developed to test the model.

In summary, the results of the multivariate analysis show that while the independent variables of quest and SDO are not associated with political tolerance for both the Israeli and the U.S. samples, religious beliefs, intrinsic/extrinsic, and fundamentalism were partially associated with the dependent variable only for the U.S. sample. A negligible association was found between political tolerance and level of religiosity, gender, intrinsic/extrinsic, and fundamentalism for the Israeli sample. An interesting finding was that for the U.S. sample, intrinsic/extrinsic orientation was

associated with political tolerance toward radical Christians, while religiosity was

associated with political tolerance toward Muslims only for the Israeli sample.

The inconsistency in the direction and power of the associations in this study

compared with previous studies may be a result of the demographics of the participants.

The fact that so many hypotheses were rejected is possible evidence for how much

political tolerance is a culturally-based and context-related phenomenon.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The concept of political tolerance is crucial for the existence of democratic

societies. Historically, many of the disagreements between different political and

religious groups can be traced back to political and religious intolerance and prejudice.

While political tolerance can be viewed as a feature of a regime, it can also be observed

as a characteristic of the individual or a group. People differ greatly in the way they

perceive individuals from a culture or with values which are different from their own, and

this perception has behavioral implications.

This investigation is important in at least three areas of inquiry: first, the area of

political tolerance studies; second, the future of the Jewish communities in Israel and in

the U.S. Third, it may have an effect on the Global Jewish community as a whole, and to

Israel's peace process.

First, the study of political tolerance is important because of the assumption that

fewer political cleavages and greater political tolerance within a given regime will

ultimately lead to increased democratic stability. "Since a tolerant regime is generally

thought to be a good regime, tolerance is sometimes understood as a good in itself, as an

essential characteristic of the good society." (Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1979, p. 781).

My goal is to capture, clarify, and compare the concepts of political tolerance in

two heterogeneous Jewish populations: the American Jewish people and the Israeli

Jewish people. As will be elaborated in the research methods chapter, these two

populations have similar religious characteristics and each contains sub-groups with

fragile interrelationships. As examples of the interrelationships, I will note some

differences between the Reform and the Orthodox American Jewish movements in the United States – movements that have difficulties accepting each other's truth (Hirsch & Reinman, 2002). I will note the schismatic political milieu of contemporary Israel, which has dozens of political parties that are separated by faith issues yet thrown together in the context of the political realities of the Middle East.

Second, it is well known that the religious cleavages in Israel are one of the most difficult political challenges in Israeli politics (Korn & Shapira, 1997). This research will examine in depth the interactive relations between Jewish people of different streams of Judaism (such as; Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform movements in America, and Harediem, Masortiem, and Datiem in Israel). This study, conducted among Jews in the U.S. and in Israel, will also analyze and compare the responses to a questionnaire distributed in both countries.

Third, this study will also be important to the Jewish people as a whole since its findings will allow them to assess the level of political tolerance that may be needed for the improvement of the relationships between distinct Jewish faiths and political groups. Hopefully, it will enhance the essential unity of the Jewish people. While examining the issue of tolerance and intolerance within the different streams in Judaism, my study expresses deep commitment to the heritage and unity of the Jewish people.

In addition, I hope the results of this study will help leaders that are involved in planning for the diplomatic tasks ahead. Specifically, in highlighting the political tolerance of Jews toward Muslims and Christians, foreign policy makers will be able to better understand the political tolerance of the Jewish population and to efficiently advocate for the Jews in President Obama's actions toward the permanent solution of the

peace process in the Middle East. In order for the peace process to succeed, more information is required for the understanding of the perceptual barriers on each side. This study is one of the steps toward this understanding.

Why Study these Groups?

Two reasons underlie my choice to study tolerance in the American and Israeli Jewish communities. First, the Jewish people are united by history and commitment to Torah as a way of life. Yet many streams of belief divide the Jewish people. Tolerance is needed within this worldwide community. Second, the Jews of America are connected with the Jews of Israel and vice versa. The unity and the diversity of the Jewish people affect the United States and Israel. Tolerance is needed in both the political and religious realms; and these two realms are interrelated.

To understand the unity and diversity of the Jewish people, an understanding of some Talmudic studies will help. The Talmud is one of the literary sources that explain the self-understanding of some Jews as to Jewry's political situation in the world. The Talmud is a collection of ancient (500 C.E.) rabbinic writings on Jewish civil and religious law. At the practical level, it is the oral Jewish Torah. The Oral Torah, along with the Written Torah, had passed from Moses to the Sanhedrin and from father to son through many generations (from the Talmud Bavlie). The men of the Sanhedrin were leaders of the people of Israel. They had passed along the Talmud orally, along with the interpretation of the written Torah, for generations. After the destruction of the second Jewish temple, 70 C.E, the need to bring the Oral Torah to a written form overruled the

traditional method of the oral communication. Then, the massive body of knowledge was written into 20 tractates.

In the fourth tractate, page 178, the rabbinic subject for discussion is the decision of the Jew's God to scatter the Jewish people all over the world. The metaphor used is that of taking a sieve and scattering flour over a large area. Just so, the Jewish people are scattered and do not have much connection with one another. While the scattering of the Jewish people might be seen as a negative thing, Rabbis see a positive result of the scattering. If an attempt is made to eliminate the Jewish people, it will be impossible since they are not located in one geographic place. However, on the negative side of the scattering was the lack of agreement between the different Rabbis on how to fulfill the commands of Torah. For example, how many cups of wine should be on the Passover Seder table? Five or four? The Rabbis were divided on the question. What is the exact hue needed for the blue thread to which the Torah refers when it comes to Tzitzit (the fringes found on the corners of a man's garment.) These Rabbinical differences of opinion have resulted in the formation of different streams in Judaism.

The American and Israeli Jewish communities are interrelated. The Pew Forum's U.S. Religious Landscape survey, conducted in August of 2008, indicates that 53% of American Jews believe the U.S. should be more active in its role in the world affairs and especially in the Israeli realm. To illustrate, the Jewish philanthropy to Israel, as measured by the annual United Jewish Appeal (UJA, 1999), indicates that more than $1 billion was raised annually to support Israel. Jewish people in the United States are also involved in and influence Israeli politics and policies. As an example, at the time that study was conducted, American Jews asked Israel's then Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, to

influence conversion procedures of non-Jews so that people who were converted to Judaism-using reform procedures-would be considered Jewish in Israel (Maariv Newspaper, 7/14/08).

On the one hand, Jews are people who have a lot in common. They are bound together by the same history and religious beliefs. On the other hand, they are splintered by attempts to find and hold truth. Holding one particular view on an item of faith or a subject of Torah seems to necessitate denying the authenticity and validity of other views and rejecting those holding the other views. Yet, tolerance is necessary for this grand body of people.

In this study, I also propose an alternative way to theorize about political tolerance than has been in use in the past, as well as propose new data collection tools consistent with that theorization. This analysis is likely to draw conclusions different from the conclusions of previous researchers who are included in the literature review section of this paper.

In the following chapter, I conceptualize and define tolerance, religion, religious tolerance, and religious prejudice. I also report on the empirical studies available on political tolerance, and highlight religion as an independent variable within the study of political tolerance. The chapter ends with a model that represents my understanding of the relationships between political tolerance and the variables that affect this phenomenon. I also provide my research hypotheses

In Chapter Three, I discuss the methods used to test the hypotheses posed at the end of chapter two. I justify the decisions I have made as far as sampling concerns. This section is followed by an explanation of how the religious and the socio-demographic

variables were measured. The chapter concludes with a specification of the procedures utilized in this study.

In Chapter Four I review the results derived from the 3 statistical analyses employed to test the research hypotheses: the univariate, and the multivariate analyses. While the first analysis aimed at describing the Israeli and American samples, the second analysis attempted to identify associations and the exact effect between the independent variables and political tolerance.

The Concluding Chapter of this paper summarizes the results of this study. It contextualizes the results of this study with previous research in this field of study. A discussion of the limitations and implications is provided as well as suggestions for future research in this area.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Introduction

The aim of the present chapter is to both demystify and capture the concept of political tolerance. This chapter reviews a survey of studies that focus on measuring political tolerance. It begins with an overview of the different definitions of tolerance as one of the essential factors for sustainability of diversified societies. Its aim is to define religion as an additional factor which affects human behavior and therefore influences societies. The discussion is then followed by the two sources of political tolerance: governmental and attitudinal.

This chapter offers a sociological analysis that specifies how the concepts of discrimination and tolerance emerged, which leads to a conceptual review of religious tolerance and is followed by the measures of religious prejudice: intrinsic/extrinsic religious orientation, Christian orthodoxy, religious fundamentalism, attitudes toward religions/nations, and religious quest.

Aside from synthesizing the main findings that previous research highlights pertaining to each of these variables, a discussion of the individual-level measure, such as social dominance orientation (SDO) – as a predictor of tolerance – is provided. I cite the social and demographic predictors of political tolerance, as well as the individual level predictors. A synthesis of these measures is followed by a causal model that summarizes the findings, and poses the 12 hypotheses of the study.

Tolerance

Cultural diversity is a characteristic of many societies (especially in Western countries). Even if a society is considered relatively homogenous, different subgroups may form within it as a result of geographical locations and loyalties, social classes, ethnicities of origin, language preferences, or faith issues. In my opinion one of the essential factors for the sustainability of such diversified societies is tolerance.

According to Voltaire, tolerance is a condition in which "each individual citizen is to be permitted to believe only what his reason tells him, be his reason enlightened or misguided, provided he threatens no disturbance to public order" (Voltaire, as cited in Harvey, 2000, p. 49).

John Stewart Mill states that "tolerance for conflicting opinions encourages the exchange of ideas and provides an opportunity for identifying inaccurate propositions and pursuing the truth, and for developing efficient solutions to problems" (Wainryb, Shaw & Maianu, 1998, p. 1541).

Mendus states: "we cannot, properly speaking, be said to tolerate things which we welcome, or endorse, or find attractive … you must think that you have a right to exercise your power [to control others], if you are to claim any credit for not exercising it" (1988, p. 4). In other words, to tolerate means to assume one has the power to control others and then intentionally allow an attitude or act that one dislikes. Thus, the basis for all toleration is rejection (Habermas, 2004). Toleration goes hand in hand with disapproval, reservation and discontent (Habermas, 2004). For example, to allow a group to maintain a distinct dress code, or allow them to exercise various kinds of rituals, or display forms of art, means enabling or permitting functions that differ from those of the tolerant one,

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allowing those functions to thrive although the tolerant one perceives such functions as incorrect or invaluable (Miller, 1988, p. 139, in Mendus, 1988).

In Jewish thought, such toleration is considered a gracious Mitzvah or a good deed, but only if it involves suppressing passions and desires. That is to say, a person exercises tolerance only if he controls a strong motivation to damage the other (Raz, 1988, p. 162, in Mendus, 1988).

Popper (1994) introduces another concept relevant to understanding tolerance: the **paradox** of tolerance. According to Popper, when the limitations of tolerance are not set forth, the result is the destruction of tolerance. "[I]f we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them" (p. 266). According to Popper the state should have the privilege to suppress the intolerant because this situation may escalate into using violence rather than arguments. Therefore, claims Popper, for the sake of tolerance, anyone moralizing intolerance should be considered a criminal.

Waltzer (1997) reviews four patterns of tolerant societies. The first pattern is **imperial autonomy** (which existed in the empires of Persia and Rome). In this model, imperial bureaucrats were tolerant toward the different communities within the empire for the sake of peace. These sub-groups had to tolerate one another because they did not have any other choice, as the code of the empire required that conduct. For that reason the imperial regime was called a "regime of toleration" (Waltzer, 1997, p. 167). An effect of this arrangement was that individuals were shut off in their communities and that clear boundaries existed between different communities.

The second pattern is the **bi**- or **tri**- **national state** (as in Switzerland or Cyprus). A characteristic of this pattern is that the different groups are not forced by a superior entity to tolerate one another. Rather, they have to figure out ways by themselves to work through challenges brought on by diversity – without anyone forcing them to do so.

The third pattern of tolerant societies arises within the formation into **nation-states** (as most western countries). Such nation-states are not homogenous societies; rather, they usually consist of a dominant group and minorities. The dominant group controls public life based on the culture and history of the dominant group. Yet, tolerance toward minorities is reflected in different ways.

The last societal pattern is the **immigrant society,** an ideal neutral society, which is very different from the previous models in that toleration is practiced by individuals and toward individuals rather than by and toward groups; "no group is allowed to organize itself coercively or to seize control of public space or to monopolize public resources" (Waltzer, 1997, p. 171).

These four patterns are clearly ideal types and in reality combinations of them are apparent in the current international system. Characteristics of both the nation-state and the immigrant society can be identified in Israel and the U.S. These are not homogenous societies which are composed of immigrants from different cultures with different beliefs. For example, the Israeli parliament is composed of more then 50 parties. Each one of these parties represents different segments and layers of the Israeli population. Although, the U.S. congress is less diverse, its still represents a vast variety of opinions from different states of the federation. Also, in both societies, toleration is exercised in the individual level.

Religion

Religion is a concept that is difficult to define since the actual attempt to define it relies on the misguided assumption that all religions have the same characteristics worldwide. To illustrate, if we define religion as a belief system which assumes some kind of providence by a divine being, then Buddhism – which does not acknowledge such a divine being – would NOT be counted as religion.

Furthermore, some anthropologists, such as Durkheim (1984) and Levi-Strauss (1955), conceptualized religion as structured by society. While Durkheim's (1984) understands religion as a means for upgrading the status of social symbols and practices, Levi-Strauss (1955) explains religious practices as a set of consistent social rituals. Both classical ideas of religion, which are society-based, are evidence for the difficulties of trying to provide a global definition for religion due to the variety of social structures.

Thus, some definitions of religion emerge from another aspect, which confronted human involvement with existential questions. "What is the meaning and purpose of my life? How should I relate to others? How do I deal with the fact that I am going to die? What should I do about my shortcomings?" (Batson, Schoenrade & Ventis, 1993, p. 9). In accordance with these questions, Batson, Schoenrade and Ventis (1993), define religion as "whatever we as individuals do to come to grips personally with the questions that confront us because we are aware that we and others like us are alive and that we will die."(p. 8). Fox and Sendler (2004) argue: "the key is to focus not on what religion is, but what it does. That is, rather than addressing the more philosophical issues involved in defining religion, it is easier to stress what role religion plays in society" (p. 2).

Fox and Sendler (2004) assume that religion affects human behavior and therefore they concentrate on revealing these influences. First, religion influences perceptions. People's perceptions translate to behaviors and may cause changes in the way others behave. Second, religion influences personal and social identity because it affects how individuals perceive themselves both as individuals and as members of a certain community. Religious commitment provides humans with a sense of belonging to their own religious group and differentiates them from members of other religions. Third, the intersection of religious and social behavior is also manifested in the power of religion to make specific actions legitimate due to its attachment with formal institutions.

Insights from these two schools of thought highlight the idiosyncrasy, complexity, and diversity of religion. Religion contributes to "the individual's total personality and social life, and so it invites psychological questions about the sources, nature, and consequences of religion" (Batson, Schoenrade & Ventis, 1993, p. 21).

An additional, pertinent question that researchers have been exploring is this: Is religion the cause of religious conflicts? On the one hand, religion is considered a source of moral values. On the other hand, religion provides a moral justification for fighting other people. Is Religion the cause of prejudice, or is it the rationalization people offer for intolerant acts?

The above review of the psychological and social dimensions of religion is in the basis of the definition of religion that informs this study. Because the unit of research is the individual as part of society, the psychological and social components have to be taken into account.

Religious Tolerance

In the scholarly literature, some theorists examine the relationship between the governmental system (of any given territory) and its citizens. In this context, some say religious tolerance is "the peacemaker of multiculturalism" as it honors, uses, and strengthens the neutrality of the state. Habermas (2004) reasons:

Frequently neutrality is threatened by the predominance of a majority culture, which abuses its historically acquired influence and definitional power to decide according to its own standards what shall be considered the norms and values of the political culture which is expected to be equally shared by all (p. 14).

For that reason, religious tolerance is crucial for the development of democracy, cultural freedoms, and rights. These freedoms are crucial for the maintenance of individuals' personal and social identities, so that different groups can co-exist harmoniously. I would take an additional step and claim here that religion is crucial to the existence of a human society.

Habermas (2004) explains an important linguistic distinction – the semantic difference between the term 'tolerance' and the term toleration. While the former suggests "a form of behavior", the latter implies "a legal act with which a government grants more or less unrestricted permission to practice one's own particular religion" (p. 5).

In accordance with the paradox of toleration that Popper (1994) presents, when referring to religious tolerance, a decision must be made in regards to what will not be tolerated. Thus, mutual acceptance of the regulations of tolerant behavior is a

prerequisite, as Habermas (2004) indicates, "the usual conditions for liberal co-existence between different religious communities stand this test of reciprocity" (p. 6)

Opposed to Habermas (2004) is John Locke's position. For Locke, having a pluralistic social structure with multiplicity of opinions, worldviews and religious beliefs will only interfere with a monolithic unanimity. "There is nothing in his argument to justify a policy of fostering religious pluralism or of providing people with a meaningful array of choices" (Waldron, 1988, in Mendus, 1988, p. 76).

Hobbes' approach in *Leviathan* parallels Locke's. He claims that one of the assignments of the ruler is to set ethical truths by forcing regulations for determining which acts of states are considered 'good' and which are considered 'bad' (Ryan, 1988, in Mendus, 1988, p. 37).

Weber (2002) analyzes historical sources of tolerance/intolerance and presents a different viewpoint identifying three principle sources: (1) purely political reasons of the state (2) mercantilism – as valuable bearers of economic progress, and (3) a desire for the "glory of god" which caused the church to claim the assistance of the state in the suppression of heresy (Weber, 2002). That is to say, because Weber defines the state as an "organized monopoly of legitimate force in a given territory, which are deployed to carry out whatever ends a state may happen to undertake" (Waldron, 1988, in Mendus, 1988, p. 64), his perception of toleration is limited to the context of the means available to the state.

In the current study, I will define religious tolerance based on Habermas' (2004) distinction. I conceptualize religious tolerance as a characteristic of the individual which is a part of a given society and not as a legal act on the part of a specific government.

Tolerance as an Attitude

Another way tolerance is conceptualized is as a characteristic of the individual, an attitude. An attitude is "the association of a social object or social group concept with a valence attribute concept" Greenwald et al. (2002, p. 4), and conceptualizing religious tolerance as an attitude requires an understanding of its psychological and social motivational basis. According to Eagly and Chaiken (1993), "attitude is a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor." (p. 1). Psychological tendency is an internal human condition; evaluating includes all types of evaluative reacting (that can be cognitive, affective, or behavioral). An attitude grows within an individual as a result of evaluative responding. In order to develop an attitude, one has to be exposed to and interact with a reality on one of three levels (cognitive, affective, or behavioral). An attitude is not something that can be observed but can be concluded from viewable actions, such as responses on a questionnaire.

To have a tolerant attitude means to set specific criteria for differentiating between acceptable and unacceptable opposition. Indeed, some key questions of philosophers, scholars and social scientists are: "What are the grounds of tolerations?" and, "what are the limits of toleration?" (Mendus, 1988, p. 19).

To grasp tolerance as an attitude also means considering three levels of tolerance: acceptance of differences; benign indifference to differences; and enthusiastically endorsing differences (Waltzer, 1997). Tolerance and indifference is not the same thing because toleration involves ethical obligation and responsibility and judgments that will frame its appropriate practice. Moreover, "the nature and extent of what is tolerated will

also differ, and this shows us that disputes about toleration are disputes about ends and not merely about means." (Mendus, 1988, p. 19).

For this current study I will define tolerance as an attitude as the actions one takes toward groups that are religiously different from one's own. For instance, Orthodox people actions toward Reforms, and vice versa. These actions will probably have the characteristics of either acceptance of the others, or opposing them.

Religious Prejudice

Since historically, the source of discrimination is prejudice and stereotyping, and tolerance emerged as a response to the elimination of discrimination (Allport, 1979), I will briefly explain the concepts of prejudice and stereotyping before describing how religious tolerance is measured in the empirical studies that I reviewed.

The study of prejudice evolved with the study of Allport (1979). His definition of prejudice has psychological ramifications. Allport (1979) defined prejudice as "thinking ill of others without sufficient warrant." (p. 6). A more recent definition (Von Der Haar, 2005) brings sociology into the definition by referring to prejudice in terms of attitudes and behaviors. These definitions consider positive and negative evaluations of other groups, as well as, likes and dislikes of other groups (Duckitt, 1992; Wiggins, Wiggins & Zanden, 1994; Hunsberger, 1995). According to these definitions, we can be prejudiced against all groups of people. For example, one group of football fans can be prejudiced against the opponent's football fans, and only because they cheer for the other team. This is one of the reasons that fans of one group will gather on one side of the football field, while the opponents will sit on the other end separated by fences and bricks. Often, the

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presence of police is necessary to prevents escalations of feeling of likes and dislikes to actions of violence.

In social psychology, prejudice is referred to as negative evaluation of the others (Wiggins, Wiggins & Zanden, 1994; Eagly, Mladinic & Otto, 1994; Esses et al., 1993). Jackson and Hunsberger (1999) add to the definition of prejudice the aspect of moral justification for negative evaluation of others. They claim that a negative attitude is prejudice when 'misguided beliefs' (as defined by them) have no objective justification but are blindly accepted by those who hold the beliefs (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Michener, DeLamater & Myers, 2004).

One needs to differentiate between implicit and explicit attitudes toward prejudice (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Fazio & Olson, 2003). While explicit attitudes are conscious and are "traditionally measured with multi-item self-report" (Himmelfarb, 1993, as cited in Rowatt, Franklin and Cotton, 2005, p. 30), implicit attitudes are automatic and unconscious, and "are usually measured using response latency" (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, as cited in Greenwald, MacGhee & Schwartz, 1998, p. 1464), evaluation priming (Wittenbrink, Judd & Park, 1997), or unobtrusive measures of helping behavior, aggression, or nonverbal communication (Crosby, Bromley & Saxe, 1980).

In this study I will use Hunsberger's (1995) definition of prejudice: "a negative inter-group attitude, involving cognitive, affective, and behavioral components." (p. 114).

What is the source of prejudice? One sociopsychological point of view assumes that "people may unconsciously project their own feelings of inferiority onto convenient racial, religious, and ethnic minority groups. By doing so, the prejudiced person bolsters his own ego by feeling superior to members of the out-group" (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993.

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p. 481). This is a crucial point to take into consideration when one attempts to change attitudes; because, if people understand that stereotyping is an ego defense and resistance mechanism (used to deal with feelings of inferiority), they may find it easier to change their attitudes toward those who are different.

Prejudice can move in two directions: majorities can be prejudiced against minorities, and minorities can be prejudiced against majorities. Minorities may be prejudiced against majorities to repay humiliations and resentment (due to lack of or limited political power) or to attempt to preserve their own unique identity (Perlmutter, 2002). Much prejudicial discourse regarding majorities by minorities is not expressed publicly but in a more private setting.

The Measures of Religious Prejudice

Some studies examined the relationship between the level of religiosity and prejudice, but the correlation between these two variables wasn't uniform across studies (Jacobson, 1998; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Hunsberger, 1995). As Allport (1954) pointed out: "religion makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice" (p. 444). Furthermore, it was impossible to show consistent results across different religious groups. Even though it seems plausible that religiosity could make a contribution to reducing prejudice, research results have been contradictory. One conclusion I draw from this is that the measures that have been used (e.g., church attendance, religious orientation, religious fundamentalism, or religious quest) do not enlighten our knowledge of the subject.

To sum up, despite the fact that the measurements of religiosity and religious prejudice are based on self report instruments, the primary sociocultural-level measures

that seem predictive of prejudice are: intrinsic/extrinsic religious orientation, Christian orthodoxy, religious fundamentalism, attitudes toward religions/nations, and religious quest. I will discuss the main findings pertaining to each of these variables.

Religious Orientation

Religious orientation refers to the motivations for practicing religion. An important distinction that is made in the literature is between two poles of a continuum: intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation. Two of the first researchers that discussed the distinction were Allport and Ross (1967). In their study, they created a religious orientation scale (ROS) which consisted of items that subjects needed to rank (from strongly disagree to strongly agree). Based on the subject's answers a score was calculated with higher scores indicating a stronger extrinsic orientation (Herek, 1987). As a result of the study, Allport and Ross (1976) explained that the "extrinsically motivated person uses his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated lives his religion." (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 434). They added that intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations are ideal types and that each person can be located somewhere in between these two poles (Allport & Ross, 1967). In summary, orientation is one variable, with variation along a continuum ranging from complete intrinsic orientation to complete extrinsic orientation.

People with extrinsic religious orientation use religion for other ends (Donahue, 1985; Allport, 1966; Baston, et al., 1986; Duck & Hunsberger, 1999; Herek, 1987). Extrinsic religious values are always instrumental and are used to achieve a variety of ends such as "security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification." (Duck & Hunsberger, 1999, p. 158). Intrinsic orientation, on the other

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hand, refers to a pure motivation and interest in religion that is not a means for achieving other ends but an end in and of itself.

The distinction between these two types of religious orientation is crucial to the understanding of the interrelationship of religion and tolerance because "a life that is dependent on the support of extrinsic religion is likely to be dependent on the supports of prejudice, hence our positive correlations between the extrinsic orientation and intolerance. " (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 441). In contrast, when intrinsic religious orientation exists, there is no disapproval or scornfulness of another's religion. Such is the explanation for the relationship between extrinsic religion and prejudice, and between intrinsic religion and tolerance. Thus, intrinsic religious orientation is an effective criterion for measuring religious commitment, which is very different from religious belief, for example (Baston et al., 1986). Extrinsic religious orientation assesses religious utilitarianism (Duck & Hunsberger, 1999) and is positively correlated with prejudice and intolerance (Donahue, 1985).

In some studies the correlation between intrinsic religiosity and prejudice wasn't significant. For example, in a regression analysis that Kirkpatrick conducted in 1993, the results of the intrinsic scale varied. In some cases it negatively correlated with prejudice, and in others it didn't. One of the reasons for that was that study utilized multiple samples of college students on different campuses.

<center>Religious Fundamentalism</center>

Religious fundamentalism is defined as "the belief that there is one set of religious teaching that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential,

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inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by the forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity". (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, p. 40).

Religious fundamentalism is a stronger predictor of prejudice than the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction posited by Allport. One reason is that fundamentalism is associated with aggression, fear of a dangerous world and self-righteousness (Altemeyer, 1988). Another reason is that fundamentalism (not necessarily religious fundamentalism) is not just a way to add religious content to one's life (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), it is also a way of living (Kirkpatrick, 1993).

Fundamentalism was assessed by a six-item scale first developed by McFarland (1989) in consultation with some ministers to "verify that the (the items) indeed reflected the core of the point of view commonly called fundamentalism." (McFarland, 1989, p. 326).

Fundamentalism can correlate with right wing authoritarianism (RWA) which has been used by Rowatt, Franklin and Cotton (2005). People who are characterized by RWA tend to be fundamentalist to a large extent in their religious orientation. Thus, the relationship between religion and authoritarianism is reciprocal as Altemeyer (1988) indicates: "both religious fundamentalism and authoritarianism encourage obedience to authority, conventionalism, self-righteousness, and feelings of superiority." (p. 120)

Right wing authoritarianism is positively correlated with intrinsic religious orientation and negatively associated with extrinsic religious orientation. This is

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consistent with previous findings that RWA is positively associated with measures of

religious fundamentalism and orthodoxy (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger,

1995).

<center>Attitudes Toward Religions/Nations</center>

In order to learn more about religion and prejudice, some studies used attitudinal

surveys. For example, attitudes toward Christianity were measured by Rowatt, Franklin

and Cotton (2005) and by Francis and Stubbs (1987). These studies used the Implicit

Association Test (IAT) that consisted of 24 items that assess perceptions of Christian

behaviors. Higher scores on this instrument are interpreted as having a more positive

attitude toward Christians as a religious group." (Rowatt, Franklin & Cotton, 2005, p.

35). The results of the study by Rowatt and colleagues (2005) showed that "Christians'

implicit and explicit evaluations of the in group (for example, Christian) are more

favorable than their implicit and explicit evaluation of the out-group, for illustration,

Muslim" (Rowatt, Franklin & Cotton, 2005, p. 39).

Rowatt and colleagues (2005) researched attitudes toward Muslims. In this study,

the researchers used a 25-item scale that assessed positive feelings about Muslims. The

higher the score is, the more positive the attitude toward Muslims. (Rowatt, Franklin &

Cotton, 2005).

Rowatt, Franklin and Cotton (2005) and Pratto et al. (1994) also researched

feelings toward Arabs. In their study they used "the anti Arab racism scale" (Pratto et al.,

1994) that required respondents to rank degrees of positive or negative feeling toward

Arabs. The findings confirmed that attitude toward Muslims correlated negatively with

<center>22</center>

anti-Arab racism, right wing authoritarianism, and religious fundamentalism. These findings show that as the personal dimensions get stronger, explicit attitudes toward Muslims become more negative (Rowatt, Franklin & Cotton, 2005).

Religious Quest

Another instrument that has been used in the studies that explored religion and prejudice is religious quest. This measure is described as assessing an orientation that involves asking questions about religion, looking for answers, investigating and being open to religious conceptions (Batson, 1993). In their 1993 essay, Batson and his co-writers explain that religious quest is theoretically related to tolerance. In later empirical research this argument is strengthened showing that respondents who scored higher points in a quest survey were said to have what the researchers called 'universal compassion' (Baston, Eidelman, Higley & Russell, 2001; Baston, Floyd, Meyer & Winner, 1999).

Social Dominance Orientation

Social dominance orientation (SDO) is a measure of a "person's desires that his or her in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups." (Rowatt, Franklin & Cotton, 2005, p. 35). SDO reflects whether a person views the relationship between his group and other groups as equal or hierarchical. The assumption behind this measure is that social-dominance oriented individuals will like hierarchy-based relationships more than those with lower levels of social dominance orientation (Rowatt, Franklin & Cotton, 2005; Pratto et al., 1994).

Pratto et al. (1994) added that levels of SDO will also predict the types of roles individuals will choose in society, as they state "those who are higher on SDO will become members of institutions and choose roles that maintain or increase social inequality, whereas those who are lower on SDO will belong to institutions and choose roles that reduce inequality." (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 742).

Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) contribute to the discussion by pointing that individuals with high SDO levels are relatively more conservative, racist, ethnocentric, and prejudiced. They added that these individuals would be less tolerant to lower status groups.

Attitudes
Implicit(-)/Explicit(+)
Positive (-) and Negative (+)
      attitudes toward religious beliefs

Religious orientation
Religious Quest(-)   Religious prejudice
Intrinsic (-)/Extrinsic (+)
Religious fundamentalism (+)

Personality
SDO(+)

Figure 1. The model of religious tolerance.

Figure 1 shows a causal model that summarizes the relationships between the constructs I have just discussed. Specifically, the model shows how key variables influence religious prejudice. The first set of variable that represent the individual's personal attitudes is the explicit/implicit and the positive/negative natures of the attitudes. The more implicit the attitudes are the more negative they are the greater this person's religious prejudice, and vice versa. The second set of variables that represent an

individual's religious orientation includes religious quest, the intrinsic/extrinsic nature of orientation and religious fundamentalism. The greater the quest, the less prejudice, the more extrinsic the person is the more prejudiced he is, and the greater the religious fundamentalism, the greater religious prejudice. Finally, the higher the SDO, the greater religious prejudice. This is a schematic representation of the variable of religious tolerance which will be used in the causal model of political tolerance that will help predict levels of political tolerance. As I will show in the review of political tolerance, previous models have did not included a variable of religious tolerance in the political tolerance model.

Political Tolerance

The concept of political tolerance is relatively new and was first introduced in 1955 by Samuel A. Stouffer who published the results of a survey that posed an array of questions about civil liberties for Communists, Socialists, and atheists. His aim was to assess the willingness of people in the United States at that time to allow such people to express their views, either by teaching, publishing books, or speaking in various public forums.

In 1978, Nunn, Crockett and Williams replicated Stouffer's methods and used the same questions to conduct a study that showed changes in the American society from 1955 to 1972. Broadly speaking, the conclusion that can be drawn from the two studies is that over these two decades the American population became more politically tolerant. Further, in the seventies, additional development increased research in the field. Most of

Stouffer's survey results became available for academic use on the GSS (the General Social Survey), and research in the field of political tolerance started to flourish.

Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1979, 1982) created two paradigms in the study of political tolerance. They argued that in order to be able to generalize the conclusions in regards to political tolerance, researchers have to incorporate the "least-like" method. They argued that the respondents have to answer the questions that measure tolerance only after they identify a group they "least-like". The rationale behind this demand was that if the researcher proposes groups that respondents have neutral feelings for, they will answer the questionnaire from a place of being tolerant already, and what will eventually be measured are general norms and not political tolerance per se. For example, people with no religious affiliation might present tolerant views toward atheists, since they can be considered as atheists themselves. On the other hand, if they identify a group they "least-like", they are likely to express intolerance.

Debates over this question evolved toward the end of the century between some mainstream scholars. Gibson (1985, 1986, 1989) argued in favor of using secondary data, which includes mixed questions and general measurements. On the other side of the debate, Mondak and Sanders (2003, 2005) advocated using primary data. They asserted that one of the advantages of using primary data is to place the conclusions in context by using Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus' (1979, 1982) "least-liked" methods. Gibson (2005a, 2005b) argued against the absolutism of Mondak and Sanders (2003, 2005) and Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus' (1979, 1982), and suggested that primary data, in many cases, is conducted with low number of participants, and therefore, narrows the conclusion and the ability to be original and innovative as demonstrated by using the "least-liked" method.

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Gibson (2005a, 2005b) concluded that researchers can use either secondary data or primary data, as dictated by the research goals.

The two paradigms produced two sets of definitions for understanding political tolerance. Both define political tolerance as the willingness to extend civil and democratic liberties to a specified group or set of groups that are of similarly limited value. In the realm of political science, this process involves deciding how far to extend the basic rights of citizenship (e.g., free speech and free assembly).

The first set of studies (Stouffer, 1955; Nunn, Crockett & Williams, 1978; McClosky & Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Davis, 1995; Gibson, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1992, 2005a, 2005b; Karpov, 1999) used secondary data and defined political tolerance as the willingness to extend civil and democratic rights to others.

The second set of studies (Sullivan, Pierreson & Marcus, 1979, 1982; Sullivan, Pierreson, Marcus & Feldman 1979; Beatty & Walter, 1984, 1988; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh & Robert, 1985; Sullivan & Marcus, 1988; Wilson, 1991, 1994; Avery, Sullivan & Wood, 1997; Mueller, 1988; Katnik, 2002; Avery, 2002; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003; Mondak & Sanders, 2003, 2005) conducted research with primary data, and defined political tolerance according to the "least-like" method. These scholars argue that political tolerance requires an object that is "least-like" to be considered, because it is easy to afford civil liberties to groups one supports or to ideas you encourage. But, it is not so easy to tolerate groups one opposes. The object of tolerance, in these studies, is only a group (or groups) one opposes, objects to, or dislikes. Therefore, the definition of political tolerance according to these studies is the willingness to extend civil and democratic liberties to a specified group or set of groups that one "least-likes". The

measurements for political tolerance are now measuring tolerance in the context of the group or groups that the participants specified.

Determinants of Political Tolerance

In this section I will review the empirical literature on political tolerance, highlighting what variables have been found to be statistically associated with political tolerance. Although scholars from both sides of the debate have not agreed on a conceptual and operational definition, the predictors of political tolerance being used have been the same. There is a distinction between the social measurements and the psychological/individual measurements and their influence on political tolerance. The **social background** predictors described in the literature are education, gender, race, and region, social status (which includes income), age, and religiosity. The **individual** level predictors of political tolerance relate to the cognitive or psychological aspects of the individual and are self-esteem, political involvement, and personal security.

Social Demographic Predictors

Level of education has been found to have strong influence on political tolerance (Stouffer, 1955; Dynes, 1967; Crockett, 1976, Crockett & Williams, 1978; Nunn, Crockett & Williams, 1978; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982; Weil, 1982; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh & Robert, 1985; Gibson, 1992). Specifically, research shows the less educated a person is, the less tolerant he is. While Stouffer (1955) was the first to point out the relationship between education and political tolerance, subsequent studies confirmed the relationships, although the strength of the relationship has varied. Further,

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while Stouffer (1955), Dynes (1967), and Gibson (1992) found a direct relationship between the two variables Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) and Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978), found a strong direct relationship between education and political tolerance.

Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh and Robert (1985) found a direct link between income and political tolerance. They write that income is a variable that determines the social status of a person and, similar to education, has a positive and direct relationship with political tolerance. Both, education and income, as part of social status, influence each other since the people with higher means will have higher education and therefore will be tolerant. Other studies that researched the relationship between income and political tolerance are Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) and Stouffer (1963). All came with the same conclusion that the higher income the more tolerant the individual is.

A few articles feature a discussion of gender as a factor influencing political tolerance (Stouffer, 1955; Nunn, Crockett & Williams, 1978; Crockett & Williams, 1978; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982). While Stouffer (1955), Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978), and Crockett and Williams (1978) suggest that in general women are less tolerant than men, Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) express the opposing idea and argue that women are not necessarily less tolerant than men. The studies that showed gender differences in the level of political tolerance were conducted a few decades ago when the men were the majority of the working force and women were largely homemakers. Limited interaction with a diverse population may explain the lower level of tolerance among women. I did not find any recent work on gender and political tolerance.

A couple of studies focused on the variable of age in relation to political tolerance. Stouffer (1955), Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978), and Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh and Robert, (1985) reported that the older generation was less tolerant than the younger generation. A possible explanation notes that older people are more resistant to change and usually like to preserve tradition. These studies confirmed the aphorism that says, "Today's liberal is tomorrow's conservative".

Some studies document that region of residence is a variable influencing political tolerance to some degree (Stouffer, 1955; Nunn, Crockett & Williams, 1978; Wilson, 1991; Ellison & Musick, 1993). A possible explanation notes the dominance of a certain stream of religion. For example, people in the South have been found to be less tolerant than people in the North due to the dominance of Protestantism that exposed followers to negative messages toward unpopular groups. Yet, other studies (Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh & Robert, 1985; Abrahamson & Carter, 1986) found it was unimportant and considered it a variable that has little to no effect on tolerance. In these studies, due to variations in region and sample of subjects, as well as the level of population diversity, no significant results were found as far as the influence of region on political tolerance.

Despite a lack of consensus, another variable is the size of the community. Stouffer (1995) claims that people who live in big cities are more tolerant than those who live in a small town. The rationale behind this suggestion is that big cities enjoy more diversity than smaller cities. Stouffer (1955) reasoned that small town life is like life in the goldfish bowl, where everyone knows about everyone else and the unusual stands out. On the other hand, in a large community where there is a greater number of unusual

people, nobody bothers to look at them. According to Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) whether someone lives in a big city or a small town make no difference. They claim that this variable is not significant in predicting of political tolerance. Abrahamson and Carter (1986) emphasized that conclusion with their finding that the effect of city size on tolerance is small and has decreased over time.

Race is a comparatively new variable in the study of political tolerance and there is disagreement regarding its effect. Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982), who were the first researchers to include it in their model, noted that prior research ignored race. They found the correlation between race and political tolerance to be weak; Whites were slightly more tolerant than Blacks. In their study, Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh and Robert (1985) found that African-Americans are slightly less tolerant than whites in the United States. One explanation for this finding is that generally speaking African-Americans have lower levels of education on average.

Finally, the relationship between religiosity and political tolerance has been well examined. Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh and Robert (1985) state that religiosity was shown to be an important determinant of political tolerance. They found that the more religious a person is, the more intolerant he is, which reinforces Stouffer's (1955) earlier claim. High levels of religiosity lead to less tolerance due to the greater amount of exclusive religious content that the followers are exposed to. Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978), and Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) examined the relationship between religion and political tolerance differently. They correlated religiosity with political tolerance across the different denominations; non-religious, Jews, Catholics and Protestants. Both

studies concluded that in all denominations, the less religious the respondents are the more tolerant they will be.

Individual Level Predictors

Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh and Robert (1985) found the relationship between individual self-esteem and political tolerance to be a positive one (meaning that the higher the self-esteem is the higher the tolerance is). They also correlated political tolerance with dogmatism and rigidity (Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh & Robert, 1985) and found that liberal people will be much more tolerant to beliefs different from their own.". They argued that dogmatism should be understood in terms of psychological and cognitive processes that shape the personal belief system.

Research also shows that individuals with low self-esteem are less likely to become involved in politics (Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982). Political involvement, moreover, has a weak positive relationship with political tolerance (Sullivan et al., 1982; Sullivan et al., 1985). Interestingly, activists are more politically tolerant than non-activists (Sullivan et al., 1982; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003). Weber (2003) pointed out that individuals' social political activities, such as campaigning and attending meetings, enhance political tolerance because generally individuals who are involved understand other individuals' rights to fight for their causes, just like themselves.

A third psychological variable is personal security. Personal security as an issue can be studied in two time periods – before 9/11 and after. The period prior to 9/11 was characterized by relatively little threat to civil liberties (Stouffer, 1955), but people had concerns with social problems (Nunn, Crockett & Williams, 1978). Sullivan, Shamir,

Walsh and Robert, (1985) emphasized that when people feel threatened; they direct their anxiety to the perceived source of danger by expressing intolerance. According to Li and Brewer (2004) who examined personal security after 9/11, perceived security threat is associated with lower tolerance for cultural diversity. They found that threat and self-security were influenced positively by feelings of nationality. After 9/11, when self-security went down, people with higher nationality feelings were less tolerant toward multiculturalism (Avery, 2002; Li & Brewer, 2004).

This subsection has looked into the phenomenon of political tolerance by examining social and psychological measurements. The above overview shows that this is a well-established body of knowledge. Yet, as it will be shown in the next subsection, the relationship between political tolerance and religious toleration has not been clearly developed.

Religion and Political Tolerance

The link between religion and political tolerance was first made by Stouffer's (1955) classic work on tolerance. In that study, Stouffer (1955) made a seminal contribution by hypothesizing that the level of religiosity was an independent variable that helps determine the level of political tolerance. Ever since Stouffer's study was published, numerous researchers have examined the degree to which level of religiosity is a predictor of political tolerance (Stouffer, 1963; Dynes, 1967; Nunn, Crockett & Williams, 1978; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1979, 1982; Gibson, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1992, 2005; McClosky & Brill, 1983**;** Beatty & Walter, 1984, 1988; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh & Robert, 1985; Jelen & Wilcox, 1990; Bruce & Wright, 1995; Jelen &

Chandler, 1996; Karpov, 1999, 2002; Katnik, 2002; Moore & Ovadia, 2006; Eisenstein, 2006).

Stouffer (1955) examined church attendance as a measure for level of religiosity. He found that there is a negative relationship between those who attend church frequently and their level of tolerance; the more individuals attend church, the less tolerant they tend to be. The same results have been found by Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh and Robert (1985), Beatty and Walter (1984), and Katnik (2002), all of whom argue that level of religiosity is an important variable in predicting tolerance among nonconforming groups.

Jelen and Chandler's (1996) work extends the discussion by providing two explanations for the effect of church attendance on tolerance. The first explanation stresses the importance of the congregation and contends that the individual is going through a process of communalism, by which they adopt the cohort's agenda and opinions. The second explanation emphasizes the messages in the church. It posits that when a congregation and the church leaders are close, the church leaders educate and influence the values of the congregation (Jelen & Chandler, 1996; Katnik, 2002). Therefore, the more one attends church, the greater the influence his congregation and church leaders have (McClosky & Brill, 1983; Beatty & Walter 1984; Karpov, 1999, 2002).

Several studies provide insight into to the relationship between religious affiliation and political tolerance (Nunn, Crockett & Williams, 1978; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1979, 1982; Beatty & Walter, 1984; Jelen & Wilcox, 1990). While Stouffer (1955) found minor differences between Catholics and Protestants regarding political tolerance, Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978) and McClosky and Brill (1983) report

that Jews are the most tolerant, and that non-religious people were more tolerant than Catholics and Protestants.

Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) did not agree with Nunn, Crockett and Williams' (1978) claim about Jews being more tolerant, critiquing the research method Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978) used. The essence of their critique was that prior research indicating that Jews are more tolerant than Protestants and Catholics was misleading because the reference group was chosen for the participants to respond about (content-bias). Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) claim that if you are interested in a group's level of tolerance, you need to figure out their "least-like" group and than research the level of tolerance toward this group. If you name the "least-like" groups for the population you want to study, than the focus of your investigation would be the hated group and not the level of tolerance of the participants. Still, Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) agreed with Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978) that non-religious people are more tolerant than those with some denominational affiliation.

Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) suggested that in order to validate the research one should use a "content controlled" method, so they created the "least-like" method to measure political tolerance. Thus, they proposed to ask the participants which group they are least-like, and then measures how politically tolerant they are of that "least-like" group. This was a breakthrough in the field of political tolerance that made it clear that using predetermined nonconformists' groups to measure political tolerance is subject for misrepresentation of the data. When using this innovative research tool they found that Jews least-liked Nazis. Using Nazis as group of reference for measuring tolerance, Jews tend to be less tolerant than Protestants and Catholics (Sullivan, Piereson

& Marcus, 1982). They concluded, then, that religious affiliation was an important predictor of tolerance.

The content controlled method has led scholars to disagree regarding the importance of religiosity and religious affiliation in predicting political tolerance. A debate exists between scholars who consider Stouffer's (1955) classical study as the fundamental study for the field (Beatty & Walter, 1984, 1988; Filsinger, 1976; Smidt & Penning, 1982; Jelen & Wilcox, 1990; Davis, 1995; Karpov, 1999, 2002, Katnik, 2002), which encourages the use of secondary data based on Stouffer's questions for research, and scholars (Nunn, Crockett & Williams, 1978; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1979, 1982; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh & Robert, 1985; Avery, Sullivan & Wood, 1997; Mondak & Sanders, 2003, 2005; Eisentein, 2006; Mutz & Mondak, 2006) who advocate for the use of primary data collection and employed the "least-like" method in their work. The secondary data being used, such as the ANES (The American National Election Study) or the GSS (The General Social Survey), include fixed questions and general measures. Gibson (1983, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1992, 2005a, 2005b), one of the leading scholars in the field, accepts both methods as legitimate and believes that religiosity is a less important predictor of political tolerance than other predictors such as level of education.

To recap this subsection, researchers have only minimally examined the relationship between religious tolerance and political tolerance. In particular, the research is flawed by using church attendance as the sole indicator of religiosity. Although researchers have made important contributions, the available literature can be improved, primarily by using more complex measures of religiosity, such as those used when examining the association between religiosity and prejudice. The use of updated and

more comprehensive measures of religiosity should contribute to our understanding of the relationship between religiosity and political tolerance.

In this section I develop a causal model that summarizes the findings discussed in this chapter. In this model I hypothesize that the following determinants have a direct impact on political tolerance, political involvement, income, race, region of residence, age, gender, level of religiosity, size of community of residence, and religious affiliation. Self-esteem has an indirect impact on political tolerance as mediated by political involvement. Level of education also has an indirect effect on political tolerance as mediated by self-esteem, political involvement, and income.

Education → Self Esteem → Political Involvement

Race

Income

Region

Age → Political Tolerance

Gender

Level of Religiosity

Size of Community

Religion

Figure 2. Political tolerance model.

The overview of the available literature suggests that a study needs to be conducted that examines the role of religious prejudice in political tolerance, using the measurements that have been reviewed here. The model of political tolerance needs to

take into account the concept of religious prejudice which is composed of attitudes, religious orientation and personality. This new multi-dimensional variable that I'll be adding to the model of political tolerance that the literature portrayed will help explain better and predict the level of political tolerance a person may have along with other variables that have been traditionally used such as: income, education, age and gender. Therefore, the essence of this research is two competing models, which I integrate into one model that is shown in Figure 3.

Education (+)

Income (+)

Age (-)   Political Tolerance

Gender

Size of Community(+)

Rural/non-rural

Level of religiosity(-)

Attitudes toward religious beliefs(+)

Intrinsic/extrinsic religious orientation (+)

Quest(+)

Fundamentalism (-)

SDO (-)

Figure 3. The model proposed in this study.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses will be tested to examine the above model:

1. The higher the level of religiosity is, the lower the level of political tolerance.

2. The higher the level of income is, the higher the level of political tolerance.

3. The higher the level of education is, the higher the level of political tolerance.

4. The older the age is, the lower the level of political tolerance.

5. Females will be more politically tolerant than males.

6. The bigger the community, the higher the level of political tolerance.

7. People from rural regions will be less tolerant than people from non-rural regions.

8. The more positive the attitudes toward religious beliefs are, the higher the level of political tolerance.

9. The more intrinsic the religious orientation, the lower the level of political tolerance.

10. The higher the level of quest, the higher the level of political tolerance.

11. The higher the level of fundamentalism, the lower the level of political tolerance.

12. The higher the level of SDO, the lower the level of political tolerance.

This chapter is an attempt to characterize the measures of political tolerance, and discuss the ramifications of religious factors on political tolerance. It may seem irrelevant to view studies that address the religious measures as predictors of political tolerance, yet I assume that one must consider religious measures in addition to the level of religiosity to understand political tolerance in religion-based group, such as the Jewish people.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction

This chapter describes the data and methods used to test the hypotheses specified at the end of the previous chapter. The first part of this chapter discusses the epistemological assumptions. This section is then followed by the sampling strategy used to attain the American and Israeli data. The next section, titled measurements describes the variables as well as the demographics that were investigated. Finally, a detailed summary of the procedures is provided.

Epistemological and Ontological Assumptions

The empirical studies in the field of political tolerance have utilized a post-positivist paradigm to approach the research questions. Since 1955, with Stouffer's inclusive study of political tolerance in the U.S., followed by Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1979, 1982) with their "least-like" method, until the present, most of the significant research (such as: Gibson, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1992, 2005a, 2005b; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1979, 1982; Sullivan, Piereson, Marcus & Feldman, 1979; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh & Robert, 1985; Sullivan & Marcus, 1988; Avery, Sullivan & Wood, 1997; Avery, 2002; Mondak & Sanders, 2003, 2005; McClosky & Brill, 1983; McClosky & Zaller, 1984;) used the empirical post positivist paradigm and its assumptions in the field of political tolerance.

There are the general ontological and epistemological justifications for the use of the post-positivist paradigm in this study. According to the post-positivists' paradigm,

ontology is based on the assumption that "one reality exists and that it is the researcher's job to discover that reality." (Mertens, 2005: 11). Since the post positivists assume that the researcher is a human being, and for that reason, he is limited as far as what he can know, the researcher can discover a reality only within the limits of probability. Therefore, the post-positivist researcher cannot prove his claims and theories but rather can make a stronger case by eliminating alternative explanations (Mertens, 2005).

The political tolerance model in this study consists of the variables that were specified in previous research in the field as predictors of the political tolerance reality. Moreover, I am proposing to use additional religious variables in this study to predict political tolerance. Specifically, attitudes toward religious beliefs, Intrinsic/Extrinsic religious orientation, religious fundamentalism, religious quest, and social dominance orientation (SDO). The relationship between the independent variables above, and the dependent variable, political tolerance, will be determined within the limitations of probability.

According to the post-positivist paradigm, the epistemological assumption is that the researcher can strongly influence his study with his theories, hypotheses, and background knowledge (Mertens, 2005). Therefore, the standard for which to struggle when conducting this study is objectivity; and, to reduce the influence of my own bias and values on the research, I rigorously followed prescribed procedures.

The epistemological assumption of the post positivist paradigm are clear in this study because I used data collected through surveys filled out by American and Israeli Jews through a website. My attitudes and background knowledge have not influenced the responses of the respondent, since the survey employed used a fixed-response format for

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the questions. The data collection strategy which was used to gather original primary data using a survey with multiple choice questions, helped in conducting the research within the epistemological restriction.

Sampling

I drew a sample of individuals from two groups: Jews in the U.S. and Jews in Israel who were 18 years old or older, at the time of the study. Because it's impossible to do a simple random sampling, this study utilized a convenience sample. In order for the survey to be available for participants both in Israel and in the United States, I published the survey on a website, which was designed especially for the purpose of the survey.

People who do not have access to computers or don't know how to use a computer, but still wanted to fill out the survey got a printout of the survey as it appeared on the website. In order to reach more people, I employed snowball sampling strategy as well. I followed the recommendations of Monette, Sullivan and Dejong (2005) for a successful snowball sampling strategy. They explained that a snowball sampling strategy is practically connecting to participants who could lead me to more participants, and the latter to more leads, and so on. Using my connections in the Jewish communities both in the U.S. and in Israel, I have asked people, who are in Jewish social circles (for example, people whose email addresses are part of mailing lists of Jewish Federations, Synagogues, and other Jewish groups), to participate in the study.

Moreover, I asked the principal of the 'Hebrew Day School of Ann Arbor, Michigan' (HDS), where I was employed as a teacher between the years 2007-2009, to send an email on the school listeserv, asking the parents of students and alumni to

participate in the study. I also asked the head of the Agency of Jewish Learning (AJL) and the Hadassah Chapter in Pittsburgh, where I volunteered to ask Jewish people in their mailing list to complete the survey online. These steps explain the high socio-economic status people in the sample.

Furthermore, during the data collection phase of the study, I returned to Israel after spending 6 years in the U.S. Thus, I used the interest around me, and channeled it to ask people to participate in the study. I introduced my family and friends, who came to greet me, to the study and the survey. They gladly agreed to pass it to as many people as they could and asked them to fill out a survey. This explains the higher volume I had for the Israeli survey than the U.S. survey.

Ideally, a true probability sample would have been the best sampling design for this study. However, I was unable to obtain a probability sample because of time and financial limitations. In addition, people reported that the burden of filling out the survey was around an hour, instead of the 20-30 minutes promised in the letter attached to the survey. From some of the 103 participants in the U.S. and 347 participants in Israel, I heard that they did fill it out because it was interesting and due to the fact that they wanted to because they had been personally asked to participate by me or by someone else. I believe that my presence in Israel contributed to the motivation of more people in Israel to participate.

The responses I received were recorded using the statistical software program, SPSS, with the receiving date of the results. Responses returned from the U.S. to my mail between July 16, 2009 and September 8, 2009. By August 1, 2009, I had received 85% of the answers. From August 1st to September 8th, I received only 15% of the answers.

The responses I received in Israel started to return on July 14th, 2009 and ended in September 8th, 2009. After 13 days from the starting day, at July 25th, 51% of the answers accumulated in my inbox. From July 25th to September 8th, I received only a few answers a day.

Response rate can be higher for a shorter questionnaire, with a time burden of only a few minutes. However, I needed to include more questions than would be found in an ordinary political tolerance survey. This is because of: (a) the high number of "least-like" groups to which I referred in the surveys (6 in Israel and 9 in the U.S.), and (b) the additional religious measures added to the ordinary political tolerance survey.

Measurement

The questions for the survey used in this study have been borrowed from the General Social Survey (GSS), which is available with the questions over the web at the following address: http://www.norc.org/GSS+Website/Codebook/. I found it reasonable to use its measures since most of the researchers, who worked with secondary data, used the data from the GSS (Gibson, 1986, 2005a 2005b; Mondak & Senders, 2003, 2005). Others who collected data in one-on-one interviews used the same measures but with some adjustments made for their specific needs (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979; Sullivan, 1987; Sullivan & Marcus, 1988).

The survey employed in this study has two versions (See Appendix A and Appendix B). One survey is in Hebrew and the other is in English. One was administered in Israel, and one in the U.S. While differing in language, the two versions of the survey were coded in the same way. The Hebrew language survey's questions have been

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adjusted to be understood in the context of Israeli culture. For example, the participants were asked to give some specific facts about their level of education. The English question assessing Education asks: "What is the highest grade in elementary school or high school that you finished and got credit for?" The Hebrew version asks (translating back literally from Hebrew to English): "Which class did you finish?" While for an American I needed to specify the level of education, as to whether it was elementary or high school, and finishing is always with a credit; for Israelis I asked simply for the class graduated from with credit. The reason for the change is that many times in Israel, people are asked for the schooling years they completed, instead of what is the level you finished.

In addition, the question that asks about the participant's college degrees was modified too. Instead of asking for the Graduate degree, as in the U.S., the question refers to Masters or Doctorate degrees; I separated the two. I ask to specify the highest degree and give the options of Masters or Doctorate by calling them second and third degrees (as this is the way people refer to them in Israel).

In order to validate the questions, I talked to a number of Israelis, native speakers and experts in teaching Hebrew, who could verify the accurate meaning of the questions, and indicated that both surveys were equivalent although in different languages. In addition, I employed a double translation strategy by which I translated the survey to Hebrew. In other words, after translating it from English to Hebrew I had someone else translate it back to double check that the original meaning was retained. Also, the questions in Hebrew were composed to address both males and females (Hebrew has many literary, linguistic distinctions dealing with gender).

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Additional modification was done for the measure for social status/income. The respondents have to compare themselves to other families and assess their income. The assessment in America is valued in U. S. dollars. The Hebrew version utilizes the Israeli New Shekel (NIS). While the exchange rate varies from 3.5 shekels to 4.5 shekels to the dollar, I chose 4 NIS to the dollar (which is a common street value).

The participants were also asked to provide their month, day and year of birth. Using this information, I computed their ages in SPSS using the 'yrmoda' function. This helped me yield more accurate and precise age data. I have restricted the survey to 18 and up because in Israel only after the age of 18 can one vote, work, or be involved politically.

Participants were asked to answer questions in regard to their religion. In the English version, the question is: In what religion were you raised? I omitted the options of the different branches of Christianity (Catholic, Protestant, etc.) and left the three main religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Muslim, along with the option to mark "other" religion or "not applicable." In the Israeli study, the meaning stays the same for applicants who are Catholic, Protestant, etc.; thus, all coded as Christians in the Israeli survey. The option of "Native-American" was omitted from the Hebrew version with no substitute, because it is irrelevant to the Israeli demographic.

The religious options for the different streams of Judaism in the U.S. (for example, Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform) were chosen according to the U.S. Religious Landscape Survey. According to the Religious Landscape survey, which sampled 35,000 Americans, Jews constitute 1.7% of the population; of these, 0.7% are Reform; 0.5%, Conservative; less then 0.3%, Orthodox; and the other 0.2% are in other

Jewish groups or are unaffiliated. Thus, the Jewish categories in the U.S. are Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Unaffiliated. For the Israeli survey the options are: Orthodox/Haredie, Religious/Datie Leumie, Traditionist/Masortie, and practice very little Judaism/Hilonie.

The measure "Race" while used in the literature review was omitted from my survey. According to the U.S. Religious Landscape Survey 95% of Jews are Whites and only 2% are of "other" race, 1% are Black and 2% of American Jews are from the Hispanic ethnic group. Thus, Race is almost a constant when measuring Jewish people in the U.S.

Demographic Measures

The survey was constructed to contain the following demographic measures; education, gender, income, social status, religion, level of religiosity, affiliation, region, size of community, and age. It is also contains the scales of political tolerance, attitudes toward religious beliefs, intrinsic-extrinsic religious orientation, a quest orientation to religion, fundamentalism, and SDO.

Education was measured using 3 questions. The first question asked for the "highest grade in elementary, school or high school" the respondent finished. The second question asked for the respondent's years of college, if any. The third question asked if the respondent had any college degree or degrees and for its level. These questions were adopted from the GSS survey.

For the variable *Gender*, I simply asked for the respondent's gender, providing the options: Male/Female.

Income was measured by asking for the total income of the respondent family before tax for the last year. This question was used in the GSS survey as well, yet, I computed a new income variable by using the next question regarding the family's expenses that same year. The new computed variable was recoded into an interval scale from low income level to a very high income level. Standardizing the income level corrected the situation that high salary is detached from the expenses, since a high salary in one place is considered low in another place and vice versa.

Social Status was measured with a set of 5 questions used in the GSS survey. These questions inquire about the level of satisfaction with the present financial situation, the perception of the past few years' financial situation, and the respondent's perception of his family's financial situation compared with other families in general. In the other questions, the respondent was required to indicate "what would be the smallest amount of income per month" his household needed, and for "the amount of money a family of four," needs each week to get along in his community. Answers computed into new social status variable using a Likert scale. A lower score reflected lower status.

Religion was elicited using the question "In what religion were you raised?" with Jewish, Christian, Muslim and other (with a blank) as the options. This question was used in the GSS survey. However I chose to add the question "Do you consider yourself to be Jewish?" with the options "Yes" or "No" since a person can be raised Jewish but not consider himself to be Jewish as an adult.

Level of Religiosity was measured by the question "How often do you attend religious services?" with the options of "Never" to "Several times a week." This question was used in the GSS survey.

Affiliation was measured by the question: "What is your affiliation?" and the options are: "Orthodox." "Conservative," "Reform," "Unaffiliated," "Other" or "Not applicable."

Region was measured by the question: "What state or foreign country were you living in when you were 16 years old?" The respondent needed to write the state or the foreign country in the space. This question was used in the GSS survey.

Size of Community was measured by asking the respondent to indicate the closest category to the type of place he was living in when he was 16 years old. The option goes from "open country" to "a large city (over 250,000)." This question was used in the GSS survey.

Age is indicated by asking for the date of birth with indication of month, day, and year of birth. I used the SPSS function "yrmoda" to compute the age. I had calculated the respondent's age from October, 1995, as the function "yrmoda" required and only then to calculate the difference to the time of the survey and get the gap from the respondent's birthday to October, 1995, to get the exact age.

Attitudes toward religious beliefs, was measured by 4 items compiled into a Likert Scale. Participants rate their level of agreement or disagreement with given statements with options ranging from 1="strongly agree" to 5="strongly disagree." This measure was used by Rowatt, Franklin and Cotton (2005) and by Francis and Stubbs (1987). Lower scores reflect higher levels of religious beliefs.

Intrinsic-Extrinsic religious orientation, was measured by 13 items combined to a Likert Scale. Participants rate their level of agreement or disagreement with the statements from 1="strongly agree" to 5="strongly disagree." This measure was used by

the key studies in the field, such as Kirkpatrick (1989), and Gorsuch and McPherson (1989). Lower score reflect a higher intrinsic orientation, whereas higher scores reflect a more extrinsic orientation.

A Quest orientation to religion was measured by a 5-items scale that creates a Likert Scale. Participants rate their level of agreement or disagreement with the statements from 1="strongly agree" to 5="strongly disagree." This scale was used by Baston and Ventis (1982) and also by Kojetin et al. (1987). Lower scores reflect higher levels of quest.

Fundamentalism, was measured by a 6 item Likert Scale. Participants rate their level of agreement or disagreement with the statements from 1="strongly agree" to 5="strongly disagree". This scale was developed by McFarland (1989), and was later used by Kirkpatrick (1989). Lower scores reflect higher levels of fundamentalism.

SDO, was measured by a 14-item Likert Scale. Participants rate their level of agreement or disagreement with the statements from 1="strongly agree" to 5="strongly disagree." This scale was used by Paratto et al. (1994) and Rowatt, Franklin and Cotton (2005). Lower score reflect a higher level of SDO.

Political tolerance toward the different religious groups was measured by 3 scales, with 7 items each, adapted from Stouffer (1963). Participants have to indicate if they favor specific actions or not for each one of the 7 items in the scales. Higher score reflected higher level of political tolerance.

In terms of reliability and validity, the advantage of quantitative methods is that the observations and the measurement tool are systematic. Mertens (2005) argues that "the more reliable the measurement, the closer the researcher can arrive at a true estimate

of the attribute addressed by the measure" (p. 346). I use established measures for most of the variables in this study, most of which have excellent face and content validity. Moreover, the reliability of the various scales has been demonstrated using an internal consistency approach (see complete survey in Appendix).

<center>Procedures</center>

The first statistical procedure employed is the univariate analysis through which I describe the Israeli and the U.S. samples. Since I did not have a probability sample, I compared the means of each of the samples with the means of the parameters in the population in order to find similarities between them. This analysis determined whether or not generalizations to the Jewish population in Israel and America could be made.

A multiple regression analysis was used in this study. I have used it to determine which hypotheses are supported. According to Berry and Sanders (2000) and Monette, Sullivan and Dejong (2005) regression is used to estimate the change in the dependent variable associated with a given change in an independent variable when the other independent variables in the regression model are held constant.

In constructing the multivariate regression equation, I satisfied several assumptions for the analysis. According to Berry and Sanders (2000) and Monette, Sullivan and Dejong (2005), all independent variables should be measured at the interval level or need to be dichotomous. In addition, the dependent variable (namely, political tolerance) should be measured at the interval level. Although my scales are all ordinal, I treated them as if they were interval, which is common practice in the social sciences. I also assumed that the variables in the model are measured with no measurement error. I

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have to assume that people have an opinion and that they self-report it as truthfully as possible in the survey as suggested by Barry and Sanders (2000), and that the effect of the independent variables on political tolerance is linear. Further, I assumed the error term (e_i) is completely uncorrelated with each independent variable, and the effects of all independent variables on political tolerance are additive.

Summary

In this chapter I described, explained and justified the methods I employed to test the hypotheses. I have described the sampling strategy, and the way I measured each of the variables. In the following chapter, I begin by describing the sample through a univariate analysis of the variables used in the study. Next, I use multivariate analysis to explore the strength and specific effect each one of the variables has on political tolerance.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

Introduction

In this chapter I present frequency distributions, which describe the Israeli and the American samples. In addition, I compare the two samples with data about the population in Israel and the U.S. By doing so, I try to compensate for not having a probability sample. This chapter shows dissimilarities between the sample estimates and the population parameters, therefore, the results described in this chapter are valid for the sample from which the data was drawn but cannot be generalized to the Jewish populations in Israel or U.S.

The chapter is structured as follows; I start by presenting univariate descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. I then report the results of the multivariate analyses to test the hypotheses articulated in the second chapter, which controls for potential sources of spuriousness. Last, I examine the results from the two samples, one from Israel and the other from the U.S., in order to discover more about the political tolerance of Jews in both countries.

Univariate Analysis

The Israeli Jews

In this section I describe the Israeli sample in terms of the variables of the study. Table 1 displays a profile of all the variables used in the survey for the Israeli sample. Just over one-third of the sample was male; around two-thirds were females. The average age was 48. Although 88% finished high school, 12% studied less then 12 years. A third

of the participants (33%) who have College degree have a Bachelor degree, 26% have

Graduate degree, and 41% of the participants do not have a College degree.

Table 1
Univariate Statistics for the Israeli Sample

Sociodemographic variables	Percent	Mean	Standard Deviation	Valid Cases
Gender				(342)
Male	36%	--	--	
Female	64%	--	--	
Age	--	47.6	14.8	(304)
High School Education				(347)
Less than H.S	12%	--	--	
Finish 12th Grd.	88%	--	--	
College Education				(347)
Bachelor	33%	--	--	
Graduate	26%	--	--	
No Degree	41%	--	--	
Income	--	-.74	1.59	(347)
Social Status	--	5.24	1.59	(347)
Stream				(336)
Haredim	3.3%	--	--	
Datiem	7.4%	--	--	
Masortiem	31.5%	--	--	
Hilonim	56%	--	--	
Other	.3%	--	--	
Not Applic.	1.5%	--	--	
Jewish	99.7%	--	--	(347)
Raised Jewish	98.8%	--	--	(347)
Religiosity	--	4.44	2.4	(331)
Size of Community	--	4.55	1.3	(344)
Attitude	--	7.02	3.5	(323)
Intrinsic– Extrinsic	--	4.61	5.2	(296)
Quest	--	16.77	5.2	(306)
Fundamentalism	--	22.1	9.6	(315)
SDO	--	28.16	9.1	(282)

Hilonim, the least Orthodox religious group, constitute just over half of the

respondents with 56%. The smallest group in the sample is the Haredim (most Orthodox)

with 3.3% of the respondents. The Masortiem is comparatively a big group, with 31.5%

of the participants, and 7.4% of the participants were Datiem. Most of the participants

were Jewish (99.7%), and 98.9% were raised as Jewish.

American Jews

Table 2 presents the profile of the participants in the Survey administered in

America. The table shows that there are more female then male participants in the survey,

with 59% female and 41% male. The average age is 52.1 years old. Almost all of the

participants graduated from high school (97%), while only 3% studied less then 12 years.

Most of the participants have a Graduate Degree (68%), while 26% have a Bachelor's

degree. A small segment of the Americans (6%) do not have a College degree.

Table 2
Univariate Statistics for the American Sample

Sociodemographic variables	Percent	Mean	Standard Deviation	Valid Cases
Gender				(100)
Male	41%	--	--	
Female	59%	--	--	
Age	--	52.1	15.1	(85)
High School Education				(102)
Less than H.S	3%	--	--	
Finish 12th Grd.	97%	--	--	
College Education				(102)
Bachelor	26%	--	--	
Graduate	68%	--	--	
No Degree	6%	--	--	
Income	--	-.16	1.55	(100)
Social Status	--	4.88	1.55	(100)
Stream				(103)
Orthodox	16.5%	--	--	
Conservative	52.4%	--	--	
Reform	19.4%	--	--	
Unaffiliated	11.7%	--	--	
Jewish	100%	--	--	(103)
Raised Jewish	88.3%	--	--	(103)
Religiosity	--	5.29	2.13	(100)
Size of Community	--	4.94	2.4	(84)
Attitude	--	7.1	3.4	(93)
Intrinsic– Extrinsic	--	1.42	5.6	(84)
Quest	--	12.83	3.08	(92)
Fundamentalism	--	23.07	6.38	(94)
SDO	--	25.47	8.21	(90)

The most common religious group in my sample is the Conservative, with 52.4% of the participants. Reform, Orthodox, and Unaffiliated groups were distributed almost evenly, with 19.4%, 15.5%, and 11.7% respectively. Although 88.3% were raised Jewish, 100% of the participants consider themselves Jewish.

A Comparison Between Israeli and American Jews

The data gathered from Israeli Jews, and the data gathered from American Jews include the same variables, yet in different contexts and in distant continents. Despite the fact that the surveys were conducted in two different contexts and had different sample sizes (103 participants for the American survey, and 347 for the Israeli survey), there are similar distributions on a number of the variables. Due to differences in distributions on some variables, however, it cannot be argued that the American and the Israeli samples come from the same population.

Although strictly speaking, significance tests are unnecessary and inappropriate with non-probability samples, I conducted significance tests to see whether differences and effects would have been statistically significant if I had been able to draw probability samples. Therefore, independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare the interval/ratio variables (age, income, social status, religiosity, size of community, attitude, intrinsic–extrinsic, quest, fundamentalism, SDO), and chi-square tests for the categorical variables (gender, education, Jewish, raised Jewish). Table 3 shows chi-square and t-tests that assess the comparability of the two samples on variables common to both surveys.

Table 3
T-tests and Chi Square Significance Test to Compare the Israeli and the U.S. Samples

Sociodemographic variables	Mean Differences (Isr/U.S)	T(df)	Significance (two-tailed)	Chi-Square value X^2(df)	N=Sample size	P value
Gender		--	--	.48(1)	(440)	.488
Age	(47.5/52.1)4.6	-2.5(387)	.013**	--	--	--
High School Educ		--	--	6.97(1)	(442)	.008**
College Education		--	--	197.31(2)	(298)	.000**
Income	(.7/.1).58	-3.2(166)	.001**	--	--	--
Social Status	(5.2/4.8).4	2.2(446)	.028**	--	--	--
Jewish		--	--	.29(1)	(440)	.585
Raised Jewish		--	--	16.03(1)	(448)	.000**
Religiosity	(4.4/5.1).7	-2.7(427)	.007**	--	--	--
Size of Community	(4.5/5).5	-3.9(239)	.000**	--	--	--
Attitude	(7/7.1).1	-.17(152)	.861	--	--	--
Intrinsic– Extrinsic	(4.6/1.4)3.2	4.6(127)	.000**	--	--	--
Quest	(16.7/12.8)3.9	6.8(396)	.000**	--	--	--
Fundamentalism	(22.1/23.1)1	-1.2(235)	.219	--	--	--
SDO	(28.1/25.4)2.7	2.4(370)	.013**	--	--	--

*Statistically significant at .10 level.
**Statistically significant at .05 level

Table 3 shows that the gender distribution in the two samples is fairly similar, and

not significantly different, X^2(1, N=440)=.48, p=.488, with 5% more females in the

Israeli sample (64%) than in the U.S. sample (59%).

The average age of the participants in the Israeli sample (52.1) is significantly

higher than in the U.S. sample (47.6), whereas the U.S. sample has a slightly higher

average level of education with 9% more having at least a college education (97% in the

U.S. sample versus 88% in the Israeli sample). The average income level and the average

social status are significantly higher for the Israeli sample than for the U.S. sample, although the differences are not large. The participants in America are somewhat more religious than the Israeli respondents, with mean religiosity score of 5.29 versus 4.44. Interestingly, 99.8% of the participants in Israel were raised Jewish versus 88.3% of the participants in the U.S., a difference that would be significantly different if the samples had been probability samples. The percentage of participants that are Jewish is virtually identical in the two samples (100% in the U.S. sample and 99.7% in the Israeli sample). Almost all of the respondents identified as Jewish.

The average size of the community is slightly higher in the U.S. sample (4.94 versus 4.55). The samples also differed with regard to the following variables: intrinsic/extrinsic, quest, and SDO. Specifically, the U.S. sample scored lower on the intrinsic/extrinsic scale, the quest scale, and the SDO scale than Jews living in Israeli.

Participants from both countries demonstrate similar attitudes toward religious beliefs. The American average on religious attitudes of 7.1 is very similar to the Israeli average of 7.02. Also, the level of Fundamentalism in both countries is very similar, with an average of 23.1 in America and 22.1 in Israel.

<center>External Validity of the Israeli and the U.S. Samples</center>

In this section of the study I compare the two samples to data from the population in Israel and the U.S. in an attempt to ascertain how representative my convenience samples are of their respective populations. Because there are some differences between the samples and the populations from which they are drawn, inferences to the populations need to be considered as tentative and made with caution.

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Israeli Jews

In Israel there are two main institutions that produce data in regards to the Israeli population. The first one is The Guttmann Institute, and the second one is the Governmental central bureau of statistics. Although the central bureau of statistics' data is transparent, the Guttmann's one is restricted. I found a reliable source for the Guttmann's data at the AviChai foundation, a well known foundation in Israel and in the U.S. As shown in Table 4, according to AviChai's data, collected by the Guttmann Institute at 1999, there are 5% Haredim, 12% Datiem, 35% Masortiem, and 48% Hiloniem in Israel. The Jewish population's religiosity is split into 16% very observant, 20% somewhat observant, 43% are low observant, 21% are not observant at all. Moreover, 65% of all Jewish Israelis believe in God.

The affiliation of the respondents I surveyed in Israel indicates 3.3% Haredim, 7.4% Datiem, 31.5% Masortiem, and 56.3% Hilonim, which is a similar but not exact distribution to the population. Also, 14.2% are not observant, 54.1% are low observant, 9.1% report that they are somewhat observant, and 22.7% are very observant of the Jewish religion. This distribution is fairly similar to the population distribution, although the sample has 7% fewer individuals who not observant and 7% more individuals who are very observant. Fully 67.2% of the respondents indicate that they believe in God, which is a similar rate as in the population (65%).

As shown in Table 4 and reported by the Israeli census of 2008, there are 49.3% males, and 50.7% females in the country. By comparison, females were overrepresented in my sample, with 64% being female and 36% male. The average monthly income for males is 12012 NIS, while it is 11256 NIS for females in Israel, which is much higher

than in my sample; 4000 for females and 4416 NIS for males. The average number of

years of schooling in Israel is 12.6 for males and 12.7 for females. The average number

of years of schooling is significantly higher in my sample than for the broader Israeli

population, with an average of 15.0 for males and 15.3 for females. Therefore, my sample

is more affluent than the population, which is logical given my sampling process.

Table 4
Frequency Distribution and Means for the Israeli Sample and the Israeli Population

	Current Sample	Population	The Percentage Difference
Religious Group			
Haredim	3.3%	5%	1.7%
Datiem	7.4%	12%	4.6%
Masortiem	31.5%	35%	3.5%
Hilonim	56.3%	48%	8.3%
Sex			
Male	36%	49.3%	13.3%
Female	64%	50.7%	13.3%
Educational level			
Mean Years - Male	15.0 Years	12.6 Years	2.4 years
Mean Years -Female	15.25 years	12.7 Years	2.5 years
Monthly Income			
Male	4416NIS	12012NIS	36%
Female	4000NIS	11256NIS	35%
How Observant is Respondent			
Not Observant	14.2%	21%	6.8%
Low Observant	54.1%	43%	11.1%
Somewhat Observant	9.1%	20%	10.9%
Very Observant	22.7%	16%	6.7%
Believe in God	67.2%	65%	2.2%

According to table 4, the gap between the values of income, the gender

distribution, and years of education in my sample and the population parameters is higher

than the gap between the religious variables for the same samples. The largest differences

between the sample and the population are the greater percentage of females in the

sample, and the sample's higher average level of education and socioeconomic status.

American Jews

I found two reliable sources that describe the Jewish population in America. The

first is the U.S. Religious Landscape Survey (RLS), and the second one is the General

Social Survey (GSS).

The Jewish population in America according to the RLS is about 5 million people

out of approximately 300 million American, which represents about 1.7% of the entire

U.S. population. The Jewish people in the U.S. are divided religiously into Orthodox with

.3%, Reform with .7%, Conservative with .5%, and Unaffiliated with any of the above

with .2%. As shown in Table 5, the distribution of the Jewish people percentage wise, out

of the entire Jewish population in the U.S., is Orthodox 17.6%, Conservative 29.4%,

Reform 41.1%, and Unaffiliated 11.9%. In my U.S. sample the percentage of Orthodox

and unaffiliated are nearly identical to the distribution of Jewish groups in the U.S.

population. The sample contains 23% more Conservative Jews; however, and 22% fewer

Reformed Jews.

Furthermore, according to the RLS, the percentage of Jewish people in the

population who report that they believe in God is 83%, while 10% don't believe in God,

and 7% don't know. These percentages are somewhat similar to my sample, although the

sample respondents are slightly less likely to believe in God (75% believe in God; 25%

do not).

According to the GSS, 41% of the Jewish people in the U.S. are males, and 59% are females, which is the same sex distribution that I obtained in my sample. The sample was virtually identical to the population with regard to the percentage who lived in a big city (250,000+) at the age of 16 (37% in the sample; 36% in the population). On average, the respondents in my sample were slightly more educated, with an average of 17.5 years versus the population average of 16.2 years of education.

According to table 5, which compares the population's parameters with the sample values, the differences in the demographics and level of religiosity are slight. The only moderate bias pertains to religious affiliation.

Table 5
Frequency Distribution and Means for American Sample and the U.S. Population

	Current Sample	Population's Percent	The Percentage Difference
Religious Group		17.6%	1.1%
Orthodox	16.5%		
Conservative	52.4%	29.4%	23%
Reform	19.4%	41.1%	21.7%
Unaffiliated	11.7%	11.9%	.2%
Gender			
Male	41%	41%	0%
Female	59%	59%	0%
			1.24
Average Years of School	17.45	16.21	
Lived in Big City at Age 16	36.9%	35.9%	1%
Believe in God	75%	83%	8%
Do Not Believe in God	25%	10%	15%
Don't know	0%	7%	7%

In conclusion, both the Israeli and the American surveys are a good starting point for the understanding of the political tolerance of Jewish people in Israel and in the U.S. The American sample has a closer correspondence to the demographic parameters of the

U.S. population, while the Israeli sample has less resemblance to the demographic parameters.

In summary, the samples I collected are only marginally representative of the populations they were drawn from due to differences in demographics between each sample and its population. As a result, generalizations to Israeli and American Jews must be made with caution.

Multivariate Analysis

Introduction

In this section I present the results of the multiple regression analyses, in which I provide an exploratory test of the model of political tolerance developed in the literature review chapter. Specifically, I attempt to identify what independent variables are predictive of political tolerance toward each of the religious groups in both the Israeli and U.S. samples.

Descriptive Statistics for the Israeli Sample

Table 6 presents bivariate Pearson's correlations among the variables used in the multivariate analyses for the political tolerance of Hilonim. Religiosity is weakly to strongly, positively correlated with education, attitudes toward religious beliefs, quest, and fundamentalism. Specifically, as the respondents increase in levels of religiosity they report higher level of education, (.10), higher attitudes toward religious beliefs (.41), more quest (.10), and have higher levels of fundamentalism (.55). Income is modestly and negatively correlated with level of education (-.12), but positively correlated with age

(.19), religious beliefs (.11), and SDO (.19). As the level of income increase, the level of age increase and the level of education decreases. In addition, as income increase, the level of religious beliefs and SDO increases as well. Education is moderately correlated with age (-.3), and fundamentalism (-.25), and modestly correlated with size of community (.21), religious beliefs (-.22), and SDO (-.12). Age is weakly, although significantly correlated with size of community (-.14), non-rural (-.13), religious beliefs (.17), and fundamentalism (.13). Gender is negatively and modestly correlated with size of community (-.09). Size of community is significantly and strongly correlated with rural variable (.38). Religious beliefs is very strongly correlated with fundamentalism (.71), and modestly correlated with quest (.14), and SDO (.25). As religious beliefs increase, the level of quest, fundamentalism, and SDO increases as well. Intrinsic/extrinsic orientation is moderately correlated with SDO (.27). Individuals with an extrinsic orientation tend to have higher levels of SDO. Quest is moderately associated with SDO (.36), and modestly associated with fundamentalism (.18). As Quest goes up, levels of fundamentalism and SDO also tend to go up as well. Finally, fundamentalism and SDO are moderately correlated (.31) in a positive direction. When the level of fundamentalism is high, SDO levels are more likely to be high as well.

Because of the strong associations of some of the religious variables, in particular fundamentalism with religiosity, and religious beliefs, I will have to be concerned with the issue of multicollinearity. It will be difficult to ascertain which specific dimensions of religiosity are predictive of political tolerance, although I will be able to ascertain whether religious indicators are predictive of political tolerance in general.

Table 6

Pearson's Correlations Among the Variables used in the Multivariate Analysis: Israeli Sample

Israeli sample	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.
1.	1.00																	
2.	**.579****	1.00																
	(300)																	
3.	**.404****	**.671****	1.00															
	(219)	**(205)**																
4.	.063	**.174***	**.468****	1.00														
	(137)	**(123)**	**(42)**															
5.	**.296****	**.364****	**.369****	**.304****	1.00													
	(325)	**(311)**	**(230)**	**(148)**														
6.	342**	**.272****	**.210****	**.192****	**.681****	1.00												
	(325)	**(311)**	**(230)**	**(148)**	**(347)**													
7.	**.26****	**.149****	**.121***	**-.197****	**-.263****	**-.161****	1.00											
	(315)	**(301)**	**(225)**	**(143)**	**(331)**	**(331)**												
8.	-.046	-.025	**-.129***	.081	-.056	-.06	-.001	1.00										
	(325)	(311)	**(230)**	(148)	(347)	(347)	(331)											
9.	.026	.072	**.272****	.009	**.166****	**.184****	**.103***	**-.128****	1.00									
	(322)	(308)	**(228)**	(147)	**(342)**	**(342)**	**(327)**	**(342)**										
10.	.026	-.074	-.078	.001	**-.124***	-.04	-.055	**.196****	**-.305****	1.00								
	(285)	(273)	(200)	(129)	(304)	(290)	(290)	**(304)**	**(301)**									
11.	.08	.063	-.067	**-.229****	-.011	.041	.03	.043	-.039	.015	1.00							
	(321)	(307)	(228)	**(146)**	(342)	(342)	(327)	(342)	(338)	(301)								
12.	.05	.054	-.038	-.066	.053	.046	.069	.066	**.21****	**-.149****	**-.098***	1.00						
	(323)	(309)	(230)	(146)	(344)	(344)	(329)	(344)	**(340)**	**(302)**	**(340)**							
13.	.034	-.061	**-.147***	-.136	.095	.065	-.034	-.014	.021	**-.132***	-.033	**.386****	1.00					
	(221)	(208)	**(160)**	(103)	(233)	(233)	(229)	(233)	(230)	**(204)**	(230)	**(232)**						
14.	**.174****	.039	-.102	**-.177***	**-.431****	**-.294****	**.413****	**.116***	**-.224****	**.152****	.062	-.033	-.029	1.00				
	(307)	(279)	(218)	**(138)**	**(323)**	**(323)**	**(313)**	**(323)**	**(319)**	**(287)**	(319)	(321)	(223)					
15.	-.038	.001	**.19***	.087	-.105	-.016	-.126	.049	-.057	**.179***	-.056	-.095	-.021	-.061	1.00			
	(155)	(148)	**(80)**	(107)	(166)	(166)	(160)	(166)	(166)	**(150)**	(162)	(164)	(112)	(160)				
16.	**.108***	**.095***	**.201****	.09	**.117***	.088	**.109***	.067	.042	.031	.052	.005	.023	**.14****	.092	1.00		
	(325)	**(311)**	**(230)**	(148)	**(347)**	(347)	**(331)**	(347)	(342)	(304)	(342)	(344)	(233)	**(323)**	(166)			
17.	**.249****	-.006	**-.126***	**-.364****	**-.455****	**-.294****	**.553****	.04	**-.255****	**.139***	.068	.013	.035	**.71****	-.121	**.187****	1.00	
	(300)	(285)	**(208)**	**(139)**	**(315)**	**(315)**	**(304)**	(315)	**(310)**	**(279)**	(310)	(312)	(216)	**(304)**	(161)	**(315)**		
18.	.064	-.002	.095	.063	**-.215****	**-.106***	.047	**.19****	**-.126***	.061	.014	.009	-.044	**.251****	**.279****	**.361****	**.311****	1.00
	(271)	(260)	(185)	(122)	**(283)**	**(283)**	(274)	**(283)**	**(279)**	(254)	(279)	(281)	(196)	**(277)**	**(147)**	**(283)**	**(270)**	

*P<.05 (1-tailed), **P<.01 (1-tailed)

1. = Political Tolerance toward Haredim　　　2. = Political Tolerance toward Datiem　　　3. = Political Tolerance toward Masortiem　　　4. = Political Tolerance toward Hilonim
5. = Political Tolerance toward Christians　　6. = Political Tolerance toward Muslims　　　7. = Religiosity　　　8. = Level of Income
9. = Level of Education　　　10. = Age　　　11. = Gender　　　12. = Size of Community
13. = Rural/non-Rural　　　14. = Religious Beliefs　　　15. = Intrinsic/Extrinsic　　　16. = Quest
17. = Fundamentalism　　　18. = SDO

Descriptive Statistics for the U.S. Sample

Table 7 presents bivariate Pearson's correlations among the variables used in the multivariate analyses for the U.S. sample. Religiosity is moderately to strongly, positively correlated with males, size of community, religious beliefs, and fundamentalism. Religiosity is moderately and negatively correlated with income. Specifically, as the respondents increase in levels of religiosity they report as males (.31), higher size of community (.17), higher attitudes toward religious beliefs (.43), higher levels of fundamentalism (.43), and have lower level of income (-.21). Income is modestly correlated with females (-.2), and positively with SDO (.22). Age is moderately, although significantly correlated with size of community (.2), and negatively with fundamentalism (-.19). Gender is positively and moderately correlate with rural (.21), religious beliefs (.3), fundamentalism (.2), and negatively with SDO (-.22). Size of community is significantly and strongly correlated with rural variable (.59), and moderately with SDO (.29). Rural is negatively and moderately correlated with quest (-.22). Religious beliefs is very strongly correlated with fundamentalism (.63), and moderately correlated with intrinsic/extrinsic orientation (-.30). As religious beliefs increase, the level of fundamentalism, and extrinsic increases as well. Finally, intrinsic/extrinsic orientation is moderately but negatively correlated with fundamentalism (-.28), and positively correlated with SDO (.37). Individuals with an extrinsic orientation tend to have higher levels of SDO and lower level of fundamentalism.

Multicollinearity is a concern for the U.S. data as well. Strong associations were found in particular with fundamentalism and religiosity, and religious beliefs. Again, I will be able to ascertain whether religious indicators are predictive of political tolerance in general, although it may be difficult to determine which religious variables are the best predictors.

Table 7

Pearson's Correlations Among the Variables used in the Multivariate Analysis: American Sample

US sample	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
1.	1.00								
2.	**.847****	1.00							
	(33)								
3.	**.767****	**.771****	1.00						
	(65)	**(31)**							
4.	**.699****	**.721****	**.766****	1.00					
	(74)	**(40)**	**(72)**						
5.	**.517****	**.542****	**.606****	**.597****	1.00				
	(84)	**(50)**	**(82)**	**(91)**					
6.	**.522****	**.606****	**.491****	**.626****	**.623****	1.00			
	(84)	**(50)**	**(82)**	**(91)**	**(101)**				
7.	**.555****	**.558****	**.539****	**.655****	**.737****	**.782****	1.00		
	(84)	**(50)**	**(82)**	**(91)**	**(101)**	**(101)**			
8.	**.527****	**.484****	**.444****	**.6****	**.604****	**.69****	**.791****	1.00	
	(84)	**(50)**	**(82)**	**(91)**	**(101)**	**(101)**	**(101)**		
9.	**.436****	**.366****	**.366****	**.568****	**.687****	**.607****	**.795****	**.732****	1.00
	(84)	**(50)**	**(82)**	**(91)**	**(101)**	**(101)**	**(101)**	**(101)**	
10.	.074	.128	-.123	-.029	**-.211***	-.031	**-.145**	.043	-.088
	(82)	(48)	(79)	(88)	**(98)**	98	**(98)**	(98)	(98)
11.	-.025	-.077	.009	-.021	-.035	-.079	**-.018**	-.088	-.081
	(84)	(82)	(82)	(91)	(101)	(101)	**(101)**	(101)	(101)
12.	-.134	-.139	-.147	-.125	**-.241****	**-.232***	**-.237****	**-.259****	**-.238****
	(82)	(50)	(79)	(89)	**(98)**	**(98)**	**(98)**	**(98)**	**(98)**
13.	.089	-.128	**.261***	**.2***	**.183***	**.231***	**.208***	.125	.116
	(72)	(42)	**(66)**	**(78)**	**(85)**	**(85)**	**(85)**	(85)	(85)
14.	.017	.13	**-.187***	-.026	-.044	.049	.098	.154	.093
	(81)	(50)	**(79)**	(88)	(98)	(98)	(98)	(98)	(98)
15.	-.063	-.153	-.113	.019	-.007	.04	-.015	-.069	-.042
	(84)	(50)	(82)	(91)	(101)	(101)	(101)	(101)	(101)
16.	-.009	**-.252***	-.118	.09	.106	.106	.112	.136	.173
	(75)	**(44)**	(71)	(81)	(89)	(89)	(89)	(89)	(89)
17.	**.24***	.093	**-.264***	**-.349****	**-.177****	-.108	**-.266****	-.112	**-.41****
	(77)	(47)	**(77)**	**(84)**	**(94)**	(94)	**(94)**	(94)	**(94)**
18.	-.04	.11	.215	.193	**.295****	**.237***	**.365****	**.323****	**.254***
	(58)	(33)	(57)	(64)	**(70)**	**(70)**	**(70)**	**(70)**	**(70)**
19.	-.142	**-.278***	-.049	-.025	.096	.046	.053	.037	.114
	(76)	**(48)**	(75)	(83)	(93)	(93)	(93)	(93)	(93)
20.	**.284****	.078	**-.248***	**-.205***	**-.178***	-.07	**-.25****	-.021	**-.323****
	(78)	(47)	**(78)**	**(86)**	**(95)**	(95)	**(95)**	(95)	**(95)**
21.	.027	.214	**.316****	**.276****	.131	.037	.178	**.192***	**.193***
	(70)	(43)	**(69)**	**(75)**	(85)	(85)	(85)	**(85)**	**(85)**

	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.	20.	21.
1.												
2.												
3.												
4.												
5.												
6.												
7.												
8.												
9.												
10.	1.00											
11.	**-.211*** **(98)**	1.00										
12.	.055 (95)	.032 (98)	1.00									
13.	-.127 (82)	.007 (85)	-.073 (83)	1.00								
14.	**.315*** **(95)**	**-.201*** **(98)**	.149 (95)	-.123 (82)	1.00							
15.	**.178*** **(98)**	-.059 (101)	.084 (98)	**.203*** **(85)**	.151 (98)	1.00						
16.	-.087 (88)	.028 (89)	.008 (86)	.064 (74)	**.215*** **(88)**	**.597*** **(89)**	1.00					
17.	**.438*** **(91)**	-.057 (94)	-.163 (91)	-.024 (79)	**.303*** **(91)**	.065 (94)	-.1 (82)	1.00				
18.	-.548 (70)	.179 (70)	-.142 (69)	.107 (60)	-.099 (69)	-.043 (70)	.168 (64)	**-.307*** **(68)**	1.00			
19.	.168 (90)	.09 (93)	-.056 (90)	.156 (78)	-.02 (90)	-.004 (93)	**-.226*** **(82)**	.044 (91)	-.137 (68)	1.00		
20.	**.434*** **(92)**	-.087 (95)	-.033 (92)	**-.193*** **(79)**	**.202*** **(92)**	-.003 (95)	.05 (84)	**.636*** **(92)**	**-.289*** **(67)**	-.033 (91)	1.00	
21.	-.229 (83)	**.223*** **(85)**	-.143 (70)	-.021 (83)	**-.227*** **(83)**	**-.294*** **(85)**	-.191 (75)	-.124 (82)	**.377*** **(60)**	.067 (83)	.025 (83)	1.00

*P<.05 (1-tailed), **P<.01 (1-tailed)

1. = Political Tolerance toward Orthodox
2. = Political Tolerance toward Conservatives
3. = Political Tolerance toward Reform
4. = Political Tolerance toward Unaffiliated
5. = Political Tolerance toward Catholics
6. = Political Tolerance toward Mainline Protestants
7. = Political Tolerance toward ECP
8. = Political Tolerance toward Orthodox Christian
9. = Political Tolerance toward Muslims
10. = Religiosity
11. = Level of Income
12. = Level of Education
13. = Age
14. = Gender
15. = Size of Community
16. = Rural/non-Rural
17. = Religious Beliefs
18. = Intrinsic/Extrinsic
19. = Quest
20. = Fundamentalism
21.= SDO

Results of the Multiple Regressions

In this section, I report the results of the multivariate analyses. I will test the hypotheses in a rigorous fashion by controlling for other potential predictors, which will control for potential sources of spuriousness. Specifically, I will regress political tolerance toward each religious group, the dependent variables, on the predictor variables in a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regressions. Diagnostics for multicollinearity will be used by obtaining tolerances and VIFs (the reciprocal of tolerance) for each predictor in each equation. This series of equations will constitute multivariate tests of hypotheses 1 through 12. For each one of the models I had to make sure that the number of cases is times ten the number of variables. I had to adjust the number of variables and eliminate the ones that were not significant. I also had to exclude respondents who were from the religious group that was being assessed with regard to political tolerance, which resulted in varying sample sizes across the multivariate equations. For example, when predicting political tolerance toward the Haredim, the Haredim respondents were excluded.

Israeli Survey

Political Tolerance Toward Haredim

As shown in Table 8, the multivariate model explains 18% of the variance in the political tolerance toward Haredim. The strongest predictor is fundamentalism, which has a moderate positive relationship with political tolerance toward Haredim (Beta = .42). As fundamentalism increases, political tolerance decreases. The second strongest predictor is

intrinsic/extrinsic orientation (Beta = -.16). The higher the level of extrinsic orientation,

the lower the level of political tolerance.

These results reveal that hypothesis 9 (intrinsic/extrinsic) receives support, while

hypothesis 11 (fundamentalism) is not supported by the multivariate analysis since the

direction of these association is in the opposite direction from what I predicted in the

original hypothesis. The other hypotheses are not supported as well, since none of the

other variables are significant predictors.

Table 8
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward Haredim: Israel

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	**14.9**		**4.4**	**.000**		
Education	-.095	-.106	-1.2	.111	.93	1.0
Gender	.315	.122	1.4	.078	.96	1.0
Religious variables						
Attitudes	-.117	-.132	-1.1	.137	.49	2.0
I/E	**-.129**	**-.162**	**-1.83**	**.035**	**.89**	**1.1**
Quest	-.219	-.085	-.87	.192	.75	1.3
Fundamentalism	**.698**	**.422**	**-3.4**	**.001**	**.45**	**2.2**
SDO	.086	.049	.5	.31	.71	1.3

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 125
R Square = .18
F = 3.6 ; P < .01

Political Tolerance Toward Datiem

As shown in Table 9 the model explains 5% of the variance in the political

tolerance toward Datiem. Only two variables are significant predictors in the model,

income (Beta = -.13) and gender (Beta = .12). Both relationships are in the opposite

direction than the predicted direction. Income is negative and the predicted direction was

positive. For gender the predicted direction was negative and the observed direction is positive. Therefore, none of the hypotheses are supported with regard to political tolerance toward Datiem.

Table 9
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward Datiem: Israel

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	**11.8**		**7.5**	**.000**		
Income	**-.25**	**-.139**	**-1.8**	**.033**	**.98**	**1.0**
Education	.002	.002	.022	.491	.89	1.1
Gender	**.352**	**.127**	**1.7**	**.047**	**.97**	**1.0**
Rural/non-Rural	-.293	-.091	-1.2	.115	.97	1.0
Religious variables						
Religiosity	.078	.068	.76	.222	.7	1.4
Attitudes	.015	.021	.19	.423	.47	2.1
Fundamentalism	-.143	-.096	-.82	.207	.4	2.4

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 181
R Square = .05
F = 1.2; P < .01

Political Tolerance Toward Masortiem

As shown in Table 10, none of the variables are significant predictors, and only 5.6% of the variance in political tolerance toward Masortiem is explained. Therefore, none of the hypotheses is supported with regard to political tolerance toward Masortiem.

Table 10
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward Masortiem: Israel

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	**11.9**		**14.7**	**.000**		
Rural/non-Rural	-.498	-.187	-2.0	.190	.94	1.0
Religious variables						
Attitudes	-.075	-.115	-1.3	.097	.96	1.0
SDO	.203	.103	1.1	.124	.95	1.0

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 130
R Square = .056
F = 2.48 ; P < .05

Political Tolerance Toward Hilonim

As shown in Table 11, the model explains close to 24 percent of the variance in

the political tolerance toward Hilonim. The best predictors of political tolerance toward

Hilonim are gender, religiosity and fundamentalism. As fundamentalism increases,

political tolerance toward Hilonim decreases, and the relationship is moderate (Beta = -

.28). Therefore, hypothesis 11 is supported. As religiosity increases, political tolerance

toward Hilonim decreases, and the relationship is moderate (Beta=-.22). Therefore,

hypothesis 1 is supported. In addition, gender is a significant and modest predictor (Beta

= -.19), the direction of the relationship is in the predicted direction. Females are more

politically tolerant than males in the Israeli sample. Therefore, hypothesis 5 is supported

by the analysis. None of the other hypotheses were supported with regard to political

tolerance toward Hilonim.

Table 11
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward Hilonim: Israel

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	**14.4**		**9.2**	**.000**		
Gender	**-.664**	**-.192**	**-1.7**	**.039**	**.93**	**1.0**
Rural/non-Rural	-.174	-.047	-.43	.334	.91	1.0
Religious variables						
Religiosity	**-.226**	**-.183**	**-1.6**	**.05**	**.86**	**1.1**
Fundamentalism	**-.666**	**-.284**	**-2.4**	**.009**	**.77**	**1.2**
SDO	.288	.128	1.2	.116	.94	1.0

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 77
R Square = .242
F = 4.53 ; P < .01

Political Tolerance Toward Christians

As shown in Table 12, the model explains 35 percent of the variance in the political tolerance toward Christians. The significant variables in the model are income, education, religiosity, religious beliefs, and intrinsic/extrinsic. The strongest variables in the model are religious beliefs (Beta=-.58) and income (Beta=-.47); both have a strong, negative association with political tolerance toward Christians. As attitudes toward religious beliefs increase, the higher the level of political tolerance toward Christians decreases, which does not support hypothesis 8. Although income is significant, it is not in the predicted direction. Hypothesis 2, therefore, is not supported as well. Intrinsic/extrinsic (hypothesis 9) is also a modest, negative predictor of political tolerance toward Christians, although it also is not in the predicted direction. Education (hypothesis 3) is modestly, but significantly, negatively correlated with political tolerance toward Christians. Therefore, none of the hypotheses were supported in this model.

Table 12
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward Christians: Israel

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	**31.7**		**6.9**	**.000**		
Income	**-.471**	**-.183**	**-2.03**	**.023**	**.82**	**1.2**
Education	**-.229**	**-.186**	**-2.18**	**.016**	**.90**	**1.1**
Gender	.337	.094	1.1	.135	.92	1.0
Rural/non-Rural	-.356	-.083	-1.0	.155	.98	1.0
Religious variables						
Religiosity	**-.254**	**-.188**	**-2.05**	**.022**	**.73**	**1.3**
Attitudes	**-.581**	**-.436**	**-4.6**	**.000**	**.83**	**1.2**
I/E	**-.25**	**-.227**	**-2.5**	**.006**	**.81**	**1.1**
SDO	-.188	-.076	-.79	.215	.75	1.4

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 213
R Square = .351
F = 13.58; P < .01

Political Tolerance Toward Muslims

As shown in Table 13, the model explains 13 percent of the variance in the

political tolerance toward Muslims. The significant variables in the model are religiosity,

and attitudes toward religious beliefs. The strongest predictors in the model are religious

beliefs (Beta = -.21) and religiosity (Beta = -.22), and both are moderately and negatively

associated with political tolerance toward Muslims. As predicted by hypothesis 1, as

religiosity become more negative, the level of political tolerance toward Muslims

becomes positive. Hypothesis 1, therefore, is supported. Although religious beliefs is

significant, the association is not in the predicted direction. Hypothesis 8, therefore, is not

supported. None of the other hypotheses were supported with regard to political tolerance

toward Muslims.

Table 13
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward Muslims: Israel

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	1.6		3.6	.000		
Age	-.003	-.013	-.13	.447	.9	1.1
Gender	.243	.072	.77	.221	.94	1.0
Size of Community	-.017	-.007	-.07	.472	.93	1.0
Religious variables						
Religiosity	**-.27**	**-.207**	**-2.0**	**.002**	**.77**	**1.2**
Attitudes	**-.246**	**-.218**	**-1.7**	**.046**	**.49**	**2.0**
I/E	-.16	-.153	-1.5	.062	.83	1.1
Quest	-.255	-.078	-.77	.22	.79	1.2
Fundamentalism	.089	.042	.3	.382	.42	2.3
SDO	.113	.051	.48	.313	.76	1.3

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 117
R Square = .132
F = 1.81; P < .01

U.S. Survey

In this section I present the multivariate results for the U.S. sample of Jews. Because of the relatively small sample size, it is less likely that predictors will be statistically significant. Therefore, I will also examine the effect sizes as measured by the standardized regression coefficients (Betas).

Political Tolerance Toward Orthodox

As shown in Table 14, the model explains 12 percent of the variance in political tolerance toward Orthodox. Only one predictor, however, is statistically significant. Respondents who are higher religious beliefs are significantly likely to be higher in political tolerance, which is in the direction predicted by hypothesis 8. The Beta of .32 is suggestive of a moderate effect of religious beliefs on political tolerance. All of the other Beta weights are weak. Therefore, only hypothesis 8 is supported with regard to political tolerance toward Orthodox.

Table 14
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward Orthodox: U.S.

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	**9.1**		**4.6**	**.000**		
Education	.117	.146	1.2	.108	.93	1.0
Religious variables						
Attitudes	**.178**	**.328**	**2.8**	**.004**	**.93**	**1.0**
Quest	-.424	-.157	-1.3	.086	.99	1.0

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 72
R Square = .129
F = 3.3; P < .01

Political Tolerance Toward Conservatives

As shown in Table 15, the model explains 12 percent of the variance in political

tolerance toward Conservatives. There two statistically and moderate predictors of

political tolerance. Respondents with more favorable attitudes toward religious beliefs are

more likely to have higher levels of political tolerance (Beta = .60). Respondents with

lower level of fundamentalism are likely to have higher level of political tolerance (Beta

= -.61). Since hypothesis 8 and hypothesis 11 predicted the same relationship as observed

in the model, they are supported in this analysis. Therefore, other than hypothesis 8 and

11, none of the hypotheses are supported with regard to political tolerance toward

Conservatives.

Table 15
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward Conservatives: U.S.

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	**11.9**		**14.3**	**.000**		
Religious variables						
Attitudes	**.316**	**.599**	**2.3**	**.012**	**.31**	**3.1**
Fundamentalism	**-.761**	**-.608**	**-2.4**	**.011**	**.31**	**3.1**

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 46
R Square = .126
F = 3.11; P < .01

Political Tolerance Toward Reforms

As shown in Table 16, the model explains 4 percent of the variance in the political

tolerance toward Reforms. None of the variables was found to be a strong and

statistically significant predictor of political tolerance toward Reforms. Therefore, none

of the hypotheses are supported with regard to the Reforms.

Table 16
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward Reforms: U.S.

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	**8.8**		**2.9**	**.000**		
Income	-.009	-.006	-.04	.0484	.86	1.1
Rural/Non-Rural	-.296	-.085	-.57	.284	.92	1.0
<u>Religious variables</u>						
I/E	.109	.195	1.2	.104	.85	1.1

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 52
R Square = .039
F = .646; P < .01

Political Tolerance Toward the Unaffiliated

Examination of Table 17 reveals only one significant predictor of political tolerance toward the Unaffiliated. However, the size of the Beta for age (.23) suggests modest effects. Because the association is not in the predicted direction, however, none of the hypotheses with regard to political tolerance toward the Unaffiliated are supported.

Table 17
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward the Unaffiliated: U.S.

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	7.9		3.6	**.000**		
Education	.117	.158	1.2	.114	.97	1.0
Age	**.025**	**.228**	**1.7**	**.042**	**.96**	**1.0**
<u>Religious variables</u>						
Quest	-.088	-.033	-.25	.4	.97	1.0
SDO	.297	.199	1.5	.065	.97	1.0

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 60
R Square = .105
F = 1.6; P < .01

Political Tolerance Toward Catholics

Examination of Table 18 reveals only one significant predictor of political

tolerance toward Catholics. Respondents with more extrinsic orientation are more likely

to have higher levels of political tolerance (Beta = .26). Since hypothesis 9 predicted the

same relationship as observed in the model, it is supported in this analysis. Therefore,

other than hypothesis 9, none of the hypotheses are supported with regard to political

tolerance toward Catholics.

Table 18
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward Catholics: U.S.

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	2.9		.68	.248		
Size of Community	-.471	-.165	-1.0	.158	.58	1.7
Rural/Non-Rural	.892	.171	1.0	.157	.54	1.8
Religious variables						
I/E	**.168**	**.264**	**2.0**	**.023**	**.92**	**1.0**
Quest	.67	.153	1.1	.122	.92	1.0

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 62
R Square = .114
F = 1.9; P < .01

Political Tolerance Toward Mainline Protestants

As shown in Table 19, the model explains around 8 percent of the variance in the

political tolerance toward Mainline Protestants. Intrinsic/extrinsic is statistically

significant and is the strongest predictor of political tolerance toward Mainline

Protestants (Beta = .29). As extrinsic orientation increases, political tolerance toward

Mainline Protestants increases, which is in the predicted direction. Thus, Hypothesis 9 is

supported in this model. Therefore, hypothesis 9, which pertains to extrinsic orientation,

is the only hypothesis that is supported with regard to political tolerance toward Mainline

Protestants.

Table 19
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward Mainline Protestants: U.S.

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	3.6		1.0	.14		
Income	-.203	-.115	-.86	.196	.83	1.2
Gender	-.109	-.043	-.34	.366	.93	1.0
Religious variables						
I/E	**.185**	**.293**	**2.3**	**.011**	**.94**	**1.0**
Quest	.205	.046	.35	.363	.87	1.1

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 67
R Square = .086
F = 1.45; P < .01

Political Tolerance Toward ECP

As shown in Table 20, the model explains fully 31 percent of the variance in the

political tolerance toward ECP. Two predictors were statistically significant, and both are

in the predicted direction. Fundamentalism was strongly and negatively associated (Beta

= -.40) with political tolerance toward ECP. As fundamentalism decreases, political

tolerance increases, which supports hypothesis 11. Intrinsic/extrinsic is moderately and

positively associated (Beta = .30) with political tolerance toward ECP. Thus, Hypothesis

9 is supported. Therefore, only hypothesis 9 and 11 are supported with regard to political

tolerance toward ECP.

Table 20
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward ECP: U.S.

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	3.99		1.1	.128		
Income	-.022	-.012	-.106	.458	.83	1.1
Religious variables						
I/E	**.191**	**.299**	**2.5**	**.007**	**.8**	**1.2**
Quest	-.009	-.002	-.01	.493	.8	1.2
Fundamentalism	**-.701**	**-.398**	**-3.4**	**.001**	**.8**	**1.1**

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 66
R Square = .318
F = 7.1; P < .01

Political Tolerance Toward Orthodox Christians

As shown in Table 21, 14 percent of the variance in political tolerance toward

Orthodox Christians is explained by the model. Only one predictor is significant and in

the predicted direction. As extrinsic orientation increases, political tolerance increases.

The Beta weight of .28 suggests a moderate effect of extrinsic orientation, which supports

hypothesis 9. Therefore, only hypothesis 9 is supported with regard to political tolerance

toward Christians.

Table 21
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward Orthodox Christians: U.S.

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	.37		.08	.469		
Gender	.455	.165	1.2	.112	.8	1.1
Religious variables						
Religiosity	-.023	-.018	-.11	.454	.6	1.4
I/E	**.194**	**.283**	**1.8**	**.035**	**.6**	**1.4**
SDO	.402	.149	1.03	.154	.7	1.3

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 59
R Square = .142
F = 2.29; P < .01

As shown in Table 22, 39 percent of the variance in political tolerance toward

Muslims is explained by the model. Two of the predictors are statistically significant,

although neither one of them is in the predicted direction. Attitudes toward religious

beliefs is moderately and negatively associated with political tolerance (Beta = -.51).

Hypothesis 8, therefore, is not supported by the analysis. Gender is also moderately

associated with political tolerance toward Muslims (Beta = .29). However, the association

is not in the predicted direction. Therefore, none of the hypothesis is supported by the

analysis.

Table 22
Multiple Regression Results for Political Tolerance Toward Muslims: U.S.

Variables	B	Beta	T	1-Tailed Sig.	Tolerance	VIF
(Constant)	6.22		1.4	.075		
Gender	**.911**	**.296**	**2.6**	**.005**	**.8**	**1.1**
Religious variables						
Attitudes	**-.455**	**-.507**	**-4.3**	**.000**	**.8**	**1.2**
I/E	.141	.179	1.6	.057	.8	1.1
Quest	.803	.147	1.3	.088	.9	1.0

B = Unstandardized regression coefficient
Beta = Standardized regression coefficient
N = 89
R Square = .394
F = 4.22; P < .01

Summary

In summation, the overall model has received limited support by the exploratory

multivariate analyses. As shown in Table 23, Hypothesis 1, the level of religiosity, was

supported in the case of political tolerance toward Muslims for the Israeli survey, but not

in the cases of political tolerance toward the other groups for both the U.S. and the Israeli

survey. Hypothesis 2, the level of income, was not supported in the cases of political

tolerance for all groups of both surveys. Hypothesis 3, the level of education, was not

supported in all cases of the political tolerance. Hypothesis 4, age, was not supported as

well for all case of political tolerance. Hypothesis 5, Gender, was supported in the case of

political tolerance toward Hilonim, but was not supported in all other cases of both

surveys. Hypotheses 6, size of community, as well as, hypothesis 7, rural/not-rural, were

not supported in both the Israeli and the U.S. surveys for all cases. Hypothesis 8,

attitudes, was supported by the political tolerance toward Orthodox, and toward

Conservatives in America, but was not supported in all other cases. Hypothesis 9,

intrinsic/extrinsic was supported in the case of political tolerance toward Haredim in

Israel, and toward Catholics, Protestants, ECP, and Orthodox Christians in the U.S.

Hypothesis 10, quest, was not supported for all cases. Hypothesis 11, Fundamentalism,

was supported only for the political tolerance toward Hilonim in Israel, and toward

Conservatives and ECP in the U.S., but not for all other cases. Finally, Hypothesis 12,

SDO, was not supported for all cases in both the Israeli and the U.S. surveys.

Table 23

Summary of Multivariate Results

	Hypothesis:	1 Religiosity	2 Income	3 Education	4 Age	5 Gender	6 Size of community	7 Rural	8 Attitude	9 I/E	10 Quest	11 Fundamentalism	12 SDO
P.T toward:							**Israeli Survey**						
Haredim		Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	**supported**	Not supported	Significant but wrong direction	Not supported
Datiem		Not supported	Significant but wrong direction	Not supported	Not supported	Significant but wrong direction	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported
Masortiem		Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported
Hilonim		Significant but wrong direction	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	**Supported**	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	**Supported**	Not supported
Christians		Significant but wrong direction	Significant but wrong direction	Significant but wrong direction	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Significant but wrong direction	Significant but wrong direction	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported
Muslims		**Supported**	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Significant but wrong direction	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported
P.T toward:							**U.S. Survey**						
Orthodox		Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	**Supported**	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported
Conservatives		Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	**Supported**	Not supported	Not supported	**Supported**	Not supported
Reforms		Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported
Unaffiliated		Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Significant but wrong direction	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported
Catholics		Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	**Supported**	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported
Protestants		Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	**Supported**	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported
ECP		Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	**Supported**	Not supported	**Supported**	Not supported
Orthodox Christians		Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	**Supported**	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported
Muslims		Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Significant but wrong direction	Not supported	Not supported	Significant but wrong direction	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported	Not supported

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CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Introduction

This chapter deals with the meaning of the results of the data analysis conducted

on the Israeli and U.S. samples of Jews. I will attempt to explain the gap between the

expected results and the results I actually obtained. I will also compare the results of the

two populations and cautiously draw general conclusions regarding political tolerance of

the Jewish people in both countries. I will link the results to the research implications and

the policy implications, both for Israel and for the U.S., and I discuss limitations of the

current study. Finally, I will offer suggestions for future research in the field of political

tolerance.

Table 24: summarizes the results for the 12 hypotheses for the multivariate

results. I will discuss each of the hypotheses in order.

Table 24
Analyses Based on the Multivariate Level

Hypothesis: Independent Variable	Multivariate level	
	Level of support- Israel	Level of support - U.S.
1: Level of Religiosity	*negligible support*	not supported
2: Level of Income.	not supported	not supported
3. Level of Education.	not supported	not supported
4: Age	not supported	not supported
5: Gender	*negligible support*	not supported
6: Size of Community	not supported	not supported
7: Rural/non-rural	not supported	not supported
8: Religious Beliefs	not supported	**partially supported**
9: Intrinsic/Extrinsic	*negligible support*	**partially supported**
10: Quest	not supported	not supported
11: Fundamentalism	*negligible support*	**partially supported**
12: SDO	not supported	not supported

Discussion

Hypothesis 1 stated that the higher the level of religiosity, the lower the level of political tolerance. Based on the multivariate analysis, this hypothesis was negligibly supported for the Israeli sample. For the Israeli sample, the higher the level of religiosity, the lower the level of political tolerance is toward Muslims.

The meaning of this finding is that Jewish people in Israel who have higher level of religiosity feel less comfortable with Muslims, mainly based on the territorial disagreement. While Jewish people who have higher level of religiosity believe that the land of Israel was granted to them in the Bible, Muslims reject the Bible's promise to the Jewish people, and believe in the Koran, which grants the land to the Muslims. The contrast between having a high level of religiosity and having a low level of religiosity is reflected mainly over the issues of the land and the Jewish state. While Israeli Jewish religious people support the ideas of a greater land for the Jewish people and in making Israel a Jewish state, Jewish people with a low level of religiosity would give up these ideas for a peace agreement with the Muslim world. Furthermore, Israeli Jewish religious people believe that Muslims would like the country of Israel to be a Muslim country, in which, Jewish people can be legal citizens. This finding aligns with the research by Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978), and Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) who argued that the less religious the respondents are the more tolerant they will be.

Furthermore, I speculate the reason that hypothesis 1 was not supported for Christians in Israel is that Christians do believe in the Bible and its promise of the land to Israel.

Hypothesis 1 was not supported for the U.S. sample in the multivariate results. I speculate this finding occurs because U.S. Jews live in neighborhoods with Christians, Muslims, and Jewish people from all groups and do not tend to raise the issue with their fellows neighbors, as the conflict is overseas.

Hypothesis 2 stated that the higher the level of income is, the higher the level of political tolerance. This hypothesis was not supported, as no association was found between the level of income and political tolerance. The finding may be explained by the idea that both rich and poor people are indifferent to issues beyond their own interests. Because my samples were drawn from the internet, the finding of no association may partly be due to selection bias. Some lower income and potentially more intolerant Jews may not have had the inclination or opportunity to participate. This finding does, however, contradict the indirect link argued by Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh and Robert (1985).

Hypothesis 3 stated that the higher the level of education, the higher the level of political tolerance. In Israel this hypothesis was not supported in both countries. This finding does not support the idea that the more educated Jews are, the more open and accepting of diversity they are. Although, this study joins to a long list of studies (Stouffer, 1955; Dynes, 1967; Crockett, 1976, Crockett & Williams, 1978; Nunn, Crockett & Williams, 1978; Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982; Weil, 1982; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh & Robert, 1985; Gibson, 1992) that examined the link between education and political tolerance, the relationship was not supported for the U.S. and the Israeli samples. As with income, this lack of association may partly be due to a selection bias with regard to who did and who did not respond to my survey.

Hypothesis 4 argues for the association of age and political tolerance. The statement that the older the age of the person is, the lower the level of political tolerance, was not supported for both samples. As with income and education, this lack of association may partly be due to a selection bias, with regard to who did and who did not respond to my survey.

Hypothesis 5 claims differences between Males and Females. There was negligible support for this hypothesis in the Israeli sample but not in the U.S. sample. Females were found to be more politically tolerant toward Hilonim in Israel. The assumption that females are more politically tolerant than males was not found to be true toward the rest of the groups in my samples. In my samples, I believe that both males and females are somewhat equal from a religious point of view, and thus, from a political tolerance point of view a well. This finding might help explain the contradiction in the literature in regard to the differences in gender and the association to political tolerance. While Stouffer (1955), Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978), and Crockett and Williams (1978) suggest that in general women are less tolerant than men, Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982) express the opposing idea. As noted in the literature review, these studies were conducted at a time when women were more likely to be homemakers and men were more dominant in the work force. Nowadays, these differences blurred and research on political tolerance should assume greater gender equality.

Hypothesis 6 posited an association between the size of the community and political tolerance. The hypothesized statement that the bigger the community, the higher the level of political tolerance, was not supported by the analysis of the Israeli sample or in the U.S. sample. A possible explanation is that Jewish people usually live close to

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other Jewish people, which is essential for their ability to survive. Therefore, they are familiar and accept all the other Jewish religious groups in both bigger and smaller communities. This finding supports the study conducted by Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus (1982), who claim that this variable is not significant in predicting political tolerance.

Hypothesis 7 posited that people from rural regions will be less tolerant than people from non-rural regions. This hypothesis was not supported, either in Israel as a small country with close distances between the regions, nor in America where Jews live in their small Jewish communities. This finding supports previous studies (Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh & Robert, 1985; Abrahamson & Carter, 1986), which found this variable to have little or no effect on political tolerance.

Hypothesis 8 claimed that the more positive the attitudes toward religious beliefs are, the higher the level of political tolerance. This argument was supported with the models of political tolerance toward Orthodox and Conservatives in the U.S., and was not supported in the Israeli sample. Positive attitudes toward religious beliefs mean accepting the other, especially people from outside the mainstream of the Jewish community in the U.S. such as Orthodox and Conservatives, who have more restrictions then reforms and unaffiliated Jewish people. This result was found for the political tolerance toward Christians in studies by Rowatt, Franklin and Cotton (2005) and by Francis and Stubbs (1987). The investigation of the political tolerance toward Orthodox and Conservatives Jewish people was not found in previous studies.

Hypothesis 9 was negligibly supported for the Israeli sample, and partially supported in the U.S. sample. Hypothesis 9 stated that the more intrinsic the religious

orientation, the lower the level of political tolerance. For the Israeli sample, the higher the level of intrinsic, the lower the level of political tolerance is toward Haredim. For the U.S. sample, the higher the level of intrinsic, the lower the level of political tolerance toward Catholics, Protestants, ECP, and Orthodox Christians. The meaning for these findings is that Jewish people in Israel tend to be less politically tolerant toward Haredim, who determine the religious rules in the country of Israel. For example, not opening malls during Shabbat, and not selling bread products during Passover, are actions that non-Orthodox Jewish people opposed. For the U.S., the meaning is that Jewish people oppose Christian rules in America. For instance, Jewish people in the U.S. would like to have their weekend vacation during Shabbat instead of Sunday. They would like to have official Jewish Holidays vacations instead of the official breaks during the Christmases. I also believe that having official Christian country wide holidays exclude them as U.S. citizens, in addition to making Judaism practices harder to follow. It is not surprising that the political tolerance toward Muslims in the U.S. was not associated with intrinsic, since Muslims do not influence the connection between the Christian church and the U.S. administration. This finding supports previous studies (Allport, 1966; Allport and Ross, 1976; Donahue, 1985; Baston et al., 1986; Herek, 1987; Duck & Hunsberger, 1999) that found this variable to be associate with tolerance.

Hypothesis 10 argued that the higher level of quest, the higher level of political tolerance. These hypotheses are based on previous studies that examined non-Jewish population in general. The participants in my study have mostly lower level of quest for both samples. Thus, this hypothesis was not supported for both the Israeli and U.S. samples.

Hypothesis 11 argued for the influence of fundamentalism on political tolerance. It stated that the higher the level of fundamentalism, the lower the level of political tolerance. This hypothesis was supported only for the political tolerance toward Hilonim in Israel. In Israel the most fundamental groups are highly religious as well. Thus, individuals with higher levels of fundamentalism will be less politically tolerant toward Hilonim, who are less religious than the other Jewish groups. The hypothesis was partially supported for the U.S. sample, it was supported with the political tolerance toward Conservatives and toward ECP. The meaning is that Jewish people perceive Conservatives as a Jewish group that made changes in Judaism. For example, they dropped the rabbinic laws. But still, they will not accept non-Jewish spouse as a member in their congregation. Therefore, a fundamental person will feel that the changes Conservatives do, are against his beliefs. This finding supports previous studies (Kogel & Katz, 1995; Hirsch & Reinman, 2002).

Hypothesis 12 stated that the higher the level of SDO, the lower the level of political tolerance. This hypothesis was not supported for both the Israeli and the U.S. sample in the multivariate level. I believe that the Jewish religion binds Jews together and makes them seem as one cohort, which results in tolerating each other on that basis. Thus, SDO have minimal effect, if any, on the political tolerance toward other Jewish groups, or other non-Jewish groups.

In general, I believe that the inconsistency in the direction and power of the associations in this study compared with previous studies may be a result of the demographics of the participants. While the participants in this study varied in age, income, social status, level of education and the community they have been raised in,

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most of the previous studies used college students, which are a relatively homogenous sample. Therefore, the external validity of previous research comes into question. Of course, additional research with more representative and heterogeneous samples of Jews in the U.S. and Israel needs to be conducted.

In sum, the understanding of political tolerance is becoming context based. Although religious factors were more predictive of political tolerance than demographic factors in my study, additional variables need to be considered in future research.

Expectations vs. Findings

In general, even though previous studies yielded mixed results, I was somewhat surprised at the weak results. Nonetheless, previous research has used church attendance, which may be a weak measure of the level of religiosity. My study used more in-depth measures of religiosity. Hypothesis 1 was negligible supported, possibly because of my more refined measures of religiosity. Further, I think that political tolerance of Jews is more owing to religious factors than to income factors, so rejecting the second hypothesis was not surprising either. Controlling for richer measures of religiosity may have appropriately suppressed a potentially spurious relationship between income and political tolerance found in previous studies.

I expected that the level of education would influence the level of political tolerance, since people who are more educated are exposed to a variety of ideas. Yet, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. I also expected hypotheses 4, 6, and 7 to be supported, but I understand that the different culture of my participants from those surveyed in previous studies influence these results.

Also, the fact that so many hypotheses were rejected is an evidence to how much political tolerance is a culturally-based phenomenon. Clearly, the hypotheses this study posed were based on the literature review that synthesized findings from previous research. However, this body of literature, specifically the "least-like" method studies, mainly drew its conclusions from data that were gathered from white middle class American college students. Further, the studies using secondary data, mainly from the GSS, did not specify its conclusions toward the different Jewish group for the U.S. and for Israel. When I developed my hypotheses from previous research to the Jewish communities in Israel and the United States, I obtained different results.

Accordingly, the model of political tolerance is now as the following:

Gender

Level of religiosity(-)

Attitudes toward religious beliefs(+)

Intrinsic/extrinsic religious orientation (+)

Fundamentalism (-)

Political Tolerance

Figure 4. The model supported in this study.

The model of political tolerance is constructed from the concept of the level of religiosity, of attitudes toward religious beliefs, intrinsic/extrinsic religious orientation, fundamentalism, and gender. This newly multi-dimensional model explains and predicts the level of political tolerance of the Jewish people in the U.S. and Israel.

Implication for Research and Policy

The results found in Chapter 4 influence both research in the field of political tolerance and policy in regard to the conflict between Jews and Muslims around the world.

While examining the implications of the current study for research of political tolerance, I concluded there are at least three important conclusions from this study that elevate our knowledge of political tolerance. The first conclusion is that the population of this study is different from the populations typically used in research on political tolerance. This study challenges political tolerance theories that were created out of explorations of populations that were mainly students. The participants in this study were from the Jewish populations in both Israel and the U.S. Further, I tested the political tolerance of Jewish people toward Jews from the different streams of Judaism, in addition to Christians and Muslims in both countries. Thus, this study is a pioneer study in the manner in which it attempted to understand the political tolerance of a population that very few studies have explored.

This study took unique steps toward exploring a population that historically struggled with political and religious intolerance, and was subjected to events such as the Holocaust, for example. Additionally, some of the most influential studies that examined Jews used a very specific age group, which was limited to the age of the college students conveniently available to them (Kirkpatric, 1993; and Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus, 1979).

The second important conclusion is that this study used more refined measures of religiosity. Instead of measuring religiosity by using just church attendance, this study makes use of 6 different measures that together conceptualize the level of religiosity a person might have. This refinement in measuring religiosity may provide a better test of the relationship between religiosity and political tolerance. This important finding assumes that religiosity cannot be measured by single variables, rather it should be measured by a combination of more than one factor. All the six measures, (attitudes, intrinsic-extrinsic, quest, fundamentalism, SDO, and church attendance), which different researchers used separately in previous studies, were tested in the same model to comprise a more comprehensive understanding of the level of religiosity of an individual. Future research should continue to investigate the influence of attitudes, intrinsic-extrinsic, quest, fundamentalism, SDO, and church attendance on political tolerance.

The third important conclusion is that overall the new religiosity measures (attitudes, intrinsic-extrinsic, quest, fundamentalism, SDO, and church attendance) are stronger predictors of political tolerance than other demographic variables I tested. For example, income, age, education, region, and size of community have less strength in predicting political tolerance.

Cross-disciplinary postmodern theories have taught us that context is a critical factor, thus it is impossible to draw conclusions for all cultures, all countries, and all Jewish people wherever they are. Consequently, it is logical for a hypothesis to be supported in one country and rejected in another, as it demonstrates the diversity of the population and the complexity of the phenomena under examination.

This study has implications on policy for the U.S., as well as for the state of Israel. The Jewish people are important to study because they are involved in various political debates in the U.S. and in Israel, as well as in connection to political processes around the world. The American Jewish community is highly significant to the political debate in Washington D.C., and the Israeli Jews play a pivotal role in shaping the Middle East politics and future. Therefore, I believe that this study both heightens and reshapes our understanding of the political tolerance of a group of people, who help shape political policies in the U.S. and in the Middle East.

Huntington (1993), in his classical study about the clash of civilizations, argues that world conflicts are getting more and more culturally based. Therefore, political tolerance is crucial for the peace process around the world. Specifically, the conflict between the Jewish people in Israel and the Muslims in Israel overflows beyond the boundaries of this small country, and beyond the Middle East.

This study's ramifications regarding the peace process, between Jews and Muslims, enable policy makers to understand the roots of the conflict from the point of view of Jews. If Jews are found to be less politically tolerant toward Muslims in both the U.S. and in Israel, it can be assumed that Muslims are perceived by Jews as a threat to the country of Israel, and its people, whereas, radical Christian's ideas are perceived by Jews as a threat to the Jewish ideology, as found in this study.

Therefore, by understanding the Jewish people in Israel and in the U.S., American policy makers who are involved in promoting the peace process will be better able to guide the process to productive results. At this time, President Barack Obama has failed to revive the Middle East peace process. I argue, therefore, that the results of this study,

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and future studies on the perceptions of Jews will enable potential peacemakers to resuscitate the peace process, as they will be able to take into consideration existing Jewish perceptions toward their Muslim neighbors. For example, an important consideration is that Muslims are perceived by Jews as a threat to the country of Israel. The term "confidence-building measures" takes on new meaning and new importance when the perceptions on both sides of the conflict are understood and are taken into consideration.

Furthermore, another implication of focusing on Jews is to help policy makers in Israel understand the conflicts of Jewish people toward Jews from other Jewish religious groups. It is arguable that the conflict of Jews with other Jews in Israel and in the U.S. is much more significant to the political arena in Israel than the conflict of Jews with people from other religions. Thus, in the following I explain the ramification of the results of this study on policy making in Israel.

Dahl (1966) claims that instability of a political system results from the number of political cleavages. The religious cleavages in Israel constitute one of the biggest causes for the instability of the Israeli government and parliament (Korn & Shapira, 1997). According to Korn and Shapira (1997), the political debate in Israel revolves around three main issues; the socio-economic debate (i.e. left vs. right), homeland security issues (i.e. hawks vs. doves), and Jewish religious issues (i.e. opening of malls on Saturdays). Korn and Shapira (1997) argue that the political system in Israel cannot bridge or heal the religious cleavages because of the intolerance of the parties based on political-religious issues and the lack of ability to form a stable coalition based on homeland security issues.

The religious cleavages in Israel are caused by the ongoing conflict between Judaism as religion and the ambivalent definition of Israel as a secular Jewish state (Korn & Shapira, 1997; Weinryb, 2000; Kehat, 2002; Piron, 2002). Three segments of population in the Jewish state are taking part in this conflict/cleavage; Orthodox, Religious Zionists, and Secular. According to Gutman Institute 2008 (a national census institute) there are 9% Orthodox, 10% Religious Zionists and 30% people who practice religion on a lower level of religiosity, while 51% of the Jewish Israeli population are Hilonim.

Each one of the populations brings its own ideology and value systems to a variety of domains in the Jewish state. While on the one hand, the Orthodox and the Religious Zionists are trying to incorporate religious rules into the legal system, the Secular people try to open the state to global modern and western processes (Korn & Shapira, 1997; Weinryb, 2000; Rapaport, 2005).

The 'status-quo' is a mechanism that was established for the developing state at the expense of a well-formed constitution. Israel as a country visualized a Jewish country as an objective for the Jewish people. But it did not want to deal with future problems by making a constitution. The solution was an agreement not to change any of the "current situation,", which existed in the establishment of the state. The result was that the state would not interfere with the rituals of the religious or the secular people with any regulation, in order for the state to be created (Weinryb, 2000). In addition, the opponents to the constitution claimed that since Israel has to be a Jewish state, the small number of people in Israel could not dictate a constitution for the future large number of Jewish people who would immigrate to Israel (Weinryb, 2000). The temporary arrangement of

the 'status-quo' soon becomes a permanent one. Each one of the sides used it and supported its ideologies when it served them, and opposed it when it did not serve them (Weinryb, 2000; Caplan & Sivan, 2003).

The Haredim seek to practice religious life in the Jewish state. This practice is according to the Jewish religious law (Kehat, 2002; Piron, 2002; Caplan & Sivan, 2003). Often, these religious laws completely oppose the laws of the state (Kehat, 2002; Piron, 2002; Stern, 2002; Caplan & Sivan, 2003).

The Datiem try to be more open minded to the modern changes. Their ideology holds that one should practice the Jewish religious law as rigorously as s/he can, but also participate in the modern activities and processes (Caplan & Sivan, 2003).

The Hilonim view the Jewish religious law as unambiguous (Stern, 2002). Most of the religious debates – whether to take one side or another – will be perceived as rigid and inflexible. For the Hilonim, the Jewish religious law is old, exclusive to its ancient times, and does not depend on time, place, culture, or current preferences (Stern, 2002).

According to Statman (2002), each one of the three streams perceives any debate as implying their ideologies and values are not respected. This complex situation affects political tolerance. One of my objectives in this study has been to assess the degree of tolerance in Israeli society.

The Jewish Diaspora (Jews living outside the country of Israel) is connected to Israel and is important in two main ways. First, those Jews carry the vision of the Jewish state to the Jewish people around the world, which is not only an international policy vision for the government of Israel but also part of the *Geula*/Salvation of the people of Israel. Second, Jews of the Diaspora strengthen the Jewish state by lobbying for it and by

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contributing financially to projects in Israel. The importance of tolerating each other as Jewish people unites the Jewish people for the same goals.

One underlying necessity for these two important processes to continue is the continuity of the economic achievements of American Jews (Diner, 2004). According to the U.S. religious landscape survey, Jewish people are characterized by comfortable, upper-middle class economic status with relatively higher educational degrees. About 46% of the Jewish people earn $100,000+ a year and 35% have post-graduate degrees (U.S. religious landscape).

Nevertheless, American Jews have inner-conflicts in regards to the Jewish aspects of their lives (Diner, 2004). One of those conflicts is the level of interfaith marriages. Intermarriages have become a serious concern of Judaism since marrying a person from another faith results in more children being raised at home with a non-Jewish parent, one set of non-Jewish grandparents, and relatives that together are the connection to a different family heritage (Diner, 2004).

The ongoing debate has taken place in the different denominations. The perceived problem has been that the children will not follow the Jewish laws and start worshiping the other faith. Diner (2004) claims that the Reforms' decision was to accept intermarried couples and not to exclude them or their offspring in confronting the problem. The idea was to let the intermarried families participate so Judaism will remain an option for the children and the families when they will want to make the choice.

For Orthodox Jews, interfaith marriage is handled differently. They live their lives in an isolated environment that they have created for themselves. They observe the Jewish religion according to its strict laws with no exemptions. Thus, Orthodox Jews who

intermarry must choose to live outside this conservatory and abandon their agenda (Diner. 2004).

According to Diner (2004), conservative Jewish people choose the middle ground between isolationism as in the Orthodox agenda and opening arms as wide as in the Reform's approach. Conservatives do not renegotiate the Jewish laws, but they accept intermarriage on the one hand, but do not condemn it on the other hand." Their approach is to accept the Jewish part of the families and not let the non-Jewish partner belong to a Conservative congregation (Diner, 2004). Their liberal approach does not legitimate intermarriages, but has found a creative way to conform to current processes.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

Due to the sampling method implemented in this study, the number of respondents in both countries was not high. I aimed to have between 500-1000 participants from each one of the countries, but eventually ended with 103 participants from America out of a population of above 5 million, and 347 participants from Israel in a population of around 6 million.

I believe that the length of the surveys, due to the high number of questions, was a factor in the decision of the potential participants to complete it or not. In the cover letter I sent to the potential participants I indicated the time it would take to complete it, but people reported that it took longer.

I used the university's servers as the host for the web based surveys. Some people found the webpage hard for loading, or sending and submitting the results. One person emailed me and complained that the website did not upload and only after he retried on 3

different occasions was he able to log on to complete the survey. Some of the difficulties in connecting to the web based survey were technology-related. Some could not connect to the website because the university's server was busy, or the end user's Internet capacity was low. Others had a difficulty because their computer was not fast enough to process the survey. The mix of using hardcopies of the survey and directing people in a variety of ways to the web based survey was necessary for a higher volume of participation.

The low volume of participants, from both countries, increases the level of making error type 1, or failing to reject the null hypothesis when it should be rejected. I must also be careful when I make generalizations of the findings to the population in other settings and other countries.

Further, I acknowledge the importance of probability sampling in order to more accurately generalize the conclusions on the population in both countries. Although, I compared my samples to the populations on a number of factors, a future probability sample is needed for more accurate results and generalization.

In addition, in order to gain a better understanding of the political tolerance of the Jewish people, I suggest completing a study which will investigate the leaders of the Jewish people. Stouffer in his pioneer study (1955) surveyed the leaders as well. The leaders may influence others with regard to political tolerance. If so, policies could be implemented through the leadership. Therefore, I believe that further studies should be done that include leaders of various Jewish groups.

Furthermore, a study on the political tolerance of Muslims and Christians in Israel and in the U.S. is necessary as well. Investigations of the political tolerance of these

populations toward Jews may help policy makers, in Washington D.C., Gaza, and Jerusalem to better understand the perceptions of the additional sides involved in this conflict. Looking at the roots of the conflicts from different angles will help political leaders vision a stable peace agreement for the Middle East.

Summary of the Chapter

This chapter discussed the ramifications of the results of the current study. I discussed the conclusions of the study while summarizing the findings for each hypothesis. I developed a discussion for reasons hypotheses were supported and connected it to previous theory and research. I also discussed the results in terms of their fit to the previous literature and explained my expectations in view of the given results. I made connections between the results and their implications for research and policy. At the end of the chapter I discussed the limitations of the study and provided recommendations for future research.

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Political Tolerance Among Jewish People

Education

1 What is the highest grade in elementary school or high school that you finished and got credit for?

- ○ 1st Grade
- ○ 3rd Grade
- ○ 5th Grade
- ○ 7th Grade
- ○ 9th Grade
- ○ 11th Grade
- ○ No formal schooling

- ○ 2nd Grade
- ○ 4th Grade
- ○ 6th Grade
- ○ 8th Grade
- ○ 10th Grade
- ○ 12th Grade

2 Did you complete one or more years of college for credit (not including schooling such as Business College, technical or vocational school)? If YES: How many years did you complete?

- ○ 1 year of college
- ○ 3 years
- ○ 5 years
- ○ 7 years
- ○ Don't know

- ○ 2 years
- ○ 4 years
- ○ 6 years
- ○ 8 years

3 Do you have any college degrees? IF YES: What degree or degrees?

- ○ Associate/Junior college
- ○ Graduate

- ○ Bachelor's
- ○ Don't know

Gender

1 What is your gender?

- ○ Male
- ○ Female

Region

1 Which of the categories comes closest to the type of place you were living in when you were 16 years old?

- ○ In open country but not on a farm
- ○ In a small city or town (under 50,000)
- ○ In a suburb near a large city

- ○ On a farm
- ○ In a medium size city (50,000-250,000)
- ○ In a large city (over 250,000)

2 what state or foreign country were you living when you were 16 years old?

social status/income

1 We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are pretty well satisfied with your present financial situation, more or less satisfied, or not satisfied at all?

- ○ Pretty well satisfied
- ○ Not satisfied at all

- ○ More or less satisfied
- ○ Don't know

2 During the last few years, has your financial situation been getting better, worse, or has it stayed the same?

- ○ Getting better
- ○ Stayed the same
- ○ Not applicable

- ○ Getting worse
- ○ Don't know

3 With American families in general, would you say your family income is far below average, below average, average, above average, or far above average? (Just your best guess.)

- ○ Far below average
- ○ Average
- ○ Far above average
- ○ Not applicable

- ○ Below average
- ○ Above average
- ○ Don't know

4 Living where you do now and meeting the expenses you consider necessary, what would be the very smallest amount of income per month, after taxes, your household would need to make ends meet?

- ○ $0 - 500
- ○ $501 - 1000
- ○ $1001 - 5000
- ○ $5001 +
- ○ REFUSED
- ○ Don't know
- ○ Not applicable

5 What is the smallest amount of money a family of four (husband, wife and two children) needs each week to get along in this community?

- ○ 0 - $249
- ○ $250 - 499
- ○ $500 - 749
- ○ $750 +
- ○ Don't know
- ○ Not applicable

6 In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall last year (before taxes, that is)?

Under $1,000

Age

1 What is your date of birth?

month --   day --   year

Religion

1 In what religion were you raised?

- ○ Judaism
- ○ Christianity
- ○ Islam
- ○ Buddhism
- ○ Hinduism
- ○ Other Eastern
- ○ Native American
- ○ Inter-Nondenomenational
- ○ None
- ○ Don't know
- ○ Other (SPECIFY RELIGION AND/OR CHURCH AND DENOMINATION)

2 Do you consider yourself to be Jewish?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

3 How often do you attend religious services?

- ○ Never
- ○ Less than once a year
- ○ About once or twice a year
- ○ Several times a year
- ○ About once a month
- ○ 2-3 times a month
- ○ Nearly every week
- ○ Every week
- ○ Several times a week
- ○ Every Day

Affiliation

1 Please indicate your answer in the table below.

	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform	Unaffiliated	Catholic	Mainline Protestants	Evangelical Christian Protestants	Orthodox Christian	Muslims	Other	Not Applicable
What is your affiliation	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
What is your best friend's affiliation	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Affiliation of second best Friend	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Affiliation of third best Friend	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Affiliation											

of fourth best Friend	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Affiliation of fifth best Friend	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Affiliation continued

1 About how many friends do you have?

- ○ 1
- ○ 3
- ○ 5 - 9
- ○ 30 or more
- ○ Not applicable (no friends)

- ○ 2
- ○ 4
- ○ 10 - 29
- ○ Don't know

2 How many of your friends are Orthodox Jews?

- ○ 1
- ○ 3
- ○ 5 - 9
- ○ 30 or more
- ○ Not applicable

- ○ 2
- ○ 4
- ○ 10 - 29
- ○ Don't know

3 How many of your friends are Conservatives Jews?

- ○ 1
- ○ 3
- ○ 5 - 9
- ○ 30 or more
- ○ Not applicable

- ○ 2
- ○ 4
- ○ 10 - 29
- ○ Don't know

4 How many of your friends are Reforms Jews?

- ○ 1
- ○ 3
- ○ 5 - 9
- ○ 30 or more
- ○ Not applicable

- ○ 2
- ○ 4
- ○ 10 - 29
- ○ Don't know

5 How many of your friends are Unaffiliated?

- ○ 1
- ○ 3
- ○ 5 - 9
- ○ 30 or more
- ○ Not applicable

- ○ 2
- ○ 4
- ○ 10 - 29
- ○ Don't know

6 How many of your friends are Catholics?

- ○ 1
- ○ 3
- ○ 5 - 9
- ○ 30 or more
- ○ Not applicable

- ○ 2
- ○ 4
- ○ 10 - 29
- ○ Don't know

7 How many of your friends are Mainline Protestants ?

- ○ 1
- ○ 3
- ○ 5 - 9
- ○ 30 or more
- ○ Not applicable

- ○ 2
- ○ 4
- ○ 10 - 29
- ○ Don't know

8 How many of your friends are Evangelical Christian Protestants?

- ○ 1
- ○ 3

- ○ 2
- ○ 4

○ 5 - 9   ○ 10 - 29
○ 30 or more   ○ Don't know
○ Not applicable

9 How many of your friends are Orthodox Christians?
○ 1   ○ 2
○ 3   ○ 4
○ 5 - 9   ○ 10 - 29
○ 30 or more   ○ Don't know
○ Not applicable

10 How many of your friends are Muslims?
○ 1   ○ 2
○ 3   ○ 4
○ 5 - 9   ○ 10 - 29
○ 30 or more   ○ Don't know
○ Not applicable

Various groups of people

1 Now I'm going to ask you about different types of contact with various groups of people. In each situation would you please tell me whether you would be very much in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat opposed, or very much opposed to it happening?

	Strongly favor	Favor	Neither favor nor oppose	Oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know
Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were orthodox Jews?	○	○	○	○	○	○
Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were Conservative Jews?	○	○	○	○	○	○
Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were Reform Jews?	○	○	○	○	○	○
Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were Unaffiliated?	○	○	○	○	○	○
Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were Catholics?	○	○	○	○	○	○
Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were Mainline Protestants?	○	○	○	○	○	○
Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were Evangelical Christian Protestants?	○	○	○	○	○	○
Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were Orthodox Christians?	○	○	○	○	○	○
Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were Muslims?	○	○	○	○	○	○
What about having a close relative marry someone that is an Orthodox? Would you be very in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat opposed, or very opposed to it happening?	○	○	○	○	○	○
How about having a close relative or family member marry a Conservative?	○	○	○	○	○	○
A Reform	○	○	○	○	○	○
An Unaffiliated?	○	○	○	○	○	○
A Catholic?	○	○	○	○	○	○
A Mainline Protestant?	○	○	○	○	○	○
An Evangelical Christian Protestant?	○	○	○	○	○	○
An Orthodox Christian?	○	○	○	○	○	○
A Muslim?	○	○	○	○	○	○

2 When you think about yourself, how important is your affiliation group membership to your sense of who you are?

○ Very important   ○ Moderately important

120

○ Slightly important   ○ Not at all important
○ Don't know   ○ Not applicable

Orthodox

Now, I would like to ask you some questions about an Orthodox Jew who admits that he/she is against adopting the modernity values

1   Suppose he/she wants to make a speech in your community, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

   ○ Yes
   ○ No
   ○ Don't know

2   Suppose he/she wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

   ○ Yes
   ○ No
   ○ Don't know

3   Suppose he/she is a television talk show broadcaster. Should he be fired, or not?

   ○ Should be fired
   ○ Not be fired
   ○ Don't know

4   Should he/she be put in jail, or not?

   ○ Yes
   ○ No
   ○ Don't know

5   If such person wanted to make a speech in your city (town, community) promoting his/her ideology, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

   ○ Yes
   ○ No
   ○ Don't know

6   If some people in your community suggested that a book he/she wrote promoting his/her ideology should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book or not?

   ○ Yes
   ○ No
   ○ Don't know

7   Suppose he/she advertizes a brand of soap. Somebody in your community suggests you stop buying that soap. Would you stop, or not?

   ○ Would stop
   ○ Would not stop
   ○ Don't know

Conservative

Now, I would like to ask you some questions about a Conservative Jew who admits that he/she is against intermarriages and same sex marriages

1   Suppose he/she wants to make a speech in your community, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

   ○ Yes
   ○ No
   ○ Don't know

2   Suppose he/she wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

   ○ Yes
   ○ No
   ○ Don't know

3   Suppose he/she is a television talk show broadcaster. Should he/she be fired, or not?

○ Should be fired
○ Not be fired
○ Don't know

4 Should he/she be put in jail, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

5 If such person wanted to make a speech in your city (town, community) promoting his/her ideology, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

6 If some people in your community suggested that a book he/she wrote promoting his/her ideology should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

7 Suppose he/she advertizes a brand of soap. Somebody in your community suggests you stop buying that soap. Would you stop, or not?

○ Would stop
○ Would not stop
○ Don't know

Reform

Now, I would like to ask you some questions about a Reform Jew who admits that he/she is against the Rabbis role within Jewish religion and wants to adopt only Judaic rules that fit with his/her way of thinking

1 Suppose he/she wants to make a speech in your community, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

2 Suppose he/she wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

3 Suppose he/she is a television talk show broadcaster. Should he/she be fired, or not?

○ Should be fired
○ Not be fired
○ Don't know

4 Should he/she be put in jail, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

5 If such person wanted to make a speech in your city (town, community) promoting his/her ideology, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

6 If some people in your community suggested that a book he/she wrote promoting his/her ideology should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book or not?

○ Yes

○ No
○ Don't know

7 Suppose he/she advertizes a brand of soap. Somebody in your community suggests you stop buying that soap. Would you stop, or not?

○ Would stop
○ Would not stop
○ Don't know

Unaffiliated

Now, I would like to ask you some questions about an Unaffiliated Jew who admits that he/she is against all churches and religion.

1 Suppose he/she wants to make a speech in your community, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

2 Suppose he/she wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

3 Suppose he/she is a television talk show broadcaster. Should he/she be fired, or not?

○ Should be fired
○ Not be fired
○ Don't know

4 Should he/she be put in jail, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

5 If such person wanted to make a speech in your city (town, community) promoting his/her ideology, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

6 If some people in your community suggested that a book he/she wrote promoting his/her ideology should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

7 Suppose he/she advertizes a brand of soap. Somebody in your community suggests you stop buying that soap. Would you stop, or not?

○ Would stop
○ Would not stop
○ Don't know

Catholic

Now, I would like to ask you some questions about a Catholic who blames the Jews for the death of Christ.

1 Suppose he/she wants to make a speech in your community, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

2
Suppose he/she wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor

removing it, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

3 Suppose he/she is a television talk show broadcaster. Should he/she be fired, or not?

○ Should be fired
○ Not be fired
○ Don't know

4 Should he/she be put in jail, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

5 If such person wanted to make a speech in your city (town, community) promoting his/her ideology, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

6 If some people in your community suggested that a book he/she wrote promoting his/her ideology should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

7 Suppose he/she advertizes a brand of soap. Somebody in your community suggests you stop buying that soap. Would you stop, or not?

○ Would stop
○ Would not stop
○ Don't know

Mainline Protestant

Now, I would like to ask you some questions about a Mainline Protestant who admits that he/she is against Roman Catholics.

1 Suppose he/she wants to make a speech in your community, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

2 Suppose he/she wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

3 Suppose he/she is a television talk show broadcaster. Should he/she be fired, or not?

○ Should be fired
○ Not be fired
○ Don't know

4 Should he/she be put in jail, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

5 If such person wanted to make a speech in your city (town, community) promoting his/her ideology, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No

○ Don't know

6 If some people in your community suggested that a book he/she wrote promoting his/her ideology should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

7 Suppose he/she advertizes a brand of soap. Somebody in your community suggests you stop buying that soap. Would you stop, or not?

○ Would stop
○ Would not stop
○ Don't know

Evangelical Christian Protestant

Now, I would like to ask you some questions about an Evangelical Christian Protestant who admits that he/she tries to proselytize the Jews.

1 Suppose he/she wants to make a speech in your community, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

2 Suppose he/she wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

3 Suppose he/she is a television talk show broadcaster. Should he/she be fired, or not?

○ Should be fired
○ Not be fired
○ Don't know

4 Should he/she be put in jail, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

5 If such person wanted to make a speech in your city (town, community) promoting his/her ideology, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

6 If some people in your community suggested that a book he/she wrote promoting his/her ideology should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

7 Suppose he/she advertizes a brand of soap. Somebody in your community suggests you stop buying that soap. Would you stop, or not?

○ Would stop
○ Would not stop
○ Don't know

Orthodox Christian

Now, I would like to ask you some questions about an Orthodox Christian who argues that Jewish people are not God's beloved any more.

1 Suppose he/she wants to make a speech in your community, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

2 Suppose he/she wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

3 Suppose he/she is a television talk show broadcaster. Should he/she be fired, or not?

○ Should be fired
○ Not be fired
○ Don't know

4 Should he/she be put in jail, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

5 If such person wanted to make a speech in your city (town, community) promoting his/her ideology, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

6 If some people in your community suggested that a book he/she wrote promoting his/her ideology should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

7 Suppose he/she advertizes a brand of soap. Somebody in your community suggests you stop buying that soap. Would you stop, or not?

○ Would stop
○ Would not stop
○ Don't know

Muslim

Now, I would like to ask you some questions about a Muslim who admits that he/she is against the Jewish State.

1 Suppose he/she wants to make a speech in your community, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

2 Suppose he/she wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

3 Suppose he/she is a television talk show broadcaster. Should he/she be fired, or not?

○ Should be fired
○ Not be fired
○ Don't know

4 Should he/she be put in jail, or not?

○ Yes
○ No

○ Don't know

5 If such person wanted to make a speech in your city (town, community) promoting his/her ideology, should he/she be allowed to speak, or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

6 If some people in your community suggested that a book he/she wrote promoting his/her ideology should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book or not?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Don't know

7 Suppose he/she advertizes a brand of soap. Somebody in your community suggests you stop buying that soap. Would you stop, or not?

○ Would stop
○ Would not stop
○ Don't know

Opinions

1 Here are some opinions some people have expressed in connection with affiliation issues in the United States. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each one?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
Harmony among Jewish people in the United States is best achieved by down playing or ignoring religious differences.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Religious minority groups will never really fit in with mainstream Jewish American culture.	○	○	○	○	○	○
If we want to help create a harmonious society, we must recognize that each Jewish group has the right to maintain its own unique traditions.	○	○	○	○	○	○
In order to have a smoothly functioning Jewish community, members of minorities must better adapt to the ways of mainstream American Jewish culture.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Individuals who belong to the same Jewish group tend to be fairly similar to one another.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Orthodox people, Conservatives, Reforms, and Unaffiliated are very distinct and different from one another.	○	○	○	○	○	○

Feelings

1 Please indicate your answer in the table below.

	Very Warm	Very cool	Don't know	Not applicable
In general, how warm or cool do you feel towards Orthodox people?	○	○	○	○
In general, how warm or cool do you feel towards Conservatives?	○	○	○	○
In general, how warm or cool do you feel towards Reforms?	○	○	○	○
In general, how warm or cool do you feel towards Unaffiliated people?	○	○	○	○
In general, how warm or cool do you feel towards Catholics?	○	○	○	○
In general, how warm or cool do you feel towards Mainline Protestants?	○	○	○	○
In general, how warm or cool do you feel towards Evangelical Christian Protestants?	○	○	○	○
In general, how warm or cool do you feel towards Orthodox Christians?	○	○	○	○
In general, how warm or cool do you feel towards Muslims?	○	○	○	○

Attitudes

1 This survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a variety of social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, disagree with others, and to varying extents. Please mark your opinion as follows:

	Strongly	Moderately	Slightly agree	Slightly	Moderately	Strongly

	agree	agree		disagree	disagree	disagree
Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things.	○	○	○	○	○	○

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
Religion offers me comfort when sorrow and misfortune strike.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I try hard to carry religion over to all other dealings in life.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Synagogue membership helps establish a person in the community.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The purpose of prayer is to secure a happy and peaceful life.	○	○	○	○	○	○
What I believe doesn't matter as long as I lead a normal life.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I've often been keenly aware of the presence of a divine being.	○	○	○	○	○	○
My religious beliefs lie behind my whole approach to life.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Prayers said alone are as meaningful as when said during service.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The synagogue is most important as place to form social relationships.	○	○	○	○	○	○
If not prevented by circumstances, I attend synagogue once a week.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Religion is important for answering questions about life's activity.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Private religious thought and meditation is important to me.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The primary purpose of prayer is to gain relief and protection.	○	○	○	○	○	○

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
Education has led me to question some teachings of my synagogue.	○	○	○	○	○	○
It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the tensions in my relation to the world.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers.	○	○	○	○	○	○
I do not expect my religious convictions to change in the next few years.	○	○	○	○	○	○

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
I am sure the Bible contains no errors or contradictions.	○	○	○	○	○	○
It is very important for true Jewish to believe that the Bible is the infallible Word of God.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The Bible is the final and complete guide to						

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
mortality; it contains God's answers to all important questions about right and wrong.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Jewish people should not let themselves to be influenced by worldly ideas.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Jewish people must try hard to know and defend the true teaching of God's word.	○	○	○	○	○	○
The best education for a Jewish child is in a Jewish school with Jewish teachers.	○	○	○	○	○	○
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.	○	○	○	○	○	○
In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.	○	○	○	○	○	○
It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others	○	○	○	○	○	○
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups.	○	○	○	○	○	○
If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.	○	○	○	○	○	○
It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Inferior groups should stay in their place.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.	○	○	○	○	○	○
It would be good if groups could be equal.	○	○	○	○	○	○
Group equality should be our ideal.	○	○	○	○	○	○
All groups should be given an equal chance in practicing Judaism.	○	○	○	○	○	○
We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.	○	○	○	○	○	○
We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.	○	○	○	○	○	○
No group should dominate in the Jewish religion.	○	○	○	○	○	○

SEND

סובלנות פוליטית בקרב יהודים

השכלה

1   באיזו כיתה סיימת/ת בית ספר?

⚬ כיתה א׳   ⚬ כיתה ב׳
⚬ כיתה ג׳   ⚬ כיתה ד׳
⚬ כיתה ה׳   ⚬ כיתה ו׳
⚬ כיתה ז׳   ⚬ כיתה ח׳
⚬ כיתה ט׳   ⚬ כיתה י׳
⚬ כיתה י״א   ⚬ כיתה י״ב
⚬ לא למדתי לימודים פורמאליים

2 כמה שנים למדת/ה באוניברסיטה/מכללה (לא כולל לימודים שאינם לצורך קבלת תואר)

⚬ שנה אחת   ⚬ שנתיים
⚬ 3 שנים   ⚬ 4 שנים
⚬ 5 שנים   ⚬ 6 שנים
⚬ 7 שנים   ⚬ 8 שנים
⚬ לא למדתי באוניברסיטה

3 האם אתה מחזיק בתואר מאוניברסיטה/מכללה (אם כן, מה התואר הגבוה ביותר אותו את/אתה מחזיק/ה)?

⚬ תואר ראשון   ⚬ תואר שני
⚬ תואר שלישי   ⚬ לא

מיגדר

1 מה המיגדר שלך?

⚬ זכר   ⚬ נקבה

אזור

1 איזו מהקטגוריות הכי קרובה לסוג המקום בו גרת כשהיית/ה בן/בת 16?

⚬ חווה   ⚬ קיבוץ
⚬ עיר קטנה (פחות מ-50000)   ⚬ עיר בינונית (50000 עד 250000)
⚬ ליד עיר גדולה   ⚬ עיר גדולה (מעל 250000)

2 באיזו מקום בישראל או באיזו מדינה בחוץ לארץ גרת/ה כשהיית/ה בן/בת 16?

מצב חברתי/כלכלי

1 אני מתעניין באיך אנשים מסתדרים כלכלית בימים אלו. עד לרגע זה, רק לגבי או לגבי המשפחה
שלך, האם היית/ה אומר שאת/ה מאוד מרוצה עם המצב הכלכלי שלך, פחות או יותר מרוצה, או
לא מרוצה בכלל עם המצב הכלכלי שלך?

מרוצה מאוד ○   פחות או יותר מרוצה ○
לא מרוצה בכלל ○   לא יודע ○

2 במשך השנים האחרונות, האם המצב הכלכלי שלך הפך להיות יותר טוב, יותר גרוע, או נשאר
אותו דבר?

הפך להיות יותר טוב ○   הפך להיות יותר גרוע ○
נשאר אותו דבר ○   לא יודע ○
לא רלוונטי ○

3 באופן כללי, בהשוואה למשפחות ישראליות אחרות, האם היית/ה אומר/ת שרמת ההכנסה שלך
היא הרבה מתחת לממוצע, מתחת לממוצע, כמו הממוצע, מעל לממוצע, או הרבה מעל לממוצע?
(נסה לנחש)

הרבה מתחת לממוצע ○   מתחת לממוצע ○
כמו הממוצע ○   מעל לממוצע ○
הרבה מעל הממוצע ○   לא יודע ○
לא רלוונטי ○

4 ברמת החיים שאת/ה חי היום, עם ההוצאות שאת/ה חושב/ת שהם חיוניות, מה צריך להיות
הסכום הקטן ביותר בחודש - אחרי מס - שהמשפחה שלך צריכה להרוויח כדי לכסות את
ההוצאות הללו. (הסכומים בשקלים חדשים)

○ 4000 - 2001   ○ 2000 - 0
○ + 20,001   ○ 20,000 - 4001
○ לא יודע   ○ לא מוכן לענות
○ לא רלוונטי

5 מה הסכום הקטן ביותר (בשקלים חדשים) שמשפחה בת 4 נפשות (בעל, אישה, ושני ילדים)
צריכים כל שבוע כדי להסתדר באזור שאת/ה חיי?

○ 1999 - 1000   ○ 999 - 0
○ + 3000   ○ 2999 - 2000
○ לא רלוונטי   ○ לא יודע

6 איזו מהקטגוריות הבאות מתאימה להכנסת המשפחה שלך (בשקלים חדשים), מכל מקורות
ההכנסה, במשך השנה שעברה?

[ ] פחות מ-4,000

גיל

1 מהו יום ההולדת שלך?

שנה [ ] חודש -- [ ] יום

דת

1 מה הייתה הדת עליה התחנכת/ה?

נצרות ○   יהדות ○
בודהיזם ○   איסלם ○
דת אחרת ○   אינדוניזם ○
לא יודע ○   אף דת ○
○ דת אחרת (פרט)

2 האם אתה מגדיר עצמך כיהודי?

○ לא   ○ כן

3 באיזו תדירות את/ה משתתף/ת בטקסים דתיים?

○ פחות מפעם בשנה   ○ אף פעם

○ כמה פעמים בשנה   ○ פעם או פעמיים בשנה בערך

○ פעמיים עד שלוש פעמים בחודש   ○ פעם בחודש בערך

○ כל שבוע   ○ כמעט כל שבוע

○ כל יום   ○ כמה פעמים בשבוע

מגזר דתי

1 בבקשה ציין את תשובתך :

	חרדי	דתי לאומי	מסורתי	חילוני	נוצרי	ערבי	אחר	לא רלוונטי
האם אתה מגדיר עצמך כחרדי, דתי לאומי, מסורתי, או חילוני?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
מה השייכות הדתית של החבר הקרוב ביותר שלך?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
מה השייכות הדתית של החבר השני הקרוב שלך?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
של החבר השלישי?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
של החבר הרביעי?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
של החבר החמישי?	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

המשך

1 כמה חברים יש לך?

2 ○   1 ○

4 ○   3 ○

29 - 10 ○   9 - 5 ○

לא יודע ○   30 או יותר ○

○ לא רלוונטי (אין חברים)

2 כמה מהחברים שלך הם חרדים?

2 ○   1 ○

4 ○   3 ○

29 - 10 ○   9 - 5 ○

לא יודע ○   30 או יותר ○

○ לא רלוונטי (אין חברים)

3 כמה מהחברים שלך הם דתיים?

2 ○   1 ○
4 ○   3 ○
29 - 10 ○   9 - 5 ○
לא יודע ○   30 או יותר ○
○ לא רלוונטי (אין חברים)

4 כמה מהחברים שלך הם מסורתיים?

2 ○   1 ○
4 ○   3 ○
29 - 10 ○   9 - 5 ○
לא יודע ○   30 או יותר ○
○ לא רלוונטי (אין חברים)

5 כמה מהחברים שלך הם חילונים?

2 ○   1 ○
4 ○   3 ○
29 - 10 ○   9 - 5 ○
לא יודע ○   30 או יותר ○
○ לא רלוונטי (אין חברים)

6 כמה מהחברים שלך הם נוצרים?

2 ○   1 ○
4 ○   3 ○
29 - 10 ○   9 - 5 ○
לא יודע ○   30 או יותר ○
○ לא רלוונטי (אין חברים)

7 כמה מהחברים שלך הם ערבים?

2 ○   1 ○
4 ○   3 ○
29 - 10 ○   9 - 5 ○
לא יודע ○   30 או יותר ○
○ לא רלוונטי (אין חברים)

קבוצות שונות של אנשים

1 כעת אני מתכוון לשאול שאלות על הקשר עם קבוצות שונות של אנשים. לכל אחד מהמצבים
הבאים, האם תוכל לומר לי בבקשה כמה את/ה מעדיף או לא מעדיף שהמצב יתרחש?

לא יודע	מאוד נגד המצב	נגד המצב	לא מעדיף וגם לא נגד המצב	מעדיף	מעדיף מאוד	
○	○	○	○	○	○	לחיות בשכונה שחצי מהשכנים שלך הם חרדים?
						לחיות בשכונה שחצי מהשכנים שלך

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○	○	○	○	○	○	הם דתיים?
○	○	○	○	○	○	לחיות בשכונה שחצי מהשכנים שלך הם מסורתיים?
○	○	○	○	○	○	לחיות בשכונה שחצי מהשכנים שלך הם חילונים?
○	○	○	○	○	○	לחיות בשכונה שחצי מהשכנים שלך הם נוצרים?
○	○	○	○	○	○	לחיות בשכונה שחצי מהשכנים שלך הם ערבים?
○	○	○	○	○	○	מה אם בן/בת משפחה קרוב/ה היה/הייתה מתחתנ/ת עם חרדי? האם היית/ה מעדיף שזה יקרה?
○	○	○	○	○	○	מה אם בן/בת משפחה קרוב/ה היה/הייתה מתחתנ/ת עם דתי לאומי?
○	○	○	○	○	○	עם מסורתי?
○	○	○	○	○	○	עם חילוני?
○	○	○	○	○	○	עם נוצרי
○	○	○	○	○	○	עם ערבי?

2 כאשר את/ה חושב/ת על עצמך, כמה השייכות הדתית חשובה לזהות שלך?

○ חשובה   ○ מאוד חשובה

○ לא חשובה בכלל   ○ לא כל כך חשובה

○ לא רלוונטי   ○ לא יודע

חרדי

עכשיו, אני רוצה לשאול אותך שאלות על חרדי שמצהיר שהוא מכבד רק את חוקי התורה ושהוא נגד גיוס לצבא.

1 נניח שהוא רוצה לנאום בציבור בקהילה שלך. האם צריך להרשות לו לדבר, או לא?

○ כן

○ לא

○ לא יודע

2 נניח שהוא כתב ספר שנמצא בספריה הציבורית. מישהו בקהילה שלך מציע להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית. האם אתה בעד להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית, או לא?

○ כן

○ לא

○ לא יודע

3 נניח שהוא מנחה בתוכנית טלוויזיה. האם צריך לפטר אותו, או לא?

○ צריך לפטר אותו

○ לא צריך לפטר אותו

○ לא יודע

4 האם צריך להכניס אותו לכלא, או לא?

○ כן
○ לא
○ לא יודע

5 אם איש שכזה היה רוצה לנאום בקהילה שלך כדי לקדם את האידיאולוגיות שלו, האם צריך
לאפשר לו לנאום, או לא?

○ כן
○ לא
○ לא יודע

6 אם משהו בקהילה שלך היה מציע להוציא מהספריה הציבורית ספר שאיש זה כתב, ומקדם את
האידיאולוגיה שלו. האם אתה בעד להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית, או לא?

○ כן
○ לא
○ לא יודע

7 נניח שאיש זה מקדם סבון של חברה מוכרת. מישהו בקהילה שלך מציע להפסיק לקנות את
הסבון הזה. האם אתה תפסיק, או לא?

○ אני אפסיק
○ אני לא אפסיק
○ לא יודע

דתי לאומי

עכשיו, אני רוצה לשאול אותך שאלות על דתי-לאומי שהוא בעד ארץ ישראל השלמה
אבל מנסה להתאים את חוקי התורה לשינויי הזמן.

1 נניח שהוא רוצה לנאום בציבור בקהילה שלך. האם צריך להרשות לו לדבר, או לא?

○ כן
○ לא
○ לא יודע

2 נניח שהוא כתב ספר שנמצא בספריה הציבורית. מישהו בקהילה שלך מציע להוציא את הספר
מהספריה הציבורית. האם אתה בעד להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית, או לא?

○ כן
○ לא
○ לא יודע

3 נניח שהוא מנחה בתוכנית טלוויזיה. האם צריך לפטר אותו, או לא?

○ צריך לפטר אותו
○ לא צריך לפטר אותו
○ לא יודע

4 האם צריך להכניס אותו לכלא, או לא?

○ כן
○ לא

○ לא יודע

5 אם איש שכזה היה רוצה לנאום בקהילה שלך כדי לקדם את האידיאולוגיות שלו, האם צריך
לאפשר לו לנאום, או לא?

○ כן

○ לא

○ לא יודע

6 אם משהו בקהילה שלך היה מציע להוציא מהספריה הציבורית ספר שאיש זה כתב, ומקדם את
האידיאולוגיה שלו. האם אתה בעד להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית, או לא?

○ כן

○ לא

○ לא יודע

7 נניח שאיש זה מקדם סבון של חברה מוכרת. מישהו בקהילה שלך מציע להפסיק לקנות את
הסבון הזה. האם אתה תפסיק, או לא?

○ אני אפסיק

○ אני לא אפסיק

○ לא יודע

מסורתי

עכשיו, אני רוצה לשאול אותך שאלות על יהודי מסורתי שמצהיר שהוא בעד קיום של מצוות
שהוא בוחר לקיים ורק כשהוא רוצה לקיים אותם.

1 נניח שהוא רוצה לנאום בציבור בקהילה שלך. האם צריך להרשות לו לדבר, או לא?

○ כן

○ לא

○ לא יודע

2 נניח שהוא כתב ספר שנמצא בספריה הציבורית. מישהו בקהילה שלך מציע להוציא את הספר
מהספריה הציבורית. האם אתה בעד להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית, או לא?

○ כן

○ לא

○ לא יודע

3 נניח שהוא מנחה בתוכנית טלוויזיה. האם צריך לפטר אותו, או לא?

○ צריך לפטר אותו

○ לא צריך לפטר אותו

○ לא יודע

4 האם צריך להכניס אותו לכלא, או לא?

○ כן

○ לא

○ לא יודע

5 אם איש שכזה היה רוצה לנאום בקהילה שלך כדי לקדם את האידיאולוגיות שלו, האם צריך
לאפשר לו לנאום, או לא?

◯ כן
◯ לא
◯ לא יודע

6 אם משהו בקהילה שלך היה מציע להוציא מהספריה הציבורית ספר שאיש זה כתב, ומקדם את האידיאולוגיה שלו. האם אתה בעד להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית, או לא?

◯ כן
◯ לא
◯ לא יודע

7 נניח שאיש זה מקדם סבון של חברה מוכרת. מישהו בקהילה שלך מציע להפסיק לקנות את הסבון הזה. האם אתה תפסיק, או לא?

◯ אני אפסיק
◯ אני לא אפסיק
◯ לא יודע

חילוני

עכשיו, אני רוצה לשאול אותך שאלות על חילוני שמצהיר שהוא מעוניין לחלוק זכויות אבל גם לחלוק חובות, ולכן הוא נגד מי שלא מוכן להתגייס לצבא.

1 נניח שהוא רוצה לנאום בציבור בקהילה שלך. האם צריך להרשות לו לדבר, או לא?

◯ כן
◯ לא
◯ לא יודע

2 נניח שהוא כתב ספר שנמצא בספריה הציבורית. מישהו בקהילה שלך מציע להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית. האם אתה בעד להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית, או לא?

◯ כן
◯ לא
◯ לא יודע

3 נניח שהוא מנחה בתוכנית טלוויזיה. האם צריך לפטר אותו, או לא?

◯ צריך לפטר אותו
◯ לא צריך לפטר אותו
◯ לא יודע

4 האם צריך להכניס אותו לכלא, או לא?

◯ כן
◯ לא
◯ לא יודע

5 אם איש שכזה היה רוצה לנאום בקהילה שלך כדי לקדם את האידיאולוגיות שלו, האם צריך לאפשר לו לנאום, או לא?

◯ כן
◯ לא
◯ לא יודע

6 אם משהו בקהילה שלך היה מציע להוציא מהספריה הציבורית ספר שאיש זה כתב, ומקדם את
האידיאולוגיה שלו. האם אתה בעד להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית, או לא?

○ כן
○ לא
○ לא יודע

7 נניח שאיש זה מקדם סבון של חברה מוכרת. מישהו בקהילה שלך מציע להפסיק לקנות את
הסבון הזה. האם אתה תפסיק, או לא?

○ אני אפסיק
○ אני לא אפסיק
○ לא יודע

נוצרי

עכשיו, אני רוצה לשאול אותך שאלות על נוצרי שמצהיר שהוא מעוניין להמיר את דתך.

1 נניח שהוא רוצה לנאום לנאום בציבור בקהילה שלך. האם צריך להרשות לו לדבר, או לא?

○ כן
○ לא
○ לא יודע

2 נניח שהוא כתב ספר שנמצא בספריה הציבורית. מישהו בקהילה שלך מציע להוציא את הספר
מהספריה הציבורית. האם אתה בעד להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית, או לא?

○ כן
○ לא
○ לא יודע

3 נניח שהוא מנחה בתוכנית טלוויזיה. האם צריך לפטר אותו, או לא?

○ צריך לפטר אותו
○ לא צריך לפטר אותו
○ לא יודע

4 האם צריך להכניס אותו לכלא, או לא?

○ כן
○ לא
○ לא יודע

5 אם איש שכזה היה רוצה לנאום בקהילה שלך כדי לקדם את האידיאולוגיות שלו, האם צריך
לאפשר לו לנאום, או לא?

○ כן
○ לא
○ לא יודע

6 אם משהו בקהילה שלך היה מציע להוציא מהספריה הציבורית ספר שאיש זה כתב, ומקדם את
האידיאולוגיה שלו. האם אתה בעד להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית, או לא?

○ כן
○ לא

○ לא יודע

7 נניח שאיש זה מקדם סבון של חברה מוכרת. מישהו בקהילה שלך מציע להפסיק לקנות את הסבון הזה. האם אתה תפסיק, או לא?

○ אני אפסיק

○ אני לא אפסיק

○ לא יודע

ערבי

עכשיו, אני רוצה לשאול אותך שאלות על ערבי שמצהיר שהוא לא מכיר בקיומה של מדינת ישראל.

1 נניח שהוא רוצה לנאום בציבור בקהילה שלך. האם צריך להרשות לו לדבר, או לא?

○ כן

○ לא

○ לא יודע

2 נניח שהוא כתב ספר שנמצא בספריה הציבורית. מישהו בקהילה שלך מציע להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית. האם אתה בעד להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית, או לא?

○ כן

○ לא

○ לא יודע

3 נניח שהוא מנחה בתוכנית טלוויזיה. האם צריך לפטר אותו, או לא?

○ צריך לפטר אותו

○ לא צריך לפטר אותו

○ לא יודע

4 האם צריך להכניס אותו לכלא, או לא?

○ כן

○ לא

○ לא יודע

5 אם איש שכזה היה רוצה לנאום בקהילה שלך כדי לקדם את האידיאולוגיות שלו, האם צריך לאפשר לו לנאום, או לא?

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○ לא

○ לא יודע

6 אם משהו בקהילה שלך היה מציע להוציא מהספריה הציבורית ספר שאיש זה כתב, ומקדם את האידיאולוגיה שלו. האם אתה בעד להוציא את הספר מהספריה הציבורית, או לא?

○ כן

○ לא

○ לא יודע

7 נניח שאיש זה מקדם סבון של חברה מוכרת. מישהו בקהילה שלך מציע להפסיק לקנות את הסבון הזה. האם אתה תפסיק, או לא?

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○ אני אפסיק

○ אני לא אפסיק

○ לא יודע

דעות

1 הנה כמה דעות שאנשים הציגו בהקשר למדינת ישראל. עד כמה אתה מסכים או לא מסכים עם כל אחד מהם?

לא יודע	לא מסכים בכלל	לא מסכים	מסכים וגם לא מסכים	מסכים	מסכים מאוד	
○	○	○	○	○	○	הדרך הכי טובה להשיג הרמוניה חברתית בישראל היא להתעלם מהבדלים דתיים.
○	○	○	○	○	○	קבוצות דתיות קטנות לעולם לא יתאימו לתרבות הישראלית.
○	○	○	○	○	○	כדי לעזור להרמוניה בחברה הישראלית עלינו לתת לכל קבוצה דתית את הזכות לשמור על המסורת שלה.
○	○	○	○	○	○	כדי שהחברה הישראלית תתפקד באופן חלק, קבוצות דתיות חייבות לאמץ את התרבות הישראלית.
○	○	○	○	○	○	כל הדתיים הם אותו דבר.
○	○	○	○	○	○	חרדים,דתיים, מסורתיים וחילונים שונים מאוד אחד מהשני.

רגשות

1 בבקשה ציין את תשובתך :

לא רלוונטי	לא יודע	מאוד קריר	מאוד חמים	
○	○	○	○	באופן כללי, כמה אתה מרגיש חמימות או קרירות כלפי חרדים?
○	○	○	○	כלפי דתיים?
○	○	○	○	כלפי מסורתיים?
○	○	○	○	כלפי חילוניים?
○	○	○	○	כלפי נוצרים?
○	○	○	○	כלפי ערבים?

עמדות

1 החלק הזה של השאלון בודק דעות בנושאים חברתיים כלליים. את/ה לבטח תסכימ/י עם כמה מהם ותתנגד/י לאחרים ברמה כזו או אחרת. על פי רמת ההסכמה שלך או אי ההסכמה שלך סמן את המשבצת המתאימה.

לא מסכים בכלל	לא מסכים	לא כל כך מסכים	מסכים מעט	מסכים	מסכים מאוד	

לא מסכים בכלל	לא מסכים	לא כל כך מסכים	מסכים מעט	מסכים	מסכים מאוד	
○	○	○	○	○	○	ציות וכבוד לסמכות דתית היא הערך החשוב ביותר שילדים צריכים ללמוד
○	○	○	○	○	○	המדע, כבודו במקומו מונח, אבל יש הרבה נושאים חשובים שאינם יכולים להיתפס במוח האנושי
○	○	○	○	○	○	לכל אדם צריכה להיות אמונה שלמה בכח על טבעי אליו הוא מציית ללא פקפוק
○	○	○	○	○	○	יום אחד יוכח שהאסטרולוגיה יכולה להסביר המון דברים
לא מסכים בכלל	**לא מסכים**	**לא כל כך מסכים**	**מסכים מעט**	**מסכים**	**מסכים מאוד**	
○	○	○	○	○	○	הדת מנחמת אותי כאשר רע לי
○	○	○	○	○	○	אני מנסה להכניס את הדת לכל תחומי החיים שלי
○	○	○	○	○	○	הקהילה בבית הכנסת עוזרת למקם את האינדיבידואל בקהילה
○	○	○	○	○	○	מטרת התפילה היא להבטיח חיים שקטים ושלווים
○	○	○	○	○	○	מה שאני מאמין בו אינו משנה כל עוד אני מנהל חיים נורמאליים
○	○	○	○	○	○	אני מודע לנוכחות של ישויות אלוקיות
○	○	○	○	○	○	האמונות הדתיות שלי מגבות כל פעולה בחיי
○	○	○	○	○	○	ברכות מחוץ לתפילה משמעותיות בדיוק כמו שהם נאמרות בתוך התפילה
○	○	○	○	○	○	בית הכנסת הוא המקום החשוב ביותר ליצור קשרים חברתיים
○	○	○	○	○	○	אני הולך לבית הכנסת פעם בשבוע, אלא אם זה נבצר ממני בגלל הנסיבות
○	○	○	○	○	○	הדת חשובה כדי לענות על שאלות הנוגעות לפעולות יומיומיות
○	○	○	○	○	○	התבודדות, חשיבה דתית, ומדיטציה דתית חשובה בשבילי
○	○	○	○	○	○	המטרה העקרית של התפילות לקבל הקלה והגנה
לא מסכים בכלל	**לא מסכים**	**לא כל כך מסכים**	**מסכים מעט**	**מסכים**	**מסכים מאוד**	
						ההשכלה הביאה אותי לפקפק

לא מסכים בכלל	לא מסכים	לא כל כך מסכים	מסכים מעט	מסכים	מסכים מאוד	
○	○	○	○	○	○	בכמה מהדברים שמלמדים בבית הכנסת
○	○	○	○	○	○	אפשר לומר שאני מעריך את הספק וחוסר הביטחון שיש לי בדת
○	○	○	○	○	○	המתח הגובר שבין העולם לבין הדת מניע אותי לשאול שאלות דתיות
○	○	○	○	○	○	השאלות הדתיות שאני שואל קשורות לנסיון הדתי שלי, לא כך לגבי התשובות
○	○	○	○	○	○	אני לא צופה שהאמונות הדתיות שלי ישתנו בשנים הבאות
לא מסכים בכלל	**לא מסכים**	**לא כל כך מסכים**	**מסכים מעט**	**מסכים**	**מסכים מאוד**	
○	○	○	○	○	○	אני בטוח/ה שבתנ״ך אין שגיאות וסתירות.
○	○	○	○	○	○	מאוד חשוב שיהודי יאמין שהתנ״ך הוא דבר האמת של בורא העולם.
○	○	○	○	○	○	התנ״ך הוא הדרך לחיי נצח, הוא כולל את כל השאלות החשובות של מה נכון ומה לא נכון.
○	○	○	○	○	○	אסור ליהודים להיות מושפעים מהבלי העולם ורעיונותיו
○	○	○	○	○	○	על היהודים ללמוד בכל כוחם לדעת ולהגן על דברי אלוקים חיים.
○	○	○	○	○	○	החינוך הטוב ביותר לילד יהודי הוא ללמוד בבית ספר דתי, עם מורים דתיים.
לא מסכים בכלל	**לא מסכים**	**לא כל כך מסכים**	**מסכים מעט**	**מסכים**	**מסכים מאוד**	
○	○	○	○	○	○	קבוצות דתיות יהודיות שונות הם פשוט נחותות מקבוצות יהודיות אחרות
○	○	○	○	○	○	כדי לקבל מה שרוצים, לפעמים צריך לכפות כח על קבוצות יהודיות אחרות
○	○	○	○	○	○	זה בסדר אם לקבוצות דתיות שונות יש יותר הזדמנויות בחיים מאשר לאחרים
○	○	○	○	○	○	כדי להתקדם בחיים, לפעמים צריך לדרוך על אחרים
						אם קבוצות דתיות מסוימות היו

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○	○	○	○	○	○	נשארות במקומם, היו לנו פחות בעיות
○	○	○	○	○	○	זה כנראה טוב שקבוצות דתיות מסוימות נמצאות בראש ואחרות בתחתית
○	○	○	○	○	○	קבוצות נחותות מבחינה דתית צריכות להשאר במקום שלהם
○	○	○	○	○	○	לפעמים קבוצות דתיות אחרות משלנו צריכות להשאר במקומם
○	○	○	○	○	○	זה יכול להיות טוב אם היה שוויון בין קבוצות דתיות יהודיות שונות בחברה
○	○	○	○	○	○	שוויון חברתי צריך להיות המצב האידיאלי
○	○	○	○	○	○	צריך לתת לכל הקבוצות הדתיות היהודיות הזדמנות שווה
○	○	○	○	○	○	צריך לעשות כל מה שניתן כדי ליצור שוויון בין הקבוצות היהודיות השונות
○	○	○	○	○	○	צריכות להיות פחות בעיות אם נתייחס לאנשים יותר בשיוויון
○	○	○	○	○	○	אף קבוצה דתית לא צריכה להיות דומיננטית בדת היהודית

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