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# Reproduction, Resistance, and Supranational Language Management: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Role of Soros-Funded English Language Programs in the Building of Open Societies

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REPRODUCTION, RESISTANCE, AND

SUPRANATIONAL LANGUAGE MANAGEMENT:

A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

OF THE ROLE OF SOROS-FUNDED ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROGRAMS

IN THE BUILDING OF OPEN SOCIETIES

A Dissertation

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Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

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Indiana University of Pennsylvania

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Indiana University of Pennsylvania
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Title: Reproduction, Resistance, and Supranational Language Management: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Role of Soros-Funded English Language Programs in the Building of Open Societies

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This dissertation joins the debate over the global hegemony of English by investigating discursive relationships between English, English language teaching (ELT), and the building of open societies. Following Phillipson (1992, p. 2), I sought to relate how "language pedagogy supports the spread and promotion of [English], to the political, economic, military, and cultural pressures that propel it forward." To do so, I analyzed the discourses of the Open Society Institute Soros Foundations Network (OSI/SFN), which works to build open societies globally. Crucially, OSI/SFN constructed English and ELT as necessary to this work through its English Language Programs (ELP) initiative, managed from New York and implemented throughout former Soviet bloc countries from 1994-2005.

Using critical discourse analysis, I first analyzed how the New York-based ELP discourse constructed English, ELT, the role of English in building open societies, and the actors involved in these programs. I then mapped identified discourse chains as they were reproduced, re-scripted, transformed, or resisted in (a) the written discourses of local Soros-funded English language programs and projects in post-communist countries; and (b) in the discourses of actors involved in these programs.

Multiple findings emerged. The New York ELP discourse effectuated a form of supranational language management, fostered supranational identity through "re-scaling" space

(Fairclough, 2006), reproduced Holliday's (2005) "native-speakerism," qualified access to ELP, and constructed English as *the* language of open society. Local discourses both reproduced the necessity of English to building open societies and started new discourse chains promoting linguistic diversity, local ownership and expertise, and greater inclusiveness. Interview participants constructed English as the lingua franca of open societies, but a negotiated, simplified, international English detached from culture. They further voiced the risks of EU accession and the dominance of English as Othering, marginalizing, and threatening the countries, peoples, and languages east of Western Europe.

These findings accentuate the need for English language aid projects to include more local stakeholders in decision-making at all levels, invite two-way exchange of program design and instruction, and promote "critical language awareness" (Fairclough, 1992a) by integrating *local* knowledge, discourse conventions, methodological diversity, and context-sensitivity into ELT worldwide.

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As I move toward the close of this research, I am overwhelmed by the people who have been with me on this journey. First, my family, and first, my father and mother, Kent and Karen Minett, who *always* believed in and supported (or forgave) the choices I made in my life: from joining the Peace Corps (the people of whom I also thank, especially Lyman, Ted, Kerry), to staying so long in Hungary (nine years, and I thank my friends, colleagues, and students there: Köszönöm, nagyon!), to working in Afghanistan last summer (I'm sorry, Mom and Terry, for all the lost sleep, and thank you, Delair and Nazir, for helping keep me safe in spite of the risks to yourselves and your beautiful families). Dad, we lost you in 2000, but not really. I have felt you with me: on the trains and buses and vans and planes which took me from Sarajevo to Transylvania to the Salang Pass of the Hindu Kush to the snowy ruins of a castle in Sirok, Hungary, where Paul and I went sledding and missed the last bus back to Eger—you would have laughed and laughed at all the new stories. Mom, you helped me start my Ph.D. and my years in Pennsylvania: Even though you had just gone through major surgery, you leaned in pain on a shopping cart and bought me pillows, sheets, a bed, a desk, so I could begin a new life. You've been at the airport. You've been at the bus stop. There, always there, for me. Terry (and Tim, Gail, Robby, Lauren), you used your summer vacation to move me out to Indiana (just as you did to Virginia years ago), and I am so grateful still. David, my brother, you make me laugh and you make me proud, and I'm so glad Steph could see a little of my world. Sheila: a hug. I love you all.

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This dissertation, *Reproduction, Resistance, and Supranational Language Management: A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Role of Soros-Funded English Language Programs in the Building of Open Societies*, by Amy Jo Minett, was awarded "Pass With Distinction" in recognition of its exceptional quality and scholarship. The award was granted November 2nd, 2009, by the members of the Dissertation Committee: Dr. Dan J. Tannacito (Chair), Dr. Ben Rafoth, and Dr. Michael M. Williamson.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Origins of the Study

In his 1992 publication *Linguistic Imperialism*, Robert Phillipson cited a British Council

Annual Report (1989/90): "In the wake of the disintegration of communist states, an estimated

100,000 new teachers of English are needed for 30 million learners in Central and Eastern

Europe in the 1990s" (p. 6). Phillipson then went on to share that—even before the Berlin Wall

had been wholly dismantled and the pieces of stone hauled away to museums and town squares

and mantelpieces throughout the former Soviet satellite countries—the British Foreign Secretary

had declared "that Britain aims to replace Russian with English as the second language

throughout Eastern Europe" (quoted in Phillipson, 1992, p. 9).

Quite by chance, I became one of those 100,000 English teachers working in Central and

Eastern Europe in the 1990s: predominantly in Hungary, where I taught for nine years, though I

was also a part of outreach teaching ventures in Romania and Serbia. I went as a Peace Corps

volunteer initially, but after my service, I stayed on through private contract with a teachers'

training college. In this capacity, I worked to retrain Russian teachers whose jobs were

suddenly—after the fall of communism—obsolete; I traveled to Romania once a month for five

years to teach ethnic Hungarian English teachers in Transylvania; I spent my summers teaching

English to business executives at International House-Hungary, and teaching English to Bosnian

Muslim refugees; and I finished the decade working at a regional university founded and funded

in large part by the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network.

To accomplish my work, I had to bribe border guides, apologize for NATO bombs, and

anonymously help edit a letter to the United Nations written by a Russian student on behalf of a

Chechen warlord. I was scolded for not dropping a portion of a US-AID grant into the pocket of

the college president (the former head of the former Ho Chi Minh University's former Marxist department). I taught English to an ethnic minority whose first language had been oppressed and suppressed for more than 40 years. I helped revise a Hungarian colleague's English translation of a Ukrainian novel about Chernobyl (the Ukrainian author played a lead role in the Chernobyl evacuation and "clean-up"; he has since committed suicide). I worked in a refugee camp for Bosnian Muslims who had fled the war in the Balkans—those flashes of light just over the Hungarian border. And through it all, I was a Westerner—with power and privilege—in an East European, post-communist context, with an American passport in my pocket and a strong embassy at my back. What I wasn't—at least at first—was reflective or reflexive. I trotted in with idealism and a mission, but out with a lot of doubts.

This dissertation begins, therefore, with hard questions, both from the literature and from my own life. Phillipson (1992) asked, for instance, "How can one relate the micro level of ELT (English Language Teaching) professionalism to the macro level of global inequality?" (p. 2). And then, importantly:

> How can we, in a theoretically informed way, relate the global role of English, and the way in which language pedagogy supports the spread and promotion of the language, to the political, economic, military, and cultural pressures that propel it forward? How can analysis probe beyond individual experience and reflection to the processes and structures which are in operation at the international, national, group and personal levels? (p. 2)

These questions, encountered when I returned to the United States to begin my Ph.D., haunted me. In order to make sense of my own experiences in Central and Eastern Europe, I began to read, therefore, from a growing body of important research which critically examines the global spread of English and implications thereof, such as loss of or threat to indigenous languages, questions of access, and the economic marginalization and political isolation of non-

Anglophone countries.[1] I discovered that publications, conferences, and personal correspondences amongst TESOL educators were tackling questions regarding native vs. non-native teachers (Holliday, 2005; Medgyes, 1992), English versus Englishes (Widdowson, 1994; Widdowson, 1997), and cultural biases in standardized testing (Hamp-Lyons, 1991). Of particular relevance to my past experiences and future professional goals, I also encountered critical research into the role of English Language Teaching (ELT) and English language aid projects in periphery countries,[2] the less technologically and economically powerful nations of the world which are, in many cases, also post-colonial. This strand of critical research, I soon learned, asked many of the same questions I've carried with me since returning from Central and Eastern Europe, and it prompted many more. This, then, was the research conversation I wanted to join.

The beginnings of the debate over the role of English in the periphery can be summarized this way. In a study of English linguistic imperialism, Phillipson (1992) situated ELT in a macro-societal theoretical framework that explored how ELT and the spread of English have been consciously promoted in the service of British and American political and economic interests. Combining a macro- and micro-theoretical perspective, Pennycook (1994) explored how English language learners in the periphery countries of Malaysia and Singapore used and appropriated English in ways which may reflect and reify "postcolonial and anticolonial struggle" (p. 257). Taking a micro-level perspective, Holliday (1994) examined the multiple conflicts which occur between expatriate ELT project facilitators from center countries and their local counterparts in

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[1] See, e.g., Benesch, 2001; Crystal, 2000; Hedge & Whitney, 1996; Kachru, 1994, 1992; Kramsch, 2001; Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gounari, 2003; Tollefson,1995.

[2] The terms "center" and "periphery" originate in Galtung's (1971) theory of imperialism, where "center" refers to the economically and technologically more "developed" countries of the West, "periphery" to the less developed nations, many of which are also post-colonial. I struggle somewhat with using these terms, since any discursive construction of space assumes a particular geopolitical and ideological perspective.

periphery contexts such as Egypt and Indonesia. In a longitudinal ethnographic study of the

Tamil community in Sri Lanka, Canagarajah (1999) investigated how periphery countries

appropriate English for their own purposes, in the process articulating "pedagogical approaches

that reconcile the conflicts [English language learners] face in acquiring and using English in the

periphery" (p. 173).

These studies addressed and sought to illuminate the implications of the global spread of

English by examining how the interests of center countries are being reproduced and/or resisted

in nations of the periphery. None of the studies, however, explored the role of ELT in the so-

called "Second World," the emerging democracies of post-communist Central, Eastern, and

South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, transition countries which—in the literature

of nationalism, political science, history, and international relations—have likewise been situated

as periphery and post-colonial.[3] This neglect is particularly striking because—since the collapse

of the Soviet Union (along with the end of compulsory Russian courses throughut the former

Eastern Bloc countries)—post-communist Europe has experienced a dramatic call for and rise in

English language educators and education, an increase Phillipson drew attention to in the

opening quote of this chapter, and which has taken on particular urgency in light of the swiftly

changing political landscape of Europe. Most notably, the advent of accession to the European

Union is bringing new pressures and paradoxes to bear on these countries in transition which are

vying for—or have achieved—EU membership.

The question of language may be the most striking paradox of this process. As Breidbach

(2002) made clear, in spite of a proliferation of European Commission White Papers and

recommendations intended to encourage individual multilingualism in the EU, "no prophetical

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[3] See, e.g., Smith, Law, Wilson, Bohr, and Allworth, 1998.

talent is needed to state that English is very likely to evolve into one such—if not the only—lingua franca in Europe" (pp. 275-276).

And yet, to date, very few studies have grappled critically with the implications of the spread of English and ELT in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (which, for the sake of brevity, I abbreviate as CESEE-fSU).[4] The present study thus addresses this neglect by investigating the discourses of English language programs funded by the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network (OSI/SFN), a private grant-making foundation based in New York City and committed to building open societies in more than sixty countries globally. Its starting point, however, and its longest history of English language aid work, has been in the transition countries of CESEE-fSU. OSI/SFN thus seemed an ideal organization to study and learn from its English Language Programs (ELP) initiative, a specific program which ran from 1994-2005; and its former and ongoing programs in the region which were supported by the ELP initiative and/or necessitate English to function.[5]

Accordingly, in this dissertation, I first examine how the official written discourse of the New York-based OSI/SFN ELP initiative constructed and conceptualized English, English Language Teaching (ELT), the actors involved in its English language programs, and the relationship between English, ELT, and the building of open societies. This analysis leads to the identification of patterns of *discourse fragments* which eventually, through repetition, cohere into *discourse chains*. I then explore the written ELP discourses of *local*[6] Soros Foundations, programs, and projects, in order to map these discourse chains as they flow from the central

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[4] A fascinating exception can be found in Duszak (1997).

[5] As the OSI/SFN ELP initiative first provided English language education to multiple actors in multiple programs as part of its mission, I group both the official and spin-off, support programs under the acronym ELP and note distinctions in text as needed.

[6] I use the term "local" to describe the discourses of regional, national, *and* local foundations, the constant repetition of which became too cumbersome in the writing of this dissertation. I myself somewhat "re-scale" space (Fairclough, 2006) by so doing. See Footnote two.

office (OSI/SFN ELP based in New York) into English language programs and projects in the countries of CESEE-fSU. My purpose here was to see what language of the official New York-based ELP discourse is reproduced, re-scripted, transformed, or resisted, and why. In other words, following Blackledge (2005) and Bakhtin's (1981) conceptualization of the dialogic nature of discourse, I traced which *discourse chains*—and, ultimately, which meanings and policies—become increasingly stabilized, legitimized, and authoritative—or not—over time and across multiple spaces and contexts.

In my research, I also felt it imperative to include the voices and views of actors involved in local OSI/SFN-funded English language programs throughout the countries of CESEE-fSU, in order to bring to light their perspectives on English language teaching in their communities and their views on the role of English in the creation of open societies. Hence, I analyzed not only text, but also talk, in order to map reproductions, transformations, and resistances to policies and practices which began in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse. From analysis of these discourse chains, or "the historically rooted flow of text and speech, respectively *knowledge*, through time" (Jaeger quoted in Langer, 1998, p. 25; italics added), I hoped to bring to the surface and question the socially and discursively constructed "knowledge" of these programs and to map how that "knowledge" is received, adapted, applied, or resisted. Findings from this study should provide meaningful lessons for English language aid project developers and teachers in transition countries by (a) helping us identify and interrogate the biases and interests of accepted, status quo "knowledge" of ELT and those who pass it along; and (b) contributing to a more nuanced and detailed picture of the pressures and practices which, as Phillipson (1992) noted, continue to propel the spread of English and ELT forward globally. I thus extend the debate over English linguistic imperialism and the particular politics of ELT in post-communist nations.

The first section of this chapter has narrated the origins of this study. In the second section, I review the beginnings of the debate over ELT in periphery nations, in order to underscore the purpose for and significance of this study as well as the research questions which drive it.[7] These questions necessitate a closer look at the particular role American philanthropic foundations have played in the global spread and rise of English, which makes up the third section of this chapter. In the fourth section, I introduce the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network (OSI/SFN), an organization which I contend both converges with—and departs distinctly from—the paradigm of American foundation work this chapter describes, a paradigm—the literature argues—which is underpinned by the post-World War Two expansionist tendencies of the United States. Because of these departures, OSI/SFN provides an especially rich case for the kind of in-depth examination this dissertation undertakes, for such a study will help create an enriched and nuanced picture of English language aid work, one which will inform—and help educators strive for more equitable and critical—ELT practices and policies, especially in developing and transition countries. I conclude this chapter with summary remarks and an overview of chapters to come.

Background to the Study: The Debate Over ELT in Periphery Countries

Phillipson's (1992) landmark work, *Linguistic Imperialism*, provided the starting point for this debate. He examined with acumen the historical role of the British Council, Ford Foundation, and U.S. government agencies involved in ELT—from the United States Agency for International Development and Peace Corps, to the State Department's Regional English Language Offices scattered around the world—in order to postulate that ELT and the spread of English have been consciously promoted in the service of British and American political and

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[7] Chapter Two, in contrast, creates an interdisciplinary and interpretive framework which will illuminate the interrelationship between English language teaching and the building of open societies.

economic interests. He explained, for example, the purpose for the genesis of the British Council, whose primary mission initially was "the promotion of English outside the British empire"; it was first established in 1934 "to counteract cultural propaganda on the part of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy" (pp. 34-35). Turning to the United States, Phillipson cited Enriquez and Marcelino (1984) in order to highlight "the colonial relationship between the US and Philippines": "With the imposition of English [as the primary medium of instruction], the country became dependent on a borrowed language that carries with it the dominant ideological and political-economic interest of the US" (pp. 152-153). Phillipson further mapped how private foundations such as the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations helped establish "ESL as an academic discipline" by founding American universities in worldwide locations of strategic geopolitical and economic interest to the United States, universities which in turn launched programs emphasizing social science research, public administration, "manpower planning programs," teacher training and curriculum development projects—in the process, creating a regimen of trained, "American-style" experts prepared to take up leadership roles at local and national levels in their home countries (pp. 160-161).[8] I say more about Phillipson's discussion of foundations in the third section of this chapter.

In addition to tracking down key historical documents which attested to the implicit interests and hidden motives of British and American ELT efforts in periphery nations, throughout his book, Phillipson (1992) further dared to ask "awkward and difficult questions" about the English teaching profession internationally and "some of the possibly unquestioned ideological tenets of our work" (p. 15), questions which still unsettle TESOL educators. He challenged as fallacious, for instance, the assumptions that English is ideally taught in a mono-

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[8]As further illustration, in just the past decade, American universities have been established in Kosovo, Bulgaria, and Kyrgyzstan, several with monies from OSI/SFN. The American University of Afghanistan opened to students in 2006, and the American University of Iraq opened in 2007.

lingual classroom; that native speakers make the best teachers of English; and that "standards" are objectively measurable (pp. 185-215). He questioned the appropriacy of materials created in the center for dissemination in the periphery (pp. 230-231). He made a compelling case for ELT as being ideologically disconnected from the economic and political structures within which it functions and for the training of ELT experts as being too "narrowly technical" (pp. 250-256). And he argued a powerful thesis throughout: that "linguistic imperialism"—as one example of "linguicism"—is part of the means used by center countries to "legitimate, effectuate, and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of language" (p. 47).

Phillipson launched, then, a strongly critical discussion of ELT in periphery countries, though not without inviting equally strong criticism. Most vehement was Davies (1996), who saw *Linguistic Imperialism* as dominated by the cultures of colonial guilt and romantic despair, and wrought through with cloak and dagger conspiracy theory. Davies critiqued what Phillipson laid out as the British and American motives of ELT: to promote foreign policy and other interests, to which Davies replied, yes, of course, unremarkable (pp. 486-487). He also challenged Phillipson's failure to acknowledge the agency of recipient countries, or, in Davies' words, "that oppressed groups' common sense is active enough for them to reject English if they so wish" (p. 490). Canagarajah (1999) picked up and expanded on this critique, observing first that the dominant role of English globally is not just the *result* of power disparity between center and periphery, but also a *cause* of it (p. 41). He worried that Phillipson's macro perspective on structural inequalities failed to account for the power of "the individual, the local, the particular": Like Davies, that is, Canagarajah criticized Phillipson for not attending to the agency of teachers and learners in the periphery, "the lived culture and everyday experience of periphery

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communities" (pp. 41-42). Canagarajah also faulted Phillipson's methodology, which analyzed historical documents alongside interviews with eight ELT policy makers from the West: The end product, Canagarajah claimed, was that "Phillipson's contribution suffers as well as gains from being a perspective of and from the center" (pp. 42-43).

Both Davies (1996) and Canagarajah (1999) did admit that it was vital that scholarship continue to explore the role of English as a part of the "imperialist enterprise" (Davies, 1996, p. 495), and the role of linguistic imperialism in the periphery (Canagarajah, 1999, p. 43). They gave Phillipson credit where credit was due, namely, in sparking an important if terse debate over the global role and hegemony of English, a debate which should at least give pause to any of the thousands of English language teachers who go to work in foreign countries each year. It has certainly given me pause, and I credit, again, Phillipson's initial questions: not only for starting the debate over linguistic imperialism generally, but also for prompting this dissertation, which seeks to enlarge that debate by exploring the as-of-yet unexplored role of English and ELT in the Second World.

Another teacher and scholar to whom Phillipson (1992) has clearly given pause—and a second key voice in this conversation—is Pennycook, who in 1994 wrote, "It is essential for me, politically and morally, to work out the relationships between my work as an English teacher and what I see around me in the world" (p. 3). This "working out" is his task in *The Cultural Politics of English as an International Language*, which both built on and problematized Phillipson's study. Like Phillipson (one of his dissertation readers), Pennycook began with tough questions. In reference to ELT in the newly emergent states of Central Asia, for instance, he asked the following:

> What are the implications here, as these nations redefine their ethnic, linguistic and religious identities, of the export of English language teaching from Pakistan? . . . What

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intrigues me here is not so much how this 'variety' of English differs from other forms of English as a linguistic system, but rather to what uses is it put, what different meanings it comes to carry. (p. 4)

In his study, Pennycook clearly honored Phillipson's "valuable service for putting the phrase 'linguistic imperialism' into play in ELT circles" (p. 56); he acknowledged and lauded Phillipson's efforts at trying to define and get accepted a code of international linguistic rights (p. 69). At the same time, however, Pennycook strove to push beyond a thesis such as Phillipson's, which he intermittently refers to as "reductive" and "deterministic," where "English linguistic imperialism, in conjunction with other forms of imperialism, remains the end point of analysis" (p. 57).

Pennycook's (1994) objective was to surpass such a totalizing tendency and arrive at a more complex view of ELT and English language learners, one which "allows for struggle, resistance, and different appropriations of language, opening up a space for many different meaning-making practices in English" (p. 69). He arrived at this view through an examination of "the worldliness of English"—on the ground and as it happens—in the contexts of Malaysia and Singapore, thereby attending more to "the individual, the local, the particular" (Canagarajah, 1999, p. 41). Pennycook's findings from this examination were two-pronged: First, English is bound up in varying local conditions and pressures (from "Islamization," to pragmatic uses, to the pressures of a meritocracy), and, no doubt, "operates globally in conjunction with capitalist forces" (p. 219). At the same time, in contrast with Phillipson's arguments, Pennycook concluded that "using English does *not* imply a deterministic imposition of cultural and discursive frameworks; rather, English can be used and appropriated in different ways," ways which well may reflect and reify "postcolonial and anticolonial struggle" (p. 257; italics added).

Pennycook's (1994) conclusion was as *re*-constructive as it was deconstructive—as rich in possibility for "good" work (risky as that word may be) and learner agency as it was conscious

of the structural forces which countries, communities, schools, classrooms, teachers, and learners

grapple with and help shape daily—from the imposition of standardized testing (such as TOEFL

or IELTS) to the global dominance of the BBC and CNN in English language media. As he

explained, this more complex picture of ELT and English in the world—unlike Phillipson's—

does *not* discount those English language learners worldwide who have benefited from their

learning (I think of countless students of my own here); nor does it shut down the possibility that

English teachers can "establish some way of teaching English that is not automatically an

imperialist project" (p. 69). It *does*, however, place demands on teachers, scholars, and

researchers, three of which I have seized upon as a core force and guiding shape of my own

work.

The first two of Pennycook's (1994) demands related to the discourse of ELT, and the

interests implicit and explicit within it: "To the extent that this discourse of EIL [English as an

International Language] has permeated much thinking on English language teaching, there is an

urgent need to investigate the construction of this discourse and its relationship to English

language teaching"; Pennycook then added that—as a consequence of such investigation—"It is

incumbent on us as teachers and applied linguists to discard ways of thinking about ELT as if it

were some neutral enterprise" (p. 24). As Pennycook's third demand, he urged us to attend

particularly to those sites where "resistance and appropriation may occur"; in other words, we

need to abandon reductive and essentializing views of "culture" and instead, come to see "culture

in terms of how people make sense of their lives and thus how human agency operates within

global structures of inequality" (p. 57). This more expansive approach to a study of ELT and

English in the world, according to Pennycook, can help us resist positioning learners (and

teachers, too, I would add) "within a new academic imperialism" (p. 69). From it, we may learn

better how to "teach back," to help our students "write (speak, read, listen) back," and, in the process, not only "decolonize the colonizers' mind" but also—through this less essentializing view of the global spread of English—discover and exploit "chances for cultural renewal and exchange around the world" (pp. 295-325), strategies for which he began to articulate in his final chapter, "Towards a Critical Pedagogy,"[9] and which I will return to in my conclusion.

Pennycook's (1994) call here was ambitious and perhaps idealistic, yet it is a call this dissertation seeks to heed. His voice greatly enriched the debate in that it considered how English and ELT may not only *reproduce*, but also be appropriated to *resist*—the interests of center countries. There are limits to Pennycook's work, the most prominent of which may be that he explored resistance through the medium of "Third World," post-colonial literature: He quoted poems and novels in order to evidence appropriation of and resistance to English (pp. 259-294), in the process, probably missing resistance and appropriation as it took place on a daily basis in the discourses of English language teachers and learners in periphery communities (see also Canagarajah, 1999, pp. 59-60). Still, Pennycook's work forwarded this dissertation in important ways: through drawing attention to the function of the *discourses* of English language programs and the ideologies within those discourses; and through encouraging attention to cultural sites where resistance and appropriation may occur.

I share now two more voices which have informed the debate over English and ELT in the periphery, and, in turn, this dissertation. Influenced by Phillipson, yet not uncritically, Holliday's (1994) *Appropriate Methodology and Social Context* expressed clear concern over

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[9] More specifically, Pennycook (1994) suggested strategies for (a) "discursive interventions," which help make plain connections between English and other social domains such as pop culture and Christianity; (b) "linguistic action," which creates a space for teaching both "standard" and individual uses of English; and (c) "exploring subjectivities" of students and self through attention to "how people's lives are constructed and constricted through different discourses and lived experiences" (pp. 312-320). Curiously, Pennycook did *not* acknowledge Norman Fairclough's (1992a) work in this area, which Fairclough describes as critical language awareness. See Chapter Three for more discussion of Fairclough's work.

cultural imperialism and linguicism, which he attributed to a unilateral and ethnocentric ELT

methodology and professionalism promoted and perpetuated by ELT specialists in British,

Australian, and North American (what he called BANA) countries, who have created and then

spread this methodology around the world (p. 3). For Holliday, this paradigm was

"integrationist" and "destructive by nature," and was evidenced by "English language teaching

projects, which often attack host collectionist structures" (p. 109). He described, for example, the

opposition to group work in Pakistan as influenced by Koranic attitudes to thought and learning.

He was similarly rough on what he described as "hyperrational funding agencies" such as Peace

Corps and the British Council, for the objectives set by aid agencies, he argued, too often run

counter to the realities of project work, which are inherently "qualitative" rather than

quantitative, their successes and failures depending in large part on the difficult-to-describe,

"deep" phenomena which "may be too sketchy and impressionistic to be reportable" (pp. 138-

139). Such phenomena, he observed, pose barriers to the frequent ELT management task of

attempting to convert "inputs to outputs" (p. 139).

In lieu of such "destructive" tendencies in ELT, Holliday (1994) argued for ways to go

about making methodologies appropriate to the local contexts in which they are employed. In

essence, the design of such methodology entails culture-sensitivity, best gained, he argued, when

teachers continually reflect on and learn about the "social dimension of the classroom" through

ethnographic action research; teachers can then apply their learning to the various social contexts

in which they find themselves (p. 164). For Holliday, culture-sensitivity and appropriate

methodology are also ways to subvert the more patronizing elements of the imperialist paradigm:

"Recipients" of English language education may have agency restored when—through the

understanding and acknowledgement of differing social contexts—ELT can be utilized in ways which are beneficial for all (p. 4).

Of the studies reviewed so far, Holliday's (1994) perspective was clearly the most micro-level: Multiple instances of classrooms and contexts and local cultures came vividly and compellingly to life in his book and encouraged me to seek a similar range of ELT experiences and perspectives, from project directors, to teacher educators, to teachers, to students. These insightful cases notwithstanding, Holliday's work also fell short in several ways. Canagarajah (1999) listed these shortcomings: Holliday's work had only limited theoretical underpinnings; he seemed to assume all Western-funded ELT had immediate commercial interests at its core; and he discussed culture at length, but not the politics of culture (Canagarajah, pp. 44-45). What *I* found most problematic was Holliday's recommendation that curriculum developers become "opportunists" in their research, even willing to resort to "covert procedure because of the inevitability of cultural differences between the curriculum developer and local personnel" (p. 217). This quite startling suggestion, troubling in its divisiveness, underlined how Holliday saw his target audience as primarily donors of English language aid projects and expatriate cultural officers and teachers, which, as Canagarajah pointed out, invites a kind of suspicion: More efficient and profitable delivery of the goods may well come to blot out the cultural renewal and exchange potential of appropriate methodology. Nor did Holliday place enough emphasis on the potential of "appropriate" as a verb, as a means for local teachers, teacher educators, and project directors in periphery contexts to take from Western methodology what they believe will work in their classrooms, and leave what does not, a surprising omission on Holliday's part, given the emphasis he did place on culture-sensitivity.

The next key voice in this debate I share is that of Canagarajah (1999), whose *Resisting Linguistic Imperialism in English Teaching* was longitudinal and ethnographic. His exploration of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka hence provided an in-depth interpretation of how teachers and students in one community coped with the hidden curricula of center-based teaching materials, Western methods, the challenges of English to their identities, and the clash between the assumptions underlying Western pedagogies and those of literacy traditions from the periphery (pp. 5-6). In the process, Canagarajah identified and described a complex portrait of "the politics and pedagogy of appropriating discourses" (with due emphasis now placed on "appropriate" as a verb): He discussed, for instance, the desire of the students "for pluralistic identities and hybrid discourses in their linguistic and social life" (p. 173); he concluded that "rather than keeping competing discourses outside English, they [students] are infusing them into the very structure of the language to reconfigure its ideological character" (p. 175).

Of particular value in Canagarajah's (1999) work, he situated his exploration in a carefully articulated theoretical framework which described two distinct paradigms for teaching, main-stream versus critical pedagogy, which are evidenced by the choices teachers might make: between viewing learning as a detached cognitive activity versus learning as personal; learning as transcendental versus situated; learning processes as universal versus cultural; knowledge as value-free versus knowledge as ideological; knowledge as pre-constructed versus knowledge as negotiated; learning as instrumental versus learning as political" (pp. 14-16). Similar to Holliday (1994), Canagarajah saw context as a central factor in the learning process, with each classroom grounded in the various social and historical factors which produced it. He constructed knowledge, moreover, as "intrinsically social, and constructed through interaction between community members"; the question over which knowledge paradigm institutions adopt is

therefore a question of power, with dominant groups determining a community's knowledge paradigm (p. 18). This process takes on obvious relevance for periphery communities especially, which Canagarajah described as the Asian, African, and Latin American communities colonized by the West, with its "white man's burden" and duty to advance superior science and knowledge to the rest of the world. It is relevant too, I argue, to post-communist countries which are likewise undergoing transition and reform in their "knowledge-making" practices. Following Canagarajah then, the knowledge systems of the periphery likewise became colonized and suppressed, and it is only in a post-colonial and anti-Enlightenment climate that mainstream (Western, Enlightenment) thinking is challenged, local knowledge explored and embraced (pp. 18-19).

Canagarajah's (1999) contributions to this study were numerous and rich. In addition to the above elucidation of paradigms, context, and knowledge, he further offered a cogent program for exploring resistance: (a) through adopting a post-structuralist approach to language, a "resistance linguistics" which deconstructs texts in order to "expose the hidden ideologies that control meaning"; (b) through conceptualizing identities as fluid, dynamic, and able to resist dominant discourses through the formation of critical consciousness; (c) through theorizing the local and "counter-knowledge of subaltern groups" as bringing "its own critical insights to demystify the dominant ideologies and empower them to achieve their own interests"; and (d) through conceiving power as having multiple sources rather than being monolithic, and therefore present and available to subaltern groups as well as to larger structural levels and domains (pp. 29-33). At the same time, Canagarajah warned against seeing the mere deconstruction of texts and language as the end point of analysis and action. He reminds us of the material forms of oppression—poverty, hunger, war—and of the dangers of over-intellectualizing in lieu of *doing*,

in the Freirian sense of working "in solidarity with the masses" (pp. 34-35). He further

encourages a reflexive use of the resistance paradigm, one which is prepared to revise the core

constructs according to the specific periphery community in which a scholar works.

Finally, I turn very briefly to a book which came out right as I was in the final throes of

analysis, research, and writing, Spolsky's (2009) *Language Management*, a work which provides

an alternative paradigm for thinking about the global spread of English. Spolsky worked toward

developing a theory of language management which ranged from language management within

families, to nation-states, and eventually, to what he referred to as supranational groupings. He

explored the United Nations, for instance, as a "supranational domain," along with "legal" and

"health" domains which cross borders and regions (e.g., the World Health Organization). He

noted, significantly, the enormous costs of multiple languages in supranational settings and

domains, costs he described as unable to achieve "a utopian solution with efficient interpretation

services available for all possible situations" globally (p. 128). Most importantly for my

purposes, Spolsky provided a definition which has made me rethink linguistic imperialism, as it

pins down and instrumentalizes the spread of English through a study of particular policies:

> In studying language policy, we are usually trying to understand just what non-language
> variables co-vary with the language variables. There are also cases of direct efforts to
> manipulate the language situation. When a person or group directs such intervention, I
> call this language management. (Spolsky, 2009, p. 8)

Quite patently, as we will see, OSI/SFN as a supranational NGO created both direct and indirect

"efforts to manipulate the language situation" of open society. What Spolsky called "language

management," I call in this study *supranational language management*, a phrase which perhaps

carries less of the in-your-face politics of the term "linguistic imperialism," but is no less

provocative or ideological, I believe, given the multiple ramifications of interventions into

another group's "language situation." Supranational language management thus becomes a central construct in this dissertation.

I drew from each of these studies, then, in the design of my own. At the same time, where I believe Canagarajah's (1999) study can be importantly supplemented—as well as Holliday's (1994), Pennycook's (1994), and Phillipson's (1992)—pertains, finally, to conceptualizations of periphery. These four studies considered English language teaching and learning through English language aid projects in Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore, the Middle East, and Africa, leaving un-discussed the transition countries of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, a region which—in being post-Soviet—has likewise been conceptualized as peripheral and post-colonial (Smith, Law, Wilson, Bohr & Allworth, 1998). Herein lies a central contribution of *this* study: to expand the debate into the reach of the so-called Second World, which is clearly subject to a host of different social and historical forces which have brought distinct pressures to bear on issues of language, knowledge, identity, and resistance.

*Purpose and Significance of the Study*

Accordingly, building on critical research into the role of English and ELT in periphery countries, in this dissertation I explore the role of one organization which has been active in English language teaching worldwide, but especially in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union: the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network. This is a study of how one powerful and powerfully-moneyed foundation discursively constructs and conceptualizes English, ELT, the actors involved in its ELP initiative, which ran from 1994-2005, and the role of actors and English in *other* OSI/SFN projects. Of *particular* interest in this study—given the contexts of linguistic imperialism and supranational language management— this dissertation further examines how English and ELT are discursively constructed as bound up

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in the building of open societies, which OSI/SFN makes its primary mission. Through this

analysis, the dissertation hopes to bring to light—in echo of Pennycook (1994)—some of "the

interests served by our work" (p. 24): the interests present in (a) the official written ELP

discourse of OSI/SFN; (b) the interests present in local written ELP discourses of OSI/SFN

throughout the countries of CESEE-fSU; and (c) the interests present in the discourses and

voices of Western and Eastern, expatriate and local, OSI/SFN project participants. In other

words, the dissertation seeks not only "ideological macro-strategies" (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl,

& Liebhart, 1999) present in the ELP discourses of OSI/SFN. It will further—through

examination of micro-linguistic discursive contributions of transcribed spoken discourses—

investigate these discourses as they "happen" in the countries and contexts where these programs

are or were operative—places, that is, where "resistance and appropriation may occur"

(Pennycook, 1994, p. 24).

*Research Questions*

To achieve these aims, the dissertation pursued answers to the following questions:

1. How does the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network discursively
   construct the relationship between building open societies, English, and English
   Language Teaching? How do OSI/SFN local written ELP discourses and the
   discourses of participants construct this relationship?

2. What are the interests in the official written discourse of OSI/SFN and its English
   Language Programs, and how do they converge with and diverge from interests in
   local ELP discourses?

3. How does the official written discourse of OSI/SFN English Language Programs
   construct the actors in these programs: (both expatriate and national) project

personnel, administrators, teacher trainers, teachers, and students? How do local

written discourses and project participants construct various actors?

4. What new local discourses emerge around these programs, and how do they compare

with the OSI/SFN discourse? What other discourse chains begun in the official

OSI/SFN ELP discourse are reproduced, re-scripted, resisted, and/or transformed?

## American Philanthropic Foundations and ELT

At this point, the question may well arise: why did I conduct a study of OSI/SFN and

*their* English Language Programs? As should be clear from the opening remarks in this chapter,

there exists by now a growing body of critical scholarship on ELT and the role of English in

periphery countries, though, to date, this scholarship has failed to take on board discussion of

ELT in the Second World. Another notable absence in the literature was highlighted by Benesch

(2001), in her broad overview of the political and economic roots of English for Academic

Purposes. She wrote, "Left unexamined [*still*] is the role of governments, foundations, and

private companies in the 'ascendancy' of English" (p. 26). From the fugitive literature, a doctoral

dissertation (Phillips, 1996) did examine in some depth the role of the U.S. government in the

rise of English by studying the implementation of U.S. English language policy overseas under

the auspices of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Studies of American *philanthropic* foundations, however, and their role in the rise of English,

remain in short supply.

I now briefly recap the little work which has explored this particular relationship. I do so

in order to further underscore the significance of and research space for this study as well as

establish why OSI/SFN was an important organization to examine in-depth, for it both converges

with—and departs distinctly from—the paradigm of American foundation work I overview here.

Two of the works I recap are familiar to us already—Phillipson and Pennycook again—further

testimony, I argue, to the scant exploration done in this area thus far and, hence, the need for

research such as this dissertation undertakes.[10]

Phillipson (1992), we know, began such an inquiry. He cited Fox (1975), for instance, in

order to describe financial assistance from the Ford Foundation and British Council for the

establishment of ELT programs which linked British and American universities with "periphery-

English countries" (pp. 226-227). He further alluded to the role of the Rockefeller Foundation in

coordinating overseas ELT project work—particularly in the Philippines—in collaboration with

the University of California Los Angeles (p. 161). Yet Phillipson's analysis of these relationships

(in 1992, remember) was troubling and categorical. In reference to ELT research in higher

education, he wrote: "All such Centre-Periphery contact involves the dissemination of Centre

ideas. There are no ongoing research projects, where it might be a question of the Centre learning

about something in the Periphery" (p. 227). He then went on to summarize other Ford

Foundation-supported work: sociolinguistic surveys in East Africa, an English Language Policy

Survey in Jordan, other projects on African languages (pp. 227-229). Discussing the results of

these surveys and project reports, Phillipson seemed initially surprised at the Ford Foundation's

support of and interest in indigenous languages and mother tongue education in African primary

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[10] This is a neglect both authors are troubled by, and which this dissertation has sought in part to amend. Phillipson (1988) worried that the preparation of ELT professionals "pays little attention to international relations, development studies, theories of culture or intercultural contact, or the politics or sociology of language or education" (p. 348). He reiterated this concern in *Linguistic Imperialism* (1992, p. 2). Pennycook (1994), too, borrowing from Said (1978), worried that "without examining applied linguistics as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by which British and American culture has been able to manage – and even produce – English language teaching politically, sociologically, culturally, ideologically and scientifically since the end of the nineteenth century" (p. 127). An even more strident voice, and a more current one, arises in Macedo, Dendrinos, and Gounari (2003), who declared that "most educators, particularly within the United States, have blindly embraced a positivistic mode of inquiry which enables them to deny outright the role of ideology in their work. In the process, they try to prevent the development of any counter-discourse within their institutions" (p. 3). These voices, too, bolster the aims of and necessity for my own research.

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schools (p. 229). His final take, however, moved from surprise to cynicism as he challenged the

motives behind the philanthropic endeavors of American foundations:

> The huge expenditure of American funds on research in the Periphery since the 1950s partly gives substantial numbers of Americans experience of the Periphery, which increases American professionalism, and partly exposes Periphery academics to the norms and values of the Centre. The institution-building which is central to scientific and educational imperialism serves to define the parameters of what gets studied and why. (p. 236)

> Arnove's (1980) view of foundations was almost as categorical as Phillipson's (1992),

and further underlined Canagarajah's (1999) discussion of the imposition of dominant

knowledge paradigms. Arnove wrote:

> Through funding and promoting research in critical areas, the big three [Carnegie, Rockefeller, Ford] have been able to exercise decisive influence over the growing edge of knowledge, the problems that are examined and by whom, and the uses to which newly generated information is put. Through the education programs they fund, foundations are able to influence the world views of the general public as well as the orientations and commitments of the leadership which will direct social change. (p. 17)

Arnove went on to argue that the patronage of foundations impeded the growth of communities

of critical scholars and scientists, and hence, in turn, impeded examination of the "basic

mechanisms and thought systems of repression"; any critique of domination should therefore, in

Arnove's view, start by investigating "the role of intellectuals and their connections to those

groups which exercise hegemony in a society" (p. 19).

The cynicism of Arnove and Phillipson expressed here was sounded again by Pennycook

(1994), who was almost as harsh in his critique of the role American philanthropic foundations

have played in the global spread of English. Drawing upon Arnove (1980), Pennycook

positioned the work of the foundations as reflective of the post-World War Two mentality of the

United States and Britain, the foreign policies of which abandoned "military dominance or direct

economic exploitation through colonialism" in favor of what Pennycook called the "ideological

coercion" of development, aid, and—also essential—"language and language learning" (p.

134).[11] After the war there was a need, Pennycook contended, for new—non-military—means to exercise control in the world, both socially and politically, and the spread of English, he argued, facilitated this process, soon coming to enjoy "chief status once again as it started its prodigious spread in the postwar era and as U.S. foreign policy and the giant philanthropic organizations . . . Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie . . . reacted to the needs for cultural and linguistic expansion" (p. 134). As Pennycook saw it, the postwar approach has been neocolonial rather than colonial; ultimately it was and is about the expansion of "American ideology, capitalism, and US power," a spread, he charged, as attributable to awards from Fulbright, Rockefeller, Carnegie and other Foundations as it was to more overtly political agencies such as the Defense Department and the United States Agency for International Development (p. 153).

As for arguments around the "humanitarianism" generally presumed to underlie the philanthropic work of these foundations, Pennycook (1994) cited Brown's (1980) study of Rockefeller health programs in pre-1949 China, which recorded how, for instance, the overwhelming emphasis paid in those programs to Western professionalism led to the suppression of traditional and alternative forms of Chinese medicine. Moreover, Brown purported, the Rockefeller programs trained only a small number of medical doctors who in turn were instructed to focus on the elite of Chinese society, leaving the health needs of the majority abandoned. Brown's conclusion, like Phillipson's and Arnove's, was cynical: He posited that, in the end, the "humanitarianism," too, was ultimately suspect, bolstered by the foundations' inescapable "ethnocentrism, their class interests, and their support for the imperialist objectives of their own country. By the time their humanitarianism was expressed in programs, it was so

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[11] For more on a critical view of development, see Crewe and Harrison, 1998; Crush, 1995; Escobar, 1984; Ferguson, 1994.

intertwined with the interests of American capitalism as to be indistinguishable" (Brown as quoted in Arnove, 1980, p. 139).

In short, the programs of these foundations, Pennycook and Brown averred, were so bound up in the interests of American capitalism that they inevitably reproduced and supported the "social and political status quo"; or, as Arnove (1980) put it, the foundations created "an international network of corporate interests, philanthropists, and policymakers who increasingly coordinate activities to *their* advantage" (quoted in Pennycook, p. 154; italics added). Moreover (and crucially for *my* purpose in this dissertation), as Pennycook (1994) concluded, the joint impact of the foundations in concert with private businesses and government agencies resulted in a particularly *American* outcome: "a new relationship between English and development, modernization, capitalism, democracy and education" (p. 154). This declaration leads, quite neatly, back to my question at the start of this section: Why did I conduct a study of OSI/SFN and their English Language Programs discourse?

The Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network

In 1993, the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network —"a private operating and grantmaking foundation based in New York City"—was officially founded by billionaire financier, George Soros. According to its mission statement, OSI/SFN aims "to help former communist countries in their transition to democracy," "promote open societies by shaping government policy and education," and "diminish and prevent the negative consequences of globalization" ("About Us: Overview," 2005). To this end, from 1994-2000, Soros disbursed more than $2.5 billion dollars to the mission of open society, in the process, substantially outspending the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations. In the U.S., only the United States

Lilly Endowment gave more, and that was to medical research (Kaufmann, 2002, p. 256).[12] All

told, since its founding, OSI/SFN has spent more than five billion dollars on democracy-building

initiatives in more than 60 countries.

These initiatives and programs are typically administered through network foundations

set up in countries throughout the world, which I will refer to as "local": There is the Soros

Foundation-Hungary, the Open Society Fund-Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Open Society

Foundation-Romania, for instance, each of which is organized on the U.S. tax-exempt-

organization (TEO) model, which allows Soros to distribute funds from the U.S. to recipient

countries in accord with U.S. and host country laws (Lazin, 2001, pp. 286-299). Each national

foundation has its own board and staff, though the initiatives worldwide fall under the

overarching mission of building open, civil societies. Programs to this end entail, for example,

scholarships for higher and general education; programs supporting the rule of law, judiciary and

law enforcement; arts programs; libraries; the media; programs for vulnerable populations such

as ethnic minorities or the mentally disabled; and of course, from 1994-2005, English language

programs. Importantly, too, Soros is renowned for his personal involvement in these projects,

which Kaufman (2002) characterizes as absolutely unlike any living philanthropist:

> Soros didn't simply fund his projects; he helped devise them, monitored them, tinkered
> with them, and, when they seemed to ineffective, shut them down.  He worked at it with
> the same energy, and often the same tactics, that he had employed in finance. (p. xiv)

*The Ideology of OSI/SFN and English Language Aid Projects*

My interest in this organization derived from a striking assertion on the website of

OSI/SFN's New York-based global headquarters. Central to its work of building open societies,

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[12]For a comparative sense of philanthropy, a 1996 figure has Soros donating $350 million dollars to his
Foundations, which is $2 million more than the Ford Foundation and $243 million more than the Rockefeller
Foundation distributed in the same year (Lazin, 2001, p. 296).

OSI/SFN claimed in "Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond" (1999), are English and English

Language Teaching:

> Very early on, the [Soros] foundations realized that it was hard to foster programs directly related to building open societies if these programs—many of which necessarily included a significant international component—were accessible only to people who had a good command of English. Forging open societies relies to a considerable degree on the ability of educated local people to communicate successfully with the world beyond their most immediate state and/or regional boundaries. ("Strategy," 1999)

From this statement, questions emerge. OSI/SFN is unquestionably upfront in its belief

that the whole project of "forging open societies" is dependent upon those societies' abilities to

communicate internationally and successfully, that is, to communicate in *English*. Yet the

motives behind and consequences of such an assumption—that English is the natural default

language of international communication—have been challenged fervently by scholars.  As

Phillipson (1992) pointed out, "The discourse accompanying and legitimating the export of

English to the rest of the world has been so persuasive that English has been equated with

progress and prosperity" (p. 8). He also observed that such an assumption reflects a blatant

"anglocentricity," where English "and the promise of what English represents or can lead to

[becomes] the norm by which all language activity or use should be measured" (p. 48).

Pennycook (1994) shared these concerns, noting how discourse around the spread of

English as "natural, neutral, and beneficial" has "moved from a rhetoric of colonial expansion,

through a rhetoric of development aid to a rhetoric of the international free market"; as a result,

he stated, "English and English teaching in these terms has been considered intrinsically good for

the world, a key aspect of global development, and a commodity freely traded on world markets"

(p. 6). Even more stridently—if not ominously—Macedo, Dendrinos, and Gounari (2003) argued

that such an attempt at "integration into a single 'linguistic community' [like English as an

international language] is a product of political domination. Institutions capable of imposing

universal recognition of a dominant language recognize this process as a means for establishing

relations of linguistic domination and colonization" (p. 36). Given these claims and the strong

admonition within them, the "Strategy" document of OSI/SFN ELP may at first glance seem to

easily converge with the paradigm of American foundation work which Phillipson and

Pennycook denounced so adamantly, a paradigm they deemed as pushed forward by American

interests and with the spread of American power at its heart.

This quick look at the OSI/SFN ELP discourse may suggest another convergence as well.

OSI/SFN's assumption (that building open societies depends upon those societies' abilities to

communicate in English) and its mission (to help former communist countries in their transition

to democracy, and to build open societies through shaping government policy and education)

resonate perhaps even more profoundly when set alongside one of Pennycook's (1994) central

claims: that American philanthropic foundations (along with government organizations) have

helped create "a new relationship between English and development, modernization, capitalism,

democracy and education" (p. 154). This linkage—between English, capitalism, and

democracy—is one Macedo, Dendrinos, and Gounari (2003) took to task with acrimony,

decrying such "export" as follows:

> Just another ideological trick to veil the imposition of the neoliberal order and the quest
> for new markets. Thus, democracy is usually understood as being synonymous with the
> opening up of markets and with the removal of government constraints. Absent from this
> "market democracy" is any discussion that would unveil the deeply political character of
> the markets. (p. 115)

As may be easily apparent, these authors saw the global hegemony of English as an "eminently

political phenomenon" which can only be understood in a dichotomous framework of dominant

versus dominated groups. These groups, they said, are subject to a neoliberal ideology which,

"with globalization as its hallmark, continues to promote language policies which package

'English' as a 'super language' that is not only harmless, but should be acquired by all societies that aspire to competitiveness in the globalized world economic order" (pp. 15-16).

While in this dissertation I try, like Pennycook, to eschew such potentially reductive and polarizing rhetoric which divides the world up into dominant versus dominated groups, the discourse in OSI/SFN's "Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond" (1999) nevertheless does evoke a warning of Phillipson's. Regarding ELT in the context of international "aid" and development, he urged us not to forget this point:

> Aid operates at several levels, and cannot be divorced from its social context, either at the micro level of project realization or at the macro level of donor-recipient relations and the nature of the links that unite them, and the agendas, overt and covert, of the parties involved. (Pennycook, 1994, pp. 11-12)

One possibly "covert" or at least subtle agenda present in this brief extract of OSI/SFN ELP discourse may be the promotion of what has been called the "diffusion-of-English paradigm" (Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas, 1986), the interests of which are consistent with those of foundation work as exemplified by the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations, and which Phillipson and Pennycook critiqued with such rigor—underwritten as they are by what they viewed as the capitalist, neocolonial, neoliberal, and expansionist tendencies of the United States.

As fuel for this discussion, Lahaye (2002) was similarly suspicious, attacking OSI/SFN directly along with other non-governmental and humanitarian organizations (including US-AID and Doctors without Borders) operating in post-communist Serbia. Lahaye charged that organizations like OSI/SFN "inevitably contribute to the favoring of Western governments' foreign policies and must be seen as serious actors who can undermine national interests" (p. 90). Furthermore, and like criticisms leveled by Macedo, Dendrinos, and Gounari (2003), Lahaye argued that OSI/SFN used "democracy" as a term to "designate in fact 'capitalism,' in order to

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foster the values of capitalism without explicitly naming it" (pp. 120-121). Lahaye suggested then a more covert agenda of the discourse, one with the expansion of American capitalism and markets at its core. Nor should we forget that OSI/SFN *is* an "American" foundation. It is based in New York city and subject to American tax code, legislation, and exemption, seemingly benign facts which—in the current world climate post 9/11—lead us inevitably back to another of Phillipson's (1992) claims: that, in the U.S. context especially, "there is no pretence that foreign aid is disinterested" (p. 157). As he put it, even "individuals with possibly the most altruistic motives for their work may nevertheless function in an imperialist structure" (p. 46).

Phillipson's (1992) move here—from foreign aid and its institutions generally to the individual actors working behind and for those institutions—helps us understand once again how OSI/SFN may converge with the paradigm of foundation work described herein. To the "big three" of philanthropy Arnove (1980) referenced—Ford, Carnegie, Rockefeller—the name "Soros" has been added. At the same time, Phillipson's claim called attention to what this chapter has not yet explored—the individuals behind the institutions—a move which helps us not only see Soros and his network of foundations alongside his philanthropic predecessors. It also helps make a transition to the ways in which OSI/SFN may *depart* from the paradigm of American foundation work investigated herein.

*Departures: Founder, Philosophy, Mission*

Plainly, OSI/SFN and its motives and missions may be seen—at least in part—as embodying problematic assumptions of American foundation work overseas: Its success depends upon the spread and rise of English; the goal or end-product may be not only democracy but also its accompaniments—the continued rise and spread of Western power, Western foreign policies, Western capitalism, Western culture. There are, however, ways in which OSI/SFN departs

distinctly from the paradigm of American foundation work described thus far, departures which make this particular foundation and its ELT work an intriguing point of focus for sustained examination, especially in light of Pennycook and Phillipson's stark view of American and Western foundations, ELT, and the rise of English worldwide.

*Founder*

For one thing, the founder of OSI/SFN, George Soros, brings to the foundation and its mission a worldview which was shaped a good geographic, political, and historical distance from the center countries and their interests. The complexity of his background informs this study in potentially significant ways.

Soros was born in Hungary in 1930. He survived the Nazi occupation of Budapest, in part because his Jewish family posed as Christians. As was not uncommon during the 1930s, when already Nazi policies were beginning to oppress German Jews, the family changed their name to Soros from Schwartz—a name which, as Kaufman (2002) noted, could paradoxically signify either German or Jewish identity. Soros' father, Tivadar, chose the unusual name "Soros" as he "liked the idea that it was a palindrome, and he liked the idea that it was a name that could be pronounced the same way in every language" (quoted in Kaufman, p. 24) (an erroneous assumption, incidentally, as in Hungarian "s" is pronounced as the English "sh"). Tivadar Soros further liked its double meanings: in Magyar, "the one who is next in line"; in Esperanto, with which Tivadar Soros was ardently involved, "soros" is the future tense of the verb "to soar" (Kaufman, 2002, p. 24).

Tivadar Soros' involvement with Esperanto may be more than a curious footnote in the context of this study. As Kaufman (2002) recorded, George Soros' father—with whom George remained close throughout his life—learned Esperanto in a Russian prison camp during the

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Russian Revolution; he had been taken prisoner while fighting on the side of what was then

Austro-Hungary. According to Kaufman, Tivadar Soros liked how

> Esperanto embodied and reflected the internationalism, anti-sectarianism and cosmopolitanism" that he valued so highly; it combined vocabulary from Romance, Slavic, and Germanic roots (but not Finno-Ugric, the language family of Hungarian) and became, its followers thought, the language of "universal man." (pp. 12-13)

Significantly, Tivadar Soros remained a follower of Esperanto throughout his life: He established

Esperanto clubs and attended Esperanto conferences; he published an Esperanto magazine in

Hungary and a war memoir in Esperanto, which was later translated into English (*Maskerado:*

*Dancing Around Death in Nazi Hungary*); when he died in New York in 1968, he was eulogized

by several Esperantists, one of whom said that "instead of egotism, nationalism, and chauvinism,

he had thought of universal man" (quoted in Kaufman, 2002, pp. 13-17).

This involvement with Esperanto as a "universal" language—passed down, in a sense,

from father to son—may well foreshadow George Soros' own attitudes towards language in his

philanthropic work years later. Kaufman (2002) described George Soros' language education

only briefly: He had English and French tutors while a child in Hungary, as well as some fluency

in German and "smatterings of Latin and Esperanto" (p. 29). When he left communist Hungary

for England in 1947, he took courses in English with which he struggled (failing his English

entrance exam at the London School of Economics twice). At the same time, he frequented the

Speakers Corner in Hyde Park, where he spoke at the Esperanto stand, as Kaufman put it,

"testifying for the utility of an international language in Esperanto and *English*" (p. 57; italics

added). Kaufman's biography made no further mention of the role of English in Soros' work,

beyond observing that Tivadar Soros' "internationalist" outlook would become manifest in

George Soros' "passion for 'open societies,' though without his father's enthusiasm for linguistic

reform" (pp. 12-13). *Explicit* linguistic reform notwithstanding, these facts about Soros' life may

be a provocative start to understanding just how OSI/SFN came to predicate its mission on English language teaching; they further, by underlining *internationalism*, begin to indicate how OSI/SFN may depart from the paradigm of American philanthropy critiqued above.

The "international outlook" Soros inherited from his father deepened considerably during his years at the London School of Economics (LSE). Kaufman (2002) recorded that, while Soros wasn't exactly happy being in England, which he felt was "unfeeling and austere," he was exposed to a world of intellectuals who made an enormous impression on him, "renaissance men who shuttled quite comfortably between disciplines, languages, cultures, and often countries" (p. 63). Figures like Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, and John Maynard Keynes inspired Soros to seek to make a similarly noticeable mark in the world, particularly as they came from so many different countries, hence accentuating the international, intellectual climate in the postwar Britain Soros was living in (Kaufman, 2002, pp. 63-64). The many "renaissance" scholars whose work he came to know there may have further contributed to the later reputation Soros made for himself as the "stateless statesman" and "the only private citizen who had his own foreign policy" (Kaufman, 2002, p. xiii), constructs which may well prefigure issues related to supranational identity and supranational language management. Such identity goes well beyond identities acting in the interests of U.S. foreign policy alone, or any nation, for that matter, which indicates a distinct departure from the paradigm of American philanthropy Phillipson (1992) and Pennycook (1993) took so passionately to task.

In addition to its worldly intellectual climate, the London School of Economics was further renowned for its "expansive, internationalist, and activist scholarship," which set LSE apart from Oxford and Cambridge, a distinction articulated in its basic values, or "the five E's," which Kaufman (2002) enumerated: "education, economics, efficiency, equality, and empire" (p.

63). This last, "empire," Kaufman explained, "referred to the task of training people from colonies to struggle for and assume the responsibilities of self-government" (p. 64), a remarkable comment given Soros' later philanthropic work as well as the discussions of resisting imperialism this chapter has explored (Pennycook, 1994; Canagarajah, 1999). Here, then, may be the forerunner of Soros' method in both economics and philanthropy, a method which is manifest in some of his earliest philanthropic endeavors, and which may set his foundation work apart again from the paradigm of American philanthropy Phillipson (1992) and Pennycook (1994) decried.

To illustrate (through a quick jump forward in time), in 1979, Soros visited the University of Cape Town, South Africa, which had just enrolled a small number of black students. Reflecting on his meeting with the vice chancellor, Soros wrote:

> I thought that here was an institution that believes in multiracial education, an open society. I thought that to support this institution to bring in more black students would be a very efficient way to go about things. Actually, the state was paying most of the costs of the students. My thinking was that I would pay their lodgings, their supplemental costs. In this way I would be using the mechanism of a generally oppressive state to subvert it, to widen and expand a small area, interracial activity. At the same time I would be helping to build a black elite, and I still think that the creation of elites among persecuted people is the most effective way to overcome prejudice. (quoted in Kaufman, 2002, p. 171)

Soros' words here leave little doubt as to the methods behind his mission, enacted today through the work of the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network. Soros' decision, that is, to "use the mechanism of a generally oppressive state to subvert it" contrasts starkly with earlier critiques of American philanthropy, such as Arnove's (1980) claim that such foundations impeded the formation of critical scholarship and, as a consequence, examination of the "basic mechanisms and thought systems of repression" (p. 19). Soros' methods were clearly influenced by the educational values he encountered at the London School of Economics. They may also explain how he made his fortune, and why, in turn, he has given so much of it to his mission.

In 1956, at the age of 26, Soros moved to New York, where he took a position as a

foreign securities trader. Soon thereafter he became involved in hedge funds, developed by the

A.W. Jones Group. While I do not lay claim to any sophisticated understanding of economics,

the basic definition of how hedge funds operate may illuminate further Soros' approach to and

methods of philanthropy—and his mission of building open societies—hence justifying a

seeming digression here. Kaufman (2002) provided a fairly clear introduction to hedge funds:

> The approach [to hedge funds] . . . was to assume offsetting long and short positions on
> shares of companies within a given industry. The basic rationale was that by going short
> as well as long, his A.W. Jones Group would be able to hedge against industry-wide
> macroeconomic factors while benefiting from the specific performances of individual
> companies that were thought to be bucking the tide. (p.120)

At great risk of over-simplification, I nevertheless find the approach here noteworthy in the

context of this study: that is, by hedging against macro-structural forces (of political, economic,

social, and cultural domination, such as, for instance, apartheid in South Africa) and by investing

in micro-structural forces (in groups who are "bucking the tide," such as the University of Cape

Town's first black students), profitable gains could be made, a model as readily observable in the

Soros mission of building open societies as it is in how Soros built his personal fortune.  Hedge

fund ventures are risky, but pay off well, the most stunning example of which came on

September 16, 1992, Black Wednesday, when Soros' Quantum Fund speculated on the British

pound and proceeded to make a billion dollars in one day (Kaufman, 2002, p. 238). To "stateless

statesman" a new sobriquet was added, "The Man Who Broke the Bank of England."

Soros' background, then, is unequivocally complex—linguistically, politically,

historically, economically—and may well begin to problematize the view of American

philanthropic foundations as set forth by Pennycook (1994), Phillipson (1992), and even Lahaye

(2002).[13] Soros originates from a periphery country which changed regimes at least three times in his years there, before his emigration to the center, that is, England, and then America, where he made his fortune, and from which—since 1993—he has been channeling a substantial amount of his money back into the periphery. This concept—of a figure from the periphery working from the center to help the periphery in its struggles against oppressive regimes and policies, including those which emanate from the center—may be enough in and of itself to invite a closer look at Soros' OSI/SFN. But there are additional departures as well which render OSI/SFN a rich case for in-depth examination.

*Philosophy*

In addition to Wittgenstein, Russell, and Keynes, while in England, Soros was exposed to the life and work of philosopher Karl Popper. According to the biography of Soros on the OSI/SFN website, Popper "had a profound influence on his [Soros'] thinking and later on his professional and philanthropic activities" ("About Us: FAQs," 2005). This influence, too, I argue, may set OSI/SFN apart from the paradigm of foundation work Pennycook and Phillipson challenged.

Popper's landmark work, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (1945/1962)—describing itself as a critical introduction to the philosophy of history and politics—took a harsh view of "some of the greatest among the intellectual leaders of mankind," namely, Plato, Hegel, and Marx, positing that "if our civilization is to survive, we must break with the habit of deference to great men. Great men make mistakes" (p. vii). Notably, Popper determined to write *The Open Society and Its Enemies* on the very day Austria was invaded by troops of the Third Reich, in

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[13] Lahaye (2002), too, failed to consider Soros' origin in his analysis of ideological and financial support provided by Western-based NGOs in post-communist Yugoslavia. Even more provocatively, in a clearly ad hominem attack, Lahaye draws a sardonic analogy between "Uncle Sam" and "Uncle George" (p. 136), a move which detracts from the argument at best, at worst reveals not only the researcher's inevitable bias but also his blindness to that bias. The study—if nothing else—exemplifies the controversy surrounding the figure of Soros.

March 1938, an historical context which inevitably must inform our contemporary understanding of both Soros' philanthropic work in former Soviet satellite countries as well as our understanding of Popper's "open society": Hitler—and fascism—were on the move, as Stalin—and communism—soon would be.

From this context was born Popper's (1945/1962) understanding of "open society," one which "rejects the absolute authority of the merely established and the merely traditional while trying to preserve, to develop, and to establish traditions, old or new, that measure up to their standards of freedom, of humaneness, and of rational criticism" (p. ix). This is a society which, Popper contended, made its first appearance with the Greeks and Plato and which arose in the midst of "severe strain" "due to the social revolution which had begun with the rise of democracy and individualism" (p. 171). In Popper's historicism, Plato becomes a "totalitarian party-politician," one who believed he could "heal the sick social body" through "the arrest of change and the return to tribalism"—that is, to what Popper calls "the closed society," one which is "magical or tribal or *collectivist*" (pp. 169-173; italics added). "Collectivist" here could be applied to the former Soviet Union and its satellite countries, by all means, thereby making a subtle but substantive leap from Plato to Stalin, with Hegel in the middle.

Hegel, Popper argued, was little more than a pawn of the Prussian government following the Napoleonic wars, "'the missing link,' as it were, between Plato and the modern form of totalitarianism," for Hegel's doctrine was, in short, that "the state is everything, and the individual nothing; for it owes everything to the state, its physical as well as its spiritual existence" (Popper, 1946/1950, pp. 226-227). Popper's critique of Marx was only slightly less devastating: Marx's doctrine contained elements of both social activism—in showing how social systems, like capitalism, can be unjust—and Hegel's historicism, which led to Marx's decision

that, "at least under capitalism, we must submit to 'inexorable laws' and to the fact that all we

can do is 'to shorten and lessen the birth-pangs' of the 'natural phases of its evolution'" (Popper,

1946/1950, pp. 387-397). Marx's helplessness in the face of historical determinism, Popper

argued, and his inability to believe that reason and rational thinking could help bring about a

more just world, were his ultimate downfalls: In the end, Hegel's historicism "ousted" Marx's

activism, leaving only a vague hope that Marxism's "feeling of social responsibility and its love

for freedom must survive" (Popper, 1946/1950, pp. 396-397).

Given the history of the twentieth century and the history of his own life, it is therefore

no surprise that Soros would find Popper's work greatly influential. Soros (1998) wrote:

> *Open Society and Its Enemies* made sense of the Nazi and communist regimes that I had
> experienced firsthand as an adolescent in Hungary. Those regimes had a common feature:
> They laid claim to the ultimate truth and they imposed their views on the world by the
> use of force. Popper proposed a different form of social organization, one that recognized
> that nobody has access to the ultimate truth. Our understanding of the world in which we
> live is inherently imperfect and a perfect society is unattainable. We must content
> ourselves with the second best: an imperfect society that is, however, capable of infinite
> improvement. He [Popper] called it open society, and totalitarian regimes were its
> enemies. (p. ix)

Though this dichotomy—between open and closed societies—and these definitions are

themselves problematic (Soros, too, challenged them: 1998, p. 70), for the moment it is my

purpose to simply shed light on the philosophical base of Soros' philanthropic endeavors so as to

make vivid how his foundation may differ from those critiqued by Phillipson (1992) and

Pennycook (1994), and, in turn, make clear the rationale for the focus of this study. This

philosophical base was clarified more in a recent exploration of Popper's work and its relevance

fifty years after publication, by Jarvie and Pralong (1999), who highlighted how, in Popper's

view, Plato, Hegel, and Marx "misformulate" the struggle for freedom and democracy as

"insoluble paradoxes"; as these authors explained, Popper viewed this struggle anew and in a

way which provides shape to the central mission of OSI/SFN:

> Demands for equality need to be rooted in the universal human capacity for critical, rational inquiry. Demands for freedom and openness are not about the particular system of government, but about ensuring that in all systems the government be changeable without violence. (Jarvie & Pralong, 1999, p. 5)

If we leap, therefore, from the context of Popper's writing and Soros' youth—that of Europe on the verge of, and then in the midst of, World War Two—to 1993, the period just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we can better understand how and why OSI/SFN lays claim to Popper's work as the philosophical blueprint of its primary mission:

> An open society is a society based on the recognition that nobody has a monopoly on the truth, that different people have different views and interests, and that there is a need for institutions to protect the rights of all people to allow them to live together in peace. Broadly speaking, an open society is characterized by a reliance on the rule of law, the existence of a democratically elected government, a diverse and vigorous civil society, and respect for minorities and minority opinions. ("About Us: FAQs," 2005)

It is upon this concept of "open society"—broadly speaking, broadly conceived—that Soros created the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network. While the language within this definition is ostensibly as paradoxical as Popper's view of traditional notions of freedom and democracy—it foregrounds difference, and it foregrounds institutional protection of people's rights and the rule of law, that is, perhaps, both agency and structure—at the same time it lays the groundwork for just how Soros might put these ideas into practice: "by encouraging critical thinking in education, and by contributing to the development of an active, lively, civil society" (Jarvie & Pralong, 1999, p. 8). The underlying philosophy of OSI/SFN seems, therefore, not only to reify the concerns of Pennycook (1994) and Phillipson (1992)—concerns over "ideological coercion" through development, aid, and ELT; concerns over the "structural functions served by English nationally and internationally" (Phillipson, p. 12)—it simultaneously and quite explicitly seeks to foster a space for "minority opinions," indicating, in turn, that here there may be a "center" foundation prepared to be receptive of meaning-making practices in the "periphery."

Again, this foundation departs dramatically from pictures of philanthropy we saw earlier or, one might argue, that we have seen since.

*Mission*

There is another possible departure which I contend sets OSI/SFN apart from the paradigm of American foundation work heretofore discussed. OSI/SFN's mission statement is explicit in its wish to help new democracies "diminish and prevent the negative consequences of globalization" ("About Us: FAQs," 2005), and though the OSI/SFN website does not articulate what those consequences might be, Soros himself did in *The Crisis of Global Capitalism* (1998). In this work, Soros reformulated what the enemies to open society may be: not only totalitarianism, but also, in his words, totalitarianism's opposite: "the lack of social cohesion and the absence of government," that is to say, "The Capitalist Threat" (p. x) present in a world economy which, though global, nevertheless lacks the presence and regulation of sufficient international financial authorities.

To illustrate: In an overview of the Asian financial crisis and the Russian economic meltdown of the 1990s, presented to Congress on September 15th, 1998, Soros (1998) faulted the international banking system and the international monetary authorities such as IMF and the World Bank for their inabilities "to hold it together" (p. xv) in the periphery. The global capitalist system, he stated, was disintegrating, and as a result, "we [at the center] are bereft of the capacity to preserve peace and to counteract the excesses of the financial markets" (p. xix). For Soros, this failure to develop "a global society" (and an open one, globally) reflects the dialectic of globalization, where, in spite of a fast-growing world economy (at least at that time), "The basic unit for political and social life remains the nation-state. International law and international institutions, insofar as they exist, are not strong enough to prevent war or the large-

scale abuse of human rights in individual countries" (p. xx). This tension—between

*inter*nationalism and nationalism; between global interests and those of the "nation state"—is a

dialectic oft-noted in the globalization literature, and one worth expanding upon briefly here, not

only to make clear how OSI/SFN departs from the paradigm of foundation work Phillipson

(1992) and Pennycook (1994) critiqued so vigorously, but also to make more salient the purpose

and significance of this dissertation: to attend to *both* the official written discourse of OSI/SFN

and its local foundations *as well as* to the discourses of project participants, and, in the process,

to discover how these different discourses conceptualize the relationship between English, ELT,

and the building of open societies. I will expand further on this tension between nationalism and

internationalism in Chapter Two. But first, more words on globalization.

In the arena of political science, globalization has been described as "best conceived as a

dialectical process stimulating: integration and fragmentation; cultural differentiation and

uniformity; [a] borderless world and evolution of state" (Goldman, 2002). From the field of

sociology, Bilton (1996) described it as "the process whereby political, social, economic and

cultural relations increasingly take on a global scale, and which has profound consequences for

individuals' local experiences and everyday lives" (p. 660). For my research purposes, however,

I drew predominantly upon Kellner (2002), who articulated a complex, qualified, and dialectical

theory of globalization which is particularly significant in the context of global education and—

in the narrower context of *this* study—English Language Teaching.

Kellner (2002) presented globalization "as a strange amalgam of both homogenizing

forces of sameness and uniformity, and heterogeneity, difference, and hybridity, as well as a

contradictory mixture of democratizing and anti-democratizing tendencies" ("Theorizing

Globalization"). He then went on to distinguish between two types. The first was "globalization

from above," that is, globalization as superimposed by corporations, big governments, and the capitalist state.[14] Kellner's second type, however, was "globalization from below," which referred to "how marginalized individuals and social movements resist globalization and/or use its institutions and instruments to further democratization and social justice" as well as "circulate local struggles and oppositional ideas" ("Theorizing Globalization," 2002). It is my contention that this conceptualization of globalization aligns Kellner with Pennycook (1994), whose objective, again, was to surpass the "totalizing" tendency of English linguistic imperialism (we might say the same about globalization) and arrive instead at a more complex view of ELT and English language learners, one which "allows for struggle, resistance, and different appropriations of language, opening up a space for many different meaning-making practices in English" (p. 69). Pennycook, recall, explored how English in Malaysia and Singapore was appropriated and used in ways which, he argued, both reflected and reified "postcolonial and anticolonial struggle" (p. 257). In so doing, he seemed to be attending exactly to Kellner's (2002) "globalization from below," or how local learners may deploy English to serve their own interests, whether those interests be democratization or "local struggle and oppositional ideas." It is a framework which not only guided the design of this study, but further justifies again why OSI/SFN is an important foundation to examine, for it too—at least in the discourse of its mission—aims to attend to "globalization from below."

Consider. Reflecting on the consequences of the dialectic of globalization in the context of the world post-1989 and the collapse of the Soviet system, Soros asserted that "global

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[14]  The most commonly cited example of such "globalization from above" has to be the spread of American fast food ("McDonaldsization") internationally. Selfe (1999) provided another example in her discussion of the "Global Information Infrastructure," which she described as "designed to increase the worldwide markets for American technologies and expertise by encouraging a range of developing countries to establish and become increasingly dependent on network computing environments" (p. 55). This dependency is reminiscent of Phillipson's point and that of much contemporary development theory—that work done in periphery countries by center foundations serve the interests of the center, ultimately, through propagation and perpetuation of center norms, ideals, ideologies, and products.

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capitalism emerged triumphant" over "open society, with its emphasis on freedom, democracy, and the rule of law": As a result, he said, "capitalism, with its exclusive reliance on market forces, poses a different kind of danger to open society . . . a greater threat to open society than any totalitarian ideology" (1998, p. xxii). This statement is really quite remarkable, given Soros' fortune and his reputation as the world's leading financier, a fortune and reputation made in America by betting on the British pound. I find it more striking, however, when set alongside assertions made by Pennycook and examined earlier in this chapter, that the programs and projects of American philanthropic foundations are so bound up in the interests of American capitalism (and—by default—the promotion of English) that they inevitably reproduce and support "the social and political status quo" (1994, p. 154).

Soros' discourse, on the other hand, strongly indicated otherwise: It suggested he was very aware of how "the pain at the periphery has become so intense that individual countries have begun to opt out of the global capitalist system, or simply fall by the wayside" (1998, p. xiv); it suggests he was very aware of the negative consequences of globalization—its by-products of local, national, and international conflict; isolationism in the midst of integration; competing and simultaneous tendencies the world over towards *both* democratization and anti-democratization. Clearly, too, and perhaps as a result of this heightened awareness, Soros' discourse seemed to push past or against the interests of a strictly *American* capitalism, what Pennycook described as the expansion of "*American* ideology, capitalism, and US power" (p. 153; italics added) to a broader vision of a global, open, and civil society, a vision which, I posit, demonstrates the most radical departure yet in this foundation, for Soros' vision sprang, no doubt, from his obvious *disillusionment* with the center, with the West, particularly with the

United States. In response to how the United States responded to the collapse of the Soviet

Union, he wrote:

> [T]he attitude of the West disappointed and disconcerted me. At first I thought that
> people in the open societies of the West were just slow to recognize a historic
> opportunity; eventually I had to come to the  conclusion that they genuinely did not care
> enough about open society as a universal idea to make much of an effort to help the
> formerly communist countries. All the talk about freedom and democracy had been just
> that: propaganda. (1998, p. 86)

More recently, and more cuttingly, he turned his ire onto the Bush administration specifically

and its response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the most obvious of which were

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In *The Bubble of American Supremacy* (2004), Soros wrote: "I

consider the Bush doctrine of preemptive military action pernicious. . . . The government of the

most powerful country on earth has fallen into the hands of extremists. . . . The supremacist

doctrine is in contradiction with the principles of an open society because it claims possession of

an ultimate truth" (p. vii).[15] In other words, like Pennycook and Phillipson—though much more

directly—Soros believed that America had become "a threat to the world," one which was led by

a president who "has a simplistic view of what is right and what is wrong" and who thus negated

the very "principles of open society, which recognize that we may be wrong" (Soros, 2004, p.

vii).

In short, in Soros' view, what is crucial for open society is not the propagation of

*American* ideals, ideas, and ideologies. On the contrary, he urged "open society" as a "*universal*

idea," one driven forward by the Enlightenment and Kant's illusory moral agent "who is guided

by the dictates of reason to the exclusion of self-interest and desire" (1998, p. 90; italics added).

Perhaps, too, Soros' ideas lined up with anti-Enlightenment and post-colonial theories of

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[15] In turn—and contributing to the controversy around Soros—he spent more than $15 million in an effort to defeat
the Bush administration in the 2004 elections.  His efforts in that instance did not pay off, the ramifications of which
are still felt today, in 2009.

resistance (Canagarajah, 1999), for into this framework Soros incorporated the necessity of "Fallibility," an understanding that the "Western intellectual tradition ought not to be imposed indiscriminately on the rest of the world in the name of universal values. The Western form of representative democracy may not be the only form of government compatible with an open society" (1998, pp. 95-96).

In this language, as elsewhere, Soros seemed to repudiate criticisms leveled throughout this chapter. He suggested a different paradigm of foundation work than that of Carnegie, Rockefeller, Fulbright, or Ford. Moreover, Soros himself acknowledged the shortcomings of the paradigm of foundation work such as explored by Phillipson and Pennycook. He wrote (1998), for example:

> My foundation in Hungary, established in 1984 [OSI/SFN's predecessor, the Open Society Fund] as a joint venture with the Hungarian Academy of Science, acted as the sponsor of civil society. Not only did it support civil society, but civil society supported it; as a result it was exempt from many of the unintended adverse consequences foundations usually suffer from. (p. 69)

While Soros did not discuss these "adverse consequences" and shortcomings, I can only assume that in the context of his critique of global capitalism, he intended us to make the connection for ourselves: that foundations which do not attend to local interests, local knowledge, and local meaning-making practices will fall prey to "indiscriminate imposition" of its interests and ideologies, a model which is not only expansionist, but also likely to fail. And while admittedly, Soros' discourse as encountered thus far may raise as many questions as it might seek to answer, and while my overview of Soros and OSI/SFN may be in the peculiar position of resting somewhere between "gunning for" and "gaga over," my primary purpose in this introduction is, once again, to bring to light just why this foundation invites the sort of sustained inquiry and examination I undertake in this dissertation.

The founder, the philosophy, and the mission of OSI/SFN all seem to break with the model of American philanthropic foundations overviewed in this chapter. Yet according to the "Strategy" document (1999), the necessity of English underpins the central purpose of the foundation, its very reason for being. We must ask then: What implications will this contradiction bring to bear on the actors involved in OSI/SFN-funded English Language Programs—from project planners and administrators, to teacher educators and teachers, to the students themselves? How do these actors discursively conceptualize the relationship between English, ELT and the building of open societies? What are other interests—explicit and implicit—present in the discourses and served by the work of OSI/SFN? By its project beneficiaries? And if we attend to the discourse on the ground and as it happens, what will we hear?

## Concluding Remarks

This chapter has sought to explain the rationale for this study: just why it was important to conduct a study of OSI/SFN and its English Language Programs. First, this foundation seems to promote English linguistic imperialism or, more cautiously or instrumentally, a form of supranational language management through its promotion of English as the default, common-sense language of international communication. The discourse of OSI/SFN further suggests a natural, default, and common sense link between English, democracy, and capitalism. In these regards, OSI/SFN may exemplify a paradigm of American philanthropic foundation work which has been criticized fiercely in the ELT and development literature for contributing to the global expansion of center—that is to say, *American* and/or Western—interests and power—often at the expense of periphery countries and *their* interests. But the chapter further argued that OSI/SFN may simultaneously problematize this paradigm: through an introduction to the controversial

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founder of OSI/SFN, an introduction to the philosophical base of the foundation, and an overview of its mission. In these ways, OSI/SFN seems to *depart* from the paradigm of American philanthropic foundation work conducted overseas. Close study of such a complex picture, I contend, can only enhance the work of actors involved in English language aid projects around the world, but perhaps especially in transition and developing countries.

*Overview of Subsequent Chapters*

In subsequent chapters, I undertake the following:

In Chapter Two, I dive down deeper into the literature to develop and share my conceptual and interpretive framework, a framework which illumined for me the interrelationships between nation building, the building of open societies, and ELT. This framework both enhanced my understanding of OSI/SFN's primary mission—the "forging of open societies"—as well as helped delimit and position the discussion in particular relation to the European Union, which presents itself as an ideal laboratory in which to explore the building of open societies and the role of English in this project. Membership in the European Union is, moreover, both benchmark of and backdrop to the goals for open societies as constructed in multiple countries across Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. An important part of what is at stake in this process are issues of identity—ethnic, national, and supranational—and how identities are being forged and changed in transition countries.

In Chapter Three, I explain my research process, methodology, and design. For site selection, I drew upon Jentleson's (1999) explanation of and justification for comparative multi-case studies in order to explain the need to look at OSI/SFN English language discourses as they are instantiated in multiple countries by both text and people. For my discourse analytic

framework, I drew upon commonalities between an eclectic mix of three critical discourse approaches: Fairclough's critical discourse analysis (1989, 1992b, 1995; Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2006); Wodak's discourse-historical approach (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999; Wodak, 2004; see also Fairclough & Wodak, 1997); and Hansen's (2006) post-structuralist discourse analytical framework for investigating identity construction in foreign policy discourse. While the work of Fairclough and Wodak helped me begin to categorize, analyze, and understand the OSI/SFN ELP discourse initially at the text dimension, Hansen's framework subsequently provided the three main categories for understanding my findings at the social dimension—space, time, and responsibility—or, as she put it, "the big concepts" through which political communities (such as open societies) are discursively constituted (2006, p. 46).The chapter further describes data collection procedures and how I viewed my role as a researcher in this study.

In Chapter Four, I present findings from critical discourse analysis of the official written, New York-based, OSI/SFN ELP discourse. This is the official discourse of the specific English Language Programs initiative, which ran from 1994-2005. This initiative was established in order to support and foster *other programs* with an English language component, since, a "Strategy" (1999) document informs us, English is needed for *any* OSI/SN project or program with an international component. From this analysis we will see, for instance, how the OSI/SFN policy of systemic impact leads to a form of supranational language management, with English and the need for English discursively infused into all potential discursive constructions of space, time, and people. We shall further see, among other findings, how English discursively evolves into *the* language of open society. I also identify discourse chains originating in the OSI/SFN

ELP discourse—in other words, particular "knowledge" and "meanings" which, if reproduced, eventually stabilize and become legitimized and authoritative.

In Chapter Five, I map these discourse chains as they are reproduced, re-scripted, transformed, and/or resisted in the local English language programs' written discourses. From this map, we will see, for instance, how English is continuously reproduced as *the* language of open society and international communication. At the same time, we will see local written discourses resisting English-only: They promote, rather, linguistic diversity alongside English and the need to attend to Less Widely Used Less Taught (LWULT) Languages. To provide one more example of findings we will see, the local discourses resist the OSI/SFN ELP discourse chain of *exclusion*—most likely due to an emphasis on the creation of elites—and offers instead a discourse chain of much greater *inclusion*.

In Chapter Six, I share the voices and views of participants I interviewed throughout the countries of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the summers of 2005 and 2006. Each was involved in an OSI/SFN ELP program or an OSI/SFN program with an English language component. These voices, too, reproduce and resist discourse chains begun in the New York-based OSI/SFN ELP discourse. For instance, we will hear participants talk not only about how their work has been helped by English, but also how their work has been undercut or undermined completely because of English.

Finally, in Chapter Seven, I will articulate the policy and teaching lessons learned from this research with the goal of improving practices and policies in other English language aid projects in developing and transition countries.

CHAPTER TWO: THE INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY

Rationale for the Framework

In this chapter, I share the conceptual and interpretive framework which helped illuminate for me the interrelationship between nation building, the building of open societies, and English language teaching. Several reasons underlie the theoretical approach I take in this chapter.

First, I needed to address a neglect in the ELT literature which Phillipson (1988) highlighted, namely, that the preparation of ELT professionals "pays little attention to international relations, development studies, theories of culture or intercultural contact, or the politics or sociology of language or education" (p. 348). He reiterated this concern in *Linguistic Imperialism* (1992), when he asked the questions that prompted this study:

> How can we, in a theoretically informed way, relate the global role of English, and the way in which language pedagogy supports the spread and promotion of the language, to the political, economic, military, and cultural pressures that propel it forward? How can analysis probe beyond individual experiences and reflection to the processes and structures which are in operation at the international, national, group, and personal levels? (p. 2)

Inspired by Phillipson, then, and in order to better understand the multiple pressures that propel English and ELT pedagogy forward, I took an interdisciplinary approach in this chapter: I drew upon and synthesized literature from the realms of political science, nationalism, development, and international relations in order to create a framework for understanding why English language teaching undergirds the building of open societies in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

I was further guided in this process by Maxwell (1996), who described the conceptual context of research as "a formulation of what you think is *going on* with the phenomena you are

studying—a tentative *theory* of what is happening and why" (p. 25).[16] In this chapter, I thus used

theories and readings from other disciplines as "spotlights" (Maxwell, 1996, p. 33) which

illuminated and helped me understand the phenomena under study here: the relationship between

building open societies, English, and English Language Teaching as it is constructed in the

discourses of OSI/SFN English language programs and participants; convergences and

divergences between the interests in New York-based OSI/SFN's official written ELP discourse

and the interests in local and participants' ELP discourses; discursive constructions of the actors

involved in these programs; and implications behind the local discourses which emerged from

the study.

The conceptual and interpretive framework created herein thus spotlighted "themes"

(Maxwell, 1996) or "contents" (Wodak, 2004), indicated in headings above relevant literature,

which I anticipated would be represented in—or challenged by—the three levels of data I

collected: (a) through analysis of the official written discourse of OSI/SFN English Language

Programs; (b) through analysis of ELP written discourses on local websites and web documents;

and (c) through analysis of transcripts from interviews I conducted with OSI/SFN English

language program participants from throughout the countries of Central, Eastern, and South

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (see also Chapter Three). These themes or contents

I viewed as akin to hypotheses or propositions, which Maxwell (1996) made a cogent case for

allowing in qualitative as well as quantitative research, as long as "they are grounded in the data

and are developed and tested in interaction with it" (p. 53). He further warned researchers to

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[16] I hence avoided titling this chapter as "the literature review," a term Maxwell (1996) describes as "dangerously misleading" (p. 26), and which may more aptly describe the function of Chapter One, which reviewed the debate over ELT in periphery countries in order to establish the purpose for and significance of this study.

remain open to other ways of making sense of data, so as not to be blinded by propositions or preconceptions. So warned, I proceeded.

*Overview of the Framework*

The framework herein was constructed as follows. I first explored scholarship on "nation" and "nation building," an exploration which shed light on possible reasons why OSI/SFN predicated its mission of building open societies upon English and English language teaching. From this exploration I assert that the idea of open society is part of a post World War Two international (but especially *European*) movement *against* nationalism and *towards* a supranational vision of the world— a movement the success of which, importantly, OSI/SFN conjoined to English and ELT.

For post-communist, periphery nations such as those of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, this movement entailed the forging not only of new nations and governments but also new identities: What is at stake is whether these identities would be premised upon a primordial reification of nation shaped by boundaries of ethnicity, geography, and *language* (Smith, Law, Wilson, Bohr, & Allworth, 1998, p. 1; my italics), or whether these identities would be supranational, "shared," and "cross-cutting," in other words, part of a larger political community (such as open society) which seeks to transcend and thus "reduce the exclusionary commitment to nation-states" (Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, 2004, p.1). From this reading, I anticipated that OSI/SFN would discursively construct English and ELT as a powerful means to offset national identity and dramatically influence the creation of supranational identity.

I next sought to delimit and position the research in particular relation to the European Union, for as Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer (2004) stated, "Nowhere has the effort to build pan-

nation-state identities been more active than in Europe" (p. vii). This part of the chapter took the view that the European Union was an ideal laboratory in which to explore the interrelationship between English and building open societies: Both the EU and open society emerged from "the normative desire to put an end to war" (Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, p. 1; see also Jarvie & Pralong, p. 5); both the EU and open society "seek to promote tolerance and foster better relationships among national subgroups nested within a common superordinate group" (Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, pp. 8-9; see also "About Us: FAQs," 2005); both make their aim the establishment of participatory decision-making based on "freedom, democracy, and the rule of law" (Soros, 1998, p. xxii; see also Citrin & Sides, 2004, p. 183). Furthermore, behind both the creation of the EU and recent revisions of open society there lies the desire to "distinguish Europe from the less-democratic states on its fringes and *from the United States*, which is less committed to multilateralism and to welfarist notions of social justice" (Citrin & Sides, 2004, p. 183, italics added; see also Soros, 2004). From these parallels, I predicted that OSI/SFN may actually construct the use of English in the periphery as a means to resist—more than reproduce—the interests of center countries, especially the United States, an assertion that—if borne out—would enlarge the debate over ELT in periphery nations considerably. At the same time, I predicted that OSI/SFN would link the necessity of English with accession to the European Union, where, in spite of multiple languages, English seems have become the default, most practical, lingua franca.[17]

I identified additional parallels in this section. The EU is also central in influencing how current and candidate member states define themselves; as Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer noted, "It defines them as either member states, states that wish to join, or outsiders that may wish to join or wish that some other institutional alternative were viable" (p. 2). OSI/SFN, too, in its

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[17] See, e.g., Phillipson, R. (2003). *English only Europe? Challenging language policy.* London: Routledge.

overview of project work in countries throughout CESEE-fSU, set up membership in the

European Union as backdrop to and benchmark of successful open society ("Overview: Central,"

2008; "Overview: South," 2008). I thus postulated that *both* institutions may well be working to

create *supra*national identities in the transition countries of CESEE-fSU, a contention that

reinforced my decision to focus on OSI/SFN English language programs and participants from

these countries.

The chapter lastly examines the constructs of civil society, deliberative democracy, and

global civil citizenship, possible configurations, that is, of supranational identity and what it

might mean to be a citizen of open society. These configurations provided an additional heuristic

for substantiating identity change in the discourses of OSI/SFN English language programs and

participants. The chapter concludes with summary remarks.

English and Issues of Nationalism

*English Constructed as Extending Imagined Communities*

Anderson's (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of*

*Nationalism*—a widely discussed and standard text in the academic arenas of political science,

international relations, nationalism, and history—began with an opinion echoed throughout the

literature on nationalism and the nation: that "nation, nationality, nationalism" are slippery terms,

"notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyse" (p. 12). In Anderson's view, "nationality"

and its other "significations, nation-ness as well as nationalism, are cultural artifacts of a

particular kind" (p. 13); accordingly, their meanings should not be seen as fixed, but rather, as

cultural constructs which are transformed over time in ways which create "profound emotional

legitimacy," our "deep attachments" (p. 14). This transformation, Anderson stated, began with

the decline of great religions, followed by—in the eighteenth century—the merging of capitalism

with print technology, the fusion of which "created the possibility of a new form of imagined community," in three ways: (a) print-languages unified (and divided) readers into those who could read and understand a language and those who could not; (b) print-languages "fixed" languages so that they were no longer "subject to the individualizing and 'unconsciously modernizing' habits of monastic scribes," in the process fostering a new sense of time and, particularly, antiquity; and (c) print-languages resulted in "languages-of-power," privileging certain dialects over others (pp. 46-49).

From this convergence, in Anderson's hypothesis, an imagined world of "citizens-in-the-making" began to form, citizens united as readers of a common *language*, located at a fixed moment of time and space, and part of a world of other—if "anonymous"—"equals" (Kemper, 1991, p. 4). The modern nation state thus began to take shape, but in our imaginations only, and in one shared language.

Anderson defined "nation" as follows:

It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. . . . The nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind. . . . It is imagined as *sovereign* because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. . . . Finally, it is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings. (1983, pp. 15-16; italics in original)

Anderson's conceptualization of nation was clearly social constructivist; it was also testimony to the power of imagination, memory, symbol, and perhaps most of all, *language*, in that its "deep horizontal comradeship" helped account for the profound commitments to and resultant

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sacrifices for nation that citizens have—for hundreds of years—so readily made (and still so readily make). It helped account, that is, for the passions which lead people to die for "nation."

Anderson's (1983) work also began to generate for me questions as to the role of English in the creation of imagined communities, of kinship, questions which proliferated throughout this chapter and which became subsumed by my larger research questions. For instance, in light of Anderson's (1983) theory of nation, the question arose as to whether the discourse of OSI/SFN conceptualizes English and ELT as a way to extend the sense of imagined community beyond the borders of nations, as a way to "unite readers" and create "deep horizontal comradeship" and "profound attachments" globally. Was this part of the project or part of the process of creating open society, and part of the reason why that project, according to OSI/SFN, necessitated English Language Teaching in transition countries?

### English Constructed as a Universal Idiom

Gellner's (1983) *Nations and Nationalism* approached nationalism differently, and in so doing, suggested another way OSI/SFN may construct the role of English in building open societies. For Gellner, the quest for nation is driven by political and cultural elites for whom nationalism is a tool for economic gain and cohesion. In Gellner's thesis, economic change (he focused on the historical shift from agrarian to industrialist society)—with all its sudden innovations, particularly in relation to the demands of the labor market—demanded a kind of cultural homogeneity, a "context-free," "universal idiom," so that all members of the constantly changing society could remain intelligible to one another and thereby function in a more economically effective way (pp. 33-35).

This "universal idiom" required that education become the function of the state. Students needed to learn it from teachers, who learned it at university: In this way, as one Gellner

reviewer put it, "States become the protectors of High Cultures, of 'idioms'; nationalism is the demand that each state succor and contain one and only one nation, one idiom" (Shalizi, 1998).

For Gellner (1983), this process led to "social genetics," a means for reproducing social individuals, and one which, in the context of ELT, has already been taken to task by Phillipson (1992), Pennycook (1994), Holliday (1994), and Canagarajah (1999). Gellner wrote:

> The centralized method of reproduction is one in which the local method is significantly complemented (or in extreme cases, wholly replaced) by an educational or training agency which is distinct from the local community, and which takes over the preparation of the young humans in question, and eventually hands them back to the wider society to fulfill their roles in it, when the process of training is completed. (Gellner, 1983, pp. 29-30)

As is clear from this description, Gellner's is a thesis which obviously has strong implications for language planning, language policy, and language rights. Its critique can easily be anticipated as well as its particular relevance to *this* study: namely, what implications might Gellner's view of nation bring to bear on the spread of English throughout the linguistically, culturally, and ethnically diverse transition countries of post-communist Europe and the former Soviet Union? Does OSI/SFN conceptualize English as the "universal idiom" of a supranational community?[18] What pressures does Gellner's thesis put on linguistic diversity when, as Phillipson (1992) stated, English "has been marketed [worldwide] as *the* language of development, modernity, and scientific and technological advance" (p. 11; italics added)? Perhaps more troublingly, as I envision the findings of this study and recall my past experiences, what would or does it mean to teach English to an ethnic minority whose *first* language was officially suppressed for almost 50 years—as in the case of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, Romania—or to people for whom over several decades *Russian* classes were mandatory, distant

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[18]A striking point in this regard is that in 1993, Soros convinced Gellner to leave Cambridge University in order to establish the Center for the Study of Nationalism within Central European University, a Soros-funded, English-medium, "American-style" university in Budapest, Hungary. For more on Soros' attitudes towards the utilitarian aspects of English, see Chapter One.

though Russian was from their first language and Russia from their country? How would they talk about learning English? How would they view its role in their changing societies?

*English Constructed as a Means to Offset National Identity*

The third theory of nationalism I overview springs from a student of Gellner's, Anthony Smith, whose *National Identity* (1991) explored "ethno-symbolism." In Smith's view, nationalism was born not out of a sense of kinship or the need for economic or political autonomy, but out of a group's sense of shared history—or rather, historiography—and common identity: Group members need not necessarily be alike, but they must *feel* alike, or at least feel a strong attachment to their nation and its members.

From Smith's (1991) theory, one particularly striking claim emerged: that, in Smith's words, "national *identity* is perhaps the most fundamental and inclusive of all collective identities in the modern era" (p. 143, emphasis added). Citrin and Sides (2004) then took note of the implications of this statement: it is a "claim that poses a significant hurdle for building a European [or any supranational] identity that can supersede national identity" (p. 182). One's national identity may be called upon in the process of nation building, but it may also come to impede the process of identity formation above and beyond the nation, to impede, that is, the extension of a sense of imagined community beyond the borders of nation.

Smith's (1991) theory introduced a new point of analysis in this study, then, a new theme, by bringing identity explicitly into the discussion. I wondered then, whether OSI/SFN may conceptualize English and ELT as a means to offset and/or re-shape national identities in transition countries, evidence for which may be found in the discourses of its English language programs and participants. A further point I drew from Smith refers to what he called "a cultural Pan-nationalist movement [in Europe] to create large-scale continental identities": It was Smith's

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worry that such a movement may actually revive nationalist tendencies amongst specific ethnic groups (p. 176), which led me to ask, how would English language program participants characterize the role of English in their communities? Would their discourses reveal a similar backlash to English or a revival of nationalist tendencies?

<div align="center">English and Issues of Nation Building</div>

Just as "nation" is a difficult term to define and conceptualize, so also is "nation-building." It has multiple meanings, which I explain below.  From these conceptualizations of nation building—as with nation and nationalism—I continue to spotlight themes which helped illuminate the interrelationship between the central elements of this study: English, ELT, and the building of open societies.

<div align="center">*English Constructed as Assisting and Stabilizing Nations*</div>

One particularly helpful introduction to the concept of nation building I found was the *Intractable Conflict Knowledge Base Project*, an initiative sponsored by the Conflict Research Consortium at the University of Colorado. This initiative suggested other ways OSI/SFN and its English language program participants might construct the role of English in the process of building open societies.

On the project's website, Stephenson (2003) explained how nation building was at that time conceived as programs in which "dysfunctional or unstable or 'failed' states or economies are given assistance in the development of governmental infrastructure, civil society, dispute resolution mechanisms, as well as economic assistance, in order to increase stability." Stephenson then further clarified that the term "state"—though often interchanged with "nation"—"more properly refers to the governmental apparatus by which a nation rules itself."

In the context of this study, Stephenson's (2003) description of unstable or failed states expanded on the usefulness of Smith's (1991) exploration of national identity. Stephenson led me to a broader consideration of the ways that nation building in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe has attended to (or failed to attend to) issues of national identity—or more specifically, how OSI/SFN English language programs and discourses have themselves attended to issues of national identity in transition countries. Have programs been available to all ethnicities within a country? Would the discourse of OSI/SFN construct English as a stabilizing influence, or might it be seen as a destabilizing influence in countries still under the sway of more oppressive regimes? In the same vein, I asked: how has Soros-funded ELT served to quash or communicate issues of national and ethnic identity, and for what purposes?

Another crucial point from Stephenson (2003) helped clarify further the concept of nation building and its relevance to this study. In all cases, Stephenson observed, nation building is premised upon intention or motive on the part of someone or something, somewhere. To various ends, the term "nation building" has been equated and used interchangeably with the terms "state building, democratization, modernization, political development, post-conflict reconstruction, and peacebuilding," a diverse list which attests to the complexity of the construct and the many multiple motives which may lie behind its use. Of particular note from this list, Stephenson shared how the equation of nation building with democratization builds from Kant's democratic peace hypothesis: namely, the hypothesis that "democracies don't make war against each other, or democracies don't initiate war at all" (Stephenson, 2003; Kant, 1983). Hence the oft-deployed rationale and justification for outside (and primarily U.S.) military intervention in the process of nation building; hence, too, as Stephenson elaborated, the ostensibly darker side of nation

building, whereby the term comes to mean "the external intervention and the extension of empires." She explains as follows:

> If it can be said that failed states are the cause of national, regional, or world security problems, or that human rights abuses are so extensive that the need to overcome them in turn overcomes the traditional sovereignty rights of states under international law, then intervention in the name of nation-building can be seen to be justified. Sometimes nation-building may simply be used as a justification for the expansion of imperial control. So nation-building matters, but what is meant by nation-building matters even more. (Stephenson, 2003)

From this conceptualization of nation building I was led in a new direction, or rather, led back to the starting point of this inquiry, the debate over English linguistic imperialism as discussed by Phillipson (1992), Pennycook (1994), Holliday (1994), and Canagarajah (1999): *Whose* interests, that is, are served in, by, and through English and ELT in periphery countries? I decided, therefore, to examine more deeply the implications of nation building as an imperialist venture—though in this study not necessarily a militaristic one—as doing so would help me revisit the debate over English linguistic imperialism—and the role of English in creating open societies—anew. For this purpose, I turned to one current and very forceful investigation of nation building in the world today.

*OSI/SFN ELP: Subversive? Temporary? Humanitarian? Imperialist?*

In *Empire Lite: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan*, Ignatieff (2003) took a strong view of "nation-building" that is shared by many, particularly after September 11th and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ignatieff's views, moreover, may enlarge the view of English linguistic imperialism heretofore discussed.

For Ignatieff (2003), Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan represented locations where "a distinctive new form of imperial tutelage called nation-building is taking shape" (p.2). Ignatieff then went on to enumerate the "imperial" motives behind the exercise: it allows the U.S. to strengthen its global dominance, to maintain its position as the world's last superpower, and to

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create stability in regions vital to the security of both the United States and its allies (pp. 2-3).

For Ignatieff, nation building was about reordering "political maps" but on "American terms,"

with its European (and Canadian) counterparts "reluctant junior partners" in the process, having

become demilitarized after World War II and hence "post-military," what he also calls "post-

national" in that the military is no longer an essential aspect of European national identities (pp.

3-15). America thus depends on its partners, but in Ignatieff's view, international cooperation

was something of a front, for "the empire needs legitimacy, and multilateral support is a useful

cover" (p. 16).

In the context of this study, questions quickly arose as to how the motives of OSI/SFN

might line up with Ignatieff's (2003) claims. Soros, as discussed in Chapter One, has been

consistently critical of U.S. foreign policy. For instance, he wrote in the preface to *The Bubble of*

*American Supremacy* (2004):

> The gap in perceptions between America and the rest of the world has never been wider.
> Abroad, America is seen as abusing the dominant position it occupies; public opinion at
> home has been led to believe that Saddam Hussein posed a clear and present danger to
> our national security. Only in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion are people becoming
> aware that they have been misled. (p. vii)

Soros' attitudes here and elsewhere may problematize Ignatieff's (2003) claims, in that, as

discussed in Chapter One, OSI/SFN may be working within the periphery in order to push

*against*—to even subvert—U.S. interests and global dominance, and to push *for* Soros' vision of

global, open society. When trying to understand why, then, the Soros mission is contingent upon

*English*, I turned to another bold claim of Ignatieff's, one which may broaden previous

discussions of English linguistic imperialism: "Nobody likes empires, but there are some

problems for which there are only imperial solutions" (p. 11).

This statement is strong, but also carries with it a kind of dialectic pragmatism which may

be evidenced in the discourses of OSI/SFN English language programs. First, Ignatieff (2003)

recast imperialist nation building into the notably paradoxical vision of "a humanitarian empire,"

and in language evocative of the mission of the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations

Network: "a humanitarian empire held together by common elements of rhetoric and self-belief;

the idea, if not the practice, of democracy; the idea, if not the practice, of human rights; the idea,

if not the practice, of equality before the law" (p. 17). According to Ignatieff, nation building *is*

imperialism in an era of human rights, when "great powers believe simultaneously in the right of

small nations to govern themselves and in their own right to rule the world" (p. 106). As

Ignatieff made clear, it is a paradigm packed with tension and contradiction, the U.S. itself

having been born from the overthrow of empire and now creating and leading "humanitarian

empire" by dealing with the *former* empires of the world, who are trying to distance themselves

from their own imperial pasts. Ignatieff further stated that the resultant mix is one in which

"American military power, European money and humanitarian motive have combined to produce

a new form of imperial rule for a post-imperial age" (p. 21). Phrased thus, we come to see

"humanitarian" and "empire" as a dialectic: Phrased thus, we come to interrogate the

assumptions behind both terms.

       This challenge to the constructs of "humanitarian" and "empire" becomes clearer in light

of the fact that the paradigm Ignatieff (2003) describes above distinctly parallels claims explored

in Chapter One regarding English linguistic imperialism. According to these claims, the

discourses of OSI/SFN English language programs may well be interpreted as reinforcing U.S.

economic, social, and political hegemony. Pennycook (1994) drew attention to post-World War

Two tendencies in the U.S. and Britain to move from "military dominance or direct economic

exploitation through colonialism" towards "the ideological coercion" of development (what

Ignatieff deemed the "theology of development," p. 125), aid, and—also essential—"language

and language learning" (p. 134). In Pennycook's view, as with Ignatieff's, this neocolonial approach was and is expansionist, a means for the United States to strengthen and maintain its economic, social, and political hegemony globally. Ignatieff also reinforced Brown's (1980) challenge to the humanitarianism presumed to underlie the work of philanthropic foundations (and by extension, aid agencies), that, as quoted previously, the humanitarianism too is suspect, bolstered by the foundations' inescapable "ethnocentrism, their class interests, and the imperialist objectives of their own empires" (Brown, p. 139).

On the other hand, where Ignatieff (2003) *departed* from the more totalizing picture of U.S. imperialism as depicted by Phillipson (1992), Pennycook (1994), and Brown (1980), and where he possibly provided a way to see the debate over English linguistic imperialism—and the role of OSI/SFN and its English language programs—*anew*, was in his more pragmatic approach to the exercise. For Ignatieff, imperialist nation-building may be necessary, an "uncomfortable fact about the modern world" (p. 11), but in today's "empire lite," it may also not be such a bad thing.

Two quotes help clarify this pragmatism. The first underlines the conditionality of "empire." As Ignatieff pointed out:

> Humanitarian action is not unmasked if it is shown to be the instrument of imperial power. Motives are not discredited just because they are shown to be mixed. It is entirely unsurprising that America and Europe invest in these zones of danger for motives that include just as much callow self-interest as high humanitarian resolve. Nor is the exercise of imperial power discreditable in itself, provided that it does eventuate in self-rule for nations and peoples. (p. 22)

The condition of eventual self-rule, then, in Ignatieff's view, could provide moral and pragmatic justification for a temporary imperialism, as long as power is handed off to the locals. And while it is fair to question whether power is something to be "handed off" (implying locals have none in the first place), Ignatieff's model may also create a space for the same sort of possibility for

good work and local agency in OSI/SFN English language programs as Pennycook's and Canagarajah's explorations of ELT in periphery countries. The difference is, perhaps, that along with striving to establish "some way of teaching English that is not automatically an imperialist project" (Pennycook, 1994, p. 69), Ignatieff helps us imagine ELT in periphery countries as only temporarily "imperialist," with "self-rule" a possible outcome as local project participants adapt and adopt methodologies and materials in ways which are appropriate to their contexts and goals (see also Holliday, 1994).

For the purposes of this study, Ignatieff thus led me to ask: Does OSI/SFN create discursive space for eventual "self-rule" in its English language programs, or for that matter, in its other programs which are executed in English? In what ways does its discourse invite local program participants to appropriate and transform ELT so that it is appropriate to their countries and contexts?

Further implications for such a re-visioning of ELT in periphery nations—particularly how it intersects with nation building and the creation of open society—arose from Ignatieff's (2003) elaboration on self-rule:

> Bringing order is the paradigmatic imperial task, but it is essential, both for reasons of economy and for reasons of principle, to do so without denying local people their rights to some degree of self-determination. . . . In the new imperialism, this promise of self-rule cannot be kept so distant [as under old imperialism], for local elites are all creations of modern nationalism, and modern nationalism's primary ethical content is the imperative of self-determination. Local elites, accordingly, must be 'empowered' to take over as soon as the American imperial forces have restored order and the European humanitarians have rebuilt the roads, schools, and houses. Nation-building seeks to reconcile imperial power and local self-determination through the medium of an exit strategy. (p. 22)

From this elaboration more key terms come to the fore. Ignatieff drew attention to the necessity of an exit strategy, which, in the context of this study, prompted a search for how OSI/SFN discursively conceptualizes the length of stay for its programs: Did it have an exit strategy for its

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English language programs? What criteria determined how long OSI/SFN should fund and foster ELT?

<center>*How OSI/SFN Constructs Elites, Experts, and Moral Imperatives*</center>

Ignatieff further reminded us of the role of "local elites": In a probable allusion to Gellner's modernist theory of nationalism, these are the "political and cultural" elites who—in Gellner's hypothesis—deploy nationalism as a tool for the creation of economic gain, cultural cohesion, and political autonomy—their own state. "Elites" here should also recall Soros' discussion of his methods in South Africa, whereby he stated: "I still think that the creation of elites among persecuted people is the most effective way to overcome prejudice" (quoted in Kaufman, 2002, p. 171).

In this study, the construct was useful, then, as it drew attention to the power structures at work in OSI/SFN English Language Programs and the actors caught up in those structures. In my analysis, I further asked: What are the relationships between expatriates and local program participants? How are these relationships discursively constructed? Who is an "expert," who a "novice"? More broadly, how does OSI/SFN construct the role of English in creating elites in these new democracies? Perhaps most compellingly, would these relationships reify what Ignatieff described as "the central tension in all nation-building experiments": "the conflict between local nationalism and international imperialism; between the desire of local elites to run their own show and the international concern to keep them in leading strings" (2003, pp. 73-74)? In other words, would the relationships between OSI/SFN project participants be, as Ignatieff described, "inherently colonial" (p. 95)? As possible measure of such, we can look to how Ignatieff backed up this assertion:

> The UN nation-builders all repeat the mantra that they are here to 'build local capacity'
> and to 'empower local people'. This is the authentic vocabulary of the new imperialism,

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only it isn't as new as it sounds. The British called it 'indirect rule'. Local agents ran the day-to-day administration; local potentates exercised some power, while real decisions were made back in imperial capitals. (p. 98)

Ultimately, then, in the context of OSI/SFN's English language programs, Ignatieff helped draw my attention to *real* decision-making, and to the following questions: In what ways does OSI/SFN hold on to the "leading strings," and/or in what ways are local project participants invited to take hold of those strings for themselves?

One more striking link between Ignatieff and Pennycook emerged, a link which helps continue to make plain the interrelationship between the theoretical constructs of this chapter. Just as Pennycook urged us as "teachers and applied linguists to discard ways of thinking about ELT as if it were some neutral enterprise and, instead, to start exploring the interests served by our work" (p. 24), so also did Ignatieff warn us that it is imperative we examine the language used to justify "the moral imperative sustaining foreign policy" (2003, p. 113). This warning may easily be extended to examining how OSI/SFN discursively justifies the need for ELT in the countries where OSI/SFN English language programs operate. For Ignatieff, "The imperial design [of nation building] needs to be stressed, because the usual ways of describing Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, as wards of the 'international community,' obscures the imperial interests that brought them under the administration of the United Nations in the first place" (p. 110). This statement would likewise prove telling in this study, especially as I examined OSI/SFN discursively constructed the *spaces* in which its English language programs operate, and the reasons and motives which brought those programs to those spaces in the first place.

English and Issues of Identity in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former

Soviet Union

For countries in the wake of Soviet occupation, identity, too—along with education, governance, market structure, and social policy—is undergoing dramatic transition. What's at

stake is whether these new identities will be premised upon a primordial reification of nation

shaped by boundaries of ethnicity, geography, and language (Smith, Law, Wilson, Bohr, &

Allworth, 1998, p. 1), or whether these identities will be supranational, "shared," and "cross-

cutting," in other words, part of a larger political community—like open society—which seeks to

transcend and thus "reduce the exclusionary commitment to nation-states" (Herrmann, Risse, &

Brewer, 2004, p.1). Exclusionary commitments to nation-states have led to appalling conflict

and civil war throughout the twentieth (and now the twenty-first) century.

This part of the chapter will maintain that this tension—between nationalism and

internationalism—helps shed light on the Soros mission of building open society, in that the idea

of open society may be viewed as part of a post World War Two international (but especially

*European*) movement *against* nationalism and *towards* a supranational vision of the world. From

the readings which follow, I anticipated that my research would show OSI/SFN discursively

constructs English to be a pivotal means of offsetting national identity and shaping supranational

identities in transition countries.

*Identity Politics and the Discourses of OSI/SFN*

A valuable starting point for this discussion was provided by Smith, Law, Wilson, Bohr,

and Allworth's (1998) *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National*

*Identities*. In language remindful of Soros' depiction of open society, these authors described a

new, post-national era, in which "national and ethnic identities have been superseded by

understandings of cultural difference based on a broader and more inclusive vision of political

community" (p. 1). At the same time, the authors quite carefully interrogated the transition

processes that were taking place in the region, particularly what happened when ethnic identities

found themselves swept up in this "larger political struggle," a process the authors characterized

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as the "ethnification or even racialization of identity" in the politics and cultures of the post-Soviet borderlands. Their chief claim and main worry was that identity in these regions was "being shaped as much by the ethnic politics of exclusion and division as it is by inclusion and co-existence" (p. 1).

Smith et al. (1998) argued that nation building had become—in echo of Gellner's theory of nationalism—dangerously intertwined with a kind of "identity politics which is designed to produce and reproduce nationally defined contours of community and to reflect nationally defined interests and values predicated on fulfilling a normative concept of statehood in which nation and state should be spatially congruent" (p. 2). In short, nation building reinforced national identity and often at the expense of national minorities. With nation building and identity politics so conceived, it is easy to understand the motive underlying the Soros mission of creating open society, a mission predicated upon those societies' ability to use English, and which, as articulated in Chapter One, is "characterized by a reliance on the rule of law, the existence of a democratically elected government, a diverse and vigorous civil society, and *respect for minorities and minority opinions*" ("About US: FAQs," 2005; italics added).

What was less clear—and what Smith et al. (1998) brought me back to again, as did Anthony Smith (1991)—were the ways the discourses of OSI/SFN ELP (New York and local) might work to address issues of national and ethnic identity. For instance, might OSI/SFN conceive ELT as providing a way to flow over the spatial congruence of nation and state, that is, to influence identity formation above and beyond *national* identity, towards a "superordinate shared" identity (Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, 2004, p. 2), European or otherwise? Equally important, how would local participants in Soros-funded English language programs discursively construct the influence of English on their identities, national, European, or other? More simply,

perhaps, in what ways would OSI/SFN-funded English language programs reach out to ethnic

minorities as well as ethnic majorities in these countries? Would these discourses themselves get

caught up in a form of identity politics as described by the authors, a politics that consciously or

not creates in-groups and out-groups, that excludes and divides as much as it includes and creates

discursive space for co-existence in the new society?

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*Competing Discourses of Identity*

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Just as Pennycook (1994) urged investigation of the discourses around English as an

International Language, just as Ignatieff (2003) spotlighted how the language of human rights

and democracy building help justify the extension of empire, so also did Smith et al. (1998)

make note of the fact that the key terms of this study are *discursive* constructs. Situating these

countries as "post-colonial" is correct, in that "they are constructed and labeled as such by their

nation-builders" (p. 9). Said differently, the authors' attentions to the *discursive* nature of these

constructs underlines Candlin's (1997) claim—and the methodology of this dissertation: that

discourse is "a means of talking and writing about and *acting upon* worlds," one which "is

constrained or encouraged by more macro movements in the overarching social formation"

(quoted in Jaworski & Coupland, p. 3; italics added; see also Chapter Three). In the instances

Smith et al. discussed, it thus grows clear how constructs such as nation, state, and empire

become filled and interpreted "with deep identific and historical meanings by communities, and

which in turn helps us to make sense of how such experiences have got inside post-colonial

identities" (p. 9).

Considering the discursive nature of these constructions is not a digression here: It not

only helps logically warrant the methodology of this dissertation, it further shines a light on

competing discourses of identity. I realized, therefore, that if I searched for patterns which

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emerged from discourse analysis of written discourses and interviews with OSI/SFN program participants, I might discover whether and how identities are changing in these countries, and how participants view the role of English in this process.

Smith et al. (1998) described three such discourses of identity: (a) "liberal discourse," which strives to break utterly with both Soviet and tsarist history; (b) a "return to empire" discourse which paints the present in crisis terms that contrast sharply with an earlier "Golden Age"; and (c) a "statist" discourse, which in Bakhtinian fashion hybridizes the first two discourses, in that it accepts the new Russia, though uneasily, remaining nostalgic for its political (Soviet) and historical (tsarist) homeland (pp. 9-12). My own experiences in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe rendered all three discourses familiar to my ear: My students who, along with their parents, were first time voters, seemed to utterly reject the socialist Hungary of their childhood and embrace the new democratic government; many colleagues who suffered from the initial shock therapy of the market transition spoke warmly of the more economically secure days of communism; frequently I heard strains of both excitement and nostalgia "fighting it out on the territory of the utterance"(Bakhtin, quoted in Smith et al., 1998, p. 11).

Usefully, then—in addition to drawing attention to issues of identity politics, race and ethnicity in discussions of national identity—Smith et al. (1998) further provided me tentative categories to explore in my own exploration of the discourses of OSI/SFN English language programs.

*Identity Markers: OSI/SFN as Essentializing, Historicizing, Totalizing*

Another key point emerged from these authors and enriched my understanding of conceptualizations of identity in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe. Smith et al. (1998) identified a pivotal feature of nationalizing regimes, namely, how they seek to create a sense of

*collective* identity by means of boundaries and demarcations, since identity is commonly defined through difference—between "us" and "them"—between first person and third person plural. The authors indexed three categories of discursive boundary markers, which I will first overview generally and then revisit in light of my own research.

The first is the tendency to essentialize, to codify a national or ethnic group by means of one trait. Differences between groups—identities, that is—are thus constructed as "fully constituted, separate and distinct" (Smith et al., 1998, p. 15). The second boundary marker the authors described is the tendency to historicize, which may involve a nation's search for and discovery of "an ethnic past or selective history, especially of a 'Golden Age' that can act as an inspiration for contemporary problems and needs" (Smith et al., 1998, p. 15). This search may also include the resurrection or invention of national heroes. The third boundary marker presented is the tendency to totalize, to make seemingly relative distinctions between groups into "absolute" distinctions. In the process, the authors elaborated, "individuals are thus collectivised and squeezed into particular categories: one is either a Tajik or Russian; one cannot be both" (Smith et al., 1998, p. 16). The authors then proceeded to argue that all three types of boundary markers may be deployed by nationalizing regimes in order to legitimate and strengthen "current boundaries of homeland in the face of counter-narratives by 'others' who question the legitimacy of such myths of national destiny and who are themselves engaged in putting forward alternative interpretations of their place within the borderland" (p. 20).

While the "others" Smith et al. (1998) were talking about were ethnic minorities struggling to assert a position for themselves in the new post-Soviet nations, I found it useful to extend their use of "other" to even outside groups like OSI/SFN, who may be seeking—through English and ELT—to put forward "counter-narratives" and "alternative interpretations" of

ethnicities, histories, and borders as a means to combat nationalism, as a means to push thinking about identity beyond nation to the supranational realm of open society. Additionally, as with competing discourses of identity, these boundary markers provided a foothold into understanding how identity may indeed be changing, or not, as evidenced by how OSI/SFN ELP discourses deploy these markers, or not. These categories further provided insight into how New York-based OSI/SFN ELP itself constructed local project participants, and how they constructed OSI/SFN ELP.

*English Constructed as Equalizing, English Constructed as Homogenizing*

Finally, Smith et al. (1998) spurred me to consider one more important point. In their discussion of how boundaries were demarcated by nationalizing regimes, they noted how—as discussed previously by Gellner (1983) and Stephenson (2003)—part of the tendency towards cultural standardization—that is, the elimination of *difference*—derived from Gellner's conceptualization of nationalism, discussed previously and reiterated in the following claim:

> Historically, successful nation-state building (and here western Europe is seen as the model) was bound up with making the nation and state spatially congruent. *Linguistic*, cultural and educational standardization is therefore held up as commensurate with the running of a more efficient national space-economy, 'a scientific state bureaucracy,' and with the producing of a more harmonious and loyal citizenry. (Gellner quoted in Smith et al., 1998, pp. 16-17; italics added)

Given the homogenizing forces within this assertion—particularly in reference to *linguistic* standardization—I was obliged to ask once again: What role would OSI/SFN and its ELP participants hence conceive English to play in the process of successful nation-state building? Might ELT help push against "linguistic, cultural and educational standardization" to the political detriment of nationalizing regimes, many of which have fought to create a national language (and national religion) as a means to reify the differences between ethnic majorities and minorities, as a means, that is, to secure and fortify their own hegemonic positions within the

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culture and politics of the new post-Soviet nation? Is English, in other words, a potentially equalizing force within nation-states of mixed ethnicity? Or might English itself become (or has it become already) a standardizing force, as so depicted in the debate over English linguistic imperialism, but—as OSI/SFN constructs it—a force which eschews national boundaries in favor "of a new internationalist order" (Anderson, 1983, p. 13), in favor of open society?

The tension between nationalism and internationalism reverberated again, and as I explored and explored and explored, the concept of open society became something of a shape-shifter, a changeling construct that oscillated back and forth between helping to reproduce—and helping to resist—center interests. It remains enigmatic still, though my larger taxonomy of themes was no doubt made richer by Smith et al.'s (1998) insights. They introduced into the discussion heightened awareness of how identity politics may seek to exclude and divide as much as include and create a space for co-existence; the discursive nature (again) of the constructs I tangled with; contestations between differing discourses of identity; and a new sensibility of discursive boundary markers and demarcations.

An equally enriching source in this discussion of identity was Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer's (2004) *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*. This volume strove to comprehend how international institutions act upon people's identities, how, that is, international institutions "shape people's beliefs about who they are and to which communities they belong" (Risse, 2004, p. 247). From the investigations in these essays, numerous themes are spotlighted, themes which continued to shape and enrich my own inquiry into the links between English and open society. I discuss now only those themes which became explicitly relevant in my study.

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*Configurations of Identity: Separate, Nested, Cross-Cutting*

The most noteworthy contribution Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer (2004) made to this discussion involved how identities might be configured. They discussed three models. The first configuration is identity as "separate": to be the only one in a group, the only teacher on staff who is a mother, the only Peace Corps volunteer who grew up on a farm, and so on. The second configuration is identity as "nested," in the way that Russian Matryoshka dolls are nested one inside the other. So configured, *I* might for instance feel I belong to Wisconsin, the Midwest, the United States, *and* the World. As the authors observed, the question becomes pertinent when considering "whether a person identifies more, or more often, or more intensely, with regional, national, or international communities" (pp. 8-12).

A third possible configuration is that of "cross-cutting" identity, when "some, but not all, members of one identity group are also members of another identity group" (p. 8). In a scenario like this, we all might be English teachers, but not all of us are mothers, or Ph.D.s, or heterosexual, and so on. This configuration, Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer (2004) claimed, is central to identity theory, in that psychologists and political scientists alike contend that cross-cutting identities curtail bias towards in-groups and stereotyping of out-groups, so much so that both question whether "democracy is even possible when the distribution of identities produces multiple nested groups rather than broadly cross-cutting groups" (pp. 8-9).

This statement has remarkable implications for the creation of open society and how ELT could be a factor in identity formation. Would OSI/SFN view English as a means to cross-cut identities, as learners from different ethnicities and groups come together—under the auspices of OSI/SFN-funded English language programs—and form English speaking communities? Would OSI/SFN English language program participants talk about themselves in ways that indicated

cross-cut or nested identities? In addition, Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer reminded me that group identification is necessarily a subjective and fluid experience (p. 9). I may *be* from Wisconsin but not *feel* I am from Wisconsin, or I might not feel *American* until I am outside of the U.S. This reminder helped me mediate claims and hypotheses as they emerged from my research.

English and Issues of Supranational Identity in the EU: Civil Society, Deliberative Democracy, and Global Civil Citizenship

As stated in Chapter One, since its founding, OSI/SFN has spent more than five billion dollars on democracy building initiatives in more than 50 countries, with its mission, again, to "help former communist countries in their transition to democracy," to "promote open societies by shaping government policy and education," and to "diminish and prevent the negative consequences of globalization" ("About Us: FAQs," 2005). In addition to working to these ends in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, OSI/SFN is active in Africa, South America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, the United States. With such a range and reach, another question ensues: Why did I choose to focus on Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in my exploration of the interrelationship between ELT and the building of open societies?

In this part of the chapter, I take the view that the European Union may be an ideal laboratory in which to explore the forging of open societies and the role of English in this process. Both the EU and open society emerged from "the normative desire to put an end to war" (Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, p. 1, 2004; see also Jarvie & Pralong, p. 5); both the EU and open society "seek to promote tolerance and foster better relationships among national subgroups nested within a common superordinate group" (Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, 2004, pp. 8-9; see also "About Us: FAQs," 2005); both make their aim the establishment of participatory decision-

making based on "freedom, democracy, and the rule of law" (Soros, 1998, p. xxii; see also Citrin & Sides, 2004, p. 183). What is more, behind both the creation of the EU and recent revisions of open society there lies the desire to "distinguish Europe from the less-democratic states on its fringes and *from the United States*, which is less committed to multilateralism and to welfarist notions of social justice" (Citrin & Sides, 2004, p. 183, italics added; see also Soros, 2004). From this parallel, I anticipated that OSI/SFN may construe English and ELT in the periphery as a tool to resist, more than reproduce, the interests of center countries.

Of central importance in my decision to focus on OSI/SFN English language programs in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe, the EU is now a decisive factor in determining "how states define who and what they are"; as Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer (2004) noted, "It defines them as either member states, states that wish to join, or outsiders that may wish to join or wish that some other institutional alternative were viable" (p. 2). OSI/SFN, too, in its overview of project work in countries throughout Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe, sets up membership in the European Union as backdrop to and benchmark of successful open society (see, e.g., "Overview: Central," 2008; "Overview: South," 2008). Both institutions may well thus be working to dramatically influence the formation of *supra*national identities in the transition countries of the new Europe. I wondered then: What roles might OSI/SFN conceive English and ELT to play in this process?

*English Constructed as the Language of Civil Society*

Citrin and Sides (2004) helped me begin to imagine the role OSI/SFN might conceive English to play in this process. They stated that the construction of a supranational (in their research, *European*) identity by necessity bucked any question of common ethnicity or shared

history; rather, such identity would have to be "civic." The authors then elaborated on what this construct entailed:

> Europe's 'civic religion' would encompass a demonstrated commitment to democracy, a tolerance for minorities, and a spirit of transnational cooperation. In addition, the European ethos would include support for a welfare state that tempers neoliberal market policies. These political ideas are believed to distinguish Europe from the less-democratic states on its fringes and from the United States, which is less committed to multilateralism and to welfarist notions of social justice. (p. 183)

The attributes of civil society as specified here were meant, therefore, to stand opposed to "ethnic" or "cultural" terms, with culture incorporating "history, ethnicity, civilization, heritage, and other social similarities," and "civic" addressing how citizens identify with certain political structures (Risse, 2004, p. 255), be they the EU, the national government, the local school-board, or, potentially, open society. Civil society was further set in sharp contrast to the social climate of the United States, whose unilateral foreign policy and questionable commitment to social justice aligns it, according to Citrin and Sides (2004), with the "less-democratic states" on the edges of Europe. Therefore, Citrin and Sides argued, institutions throughout Europe—but especially the EU—were working quite intentionally to construct "a postnational civic identity in the Habermasian sense [explained shortly] emphasizing democracy, human rights, a market economy, the welfare state, and cultural diversity" (Risse, p. 256).

If this list sounds familiar, we need only to look again at one sentence from the Soros definition of open society: "Broadly speaking, an open society is characterized by a reliance on the rule of law, the existence of a democratically elected government, *a diverse and vigorous civil society*, and respect for minorities and minority opinions" ("About OSI: FAQs," 2005; italics added). Plainly, civil society is at the core of building open societies, as it is at the core of the expanding European Union. Plainly, too, as discussed elsewhere, George Soros was fiercely

critical of the United States, whose unilateral foreign policy he believed to be interfering with open society globally (as well as within U.S. borders).

Less plain, however, is the relationship between English and civil society. However, as the OSI/SFN mission of building open societies (and, in turn, civil society) is predicated upon English and ELT, it was plausible for me to conjecture that the discourses of OSI/SFN might likewise construct English as the language of civil society. *Why* they might do so was indicated by Risse (2004), who, in research conducted on the EU, observed that citizens increasingly identified with the construct of "Europe" in ways "consistent with a civic identity," with the following ramifications: "The more people identify with Europe, the less xenophobic and the more positive toward Eastern enlargement they are. Hostility towards immigrants, in contrast, correlates strongly with exclusively national identifications" (p. 256). Risse constructed civic identity, therefore, as a forceful means to cross-cut national identities and, in the process, create stronger attachments to supranational communities. I thus, in my research, considered whether OSI/SFN might construct English and ELT as an equally forceful means to augment civic identities by cross-cutting national identities, thereby dramatically influencing the formation of supranational identities—in both the current EU as well as in candidate countries.

*English as the Language of Deliberative Democracy: Democratic? Imperialist?*

But how would civil citizenship be configured? Habermas (1994) envisioned active civil citizenship as participation in what he called "deliberative democracy," whereby "the sovereignty of the people has constrained itself to become a procedure of more or less *discursive* opinion and will formation" (p. 32; italics added). This configuration emphasized civil citizenship as an active process which—in the form of discourses—can flow over and across the borders of nations and the divisions between national and supranational decision-making bodies.

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To use Habermas' words, in essence, this model depends upon "a network of different communication flows," "the informal circuit of public communication" which interfaces with "institutionalized processes of opinion and will formation." In this interplay between informal communication flow and the processes and procedures of governing bodies, Habermas submitted, individuals can become *active*, though anonymously; through networks of informal communication flow, citizens can help "bind the public administration to more or less rational premises and in this way . . . enforce social and ecological discipline on the economic system without impinging on its intrinsic logic" (p. 32). Deliberative democracy, then, "no longer hinges on the assumption of macro-subjects like the 'people' of 'the' community but on anonymously interlinked discourses or flows of communication" (p. 32).

Habermas' (1994) model of deliberative democracy not only suggested how citizenship and identity might be understood and operative above and beyond the province of the nation. It further raised an issue profoundly relevant to this study. While Habermas did not say anything in regard to the *language* of the discourses flowing informally in the communication networks described above, it is not a far stretch to imagine that for such discourses to be understood, they would have to occur in one or a few common languages.

This is a position stated outright in Breidbach (2002):

If one accepts that coming to terms with diversity is the pivotal point of European integration, then the questions arise as to how to establish a common basis; a common communicative space for Europeans to negotiate their perspectives on the future shape of the EU – both culturally and politically – and how this space should be structured. To put it in a nutshell: diversity begs the question of democratic legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy, since it is founded on information and opinion, requires communication. This implies and presupposes cultural and political literacy – and the linguistic ability to participate in these discourses. (p. 277)

For Breidbach (2002), English language instruction was the most sensible means to achieve the linguistic unity necessary to Europe-wide democracy, a position which might easily

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be extended to the global sphere as well. As he stated, English was well on its way already to becoming the European lingua franca: No other foreign language is as widely taught; more than 90% of all European secondary students study it; most strikingly, he claimed, there is a "virtual absence of debate within the general public about this language choice" (p. 276). Yet Breidbach insisted we see this emphasis on English as only half of the European dialectic of integration. The other half was an unequivocal commitment to linguistic diversity, as made manifest in the European Commission's (1995) White Paper on Education and Training: "Multilingualism is part and parcel of both European identity/citizenship and the learning society" (quoted in Breidbach, p. 273).

Breidbach's (2002) solution to this paradox was the promotion of a curriculum which simultaneously provides competence in English as well as "complex, plurilingual competence" in two or more other languages; coupled together, he contended, they establish the "cornerstones for further European integration and the development of a European identity" (p. 273). Breidbach's model here was one which might well be extended beyond conceptualizations of *European* identity and citizenship, perhaps even to the realm of global citizenship, what Soros promotes in his vision of open society. It may be, as Breidbach put it, that both tendencies— toward linguistic unity and linguistic diversity—"can be acknowledged in a constructive way" (p. 274). Moreover, I realized, it might be that close examination of the discourses of OSI/SFN's English language programs could reveal a view of the role of English in the creation of open society in just this way.

Or, I realized, another kind of view could emerge from the research, one articulated by Macedo, Dendrinos, and Gounari (2003). In blunt assent with arguments over English linguistic imperialism shared in Chapter One, these authors reminded us again that "the present attempt to

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champion English in world affairs cannot be reduced simply to issues of language but rests on a full comprehension of the ideological elements that generate and sustain linguistic, cultural, and racial discrimination" (p. 13). Breidbach (2002), in their view, would most definitely be seen as not just pragmatic, but also a champion in the cause of English and hence a promoter of a most dangerous position, one that glides too easily over questions of power relations and theories of cultural reproduction, those "collective experiences that function in the interest of the dominant class, rather than in the interest of the oppressed groups that are the objects of dominant policies" (Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gounari, p. 14). Breidbach might, in their view, be obscuring how

> Like the colonial policies of the past, the neoliberal ideology, with globalization as its hallmark, continues to promote language policies which package 'English' as a 'super language' that is not only harmless, but should be acquired by all societies that aspire to competitiveness in the globalized world economic order. (pp. 15-16)

More apropos still, given the focus of this study, Macedo, Dendrinos, and Gounari further averred that the means of "*state formation* . . . creates conditions for the constitution of a unified linguistic market," which they argued is "dominated by an official market. This dominant language, used on official occasions and in official places, becomes the norm against which all linguistics practices are theoretically measured" (p. 48; italics added). In their view, Breidbach's advocacy of English in *supra*-state formation would unquestionably signal a most sinister means to erase cultural difference as a part of a project they term "linguoracism" (90). The positions of these authors, along with Breidbach's, put me on the alert as I prepared to begin analysis of the OSI/SFN ELP discourses, both New York-based and local.

<center>*English and Global Civil Citizenship*</center>

So far this section of the chapter has considered two more ways OSI/SFN may be shown to construct English: as the language of civil society (in that it is the language, in essence, of open society); and/or possibly as the language of deliberative democracy, theorized by Habermas

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(1994) in the context of the European Union, whereby "*discursive* opinion and will formation" is able to flow over national borders and across administrative levels of European decision-making bodies, national and supranational, leading, in essence, to supranational democracy (p. 32). The last study discussed herein reached beyond the realm of Europe by providing a heuristic for understanding possible configurations of *global* civil citizenship, configurations which may be instantiated in the discourses of OSI/SFN English language programs and participants, and which may help explain why English language teaching undergirds the building of open societies.

Before I overview Falk's (1994) typology of global civil citizenship, some context is in order. Falk warned that it was dire we tune in to what he called the "cultural preconditions" for global citizenship and for any normative sense of global civil identity. What exactly Falk believed we should attend to echoed again arguments in the debate over English linguistic imperialism:

> We need to consider the degree to which the United States as a global actor and as principal generator of popular culture on a global level (McDonalds, Mickey Mouse and Madonna as prime intrusive symbols) is closing off space for other societies to assert their autonomy with respect to the reshaping of political democracy in a global context. Also, what are the effects for Europe of an assertive geopolitical position, centering around the claim to establish after the Cold War what President Bush boldly called a 'new world order.' To what extent is this new world order a reality rather than a slogan, nothing more than mobilizing rhetoric that seemed useful during the special occasion of the Gulf Crisis? Is this American cultural ascendancy challenging the independence and autonomy of other civil societies by its global reach? (Falk, 1994, pp. 130-131)

In the context of *this* study, Falk's comments—particularly his last question—resonated. He reminded me of Phillipson's (1992) and Pennycook's (1994) claims that—along with development projects and international aid funded and sponsored by governmental and non-governmental organizations alike—the spread of English and ELT have helped establish

America's position of cultural ascendancy.[19] ELT may thus be seen to have aided and abetted America's challenge to the independence and autonomy of other civil societies, for ELT was part and parcel of the process.

Falk (1994) therefore helped me question again OSI/SFN's role in working toward global civil society. OSI/SFN both converges with and diverges from the paradigm of American philanthropic foundations explored in Chapter One; it assumes English to be the default language necessary to open society, though simultaneously its founder, philosophy, and mission depart radically from the paradigm. In so doing, OSI/SFN suggests a different paradigm of philanthropy, one which lays challenge to the very hegemonic position and cultural ascendancy of the United States that Falk outlines above.

Fruitfully, Falk (1994) described how global citizenship—and global citizens—might be conceived and configured. In each of these forms, many of which overlap and/or spill over into each other, there are clear echoes of the rhetoric of OSI/SFN; hence we can understand again how its mission—predicated upon English—may be to push not only against the United States, but against the insular and globally dangerous interests of *any* nation, nationalism, and national identity, and towards a supranational vision of the world, one underpinned by the construct of global citizenship and with world interests at its heart. These typologies furthered informed this study by bringing to light forms and varieties of global citizenship and configurations of global (supranational) identity, one of which, I discovered through analysis, was indeed advocated in the discourses of New York-based OSI/SFN ELP.

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[19] For a fascinating counterdiscourse which evidences what has changed since I started this dissertation, see Fareed Zakaria's *The Post-American World.* He argues that other countries are rising to global ascendancy, China and India among them, and that the global attitudes of many countries toward the U.S. have moved from hatred to indifference.

*Global Reformer*

A global citizen, Falk (1994) wrote, might first be a kind of "global reformer," someone who "intellectually perceives a better way of organizing the political life of the planet and favours a utopian scheme that is presented as a practical mechanism" (p. 132). Perhaps inevitably here Soros comes to mind, who—I think it is safe to say—at the very least perceives himself as such. In *The Crisis of Global Capitalism* (1998), for example, Soros seemed clearly bent on re-"organizing the political life of the planet": He instantiated this connection by reformulating the enemies to open society (a utopian scheme presented as a practical mechanism?) as no longer totalitarianism, but its very opposite—in his words, "the lack of social cohesion and the absence of government," that is to say, "The Capitalist Threat" now present in a world economy which, though global, nevertheless lacks the presence and regulation of sufficient international financial authorities (p. x). This connection to Soros becomes even clearer as Falk expanded on the type:

> Typically such a global citizen has been an advocate of world government or of a world state, or a stronger United Nations, accepting as necessary some kind of image of political centralization as indispensable to overcome the chaotic dangers of the degree of political fragmentation and economic disparity that currently exists in the world today. (p. 132)

Soros, too, persistently worried over the fragmentation of nation-states and the economic disparity between center and periphery countries, as when he observed that "the pain at the periphery has become so intense that individual countries have begun to opt out of the global capitalist system, or simply fall by the wayside" (1998, p. xiv). And while he did not explicitly advocate for a world government *per se*, some of the language he deployed comes close (2000):

> I am advocating that the democracies of the world ought to form an alliance with the dual purpose of, first, promoting the development of open societies within individual countries and, second, strengthening international law and the institutions needed for a global open society. (p. x)

Also noteworthy, Falk characterized the global reformer as "almost completely deterritorialized," a phrase evocative of expressions oft-deployed to describe Soros, "a stateless statesman" and "the only private citizen who had his own foreign policy" (Kaufman, 2002, p. xiii), sobriquets which derive from the events of Soros' life. As discussed in Chapter One, Soros survived the Nazi occupation of Hungary, then fled communist Hungary to England, where he was educated at the London School of Economics; later he moved to and settled in the United States, a country which he now quite harshly and frequently critiques, as in the following instance:

> While the United States views itself as the upholder of lofty principles, others merely see the arrogance of power. It may be shocking to say, but I believe that the current unilateralist posture of the United States constitutes a serious threat to the peace and prosperity of the world. (2000, p. xvi)

On the whole, the connection between Falk's global reformer and Soros' life and mission is arresting. Accordingly, I attended to the possibility of that configuration of supranational identity OSI/SFN might imagine for global citizens, that of global reformer. I wondered if Soros might be seeking to make citizens of open society ostensibly in his own image—and if so, most likely at the level of elites.

*Denationalized Global Elite and the Manager of the Global Order*

Besides the picture of global reformer, Falk (1994) overviewed other images of global citizens which may help us understand how supranational identity might be configured, and how OSI/SFN might configure supranational identity—including descriptions of what OSI/SFN may be working *not* to build. For instance, Falk discusses a type of "denationalized global elite that at the same time lacks any civic sense of responsibility" (p. 135). To illustrate, Falk described an encounter on an airplane with a Danish businessman who traveled frequently, slept in chain hotels worldwide, spoke English everywhere, and talked about himself as "more a global citizen" than Danish. This culture, Falk noted, is homogenized yet no less a "social force driving the

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political systems of the world" (p. 134), most obviously interested in the world economy, and not much else. It is a kind of global identity that Soros might depict as leading to "The Capitalist Threat" mentioned above. Another, more favorable, type is a sort of manager of the global order, but one who takes to heart the environmental as well as economic issues, and often by necessity. Citizens of this type, Falk claimed, believe that "only by a massive technical managerial effort, coordinated at a global level through the concerted action of states and international institutions, can diplomacy succeed in meeting the overall environmental challenge" (pp. 135-136). This type, too—or some variation thereof, I thought—might be evidenced in the discourses of OSI/SFN English language programs and actors.

*Regional Grassroots Activist*

The fourth type Falk (1994) connected to "the rise of regional political consciousness, and it is of great historical relevance at the present time, especially in Europe" (p. 136). Falk attributed this "great historical relevance" to the advent of the European Union, which he described as "the first significant political innovation since the emergence of the modern territorial state in the seventeenth century," "a new kind of political community," "a political reality that is intermediate between a territorial state and a globally unified political order" (pp. 136-137). Precisely because an entity like the EU is utterly new—has never existed before in the history of the world—Falk is cautious in his speculations and depictions about this type. Europe's future is uncertain at best, he wrote, chiefly due to the end of the "East/West divide" and the subsequent push to include the transition countries in the new union. Accordingly, Falk speculated that global citizens of this type might best be created through "community-building forces . . . operating closer to the grassroots"; it is these forces we should look to as the source of another kind of global citizen, Falk contended, for they

will determine whether this European experiment will develop into something distinctive and benevolent, making this new European reality a positive contribution to the restructuring of the global system. Can Europe, in other words, forge an ideological and normative identity that becomes more than a strategy to gain a bigger piece of the world economic pie? Can Europe become the bearer of values that are directly related to creating a more peaceful and just world? (p. 137)

*This* image of global citizen may perchance parallel Habermas' portrayal of the citizen of deliberative democracy, one whose role is equivalently unsure and just as hopeful. We also can doubtless see how OSI/SFN might be contributing to forging identities like this, working as it is locally, "at the grassroots," in order to make "a positive contribution to the restructuring of the global system" (Falk, p. 137).

*Transnational Activist*

Of all the types of global citizens Falk (1994) outlines, I anticipated that the fifth and last would suggest most strongly how OSI/SFN might configure supranational identity for open society. Falk describes a global citizen involved in a kind of "transnational activism" which acts "to promote a certain kind of political consciousness transnationally that could radiate influence in a variety of directions, including bouncing back to the point of origin" (p. 138). As examples of such identities, Falk cited Amnesty International and Greenpeace, organizations *not* attached to a specific country or region (deterritorialized, like the dust-jacket depictions of Soros as "stateless statesman"), with "a shared conviction that upholding human rights and building political democracy provide the common underpinning, although adapted to diverse circumstances, for the types of transnational developments that are desired" (p. 138). It is *this* configuration of identity and community, Falk declared, which best describes "global civil society," with its institutions working in various countries to build identities which are *not* bound to state, nation, country—identities, that is, which are temporal rather than spatial. As Falk puts it:

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Global citizenship operates temporally, reaching out to a future-to-be-created, and making of such a person 'a citizen pilgrim', that is, someone on a journey to 'a country' to be established in the future in accordance with more idealistic and normatively rich conceptions of political community. (p. 139)

Framed thus, open society might readily be seen as such a "country," more so still when Falk

delineated just how such a "country" might come about:

The extension of citizenship at this time, especially given the globalization of life and capital, depends on building and promoting a much stronger transnational agenda and sense of community, as well as stimulating more widespread participation at the grassroots, contributing to a process that could be called globalization from below. It also depends on the emergence of a stronger sense of time, of acting in time in relation to unborn generations. The overall project of global citizenship, then, needs to be understood also as a series of projects. These distinct projects are each responding to the overriding challenges to create political community that doesn't yet exist, premised upon global or species solidarity, co-evolution and co-responsibility, a matter of perceiving a common destiny, yet simultaneously a celebration of diverse and plural entry-points expressive of specific history, traditions, values, dreams. (p. 139)

In case the parallels between global society as described here and open society are not yet clear, I

quote from Soros (2000), in order to substantiate the connections even more profoundly. Just

as—according to Falk—the project of global civil citizenship must be seen as a "a series of

projects," each with its own challenges and purposes, so also does Soros describe the work of

OSI/SFN in the many countries in which it operates:

Each national foundation has its own board and staff who decide their own priorities and take responsibility for the activities of the foundation within their own countries. They support civil society; they also try to work with the central and local governments because a democratic and effective government is an essential part of open society. . . . In addition, we have network programs in those program areas where the network is most actively engaged: higher education and general education; youth; the rule of law; the judiciary and law enforcement, including prisons; arts and cultural institutions; libraries, publishing, and the Internet; the media; vulnerable populations such as the mentally disabled; minorities, with special emphasis on Roma peoples (Gypsies); public health, alcohol and drug abused; and so on. (p. x)

Falk (1994) thus powerfully reinforced the hypothesis that OSI/SFN may be working in

transition countries to forge a normative form of supranational identity, identity for open society.

Falk further equipped me with a lucid typology which helped me imagine how OSI/SFN and its

English language program participants might conceive of supranational identity in open society. Valuably, too, Falk refers to the grassroots efforts of global citizenship as "globalization from below," Kellner's phrase from Chapter One which, I argued, paralleled Pennycook's (1994) and Canagarajah's (1999) more complex pictures of ELT and English language learners.

This mention again of globalization from below reminds us of one way ELT may be working to build open societies—and in a manner which may *not* be imperialistic, which does *not* close off space for civil societies other than the United States to have a hand in shaping a political democracy globally (Falk, 1994, p. 130)—if, that is, ELT "allows for struggle, resistance, and different appropriations of language, opening up a space for many different meaning-making practices in English" (Pennycook,1994, p. 69). The interrelationship between nation building, ELT, and open society—and the purpose of this study—grows clearer still.

Falk steered me towards a number of important questions, then. Would OSI/SFN and its various actors at various levels imagine the citizens of open society (imagine themselves) to be global reformers, business elites, environmentally-minded technocrats, citizens whose loyalties may first lie with their regions (such as Europe), or de-territorialized transnational activists who work primarily at the grassroots in order to raise a form of political consciousness that transcends the interests and commitments of nations, of national identities? Would configurations differ according to country, ethnicity, the level of involvement with OSI/SFN? Would configurations be composites of these types (probably), and if so, of which types? If my central hypothesis obtained here—that OSI/SFN would discursively construct and deploy English as a means to reshape national identities in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, to reconfigure them into supranational identities such as we see (if only in silhouette) above—then would its discourses likewise displace space (and national borders) with time, with

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the temporal motive of preparing a world for generations as yet unborn, or, in the context of this study, for the young people as the first generations to be born and/or raised in countries transitioning to democracy?

With respect to this point, as Falk observed, open society, like global civil society, would consequently become "an essentially religious and normative undertaking, faith in the unseen, salvation in a world to come, guided by convictions, beliefs, values" (p. 140). All work would be "engagement in such future possibilities" with no delusion that such citizenship is possible in the world as it currently exists. Much like Soros' carefully propounded notion of "fallibility"—an understanding that we can attain only "a form of social organization that falls short of perfection but holds itself open to improvement" (2000, p. 27)—so also does Falk propound global citizenship as the "art of the impossible." Falk wrote:

> Global citizenship of a positive variety implies a utopian confidence in the human capacity to exceed realistic horizons, but it is also rooted in the highly pragmatic conviction that what is currently taken to be realistic is not sustainable. To strengthen the foundations for a global civil society to which all men and women belong is to be dedicated to the achievement of a functional utopia, a polity that is meant to achieve both what is necessary and what now seems 'impossible.' (p. 140)

Further, Falk argued, global citizenship so conceived would have to be multicultural—indeed, diversity affirmed and actualized has to be at the heart of such a citizenship as "safeguard against any reliance on one more totalizing concept deriving from the West" (p. 140). It is a hopeful picture, surely, and I hoped that the work of OSI/SFN as explored in my analysis would reveal that it is spearheading efforts to make it happen.

## Concluding Remarks

This chapter has sought to create an interpretive and conceptual framework with which to understand the interrelationship between the central elements of this study: English language teaching, nation building, and building open societies. The chapter asserted that the work of

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OSI/SFN is part of a more general movement globally (though especially in Europe since World War Two) away from nationalism and towards the creation of supranational political communities—a mission, importantly, which OSI/SFN makes contingent upon the spread of English and ELT.

For post-communist, post-colonial periphery nations such as those of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as the chapter discussed, this movement entails the forging of new identities: What is at stake is whether these identities will be premised upon a primordial reification of nation shaped by boundaries of ethnicity, geography, and language (Smith, Law, Wilson, Bohr, & Allworth, 1998, p. 1), or whether these identities will be supranational, "shared, and "cross-cutting," in other words, part of a larger political community like the EU which seeks to transcend and thus "reduce the exclusionary commitment to nation-states" (Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, 2004, p.1). OSI/SFN, the chapter anticipated, may construct English and ELT as a potent means to attenuate national identity and foster forms of supranational identity in the transition countries of the new Europe.

The chapter next asserted that the European Union is an ideal laboratory in which to explore the forging of supranational identities for open society and the role of English in this process. The parallels between the EU and OSI/SFN further suggested that OSI/SFN may use English in periphery Europe more to *resist* than reproduce the interests of center countries, a contention that—if borne out—would significantly enlarge the debate over English linguistic imperialism and ELT in periphery nations.

Lastly, the chapter conceptualized civil citizenship by way of Habermas' (1994) model of deliberative democracy for *European* citizenship; and further, by way of Falk's (1994) typologies of *global* civil citizenship. These conceptualizations provided me a foothold into

understanding how OSI/SFN may configure supranational identity for open society, evidence for

which may be instantiated in the discourses of OSI/SFN English language programs and

participants.

With my interpretive framework now in place, I move next to methodology: just how,

that is, I went about exploring how OSI/SFN and its New York-based and local ELP discourses

conceptualize the role of English in the process of creating open societies. The methodology

chapter revisits themes identified from the interpretive framework constructed here.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

As I explained in Chapter One of this study, the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network is currently working to build open societies in more than 60 countries. I further established that the current debate over English linguistic imperialism and the cultural politics of English Language Teaching has thus far failed to take on board in any substantive way the role of English in the Second World, the post-communist transition countries of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Given the centrality of English and ELT to the work of building open societies ("Strategy," 1999), this, then, became the task I set myself in this dissertation: to explore the relationship between English, ELT, and building open societies in these countries. But how to approach such a task?

Following Pennycook (1994), I decided to focus on the discourses of these programs, since, as he wrote: "To the extent that this discourse of EIL [English as an International Language] has permeated much thinking on English language teaching, there is an urgent need to investigate the construction of this discourse" ( 1994, p. 24). I, too, was intrigued by the discourse and how it flows and changes from one main source (in this case, New York-based ELP) out to as far as Mongolia and Tajikistan where local Soros English projects and schools were set up. So I formulated the following research questions and worked out a research design to answer them:

1.  How does the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network discursively construct the relationship between building open societies, English, and English Language Teaching? How do OSI/SFN local written ELP discourses and the discourses of participants construct this relationship?

2. What are the interests in the official written discourse of OSI/SFN and its English Language Programs, and how do they converge with and diverge from interests in local ELP written and participants' discourses?

3. How does the official written discourse of OSI/SFN English Language Programs construct the actors in these programs: (both expatriate and national) project personnel, administrators, teacher trainers, teachers, and students? How do local written discourses and project participants construct various actors?

4. What new local discourses emerge around these programs, and how do they compare with the OSI/SFN discourse? What other discourse chains begun in the official OSI/SFN ELP discourse are reproduced, re-scripted, resisted, and/or transformed?

This chapter explains the research design and methodology of my study, as follows: The first section explains the guidelines for corpus, case, and interview participant selection, and explains the purpose of conducting a comparative, multi-case study of participants and discourses in multiple countries. The second section describes data collection procedures. The third section presents the rationale and methods for data analysis, which I have divided into two parts. First, I used critical discourse analysis (CDA) according to convergences between three approaches, thereby following the suggestions of Rogers, Malancharuvil-Berkes, Mosley, Hui, and O-Garro (2005), namely, that CDA "studies should pull from a hybrid set of approaches that can help to bring fresh insights to educational questions" (p. 365; see also van Dijk, 2001). This framework further embraced, quite intentionally, Weiss and Wodak's (2003) view of methodological eclecticism in critical discourse analysis as a positive force, since it brings a variety of theories and disciplinary perspectives in dialogue with another and with a shared goal:

to theorize the mediation between the social and linguistic, between texts and institutions, and between discourse and society. The second part of my framework included qualitative content analysis as guided by Rubin and Rubin (1995). Their work helped me listen "more artfully" to the research participants I interviewed and helped me strive to hear about their lives and worlds with deepened empathy and understanding. With this richness and diversity of approaches, discourses, and voices, I ended up finally with a long, long dissertation, the end goal of which was to provide a repertoire of lessons, insights, and fodder for thinking for developers and instructors in English language aid projects.

Research Design

*A Multi-Case Study*

As I began to imagine the study I wanted to pursue, I turned first to Jentleson (1999), who explained and justified the value of interviewing participants and analyzing discourses in multiple countries through his description of a comparative multi-case study for research design:

> The essence of a comparative case study is to identify patterns rather than just single-case phenomena. The uniqueness of every case is to be respected, but the emphasis is on developing more general conceptual formulations, middle-range theories, and policy lessons. This amounts to more of an analytic than descriptive approach to the writing of case studies, with less need to "tell the whole story" of each case than to structure and focus treatment of the case on a set of analytic questions. The cases as such are less ends in themselves than means to the ends of developing "conditional generalizations," a series of propositions with some general validity within and according to specified factors and parameters. (p. 15)

Given that this study rests on the borders between multiple disciplines, including foreign policy (the field from which Jentleson writes), and given that I started this study in search of lessons for and ways to improve the policies and practices of English language aid projects in transition and developing countries, Jentleson's approach seemed a fitting approach for me.

Additionally, I knew that the organizational structure of OSI/SFN accommodated this approach. I could begin, that is, by first analyzing the official New York-based written ELP

discourse as it appeared on OSI/SFN ELP web pages from 1994-2005. This is the same discourse which was available as a resource and guide for English language programs in multiple local Soros foundations, programs, projects, and schools across Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This first level of analysis would begin to provide me with Jentleson's (1999) "conditional generalizations," which are closely akin to what other researchers have called "spotlights" or "themes" (Maxwell, 1996), or which, following Bakhtin (1981) and (Blackledge, 2005) could be constructed as "discourse chains" (see also Fairclough, 1995, on textual chains).

Armed with findings and discourse chains identified in the first level of analysis, I could then proceed to the second level of analysis, analyzing the ELP discourses of local OSI/SFN foundations, programs, projects, and schools in the countries of CESEE-fSU. This analysis, I believed, would show how discourse chains from the New York-based ELP discourse were being reproduced, re-scripted, transformed, and/or resisted in various contexts. Of particular interest, I could find out what meanings become stabilized, altered, legitimized, destabilized, or rejected outright.

Finally, interviewing actual actors on the ground in multiple countries who are involved in these programs and projects would provide a third level of analysis to be tested against findings from previous levels and from my preconceptions as I began this study. These preconceptions and possible misconceptions were shaped dramatically, I know, from the review of literature discussed in Chapters One and Two, so I felt it important to do my best to pocket my knowledge of those readings when talking to participants, in order that I could hear them just as they were telling their stories, and not (yet) hear them through the lenses of Anderson (1983),

Pennycook (1994), or any other. This, in short, would be my research design, a visual

representation of which follows in Figure 1.



*Figure 1.* A visual depiction of the research design of this dissertation.

Using this research design, I knew I could identify patterns in how these various

discourses conceptualized the role of English and ELT in building open societies, patterns of

interests, and patterns of meaning reproduction, change, and resistance as discourse chains

traveled from the official written ELP discourse in New York to local OSI/SFN foundations,

projects, programs, schools, and actors throughout Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe

and the former Soviet Union. And I knew that what we learned from mapping these discourse

chains from level to level would provide valuable insights into the processes of developing and

teaching in English language aid projects in developing and transition countries.

*Guidelines and Sources for Corpus, Case, and Participant Selection*

*Level One: Official Written Discourse of OSI/SFN English Language Programs*

In order to establish the corpus for the first level of analysis, the official written New York-based OSI/SFN English Language Programs discourse, I first needed to find out what was available globally and how I could get my hands on it. An exploration of the official website of OSI/SFN in 2004 and 2005 quickly led me to a wealth of on-line documents which met my criteria for corpus selection. First, they were relevant to the research questions: They provided linguistic instantiations of how OSI/SFN discursively constructs the role of English and ELT in building open societies; and how OSI/SFN discursively constructs the actors involved in English language programs. The corpus further provided some history of OSI/SFN English language programs and was varied enough so as to ensure a broad range of empirical data with which to study other interests which may be served by the discourse (e.g., I found a list of "Textbook Do's and Don'ts," and I found descriptions of "modern ELT methodology"). Furthermore, the central website contained links to the websites of national and local foundations throughout Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, thus providing a clear trail into my second level of analysis. First, however, let me show what the web documents look like, to make this study and my approach clearer.

The homepage of OSI/SFN changes almost daily. Figure 2 shows what it looks like now, in October of 2009.

*Figure 2*. Screen shot of current home page of the Open Society Institute and Soros Foundations Network.

In 2004 through 2007, one of the initiatives that could be selected from the "Initiatives" link at the top of the page was English Language Programs, and this is where I started my search. There I found multiple ELP discourse samples for my corpus, including mission statements, initiative overviews, statements of education principles, program histories, goals statements, program guidelines, needs statements, strategy reports, exit strategy criteria, sustainability statements, teacher training action plans, descriptions of English/foreign language schools, documents related to teachers' associations, statements explicating collaboration between English Language programs and other OSI/SFN programs and initiatives, statements of local capacity building in conjunction with partner organizations, outcomes statements, textbook project materials, and program evaluation instruments. I found these web documents by

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following the various links on the ELP Initiative page, a print screen of which is provided in Figure 3.These documents are still available now on the Internet's "Way Back Machine," as English Language Programs closed in 2005.

*Figure 3*. Former home page of OSI/SFN's English Language Programs.

*Level Two: Sources of Corpus for Local ELP Discourses*

The corpus for the second level of analysis thus began with the same home page we saw in Figure 2. On that page, under "About US," there was and is a link which leads to the various regional, national, and local Soros foundations. I began by searching these sites for language and documents related to English language programs, English, and ELT. Figure 4 shows where I

started my search for what I call, for the sake of brevity, the local discourses (which include those of national and local foundations, schools, programs, and projects).

*Figure 4.* Screen shot of links to Soros Foundations around the world.

Though I began my search for local ELP discourses from these links, I further conducted an intensive and exhaustive internet search for other documents which referenced English language programs from these various countries. In total, I found 64 ELP documents from 26 different countries. Given the fact that the OSI/SFN English Language Programs ended officially in 2005, I included in the corpus web pages from ELP projects and programs which were started and/or at one time supported with OSI/SFN funding, but have since found other partners, ended, or become financially viable without OSI/SFN funding (such as multiple language schools throughout the OSI/SFN network which were launched with ELP money but have since become self-supporting). Each of these documents explicitly acknowledges OSI/SFN's role in its early

history. Document types include portable document format (pdf) files of annual reports, textbooks, teacher training materials, job announcements and descriptions; current and archived web pages of regional, national or local Soros foundations and projects; mission statements; project descriptions; student and teacher feedback; descriptions of curriculum and methodologies; course outlines, descriptions, and evaluations; donor maps; reflective writing; strategy documents; grant applications; brochures; biographies; web articles; and program and project histories. What all have in common are the following: They originated from programs and projects which were at one time start-ups and beneficiaries of OSI/SFN funding (between 1989-2005); they have an explicit English language component; and they were started and/or executed in one or more of the transition countries of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. These documents served as the corpus for my second level of analysis.

*Level Three: Transcripts of Interviews with Program Participants*

In addition to analyzing the official written discourse of OSI/SFN English language programs and the written discourses of local ELP programs and projects from across the countries of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, I further felt that it was vital to hear the voices of actors involved in these programs. Therefore, the corpus for the third level of analysis in this study was comprised of transcripts from interviews I conducted in the summers of 2005 and 2006, during which times I traveled across the region. In total, I interviewed 18 people from 11 different countries, either face-to-face, by email, or some combination thereof (including follow-up questions). I interviewed as many participants from as many different countries as I could within the limits of funding and time. I chose *these*

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participants as in every case, English was the language of instruction and/or work. And all, of course, were involved in some OSI/SFN-supported school, foundation, program, or project.

Backing up just a bit, to learn about interview participant selection, I turned to a number of sources for guidance. Jentleson encouraged designing a framework which would "ensure cross-case analytic comparability, while avoiding a rigid framework that would preclude adaptations to fit the unique aspects of each case" (1999, p. 16). I should strive, he said, for "a flexible yet focused structure" (p. 16). Kuzel (1999) outlined how case and participant selection should be driven first by issues of "appropriateness" (will the case data fit the research purpose and phenomenon of inquiry?) and "adequacy" (how many cases will be enough to begin forming "conditional generalizations"?) (p. 37). Kuzel then drew upon Patton (1990) and Guba and Lincoln (1989) in order to suggest that, from a broad typology of purposeful sampling strategies in qualitative inquiry, "maximum variation sampling" may work best for case studies driven by a critical/ecological worldview (p. 39), which I believed my research was driven by.

Patton's (1990) description of maximum variation sampling is oft quoted and clear: The researcher deploying this strategy "documents unique or diverse variations [in cases] that have emerged in adapting to different conditions," and further (similar to Jentleson), "identifies important patterns that cut across variations" (p. 182). In this, way the researcher seeks a broad range of perspectives on the phenomenon under inquiry, a range which will help the researcher confront her own (albeit, evolving) preconceptions, conceptions (and possibly misconceptions) of the researched phenomenon (Kuzel, 1999, p. 39). Moreover, as Patton explained, maximum variation sampling of even a few distinct voices (such as 18 OSI/SFN English language project participants in 11 different countries) can turn a potential design weakness into a strength, for

"any common patterns that emerge from great variation are of particular interest and value in capturing the core experiences and central, shared aspects or impacts of a program" (p. 172).

Thus guided, I interviewed participants involved with OSI/SFN from countries which fall into these regions: "Western European," "Central or Eastern European," "South Eastern European," and "Central Asian." I also interviewed one participant who was from "North America." To put it another way, my participants were citizens of countries in regions which sit on radically different points of a socially, politically, and discursively-constructed time-line, with the fall of communism and/or "closed societies" at one end, and EU integration and/or other forms of "open societies" on the other. In spite of their great diversity, these participants generated substantial and compelling data with which I could explore how they reproduced and/or transformed meanings about English, ELT, and the building of open societies. Their answers evidenced both "diverse variations" and many "common patterns" (Patton, 1990). My participants also varied in the number of languages each spoke (from one to seven), their ages (from 22-49), and their specific involvements and roles in OSI/SFN schools, programs, and projects with an English language component (see Table 1). Again, English was their language of instruction, or work, or both. Participants lived in both urban and rural settings and varied, too, in ethnicity, religion, nationality, and gender, though I was disappointed not to land interviews with more men for whom English was an L2.

In the following table, I introduce my participants, who chose or were provided pseudonyms. I have intentionally taken a number of steps to protect participants' identities, particularly given how many people in the OSI/SFN community know one another.

Table 1

*Participants Interviewed for this Study*

| Participants' Pseudonyms | Region | Relationships to OSI/SFN | English as LI or L2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Thomas | Western Europe | Teacher/Project Consultant | LI |
| Philip | Western Europe | Teacher/Director | LI |
| Andrew | Western Europe | Teacher | LI |
| Jeremy | Western Europe | Teacher | LI |
| Lauren | North America | Student/OSI Employee | LI |
| Irena | South Eastern Europe | Teacher/Head of OSI/SFN Teachers' Association | L2 |
| Ana | South Eastern Europe | Teacher | L2 |
| Klara | Central/Eastern Europe | Student/Teacher | L2 |
| Karolina | Central/Eastern Europe | Teacher | L2 |
| Bianca | Central/Eastern Europe | Teacher/Scholarship Abroad Recipient | L2 |
| Eva | Central/Eastern Europe | Teacher | L2 |
| Magda | Central/Eastern Europe | Teacher/Scholarship Abroad Recipient | L2 |
| Victoriya | Central Asia | OSI/SFN Employee/ Student | L2 |
| Ecaterina | Central/Eastern Europe | Student | L2 |
| Galina | Central/Eastern Europe | Student | L2 |
| Mihail | Central/Eastern Europe | Student | L2 |
| Dora | Central/Eastern Europe | Teacher | L2 |
| Elsa | Western Europe | Student/OSI employee | L2 |

Interview Data Collection Procedures

To recruit subjects to interview, I drew upon a vast network of contacts I built during nine years of work in Central and Eastern Europe. I used email, letters, and follow-up phone calls to invite subjects to take part in the study: Each national and local foundation had a website and directory of contacts which I also utilized. Seven people responded initially, but my pool of respondents expanded to include project participants identified through snowball sampling (Guba & Lincoln, 1985), a technique whereby initial respondents referred me to other contacts who were formerly or currently participants in various OSI/SFN-funded English language programs, projects, schools, or work with an English language component. I contacted these potential subjects mostly through email, which led to 18 interviews in all.

Once I had a list of willing participants for my research, I set up interview appointments through a brief cover letter sent by email describing the project, why the person was invited to be a part of the study, the possible benefits of his/her participation, and how anonymity would be protected (see Appendix A). I invited participants to suggest a time and location for the interview, which in the end were varied: We met in their homes (where I was *always* served a meal), at coffee-houses, in outdoor cafés, in bars (during the World Cup finals—that was a mistake), on the banks of the Danube, in ice cream parlors, and at sunny outdoor parks. I dressed appropriately for the interviews, which in most cases were casual, with one exception: a meeting with a participant working in the Office of the High Representative, an international institution responsible for overseeing the post-war civilian implementation of a peace accord. To my deep disappointment, that participant, unfortunately, had to cancel the day of the interview due to a crisis in a neighboring republic.

Interviews were conducted this way: At the start, in addition to discussing the signed consent forms, I verbally reassured participants how their material would be used and I always asked permission before tape-recording. I had a digital voice recorder and a back-up mini-cassette recorder, extra batteries, cassette tapes and memory sticks, and a notebook. I introduced myself if I hadn't met participants before and said some words about my own background, enough to demonstrate I could both understand what they wished to share (having worked in the region) and at the same time I wanted to learn from them (Rubin & Rubin, 1995, pp. 101-103). I initially asked general, informal warm-up questions about the participant to get started, and then moved to topic-oriented questions (see Appendix B). I also used encouraging verbal and non-verbal feedback throughout the interview, in order to keep the conversation going and productive. This felt quite natural in every case. At the end of the interview, I thanked the participant, provided information for further communication, and presented the participant with a thank-you gift (either a CD of American music, a phone card, or a book from Amazon.com, if Amazon shipped to that region, which was not always the case).

I have promised all participants the final abstract of the study and I will email in pdf format Chapter Six, where their voices are heard.

Data Analysis: Rationale and Procedures

*Qualitative Content Analysis*

For my interview data only, following descriptions and guidelines set forth by Rubin and Rubin (1995) and Wodak (2004; see also Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999), I first took a qualitative, interpretive approach to the data I collected by conducting "content" or "topic" analysis of the transcripts from interviews I conducted.

Content or topic analysis is recommended as the first of three dimensions of the discourse-historical approach to research, and is the only dimension which is qualitative (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999, p. 30). "Contents" refers to the identification of themes drawn from a critical survey of the theoretical literature (Chapter Two of this study) as well as themes which emerged throughout analysis of the data. Themes should also be closely connected to the research questions. In the context of this study, I was therefore guided to search first for key terms from my research questions in the discourses of English language program participants. These topics included (a) discursive constructions of English; (b) discursive constructions of the role of English in building open societies; and (c) discursive constructions of the actors involved in these programs.

In line with Wodak (2004) again, I identified additional themes from a critical survey of the theoretical literature in Chapter Two[20]and summarized as follows:

English extending the sense of imagined community beyond the borders of nation;

English constructed as a "Universal Idiom";

English constructed as a means of off-setting national identity;

English constructed as assisting, stabilizing, or destabilizing conflict;

English as subversive, temporary, humanitarian, and/or imperialist;

Constructions of elites, experts, and moral imperatives;

Competing discourses of identity;

Essentializing, historicizing, and totalizing discourses;

English constructed as equalizing or homogenizing issues of ethnic identities;

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[20]Themes or contents may be viewed as akin to hypotheses or propositions, which Maxwell (1996) made a cogent case for allowing in qualitative as well as quantitative research, as long as "they are grounded in the data and are developed and tested in interaction with it" (p. 53). He further warned researchers to remain open to other ways of making sense of data, so as not to be blinded by propositions. So warned, I proceeded.

Configurations of identity with special attention to cross-cutting identities;

English as the language of civil society;

English as the language of deliberative democracy;

Configurations of global civil citizenship.

I looked, too, at the transcript data for discourse chains identified in Chapters Four and Five, which I will discuss at more length shortly. And I listened for "local discourses," entirely new ideas about English, ELT, OSI/SFN, open societies, and so forth. This last point was particularly relevant given the purpose of qualitative interviews, which Rubin and Rubin (1995) described as a means to understand "how people understand their worlds and how they create and share meanings about their lives" (p. 34).

In this model, the researcher herself is not neutral, nor was I: I carefully considered my own beliefs, preconceptions, interests, and needs as I asked questions and attempted to understand answers. It was my goal, therefore, to ask questions which were both topic-oriented yet open-ended enough to allow unanticipated themes and patterns to emerge from the interviews. The questions I used as starting points can be found in Appendix B and were adapted according to each participant.

Finally, as stated previously, I provided all participants the opportunity to review and share their feedback on Chapter Six before final submission. Member checking in this way will help lend internal validity to the analyses of data (Creswell, 1994, p. 158).

*Detailed Linguistic Analysis*

Qualitative content analysis combined with detailed linguistic analysis helps the researcher accomplish two goals: "(1) to see whether patterns determined in the first phase of analysis are supported when considered from another perspective, and/or (2) to uncover new

patterns" (Wodak, 2004, p. 104). As a means, therefore, of triangulating and extending findings, I further approached the research corpus for levels one and two through an eclectic blend of critical discourse approaches.

*Fairclough and Critical Discourse Analysis*

Fairclough (1992a) first guided my decision to supplement qualitative research with critical discourse analysis by articulating what might by now, since Foucault, be deemed a commonplace: that "discourse is shaped by relations of power, and invested with ideologies" (Fairclough, p. 8; see also Foucault, 1977). Certainly, over the past two decades, a groundswell of important research into discursive practices—within the larger parameters of critical social science—has borne out this claim across disciplines and continents: Discourse analysis has been deployed, for instance, to explore such diverse topics as how the discourse of development texts have constructed the "Third World" as an "unruly terrain requiring [first world] intervention and management" (Crush, 1995); how the mass media has shaped the construction of postmodern war, and, in turn, the American collective memory of war (Fisher, 2004); and how African American churches historically emerged in part as a means of  fostering alternative discourses of freedom and empowerment for slaves (Byrd, 2003). Closer to home in the disciplinary sense, in the field of TESOL, Kumaravadivelu (1999) draws upon poststructuralist and postcolonialist conceptualizations of discourse in order to look at teaching practices in the L2 classroom and hence bring to the fore how "classroom discourse, like all other discourses, is socially constructed, politically motivated, and historically determined; that is, social, political, and historical conditions develop and distribute the cultural capital that shapes and reshapes the lives of teachers and learners" (p. 472).  From Chapters One and Two of this study, further

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investigations into discourses have been urged by Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer (2004); Ignatieff (2003); Pennycook (1994); and Smith, Law, Wilson, Bohr and Allworth (1998).

Generally speaking, these analyses of discourse across multiple disciplines have helped make increasingly clear how ideology and power operate through language. Further, they have helped inform both policy and practice in these disciplines. I drew from these precedents, then, to amplify the significance of and rationale for my approach to the methodology of this study, for a study of the *discourses* of OSI/SFN-supported English language programs is, in effect, a study of the influence of an external (Western) philanthropic non-governmental organization—with its interests—on the newly-democratic, post-communist contexts of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union—and the ways in which this influence is transmitted—and/or resisted—through English Language Teaching.

To explain further the general rationale for deploying critical discourse analysis, I turn again to Fairclough (1989), who conceptualized "discourse as a place where relations of power are actually exercised and enacted" (p. 43). In Fairclough's view, "Power in discourse is to do with powerful participants [such as the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network] controlling and constraining the contributions of non-powerful participants" [or at least the less powerful, such as OSI/SFN beneficiaries]. Control and constraint are exerted, Fairclough argues, over and on (a) discourse content (leading to social knowledge); (b) social relations (between conversants); and (c) social identities (the subject positions conversants can occupy) (1989, p. 46).  These three areas begin to illuminate just how power and ideology operate through language, and how we might explore their actualization in language.

Fairclough's (1995) explanation of the aims of critical discourse analysis illuminated this process further and also clarified its particular usefulness in this study. In his words, CDA "aims

to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes"; it seeks "to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power"; and explores "how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony" (pp. 132-133). As is clear from this definition, Fairclough's approach conceptualized the social construction of knowledge, relations, and identities as dynamic processes, a continuous back and forth between the imposition and reproduction of power structures, and resistance to and recontextualization of the same. In short, fundamental to Fairclough's approach to CDA is his belief that discourse not only reproduces, but also *transform*s, societies. He writes:

> Discursive practice is constitutive in both conventional and creative ways: it contributes to reproducing society (social identities, social relationships, systems of knowledge and belief) as it is, yet also contributes to transforming society. For example, the identities of teachers and pupils and the relationships between them which are at the heart of a system of education depend upon a consistency and durability of patterns of speech within and around those relationships for their reproduction. Yet they are open to transformations which may partly originate in discourse: in the speech of the classroom, the playground, the staffroom, educational debate, and so forth. (1992b, p. 65)

Importantly, this attention to the creative, generative, and transformative potential of discourse sets Fairclough's approach apart from the approaches of other critical linguists such as van Dijk (1993), who has been criticized for giving too much weight to the reproductive aspects of discourse, and not enough weight to the agency of individual actors within societies (see, for instance, Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999, p. 24). Moreover, Fairclough's attention to the transformative aspects of discourse also helps make plain the value of his approach to *this* study, which seeks to discover how the discourses of OSI/SFN English language programs reproduce *and* resist the explicit and implicit interests of its various actors.

Accordingly, to analyze my data and to triangulate tentative findings from the qualitative content analysis described above, I first built upon Fairclough's (1989, 1992b, 1995) three-level framework for CDA: (a) description (of a text's formal properties); (b) interpretation (involving the text and interactions with it, including strategies in and of production and interpretation); and (c) explanation (how these interactions relate to the larger social context within which the text is being produced, interpreted, resisted, modified, recontextualized, and so on) (for an expanded version of this framework, see also Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). These three levels may also be described as the text dimension (description through micro-linguistic analysis of the text), the discourse practice dimension (analysis of how the text is produced and interpreted), and the social practice dimension (explanation of the ways the text constitutes, reproduces, challenges and restructures knowledge and beliefs). These dimensions, Fairclough (1992b) pointed out, overlap when put into practice; the process thus becomes a dialectical movement alternating between interpretation and description and back to interpretation again, and leading, finally, to explanation. For each dimension, Fairclough provided what he calls "pointers": a vast array of questions intended to help the researcher focus on particularities of the discourse sample which are relevant to the researcher's specific interests. Fairclough encourages analysts to focus on only a small number, and only on those which are relevant and useful to the researcher's larger questions (1992b, pp. 231-238).

Led thus, for my study I drew upon the following categories or "pointers" Fairclough delineated:

> *Text Dimension*: Features of vocabulary, including experiential, relational, and expressive values of words, and the use of metaphors; features of grammar, including experiential, relational, and expressive values of grammatical features, and how sentences are linked together; features of textual structure, including larger-scale structures of the text. (1989, pp. 110-138)

*Discourse Practice Dimension:* Intertextual chains, including how discourse samples are transformed or replicated (for instance, mission statements on OSI/SFN headquarters website versus mission statements on the websites of national foundations); and text coherence. (Fairclough, 1992b, pp. 232-233)

*Social Practice Dimension:* Asking whether the text is conventional and normative, or creative and innovative; whether the text seeks to reproduce or transform structures and relations, including systems of knowledge and beliefs, social relations, and social identities; investigating what participants do in response to texts; sharing analyses of texts with participants in text production and consumption. (Fairclough, 1992b, pp. 237-238)

These "pointers" provided me starting points for the beginning phase of critical discourse analysis; they helped me identify, for instance, ways in which interests were discursively reproduced and *resisted* in creative ways. Therefore, Fairclough's approach, to use the words of Pennycook (1994), allowed me to explore how the OSI/SFN ELP discourses—as well as participants and text producers in OSI/SFN English language programs in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union—might use English in ways which allow for "struggle, resistance, and different appropriations of language, opening up a space for many different meaning-making practices in English" (p. 69). Encouragingly, this contention was supported by the founders of the Critical Discourse Studies Network (CDSN) of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), who wrote:

> Changes in economies, political systems and processes, social processes and relations and so forth can in many cases be seen as heralded and initiated by changes in discourse. This raises questions about how for instance 'neo-liberal discourse' has been enacted, inculcated, materialized in CEE societies, and about complex processes of recontextualization within which the 'flow' of such discourses from west to east is never a simple matter of replication and homogenization, but a process whose outcomes depend upon the histories of the countries of CEE, the strategies being pursued by different groups, and so forth. (Graham, Fairclough, Wodak, Galasinski, & Krzyzanowski, 2003)

Generally, the scholars of the CDSN aimed to use critical research in order to "help make a difference to the direction and effects of change" in Central and Eastern Europe; as part of their project, they explored "possibilities for more critical perspectives in educational curricula" (see

also Fairclough, 1989, pp. 233-245). These goals, too, lined up with the hoped-for contributions of this study, a point which underlined again the centrality of CDA to the research I conducted.

The above quote mentions a second noteworthy figure among proponents of critical discourse analysis, Wodak, whose discourse-historical approach provided a second valuable framework I drew upon in the linguistic analysis phase of my study. I have previously explained the qualitative component of the discourse-historical approach. I now elaborate on the linguistic component.

*Wodak and the Discourse-Historical Approach*

Wodak aligns her approach to CDA with Fairclough's in a number of essential ways (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 2004; see also Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). She, too, views discourse as a type of social practice embodied in a dialectical partnership between discursive acts and institutional and social structures: Discourse both shapes and is shaped by, constitutes and is constituted by, social practice. Hence, like Fairclough, she believes it is discourse which produces and/or transforms—or restores, relativises, legitimates, dismantles, even destroys—social conditions and the status quo. Wodak further echoes and supports the goals of critical discourse analysis which Fairclough has outlined and which I likewise support: the advocacy and application of critical language study as a means of contributing to social equity in multiple realms, including but not limited to education, the workplace, government, and so forth (Fairclough, 1989, 1992b, 1995; see also Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). I am thinking especially about the particular implications for English language aid projects in developing and transition countries (e.g. Afghanistan, where I worked in the summer of 2008 as the interim Director of a World Bank-funded English language aid project).

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Yet Wodak's discourse-historical approach to CDA goes beyond Fairclough's in a number of important ways which anchored the methodology of this study. First, she created a more thoroughly elaborated means to investigate the social practice dimension of analysis by creating a detailed framework which helps the analyst pinpoint (a) macro-strategies of discursive formations; and (b) their means and forms of linguistic realization (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999, p. 8; see also Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp. 44-85). As will be seen shortly, these strategies can be organized and adapted according to different research projects and questions.

A second salient difference between Fairclough's and Wodak's approach to CDA—and a second reason for my decision to incorporate her framework as well into my approach—is Wodak's attention to triangulation: Her work, along with others in the Vienna School of Critical Discourse Analysis, takes care to integrate perspectives from a broad range of disciplines, including history, social and political science, and linguistics, a move similarly reflected in the theoretical framework of *this* study. She further adopts a pluralistic approach to data collection (such as focus groups, text analysis, and one to one interviews) as well as a search for different kinds of empirical data (such as political speeches, newspaper articles, brochures, interview transcripts, and so forth), thereby decreasing the danger of "critical biasing" and "simply politicizing" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 35; see also Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999, p. 9). As another means to triangulate findings, elaborated upon in the previous section, Wodak encourages the use of qualitative analysis in conjunction with detailed linguistic analysis (2004). All told, I find the partnering of Wodak's approach to CDA with Fairclough's an ideal means to answer the central questions of this study. Therefore, I drew upon the meticulously articulated methodological framework of the discourse-historical approach as deployed by Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Liebhart (1999) to explore discursive constructions of national

identity; by Reisigl and Wodak (2001) to investigate discursive constructions of race, nationality, and ethnicity; and by Wodak (2004) to investigate the discursive construction of national and transnational, European and other, identities.

*Hansen's Post-Structuralist Discourse Analytical Framework*

A third influence which strongly informed this study is Hansen's (2006) post-structuralist approach to linguistic analysis, which I discovered through her analysis of the foreign policy discourses around the war in Bosnia. Her work has proved useful in a number of ways. For one thing, given the particular context of this study—transition countries in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union—central to my analysis were instances of what Fairclough (1992) identified as textual "ambiguities and ambivalences of meaning," features which are, in his view, characteristic of "creative texts," defined as follows:"Creative texts necessarily use meaning potentials as resources, but they contribute to destructuring and restructuring them, including the shifting of boundaries and relations between meanings" (Fairclough, 1992b, p. 187). Hansen (2006), drawing from Laclau and Mouffe (1985), similarly noted the importance of discursive "slips and instabilities," places, that is, where ambiguities in language challenge or complicate how a discourse attempts to fix meaning (pp. 21-22). Moments of discursive instability and the shifting of boundaries and relations between meanings at the text dimension—meaning in flux, unstable, contested, and undergoing transformation—proved particularly helpful as I sought to understand the larger, social dimension of English and ELT in transition countries, whose own political, cultural, historical, and linguistic boundaries have been shifting dramatically throughout the twentieth (and now the twenty-first) century.

Hansen's (2006) work further helped me better understand multiple issues of identity and the implications of identity construction, which she explored through particular attention to

foreign policy discourses. Hansen (2006) explained that "identity is relationally constituted and always involves the construction of boundaries and thereby the delineation of space" (p. 47). Discursive constructions of space became, therefore, an essential lens through which to discover key interests in the OSI/SFN ELP discourses. However, as Hansen (2006) discussed, "spatiality" is but one dimension of identity which, along with "temporality and "ethicality" (or, more simply, time and responsibility) are combined such that they "draw upon and reinforce each other" with "equal theoretical and ontological status" (pp. 46-47). Hansen even argued that, "At the grandest philosophical scale, space, time, and responsibility are the big concepts through which political communities—their boundaries, internal constitution, and relationship with the outside world—are thought and argued" (p. 46). Since open society, too, may be understood as a political community under construction, the complexity of identity that Hansen described provided an ideal supplement for my analysis. I drew upon all three frameworks, therefore, to take on the questions this study raises. And all three helped tremendously.

I conducted my analysis this way. I first spent two years meticulously applying Fairclough and Wodak's ideas to the official written OSI/SFN ELP discourse. In short, I analyzed everything related to the OSI/SFN ELP initiative, noting themes and "conditional generalizations" as I went, which I eventually organized into topic documents such as *discursive constructions of space* and *the en-ageing of actors*. Frequently I turned back to my theoretical and interpretive framework to understand in more depth the possible implications of and meanings of these repeated themes, and when necessary, I researched additional sources to help me understand topics the relevance of which was not yet clear (e.g., implications of discursive constructions of space). I eventually identified discourse chains relevant to my research questions.

Once I had the discourse topics and chains outlined and Chapter Four drafted, I next turned to the local ELP discourses. This was for the most part a much easier go: I already had a long list of potential discourse chains to look for in the various web documents I had found, such as *English as the language of open society.* I found this discourse chain reproduced throughout the local written ELP discourses. I also found a new discourse chain emerge—that of *linguistic diversity.* I was on my way.

For my interview data, I transcribed it over a three-year period, except for those interviews conducted by email and follow-up questions by email. This data, too, I organized slowly into topic documents which reflected the "conditional generalizations" Jentleson (1999) recommended and which also fit in with, adapted, or negated previously identified discourse chains. By this point in the process, I knew the discourses so well that it was fairly easy to make links between the three levels of analysis and the multiple discourse chains as well as to notice idiosyncratic but no less important statements (e.g. only one Western participant, Jeremy, expressed a form of "native speaker guilt," related, perhaps, to the colonial guilt Pennycook, 1994, discussed). That chapter, while the longest, was by far the easiest to write, except that I had a very hard time not including everything my participants had said—I was that attached to and enthralled by the data. I did, however, get through it, and with findings beyond what I had expected and hoped for.

These and other findings I share in the next chapter, beginning with analysis of the first level of this study: analysis of the official written New York-based English Language Programs discourse.

CHAPTER FOUR: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

OF THE OSI/SFN NEW YORK-BASED ELP DISCOURSE

Introduction

This chapter presents findings from the first level of analysis for this research: a critical

discourse analysis of the English Language Programs (ELP) discourse of the Open Society

Institute & Soros Foundations Network (OSI/SFN). The corpus under analysis in this chapter

includes the official written New York-based ELP discourse about open society, English, and

English language teaching (ELT) as found on the central website of OSI/SFN and its English

Language Programs web pages (see also Chapter Three). This corpus meets the criteria for

textual selection set out by Hansen (2006): The discourse clearly articulates identity and policy;

it is widely available; and it has "formal authority to define a political position," even as an NGO

discourse (p. 85). For the analysis in this chapter, statements about the relationship of English to

the building of open societies, the actors involved in English Language Programs, and other

interests related to open society, English, and ELT were identified, categorized into discourse

topic documents, and then analyzed according to a framework which draws upon convergences

between three approaches: Fairclough's critical discourse analysis (1989, 1992b, 1995;

Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 2006); Wodak's discourse-historical approach

(Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 1999; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 2004; see also

Fairclough & Wodak, 1997); and Hansen's (2006) post-structuralist discourse analytical

framework for investigating identity construction in foreign policy discourse. While the work of

Fairclough and Wodak helped me begin to categorize, analyze, and understand the OSI/SFN

ELP discourse initially at the text dimension, Hansen's framework subsequently provided the

three main categories for understanding my findings at the social dimension—space, time, and

responsibility—or, as she puts it, "the big concepts" through which political communities (such as open societies) are discursively constituted (2006, p. 46).

To situate this chapter into the whole of the study again, the second and third levels of analysis in subsequent chapters will map discursive meanings identified here as they flow from the New York-based ELP office to local ELP discourses from OSI/SFN programs, schools, and projects throughout the countries of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union—and to participants involved in those projects. Following Wodak (2004) and Hansen (2006), in my analysis I assume that similarities between statements on central and local websites and documents and similarities between the views of participants involved in these programs are potential indicators of discursive and ideological reproduction. Conversely, differences between statements may be indicators of discursive and ideological re-contextualization, transformation and/or resistance.

In this chapter, I therefore use critical discourse analysis to identify the first strong links of discourse chains as they construct the relationships between building open societies, English, English language teaching, and actors involved in these programs. Given the particular context of this study—transition countries in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union—I further make central to my analysis instances and patterns of what Fairclough (1992b) identifies as textual "ambiguities and ambivalences of meaning," features which are, in his view, characteristic of "creative texts," which he defines as follows: "Creative texts necessarily use meaning potentials as resources, but they contribute to destructuring and restructuring them, including the shifting of boundaries and relations between meanings" (p. 187). Hansen (2006), drawing from Laclau and Mouffe (1985), similarly notes the importance of discursive "slips and instabilities," places, that is, where ambiguities in language challenge or

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complicate how a discourse attempts to fix meaning (pp. 21-22). Moments of discursive instability and "the shifting of boundaries and relations between meanings" (Fairclough, 1992b, p. 187) at the text dimension are especially helpful to analyze when seeking to understand the larger, social dimension of English and ELT in transition countries, whose own political, cultural, historical, and linguistic boundaries and meanings have been shifting dramatically throughout the twentieth (and now the twenty-first) century.

The research questions this chapter answers are as follows:

1. How does the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network discursively construct the relationship between building open societies and English Language Teaching?

2. What are other interests in the written discourse of OSI/SFN and its English Language Programs initiative?

3. How does the written discourse of OSI/SFN English Language Programs construct the actors in these programs—(both expatriate and national) project personnel, teacher trainers, teachers, and students?

Findings are as follows.

### Discursive Constructions of Space and the Language of Open Society:

### Systemic Impact and Supranational Language Management

The first findings in this chapter emerge from analysis informed by several key studies: Lefebvre's (1991) theorization of space as a discursive construction, understanding of which may be unveiled through investigation into how space is produced, and for what reasons; Swyngedouw's (1992) claim that "transformative sociospatial practices (social or class struggle)

produce *new* spaces" (such as space for open society) ( p. 319; italics added); and Fairclough's

(2006) focus on the discursive "re-scaling" of space—particularly the space of the nation-state—

as a strategy for social change in transition countries. Also contributive are Ignatieff's (2003)

exploration of nation-building and Neumann's (1999) work on region-building as imagining the

formation of a particular political identity. Finally, Spolsky (2009) sheds important light on the

intersections and implications of space and language in his research into language policy and

management, research which helps us reconsider and re-contextualize debates over English

linguistic imperialism. I quote again his definition of language management:

> In studying language policy, we are usually trying to understand just what non-language
> variables co-vary with the language variables. There are also cases of direct efforts to
> manipulate the language situation.  When a person or group directs such intervention, I
> call this language management. (Spolsky, 2009, p. 8)

These studies help us understand how OSI/SFN constructs the space in which it works and its

goal of "systemic impact," constructions which lead, I argue, to a discourse chain of

supranational language management. In other words, "systemic impact" as it relates to English

Language Programs reflects explicit efforts "to manipulate" and "direct" the "language situation"

(Spolsky, 2009, p. 8) in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,

and it does so by infusing English and ELT into multiple discursive constructions of space.

To show this, I will first analyze how OSI/SFN[21] discursively constructs the various

spaces in which it works. In particular, I will analyze its ambiguous and hence unstable

representations and uses of the terms "local," "national," "regional," "network-wide" and

"international,"  from which the following implications and findings emerge: (a) the OSI/SFN

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[21] As the various text producers at OSI/SFN are mostly unknown, I will be "personifying" OSI/SFN, ELP, and the
discourse of each to some extent. This decision is not intended to metonymically replace the actors producing these
texts, but rather to facilitate the writing process. Further, given the breadth of this research generally, tracking down
and talking with text producers goes far beyond the scope of this study, though doing so would certainly enrich our
understandings.

and ELP discourse create a discourse chain of supranational language management through its policy of "systemic impact," that is, through OSI/SFN's discursive and geographic reach into multiple constructions of space, and the infusion of English and ELT into these constructions of space; ( b) this discourse chain of supranational language management is strengthened by the closing of discursive space for local responsibility; and (c) the OSI/SFN discourse re-scales space (Fairclough, 2006) such that the organization semantically distances itself from the United States specifically and the nation-state generally. Rather, the discourse "carves out" (Robertson, 1992, p. 52) or opens space for supranational open society, into which English and ELT are discursively infused through OSI/SFN English Language Programs.

*Systemic Impact and Discursive Instability and Reach in the OSI/SFN Discourse*

The mission statement of OSI/SFN—found on its central website—provides a logical starting point for showing how OSI/SFN constructs the space in which it works, the instability of those constructions, and the implications for this study:

> The Open Society Institute (OSI), a private operating and grantmaking foundation, aims to shape public policy to promote democratic governance, human rights, and economic, legal, and social reform.  On a local level, OSI implements a range of initiatives to support the rule of law, education, public health, and independent media.  At the same time, OSI works to build alliances across borders and continents on issues such as combating corruption and rights abuses. ("About OSI," 2008)

To accomplish this mission, the statement tells us, OSI/SFN undertakes an array of activities under the umbrella of specific initiatives, which it claims to implement "on the local level" ("About OSI," 2008). These initiatives range from Children and Youth Programs, to Documentary Photography Projects, to Scholarship, Media, and Justice Programs ("Initiatives," 2007).  Importantly, "English Language Programs" was one such initiative which ran from 1994-2005 ("Initiatives," 2005).

Worded as is, the central mission statement describes OSI initiatives as being implemented "on a local level" ("About OSI: Mission," 2008). The "Initiatives" webpage, however—a separate link from that of the mission statement, but also on the central website—describes OSI initiatives as addressing "specific issue areas on a *regional* or *network-wide* basis. Many of them are implemented in cooperation with Soros foundations in various countries" ("Initiatives," 2005; italics added). Below this general introduction to initiatives, there are links to each of the individual initiatives, including English Language Programs. Language introducing *that* initiative states: "English Language Programs work at the *national* level, focusing on teaching English for effective international communication" ("Initiatives," 2005; italics added). In neither of the descriptions on the "Initiatives" webpage is there reference to local context.

This discursive slippage from "local" to "national" to "regional" to "network-wide" first creates, I argue, discursive space for the influence and reach of OSI/SFN into multiple geographic and discursive terrains—OSI/SFN becomes, in the discourse, ubiquitous: it is constructed as present locally, nationally, regionally and network-wide. Further, as we shall see, OSI/SFN constructs the space in which it works both vertically and horizontally, which Fairclough (2006) argues is a discursive strategy "to push … changes in particular directions" (p. 66): from top to bottom, bottom to top, and/or across space. These strategies of infusion evidence at the text dimension OSI/SFN's mission to forge open societies through its policy of "systemic impact," which one OSI/SFN document defines as "influence on state (or region) policy or practice," a way to initiate changes in systems, and a "significant increased capacity to design, initiate and implement positive change" (Iliff, n.d.). English Language Programs, as one of

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OSI/SFN's initiatives, is assumed to be a part of this "positive change": it, too, travels with

OSI/SFN and thus becomes discursively infused into these representations of space.

A closer look at how OSI/SFN uses the terms "local," "regional," and "network-wide"

further evidences and clarifies how the strategy of "systemic impact" is operationalized in

discourse. In general, analysis of OSI/SFN discourse shows that "local" seems to be used to

describe the space in which it works vertically, that is, at a level below "national." For instance,

OSI's "Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative" (2007), the title of which points

to "local" work, describes the policy issues it addresses as follows: "Democratization and

Decentralization: monitoring and reporting on good governance at *sub*-national levels" ("Local

Government," 2007; italics added). The discourse here explains in a fairly straight-forward

manner what OSI/SFN means by the use of the word "local": In this initiative, it means "sub" or

below "national" levels.

Another initiative, the "Human Rights and Governance Grants Program," uses "local"

this way: "The Human Rights and Governance Grants Program supports national and

international advocacy organizations promoting political and civil rights at local, national and

regional levels" ("Human Rights," 2007). In this initiative, "local" is now discursively and

clearly demarcated from both "national" and "regional" levels, and space is again constructed

vertically.

Similarly, "network-wide" seems to have a fairly clear definition, though now space is

constructed horizontally rather than vertically, thus pushing change and influence across as well

as down. On an "Overview" page entitled "About OSI and the Soros Foundations Network," we

find the following explanation of OSI's network:

> OSI was created in 1993 by investor and philanthropist George Soros to support his
> foundations in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Those

foundations were established, starting in 1984, to help countries make the transition from communism. OSI has expanded the activities of the Soros foundations network to other areas of the world where the transition to democracy is of particular concern. The Soros foundations network encompasses more than 60 countries, including the United States. ("About US: Overview," 2005)

"Network" hence refers to the 60 plus countries across the globe in which there is Soros-funded activity of some sort, and "network-wide" assumes that all, most, or many of these countries take part in a particular OSI/SFN initiative.

"Regional," on the other hand, is less clear. On the OSI/SFN homepage, on a drop-down menu headed "Where We Work," we are asked to "Select a Region." This wording appears in context in the following screen shot:



("About OSI," 2009)

*Figure 5.* Current regions where OSI/SFN works.

From this list of "regions" we can extrapolate OSI/SFN's use of "region" as including whole continents ("Africa," "Asia"); areas of Europe with some shared history but which are

constructed as different from "Western Europe" ("Central & Eastern Europe"; "South Eastern Europe"); one part of the super-continent of Europe and Asia ("Central Eurasia"), the name of which itself has significant political implications, discursively blending as it does what may be quite disparate associations between Europe, Russia, and Central Asia[22]; a geo-cultural region consisting of 18 Spanish-speaking countries plus Brazil and Haiti (historically colonized by Spain and/or Portugal) *along with* a group of islands in the Caribbean Sea historically colonized by the British, the Dutch, the Danes, the French, the Portuguese and the Spanish ("Latin America & the Caribbean"); three countries which were part of the former Soviet Union but which diverge linguistically and culturally ("Russia, Ukraine & Belarus"); a country which is both European and Asian ("Turkey") *along with* an area including Northern Africa and Asia ("the Middle East"); and lastly, a single country made up of fifty states ("The United States"). Elsewhere on the OSI/SFN website, "region" is used to designate regions *within* countries, such as the Serbian region of Kosovo ("About OSI: Soros Foundations," 2007).

In short, discursively, the definition of "region," based on this menu, comes to encompass super-continents, continents, parts of continents, separate countries, and areas within countries. The definition is broad and seemingly ad-hoc, both indefinite ("South Eastern Europe") and definite ("United States"), and ultimately ambiguous in that it encompasses alternating geographical, political, cultural, linguistic, and historical understandings of place and space, and to a remarkable end: OSI/SFN and its work of building open societies, one contributor of which is English Language Programs, become discursively infused and entrenched into all these geographic and discursive levels and terrains.

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[22] See, for instance, the discussion from the Committee on Central Eurasian Studies at the University of Chicago ("Committee," 2006).

In addition to "systemic impact," such an end may point to another interest in the OSI/SFN discourse which relates to the infusion of English into these spaces. OSI/SFN's use of "region" instantiates Neumann's (1999) analogy between nation building and region building in that it illustrates how political actors (such as OSI/SFN) "imagine a certain spatial and chronological identity for a region" as a part of some political project (for instance, building open societies) (p. 115). Here the discourse constructs regions such that OSI/SFN is discursively infused into all geopolitical and territorial understandings of the term; in turn, OSI/SFN can—from the inside out, outside in, top down, or bottom up—work to forge the political entity of open society. This entity, however, is discursively conjoined with English and ELT through its English Language Programs initiative, as the following quote from an ELP strategy (1999) document shows:

> English Language Programs (ELP) became a foundation program (in 1994) out of necessity, and, to this very day it has been run out of necessity. Very early on, the foundations realized that it was hard to foster programs directly related to building open societies if these programs—many of which necessarily included a significant international component—were accessible only to people who had a good command of English. Forging open societies relies to a considerable degree on the ability of educated local people to communicate successfully with the world beyond their most immediate state and/or regional boundaries. ("Strategy," 1999)

From this quote, we can begin to see consequences of systemic impact which are crucial to this study: English, too, becomes discursively infused into all these possible understandings of place and space, and a link in the discourse chain of supranational language management becomes discursively, if subtly, instantiated.

*English and Discursive Reach in the OSI/SFN ELP Discourse*

As stated above, English Language Programs (ELP), as one initiative of OSI/SFN, becomes discursively infused into multiple constructions of space and in multiple spatial directions, hence instantiating a discourse chain of supranational language management.  In

addition to the quote above describing the program's history, in the ELP discourse we find other

explicit examples of how English becomes discursively infused into potentially all spaces and

directions, and how the discourse chain of supranational language management is evidenced

again.

In text explaining the "Education Principles" of OSI/SFN English Language Programs,

we find the following:

> From Moldova to Tajikistan, from Haiti to Mongolia, the OSI English Language
> Programs have been there for EFL teachers and students striving to learn the language, all
> often struggling with the lack of resources and often mired in an inflexible curriculum.
> ("Strategy," 1999)

The discursive construction of space in this discourse tells us that English Language Programs

have "been there": on the ground, spatially there, "from Moldova to Tajikistan, from Haiti to

Mongolia," with its resources, its materials, its training, its teachers, its technology ("Strategy,"

1999). Geographically, the specific countries mentioned here represent broad poles, which

highlights again the discursive and geographic reach of OSI/SFN and now its English Language

Programs.

Grammatically, it is also important that the "theme" or initial part of the first sentence

quoted above, "the OSI English Language Programs," is doubly marked by two prepositional

phrases ("from Moldova to Tajikistan, from Haiti to Mongolia"), a discursive strategy which, in

Fairclough's framework, foregrounds even more visibly—in its double markedness—the

ubiquitousness and reach of that theme: OSI/SFN English Language Programs (1992, p. 184).

Systemic impact is operationalized and strengthened again in the discourse, as is an effect of the

same: supranational language management. Discursively, in the process, OSI/SFN ELP is

constructed as almost a savior or provider—or, at the very least, a good friend—in that it's "been

there" (discursively, everywhere) for those teachers battling against the forces of the past (such

as communism). And because it is *there*, ELP is able to provide key resources to help prepare local teachers for the "new millennium," two of which, the discourse assumes, are English and English teachers.

There are other clear instances, too, where the OSI/SFN English Language Programs discourse is infused (again, by various, mostly unknown, text producers) into multiple constructions of space, each of which bolsters if not adds a link to the discourse chain of supranational language management. If we return to a key passage from OSI/SFN's ELP discourse, we find spatial terms used this way:

> Very early on, the foundations realized that it was hard to foster programs directly related to building open societies if these programs—many of which necessarily included a significant international component—were accessible only to people who had a good command of English. Forging open societies relies to a considerable degree on the ability of educated local people to communicate successfully with the world beyond their most immediate state and/or regional boundaries. ("Strategy," 1999)

In this discourse, English is infused into "international" space by the very obvious—if very questionable—assumption that, in order to be involved in work with a "significant international component," one has to have "a good command of English" ("Strategy," 1999). The discourse also presupposes that English is the language "local" people need to "communicate successfully with the world beyond their most immediate state and/or regional boundaries" ("Strategy," 1999), a second assumption which reminds us of an assertion made by Dendrinos, Macedo, and Gounari (2003): that "the present attempt to champion English in world affairs cannot be reduced simply to issues of language but rests on a full comprehension of the ideological elements that generate and sustain linguistic, cultural, and racial discrimination" (p. 13). This assumption, in other words, completely disregards multiple other languages in which people can communicate successfully and far beyond the borders of their state or region: Spanish, Arabic, German, French, Chinese, to name but a few. Here, too, the discourse chain of supranational language

management grows discursively even stronger, if not exponentially and dangerously, as "English" becomes constructed as the language needed for *any* work with a "significant international component," whatever such work might be and wherever it might take place.

Space as constructed above by the OSI/SFN ELP discourse extends the discourse chain of English both horizontally ("beyond") and vertically, with "international" seeming to be the top of the discursive space pyramid. Elsewhere in the ELP discourse, by looking at how English is perpetuated *within* countries, we see a micro-version of how the discourse chain of supranational language management is operationalized. For example, OSI/SFN discursively infuses ELP into "local organizations" which may eventually take over OSI/SFN ELP projects. Such organizations include "pedagogical universities, or the ministry teacher retraining facility, or local teachers' associations"; "We have also developed projects over which local people may claim ownership (foreign language schools)" ("Strategy," 1999). In other words, some of ELP's projects may, in time, go to the state (pedagogical universities and teacher retraining facilities), some to local organizations ("local teachers' associations"), some to private individuals (foreign language schools) ("Strategy," 1999). The claimed spatial dispersion of projects here, a part of the discourse of "capacity building," presents additional textual evidence of systemic impact, supranational language management, and the resultant influence and reach of OSI/SFN ELP and, in turn, English: from national to local, public to private domains.

To conclude this section on how OSI/SFN ELP infuses English into multiple places and spaces, and to furnish additional evidence for a discourse chain of supranational language management, I quote from a passage describing the work of the Soros Professional English Language Teaching program (SPELT), one component of ELP:

> Soros Professional English Language Teaching (SPELT) provides the countries in the
> foundation network with Masters Degree EFL specialists who are native speakers of

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English. They teach English at local schools at all levels and, perhaps more importantly, bring modern teaching methodology not only to the capitals and major cities, but also to small far-off places. ("Strategy," 1999)

Here spatiality and temporality converge as important lenses for understanding supranational language management, since it becomes apparent in the discourse that SPELT teachers are (or have access to the) "modern" (in this case, methodology), which they can further "bring" (the commodity of it) "not only to the capitals and major cities, but also to small far-off places" ("Strategy," 1999). The discourse again underscores the all-pervasiveness of ELP, now through identified carriers, native-speaking (American) "EFL specialists" teaching English and training English teachers. Also critical, SPELT, English and ELT are now infused into the "small far-off places" in addition to "the capitals and major cities," and they are further infused into "*all* levels of education," an abstract but no less spatial (and vertical) construct. In turn, systemic impact and a discourse chain of supranational language management are forcefully perpetuated and operationalized once more.

*Discursive Ambiguity, ELP, and the Closure of Space for Local Responsibility*

What we have encountered thus far throughout the OSI/SFN and ELP discourse are differences in—and, in turn, ambiguity and instability around—constructions of *where* OSI/SFN initiatives operate—in other words, ambiguity and instability in how OSI represents the space within which it works. As a result of this discursive slippage and instability, OSI/SFN and ELP become discursively infused into almost any construction of space we can imagine. Thus a discourse chain of supranational language management is created.

Next I argue that this ambiguity and the resultant discourse chain of supranational language management have formidable implications for local decision-making and responsibility. In the case of OSI/SFN, the discourse first seems to attend to the importance of

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local context (and, in turn, local responsibility for ELP projects and programs), but instabilities within the discourse eventually close discursive space for local responsibility.

If we return to the discursive slippage between the constructs "local," "national," "regional," and "network-wide," we find that "local" is the construct stated directly in the mission statement, suggesting, perhaps, the importance OSI/SFN places—at least discursively— on a more bottom-up approach to the implementation of initiatives, or at least on the *appearance* of attention to local context. This importance would align OSI/SFN with Holliday's (1994) criticism of the top-down imposition of ELT methodologies by BANA ( British, Australian, North American) or center countries and his recommendations for methodologies which are appropriate to local contexts. It would align OSI/SFN with Canagarajah's (1999) emphasis on local context as a central factor in the learning process in periphery (as well as center) countries. It may also align OSI/SFN with Kellner's (2002) picture of "globalization from below" (elaborated on in Chapter Two), in which "marginalized individuals and social movements resist globalization and/or use its institutions and instruments to further democratization and social justice" as well as "circulate local struggles and oppositional ideas" ("Theorizing Globalization"). ELT and the use of English might then be more likely to become what Pennycook (1994) envisions: a means of learning which "allows for struggle, resistance, and different appropriations of language, opening up a space for many different meaning-making practices in English" (p. 69).

At the same time, the verb "implements" ("On a local level, OSI implements a range of initiatives") is not the same as the verb "creates" (for instance); word choice here obscures exactly what role local actors may take in the process, which underlines how ideological difference—and power, agency, and responsibility—are coded and obscured in vocabulary

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(Fairclough, 1989, pp. 112-113). Additionally, when the "Initiatives" webpage states that

initiatives address issues on a "national," "regional," or "network-wide" basis, the discourse

seems to contradict the idea of "local" entirely, deepening ambiguity around where and how

OSI/SFN operates. Discursively at least, in spite of an initial appearance of attention to local

context, the subsequent shift from "local" to "national," "regional," or "network-wide" closes

space for local participation in decision-making processes. In the case of ELP, the discourse

chain of supranational language management becomes, in turn, strengthened.

The discourse of OSI/SFN thus raises questions about where its initiatives operate

(locally, nationally, regionally, network-wide), what is meant by where, who is responsible for

its initiatives, and to what extent. This discursive ambiguity around where OSI/SFN operates and

who is responsible—and more implications thereof—are further evidenced when OSI delineates

the geographic location of its offices.  In an overview of its work on a webpage entitled "About

Us," the central website states the following:

> OSI is based in New York City and cooperates with the Hungary-based OSI-Budapest.
> OSI is exempt from United States income tax under section 501(c)(3) . . . OSI-New York
> operates initiatives, which address specific issues on a regional or network-wide basis
> internationally, and other independent programs. OSI-New York is also the home of a
> series of programs that focus principally on the United States.  ("About US: Overview,"
> 2005)

Notably here, in OSI's description of its offices, initiatives are once again discussed, only now it

is "OSI-*New York*" which "operates initiatives, which address specific issues on a regional or

network-wide basis internationally" ("About US: Overview," 2005; italics added).

Paraphrased and restated, the above discourse can be understood as follows: OSI-New

York "operates initiatives, which address specific issues" regionally (from internal province to

super-continents) or network-wide (more than 60 countries). The use of the comma following

"initiatives" indicates that the subsequent relative clause is non-defining or non-restrictive; *OSI-*

*New York* operates initiatives—how, or rather where, they are addressed (regionally or network-wide, but in *all* cases, *internationally*, according to the discourse) is subordinate or extra information, secondary to the fronted statement that "OSI-New York operates initiatives." The fact that "OSI-New York" is discursively foregrounded as the theme of the sentence, per Fairclough, further provides "insight into common-sense assumptions about the social order, and rhetorical strategies" (1992b, p. 183)—in this case, into the "common-sense assumption" that OSI-New York is, at least discursively, in charge of such operations.

If we next re-visit discourse from OSI/SFN ELP's "Education Principles," we find additional instances of discourse which suggests there is local responsibility when, discursively, there is not:

> From Moldova to Tajikistan, from Haiti to Mongolia, the OSI English Language Programs have been there for EFL teachers and students striving to learn the language, all often struggling with the lack of resources and often mired in an inflexible curriculum. Young professionals and students have benefited from efforts to increase their access to materials and courses which focus on their language learning and professional development needs. Teachers help prepare themselves for the challenges of the new millennium through training and practice that encourage integration of technology in the curriculum; distance education; self-development (professional and personal); fostering free expression; and a student-centered curriculum. ("About This Initiative," 2007)

If we look closely at this passage, which seems to ascribe responsibility to "young professionals" and "teachers," we find some interesting discursive sleights of hand. English Language Programs have "been there" for those who are "striving" to learn English and "struggling" with the lack of resources, while at the same time "mired" in the residual effects of the (communist) past. Here the two words "striving" and "struggling" are especially striking, since they frequently collocate in religious discourses, especially in discourses related to Christianity and Islam: Even the literal translation of "Jihad" means "striving" and/or "struggling" ("ProCon," 2008.). Thus, combined, "striving" and "struggling" work on an ideological—if implicit—level to legitimate and reinforce the moral "ethos" (Fairclough, 1992b),

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"ethicality" and thus "responsibility" (Hansen, 2006) of OSI/SFN ELP, which, in turn, helps install in its leaders "the power to make authoritative and *far-ranging* decisions" (Hansen, 2006, p. 50; italics added). This responsibility includes decisions and policies made in New York and then dispersed throughout the network (for this study, the countries of CESEE-fSU). Also significant, in the discourse quoted above, "all" EFL teachers and students are struggling, "all" EFL teachers and students are "mired": Hence "all" are constructed in totalizing fashion as possible beneficiaries of OSI/SFN English Language Programs, and "all" are potentially subject to the authority and decision-making of OSI/SFN ELP, the head office of which is located in New York. Because ELP is "there," that is, we might say that local responsibility is not.

Equally striking in this language is how the subjects of sentences—"young professionals and students" and "EFL teachers," "from Moldova to Tajikistan, from Haiti to Mongolia"—appear to be just that: subjects or "agents in action processes" (Fairclough, 1992b, p. 178). Thus, we should assume from the grammar that they are in charge, *actors* with the responsibility to act upon something (the object of the sentence). The ELP discourse, in other words, seems to construct local teachers and students as having agency and hence responsibility locally for ELP through using a "directed action process type" (Halliday, 2005) of sentence structure: in this case, clear subject (teachers), clear verb (have found), clear object (encouragement). However, as Fairclough (1992b), drawing on the work of Halliday (1985), notes: "The grammatical form of a clause is not always a straightforward guide to its process type; there are, for example, cases where one process type takes on the typical grammatical realization of another" (p. 181). "Grammatical metaphor," in other words, may suggest clear-cut local agency and responsibility when, in fact, local agency and responsibility are much less certain.

To clarify this point, I return to a sentence from OSI/SFN ELP "About This Initiative": "Teachers committed to their profession have found encouragement for their vision and support for their efforts to become part of the international professional community" ("About This Initiative," 2007). In this example, "Teachers" is indeed the subject, though the definition thereof is carefully restricted to "teachers committed to their profession," creating a juxtaposed and "inferior" Other: teachers *not* committed to their profession (Hansen, 2006). And what these EFL teachers "have found" (the verb) is a nominalization of the verb "encourage" ("encouragement"). According to Fairclough (1992), the nominalization (verb made into noun) erases all sense of timing along with actors involved in the process: the agents and patients, subjects and objects, and the duration of the event. And the agent of this action erased through nominalization is clearly actors involved in English Language Programs. In other words, ELP has encouraged "teachers committed to their profession," and teachers, though seemingly the subject and agent of the sentence, are actually the objects and patients of the process of being "encouraged," the meaning of which is likewise contestable. Through grammatical metaphor, qualification, and discursive constructions of where ELP occurs, the agency and responsibility of local participants are de-stabilized and undercut, again, and discursive space for local responsibility closes.

More so still if we look at other features in this construction of local ELP participants. Not only are "teachers" not the subjects and agents of the sentence, but they are further constructed again in a totalizing manner, one which suggests that they (*all* "committed" teachers in ELP across the network) share one "vision" (singular). This totalizing construction levels, in turn, individual identity and variations in vision: according to the discourse, "all" want and have worked to join "the international professional community" ("About This Initiative," 2007). In the same way, the OSI/SFN ELP discourse constructs the goal and vision of local teachers as joining

"the international professional community," a representation which, like "the international

community," "remains relatively undefined" but most certainly "partly created through

language" (Fenton-Smith, 2007, p. 698). Who belongs to this community is not always clear,

though it is clearly constructed vertically, something high up above "the mire" and mud of an

"inflexible curriculum" and therefore worth "struggling" and "striving" for. Further, belonging to

"the international professional community"—as if there were only one with fixed standards,

regular meetings and regular meeting places—is something which local teachers can achieve

(given its "significant international component") with the help and management of OSI/SFN

ELP.

Discursive space for local responsibility is hence closed, reinforcing a discourse chain of

supranational language management. At the very least, this closure and this discourse chain raise

critical questions. If initiatives such as ELP are implemented locally or nationally, as the

OSI/SFN mission statement ("About OSI: Mission," 2008) suggests, then we have to ask: are

they implemented—or imposed—top-down by OSI/SFN, or built from the bottom up, at the

request of and sensitive to local actors and contexts? Also ambiguous: Which initiatives are

"implemented in cooperation with Soros foundations in various countries" ("Initiatives," 2007),

what is the nature of that cooperation, and why is language referencing "Soros foundations in

various countries" not included in the mission statement? Are initiatives "implemented" by

means of some combination of top-down and bottom-up programming, what Robertson (1992,

pp. 173-174) interprets as "glocalization" or what Kellner (2002) theorizes as "globalization

from below"? In any case, how much decision-making is available to local actors? Alternately, if

the initiatives are "addressed" nationally, regionally, and/or network-wide, as the "Initiatives"

page states, are they thus less accessible or open to local participation and decision-making, and

more likely to be "implemented" according to a broader framework created in cookie-cutter fashion for multiple contexts across a region whose history is stunningly diverse ethnically, linguistically, historically and culturally?

As the debate over English linguistic imperialism and now, too, language policy and management, makes salient (Phillipson, 1992; Holliday, 1994; Pennycook, 1994; Canagarajah, 1999; Seidlhofer & Jenkins, 2003; Spolsky, 2009), these questions and their answers are important. Ignatieff's (2003) exploration of nation-building, humanitarianism, and self-rule further underline the importance for and parallels to this study (see also Chapter Two):

> The UN nation-builders all repeat the mantra that they are here to "build local capacity" and to "empower local people." This is the authentic vocabulary of the new imperialism, only it isn't as new as it sounds. The British called it "indirect rule." Local agents ran the day-to-day administration; local potentates exercised some power, while real decisions were made back in imperial capitals. (p. 98)

While OSI/SFN is a philanthropic NGO and not the United Nations, nevertheless, right from the start, investigation into discursive constructions of space reveals questions about and insights into who at OSI/SFN makes decisions, at what level, and why.[23]

<div align="center"><em>Discursive Re-Scaling: National and Supranational Space</em></div>

At this point, I wish to posit one more explanation for the ambiguities and instabilities around discursive constructions of space in the OSI/SFN and ELP discourse. Not only do these instabilities lead to the infusion and entrenchment of OSI/SFN, ELP, and English—through the policy of "systemic impact"—into multiple constructions of space, resulting in a discourse chain of supranational language management. Not only do the instabilities and ambiguities close discursive space for local responsibility. Further, I contend, discursive constructions of space in the OSI/SFN and ELP discourse, especially the terms "national" and "international," are used to "re-scale" space (Fairclough, 2006), which may intend to clear the way for social transformation

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[23] I will return to the construct of "responsibility" as its own discourse topic later in this chapter.

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generally, and, in the context of this study, to clear the way discursively for the construction of open societies, an obvious interest in this discourse.

As an example, a sentence from the OSI/SFN webpage "About Us" is worth revisiting, for we see that the term "New York" is also what renders the work of OSI/SFN "international": "OSI-New York operates initiatives, which address specific issues on a regional or network-wide basis internationally" ("About US: Overview," 2005). Notably in this example, "New York" discursively comes to mean "international" by a subtle process of rewording (Fairclough, 1992b, p. 113), whereby the meaning of one term ("OSI-New York") becomes altered by another ("internationally"). This slippage in meaning provides a glimpse into how the OSI/SFN discourse may seek to re-scale space, and to what ends, for an office in a global city (OSI in New York) operates initiatives which OSI claims to implement *locally* in various countries worldwide. In turn, these initiatives (operated out of New York and implemented locally) address issues on *either* a regional (definitions of which range from internal province to super-continents) or network-wide basis (across more than 60 countries). These initiatives start with, from, and in OSI/SFN-New York. Thus, local, regional, and network-wide all become possible understandings of "international" by dint of the fact that initiatives are operated out of OSI-New York. The discourse here re-scales space dramatically, in the process, "opening" the meaning of "international" in a way which has very little to do with *nation*.

Hence, word choice—and especially the reliance on city versus country name as identification strategies—may provide tantalizing textual evidence of OSI/SFN discursively beginning to downplay *national* space, in the process, producing or opening *supranational* space. At the very least, the use of city (versus country) name instances Fairclough's discussion of the discursive strategy of re-scaling space, which describes how *new* scales are being developed and

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institutionalized, including the "scale of cross-border economic regions, the network of global cities, and . . . the EU or European scale" (Fairclough, n.d.). Strategy is driven by motive, of course, and in the case of OSI/SFN, new scales of space may well be under development in order to discursively (first) "carve out" (Robertson's term, 1992, p. 52) or "open" supranational space for open society.

To illustrate further how this strategy is apparent in the discourse of OSI/SFN, on its webpage, OSI first identifies itself as based in New York with additional offices in the cities of Baltimore, Budapest, London, Paris, Brussels, and Washington, D.C.—a network of global cities, that is, and not Hungary, the United Kingdom, France, or Belgium ("OSI Offices," 2008). Clearly, OSI does not refer to its United States offices by country name (though it has locations in three U.S. cities), nor does it mention country in the names of its other offices. There is thus discursive reluctance not only to associate itself with the United States, but to associate itself with country *or nation* generally. Rather, global cities come to designate its various locations, with OSI-New York described as the "main headquarters" and OSI-Budapest as "the main hub for initiatives outside of the United States" ("OSI Offices," 2008), with one noteworthy exception: English Language Programs. Discursive constructions of office locations here continue to attenuate emphasis on national space in OSI/SFN's discourse, in the process, clearing the way discursively for social transformation—in this case, for the creation of open society.

As discussed in Chapter One, a discursive reluctance to associate OSI/SFN with national space may not be surprising, given Soros' pronounced disillusionment with the West and particularly with the United States. But there may be additional reasons for the reluctance which bring light to this discussion and will later help us better discern the role of English in these processes. We should also recall here Soros' (1998) worries over globalization, namely, that in

spite of the swift and dramatic rise of a world economy (at least in the 1990s), "the basic unit for political and social life remains the nation-state" (p. xx). Moreover, Soros is deeply disturbed that "international law and international institutions, insofar as they exist, are not strong enough to prevent war or the large-scale abuse of human rights in individual countries" (p. xx). Hence his vision for a different kind of society, a vision which—in the spirit of Popper and Kant—must have supranational and even universal aspirations, must rise above the brutality and excesses of nation-states, especially those which are anti-democratic (it is important to keep in mind Soros' fierce criticism of U.S. foreign policy under President George W. Bush). Hence the mission statement's declaration that "OSI works to build alliances across borders and continents on issues such as combating corruption and rights abuses" ("About OSI: Mission," 2008), discourse which further evinces the discursive strategy of re-scaling space (Fairclough, 2006) through its deft discursive leap from "borders" to "continents" with again, no mention of nation. Hence, Soros' vision for open society as a "universal ideal," one "guided by the dictates of reason to the exclusion of self-interest and desire" (Soros, 1998, p. 90), "the self-interest and desire," that is, of the nation-state. Hence the need, I argue, for OSI/SFN to find ways to discursively diminish national—and discursively open supranational—space.

This process of discursively re-scaling space is textually evidenced in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse as well. For instance, in describing the two components of ELP, the ELP discourse distinguishes between the identities of SPELT (Soros Professional English Language Teaching) and SELP (Soros English Language Programs) participants in spatial terms. In a strategy document, we find that "from a financial point of view, this [ELP] consisted of a network/regional component, SPELT, and a national component, SELP" ("Strategy," 1999). In other words, American SPELT teachers are constructed such that they and their work cross-cut

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national borders and boundaries; they work within the supranational bounds of region and network in addition to traveling to cities as well as remote, rural regions.

This spatiality is clarified when ELP presents more "Guidelines of the Program": "That the national SELP and network/regional SPELT work very closely together and complement each other, i.e., that the network SPELT be integrated in the national SELP in terms of providing the necessary international component to the national program's endeavors" ("Strategy," 1999). Here we find "SPELT" as providing "the necessary *international* component to the national program's endeavors" (italics added), international in that SPELT participants are native speakers of English and they come from the United States. And lest there be doubt about the significance of an observation such as this, imagine if the discourse read "the necessary American component to the national program's endeavors." The discourse again rewords "American" to mean "international" in a discursive move which not only re-scales space but which obscures the *national* origins of its EFL "specialists." Further, through SPELT, "international" and "network" (60 plus countries) become "integrated" into the "national" SELP: through this integration, the "national" becomes "international" (or American?) and "network," just as the "international" (American) is discursively integrated into the "national."

In an even more fascinating example, we find the following statement: "In March 1994, ELP was established and given the status of a New York-based network/regional program ("Strategy," 1999). According to *this* understanding, English Language Programs is now a "New York-based network [60 plus countries]/regional program" (remember the broad construction of "region" explored earlier), in contrast to—or alongside—its previous status as a "foundation program," which the discourse described it as earlier. The discourse, that is, eventually levels spatial and ontological *differences* between the two programs which constitute ELP: SELP

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(discursively described as "national"); and SPELT (discursively described as "network/regional" and "international") ("Strategy," 1999). In turn, the discourse re-scales our understanding of space such that "NY," "network," "regional," "national," and "local" all become one— presumably, the space of open society, which, as its very name suggests, "opens" our understandings of place and space in ways which ( a) discursively diminish attention to the nation-state; (b) create semantic distance from the United States; and (c) re-scale and collapse semantic boundaries, if not (yet) geopolitical borders. At the same time, and centrally, given the focus of this study, a discourse chain of supranational language management continues to infuse English and ELT into all these possible understandings and constructions of space.

Discursive Constructions of Time and Language in the OSI/SFN ELP Discourse

As established above, the OSI/SFN discourse creates a discourse chain of supranational language management by (a) infusing English and ELT into multiple discursive constructions and understandings of space; (b) closing discursive space for local responsibility; and (c) discursively re-scaling space, in the process, opening space for social transformation and supranational open society.

The discourse further infuses English and ELT into multiple discursive constructions of time, the second (along with space and responsibility) of Hansen's "big three" categories for the construction of political communities (such as open society) (2006). In this section, then, I begin by showing how the infusion of English into multiple discursive constructions of time (past, present, future) levels temporal boundaries such that ELP and its spin-off projects could go on and on *until all citizens of open societies speak English*. I then show how the discourse constructs temporal identities in order to create Falk's (1994) "citizen pilgrims" of global civil society, an identity which is all about the future and working "in accordance with more idealistic

and normatively rich conceptions of political community" (p. 139). Open society, I argue,

parallels just such a "rich conception" of "political community." At the same time, however,

discursive constructions of "citizen pilgrims" creates an out-group, an "en-aged," invisible and

"inferior Other" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Hansen, 2006) who is discursively, if implicitly,

excluded from the work of building open societies. Thus a discourse chain of *ex*clusion begins, if

never stated directly in the discourse. Finally, I will close this section by analyzing discourse in

reference to the future post-ELP. From this analysis I contend that English Language Programs,

like the European Union, constitutes the transition countries it operates in against "a temporal

Other: a fear of [their] own violent past" (Hansen, 2006, p. 49; Waever, 1996). As a result, the

discourse implicitly embeds within English the ideological constructs of security, safety, and

survival.

*Supranational Language Management:*

*The Endless Need for English and the Leveling of Temporal Boundaries*

I start analysis of this discourse topic by quoting again the first paragraph from a

document linked to the OSI/SFN English Language Programs (ELP) Initiative web page. The

document, dated 1999, is entitled "Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond," a title which tells us

it is a document about the future of ELP ("Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond"). However,

it starts, curiously, with history:

> English Language Programs (ELP) became a foundation program (in 1994) out of
> necessity, and, to this very day it has been run out of necessity. Very early on, the
> foundations realized that it was hard to foster programs directly related to building open
> societies if these programs—many of which necessarily included a significant
> international component—were accessible only to people who had a good command of
> English. Forging open societies relies to a considerable degree on the ability of educated
> local people to communicate successfully with the world beyond their most immediate
> state and/or regional boundaries. ("Strategy," 1999)

Looking first at explicit discursive constructions of time in this statement, we find time—as in the length of ELP—initially bounded by parentheses ("1994"), with a clearly fixed beginning and genesis. It is discursively without, however, a definite end in sight or explicitly stated, as suggested by the phrase "to this very day," and as suggested by the title, "The Year 2000 *and Beyond*" (italics added).

The lack of an "end" here is peculiar, especially given that, in 2007, on the first page of the English Language Programs Initiative web page, there *was* one sentence at the top which announced the end of these programs:"The Open Society Institute's English Language Programs have closed" ("English Language," 2007). There was no further explanation of why, or exactly when, the programs closed. It is even more curious that the link to the ELP Initiative was found under the heading "*Current* Initiatives" as well as under "*Past* Initiatives" ("Initiatives," 2007; italics added). Moreover, the text of these programs remained the same as when I started this study in 2004, except that all verbs on the homepage (only) had been changed to past or present perfect tense. Verb tenses on subsequent pages related to the English Language Programs initiative and linked documents remain in the present tense, just as they were when I began analysis.

How to explain these first ambiguities and instabilities around discursive constructions and use of time? A simple explanation might be that the webpage had not been updated, but someone had clearly made a point to change the verb tenses for the ELP Initiatives homepage. It is probably safe to assume, then, that there was opportunity to move the ELP webpage out of "Current Initiatives"; it was moved to the link called "Past Initiatives," after all. Therefore, its listing as a current as well as a past initiative may indicate oversight—or reluctance—on the part of the web manager to construct ELP as "past," "closed," or "spun off." Alternately, we might

interpret the ambiguity this way: Only SELP (Soros English Language Program) and SPELT (Soros Professional English Language Teaching Program)—the *direct* manifestations of the OSI/SFN ELP initiative—had closed, while *indirect* or formerly Soros-funded ELP programs (spin-offs, etc.) persist to this day (Chapter Five will discuss these in depth).

Or, the ambiguity around initiative end-date may be understood another way. It might also suggest that the discourse on the ELP website, right from the start, promotes the endless "necessity" of English and ELT, without temporal boundary. The repetition of "necessity" three times in the "Strategy" document, after all, suggests quite a strong "preoccupation with some aspect of reality—which may indicate that it is a focus of ideological struggle" (Fairclough, 1989, p. 115). In this case, the text producer is clearly preoccupied with establishing and maintaining the need for English and English language teaching: from the program's beginning, to the present, and in the future, too. Just as the discourse earlier infused OSI and its work of forging open societies into all possible discursive and geographic (spatial) levels and terrains, so also here does this first passage about ELP—along with the site's double presence on "Current" and "Past Initiative" pages, and the document's title "Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond"— infuse the necessity of English into multiple points of time: past, present, future.

To buttress this notion—shortly thereafter in the "Strategy" passage, "1994" becomes reworded as "very early on":

> Very early on, the foundations realized that it was hard to foster programs directly related to building open societies if these programs—many of which necessarily included a significant international component—were accessible only to people who had a good command of English. ("Strategy," 1999)

The time phrases here and earlier help sequence a narrative—in story-telling fashion—of ELP's history, but it is a narrative which, in the next sentence, leaps suddenly to present tense: "Forging open societies relies to a considerable degree on the ability of educated local people to

communicate successfully with the world beyond their most immediate state and/or regional boundaries" ("Strategy," 1999). This leap not only erodes the time sequence of the narrative, introducing ambiguity and instability around constructs of time as well space, suggesting (again) discourse and society undergoing transition and change. It further—and quite suddenly—erases all sense of time—and levels semantic boundaries related to time, just as earlier the discourse leveled semantic boundaries related to space—by converting a process and activity (to forge open societies) into a state or object ("forging open societies") through the process of nominalization.

Fairclough (1992b) details the multiple implications of nominalizations on discourse: nominalizations "entify" what should be a "local and temporary condition" into "an inherent state or property, which can then itself become the focus of cultural attention and manipulation"; Fairclough continues, "Accordingly, one finds nominalizations themselves taking on the roles of goals and even agents of processes" (p. 183). In this case, it is not surprising that OSI/SFN should construct "forging open societies" as the "focus of cultural attention and manipulation" and as a goal. But, as Fairclough observes, the use of nominalizations *erases all indication of the timing of a process* in addition to indications of who the actors in the process are—agents and patients alike are erased (1989, p. 129). Nominalization thus becomes one grammatical choice made by the text producer which codes (or in this case fails to code) the temporal circumstances and social relations of a process; "forging open societies" becomes constructed as an inherent state *without* a clear beginning and end. Further, and importantly, this timeless state "relies to a considerable degree on the ability of educated local people to communicate successfully with the world beyond their most immediate state and/or regional boundaries" ("Strategy," 1999)—to communicate, that is, in English. In turn, if "forging open societies" depends upon

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communication in English, the need for English and ELT likewise becomes timeless, extended indefinitely into a future without temporal boundary.

The temporal ambiguity explored above, the discursive ambiguity of a "real" end date for ELP (despite later discussion of "exit strategy criteria," analyzed later in this chapter),  and the seemingly "end"-less need for English may well matter for another reason, which Ignatieff (2003) makes clear. As he states, exit strategies and "eventual self rule" are essential  if nation building—or open society building, or development and aid projects generally—are to avoid becoming "discreditable" exercises in "imperial [even if *humanitarian*] power" (p. 22; italics added; see also Chapter Two). What I wish to suggest next is this: Spatial along with temporal ambiguities in the OSI/SFN and ELP discourse may highlight the problems and persistence of power, and perhaps even neo-imperialism or neo-colonialism,[24] problems evident even when framed within Spolky's (2009) construction of language management. Here, in discourse related to time, end-dates, and exit strategies of ELP, if such endpoints are at all fuzzy, ambiguous, unclear, then does the program, as Ignatieff suggests, risk becoming a "discreditable exercise" in imperial power? Do Phillipson's (1992) suppositions in *Linguistic Imperialism* obtain after all, only now through a framework which may align with claims of linguistic imperialism: supranational language management? That last question is a leap, I admit, but at the very least it should invite us to continue to look carefully at the role of English in development, even in organizations the origins of which may be a far remove from the very American philanthropy and ideology of Ford or Carnegie. I continue *this* investigation by turning next to discursive constructions of temporal identities.

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[24] Williams and Chrisman (1994) deconstruct both terms; they argue, in particular, whether "post" (in the sense of "subsequent") is possible when "we have not fully transcended the colonial. Perhaps this amounts to saying that we are not yet post-imperialist" (p. 4).

*Time and the Construction of Temporal Identities:*

*"Citizen Pilgrims," English for All, and the En-Aged, Inferior, Invisible Other*

Before I begin this section which explores constructions of temporal identity, it will be helpful to quickly review Falk's (1994) theoretical conceptualization of global civil society and the makers of that society: "citizen pilgrims" (see also Chapter Two). Falk describes a vision of global civil society as comprised first of organizations which are *not* attached to a specific country or region, but which are *de-territorialized* (like the dust-jacket depictions of Soros as "stateless statesman"; Kaufmann, 2002) and which share a "conviction that upholding human rights and building political democracy provide the common underpinning" (p. 138). It is *this* configuration of community and identity, Falk declares, which best describes "global civil society," with its institutions working to build identities which are *not* bound to state, nation, country (space)—but rather, identities which are temporal rather than spatial.  As Falk puts it,

> Global citizenship operates temporally, reaching out to a future-to-be-created, and making of such a person "a citizen pilgrim," that is, someone on a journey to "a country" to be established in the future in accordance with more idealistic and normatively rich conceptions of political community. (p. 139)

OSI/SFN, I argue, seems to be just such an institution working to build identities which are "reaching out to a future-to-be-created," a future with "human rights" and "political democracy" at its core.

Certainly, there is little to argue with in such a description of global civil citizenship. Still, Falk's (1994) voice here unavoidably evokes Anderson's (1983) seminal vision of nations as "imagined communities" built of "citizens-in-the-making," a construct, Anderson averred, made possible on the condition that such citizens read a common language. But Falk expands the borders around the meaning of the word and construct of "citizenship" in order to postulate a global version and vision, one which negates—or at least raises the possibility of negating—one

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of Anderson's central claims: "The nation is imagined as *limited* because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind" (p. 115). No nation, no. But if common language is the key, then global civil *open* society might readily be constructed as such a "country," coterminous with humankind and borderless, provided, that is, *that all citizens speak a common language*. Here we find one possible explanation of why English and ELT are constructed as "necessary" to the work of building open societies.

Hansen's (2006) research extends our understanding of temporal identities in other respects. She explains how such identities may be coded through "themes of repetition, progress, transformation, backwardness, or development" (p. 7), each of which is a geopolitical construction which signals some degree of Otherness in subjects (for instance, who is developed, who is developing, and who is not). In the case of the Bosnian war, Hansen argues, such constructions helped legitimate foreign policy decisions, as when Western foreign policy discourses constructed the need for NATO action against "the violent, barbaric, and tribal Balkan Other" (p. 49; see also Pennycook, 1998). This example makes salient why some constructions are deployed, others not, and the importance of attending to such constructions in the first place. Additional constructions code temporal identities through narrations of "mythological origins" and "potential" (Hansen, 2006, p. 24). Constructions of "potential" and its synonyms (capability, promise, aptitude, capacity, and so on) are thus further implicit markers of temporal identity, along with other terms connoting past, present, and future.

Informed by these sources, we can better understand how and why the OSI/SFN ELP discourse works to construct temporal identities, which, I posit, align first with Falk's (1994) "citizen pilgrims," whose identities are not bound to space, but time: They are reaching out for "a

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future-to-be-created" in a "country" with "more idealistic and normatively rich conceptions of political community" based on "upholding human rights and building political democracy " (pp. 138-139). The parallels here between this kind of "political community" and Soros' vision of "open society" are arresting, and evidence for the discursive construction of Falk's "citizen pilgrims" in the ELP discourse is rich.

*OSI/SFN ELP and the Discursive Constructions of "Citizen Pilgrims"*

In particular, in the ELP program document entitled "Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond," explicit constructions of temporal identities related to age and especially *youth* abound. In stating its goals, the text producer states: "To upgrade English language learning and teaching so that *new generations of young professionals*, and educated people in general, will not need additional foreign language training once they complete their education. This is our long-term goal" ("Strategy," 1999; italics added). In this example, the discourse no doubt reaches out to and constructs as its targets, first and foremost, present and future generations who will work for the "long-term," much in line with Falk's (1994) picture of the "citizen pilgrim" of global civil citizenship. Further, by using both "new" and "young" in one short phrase ("new generations of young professionals"), the discourse instances Fairclough's (1989) discussion of overwording and synonymy, whereby the use of synonyms or near synonyms in a sentence or phrase indicates yet again the text producer's preoccupation with some "aspect of reality" undergoing ideological conflict (p. 115). In this case, the text producer seems preoccupied with reaching out to (in the long term)—and in the process, constructing as its ELP targets—"new generations," "young professionals," a group of Others whose position in the sentence (preceding the added "and educated people in general") suggests their privileging. The intended effect of such reaching out—so that "additional foreign language training" will not be needed—is, moreover, startling:

the discursive implication is that "new generations of young professionals" will not need training

in *any* other foreign language, since OSI/SFN ELP will "upgrade English language learning and

teaching."

Constructions of such "citizen pilgrims" (Falk, 1994) persist throughout the document

"Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond" (1999). Under text describing the network of Soros

English/Foreign Language Schools, another component of English Language Programs, we find

the following constructions:

> In addition to the general English courses, these schools offer an array of ESP courses to
> young professionals, tailor-made courses for the emerging local corporate world, and
> foreign language courses for young learners (pre-school and elementary school level).
> Several of these schools also offer courses of local language(s). By and large, the target
> student population of these schools consists of secondary school and university students,
> and young professionals. ("Strategy," 1999)

Once more, the discourse "targets" "young professionals" (mentioned twice in the passage—as

the targets of ESP specifically and foreign language schools generally). It also expands its roster

of targets to include "young learners (pre-school and elementary school level)," and "secondary

school and university students" ("Strategy," 1999). These additions underscore yet more strongly

how OSI/SFN ELP seeks to construct "citizen pilgrims" by making English available at all levels

of education. Even "tailor-made courses for the emerging local corporate world" connotes the

newness and youth of that world, which is "emerging" (spatially, too, this is a fascinating

construction: a new "local" "world" with two terms fused together by the word "corporate").

Somewhat surprisingly, there *is* inserted into the middle of this paragraph the sentence "several

of these schools also offer courses of local language(s)" ("Strategy," 1999), but only "several"

schools do so, and the local language(s) and the reasons why they are on offer go unspecified.[25]

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[25] I will say more on other languages besides English in the last part of this chapter and in Chapter Five.

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Examples of "youth," the "young," and the construction of the "citizen pilgrims" (Falk, 1994) of open society are prevalent throughout the OSI/SFN ELP discourse. Earlier we saw how ELP has "been there" for "young professionals and students" who "have benefited from efforts to increase their access to materials and courses which focus on their language learning and professional development needs" ("Strategy," 1999). These actors are "young," "professional," and able to be shaped by learning English. They further face the "challenges of the *new millennium*" ("Strategy," 1999; italics added), a phrase which evokes "a future-to-be-created" (Falk, 1994, p. 139) (and which obviously hadn't been created yet in 1999) for which "young professionals" and teachers must be prepared.

In still another instance, under text discussing the need for English language support, we find one justification for the English Language Programs initiative stated as follows: "Lack of qualified ESP (English for specific purposes) teachers, which is the reason young professionals need extensive additional EFL training if they need English in their job" ("Strategy," 1999). Here again we find the target audience of ELP constructed as "young professionals," which foregrounds their temporal identities, and with similar ramifications as before: The discourse (and the program) reaches out to (in the process, discursively constructing as targets) the young and the future, through both the word choices of "young" (an explicit temporal identity marker) and "professional" (an implicit temporal identity marker). It is to these *implicit* temporal identity markers I next turn, and to the social and political repercussions for temporal identities we do *not* see in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse.

*Implicit Identity Markers: Constructions of "Potential" and English for All?*

As discussed previously, Hansen (2006) alerts us to how implicit markers of temporal identity can be constructed in discourse through terms such as "potential," "progress,"

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"capability," and "promise" (pp. 48-50). One consequence of these implicit identity markers in

the OSI/SFN ELP discourse emerges from analysis of the goals of ELP:

> To provide English language support to actual and *potential* participants in other foundation programs including, but not limited to, education and academic programs, scholarships, medical, media, and civil society; or, George Soros has put it, to provide support to "something else people want to do and need English for." ("Strategy," 1999; italics added)

Here, not only "actual" but also "potential" participants are constructed as beneficiaries of

OSI/SFN English language support. The discourse, in other words, to borrow language from

Hansen (2006, p. 24), "articulates a relation of identity" between all citizens "through an

emphasis on their 'potential'"—in this case, as potential (future) participants in foundation

programs working to build open societies, and as potential future speakers of English. At the

same time, in this example, temporal identities of "potential" become situated "within a

construction of spatial and temporal difference" (Hansen, 2006, p. 24), since the discourse

suggests that (a) not all citizens of countries where OSI/SFN runs programs are as of yet

sufficiently working towards or for the mission of open society; and/or (b) citizens of "closed"

(or opening) societies do not yet have a sufficient enough command of English to work to build

open societies.

Also crucial in this example, the discourse infuses the necessity of English into *all*

(potentially) citizens of open society, and it does so by constructing beneficiaries of OSI/SFN

ELP in three incredibly broad ways: (a) by describing beneficiaries as "actual and potential

participants," with "potential" left terrifically undefined; (b) by describing beneficiaries as

"actual and potential participants" in "other foundation programs, including, *but not limited to*"

(followed by the names of several programs; italics added), thereby discursively leveling

potential limits on which programs may need English support; and (c) by adding on—just in case

some possible participant has been left out of the previous possibilities—George Soros' broad

description of English language support for "something else people want to do and need English for" (Soros as quoted in "Strategy," 1999). This discursive infusion of the need for English into all citizens of open society (potentially) and for all purposes related to the building of open societies (potentially) reinforces again the discourse chain of supranational language management, which infuses the need for English into all constructions of time and space. Now the discourse infuses English and/or the need for English into potentially *all* people, or at least all citizens of open societies.

If we double back to the theoretical framework of this study, however, we discover that this may not be the case.

*Implicit Identity Markers and the En-Aged, Inferior, Invisible Other*

Critically, there are very specific temporal identities *not* seen in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse. Why not is answered first by Reisigl and Wodak (2001), who urge us to recognize that discursive constructions of identity—in this case, temporal identities, the so-called "citizen pilgrims" Falk (1994) describes—are produced by referential or naming strategies which rely on synecdoche or pars pro to to, part for the whole. In other words, when social actors are represented by "a specific feature, trait, or characteristic" which is pushed to the fore of their representation (such as, in this analysis, age and time), as a result, an "in-group" is created (youth, the young, new generations) as well as an "out-group" (the middle-aged, old, previous generations), a discursive strategy which Reisigl and Wodak refer to as "en-ageing" actors (p. 44). The creation of temporal identities thus becomes not only a way to reach out to the future and future generations and "potentially" all "citizen pilgrims" (Falk, 1994) working for open society. It also becomes a way to "other" Others—in other words, a way to create distance from

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and potentially discriminate against, exclude, or erase those who are identified in terms of the out-group (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001): in this case, those identified with the *past*.

Hansen (2006) illuminates this Othering process. As she explains, in development discourse especially, there is often the construction of dramatic temporal distance between the "developing" and the "developed," and "bridging" that distance is frequently constructed as best accomplished by "the developing Other's adoption of Western policies and advice" (p. 46; see also Doty, 1996). In development discourse, that is, the Other striving for "progress and prosperity" should strive to mirror a Western and "temporally superior" "Self" (Hansen, 2006, pp. 48-49). Hansen goes on to contend that, in Central Europe, these discourses frequently construct temporal identities in ways which seek "a return to Europe or 'the West,'" thus constructing *transition* countries as "identical with yet *temporarily* separated from Europe" (p. 40; italics added). The European Union, in turn, "is constituted not against an external, geographical other, but against a temporal Other: the fear of a return of its own violent past" (Hansen, 2006, p. 40, paraphrasing Waever, 1996). Hansen describes this process of identity construction as a two-way process of "linking and differentiation: that meaning and identity are constructed through a series of signs that are linked to each other to constitute relations of sameness as well as through a *differentiation* to another series of juxtaposed signs" (Hansen, 2006, p. 42).   Specific examples and an illustration of this "linking and differentiation" process will follow shortly.

First, though, I must mention one last source from the theoretical framework that reinforces the work of Reisigl and Wodak (2001) and Hansen (2006) in important ways: Smith, Law, Wilson, Bohr, and Allworth's (1998) explorations of identity politics in the post-Soviet borderlands (see also Chapter Two), and especially the authors' explication of one discourse of

identity which is, in essence, temporal, though they do not explicitly call it such: "liberal discourse," which strives to break utterly with Soviet, tsarist, and communist *history* (p. 9). A break with history demands, perforce, the construction of either a radically new present or a somehow attainable future, both of which are a part of transition discourses generally and OSI/SFN in particular (see Fairclough, 2006). Smith et al. further deepen understanding of temporal identities by elaborating on how nationalizing regimes create a sense of collective identity by means of discursive boundaries and demarcations which essentialize, historicize, and/or totalize groups, any strategy of which ultimately constructs an Other again: that is, he or she who is different from the discursive construction of collective identity (pp. 15-20).

Returning then to the ELP discourse analyzed above and its constructions of "citizen pilgrims" (Falk, 1994) through its emphasis on the young, the youth, "new generations of young professionals" ("Strategy," 1999), we can now see how this discourse first makes salient Smith et al.'s (1998) description of "liberal discourse" in the post-Soviet borderlands, a discourse which strives to break utterly with its communist and tsarist past and history—in this case, through the creation of temporal identities: the "new generations" of the "young professionals." "Professional," too, becomes a marker of temporal identity, since its use (with the resultant connotations of business, capital, and market economies, the language of neo-liberal discourse) creates a further divide across boundaries of time between the communist days of "the great mass of the proletariat" (Marx, 2002, p. 234) and the current state of new capitalism in most of the transition countries of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In the ELP discourse, English thus becomes the presupposed language needed by "young professionals," a presupposition which not only "professionalizes" English (equating it, dangerously and not necessarily correctly, with prosperity and economic success; see also

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Macedo, Dendrinos, & Gounari, 2003) but which also renders English a means to create further temporal distance—if not a temporal divide—between past, present, and future generations; between socialism and capitalism; between communism and democracy; between English speakers and non-English speakers.

So, too, discourse which states that the "lack of qualified ESP (English for specific purposes) teachers . . . is the reason young professionals need extensive additional EFL training if they need English in their job" ("Strategy," 1999). Here again we find the target audience of ELP constructed as "young professionals," which foregrounds the temporal identities of the target audience. In turn, following Hansen (2006), if "meaning and identity are constructed through a series of signs that are linked to each other to constitute relations of sameness"—such as in this discourse "new," "young," "professional"—then there must also be "differentiation to another series of juxtaposed [if unstated] signs" (p. 42), presumably, in this case, the "old" or "middle-aged" who may not be seen as "professional" according to OSI/SFN, given their education and training would have occurred under communism, before the presence and interventions of charitable foundations, Western development organizations, NGOs, and "EFL specialists." Thus, an out-group is created—those invisible identities juxtaposed to "new," "young," and "professional"—and the subject of the Other, in turn, becomes split between "superior" and "inferior" constructions: in this case, the superior "young," "new" and "professional" Other (the target of ELT), and the juxtaposed, inferior, invisible Other, "the middle-aged and old," "the unprofessional," those generations raised and educated under communism. The discourse here may even doubly split the Other, for in addition to juxtapositions to "young professionals," there must also exist juxtapositions to "qualified ESP (English for specific purposes) teachers": presumably, *unqualified* teachers.  Figure 6 illustrates

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these juxtapositions of "difference" by creating a "shadow identity" of the "inferior" en-aged

Other in contrast to the "citizen pilgrims" (Falk, 1994) of open society and ELP.

Young, Youth, New Generations
Educated under Transition to Democracy

Targets of ELP                                                  Visible in Discourse

"Superior"
Other

Professional                                                    Qualified

Unprofessional                                                  Unqualified

"Inferior"
Other

Non-Targets of ELP                                             Invisible in Discourse

Middle-Aged, Old, the Elderly
Educated under Communism

*Figure 6.* Juxtapositions of temporal identities and the "split" Other.[26]

Concomitantly, the challenges of "the new millennium" as the ELP discourse delineate

them erect further explicit and implicit barriers between generations, as the ELP discourse

describes its offerings: "training and practice that encourage integration of technology into the

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[26] This figure is adapted from Hansen, 2006, p. 42.

curriculum, distance education, self-development (professional and personal), fostering free expression and a student-centered curriculum" ("English Language Programs," 2007). These challenges of "the new millennium" become discursively and ideologically subsumed into the work of ELP, and like "professional," these words too implicitly mark time and create potential divisions between the "young and new"—echoed hopefully throughout the discourse—and the middle-aged and old.

To further this argument, I quote one justification for English language support in the ELP discourse: "Absence of or *very old and ineffective* English department university curricula" ("Strategy," 1999; italics added). This justification for ELP, what young people did have *before ELP*, contrasts sharply with what the discourse says "young professionals" need now: "qualified ESP teachers" and "extensive additional EFL training" ("Strategy," 1999). Phrasing here clearly instances Fairclough's (1992b) explanation of the relational values of words and how they help "create social relationships between participants" (p. 116) as well as Hansen's (2006) exposition on how discursive instability may complicate meaning and split subjects (p. 45): "Young professionals" inevitably stand starkly and now explicitly juxtaposed to the coordinated "very old and ineffective," and while this text is discussing curricula and not actors, it is certainly implicit that the text producers presuppose the same about the developers of that curricula: "very old and ineffective."

Temporality becomes infused into curriculum and—presumably—its (invisible) developers and other actors in more subtle ways, too. The curriculum is also referred to as "inflexible" and something EFL students and teachers are "mired in" ("English Language Programs," 2007). The trope of "mire" likewise underlines the temporality of identity, as EFL teachers and learners ("citizen pilgrims") struggle to climb out of the "mire" (with its primitive

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connotations) of the "inflexible" past (education under communism) and towards the "new millennium" (a high-tech, student-centered, and distinctly modern construct). This trope, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) argue, further divides social actors through polarization and dichotomies (see also Pennycook, 1998): "Mire," that is, connotes the primitive (communist/Soviet/Tsarist) past out of which English (the modern, the modernizing) can help lift teachers and students.

Unequivocally, then, throughout the ELP web pages, OSI/SFN clearly seeks to construct "citizen pilgrims," and it further creates discursive space for the *"potential"* for English to be used by almost anyone for almost anything. At the same time, however, and paradoxically, the ELP discourse disregards—if not erases entirely—the needs and even the existence of generations brought up under communism, the parents and grandparents of those "new generations of young professionals" ("Strategy," 1999). This move instantiates in a compelling and poignant way Hansen's (2006) discussion of "discursive disappearance": when "identities articulated at one time might cease to be important" (p. 44). In other words, the ELP discourse works toward and for the future by targeting Falk's (1994) "citizen pilgrims," but as a result, the en-aged, inferior, and now *invisible* Others—those juxtaposed to the "new generations," "the young professionals," the superior and very visible Others—are discursively excluded from the work of building open societies. Accordingly, the discourse chain which we saw earlier close space for local responsibility (thereby *excluding* locals from decision-making opportunities) is operationalized again here, if subtly: The construction of temporal identities also leads to a discourse chain of implicit *ex*clusion.

*Constructing the World without ELP: English and the Implicit Discourse of Security*

To finish this analysis of time, the need for English, and temporal identities, I next consider how the ELP discourse constructs the future post-ELP. Such a future, I argue, also

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applies to constructions of past and even present, in that the ELP discourse implicitly represents

English, if not ELP itself, as ideological safeguards against the violence and strife which have so

often and brutally haunted countries transitioning to independence and even democracy.

Segments of language from the ELP "Exit Strategy Criteria" (found in "Strategy," 1999) helps

lead me to this conclusion:

> Foundations may safely disengage when we manage to empower local EFL teachers, via internationally recognized teacher training programs, to become teacher trainers, and take over pre- and in-service in-country EFL teacher training. (e.g. Romania)

> Secure the future for the foundation-established schools for English/foreign languages by helping them become self-supporting within three years of their existence. As of the end of 1999, schools that may not survive without the foundation financial assistance will be either sold/privatized or closed down upon review of their financial status.

> Spin off viable ELP projects. For example, with the foundation's assistance local EFL teachers' associations may develop income-generating projects (translation and interpreting services, and/or foreign EFL book sales) which will help them not only survive without further foundation assistance but also take over the foundation ELP projects such as ESP (English for specific purposes) and teacher training. ("Strategy," 1999)

Noticeably, this discourse animates the discursively inanimate: programs, projects, foundations,

foreign language schools, local teachers' associations. However, because *people* make up each of

these, the combined force of the terms used in the discourse creates a larger system of signs

which point, again, to a temporal construction of the Other (directly, participants in OSI/SFN

ELP programs throughout the transition countries of the network).  This Other, however, is now

constituted *against* the past, present and future without OSI/SFN ELP, without English, without

ELT (see also Hansen, 2006, p. 49; Waever, 1996), since the "Exit Strategy" discourse

ideologically embeds into and implicitly constructs ELP and English as safeguards against

instability, cross-border violence, civil war, ethnic cleansing—what we saw throughout the

twentieth (and now, twenty-first) century right up through the 1990s and the war in the Balkans.

Here is how.

The following phrases from the "Exit Strategy Criteria" suggest this instability without

ELP: "We have endeavored to build local capacity so that our *programs may live on long after*

*the foundations are gone*"; "*secure the future* of these projects when the foundations *cease to*

*exist*"; "Foundations may *safely disengage* when"; "*Secure the future* for the foundation-

established schools"; "*Schools that may not survive*"; "which will help them [local teachers'

associations'] *not only survive* " ("Strategy," 1999; italics added). The discourse here, in other

words, constructs acute if implicit links between survival, safety, existence, and security, what

OSI/SFN and ELP have provided, and, I argue, not only to ensure the future of English language

programs and projects after OSI/SFN ELP and the Soros Foundations are gone. Also, I posit, the

discourse seeks to ensure that there is not insecurity of another kind, when it was "not safe to

disengage," when even survival, perhaps, was in question. To substantiate this point: As Hansen

(2006; paraphrasing Waever, 1996) has claimed, the European Union is "constituted not against

an external, geographical other, but against a temporal Other: the fear of a return of its own

violent past" (p. 40). This claim echoes Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer (2004), who remind us

that, in the main, the European Union (and open society, I should add) emerged from "the

normative desire to put an end to war" (p. 1; see also Jarvie & Pralong, 1999, p. 5).

Following Hansen (2006) and Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer (2004), I believe it is the

repeated and associated list of signs here, which, joined together, accomplish "discursive

stability" around—and hence reinforce the positive features of—security, survival, existence. At

the same time, implicitly juxtaposed to these explicit signs stand what they are different from:

insecurity, danger, destruction—what transition countries *without* ELP and English have faced,

face, and could face again. These invisible but no less critical signs obtain through how identity

is discursively constructed: not only through a system of "sameness" but also through a system

of "difference" (Hansen, 2006, p. 45). The discursive construction of the identity of the Other here is one made safer, if not safe, by ELP and English.

Thus far we have seen a discourse chain of supranational language management clearly established through the infusion of English and ELT into multiple discursive constructions of space and time. We have seen the discourse level temporal boundaries such that ELP could go on and on until *all citizens of open society speak English.* We have also seen the discursive constructions of temporal identities which create "citizen pilgrims" (Falk, 1994), the need for English for *potentially* all people, and, simultaneously, split identities: "superior" and "inferior" Others as constructed by markers of time and strategies of en-ageing. Paradoxically, one result is a new *discourse chain of exclusion*—the exclusion of the discursively invisible who are not included in the work of building open societies. We have seen, too, how English becomes discursively and ideologically embedded into the constructs of security and survival through analysis of the discourse of the future post-ELP. English and ELP, that is, are constructed implicitly as safeguards *against* the threats of past, present, and future in countries in transition, many of which are, for various reasons, at greater risk of large-scale violence.

Next, I would like to return to what we began to see earlier in this chapter: how discursive space for local responsibility is closed through discursive slippage, ambiguity, and instability. Some actors, in other words, are discursively excluded from building open societies, while others are excluded from taking responsibility for the same. Conceding that there may be some overlap in this section with earlier findings, I turn to Hansen (2006), who explains that responsibility is but one dimension of identity which, along with the dimensions of "spatiality"

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and "temporality," are combined such that they "draw upon and reinforce each other" with

"equal theoretical and ontological status" (pp. 46-47). In other words, separating them for this

study has been primarily a heuristic and organizational strategy. Revisiting and expanding on the

discourse topic of responsibility is vital, therefore, for as Hansen (2006) observes,

"Representations and policy are mutually constitutive and discursively linked," (p. 28) and

"foreign policy discourses," including those of NGOs (and, I contend, the policy discourses of

supranational language managers) "always involve a construction of responsibility" (p. 50). The

question thus becomes how "differences" in responsibility are constructed and how, as a result,

political leaders (or language managers) become "invested" with authority and legitimized as

makers of decisions and policies.

<center>*Explicit, Strategic, and Qualified Constructions of Responsibility*</center>

In the OSI/SFN ELP discourse ("Strategy," 1999), under the heading "Guidelines for the

Program (SELP and SPELT)," responsibility is constructed and claimed explicitly, though one

has to read far into the "Strategy" document to find it. Responsibility is also, I argue, constructed

strategically, in a way which obscures who does *not* have the power to make decisions. A part of

that text reads as follows:

> That the NY management of ELP should provide professional guidance and oversight of
> the program development, monitor its cost-effectiveness, set the standards for the
> program's ongoing evaluation (evaluation was defined as a tool for program
> improvement), develop the program's exit strategy targeting impact (rather than just the
> intrinsic value of projects) and sustainability of ELP projects, make sure that the program
> continuously supports the general mission of OSI/Soros Foundations (primarily in that
> the program stay socially inclusive, i.e., accessible to all segments of society in as many
> regions of the country as possible.) ("Strategy," 1999)

Here, although these are stated as "guidelines" rather than rules, it is the "NY Management of

ELP" (that is, the *American* management team, or at least the management team in America)

who is clearly in charge and visibly foregrounded in the subject or agent position in the

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sentences. An even closer look at the discourse suggests, however, that the power behind "the NY Management of ELP" is strategically obscured by *how* it is constructed.

Through the grammatical strategy of nominalization (Fairclough, 1992b), for instance, "the NY Management of ELP" are discursively in charge *indefinitely*, without temporal boundary, since again, important processes ("to guide," "oversee," and "develop") have been converted into nouns (and hence "entities") which "the NY Management of ELP" *provide*: "professional guidance and oversight of program development" (as opposed to "guide, oversee, and develop"). Grammar here also contributes to the construction of the moral force, "ethos" (Fairclough, 1992b), and responsibility (Hansen, 2006) of the "NY Management of ELP" by rendering them "providers" and "professionals" ("should provide professional guidance and oversight") rather than, for instance, "overseers," watchful managers, or supervisors, roles obscured through nominalization. Their work becomes, rather, ideologically entified constructs on offer as opposed to actions taken or carried out which involve people being acted upon (the patients or objects of the sentence and actions, erased through nominalization).

Additionally, "the NY Management" carries with it the ideology of professionalism (they "provide professional guidance"), which they inject into "program development" as opposed to the *people* involved locally in ELP, on the ground in various countries throughout the network. In other words, actors here are not only erased through nominalization, they are also metonymically replaced by the compound nominalization "program development," just as the decision-makers in New York are metonymically replaced by "the NY Management of ELP," a discursive strategy which semantically backgrounds or conjures away who is acting and who is being acted upon (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). One by-product? Opportunities for decision-making and responsibility on the part of local actors are also discursively conjured away.

The above passage further explains how it is the responsibility of the New York

Management of ELP to "develop the program's exit strategy targeting impact (rather than just

the intrinsic value of projects) and sustainability of ELP projects" ("Strategy," 1999). While the

presence of an "exit strategy" is imperative (see Ignatieff, 2003), here, the exit strategy criteria

paint a qualified portrait of that process: "Foundations may safely disengage when we *manage to*

empower local EFL teachers" (italics added), that is, when "we" (the New York Management of

ELP) are (finally) able to "empower" (as opposed to simply "empower") "local EFL teachers," a

structure which injects the suggestion of difficulty or struggle into the process of empowerment.

"Empower," too, is a problematic word choice, since it semantically constructs local EFL

teachers as lacking or limited in power in the first place, a presupposition which may easily be

challenged. The means of "empowerment"—"via internationally recognized teacher training

programs"—may also be problematic, since later discussion of these programs define them as "a

teacher trainers' program either in the US or in the UK" ("Strategy," 1999), a discursive move

which again renders "international" ("internationally recognized") as either American or now,

too, British, through the process of rewording (see Fairclough, 1992b, p. 113). In either case,

"internationally recognized" can be translated as "recognized in the West." If participants

attended teacher training programs in Poland, Romania, Hungary or Turkey, would those

programs similarly be deemed "internationally recognized"?  Or do only BANA (British,

Australian, North American) countries (see Holliday, 1994; 2005) "qualify" as such?

*One-Way Knowledge Transfer, Program Ownership, and Qualified Responsibility*

The language of "capacity-building" sheds additional light on discursive strategies for

constructing responsibility and actors in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse. The United States Agency

for International Development's "Commodities Reference Guide" provides one definition of

"local capacity building" which is a helpful starting point:

> Local Capacity Building**:** The process of one organization passing on a skills and
> knowledge base to another organization. Very often this involves a mutual exchange or
> sharing of skills and knowledge, or a process of working in partnership to achieve a set of
> objectives. Building local capacity can take place between two or more organizations, or
> it can be accomplished among different levels of the same organization. ("Commodities
> Reference Guide," 2006)

While the language in this definition, "a mutual exchange or sharing of skills and knowledge,"

furnishes a view of "capacity building" which may be quite positive (and which may be quite

new, reflecting substantive change in the discourse of development: see also Chapter Six), at the

same time, as Hansen (2006) cautions, when discourse—and development discourse in

particular—refers to "capacity," it often refers to a capacity for "change in the inferior identity"

(p. 49). Hansen further warns that "capacity building" is often constructed as a group's [for

example, the Balkans] "capacity to transform in the image of Western/universal civilization" (p.

104).

In the discourse of OSI/SFN ELP, "capacity" or "capacity-building" is referenced mainly

when OSI/SFN ELP discusses its "Exit Strategy Criteria," which I return to now:

> Moreover, as a crucial matter of our ELP exit strategy, we have endeavored to build local
> capacity so that our programs may live on long after the foundations are gone. Therefore,
> we have identified our program's stakeholders and developed both SELP and SPELT in a
> way that allows our projects to be taken over by local organizations (pedagogical
> universities, or the ministry teacher retraining facility, or local teachers' associations)
> without much difficulty. We have also developed projects over which local people may
> claim ownership (foreign language schools) and, thus, become motivated to secure the
> future of these projects when the foundations cease to exist. ("Strategy," 1999)

Analysis of this discourse brings several points to light. First, in this discussion of building local

capacity as a "crucial matter" of ELP's exit strategy, there is no explicit mention of "a *mutual*

exchange or *sharing* of skills and knowledge" ("Commodities," 2006; italics added). On the

contrary, the ELP discourse is clearly that of an organization "passing on a skill and knowledge

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base to another," which is evident from these constructions: "*we* have endeavored"; "*we* have identified"; "*we* have also developed projects" ("Strategy," 1999; italics added). Further, the "we" have "developed" these programs in a way which "*allows*" (lets, or gives *permission for*) the projects to be "taken over" (as opposed to adapted or transformed according to context). The agency and responsibility of the subject "we" is never in question, although who the "we" is exactly is not explicit here; presumably the "we" is speaking on behalf of the New York Management team and the foundations across the network, a discursive move which presupposes a staggering amount of "insider knowledge," authority and responsibility (to speak on behalf of all the foundations across the 60 plus countries of the network). Accordingly, it is the "we" who acts, who is in charge, and who makes decisions. And if the "we" is the New York Management team, then the discourse here suggests strongly that local participants are not the decision-makers, a likelihood underlined by the clear distinctions the discourse makes between the "we" and Others: "local organizations"; "local people." Analysis of the language of capacity building affirms a contention from analysis of discursive constructions of space: namely, that responsibility lies with the ELP Managers in New York. Further, as Hansen (2006) contends, the "Others" here (local people) can only "take over" and thus gain responsibility by transforming themselves "in the image of Western/universal civilization" (p. 104), that is, in the image of the Western (New York-based) "we."

The discourse, moreover, indicates that the New York managers of ELP remain in discursive possession of—and hence responsible for—its programs, through the use of the pronoun "our" four times in the passage: "our ELP exit strategy"; "so that *our* programs may live on long after the foundations are gone"; "*our* program's stakeholders"; "*our* projects to be taken over" ("Strategy," 1999; italics added). The We/Our language reinforces a Self/Other division, a

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distinction from "them"—in this case, the "local world": Projects will be "taken over by local organizations (pedagogical universities, or the ministry retraining facility, or local teachers' associations)"; then there are other projects "over which local people may claim ownership (foreign language schools)." "Local capacity building" thus discursively occurs again, for OSI/SFN ELP, by means of what seems to be a one-way transfer system of knowledge and skill: from the New York office to the local project site, with the end result a continued infusion of instability into questions of local ownership and responsibility. And even when ownership is discussed explicitly ("We have also developed projects over which local people may claim ownership"), that ownership is qualified by means of the text producer's choice of the modal verb "may": Local people may claim ownership, or they may not.

*Responsibility and Specific Actors Involved in ELP:*

*Discursive Constructions of SPELT and SELP Participants*

At this stage, it may be helpful to revisit and differentiate again between two key groups of actors under analysis here, both of which are affiliated with related but separate programs under the larger auspices of the OSI/SFN English Language Programs initiative. The ELP discourse makes clear that SELP participants were local actors whose involvement in English was funded by national foundations in countries across the network. SPELT participants, on the other hand, were primarily American "EFL specialists" sent to work in a particular country or region in which the ELP initiative was being implemented. Of greatest relevance to this section of the chapter is how the ELP discursively constructs these actors and, in turn, their responsibilities. As analysis will show, the ELP discourse continues a discourse chain of New York or "American" responsibility for ELP and hence a discourse chain of supranational language management.

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*Dichotomies: Genericization versus Specification*

Primary evidence for the continued discourse chain of supranational language management are the dichotomies employed in the discursive constructions of these two groups. As Reisigl and Wodak (2001) argue, discourses about "'races,' 'nations' and 'ethnicities' . . . are almost always connected with specific dychotomic, oppositional predications . . . that help the speakers to polarize and to divide the world of social actors into 'black and white' and 'good and bad'" (p. 58; see also Pennycook, 1998). In the discourse of OSI/SFN ELP, these dichotomies likewise persist, with the following implications.

The first dichotomy to emerge is a split between generic and specific descriptions of the work of SELP and SPELT. Reisigl and Wodak (2001) and van Leeuwen (1996) have noted the importance of these forms of constructions in that "*specification* or *genericisation* are two alternative aspects of representing social actors" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 53; italics in original). Specification is realized through concrete, *individualizing* reference to actors; genericization, conversely, totalizes, impersonalizes, and may even collectivize through grammatical choices which make broader, more generic references to social actors (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 53). In short, specific references construct or preserve difference, while generic references are more apt to level difference. In the ELP discourse, references to SELP (local actors) are generic and leveled, while references to SPELT (the American "specialists") are much more specific. These differences, in turn, demonstrate significant differences in responsibility.

Here is how the ELP discourse describes the two programs:

The Open Society Institute's English Language Programs primarily comprise two separate initiatives that work closely together and complement each other. The Soros English Language Program (SELP), financed by the Soros foundations in individual countries, provides English language support for the specific needs of the country. The

> Soros Professional English Language Teaching (SPELT) program sponsors English as a foreign language (EFL) specialists and provides teacher training at secondary and tertiary levels. ("About This Initiative," 2007)

The next paragraph of this overview then elaborates on the two programs:

> Among other things, SELP supports various foundation programs, establishes and provides short-term support for English/foreign language schools in the areas of both language learning and teacher training, and promotes teachers' associations. SPELT focuses on EFL teacher development, encourages curriculum reform and fosters new trends in large-scale foreign language teacher development (e.g. mentoring). ("About This Initiative," 2007)

Strikingly, the language describing SELP at first might *seem* quite specific: These are fairly lengthy sentences, and the discourse explicitly deploys seemingly individualizing constructions in its references to "individual countries" and "the specific needs of the country." However, in the first sentence, the type of "English language support" SELP "provides" goes unspecified, and the later elaborations are likewise broad and generic: "among other things" (which may be the broadest possible construction of work possible); "various foundation programs" (with no examples); "provides short-term support for English/foreign language schools in the areas of both language learning and teacher training." Even in this last elaboration the discourse refuses to yield specifics regarding the work—and more importantly—the responsibility of SELP: We do not discover, for instance, that SELP participants actually teach (which they do), but rather, that they are involved in "establishing" and "providing" "support" "in *the areas of both language learning and teacher training*" (italics added). Description of SELP further genericizes through a move from (paradoxically) "individual countries" (plural) to the totalizing leap of "the specific needs of the country," the singular with definite article: This is an example, again, of metonymy, since it is the needs of the "country" (as opposed to the people in that country) which are being addressed. Metonymy and genericization combine here to level individual difference and obscure

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the actual work—and hence responsibility (along with, incidentally, the national identities)—of local actors.

Compare now with descriptions of the work of SPELT. First, SPELT "sponsors English as a foreign language (EFL) specialists and provides teacher training at secondary and tertiary levels," a structure which makes the type of "support" much clearer: The sentence begins with a clear subject and follows with a clear verb and object. Like SELP, SPELT is constructed as a "provider," though what it provides is much more specific (if nominalized, and hence, seemingly infinite): "teacher training," and not just "teacher training," but "teacher training at secondary and tertiary levels." The levels, too, are specified. Further, the subsequent paragraph describes the work of SPELT participants in even more specific terms. As opposed to "among other things" or "the areas of both language learning and teacher training"—language used to describe the work of SELP—we now find that SPELT "focuses on EFL teacher development, encourages curriculum reform and fosters new trends in large-scale foreign language teacher development (e.g. mentoring)." Examples are hence carefully provided, including examples of examples ("e.g. mentoring"). Examples further specify the multiple "areas of both language learning and teacher training" SPELT participants have the opportunity and responsibility to engage in: teacher development; curriculum reform; mentoring. Unsurprisingly, given the previous analyses, SPELT participants further foster "*new* trends" on a "*large-scale*" as compared to SELP's "*short-term support*" (italics added). The responsibility of SPELT is distinctly more visible than that of SELP.

And there is another difference of note here related, simply, to word count. In the two sentences explaining SELP and SPELT in the second paragraph, we find the break-down of SELP work (which remains broad, generic, and nominalized) expressed in 31 (broad) words,

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whereas the breakdown of SPELT work occurs in 21 words—in one-third the amount of actual text. The "overwording" of SELP work (though less specific) further includes numerous synonyms and redundancies ("supports"; "provides . . . support"; "in the areas of language learning and teacher training"), a discursive strategy which Fairclough (1989, p. 115) assesses as evidencing "preoccupation with some aspect of reality" potentially undergoing "ideological struggle"—in this case, I suggest, struggle over how much and what exact kinds of responsibility can be made available to local actors.

*Other Dichotomies in Constructions of SPELT and SELP Identity and Responsibility*

*Professional highly qualified native English speaking teachers versus un- or under-qualified non-native speaking English teachers.* The most obvious difference in responsibility between SELP and SPELT is indicated by the names of the programs: the Soros English Language Program (SELP) and the Soros *Professional* English Language *Teaching* program (SPELT; my italics). The additions of the words "professional" and "teaching" to the SPELT name immediately mark a key difference in the responsibility of the actors: The American "EFL specialists" discursively "professionalize" the larger work of English Language Programs (which includes the work of SELP); moreover, the profession of "teaching" is inscribed into its very name, combining the forces of "professional" and "teaching."

Other key signs collaborate to form a series of links around—and in turn stabilize and fix the meaning of—what it means to be a participant of SPELT and why more responsibility is discursively ascribed to SPELT. According to the ELP discourse, SPELT participants were sought out by national foundations for the following reasons:

> However, because of the growing interest among the foundations to establish
> English/foreign language schools, and, indeed, in getting highly qualified EFL teachers
> who are native speakers of English, in March 1994, ELP was established and given the
> status of a New York-based network/regional program. From a financial point of view,

this consisted of a network/regional component, SPELT, and a national component, SELP. ("Strategy," 1999)

To "specialist" has now been added the descriptors "highly qualified" (and thus better prepared to take more responsibility) and—significantly—"native speakers of English." Interestingly here, the defining or restrictive relative clause in the construction "highly qualified EFL teachers who are native speakers of English" asserts that "native speaker" is—by necessity—a defining factor of "highly qualified," an assertion fiercely problematized by the ELT literature (see especially Holliday, 2005; Medgyes, 1994, on the myth of the native speaker; also Phillipson, 1992). At the very least, the document claims that foundations wanted *both* "highly qualified" and "native speaker." OSI/SFN ELP discursively ascribes greater responsibility, therefore, according to higher qualifications (which here go unspecified) and to being a "native speaker." Further, the use of the intensifier "indeed" ("to establish English/foreign language schools, and, *indeed,* in getting highly qualified EFL teachers who are native speakers of English"; italics added) places even more emphasis on the "getting" of native speakers to teach EFL than it places on the foundations' interest in establishing "English/foreign language schools." The error in parallelism in the ELP discourse ("to establish" and "in getting") may indicate an even stronger discursive imbalance between the desire for schools and the desire for native speakers, with the scale of desire being tipped in the favor of "highly qualified native speakers" who, as SPELT participants, automatically have more responsibility.

SELP actors, on the other hand, according to a "by-country needs analysis," are constructed by what they lack:[27]

General lack of good command of English although English is taught from elementary school to secondary school to higher education (usually for 12-14 years, with modest results); Un- or underqualified EFL teachers; (Good EFL teachers leave the profession for better paid jobs.) ("Strategy," 1999)

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[27] See Benesch, 2001, for a critical overview of needs analyses in English for Academic Purposes.

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First, though indirectly by passive voice, the discourse here immediately implicates teachers in

the multiple lacks creating the need for English: In contrast to the native speakers of SPELT,

there is generally a lack of "a good command of English *though English is taught . . . for 12-14

years*" ("Strategy," 1999; italics added). Second, what contributions teachers *do* make are

qualified ('with modest results") and overtly generalized ("General lack"). The end result is the

discursive construction of what Matsuda (1999) describes as a "deficit model of teacher

development," a view of teachers which risks (especially across 60 plus countries) being

"supported only by myths and unexamined assumptions." Also in sharp contrast to SPELT,

SELP teachers are explicitly constructed as "un- or underqualified," a construction which

explicitly and dichotomously juxtaposes them to the "highly qualified" "native speaker"

"American" teachers SPELT provides.

*The all-pervasiveness of SPELT versus the vulnerability of SELP to personal and

professional intervention.* Besides the constructions of SPELT teachers as "highly qualified" and

"native speakers of English," we find SPELT participants and their work described as follows:

"that SPELT fellows need to engage in regular professional extra-curricular activities, i.e., week-

end and summer teacher training workshops and seminars, so that a large number of local EFL

teachers may benefit from SPELT" ("Strategy," 1999). Hence, above and beyond regular

teaching or training assignments, SPELT participants are expected to engage in and be

responsible for "extra-curricular" (though no less professional) activities. SPELT participants are

further constructed as available not only for all levels of education, as discussed earlier, but also,

at almost all times: after school, week-ends and summers. These constructions perpetuate a

discourse chain of supranational language management operationalized here through

constructions of SPELT responsibility.

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Further perpetuating that discourse chain, in an overview of its "General Strategy," ELP describes its financial assistance as a tool to "further encourage utilizing SPELT teaching fellows *beyond* teaching English, in ways that not only broaden students' views, but also enhance local teachers' professional performance" ("Strategy," 1999). Here, possible meanings of the work of SPELT are vast: Students' views could be broadened in an infinite number of ways, and the same holds true for "local teachers' professional performance." The end result? The discourse here extends an overt and generic invitation to SPELT participants to intervene (especially with students) in *personal* ways which, as Fairclough (1992b) has described, "have hitherto been seen as private and outside the legitimate range of intervention and employers," an argument we can likewise make for development NGOS; the discourse, in other words, is actually *redefining* the possible range of professional intervention to incorporate the personal (Fairclough, 1992b, p. 193). In turn, so also is the construct of responsibility and authority redefined, opening discursive space for SPELT teachers to take responsibility for a limitless range of personal as well as professional interventions.

In remarkable correspondence, the ELP discourse constructs SELP participants as vulnerable to interventions "beyond the legitimate range" (Fairclough, 1992b, p. 193). It states, for instance, that SELP teachers "help prepare themselves . . . through training and practice that encourage . . . [among other things] *self-development* (professional and personal)" ("About This Initiative," 2007; italics added). The need of SELP participants to develop *personally* is made explicit here, though tucked away into a parenthetical and after another clear development goal of ELP: "professional." Both the "person" of "personal" and the "self" of "self-development" are subject to intervention, though in subtle ways, from SPELT participants and the New York ELP managers. This construction of local actors again undermines opportunities for responsibility.

*Bringers of "modern methodology" and other resources versus lacking "modern"*

*methodology and resources.* SPELT participants are also constructed, with almost missionary

zeal, as bearing the responsibility of bringing the "good news" of modern methodology, which

this description demonstrates: "They [SPELT teachers] teach English at local schools at all levels

and, perhaps more importantly, bring modern teaching methodology not only to the capitals and

major cities, but also to small far-off places" ("Strategy," 1999). Here spatiality, temporality, and

responsibility converge as SPELT participants are constructed as responsible for bringing

"modern methodology" "not only to the capitals and major cities, but also to small far-off

places." Systemic impact and supranational language management are operationalized in the

discourse again. But of particular relevance here, SPELT participants are constructed as able to

"modernize" even the "small far-off places" in need (a need presupposed) of English and

"modern" ELT methodology. The tone of the discourse here mixes sudden poetic language

("small far-off") into what has been, until now, predominantly the more technical "NGO speak"

of development discourse; in turn, the identities of SPELT participants take on almost magical,

vaguely super-hero, missionary properties as they travel the network with the good news of

English and ELT methodology. SPELT participants are responsible providers, and more. They

go above and beyond. They go everywhere.

Conversely, SELP participants are again constructed as lacking, in this case, lacking as

"qualified teachers whose command of English is very poor or whose English is not poor but

they lack communicative classroom teaching skills/methodology" ("Strategy," 1999).

Furthermore, while SPELT is *there* (everywhere, as discussed earlier), SELP teachers who *are*

qualified and even "good" "leave the profession for better paid jobs": hence, they are *not* there

("Strategy," 1999).  The discourse goes on to specify that local teachers further lack "adequate

EFL course books and other teaching materials and resources" along with "*modern* curriculum

for in-service teacher training/development" ("Strategy," 1999; italics added), a clear

juxtaposition to SPELT as bringers of "modern methodology."

In sum, each lack ascribed to SELP participants creates a distinct dichotomy which

ontologically divides actors and perpetuates the differences in identity and responsibility

between them. Moreover, differences are constructed such that SPELT participants clearly work

toward developing SELP participants in the image of "the Western Self" (Hansen, 2006, p. 48),

illustrated by Table 2.

Table 2: *Dichotomous Constructions of SPELT and SELP Participants' Identities*[28]

| SPELT Teachers (Western/American) "Self" | SELP Teachers Needing to Mirror the "Western Self" |
|---|---|
| Clear responsibilities | Ambiguous or no responsibilities |
| Native speakers of English | Poor command of English |
| Highly qualified | Un- or under-qualified |
| Bringers of "modern" methodology | Lacking modern methodology |
| Can intervene personally and professionally | Vulnerable to personal and professional intervention |
| Work constructed specifically | Work constructed generically |
| Always available everywhere | "Good" teachers leave profession |

*Qualified Constructions of Access to ELP*

In spite of the multiple ontological differences ascribed to the constructions of SPELT

and SELP participants, responsibilities, and identities, both programs do have one responsibility

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[28] Idea adapted from Hansen (2006).

in common. In an introduction to ELP, the discourse ends on the following short paragraph:

"Both programs also work to promote social inclusion. To this end, SELP and SPELT endeavor

to provide access to their diverse projects to all segments of society throughout the countries of

the Soros foundation network" ("About This Initiative," 2007). The discourse here thus states a

clear goal: "social inclusion." At the same time, however, the discourse undermines the force of

its goal through qualification or hedging: The programs "*work to promote*" (italics added) as

opposed to simply "promote"; they "endeavor to provide access" as opposed to simply providing

it.

On their own, these two instances of qualification may be seen as simply overwording,

but *wherever* there is discussion of access in the OSI/SFN ELP web pages, the discourse hedges.

"Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond" describes, for instance, how "young professionals and

students have benefited from efforts to increase their access to materials and courses which focus

on their language learning and professional development needs" ("Strategy," 1999). Again, ELP

offers "*efforts* to increase their access" as opposed to, simply, *access*. Similarly, under

"Guidelines of the Program," we find one clear goal: "to make sure that the program

continuously supports the general mission of OSI/Soros foundations (primarily in that the

program stay socially inclusive, i.e., accessible to all segments of society in as many regions of

the country as possible" ("Strategy," 1999). Again there is qualification around the construct of

"access": it is not promised simply to "all segments of society" but "to all . . . in as many regions

of the country *as possible*" ("Strategy," 1999; italics added).  Presumably, then, there are regions

where access is not possible.

Another guideline from "Strategy" complicates and clarifies what may be meant by

responsibility for "access," this in reference to the Network of Soros English/Foreign Language

Schools: "That the schools may charge tuition fees in order to become self-supporting but may not become socially exclusive, i.e., their fees need to be affordable to an average income family" ("Strategy," 1999). Here accessibility becomes more defined in that "fees need to be affordable to an average income family," but the discourse does exclude, since *below* average income families will *not* be able to afford tuition fees. And while later discourse reiterates that "in no way should these schools become socially exclusive," elaboration on this point continues to suggest the inevitability of some exclusion: "Tuition fees need to be kept at affordable rates and partial scholarships are awarded to outstanding students" ("Soros English/Foreign," 2005). Income and "outstanding" ability, that is, can combine to ensure the greater likelihood of access, but, worded as is, responsibility for the goal of "social inclusion" cannot be fully met. An earlier discourse chain, one of exclusion, is perpetuated subtly here again in the consistently qualified constructions of access.

## Discursive Constructions of the Relationship between Building Open Societies and English Language Teaching

So far in this chapter we have identified multiple discourse chains which bring light to a central question of this study: How does the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network ELP discourse discursively construct the relationship between building open societies and English Language Teaching? As analysis reveals, the discourse of OSI/SFN and ELP create a discourse chain of supranational language management which infuses English into potentially all constructions of space, time, and citizens of open society. This discourse chain is reinforced by the consistent discursive location of responsibility with the New York Management of ELP and its representatives on the ground in countries across the network, American SPELT teachers. It is further strengthened by how the discourse splits the identity of actors involved in ELP: We have

superior and inferior temporal Others (young versus old; democratic versus Soviet; "citizen pilgrims" versus en-aged, inferior, invisible Others), and we have "highly qualified native speakers" working to develop local teachers in the image of the "Western Self" (Hansen, 2006). We have seen a discourse chain which excludes access to the work of building open societies in spite of the "potential" of English for all and a goal of social inclusion. We have seen the discourse work to re-scale space in order to clear the way for social transformation and the creation of open societies, but in ways which are discursively joined to English. One possible reason? The discourse embeds the ideology of security within English, thus making it a barrier against past, present, and future violence in transition countries.

With these findings in mind, findings which emerged through analysis of space, time, and responsibility, Hansen's (2006) "big three" categories which constitute political communities (nations, regions, open societies), I turn now and lastly to what the discourse tells us about the relationship between building open societies, English and ELT.

*The Role of English in Building Open Societies:*

*A Discursive Move from Qualified to Categorical*

To start this final piece of the analysis, I will compare different discursive instantiations of how OSI/SFN ELP states the role of English in the building of open societies. This comparison will reveal a discursive move from a qualified role of English in building open societies to a hands-down categorical assertion of the same, thus constructing English as *the* language of open societies.

The first such instance is found as an explanation of the end of the ELP initiative, and it reads this way: "The English Language Programs were designed to help prepare individuals and groups for a world in which English has increasingly become a necessary language for

international communication in professional and academic fields" ("Past and Spin-Off," 2007). This text is almost identical to how "About This Initiative" introduces the role of English in the world, with the significant exception of the past tense verb ("were" from "are") and the specific mention of ELP's component parts: "Both programs [SELP and SPELT] are designed to help prepare individuals and groups for a world in which English has increasingly become a necessary language for international communication in professional and academic fields" ("About This Initiative," 2008).

Several features stand out in these descriptions of the role of English. First, the passive voice ("were designed" and "are designed") obscures who the designers of ELP were: agency is obfuscated even as the discourse seeks to explain and justify the creation and establishment of ELP. As was previously discussed, later text does indicate that the New York management team of ELP was charged—or charged itself—with this responsibility ("Strategy," 1999), but one has to read far into the documents to uncover that information.

Equally compelling in this construction, English has "increasingly become *a* necessary language" ("Strategy," 1999; italics added), a construction which reminds us that the "necessity" of English is new but growing, though the indefinite article "a" further reminds us that it is one of multiple languages which are probably necessary for "international communication," especially given the importance of languages in the European Union and the importance of the European Union as a "prototype" for open society (Soros, 2006). The discourse, moreover, constrains the role of English in the world by erecting semantic borders around what exactly English is necessary for: "international communication in professional and academic fields."

Compare this statement on the role of English with the next instantiation, which appears as the first paragraph on the "Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond":

English Language Programs (ELP) became a foundation program (in 1994) out of necessity, and to this very day it has been run out of necessity. Very early on, the foundations realized that it was hard to foster programs directly related to building open societies if these programs—many of which necessarily included a significant international component—were accessible only to people who had a good command of English. Forging open societies relies to a considerable degree on the ability of educated local people to communicate successfully with the world beyond their most immediate state and/or regional boundaries. ("Strategy," 1999)

What we find out here, though through very convoluted syntax, is the following: "forging open societies relies to a considerable degree on the ability of educated local people to communicate successfully with the world beyond their most immediate state and/or regional boundaries" ("Strategy," 1999). Re-structured, that sentence and its many presuppositions might be understood this way: (a) "to communicate successfully with the world" requires English; English is reworded, that is, to mean successful communication; (b) "the world [and its people metonymically erased by "world"] beyond [one's] most immediate state and/or regional boundaries" speaks English; (c) "educated local people" need English "to communicate successfully with that world [those people], a construction which raises questions about "*un*"-educated local people; (d) the work of "forging open societies" depends upon "educated local people" and their ability to speak English; and finally, (e) "forging open societies" depends upon English.

The presuppositions here are startling and worth reiterating: English becomes reworded as "successful communication"; English is assumed to be what's spoken in "the world beyond state and/or regional boundaries"; English is constructed as the language of open society, even though this text does not *explicitly* declare it as such. Rather, semantic distancing (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) and obfuscation come into play, which tones down the illocutionary force of the claim despite the fact that the assertion is no less present.

Further, we find that while the first discursive instantiation of the role of English in the world limited that role to "international communication in professional and academic fields," in the second instance, we find those constraints leveled completely. Instead, English has become the "necessary" work of "forging open societies" since "many" of the programs working to build open societies "necessarily included a significant international component" ("Strategy," 1999). In other words, English is now constructed, though implicitly, as *the* language (not "a" as in the first quote) for "international" communication (with the constraints of "professional and academic fields" now also leveled). It is certainly significant, too, that the English-speaking world is constructed as "the world beyond their most immediate state and/or regional boundaries" ("Strategy," 1999): English, that is, is constructed as cutting across national and regional boundaries, just as earlier discourse infused English into all possible understandings of place and space, particularly through OSI/SFN's broad constructions of region: from internal province to whole super-continents.

This ability to cut across borders and boundaries does depend, however, on whether the "educated local" person has "a good command of English," a familiar metaphor if no less striking in this context: English becomes, through this trope, a sort of "army" or "military unit" over which the ("educated local") speaker has power and authority—presumably, too, the "uneducated" do not speak English. In this way, "educated" comes to mean English-speaking. And though indirectly again, English is also constructed in this discourse as a tool with which "educated local people" can "forge" and "build" open societies, if one in a basket of tools. The question arises, however: Are other languages also tools in this process?

In the construction above, English is also constructed as a tool which provides *access* into programs intended to foster the building of open societies, but access, again, is limited:

Presumably those who do not speak English do not have access to such work, and explicitly, those who are uneducated are not participants in the work of forging open societies. What is more, earlier exploration of access to ELP (affordable to average income families; outstanding abilities) becomes even more complicated: English Language Programs intended to be "socially inclusive" but there were still limits on who could participate, yet English is needed "to a considerable degree" to participate in building open societies. The end result discursively? Non-English speakers below average income or those who lack "outstanding" abilities are doubly excluded from the work of participating in building open societies.

And another point must be made here. The discourse rewords English to mean "successful communication." In the same way, the discourse indirectly rewords "international communication" to mean English-speaking, just as previously "New York" becomes reworded as "international" and "American" becomes "international." As discussed earlier, the OSI/SFN discourse may work to restructure the world, space, and language of open society such that a center (neo-colonial, neo-imperialist) perspective ultimately obtains, and this in spite of the periphery origins of the founder.

Then there is a third place in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse where the role of English in the world is discussed, now in the mission statement of ELP:

> The mission of OSI/Soros English Language Programs is to promote English language learning and teaching in the countries of the foundation network, because a good command of English is necessary for international communication which is critical to building open societies. ("Strategy," 1999)

Significantly, prior examples of qualification and hedging are now entirely absent: "A good command of English *is* necessary for international communication which *is* critical to building open societies" ("Strategy," 1999; italics added). No modal verbs or discursive constraints work to limit the necessity of English here; the assertion has evolved from a qualified and limited

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argument about the role of English in the world and building open societies to a hands-down categorical assertion of the same—with no room for alternatives. Absent are phrases like "to a considerable degree" and "many of which [programs]"; it *is*, it *is*, and it *is* even more so with that final defining/restrictive relative clause "which is critical" ("Strategy," 1999). The trope of "command" is reinforced again, too, if unsurprisingly; and now *all* programs, it seems, require "international communication," which, the discourse states, necessitates "a good command of English." I would even posit that the choice of the word "critical" carries with it both the indispensability of English along with the risk of crisis ("critical," n.d.) and threat: Without "international communication," without English, the work of forging open societies may well be in crisis, and, too, the security and safety of those societies. English becomes constructed, then, if implicitly, as a force working against the risk of "closed," tribal, primitive, insurgent societies, a proposition made more probable, perhaps, by the nominalizations of "English language learning," "English language teaching," "international communication," and "building open societies." These verbs made noun become concretized entities without temporal boundaries whose actors (agents and patients; subjects and objects) are radically suppressed. Rather, "English" is entified, along with the subsequent actions explicitly and implicitly coded within it: "international communication" and "building open societies"; successful communication; security.

<center>*English is Foreign, English As Foreign*</center>

Another provocative ambiguity arising from the OSI/SFN ELP discourse revolves around the construction of English. Specifically, discursive constructions of English in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse raise questions about whether English is "foreign" or not, questions with rich implications in the context of this study.

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A common construction in this discourse is as follows:

> However, because of the growing interest among the foundations to establish English/foreign language schools, and, indeed, in getting highly qualified EFL teachers who are native speakers of English, in March 1994, ELP was established and given the status of a New York-based network/regional program. ("Strategy," 1999)

Uncertain here is the role of the virgule (or slash mark) between "English" and "foreign." Is it intended to mean "English *and* foreign language schools"? "English *or* foreign language schools"? Or "English *as* a Foreign Language schools"? The subsequent use of "EFL" (English as a Foreign Language) teachers suggests that the latter should be the intended understanding, but it is not fully clear.

Relatedly, on a linked web page titled "Soros English/Foreign Language Schools," we find the following text:

> Soros English/Foreign Language schools seek to provide alternative high-quality foreign language instruction that complements rather than substitutes for foreign-language programs provided by existing state education. In addition to general English courses, these schools offer an array of English for Specific Purposes (ESP) courses to young professionals, tailor-made courses for the emerging local corporate world, and foreign-language courses for young learners (pre-school and elementary school level). Several of the schools also offer courses of local language(s). ("Soros English/Foreign," 2005)

Ambiguous in this elaboration is whether, for instance, "foreign-language courses for young learners" are English courses or courses in *another* foreign language; the text does go on to specify, after all, that "several of the schools also offer courses of local language(s)" ("Soros English/Foreign," 2005). Here, the text seems to read as if English is distinct from "foreign languages"; at the same time, "local language(s)" somehow fall under the category "foreign." In both cases, there seems to be a discursive shifting of boundaries between meanings, and the meanings of both "foreign" and "local" become destabilized, contributing further to Fairclough's (2006) ideas on the "discursive re-scaling of space."

The meaning of "foreign" is complicated further in a phrase from the "exit strategy criteria," one of which is "secure the future for the foundation-established schools for English/foreign *languages*" (plural) ("Strategy," 1999; italics added). The plurality of this use suggests that other languages besides English are taught at these schools; it also suggests that English is different from "foreign languages"—it is physically separated from them by the virgule, again.

But this meaning shifts once more in the "Strategy" document, under discussion of "Collaboration With Other Donors." That text reads:

> Across the network, ELP has been collaborating with almost all international and local organizations that are involved in the development of English/foreign language programs. Our most successful collaborative efforts to date include, but are not limited to, projects with British Council (teacher training, teaching material development, and teacher resource centers in all countries that have BC), Peace Corps (upgrading EFL teachers' English), USIA (very few workshops with USIS fellows), French, German, Italian and Spanish embassies and cultural centers (introduction of foreign languages other than English). ("Strategy," 1999)

In this passage, it now seems clearer that English is discursively constructed as a "foreign" language along with other languages: "French, German, Italian and Spanish." Its "foreignness" has finally begun to discursively stabilize, though English is simultaneously distinct from—and fronted before—other foreign languages.

*EFL Teacher Training Transferable to Other Languages and Subjects*

At the same time, we discover here an even deeper entrenchment of the "systemic reach" and the supranational language management of *English* Language Programs: The influence and reach of OSI/SFN ELP now impacts "international" and "local" "English/foreign language programs"; it impacts multiple English language organizations (including British Council, Peace Corps, and USIS); and, most strikingly, it impacts even the embassies and cultural centers of other countries whose first languages are not English. The resultant "reach" of OSI/SFN ELP

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suggests, in turn, that what is disseminated through ELP goes beyond the language itself, and there are multiple ways to imagine such impact: The discourse suggests, for instance, that OSI/SFN ELP has provided the embassies and cultural centers of other countries a model for how to introduce and establish foreign language education, and the discourse suggests that OSI/SFN ELP has provided influence beyond the teaching of English. The following quote from "Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond" suggests how ELP's influence is constructed as extending beyond English language education:

> Given the ELP stakeholders, we have every reason to believe that our efforts in the fields of teacher training (pedagogical universities, secondary schools, ministry retraining facilities, private sector), as well as foreign language curriculum design (universities) will have systemic impact. Soros English/foreign language schools have also been involved (as consultants) in different government organized discussions on the modernization of foreign language curricula, teaching materials and methodology within state education. ("Strategy," 1999)

Here it is evident that the discourse constructs OSI/SFN ELP as impacting the training of teachers, the design of curriculum, the creation of materials and the methodology of each of these, *regardless of which "foreign" language is being taught*. Further, according to the discourse, OSI/SFN ELP can infuse "modernization" into each of these elements.

OSI/SFN ELP becomes, then, discursively, a model for far more than simply teaching English; it constructs itself as able to transform foreign language education and even education in other disciplines:

> Moreover, if we create a local structure of top notch EFL specialists in teacher training, our foundations' efforts in the field of education transformation may benefit from their expertise as well. EFL teacher training skills are transferable and applicable to other content subjects (as is proven in Moldova by the results of the above mentioned teacher training). ("Strategy," 1999).

With this last sentence, we arrive at a particularly sweeping assertion—that "EFL teacher training skills" (provided to "local" teachers across the "network" of 60 plus countries by OSI/SFN through "international" training) *will* transfer—and impact—other content subjects.

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And though those subjects go unnamed, the presupposition behind the assertion can be articulated: The dissemination of method, it is suggested, may be as important as the dissemination of content (including English). In turn, the OSI/SFN ELP discourse promotes not only the perpetuation of English as *the* language of open society, it further promotes a form of "methodological imperialism" (see also Newby, 2000)—at the expense of methodological diversity—which privileges an "American" at least (though it goes unstated), BANA at best (British, Australian, North American; Holliday, 2004), approach to language education, and all of this despite, I repeat, the periphery origins of the founder of the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network.

## Conclusion

This chapter has provided a critical discourse analysis of the official written discourse of OSI/SFN and its English Language Programs. Findings from analysis are summed up by Table 3 and narrated here. Analysis revealed a discourse chain of supranational language management through the infusion of English into multiple discursive constructions of space, time, and people. This chain was bolstered through an emphasis on the one-way transfer of knowledge (from West to East), qualified access to programs, and consistently qualified constructions of local responsibility and ownership, leaving decision-making in the hands of supranational language managers. A second finding reveals a clear interest in the discourse: the discursive "re-scaling" of space by de-emphasizing national space, creating discursive distance from the U.S., and by rewording "American" as "international." Relatedly, we saw a familiar set of dichotomies in constructions of the responsibility of "international" versus "local" actors (or native vs. non-native teachers) (see also Holliday, 2005). Finally, we saw English discursively evolve in one document into *the* language of open society.

In the next chapter, I will map these discourse chains as they are reproduced, re-scripted, resisted, and/or transformed in the ELP discourses of local Soros Foundations, programs, schools, and projects in the transition countries of Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Table 3: *Discourse Chains Identified in the New York-Based OSI/SFN Discourse*

| Supranational Language Management ↓ | Discursive "Re-Scaling" of Space ↓ | Constructions of Local Actors ↓ | Constructions of "International" Actors ↓ | Constructions of English and ELT ↓ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| New York Management Discursively in Charge of ELP | Discursive Distance from National Space | ELP Target: Falk's (1994) "Citizen Pilgrims," i.e. Youth | American SPELT Teachers' Work Described Specifically | English Necessary for Work of Building Open Societies |
| Discursive Constructions of One-Way Transfer of Knowledge | Discursive Distance from United States | Missing: The En-Aged, Invisible, Inferior Other | American SPELT Teachers Described as Professional, Highly Qualified, Native Speakers | Discursive Ambiguity over whether English is "Foreign" |
| Consistently Qualified Constructions of Local Responsibility | "American" Re-Worded as "International" | Local SELP Teachers' Work Described Generically | American SPELT Teachers All-Pervasive: Present Everywhere and Almost Always | English for "Potentially" All Citizens of Open Society |
| Consistently Qualified Constructions of "Access" Leads to Discourse Chain of Exclusion | | Local SELP Teachers "Un-Professional," "Un- or Under-Qualified," Lacking Good Command of English | American SPELT Teachers Able to Intervene Personally and Professionally | English Necessary for Communication with World |
| Discursive Infusion of English into all Space, Time, and Potentially All People | | Local SELP Teachers Vulnerable to Personal and Professional Intervention | American SPELT Teachers Described as Bringers of Modern Methodology | |
| | | Local SELP Teachers Lacking "Modern" Methodology | The Ideal of the International and the West | |

CHAPTER FIVE:

ANALYSIS OF THE LOCAL WRITTEN DISCOURSES OF OSI/SFN-SUPPORTED

ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS

Chapter Four critically analyzed the English Language Programs (ELP) discourse of the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundation Network (OSI/SFN). Multiple findings emerged from that analysis. First, we learned that OSI/SFN's strategy of "systemic impact" becomes discursively operationalized as a form of supranational language management, whereby English—and the need for English and ELT—are discursively infused into potentially all places, all times, and all people. This is one way the OSI/SFN discourse constructs English as *the* language needed for the work of building open societies, if not the language of open society itself. Second, we learned that the ELP discourse consistently qualifies access to programs and the responsibility, project-ownership possibilities, and decision-making of local actors: Mainly, it is the New York ELP management who call the shots. Third, we learned that the ELP discourse reaches out to and targets temporal identities, particularly "youth" and the "future generations," a discursive move which aligns the work of OSI/SFN ELP with Falk's (1994) picture of the "citizen pilgrim" of future global civil citizenship. At the same time, as Reisigl and Wodak (2001) and Hansen (2006) help us understand, an out-group is created, one which, combined with qualified access to programs, reinforces a discourse chain of exclusion from the work of building open societies—those juxtaposed to "new," "young," and "professional." This "en-ageing" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) of actors ultimately creates an Other who is split between "superior" and "inferior" constructions (Hansen, 2006): young versus old, modern versus traditional, visible versus invisible, those raised under transition to democracies versus those raised under communism.

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This chapter maps these and related findings from Chapter Four as they are reproduced, re-scripted, re-contextualized, transformed, and/or resisted in the ELP discourses of current and former regional, national, and local Soros foundations, programs and projects throughout Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (CESEE-fSU). Specifically, this chapter will explore how particular discourse chains of meaning identified in Chapter Four flow into the ELP discourses of these foundations and projects in order to form stronger, more stabilized meanings, authority, and "knowledge." In the context of this study, understanding how the OSI/SFN ELP discourse from the New York office flows into, is reproduced, and/or changes in the ELP discourses of local Soros foundations, programs, and projects throughout the transition countries of CESEE-fSU will help us better understand the larger impact of English and English language aid projects on countries in transition, for such an understanding sheds light on how the language of policy and practice becomes reproduced, adapted, resisted and/or transformed, and for what purposes. It further helps us understand what ideological constructs become discursively embedded in English and the act of teaching English.

The corpus for this chapter includes ELP documents and texts which reference, are on, or are linked to web pages of regional, national, and local[29] Soros foundations or Soros-supported programs and projects of the transition countries of CESEE-fSU. In total, I found 64 ELP documents from 26 different countries. Given that the OSI/SFN English Language Programs ended officially in 2005, the corpus also includes web pages from ELP projects and programs which were started and/or at one time supported with OSI/SFN funding, but have since found other partners, ended, or become financially viable without OSI/SFN funding (such as multiple language schools throughout the OSI/SFN network which were launched with ELP money but

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[29] As explained earlier, I will refer to all of these as "local" discourses as a means of facilitating the writing process. "Regional, national, and local" became too cumbersome to repeat throughout. I will note distinctions as needed.

have since become self-supporting). Each of these documents explicitly acknowledges OSI/SFN's role in its early history. Document types include portable document format (pdf) files of annual reports, textbooks, teacher training materials, job announcements and descriptions; current and archived web pages of regional, national or local Soros foundations and projects; mission statements; project descriptions; student and teacher feedback; descriptions of curriculum and methodologies; course outlines, descriptions, and evaluations; donor maps; reflective writing; strategy documents; grant applications; brochures; biographies; web articles; and program and project histories. What all have in common are the following: They originate from programs and projects which were at one time start-ups and beneficiaries of OSI/SFN funding (between 1989-2005); they have an explicit English language component; and they were started and/or executed in one or more of the transition countries of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

I should add here: Given the breadth of my study and the limited funding and time with which to conduct it, I chose to gather my corpus for this chapter through exhaustive and intensive web searching. These same limits prohibit extensive analysis of the multiple contexts from which these documents originate and analysis of the various genres and text producers which contribute to this study. The corpus, however, as with the corpus for Chapter Four, continues to meet the criteria for textual selection for discourse analysis set out by Hansen (2006): These discourses clearly articulate identity and policy; they are widely available; and many have "formal authority to define a political position," even as "marginal NGO discourse[s]" (pp. 64-85; see also Chapter Two). Accordingly, as with Chapter Four, in my analysis I continue to assume that similarities between statements on local ELP web documents are potential indicators of discursive and ideological reproduction through the stabilization of

discourse chains. Conversely, differences between statements may be indicators of discursive

and ideological re-contextualization, transformation, and/or resistance, whereby discourse chains

weaken or break, utterly, whereby, that is, *meaning* is accepted, negotiated, or rejected.

The following research questions guided the analysis in this chapter:

1. How is the relationship between English language teaching and the building of open

   societies discursively constructed in current and former ELP discourses of local Soros

   foundations, programs, and projects throughout CESEE-fSU?

2. What other interests emerge in local ELP discourses, and how do these compare with

   interests identified in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse?

3. How do local ELP discourses construct the responsibilities of actors in these

   programs? How do these constructions compare with OSI/SFN ELP constructions of

   actors?

4. What *new* local discourses emerge around these programs, and how do they impact

   the OSI/SFN ELP discourse?

Reproduction and Transformation of OSI/SFN's Systemic Impact:

Discursive Responses to Supranational Language Management

In Chapter Four, I identified and then analyzed one clear interest of OSI/SFN ELP,

"systemic impact," which OSI/SFN defines as follows: "impact at a national level, and on a

national scale" ("Education Sub-Board," 1999); also, "influence on state (or region) policy or

practice," a way to launch changes in systems which re-channel "state resources toward the

intended goal [the building of open societies]," and "a significant increased capacity . . . to

design, initiate and implement positive change" (Iliff, n.d.).  From this analysis, I argue that

OSI/SFN's policy of "systemic impact," when applied to OSI/SFN ELP, becomes discursively

operationalized as a form of supranational language management. I quote again from Spolsky

(2009) for a simple but clear understanding of "language management":

> In studying language policy, we are usually trying to understand just what non-language
> variables co-vary with the language variables. There are also cases of direct efforts to
> manipulate the language situation. When a person or group directs such intervention, I
> call this language management. (Spolsky, 2009, p. 8)

Spolsky (2009) helps us understand just how the OSI/SFN ELP discourse reflects overt efforts

by language managers to "manipulate," "direct," and control language choices—in this case,

choices over which language to use in the various programs and projects put to work in the

forging of open societies. Fairclough (2006), too, in the larger context of language and

globalization, notes that "various groups of people [for instance, the actors of OSI/SFN] develop

strategies to try to regulate, direct and control elements of these real processes" (p. 28), including

language, which we saw clearly in Chapter Four. Here, again, is how OSI/SFN justifies its

English Language Programs, discourse which was analyzed at length in Chapter Four:

> English Language Programs (ELP) became a foundation program (in 1994) out of
> necessity, and, to this very day it has been run out of necessity. Very early on, the
> foundations realized that it was hard to foster programs directly related to building open
> societies if these programs—many of which necessarily included a significant
> international component—were accessible only to people who had a good command of
> English. Forging open societies relies to a considerable degree on the ability of educated
> local people to communicate successfully with the world beyond their most immediate
> state and/or regional boundaries. ("Strategy," 1999)

Subsequent analysis in Chapter Four revealed how the OSI/SFN ELP discourse creates space for

the infusion of English and English Language Teaching into multiple discursive constructions of

space, time and, potentially, all people, thus clearly controlling choices over which language

should be promoted, funded, and used during the work of building open societies. Many of the

ELP discourses found in local Soros Foundation programs and project documents reproduce this

potential for the infusion of English and ELT into all times, places, and people, hence extending

and strengthening a discourse chain central to this study. This is the first finding from this chapter.

*Reproduction of Discourses Related to Supranational Language Management*

Usefully, one report from OSI-Samara, Russia (2000) provides a visual depiction of various ELP activities and how they relate to other OSI programs and international organizations. This visual map concretizes systemic impact discursively operationalized as supranational language management, thus reproducing an OSI/SFN discourse chain, as the work and influence of ELP flows into and out of multiple discursive constructions of actors, projects, and space. The figure is titled, appropriately, "English Language Program Activities and its links with OSI programs and International Organizations" ("OSI-Samara," 2000). I include it as Figure 7 of this study.

Made visible in this figure are, first, the countless actors who are directly impacted by ELP: American SPELT teacher trainers; local university teachers, secondary school teachers, their colleagues, and students; actors involved in Educational Advising Centers worldwide; actors involved in English for Specific Purposes (teacher trainers, teachers, students; and, indirectly, all involved in the disciplines, industries and fields those specific purposes address); members of teachers' associations; and English language and other students on international scholarships. We also see actors who are perhaps less directly impacted by ELP: regional actors taking TOEFL or TWE; librarians and all whom they serve; anyone involved in local Departments of Education (local government officials, school administrators, teachers, parents, students); participants in distance education; developers of English language materials and curricula and users of the same; and future teacher trainers and trainer trainers.

BC - British Council
USIS - United States Information Service
ELP - English Language program
EAC - Educational Advising Center International Organizations
NLP - Network Library Program
ISTTI - In-service Teacher Training Institute OSI Programs
ACTR - American Council of Teachers of Russian
IREX - International Research and Exchange Board ELP Projects
ESP - English for Specific Purposes

- International Organization

- OSI Programs

- ELP Project

- ELP Activities

("OSI-Samara," 2000)

*Figure 7.* A visual map of "systemic impact" operationalized as supranational language management.

Figure 7 further shows some of the international organizations which ELP comes into

contact with in various forms and for various purposes: British Council, actors at work in In-

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Service Teacher Training Institutes, the American Council of Teachers of Russian, the International Research and Exchange Board, the former United States Information Service, and OSI itself, along with other OSI non-ELP programs which nevertheless have an English language component (Internet Centers, Megaproject Education, Network Library Program). It also begins to show some of the spaces into which the work of ELP—constructed as part of the mission of building open societies—becomes discursively infused: universities worldwide, secondary schools, Educational Advising Centers, libraries, testing centers, internet centers, and—eventually and potentially—other countries in which British Council and USIS may work. In short, the OSI-Samara (2000) discourse reproduces the infusion of English and ELT—through the various strands of ELP—into potentially *all* people and places worldwide, through the reproduction of a discourse chain of supranational language management.

*English in Support of Other Soros Foundation Projects and Programs: English for All?*

A more specific look at English in support of other local Soros foundation ELP projects and programs shows more precisely how the discourse chain of supranational language management is reproduced in ELP discourses throughout the transition countries of CESEE-fSU. Appendix C presents a table of the projects OSI/SFN ELP funded (and in some cases, continues to support to this day). To mention but a few, local OSI/SFN ELP addressed multiple groups and purposes: in Yugoslavia, English for Art Marketing/Management, English for NGOs, English for Journalists, and even programs as striking as "English for Albanian and Serbian Physicians and Nurses from Pristina," an example which attests to the needs and horrors of war *as well as*, perhaps, a way to bring Albanians and Serbs *together* for the common purpose of healing. In Macedonia, local OSI/SFN ELP created English for Public Attorneys, English for Judges, and English for Managers of Loss Making Enterprises, a unique program which provides a

fascinating glimpse into assumptions around the role of English as vital to progress, business, and profits. The Open Society Fund-Lithuania created dual Lithuanian/English resources which dealt with such topics as Smoking, Drugs, and AIDS. Multiple local Soros foundations started English programs for translators, librarians, doctors, and even veterinarians (in Mongolia).

Related indicators of discursive reproduction of supranational language management come from OSI-Croatia's "Community Spirit in Action" report (1999), which reproduces *exactly* a Soros quote analyzed in Chapter Four and found in italics below:

> ELP consists of two, at first sight independent, but in practice strongly intertwined programs: SPELT (Soros Professional English Language Teaching), line item, network program which provides the country with American Masters degree EFL specialists who bring modern teaching methodology to local schools at all levels, run teacher training workshops, courses for talented, badly-off students, and assist other foundation programs which need EFL/ ESP support, including, but not limited to debate, education or media, or, as Mr Soros has put it, to *provide support to "something else people want to do and need English for.*" ("Community," 1999; italics added)

Here, the exact reproduction of the Soros quote we read in Chapter Four, "something else people want to do and need English for," forcefully underlines and reproduces the larger process of supranational language management at work, as Soros' words are again used to discursively open up space for English and ELT to be deployed by anyone for almost any purpose.

*English for All Levels of Education, All Places, and Almost All Times*

The need for English and ELT becomes discursively infused into all these projects and programs, thereby reproducing a discourse chain of supranational language management. Further, as established in Chapter Four, the discourses of local foundations likewise infuse English and ELT into all levels of education, from pre-school to university and beyond. Here are a few examples of discourses from various websites and project reports to illustrate how ELP is infused into all levels of education:

Table 4: *Examples of English for All Levels of Education*

| Country and Organization | Levels of English |
|---|---|
| Tajikistan (UN-Tajikistan, 1998) | English for Primary School, Secondary School, University: "to improve English language teaching and learning in schools and universities through training, seminars, summer school;" to "create a new [English language] textbook for Grade 5" |
| Soros Yugoslavia Foundation (1994-1998) | English for Primary School, Secondary School, Rural Schools: "Expanding the network of participating primary and secondary-school teachers and focusing on outreach incentives and projects (far away from capitals)" |
| OSI-Macedonia (1997) | English for Children and Adolescents: "'English Courses for 39 Roma Children and Adolescents' from Kumanovo, Kriva Palanka and Delcevo" |
| OSI-Croatia (1999) | English for All Levels of Education+: ELP consists of . . . American Masters degree EFL specialists who bring modern teaching methodology to local schools *at all levels*, run teacher training workshops, courses for talented, badly-off students, and assist other foundation programs which need EFL/ ESP support, including, but not limited to debate, education or media, or, as Mr Soros has put it, to provide support to 'something else people want to do and need English for.' ("Community," 1999; italics added) |

Discourse from OSI-Croatia explaining its education programs' development strategy further infuses English both into and outside of "official institutions," in the process, constructing what the same report later refers to as "guerrilla education":

These [education] activities are to take place: a) within the official institutions of educational system, wherever possible. In principle, those are low-profile activities, such as I*EARN, scholarships, in-service teachers' education through expert associations (SELP) etc. b) through co-operation with independent institutions which, through their activities and with the help of their members, can make possible for certain ideas to enter schools in alternative ways (Croatian Debate Society, Youth Parliament, Step by Step - Parents' Association); c) through non-institutional education (independent media and

NGOs, like Education for Democracy); d) through independent educational institutions (independent schools, kindergartens), which can serve as pilot-institutions for developing and initializing changes in curricula, methods and organizational formation (School Improvement/Model Schools). This is particularly important if schools participate in pre-service and in-service teachers' education; e) through individuals and institutions which prepare the ground for a change on critically-theoretical and practical levels, by analyzing the existing and developing new curricula, models and methods (Alternative projects). . . These programs are generally implemented in schools / kindergartens / universities. ("Community," 1999)

Importantly, ELP is explicitly infused into multiple programs referenced above, including I*EARN, scholarships, SELP, debate, NGOs, the Croatian Debate Society, and the Model Schools project, to name just a few. In turn, ELP likewise becomes a part of OSI-Croatia's "guerrilla education" strategy (1999).

Additional discourse from OSI-Croatia's "Community Spirit in Action Report" (1999) further reproduces the infusion of English into various times (here, present and future) and differing discursive constructions of space: "The basic objective of ELP program is introducing creative, innovative and alternative language teaching, primarily through educating *present and future teachers* and providing methodical equipment and books" (italics added). This same report pushes for the broader diffusion of English spatially as it states "there are hardly any facilities outside of the capital where FL/EL teachers can get acquainted with latest teaching methodologies/materials." The report later articulates a part of its ELP mission as "to carry on with outreach projects – in-service training of FL teachers who teach in rural areas and small towns." Here, OSI-Croatia subtly critiques the British Council and highlights how OSI/SFN-funded ELP differs: "the presence of international organizations, such as the British Council, does not help sufficiently, since it runs only occasional workshops, mostly for the teachers in the capital" ("Community," 1999).

OSI-Croatia's emphasis on "rural areas and small towns" is another discourse fragment which both reproduces a policy of supranational language management through the spatial

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diffusion of English and ELT and echoes similar discourse fragments throughout the ELP discourses of CESEE-fSU, thus establishing key links in a discourse chain, one which subtly constructs the Other as needing to emulate the "Western Self" (Hansen, 2006). Fairclough (2006) reminds us of the implications: In reference to the "World Bank's Rural Education Project" in Romania, for instance, he notes how such projects provide resources, yes, but they also seek to change behaviors. In the end, Fairclough surmises, these projects disseminate "essentially Western ideas, practices, values, attitudes" (p.71). Hansen (2006) echoes this claim when she describes the frequent expectation in development discourses that closing the gap between the "Western Self" and the "developing Other" is best accomplished by "the developing Other's adoption of Western policies and advice" (p. 40). Accordingly, in these examples we see one particularly disturbing implication of a discourse chain of supranational language management—that of creating other English teachers throughout CESEE-fSU, including in the most remote areas, in "our" own images, assuming a Western, native-speaking "our."

As explained in Chapter Four, OSI/SFN's "Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond" (1999) provides the source discourse fragment for this emphasis on remote and rural as well as urban access to Soros-funded ELP:

> Soros Professional English Language Teaching (SPELT) provides the countries in the foundation network with Masters degree EFL specialists who are native speakers of English. They teach English at local schools at all levels and, perhaps more importantly, bring modern teaching methodology *not only to the capitals and major cities, but also to small far-off places.* ("Strategy," 1999; italics added)

The missionary-like construction of "small far-off places" in contrast with "capitals and major cities" and the need to infuse these places, too, with English and ELT, is reproduced throughout the ELP discourses of the countries of CESEE-fSU. A 1994 report from the Soros Yugoslavia Foundation describes its ELP work as follows:

The English Language Program was further strengthened and developed in following the long-term strategic focus on upgrading the overall EFL/ESL teaching in Yugoslavia. Expanding the network of participating primary and secondary-school teachers and *focusing on outreach incentives and projects (far away from capitals)* again proved to substantially contribute to both the quality of the program and promoting the Fund's mission. ("Soros Yugoslavia,"1994; italics added)

Similarly, the Romanian Soros Educational Center (SEC) places special emphasis on English for service workers in rural areas, as this project description shows: "Training of the labor force for the improvement of the quality of the services from hotels and restaurants from the *rural* area of Harghita county" ("Soros Educational," 2006). OSI-Samara, Russia (2000) describes the target of its English for Specific Purposes programs as "ESP teachers from *provincial* universities that participate in the Megaproject 'Education'" ( italics added), and it later forecasts its future work as "providing information in *remote parts of the region, making outreaches to smaller cities* (italics added)." Poland's Stefan Batory Foundation cites foreign language education among other projects as particularly key "in neglected areas and provincial Poland" (2001). The Soros Foundation-Mongolia (2001) funded several "Teacher Training Seminars for *Rural* English Language Teachers" (italics added). The Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan (1998), too, reported its 1998 achievements this way: "Monthly regional workshops with SPELT teachers were conducted in the following areas: Narin, Issyk-Kul, Talas, Jalal-Abad, Osh, Chui. These two-day workshops focused on bringing new, communicative methodology and techniques to primary and secondary school English teachers in *remote regions*" ("SF-Kyrgyzstan," 1998; italics added).

The frequent discursive emphasis placed on small, far-off, faraway, remote, rural, and provincial regions by multiple local Soros foundations and projects throughout CESEE-fSU demonstrates again how the need for English and ELT become infused into varying discursive constructions of space. Systemic impact, again, becomes discursively operationalized as a form

of supranational language management, and discourses operationalizing such management are reproduced and disseminated throughout the region. These discourses underline OSI/SFN-funded ELP's clear attempt at "closing the gap" between the "Western Self" and the "developing Other" (Hansen, 2006).

Just as the need for English and ELT are discursively infused into multiple projects and actors, educational levels (kindergarten through university), academic and career fields (English for Specific Purposes), and spatial constructions (inside and outside institutions; remote rural regions as well as cities), so also is supranational language management discursively perpetuated in discourses outlining *when* English Language Teaching is available. Chapter Four identified how American SPELT teachers were discursively constructed as available at almost all times: "that SPELT fellows need to engage in regular professional extra-curricular activities, i.e., week-end and summer teacher training workshops and seminars, so that a large number of local EFL teachers may benefit from SPELT" ("Strategy," 1999).

This need to make English and ELT available at almost all times (after school, on weekends, in summer) so that many EFL teachers and students may benefit is also discursively reproduced throughout multiple ELP programs and projects in CESEE-fSU. To name but a few: the Soros Foundation-Tajikistan offered English language summer school (1998); the Soros Yugoslavia Foundation (1998) "started a project of a series of weekend seminars for EFL/ESL teachers"; OSI-Samara, Russia (2000) reported that "a group of ESP teachers (approximately 60) from 21 provincial universities will be trained intensively at winter and summer sessions," and it also offered summer "mentoring" workshops for EFL teachers. OSI-Croatia (1999) emphasized the need for multiple ELP-related "extra-curricular [after school] activities"; International House (IH) Kyiv, Ukraine, is one of many institutions offering English language summer camps for

children, teens and adults. IH-Kyiv also offers a "Teacher Training/Teacher Development" course which is two weeks long, because "secondary school holidays in autumn, winter and spring are fourteen days" (2007). Soros International House-Vilnius, Lithuania, (2007) offered both summer school for children as well as "summer schools for language and teaching methods." The Open Society Foundation-Slovakia (2003) offered "Summer School of English for Doctors"; the Soros Foundation-Moldova (1998) offered "two summer courses for 40 English teachers"; the Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan (1998) offered "annual summer English language camp[s] for secondary and university English teachers." Further, and not surprisingly, all Soros-founded and initially funded language schools throughout CESEE-fSU offer evening, weekend, and summer English classes (for instance, see Syllabus School, Bosnia; IH-Kyiv, Ukraine; IH-Kharkiv, Ukraine; IH-Vilnius, Lithuania; IH-Tallinn, Estonia; and Lingua School, Kyrgyzstan).

Distance education and communication technologies are other areas where OSI/SFN's policy of "systemic impact" becomes reproduced, perpetuating once more a form of supranational language management as these technologies, too, infuse the need for English and ELT throughout the transition countries of CESEE-fSU. As examined in Chapter Four, in a description of its "Education Principles," OSI/SFN encourages among other things "distance education" and the "integration of technology into the curriculum" ("English Language Programs," 2007). In turn, OSI-Samara, Russia (2000) states that "distance learning will be used . . . to introduce modern technology," and "a distance learning course in English language teaching will be provided by P.R. Millrood." IH-Kyiv (2007) offers a distance DELTA (Diploma in English Language Teaching to Adults). SIH-Vilnius (2007) set up several "virtual conferences" to promote discussion on English and global identity and "the Impact of the Language Learning on Intercultural, Professional Levels of Adult Learners, including the

Socially Excluded" (more on these to follow). Similar workshops were set up in Timisoara, Romania, where students from countries across the region "shared experience in virtual communication" ("Soros International House-Vilnius," 2007). The Soros Yugoslavia Foundation (1998) likewise set up a "vocational virtual forum for exchanging EFL/ESL ideas, information, announcements, questions, advice, etc." In other words, the discourses of local Soros foundations and projects throughout the countries of CESEE-fSU infuse English and the need for ELT into virtual space, too, just as they infuse English and ELT into all potential actors, projects, levels of education, constructions of space, and constructions of time.

*Reproductions, Re-Scripts, and Discursive Re-appearance:*

*Access, Actors, and Responsibility*

Chapter Four contended that OSI/SFN ELP promotes a form of supranational language management through its policy of systemic impact. So far this chapter has identified multiple ways that the ELP discourses of local Soros foundations, programs, and projects reproduce this policy throughout the countries of CESEE-fSU. Chapter Four also identified, however, multiple moments of ambiguity and instability within the OSI/SFN discourse, moments which destabilize the meaning of various discourse fragments and hence weaken or obviate particular discourse chains. One such ambiguity which relates directly to supranational language management occurs with discourse around questions of "access": *which* actors, that is, have access to ELP—and hence access to the work of building open societies—throughout the Soros Foundations Network of the countries of CESEE-fSU. Questions around "access" further lead to questions around who ultimately has "responsibility" for local Soros foundation ELP programs and projects, which Chapter Four eventually determined resided with the New York Management of ELP.

As shown in Chapter Four, OSI/SFN ELP *always* constructs "access" in discursively qualified ways: "SELP and SPELT *endeavor* to provide access to their diverse projects" ("About This Initiative," 2007; italics added), as opposed to simply providing it; "young professionals and students have benefited from *efforts* to increase their access to materials" ("Strategy," 1999; italics added) as opposed to benefiting simply from access; OSI/SFN ELP programs have attempted to be "accessible to all segments of society *in as many regions of the country as possible*" ("Strategy," 1999; italics added),  as opposed to simply being "accessible to all segments of society." While such qualification and hedging may indicate a form of discursive pragmatism on the part of actors within OSI/SFN ELP headquarters, the fact that *every* mention of access is qualified consistently undermines the force of the promise of social inclusiveness.

Further complicating questions of access in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse are the generic constructions deployed: "SELP and SPELT endeavor to provide access to all segments of society" ("Strategy," 1999), a construction which, through metonymy (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), discursively levels the actors and identities who actually make up "all segments of society.  In the same way, OSI/SFN ELP present guidelines which aim to "make sure . . . that the program stay socially inclusive, i.e., accessible to all segments of society in as many regions of the country as possible" ("Strategy," 1999).  Further, and perhaps most obviously excluded from access to multiple OSI/SFN ELP programs, are the invisible actors juxtaposed to the young "citizen pilgrims" of Falk's (1994) global civil citizenship, those who have discursively "disappeared" (Hansen, 2006) in contrast to "the new generations of young professionals" ("Strategy," 1999) made visible over and over in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse: the generations raised under communism; the parents and grandparents of those "new generations of young professionals."

*Transforming Discourses of Access*

In a very perceptible about-face, in the ELP discourses of local Soros foundations,

programs, and projects, discourse fragments relating to access are significantly less qualified,

descriptions of actors for whom access is provided are more specific, and, in some cases, the

discourses themselves draw attention to complications with and questions around access.

Furthermore, generations raised under communism discursively *re-appear* throughout these ELP

discourses of access.

Romania's EuroEd Foundation, started in 1992 with support from the Soros Foundation

for Open Society and the British Council ("EuroEd," 2008), partners with and helps support one

project which spells out access as follows:

> VIVACE is a Lingua 1 Socrates project that aims to make language learning accessible to
> disadvantaged learners. VIVACE aims to increase confidence and self-esteem, improve
> social and communication skills and spread the message that "language learning is fun
> for everyone" to as many social and community providers as possible. At the same time,
> it also investigates ways in which the barriers of finance and attitude to providing these
> opportunities can be overcome. ("EuroEd," 2008)

In this description, EuroEd and VIVACE draw attention to and begin to counter one barrier to

access identified in Chapter Four: that tuition fees at Soros English/Foreign language schools

need to be "affordable to an average income family" ("Strategy," 1999), language which

excludes below average income families. EuroEd (2008) and the VIVACE project at least

explore ways to overcome "barriers of finance."

To clarify further whom access is for, the VIVACE project description makes explicit

issues of access:

> The VIVACE project brings opportunities for language learning to disadvantaged groups.
> Our understanding of disadvantage is broad and can vary from one culture to another. We
> have learned that disadvantage may be interpreted in a variety of ways in different
> cultures and may often be hidden. ("EuroEd," 2008)

The discourse producer here is astute and clear in acknowledging that "disadvantage" is context- and culture-specific and frequently "hidden." Thus the project draws on experience in order to identify just who might be disadvantaged:

> The VIVACE Project has worked with many different groups. Some learners may never have had the opportunity to learn a language, or may have had to abandon it because traditional classes do not cater for their needs. Others have started learning at school but have not felt confident enough to continue. Some learners' circumstances have changed, so they need a new approach which will cater for their current needs. ("Vivace," n.d.)

This description begins to articulate more specifically who, in particular, needs increased access to language learning.

Along with its work with VIVACE, Romania's EuroEd (2008) further promotes the importance of access—in the process, re-scripting the OSI/SFN discourse of access—through description of the goals of another project, its Centre for European Integration. One goal is, unequivocally, access:

> Through **local, regional, national and international projects**, the Centre works towards public, social, educational and cultural European policies to create new opportunities for a variety of target groups – education professionals, language learners, social workers, young people with disabilities, the elderly etc. The majority of the efforts concentrate around education and languages through Socrates and Leonardo da Vinci projects – eLanceNet (www.elancenet.org), eEuro Inclusion (www.eeuroinclusion.org) – but the team has also been focusing on the social inclusion of disadvantaged people (EU Access projects). ("EuroEd," 2008; bold in original)

Clearly at the forefront of creating access for disadvantaged groups, Romania's EuroEd (2008) describes the goals of one more ELP project, "Steps to the World," which works to help connect "children from orphanages together with children from standard families to develop their cognitive, affective and social potential for a better integration of the former in the community through the study of English" ("EuroEd," 2008). While English is still the "language variable" Spolsky (2009) describes as linking with the "non-language variable" of access, all the same, EuroEd (2008) is discursively unflinching in its discussions of access for disadvantaged groups.

The discourse of access is reproduced also in the Stefan Batory Foundation of Poland, established by Soros in 1988 ("Stefan Batory," 2001). Like the OSI/SFN ELP discourse, its website first articulates access quite broadly:

> For many years the Stefan Batory Foundation has remained the only non-governmental patron of ethnic minority education and culture and the leading promoter of culture on the local level: in neglected areas and provincial Poland, where it stimulated cultural life and worked toward equal access to culture. ("Stefan Batory," 2001)

A subsequent report from the Stefan Batory Foundation (2003) articulates more specific beneficiaries of its "Equal Opportunities" program when describing its "Day Care Centre-My Place Project": "art, theatre, music, and English language classes for disabled children and their peers." In a 2005 "Annual Report," the Stefan Batory Foundation spells out beneficiaries and access even more clearly, noting that it was "among the first to address women's issues, child abuse, palliative care, and the rights of ethnic minorities and the disabled" as a part of its grant-making activity, partly through, the report makes clear, training "teachers of foreign language instruction."

We see, then, that discourses of access are reproduced, specified, and explicitly complicated throughout local Soros Foundation ELP programs and projects across the countries of CESEE-fSU. As mentioned already, the Soros International House-Vilnius even organized a conference entitled "Impact of the Language Learning on Intercultural, Professional Levels of Adult Learners, *Including the Socially Excluded*" (2007; italics added). OSI-Croatia (1999), too, articulates the following goals of access:

> Equality in the right to education and its realization. This includes systematical, as well as individual help to all those who are deprived in a way that puts them in an unequal position in realizing the right to education that is in accordance with their needs and abilities. This aspect includes expert and financial support to institutions that provide education for disabled persons and minorities, as well as individual scholarships to talented individuals who have difficulties acquiring education due to the lack of money. ("Community," 1999)

Here, OSI-Croatia may be reproducing one finding from analysis of "access" in the OSI/SFN

ELP discourse—that of providing access especially for "talented individuals," but in this

instance there is no discursive en-ageing of actors. Further, "disabled persons and minorities" are

not only explicitly articulated as having the "right to education and its realization," but these

groups are even listed first, discursively fronted before "individual scholarships to talented

individuals" ("Community," 1999).

*Discursive Re-appearance of Actors*

One of the more compelling projects focusing on access is a project from the Open

Society Foundation-Slovakia (2005).  While the project does not specifically explain *how*

English is a part of its work, it is listed as an English Language Program project, and it is called

"Nobody is Missing." This title contrasts sharply and even poignantly with one assertion from

Chapter Four: that OSI/SFN's ELP discourse—in its construction of "citizen pilgrims" who are

young, professional, and working for the future—in the process discursively erases, omits, or

makes disappear generations brought up under communism. Hansen (2006) describes this

process as "discursive disappearance": when "identities articulated at one time might cease to be

important" (p. 44).  In the work of OSF-Slovakia, on the other hand, "Nobody is Missing" begins

to make visible again those invisible in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse. As the project report states,

> "Nobody is Missing" was designed for NGOs and public and local administration
> institutions cooperating with NGOs to improve access to education and increase the
> quality of education for marginalized groups.  The program aimed to contribute to
> overcoming the unequal position of marginalized groups through educational activities.
> (OSF-Slovakia, 2005)

To illustrate, "Nobody is Missing" funded the following projects with an ELP component:

"Roma Children Adopt Africa"; "Diverse World; Let's Sew Together – For Us, For You";

"Tutoring Roma Children"; "We Live Here Together"; "Establishing Roma Preschool Club";

"Chance for the Roma"; "Young Offenders Prison, Second Chance"; "Training School for Guide

Dogs, Me and My Four-Legged Eyes"; and "Marginalized and Disadvantaged Citizens and Electronic Information Media" (OSF-Slovakia, 2005). In this list of programs, the Open Society Fund-Slovakia specifies yet more groups for whom access to ELP is unqualified. These groups join others made visible throughout the ELP discourses of local Soros foundations, programs, and projects: "the visibly impaired," "young offenders," "the elderly," "orphans," "the disabled," to name but a few.

However, this is not to say that "youth" as the "future" and "citizen pilgrims" (Falk, 1994) of open societies are neglected by any means. Multiple ELP projects are discursively constructed for youth, including, for instance, OSI-Croatia's program called "The Bright Future," "which was carried out through three workshops: tambour group, informatics and English Language" ("Community," 1999). OSI-Croatia (1999) also offered English through its "Development of Creative Thinking" project, which sought to develop "children's creative thinking in early learning of English." International House-Kyiv, Ukraine, offers "English for Young Learners," which constructs English as "not just grammar and vocabulary drills – it is also a lot of fun!"; it further offers English language courses called "Wonderkids," "Grammar Booster," and "Drama Booster," the last of which is "designed for children aged 8-12, who would like to become young actors and actresses and perform in English on the IH stage" (IH-Kyiv, 2007).

Examples like these flourish throughout the ELP discourses of local Soros foundation programs and projects just as they did in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse. But additionally and importantly, people who do *not* belong to the "new generations," to the "youth," to "the bright future," to "the Wonderkids"—those in contrast—*re-appear* throughout these discourses, hence creating a new discourse chain of *in*clusion which resists the en-ageing (and particularly, the "en-

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youthing") of actors. For instance, the Soros International House-Vilnius created the English

course "Let's Learn Together: Children, Parents and Grandparents" (2007). SIH-Lithuania also

began "Life Long Learning Programs" and "Bridges to Cooperative Adult Learning," each of

which sought to get "different generations learning together"; it has further offered workshops on

"Adult Language Education" and sponsored "Adult Education Week" programs (2007). Other

projects which have again made visible identities absent in the OSI/SFN ELP discourses include

the Soros Yugoslavia Foundation's 1994 grant for the English language book "Primary Adults,"

an "English Language Course for Adult Refugees" offered by the Soros International House-

Tetovo, Macedonia (1996), a certificate in "English Language Teaching for Adults" offered by

IH-Kyiv, Ukraine (2007), and programs in "Adult Education" and "Life Long Learning" offered

through EuroEd's (2008) "Regional Centre for Education and Communication" ("EuroEd,"

2008).

But perhaps the most striking example of a "recovery" or re-appearance of a missing

identity comes from an English language teacher's book created by the Open Society Institute

Assistance Foundation-Azerbaijan (Rasulova, Aliyeva & Aliyeva, 2003). While this study has

been limited to discourse analysis of written and transcribed text, the following textbook cover of

"English 7" (2003) powerfully illustrates how local ELP projects have resisted the particular

discourse chain of "en-ageing" (or "en-youthing" actors) (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001):

(Rasulova, Aliyeva, & Aliyeva, 2003)

*Figure 8.* Textbook cover resisting the en-aging of actors.

Clearly the English teacher here comes from a generation raised under communism, yet she is portrayed as still productive, almost smiling, intent on the book, pencil in hand as she takes notes or marks a paper. Further, as this course is for "English 7," we can assume she is a more advanced teacher of English, just as she is somewhat advanced in years. The cover forcefully resurrects one face of those gone missing in what might be termed the "liberal" ELP discourse of OSI/SFN flowing into the post-Soviet borderlands, which, in line with Smith, Law, Wilson, Bohr, and Allworth (1998), may, through its en-ageing of actors (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), strive to break utterly with both Soviet and Tsarist history. Rather, we encounter here a counter-discourse to Smith et al.'s (1998) worry that identity in these regions is shaped as much by "politics of exclusion and division as it is by inclusion and co-existence" (p. 1). Instead, we find

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the converse: the *in*clusion of one kind of identity wholly absent in the discourse of OSI/SFN

ELP and hence excluded from the work of building open societies. The teacher's book brings

this teacher—and her generation—discursively, beautifully, back to life.

Just as the discourses of local Soros Foundation ELP programs and projects are much

more inclusive when it comes to age, so also do they attend to and include ethnic identities which

have historically been marginalized, most centrally, the Roma. The OSF-Slovakia (2003)

program "Nobody is Missing," like multiple other local Soros foundations, programs, and

projects with an ELP component, have placed particular emphasis on access to ELP (and hence

the work of building open societies) for the Roma of CESEE-fSU, as illustrated by programs

such as the "Roma Preschool Club" and "Chance for the Roma." Central European University

(2007), an English-medium university founded in 1991 with support from the Open Society

Institute, has created a "Roma Access Course," described as follows:

> This project . . . allows CEU to provide training for 16 young Roma for three consecutive
> years. The course includes English language teaching with a special emphasis on
> academic writing and discipline-specific tutoring in the students' field of choice.
> Managed by SPO [Special Projects Office], the program will provide the opportunity for
> many more Roma than at present to attempt competitive admittance to CEU—or to any
> other international post-graduate university—on equal terms with CEU's other
> exceptional candidates. ("Roma Access," 2007)

Granted, the discourse here is somewhat qualified: the program offers "many more Roma than at

present to *attempt* competitive admittance . . . on equal terms with CEU's other exceptional

candidates" (italics added). However, CEU also offers full scholarships for a "*preparatory*

course for promising young Roma from Central and Eastern Europe" ("Roma Access," 2007;

italics added), which cover housing, travel, tuition, and living expenses. Similarly, OSF-Slovakia

(2003) offers a "Summer School of English for Roma," in order to "enable Roma activists and

representatives of partner NGOs actively working on Roma issues and programs for the Roma,

to improve their proficiency in the English language." Again, the local ELP discourses of this

and other programs and projects across the Soros Foundations Network frequently specify who, in particular, is allowed access to ELP, and ultimately the discourses dramatically increase the possible number of participants who can work to build open societies.

*Reproducing, Re-Scripting, and Reclaiming Responsibility*

Local ELP discourses of access ultimately expand on *who* can participate in the work of building open societies through discursive specification and discursive re-appearance. So, too, do the ELP discourses re-script and often re-claim local responsibility for and ownership of these programs and projects. This finding re-writes one key finding from Chapter Four: that the OSI/SFN ELP discourse consistently constrains, qualifies or closes space for local actors to take responsibility for ELP in their own countries. In the OSI/SFN ELP discourse, almost without exception, local actors are constructed as "patients" rather than "agents" and subject to a one-way transfer of knowledge and skills from the New York office to the local foundations throughout the countries of CESEE-fSU. In this next section, I map the reproduction of established discourse chains along with a new discourse chain of local responsibility—one which, along with greater access to ELP and the discursive re-appearance of identities missing in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse—quietly but decisively confronts OSI/SFN ELP's implicit discourse chain of *ex*clusion. Specifically, I analyze discursive constructions related to responsibility as identified in Chapter Four: the need for mutual or two-way exchange; project ownership; actors as experts or specialists; and the ideal of the native English speaker.

The first discursive re-scripting if not transformation of responsibility comes from the Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan's "English Language Project Description" ("Annex," 1997). SF-Kazakhstan's ELP discourse discusses the relationship between the building of open societies, English, and ELT in a way that, similar to OSI-Croatia, highlights how SF-Kazakhstan differs

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from the British Council (BC)—through the creation of "a platform for *cross*-cultural development through English language training" (italics added) ("Annex," 1997). The constructs of "cross"- and "inter"-cultural development speak, I argue, to the larger issue of responsibility (Hansen, 2006) and agency.

In the Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan's "English Language Project Description," "cross-cultural" development is what sets SF-Kazakhstan apart from the British Council (BC) ("Annex," 1997):

> BC wanted to deliver intensive, high-quality, focused English language courses to priority groups and to improve the standards of English language and teaching through British certified courses for 60 key individuals in teaching. SFK aimed to create a platform for cross-cultural development through English language training and to promote the development of open society through English language training. ("Annex," 1997)

The new term introduced here—and the feature which the Soros Foundation-Kazakhstan constructs as distinguishing itself (curiously and importantly) from the British Council—"a platform of *cross*-cultural development through English language training" (italics added)— along with the reproduction of the discourse pattern promoting "the development of open society through English language training," exemplify how the local ELP discourse both reproduces and re-scripts the relationship between ELT and the building of open societies. The discourse chain relating ELT to open society building is perpetuated and strengthened again, but SF-Kazakhstan adds the discourse fragment "cross-cultural development" into the mix, and it does so twice: not only in its ELP project overview, but also in the last of its stated ELP goals: "to increase the access and information flow with other countries and cultures for the citizens of Kazakhstan" ("Annex," 1997). This discourse fragment opens space for, I posit, mutual exchange rather than a one way transfer of knowledge from, for instance, SPELT "expert" to local "novice." We can thus identify one link in a new discourse chain reproduced or constructed in similar form

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throughout the ELP discourses of local Soros foundations, schools and projects: a discourse chain articulating the need for information flows into and *out of* the various countries.

Further evidencing this new discourse chain of mutual exchange, OSI-Croatia (1999) describes its English language program as a program with "strong cross-cultural underpinnings," and it describes SPELT "as a cross-cultural program," language which clearly carves out space for two-way exchange. The Open Society Fund-Lithuania provides English language students scholarships in order to "acquire experience of contact with other cultures" as well as "to learn to represent *their* country" (1997, italics added), again discursively encouraging a take *and give* of culture through language. The Soros Foundation-Moldova offered an "*Intercultural* High School Exchange Program" for a number of years with the goal of improving "English language skills and cultural awareness" as well as *exchanging* "ideas with peers and adults, thus forming friendships that cross national and cultural boundaries" (2000). Romania's EuroEd Foundation promotes "Travel and Cultural Exchange" through a program for elementary children called "EAT (Eating Abroad Together)," which focuses on "the acquisition of language and the exchange of cultural experience" (2008). Even Shanklin (2000), a SPELT teacher trainer working with OSI-Samara, reports on discussions with teachers which "showed mutual exchange and regard," an example which demonstrates how programs as actualized on the ground by specific actors may differ dramatically from programs as operationalized in discourse.

What is most important here, however, is that in each of these cases, the discursive emphasis on *two-way* exchange creates space for—and constructs—participants from these various countries as having something equally important to offer in the relationships built during ELP and the building of open societies. In so doing, this discursive pattern subtly suggests one step toward countering how, as discussed in Chapter Four, OSI/SFN ELP—the priorities of

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which were established by the New York office—consistently closed discursive space for local responsibility. The local foundations and programs mentioned above "talk back" subtly in a new discourse chain of English as a pathway to *cross-* and *inter*cultural development, words never mentioned in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse.

In other ways, too, the discourses of actors and text producers in foundations and programs across the countries of the CESEE-fSU reproduce, re-contextualize, and even openly resist OSI/SFN ELP discourses which relate to larger issues of responsibility (Hansen, 2006) and agency, especially as responsibility relates to the constructs of "project ownership," "experts," and the ideal of "native speakers of English." The ELP discourse of OSI/SFN, recall, discursively retains careful ownership of programs through repetitions of the pronoun "our" ("*our* programs' stakeholders"; "*our* projects to be taken over") ("Strategy," 1999; italics added); through the pronoun "we" and the use of modal verbs ("*we* have developed projects over which local people *may* claim ownership") ("Strategy," 1999; italics added), which reinforces an us/them division; and through the following very explicit claim to ownership:

> That the NY management of ELP should provide professional guidance and oversight of the program development, monitor its cost-effectiveness, set the standards for the program's ongoing evaluation (evaluation was defined as a tool for program improvement), develop the program's exit strategy targeting impact (rather than just the intrinsic value of projects) and sustainability of ELP projects, make sure that the program continuously supports the general mission of OSI/Soros Foundations (primarily in that the program stay socially inclusive, i.e., accessible to all segments of society in as many regions of the country as possible.) ("Strategy," 1999)

OSI/SFN ELP further constructs its SPELT (Soros *Professional* English Language Teaching; italics added) teachers as "highly qualified," "EFL specialists," "professional," "bringers of modern methodology," and desirable as they were "native speakers of English," thus perpetuating the "myth" and discourse chain of the superiority of the native speaker English "expert" teacher (see Holliday, 2005; Medgyes, 1994; Phillipson, 1992). Concurrently, the

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OSI/SFN ELP discourse consistently constructs local SELP teachers throughout the CESEE-fSU as "unqualified," as "struggling with the lack of resources and often mired in an inflexible curriculum," as needing to "become motivated to secure the future of [ELP] projects," as dependent upon "foreign expertise" ("Strategy," 1999) and thus needing to change in the image of the "Western Self" (Hansen, 2006).

Unmistakably, the discourse chain of the myth and desirability of the "native speaker of English" *is* strongly reproduced throughout the local ELP discourses of the CESEE-fSU. OSI-Croatia ("Community," 1999) discursively regrets that "there are not any native English language advisors in state schools," while a Romanian (2000) ELP report writer takes pains to note that "the Director of Studies . . . *is* a native speaker" (italics added), and he "can attest to the quality of these classes" (Doebel, 2000).  International House-Lviv, Ukraine (2008) assures visitors to its website that its "Conversational Booster" course is taught by native speakers, and the Mongolian Foundation for Open Society (2001) discursively lauds one of its achievements as the fact that the "EL [English Language] program also placed professional English native speakers [through SPELT] to work with teachers at key institutions on methodology and curricula." These are just a few of multiple discourses reproducing a very strong discourse chain: the desirability of the native English speaker.

In other cases, too, the ELP discourses reproduce discursive constructions of SPELT teachers as "experts" and "specialists," such as in the Soros Yugoslavia Foundation's 1998 "Annual Report," where "SPELT experts took part in numerous extra-curricular activities engaged through the fund, the Montenegrin Ministry of Education or the Agency for International Cooperation." This same report discusses the work of Mark Trotter, "a SPELT fellow" and "EFL specialist in teaching general English and ESP courses to university students"

("SYF-Annual Report," 1998). OSI-Croatia (1999) constructs SPELT teachers as "American Masters Degree EFL specialists," reproducing again a familiar construction from the OSI-SFN ELP discourse, though at the same time specifying "American" versus "International," a lexical choice which reminds us that not all countries are willing to equate and interchange the two terms as easily as the OSI/SFN ELP discourse so clearly did.

In spite of some discursive reproductions, also present in the ELP discourses of local foundations are discourses which "talk back" or resist how the actors in these programs are constructed in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse. In the process, regional, national, and local actors reclaim ownership, agency and expertise for themselves, in spite of the fact that they may not be "native speakers of English" or an "American Masters degree EFL Specialist." Hence, they reinforce a new discourse chain of local responsibility.

To illustrate, a Romania ELP report (Doebel, 2000) finds a need for improving "the selection and training of collaborating foreign experts," as the presence of SPELT led to "occasional incompatibilities which seem to have been more of a cultural than personal nature." As recourse, the report requested "the inclusion of local people in the selection committee" (Doebel, 2000).[30] The Soros International House-Tetovo, Macedonia, in reference to SPELT, reports the program as "having had all kinds of difficulties with teachers" ("SIH-Tetovo," 1996). These difficulties, too, were ascribed to "all the cultural and other differences," though eventually, in most cases, the report states, these difficulties were "overcome" ("SIH-Tetovo," 1996).

More positively, Shanklin (2000), in his SPELT mentoring report of an OSI-Samara teacher development group, openly acknowledges how he learned in a one-to-one setting about

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[30] While working in Afghanistan, I was likewise asked by my Afghan colleagues about why they had no say in the hiring process of L1 English teachers.

each Russian English teacher's "experience and expertise." Of even greater interest, IH-Minsk states the following: "We are happy and proud to have a team of creative and highly qualified teachers with a high-level of expertise and in-depth knowledge of teaching approaches. Both the native and non-native teachers of our school remain on the cutting edge of their profession" (2007). Here the discourse clearly resists a "native-speaker-only-expert" approach: Byelorussian teachers are discursively constructed as no more or no less qualified than those from the U.S., Canada, Australia, or Great Britain.

OSI-Croatia (1999) further highlights the expertise of its Croatian teachers this way: "The second step [of its English Language Programs Evaluation] will include teams of experts from HUPE [the Croatian Association of Teachers of English], the British Council, ELP – OSI Croatia, Faculty of Philosophy and TTs or TFs [Teacher Trainers or Teaching Faculty]" ("Community," 1999). Plainly here, the Croatian teachers and teacher trainers are discursively constructed as "experts" easily on par with OSI-Croatia and the British Council. They are even first on the list of "experts" needed to evaluate ELP's progress in Croatia. The Open Society Georgia Foundation also reclaims agency and responsibility in the following statement: that it "supported Georgian English language specialists to work with Georgian computer specialists to develop original computer assisted language learning programs" (1995). OSI-Samara (2000) describes its English for Specific Purposes programs as including "experts from the leading Moscow and St. Petersburg universities." Similarly, two Slovak doctors who were "experts on English medical terminology" helped lead an "English for Doctors" course (OSF-Slovakia, 2003). These discourses resist the ideology that only native English speakers are English specialists or experts "on the cutting edge of their profession" (IH-Minsk, 2007).

Regarding "project ownership," OSI-Croatia (1999) is discursively quite direct in its statement that an "in-system" approach to ELP and other educational programs will ensure that "institutions of educational system continue with their activities, taking over the curricula of the initiating programs [such as ELP] *as their own*" (italics added). OSI-Croatia is further adamant in creating "ESP materials that best suit *our* needs," another discursive move highlighting project ownership and context-appropriacy as OSI-Croatia appropriates the pronoun "our." International House-Kyiv, initially founded as a Soros foreign language school, now includes proudly the pronoun "our" throughout its discourse, as in this example: "you may choose to have classes in your office or in *our* school" (2007). Indeed, the pronouns "our" and "we" proliferate throughout the local ELP discourses of the countries of CESEE-fSU, hence again showing how local ELP participants discursively claim or re-claim ownership over projects, usually with fervor, and in the process, reclaim responsibility and agency. In this way, a new discourse chain of local responsibility and local expertise takes hold and is reproduced throughout the local ELP discourses of Soros foundations, programs, and projects.

*Re-Contextualization and Transformation of Supranational Language Management:*

*Linguistic Diversity*

Thus far we have seen multiple discursive patterns and discourse fragments reproduced throughout the ELP discourses of local Soros foundation programs and projects, all of which have contributed to the strengthening of a discourse chain which, in turn, reproduces and perpetuates a form of supranational language management. English and the need for ELT continue to be infused into multiple discursive constructions of actors, spaces, and times. Further, the discourses of access are not only reproduced, but beneficiaries are also specified— spelled out in much more detail, hence individualizing and making visible again identities which

the discourse of OSI/SFN ELP leveled through genericization (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001): "All segments of society" now become the disabled, orphans, Roma children and mothers, the poor, the visually impaired, adults and the elderly, young offenders, minorities. English and the need for English are discursively infused into these groups, too. Further, we see actors involved in local ELP programs reclaiming responsibility through discursively constructing the need for two-way exchange, claiming project ownership, and constructing themselves as experts and specialists alongside native speakers and SPELT teachers.

Another way the discourses of local Soros foundations, programs, and projects differ from the OSI/SFN ELP discourse, and quite dramatically, is that they transform systemic impact—discursively operationalized as a form of supranational language management—to include *multiple languages in addition to English*. In so doing, they create a new discourse chain of linguistic diversity.

Chapter Four explored how the OSI/SFN ELP discourse made some allusions to languages beyond English: there are multiple mentions of "English/foreign language schools," for instance, but the slash or virgule raises the question of whether English *and* foreign languages are taught at such schools (English hence not being foreign, at least from the text producer's points of view) or whether English *as* a foreign language school was the intended understanding. The meaning is ambiguous and unstable. Additional text mentions "foreign–language courses for young learners . . . and courses of local languages" ("Strategy," 1999), but without specification of those languages. Elsewhere, OSI/SFN ELP mentions collaborations with "French, German, Italian and Spanish embassies and cultural centers (introduction of foreign languages other than English)" ("Strategy," 1999), but significantly (Fairclough, 1992), here and throughout the OSI/SFN ELP discourse, English is distinct from—and fronted before—other commonly taught

foreign languages. Moreover, the OSI/SFN ELP discourse articulates how it has influenced not only English language teaching, but also "the modernization of foreign language curricula, teaching materials and methodology within state education" ("Strategy," 1999). Clearly, if implicitly, English is consistently constructed as *the* language of open society, and the methods and materials developed for teaching English are constructed as able to "modernize" the teaching of other foreign languages, regardless of context and goals.

Throughout the countries of CESEE-fSU, on the other hand, from schools, programs, and projects initially launched and supported by OSI/SFN *English* Language Programs, the teaching of and projects related to *other* languages have proliferated profoundly, hence both re-contextualizing and transforming the discourse of English language teaching and the form of supranational language management OSI/SFN ELP discursively perpetuated. Thus begins a new discourse chain: that of linguistic diversity. Appendix D shows how language projects and the teaching of other languages have rapidly spread throughout the countries of CESEE-fSU, in large part due to OSI/SFN ELP. In other words, the teaching of English through OSI/SFN has led to the teaching of multiple languages.

From the group of projects and languages discussed in Appendix D, several exemplar projects promoting linguistic diversity deserve particular mention. The first is the European Language Portfolio, supported by Socrates Lingua 1, one of a number of EU linguistic diversity projects ("Socrates," 2006). Romania's EuroEd Foundation (2008), first launched in 1992 with support from the Soros Foundation for Open Society and the British Council, states the goals of the European Language Portfolio as follows: "To contribute to the promotion of language learning among adults from various social and professional groups through the use of the ELP

[European Language Portfolio]; to enhance opportunities for social integration and professional development through language learning" ("EuroEd," 2008).

While this particular project addresses language learning broadly, other EuroEd partner projects focus specifically on linguistic diversity. EuroEd and International House-Tallinn, Estonia, along with other partners, collaborate to support the "eEuroInclusion" project. Its main goals address "Less Widely Used Less Taught" (LWULT) languages and are stated below:

> To raise public awareness of the importance of learning the languages of the partner countries by facilitating free access to information and opportunities for LWULT language teaching and learning; To bring the language resource centres involved in LWULT language teaching together in a pan-European virtual network fostering communication and cooperation. ("EuroEd," 2008)

The goal of a third project which EuroEd supports, "Funny, Easy and Effective Learning About Countries, Cultures and Languages," most concisely sums up the larger goal of linguistic diversity: It seeks to "promote EU languages and cultures" through language festivals and the spread of its materials "in all languages of the project" ("EuroEd," 2008). A similar project organized by EuroEd (2008) and targeting children throughout Europe is "chain stories," which "wants to improve the motivation rates towards the knowledge of the LWULT languages, inside the same linguistic family, through . . . the form of a chain story." The larger goal of this project, EuroEd's website states, is "children's awareness of the multilingual and cultural wealth of the European Union" ("EuroEd," 2008). Of one note here, the discourse of EuroEd, as the name suggests, emphasizes *European* languages, which raises questions about *non*-European languages. In this case of promoting linguistic diversity, we find an Othering of *languages* rather than people.

One more project supporting linguistic diversity is offered through FocusEd, "an association of educational institutions throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia" ("FocusEd," 2006). Like EuroEd, FocusEd was also launched with a start-up grant from OSI/SFN and

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influenced profoundly by OSI/SFN ELP, which continues to support it to this day ("FocusEd," 2006). It, too, is registered in Romania, though other members include schools in Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine, Belarus, and Mongolia, thus (unlike EuroEd) discursively expanding the promotion of linguistic diversity far beyond the borders of the European Union ("FocusEd," 2006). At the same time, FocusEd operationalizes the promotion of linguistic diversity through its "TALLER Certificate Project," a program in "Teaching and Learning LWULT Languages in *Europe*" which draws upon the "best practices and expertise developed in the teaching and training of more commonly taught languages" ("FocusEd," 2006). One could question the role of, say, Mongolian in a European project, which may suggest the role of language in discursively re-scaling space (Fairclough, 2006). That question aside, the TALLER certificate draws upon practices developed by "more commonly taught language*s*" *plural*, and not just English. English is not even mentioned.

One language in particular which Soros foundations, programs, and projects throughout the countries of CESEE-fSU have worked to promote and protect is Romany, the language of the Roma. The Soros Yugoslavia Foundation (Soros Yugoslavia, 1994; Soros Yugoslavia,1998) underlines the importance this way:

> Bearing in mind the particularly difficult situation of the Roma population and escaping from all forms of the segregation the Fund has widely continued in supporting various initiatives coming from the Roma organizations as well as projects dedicated to Roma or addressing problems concerning Roma through its programs. Following this philosophy of addressing the Roma issues, the Fund's Media Program supported both print and electronic media, in the Romany language or intended for the Roma.

Later text from SYF ("Soros Yugoslavia," 1994; "Soros Yugoslavia," 1998) outlines other specific projects intended to preserve "Roma culture, tradition and language," including "collecting Roma oral literacy, publishing of traditional Roma poems, establishing of the first puppet theater for children in Roma language." Equally important, the report states, "As Romany

language became a language that the Roma children can learn in primary schools, Roma teachers and lecturers were trained" ("Soros Yugoslavia," 1994; "Soros Yugoslavia," 1998). Romania's EuroEd Foundation and Soros Educational Center, too, contribute to a project called "EducaRom," the goal of which is "promoting integration of EU Roma population, their language and culture" through the identification of "learning materials for Roma language and culture" ("EuroEd," 2008). In addition, OSI-Macedonia (1997) supported a "Media" project in minority languages, part of which included a workshop "set up for young Romas involved in news production in the Roma language" ("OSI-Macedonia Annual Report," 1997).

While discursive promotion of linguistic diversity throughout the local discourses of Soros-launched and supported Foundations, programs, and projects suggest a dramatic transformation of or resistance to the discourse chain of "English" as *the* language of open society, one more subtle transformation should also be mentioned here, as it points to how a simple re-scripting of discourse—the addition of one word—can potentially have dramatic social consequences. OSI-Croatia's ELP discourse almost exactly reproduces the OSI/SFN ELP discourse, which states its goals thus: "To upgrade English language learning and teaching so that new generations of young professionals, and educated people in general, will not need additional foreign language training once they complete their education" ("Strategy," 1999). Compare this sentence with how the OSI-Croatia ELP discourse states *its* goals: "The final goal and the exit strategy is to upgrade English learning and teaching so that new generations of young professionals, and educated people in general, will not need *extensive* additional foreign language training once they complete their education" ("Community," 1999; italics added). The OSI-Croatia ELP discourse reproduces exactly the discourse fragments "new generations of young professionals" and "educated people in general," perpetuating the en-ageing of actors

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(Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), the construction of "citizen pilgrims" (Falk, 1994) and the discursive presupposition that "educated people in general" speak English. Where OSI-Croatia *departs* from and re-scripts the OSI/SFN ELP discourse, however, and crucially, is in its addition of one word, "extensive," to the goal: "will not need *extensive* additional foreign language training once they complete their education" ("Community," 1999). In this way, the OSI-Croatian ELP discourse creates space for training and education in *additional* foreign languages—not just English—thus discursively perpetuating, if subtly, the discourse chain of linguistic diversity. Simultaneously, OSI-Croatia's discourse broadens the picture of just *who* might contribute to building open societies.

In short, the English Language Programs of OSI/SFN have helped lead, directly and indirectly, dramatically and subtly, to a new discourse chain: the need for and presence of a *proliferation* of languages being taught and promoted throughout CESEE-fSU. In the final analysis, local Soros Foundations and ELP programs and projects have re-contextualized, re-scripted and transformed language teaching such that it contributes to the promotion of linguistic diversity throughout the countries of CESEE-fSU.

The Role of English and English Language Teaching in the Building of Open Societies:

A Comparative Look at Interests, Ideologies, and Implications

In Chapter Four, I explored and analyzed how discursive constructions of the role of English and ELT in the building of open societies evolve quite dramatically in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse. In this section, I will first reiterate key findings from that analysis in order to highlight subsequent reproductions, adaptations, and transformations if not resistance between the ELP discourse of OSI/SFN and the ELP discourses of local Soros foundations, programs, and projects throughout the countries of CESEE-fSU.

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The first mention of the role of English in the building of open societies in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse is found as an explanation of the ELP initiative, which reads this way: "The English Language Programs were designed to help prepare individuals and groups for a world in which English has increasingly become a necessary language for international communication in professional and academic fields" ("Past and Spin-Off," 2007). The need for English here, though still broadly constructed, has some discursive constraints: English is constructed as "a necessary language for *international communication in professional and academic fields*" ("Past and Spin-Off," 2007).

Compare this statement on the role of English in the world with the next instantiation, which appears as the first paragraph in the document "Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond" (1999):

> English Language Programs (ELP) became a foundation program (in 1994) out of necessity, and to this very day it has been run out of necessity. Very early on, the foundations realized that it was hard to foster programs directly related to building open societies if these programs—many of which necessarily included a significant international component—were accessible only to people who had a good command of English. Forging open societies relies to a considerable degree on the ability of educated local people to communicate successfully with the world beyond their most immediate state and/or regional boundaries. ("Strategy," 1999)

What we find out here, though through very convoluted syntax, is the following: "Forging open societies relies to a considerable degree on the ability of educated local people to communicate successfully with the world beyond their most immediate state and/or regional boundaries" (OSI "Strategy," 1999). Re-structured and re-stated, that sentence and its many discursive presuppositions can be understood this way:

1. "To communicate successfully with the world" requires English; English is reworded, that is, to mean *successful* communication;

2. "The world [and its people, metonymically erased by "world"] beyond [one's] most immediate state and/or regional boundaries" speaks English;

3. "Educated local people" need English "to communicate successfully with that world [those people], a construction which raises questions about "*un*"-educated local people;

4. The work of "forging open societies" depends upon "educated local people" and their ability to speak English; and

5. "Forging open societies" depends upon English.

The presuppositions here are startling. Further, we find that while the first discursive instantiation of the role of English in the world limited that role to "international communication in professional and academic fields," in the second instance in the same document, we find those constraints discursively leveled; instead, English has become the "necessary" work of "forging open societies" since "many" of the programs working to build open societies "necessarily included a significant international component" (OSI "Strategy," 1999). In other words, English is now constructed, though implicitly, as *the* language (not "a," as in the first quote) for "international" communication, with the constraints of "professional and academic fields" now discursively leveled. It is certainly significant, too, that the English-speaking world is constructed as "the world beyond their most immediate state and/or regional boundaries" ("Strategy, 1999): English, that is, is constructed as cutting across government, national, and regional boundaries, just as earlier discourse infused English into all possible understandings of place and space, particularly through OSI/SFN's broad constructions of region: from internal province to whole super-continents.

There is a third place in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse worth reiterating which discusses the role of English in the world, also in the "Strategy for the Year 2000 and Beyond" (1999), under the heading "Mission" and just a few paragraphs down from the previous quote:

> The mission of OSI/Soros English Language Programs is to promote English language learning and teaching in the countries of the foundation network, because a good command of English is necessary for international communication which is critical to building open societies. ("Strategy," 1999)

Significantly, prior examples of qualification and hedging are now entirely absent: "a good command of English *is* necessary for international communication which *is* critical to building open societies" ("Strategy," 1999; italics added). No modal verbs or discursive constraints limit the necessity of English here; the assertion has evolved from a qualified and limited argument about the role of English in the world and building open societies to a hands-down categorical assertion of the same—with no room for alternatives. Absent are phrases like "to a considerable degree" and "many of which [programs]"; it *is*, it *is*, and it *is* even more so with that final defining/restrictive relative clause "which is critical" ("Strategy," 1999). Now *all* programs, it seems, require "international communication," which, the discourse states, necessitates "a good command of English." I would even posit that the choice of the word "critical" carries with it both the indispensability of English along with the risk of international crisis ("critical," n.d.): Without "international communication," without English, the work of forging open societies may well be in crisis. So too would the security and safety of those societies be at risk of crisis. OSI/SFN ELP constructs English then, if implicitly, as a force working against the risk of closed, tribal, primitive, insurgent societies. "English" becomes discursively entified, along with the subsequent actions explicitly and implicitly coded within it: "international communication" and "building open societies"; "successful communication"; security.

*Discursive Constructions of the Role of English and ELT in the Building of Open Societies*

*in the ELP Discourses of Local Soros Foundations, Programs, and Projects*

In order to begin to understand how local Soros Foundations, programs, and projects

discursively construct the relationship between English, ELT, and the building of open societies,

it will be helpful to review OSI/SFN's definition of "open society":

> An open society is a society based on the recognition that nobody has a monopoly on the truth, that different people have different views and interests, and that there is a need for institutions to protect the rights of all people to allow them to live together in peace. Broadly speaking, an open society is characterized by a reliance on the rule of law, the existence of a democratically elected government, a diverse and vigorous civil society, and respect for minorities and minority opinions. ("About Us: FAQs," 2005)

From the discourse of this definition we shall see multiple ways in which Soros-funded ELP

projects throughout the countries of CESEE-fSU discursively reproduce—at least in part—the

relationship between English, ELT and the building of open societies. We further encounter in

the various discourses discursive patterns which re-script slightly—and at times transform—the

role of English in building open societies.

*English, Open Society, and Local, Regional, and National Interests*

This section begins by exploring the discursive links between English, open society, and

local interests as they are constructed in the ELP discourses throughout the countries of CESEE-

fSU. The first of these foundations acknowledges the dual mission of ELP and forging open

societies quite openly. At the same time, the ELP discourse combines OSI/SFN ELP's interests

with interests of its own.

Romania's Soros Educational Center states its mission as follows: "The mission of the

Soros Educational Center [SEC] Foundation is to promote open society and develop the region

via education-related projects" (2006). Text following shortly thereafter on the website states:

> Between 1996-1998 the Center worked as a satellite branch of the Soros Foundation for an Open Society (Cluj) and its main activities were teaching English and German

languages, IT and general management.  In December 1998 the center became a separate foundation and expanded its portfolio with other educational offers depending on the local and regional needs of the community. ("Soros Educational," 2006)

Here we see the work of SEC (including English) as "promoting" open society, if not "forging" it, and the "educated-related projects" at work in such promotion, the discourse makes clear, historically began with "teaching English and German languages." The discourse chain linking English and open society in a form of supranational language management is again reproduced and reinforced. At the same time, the mission statement discursively conjoins its two main tasks with the key word "and": "to promote open society *and* develop the region," discourse which coordinates the two tasks as separate if equal (Fairclough, 1992b).  Similarly, in the subsequent web text, once SEC became a separate foundation (in 1998), "the local and regional needs of the community" began to play a primary discursive role in the foundation's expansion and mission.

Ostensibly, then, in analyzing both the mission statement and subsequent web discourse of the Romanian Soros Educational Center, we can say open society is promoted, but, through overwording and repetition (Fairclough, 1989, 1992b), *local and regional* development is constructed as just as important as open society building, if not more so. This is not to say the two are mutually exclusive, by any means, but the "and" and end of the mission statement ("to promote open society *and* develop the region") and the final prepositional phrase of the subsequent web text (which ends on "the local and regional needs of the community") discursively mark local and regional needs as being *as* important as the building open society.

A second example which links "openness"—if not open society—with English and ELT comes from OSI-Samara, Russia, and its description of its English Language Program (2000). OSI-Samara (2000) justifies the needs for ELP in a way that highlights *its* interests:

Political and economic changes and increasing links between Russia and western countries have caused a great demand for knowledge of foreign languages, especially English. English is now the language which is vital for economic success. English

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language proficiency is also a necessary requirement for entering international educational projects and for developing and implementing up-to-date technologies in all spheres of our life. The increasing openness of modern Russian society and reform in education, the great demand for specialists proficient in foreign languages, all require considerable changes in the content, structure, organization and technology of teaching foreign languages.

Here, the discourse justifies the need for ELP mostly in terms of its own choosing rather than mere reproduction of discourse fragments and patterns from OSI/SFN ELP, and those terms begin with "political" and "economic." From the start, OSI-Samara constructs English ("especially," though among other unspecified foreign languages) as in demand due to "political and economic changes and increasing links between Russia and *western* countries" (2000). It comes as no surprise here that the emphasis on links with "western" countries highlights the new "political and economic" climate since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. However, the discursive positioning of links westward rather than eastward (or southward, for that matter) diminishes if not erases the need for increasing links with the "east" or "south," a discursive move which paradoxically reinforces an east/west division while simultaneously seeking to build a discursive bridge with the west.

The next sentence sheds further light on local, national, and regional interests in that, according to OSI-Samara, "English is now the language which is vital for economic success" (2000). This discourse expresses most bluntly one "motive" for implementing ELP, while ideologically embedding within English its necessity "for economic success." Other ELP programs and projects have highlighted the importance of communications and even business to the building of open societies, but the OSI definition of "open society" quite markedly does not mention "economics." Accordingly, the OSI-Samara discourse re-contextualizes the ELP discourse according to *its* priorities: "economic success" (and not just stability) and "western" (rather than eastern or other directional) ties, in order for political and economic change to

happen. As we saw with "International" in Chapter Four, "West" also takes on connotations of ideal.

This is not to say that OSI-Samara does not reproduce some aspects of OSI/SFN ELP discourse. Much like OSI/SFN's "Strategy for the Year 2000" (1999), OSI-Samara does reproduce the "necessity" of English for participating in "international educational projects" (implicitly, here, a component of building open societies) and for "developing up-to-date technologies in all spheres of our life" (2000). At the same time, the OSI-Samara ELP discourse does not *ever* use the exact term "open society," an omission which may well be indicative of some resistance to the construct of open society. At this stage, that is, OSI-Samara seems willing to go only part of the way on the journey to open society, taking what it needs along the way, but without exactly committing to what *its* version of open society will be.

*English, Open Society, and Democracy*

Like the Soros Educational Center (2006), the Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan (1998) and its Soros-founded and funded Lingua School explicitly acknowledge the role of English in building open societies in its description of its English Language Programs. In so doing, it reproduces multiple discourse fragments and chains started in the OSI/SFN ELP discourses. Most particularly, it reproduces a discourse chain linking English not only with "open society" but also with democracy.  The Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan (1998) introduces ELP this way:

> The English Language Programs are a direct response to the fact that English is fast becoming the international language of business, communications, media, and cyberspace, to name but a few areas. Kyrgyzstan is anxious to join the world community and access the information and opportunities that a good knowledge of English allows. This is one of the crucial aspects to the building of an open and democratic society in Kyrgyzstan. The goals of the programs are to disseminate the new methods of teaching English and to promote English language learning in Kyrgyz secondary schools and universities by improving the quality of teaching English in those institutions.

Here a number of discursive presuppositions and discourse fragments identified and analyzed in Chapter Four are reproduced. According to this ELP discourse, "a good knowledge of English" is "one of the *crucial* aspects to the building of an open and democratic society in Kyrgyzstan" (italics added), an assertion which extends, echoes, and strengthens the discourse chain perpetuating the necessity of English to the building of open societies. Most importantly, this assertion discursively extends the discourse chain that "a good knowledge of English" is needed for the "building of an open and *democratic* society in Kyrgyzstan" (italics added), a discourse chain which now explicitly links English and democracy, and which, we will see, is reproduced throughout the countries of CESEE-fSU. Before those are discussed, however, it is important to note that the discourse also constructs English as "fast becoming the international language of business, communications, media and cyberspace, to name but a few areas" (1998), a description which both reproduces and begins to specify OSI/SFN's assertion that "a good command of English is necessary for international communication which is critical to building open societies" (OSI "Strategy," 1999). By ending the sentence on "to name but a few areas," the discourse further creates space for the need for English (and subsequently, ELT) as *the* language needed not only for "an open and democratic society in Kyrgyzstan," but now, also, for potentially infinite reasons, text which reproduces a discourse chain of supranational language management. Further, SF-Kyrgyzstan constructs English as a way to enter "the world community," a construction which reproduces OSI/SFN's claim that "a good command of English" is needed "to communicate successfully with the world beyond … most immediate state and/or regional boundaries" ("Strategy," 1999) and which, in turn, reproduces the presupposition that the "the world community" is an English-speaking community. According to the SF-Kyrgyzstan

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discourse, communication in English thus becomes almost a linguistic passport into a world without which they would be barred.

As mentioned above, the Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan discursively and overtly links "English" and "democracy" (1998), reproducing a discourse chain identified in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse. Relatedly, in a Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan ELP strategy document (1998), the discourse forecasts the following: that "one of the crucial moments of the [ELP] program will be the establishment of the Linguistic School . . . which will work according to the principles of an open society and ultimately, contribute to the development of a new democratic state" (1998). Here the discourse makes a significant leap between the running of one school which teaches English in accordance with "the principles of an open society" and the end result, contribution to "a new democratic state," thus strengthening a key discourse chain originating in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse. The argument, however, is both highly optimistic and logically problematic in its *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* or "false cause" assumption. There is neither certainty nor evidence warranting the claim that running one school according to "the principles of an open society" will necessarily contribute to "a new democratic state."

And yet, English and ELT are discursively conjoined with democracy here and throughout the discourses of regional, national, and local Soros foundations, programs, and projects in these transition countries. For instance, the Soros Foundation-Moldova's "Intercultural High School Exchange Program" equates "English language improvement" with promoting "the development of a highly educated and democratic society" ("SF-Moldova Annual Report," 1997), in the process, reinforcing the quality of "educated" with "English speaking," another discourse fragment from the OSI/SFN ELP discourse. A report from a "Regional Mentoring Training Program" in Romania and Serbia constructs English and ELT as

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one strategy "for promoting democracy in professional and classroom relationships" ("Regional Mentoring," 2001). An article on Romania's EuroEd Foundation constructs English such that "even in Communist times, it carried the promise of western democracy and standards of living" ("Worldaware," 2001). These are just a few of multiple examples of how the discourse chain conjoining English and democracy is reproduced and reinforced throughout the ELP discourses of Soros foundations, programs, and projects in the transition countries of CESEE-fSU.

Not all Soros foundations, programs, and projects, however, so readily equate English with the construct of "democracy" explored thus far. For the Soros Foundation-Tajikistan ("UN," 1998), an amalgamation of lexical items from the OSI/SFN definition of open society are discursively put into play, along with discourse which both reproduces and re-contextualizes discursive constructions of open societies and the role of English and ELT in building them. Moreover, the SF-Tajikistan ELP discourse re-scripts—and perhaps resists—OSI/SFN's use of "democracy" in a very distinct way.

Paradoxically, first, the Soros Foundation-Tajikistan ELP discourse both universalizes and re-contextualizes the work of building open societies and the role of English in this process:

> The conventional term for designation of the design principle of SF-Tajikistan activity is strategy of activity, which, being based on the concept of the "open society" is *universal for all countries, where Foundation network functions, taking into account local social-historical differences.* ("UN," 1998; italics added)

Striking in this passage is SF-Tajikistan's discursive construction of "open society" as being "universal for all countries," or more precisely and paradoxically, "universal" for those countries "where Foundation network functions" ("UN," 1998). The discourse here may presuppose that countries outside of the "Foundation network" are already "open" or else simply outside the realm of Tajikistan's national, economic, and/or political interests. SF-Tajikistan is also quick to discursively add "taking into account local social-historical differences" ("UN," 1998), a

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discursive qualification which creates spaces for the rejection of any "strategy of activity" which

does *not* take into account local context and "social-historical difference" ("UN," 1998). No

other foundation's discourse discussed thus far, nor the discourse of OSI/SFN ELP itself, has so

explicitly acknowledged the role and importance of "local social-historical differences"

specifically, or "context" more generally.

Continuing with the same passage from the Soros Foundation-Tajikistan, we find further

discursive re-scripting of open society which complicates, re-contextualizes, and perhaps even

resists the discourse fragment of "democracy":

> In regards to this, Soros Foundation-Tajikistan strategy of activity is defined as positive
> assistance and aid in the formation of social- democratic institutes and the formation of
> the open civic society in Tajikistan - the country of transitional democracy. . . . Practical
> and organizational activity on implementation of strategy of Open Society Institute -
> Tajikistan are realized in the spheres of education, art and culture, law, civic society,
> media, business development and local governance, gender policy and ethnic minorities,
> public health, harm reduction and HIVAIDS, drug demand reduction, tourism
> development, *English language* and etc. ("UN," 1998; italics added)

Here, the SF-Tajikistan discourse combines and constructs, through hyphenation, "social-

democratic institutes," a discourse fragment which, as with "local social-historical differences,"

is used in no other ELP discourse from any foundation or from OSI/SFN. The lexical term

"social-democratic" and, particularly, the fronting of "social" before "democratic," inevitably

carry echoes of "social democracy," which seeks to integrate "socialism" (Tajikistan's past under

Soviet rule as a Soviet Republic) and democracy (barely in name now only in Tajikistan) such

that the end result, potentially, is the construction of a democratic  welfare state working for

people to "control the economic structures which have so long dominated them" ("Declaration of

Principles," 1989). In other words, the discourse of the SF-Tajikistan draws upon both elements

of past and future, socialism and democracy, and in so doing, constructs an alternative and

mediated construction of open society and democracy and a discursively different goal than other

foundations: "the formation of open civic society in Tajikistan, the country of transitional democracy" ("UN," 1998).

Furthermore, in this instance, the discourse of SF-Tajikistan constructs "open *civic* society" (rather than open society) as its work, and, indeed, opening civic (or civil) society may be one of the first steps towards opening society more generally. More intriguingly, though, the discourse of the SF-Tajikistan does not construct Tajikistan as democratic per se, but rather, it is "the country of *transitional* democracy" ("UN," 1998; italics added). In this grab bag of constructs, the discourse seems to be in as much transition as the country itself and democracy itself, a claim made stronger by the earlier use of the term "social-democratic." At the same time, the list of activities supporting SF-Tajikistan's work is basically familiar, particularly the last item specified: "English language and etc." Still, the fact that "English language" is the *last* specific activity mentioned—followed immediately thereafter by the almost throwaway "and etc."—may discursively diminish its importance, another difference which marks how SF-Tajikistan may be operating under very different conditions, and with different priorities, than a number of other countries in CESEE-fSU.

*English, Open Society, and "Modern" Methodology*

This discourse chain—that if English is needed to build open societies, and open societies are democratic, English is thus also needed to build democracies—and the multiple assumptions behind it, carry problematic echoes of neo-colonialism and linguistic imperialism (Pennycook, 1994; Phillipson, 1992; see also Chapter Two). Perhaps just as problematic, in another passage from the Lingua School, "new methods of teaching English" are constructed as another central means by which "an open and democratic society" can be built in Kyrgyzstan ("UN," 1998), an assumption which perpetuates and reifies the construct of "modern methodology"—if not

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"methodological imperialism" (Newby, 2000, p. 7)—for open and democratic societies. Further, according to the OSI/SFN ELP discourse analyzed in Chapter Four, (American) SPELT teachers were constructed as "bringers of modern methodologies." This is another potentially neo-colonialist and imperialist discourse chain reproduced in the ELP discourses of local Soros foundations, programs, and projects. Newby (2000), in his overview of teaching and learning cultures for the European Council of Modern Languages, describes this as a form of "methodological imperialism on the part of certain 'western' methodologists and publishers of FL textbooks" (p. 7). While Newby (2000) later goes on to argue that by the mid-1990s the idea of "methodological diversity" had begun to take root in Central and Eastern Europe at least (p.7), the ELP discourses of Soros Foundation ELP programs and projects in Central and Eastern Europe usually indicate otherwise, not to mention the ELP discourses of the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union (like Kyrgyzstan).

In point of fact, the majority of documents analyzed which referenced SPELT discursively constructed the identities of SPELT teachers as bringers of "modern methodology." OSI-Samara (2000) notes how SPELT teachers brought "modern *American* methodology" to Russia, a construction which both perpetuates the "modernity" of SPELT "methodology" and reminds us pointedly that these teachers are "American" as opposed to "international" (see Chapter Four) (OSI-Samara, 2000; italics added). Similarly, an ELP report from the Soros Foundation-Romania praised "the interactive modern teaching style and methods" introduced through SPELT (Doebel, 2000). The Soros-founded International House-Minsk, Belarus, markets its "modern method of teaching" ("IH-Minsk," 2007), while the Soros Yugoslavia Foundation (1994) describes a SPELT teacher development course in Kosovo as including

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"some basics of the modern teaching techniques, the introduction to the communicative approach in teaching" ("SYF Annual Report," 1994).

The discursively strongest advocate of the link between English, "modern" ELT methodology, and the opening of societies may be the Soros Yugoslavia Foundation. In reference to the work of SPELT in Montenegro, its "Annual Report" (1998) noted that "all this 'modern' input, both on professional and social levels, will greatly contribute to deeper and more substantial changes in the system of formal EFL/ESL teaching in Montenegro and in the long run will be a significant step toward its opening to the world" ("SYF Annual Report," 1998). Here again, there is quite a large leap logically as the discourse presupposes how "changes in the system of formal EFL/ESL teaching in Montenegro" will lead "toward its opening to the world" ("SYF Annual Report," 1998). At the same time, the emphasis on "modern teaching techniques" and their contribution to both changes in teaching *and* in helping Montenegro in its "opening to the world" expands—even dramatically—on OSI/SFN's construction of SPELT teachers as "bringers of modern methodology" (see Chapter Four). Now SPELT teachers are constructed as "bringers of modernity" more generally, if not levelers of borders. In turn, implicitly but importantly, SYF constructs teaching and teachers in Montenegro pre-SPELT according to signs juxtaposed to and other than "modern": that is, "traditional" or "primitive" (Hansen, 2006, p. 42; see also Chapter Four). This, too, is a discourse chain which the SYF (1998) discourse—and arguably all OSI/SFN ELP discourses emphasizing "modern methodology"—strengthens through the reproduction of an, if unspoken, discourse chain.

Given the discursive construction of modern ELT methodology as a contributor to open society throughout the ELP discourses of Soros Foundation programs and projects in the CESEE-fSU, it is not surprising that most discussions of *traditional* methodology in these

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discourses are constructed negatively, which the following example from the Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan's Lingua School (1998) may best illustrate. Lingua School, too, describes its methodology as "modern and communicative," which it attributes to its SPELT teachers (1998), and which it defines by what it is not:

> Traditional teaching methods in the Soviet Union concentrated heavily on translation, memorization, grammar, and writing. Learners using these methods often found that even after years of study they were unable to use the language to communicate effectively outside the classroom. Language lessons often seemed dry, boring, and removed from the real world. (1998)

Here, the Lingua School constructs its methods (and perhaps even itself) in opposition to what it was and now is not—subject to the ideologies of the Soviet Union—a discursive move which clearly seeks to distance itself from its communist past, during which and in the wake of, according to OSI/SFN ELP, teachers were "all often struggling with the lack of resources and often mired in an inflexible curriculum" ("About This Initiative," 2007). OSI/SFN ELP further constructed teachers of the CEESEE-fSU as lacking "communicative classroom teaching skills/methodology" ("Strategy," 1999), until, that is, OSI/SFN ELP SPELT teachers brought "modern teaching methodologies" ("Soros Professional English," 2005). The "mire" of Soviet-style, traditional methodologies may in itself be another discourse chain, one repeated by IH-Kyiv, Ukraine.

International House-Kyiv explains the lack of qualified methodology teachers this way: "The majority of 'Methodology' teachers at Pedagogical Universities were trained in Soviet times and now are either unable to introduce any innovation or have little access to teaching resources" (2007). Like the Lingua School, the ELP discourse of IH-Kyiv bolsters and perpetuates a form of "liberal" post-Soviet discourse (Smith et al., 1998) which strives to break utterly with Soviet history. It does so here by constructing teachers at Pedagogical [or State-run] Universities as lacking both abilities to innovate and resources. In turn, breaking with Soviet

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history, at least in these discourses, means embracing democracy, and "American," "Modern," "Communicative," "New," "Up to Date," and the "Latest" ELT methods are perpetuated in a discourse chain which semantically stabilizes their role in contributing to the building of democratic open societies. This, too, is a reproduction of a key discourse chain originating in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse.

Importantly, however, discourse analysis also reveals occasional flashes of discursive resistance and/or discursive re-contextualization of "modern methodology" in the ELP discourses of Soros Foundation programs and projects, suggesting local resistance to wholesale top-down imposition of methods. For instance, an English language textbook created by the Open Society Assistance Foundation-Azerbaijan emphasizes quite plainly its use of "modern *and* traditional methods" (Rasulova, Aliyeva & Aliyeva, 2003; italics added). Romania's "Access Language Center," also initially launched and funded by OSI/SFN ELP, is careful to articulate its emphasis on "effective teaching methods adapted to the students' needs," without any mention of "modern" in its discourse (2008). In like manner, OSI-Croatia emphasizes the need for the "development and introduction of *appropriate* new teaching methods" (Puhovski, 1998), adding the term "appropriate" which, like the earlier discussion of "extensive" in relation to "language training," creates space for the rejection, re-contextualization or transformation of methodologies which Croatian educators believe may *not* be appropriate.[31]

In an even more compelling case, the Soros Educational Center (2006) in Romania describes its approach to teaching this way: "The Soros Educational Center sets its standards with a new generation of teaching materials which *combine* the best elements of **traditional approaches** with **communicative methodology**" ("Soros Educational," 2006; italics added; bold

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[31] For more, see Chapter Two's overview of Holliday's (1994) *Appropriate Methodology and Social Context*.

in original). In particular, the emphasis through bold font here and the acknowledgement that

there are "best elements of traditional approaches" suggest a reflective and distinct awareness of

what methods work best in the particular context of this area of Romania and in this school, a

discursive move which may not only re-contextualize the OSI/SFN ELP discourse, but even

discursively, if subtly, resist it.

*English and ELT as a Path to Social and Political Consciousnesses*

Another document reporting on OSI/SFN ELP in Croatia, "Common Goals – Varieties of

Approaches: Promotion of Peace, Human Rights and Democratic Citizenship Through

Education" (Puhovski,1998), does delineate in more detail how ELP—as a part of OSI-Croatia's

"Educational Programmes"—seeks to impact teachers, students, and the creation of open

societies—but now through "opening" individuals' social and political consciousnesses.

According to Puhovski (1998), "The mission of the Educational Programmes is to provide

pupils, students and teachers with the opportunities and resources to help them to participate

fully in an open society." The authors then expand on the mission of Educational Programmes:

> Mission of OSI Educational Programme focuses on establishing an educational
> framework and conditions for development of young people as:
>
> > • *critical persons* **–** individuals open for new information, ideas and values through
> > understanding and critical evaluation.
> >
> > • *socially responsible persons* **-** members who contribute to their community in
> > developing the sensitivity to others and general benefit, which is not motivated
> > solely by personal profit, but rather by social and moral responsibility.
> >
> > • *politically conscious persons* **-** realising the fact that political participation is not a
> > matter of somebody's permission, but individual's right, as well as learning about
> > possible ways and forms of political participation. (Puhovski, 1998; italics in
> > original)

Under the umbrella of these goals and the mission of OSI-Croatia's Educational Programmes,

ELP becomes implicitly constructed as one of multiple programs working to achieve them.

Constructed this way, English and ELP thus become discursively—if implicitly here—ways for individuals to "become open for new information, ideas and values"; ways for individuals to become "socially responsible people"; and ways for individuals to become "politically conscious persons" (Puhovski, 1998).

In subsequent discussion of *how* ELP and other educational programs work to achieve these goals, OSI-Croatia articulates the following paths to the "values" and "idea of open education": through curricular reform and extra-curricular activities; through the "development and introduction of appropriate new teaching methods"; through reorganizing schools and the education system generally to include, for instance, parents and students as decision-makers on policy; and "to promote equality in the right to education and its realization" (Puhovski, 1998). English and ELT thus also become discursively embedded into these pathways to opening social and political consciousness: through curricular reform; new methods; education reform; and "equality in the right to education and its realization" (Puhovski, 1998).

In this document, OSI-Croatia also discursively echoes fundamental political concerns of George Soros which may underscore the need for the opening of social and political consciousness. Soros (1998), recall, has been consistently "disappointed" in "the attitude of the West," which he believes (or believed in 1998, at least) "genuinely did not care enough about open society as a universal idea to make much of an effort to help the formerly communist countries. All the talk about freedom and democracy had been just that: propaganda" (Soros, 1998). In its explication of "social responsibility," OSI-Croatia may likewise here provide a strong critique of the "West" and the United States, as OSI-Croatia points out how the "social responsibility" the discourse intends is not "motivated solely by personal profit, but rather by social and moral responsibility" (Puhovski, 1998). At the same time, this document elaborates on

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the mission of Education Programs in such a way that may also critique past models of

government, particularly communism:

> In a long run, the results [of Education Programs, including ELP] might be of crucial
> importance for the development of an open, democratic Croatian society.  In that way,
> through education, OSI contributes to realisation of the idea of open society, whereas it is
> assumed that education could influence society in a way that is not indoctrination.
> (Puhovski, 1998)

"Indoctrination" becomes, perhaps, the other side of the "personal profit" coin: The discourse of

OSI-Croatia, that is, like George Soros himself (1998), takes care to acknowledge the risks that

lie at either side of the ideological political spectrum between communism and capitalism.

Further, perhaps because of the specters of "indoctrination," communism, and the continued

violent fall-out from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia (on-going still in 1998, when this

text and Soros' book was published), the discourse above is cautious in its predictions: "The

results *might be* of crucial importance" (italics added), but are decidedly less certain than in

previous assertions.

Such caution may also arise, provocatively, due to the specification of the previously

generic "impact on society," which this document articulates more clearly: "the development of

an open, democratic *Croatian* society" (Puhovski, 1998). In the above text, Puhovski (1998)

articulates what is needed to achieve such a society: participants who are "critical" thinkers,

"socially responsible" and "politically conscious." If we next turn to how "open society" for

OSI-Croatia has been re-worded as "an open, democratic Croatian society," we see a

construction which again adds the word "democratic" to the intended outcome (just as previous

discourse added "extensive" and "appropriate") and thus again perpetuates a discourse chain

from OSI/SFN ELP linking English and ELT with "democratic" and "open." However,

simultaneously, OSI-Croatia discursively marks *national* identity rather than supranational

identity in this construction: "an open, democratic *Croatian* society," which, arguably, may form

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part of the "political consciousness" Puhovski (1998) allude to earlier. If so, then the construct of "open society" here becomes re-contextualized and specified, and English and ELT become—as a part of Education Programs—discursively constructed as contributors to the same: "an open, democratic Croatian society."

This construction may fittingly capture the paradoxes of globalization and political transition discussed in Chapter Two and highlighted by Fairclough (2006) in his analysis of Romanian transition discourses. As he observes in the context of Romania, transition does not "result in any simple process of harmonization and integration . . . at the European or global scales, but complex, contradictory and unpredictable mixtures of old and new" (Fairclough, 2006, p. 70). Applied to Croatia, we see the "old" "national identity" discursively confronts and mixes with the new constructs of "open" and "democratic," which Croatia decidedly was not under Tito, under communism. In sum, English, ELT, and other educational programs from OSI-Croatia may be discursively constructed as pathways to social and political consciousness, but the pathways are by no means always so clear.

*English, Civil Society, and Freedom of Expression*

Similar to OSI/SFN's "Strategy for the Year 2000" (1999), which emphasized the necessity of English and ELT to the building of open societies (forms of the word "necessary" are repeated three times in OSI/SFN justification of its English Language Programs), the Soros Foundation-Moldova (1997) and its Open World House is another foundation and project which reproduce the discourse fragment of "necessity" around the relationship between English, ELT, and the building of open societies, thus strengthening a discourse chain central to this study. SF-Moldova further reproduces other key terms from the OSI/SFN definition of "open society" ("About Us: FAQs," 2005), particularly, "civil society," "the recognition that . . . different

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people have different views and interests," and "respect for minorities and minority opinions" ("About Us: FAQs," 2005). The reproduction of these constructs—all which contribute to "freedom of expression"—further strengthens the discourse chain of the necessity of English and ELT to the building of open societies by discursively and ideologically embedding English into the construct of "freedom of expression."

In its 1997 "Annual Report," the Soros Foundation-Moldova describes Open World House this way:

> Established in 1994, the Open World House continues to work in fields of major importance for the transformation of Moldovan society. The institution worked through projects proven necessary for the transition to an open society: the Independent Journalism Center, the TV Studio, the Educational Advising Center, the English Language School, the Computer Class, Radio DÕor. (SF-Moldova, 1997)

In this description, "the English Language School" of the Open World House is constructed as one of multiple projects "proven necessary for the transition to an open society." Here we find that OSI/SFN ELP's presupposition—"a good command of English is necessary for international communication which is critical to building open societies ("Strategy," 1999)—has been reworded significantly, but is no less categorical. Curiously, too, the Open World House discourse now includes the word "proven," an assertion which is questionable at best, particularly given the date of the report (1997), which is but six years after Moldova's declaration of independence from the Soviet Union (in 1991), and particularly given the discursive emphasis elsewhere on the need for "long-term support" (OSI-Croatia, 1999) and ELT's transformative importance "in the long run" ("Soros Yugoslavia," 1994; "Soros Yugoslavia," 1998). "Proven" is also likely a discursive overstatement, given current events in Eastern Europe (and around the world) as a result of the current (as of 2009) global economic crisis.

Nevertheless, the Soros Foundation-Moldova (1997) ELP discourse directly asserts the centrality of English to the building of open societies here. In addition, discourse describing the Soros Foundation-Moldova's Open World House underlines the necessity of English to the work of building open societies in other key terms taken directly from OSI/SFN's definition of "open society," particularly "civil society" ("About Us: FAQs," 2005). In a 1997 annual report, SF-Moldova states the following:

> Crucial for a civil society, independent media (independent not only politically, but also economically) is the major focus of the OWH [Open World House] activities. Print and broadcast journalists participated in numerous projects, such as seminars, conferences of the IJC, training at the TV studio and in the computer class, English language scholarships, and visits and training at radio stations in Bucharest. All these projects carried out the institution's principles of freedom of expression and access to information.

First of note in this discourse is the mention of "civil society," defined and analyzed in Chapter Four and constructed by OSI/SFN as one key characteristic of "open society": "Broadly speaking, an open society is characterized by a reliance on the rule of law, the existence of a democratically elected government, a diverse and vigorous civil society, and respect for minorities and minority opinions" ("About Us: FAQs," 2005).  The discourse of SF-Moldova seizes upon and fronts the importance of "civil society" in particular as it articulates its vision for the role of the media. However, in the process of this articulation, the centrality of English and ELT become discursively embedded as "crucial" languages and activities for "civil society" generally and for "print and broadcast journalists" specifically. Additionally, "English language scholarships" along with other projects are constructed as vehicles for carrying out "principles of freedom of expression and access to information." While there is no question that English can provide enormous "access to information" globally, it may be a risky if not dangerous assumption that "English language scholarships" naturally or automatically (as the discourse presumes) lead to the execution of "principles of freedom of expression."  Perhaps, but perhaps

not, and it is part of the purpose and hope of this study to disinter and question the assumptions

and collocations that occur around and within discursive constructions of English and its role in

building open societies.

A particularly striking example of an ELP discourse which conjoins English, ELT, and

"freedom of expression" comes from OSI-Samara, and specifically from a report on a SPELT

mentoring workshop by American SPELT teacher trainer Trevor Shanklin (2000).  Importantly

here, we must remember that we are seeing the following classroom through a specific text

producer, Trevor Shanklin, and his American eyes and American worldview. Shanklin reports on

a classroom he observed this way:

> The image that I leave Samara with is of "The English Classroom," an image that will
> stay with me for a long time, like Olga's sixth grade classroom: Despite difficult
> circumstances, Olga has managed to create a warm, supportive, colorful environment in
> the classroom. She enjoys an extremely good rapport with the pupils. A poster over the
> door had two Garfield like cats pointing at each other with the caption "You are
> responsible." There are a variety of posters and decorations on the wall. The largest, a
> bulletin board that spans the width of the room, was created by students about the holiday
> Valentine's Day. It was filled with postcards, pictures, etc.  It is a kind of sanctuary,
> where the free expression of ideas is encouraged and the individual voice respected.
> (Shanklin, 2000)

In this discourse, "The English Classroom" along with the obvious dedication of the Russian

English teacher, Olga, leads the SPELT mentor to note the warmth and supportive atmosphere of

the room along with its very "western" images of "Garfield" and "Valentines Day." Importantly,

the mentor takes no credit for the construction of the classroom; rather, the environment has been

created by Olga "despite difficult circumstances." What the mentor does suggest, however, is

that "The English Classroom" is special because it "is a kind of sanctuary, where the free

expression of ideas is encouraged and the individual voice respected" (2000).  In turn, we are left

to assume that this "sanctuary" is very different from other classrooms in the same school: by

juxtaposition, the other classrooms become differentiated and therefore *not* sanctuaries, *not*

places "where the free expression of ideas is encouraged and the individual voice respected" (see Hansen, 2006, pp. 18-25). In other words, the discourse here sets the "English Classroom" carefully apart from others we do not see, and in so doing, English again becomes conjoined with and discursively embedded in "the free expression of ideas" along with a new discourse chain: respect for "the individual voice" (Shanklin, 2000).

Civil society and "openness" as they relate to "freedom of expression," the recognition that "different people have different views and interests," and "respect for minorities and minority opinions" ("About Us: FAQs," 2005) is thus another discourse chain reproduced in the ELP discourses of Soros foundations, programs and projects in the countries of the CESEE-fSU. This discourse chain is additionally reproduced through the infusion of English and ELT into civic education for civil society, with particular emphasis on the role of debate. Frequently in these discourses, but not always, the language in which debate should occur is constructed as English.

The Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan's Lingua School, for instance, claims to promote civic education through the start-up of the "Lingua Debating Society," the goals of which are to "give participants the opportunity to practice and improve their spoken English, increased confidence in debating and negotiating skills, advice and practice on preparing and making presentations" ("Lingua," 2001). Later in the discourse, the "Lingua Debating Society" specifies some of its topics as "Freedom of Expression, Freedom of the Press, government responsibilities, etc.," all of which seem in support of general "openness" and the OSI mission. Here the discourse again—as with the Soros Foundation-Moldova's description of its "Open World House" and Shanklin's description of "The English Classroom"—conjoins English with the topics of "Freedom of Expression, Freedom of the Press, government responsibilities, etc." ("Lingua," 2001). Again,

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English becomes ideologically and discursively embedded into these rights and activities, perpetuating and strengthening a discourse chain which legitimizes and authorizes the unique role of English in "freedom of expression" and "freedom of the press."

Elsewhere throughout the CESEE-fSU, debate and debate in English have an even clearer discursive role, and English again becomes ideologically embedded into activities indicative of OSI's definition of open society: below, for instance, "critical thinking skills and tolerance for differing points of view" (1996). The Soros Foundation-Hungary (1996) articulates the design of its Karl Popper Debate Program this way:

> The Karl Popper Debate Program, like other Open Society Institute programs, is designed to foster critical thinking skills and tolerance for differing points of view. Currently, more than twenty countries throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the N.I.S. [Newly Independent States] participate in the program, which supports debate clubs and tournaments in secondary schools and universities in each country and international tournaments between countries in the region. Participating high school and university students compete within their countries in their local languages and compete regionally in English. By training coaches and student debate teams, the Karl Popper Debate Program is helping to prepare a new generation of articulate and socially aware citizens. (Lorant, 1996)

First of note here, student participants from Soros foundation schools and projects do have the opportunity to compete "in their local languages," promoting once more a subtle but significant means of encouraging linguistic diversity, and resisting, to an extent, OSI/SFN ELP's implicit discursive push for supranational language management in the process of building open societies. At the same time, English *is* constructed as the language for regional and international debate, "and the end goal of training for debate is to "prepare a new generation of articulate and socially aware citizens" (1996). Presumably, then, English contributes to and is discursively embedded in the same: the construction of "articulate and socially aware citizens" regionally and internationally. Also significant, in its hopes of creating "a new generation of articulate and socially aware citizens," the Soros Foundation-Hungary once again constructs the "citizen

pilgrims" described by Falk (1994), in the process, en-ageing participants (Reisigl & Wodak,

2001). In turn, those generations juxtaposed to the "new" are again discursively omitted, erased

and/or excluded (Hansen, 2006) from opportunities to become "articulate and socially aware

citizens" (1996). This is another clear reproduction of one implicit discourse chain started in the

OSI/SFN ELP discourse but often resisted in national and local ELP discourses—the exclusion

of those who are not young, not part of the "new generations" who are growing up in a very

different world than their parents and grandparents.

Interestingly, however, there are two examples in which debate becomes a way to quite

directly resist supranational language management and the coupling of English with "freedom of

expression." The Soros Foundation-Moldova's 1997 "Annual Report" articulates the role and

importance of debate this way:

> Debate activities are facilitated through the efforts of the National Debate Center,
> University Centers, Regional (North, South) Centers and debate clubs. By the end of
> 1997 the activity of 45 English, Romanian, Russian and Gagauz clubs had widened to
> involve 1300 students, for whom debate is considered the best course of solving
> controversies through the stormy seas of everyday life. The expansion of the program's
> reach into Gagauz and Bulgarian speaking districts was anticipated in 18 seminars
> involving some 600 teachers, judges and students under the slogan, "If a language can't
> unite us, debate will!"

Here, as with the Soros Foundation-Hungary, debate activities are "open" to other (local and

regional) languages in addition to English (in this case, Romanian, Russian, Gagauz, and

Bulgarian). Furthermore, and critically, with that last slogan, "If a language can't unite us, debate

will!," SF-Moldova and its associated national and regional centers discursively diminish the

importance of language, and possibly English, to national and regional unity: Rather, debate is

constructed as higher than any one language ("a language") in its ability to unify and solve

"controversies through the stormy seas of everyday life" (SF-Moldova, "Annual Report," 1997).

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This shift—from English and debate to *other* languages and debate—is further evidenced

by a change in language from the Open Society Fund-Lithuania's 1997 "Annual Report" to its

1998 "Annual Report." The 1997 report describes its "Debate Programme" as follows:

> The programme helps participants to acquire crucial skills in argumentation and logical
> speaking, particularly listening to one's opponent and conducting tolerant discussion on
> urgent questions. Its participants include secondary school pupils and university students.
> Sessions and tournaments are held in English and Lithuanian. ("OSF-Lithuania,"1997)

Compare this text with that of the *1998* "Annual Report's" description of OSF-Lithuania's

"Debate Programme":

> The Debate Programme expanded its activities in 1998. Currently, 40 debate clubs
> operate in schools in different cities (in the Lithuanian, Russian, English and Polish
> languages). Debate, as a subject at school, was presented for consideration to the Ministry
> of Education and Science.  Ten debating training seminars were organized for teachers of
> different subjects. Moreover, seminars for teachers and pupils in Russian were arranged
> in cooperation with debate experts from Byelorussia, and in Polish with a group of
> experts from the Polish Debate Programme. ("OSF-Lithuania," 1998)

Here, too, as in the case of SF-Moldova, OSF-Lithuania discursively reproduces the role of

debate in building open societies (if implicitly) while simultaneously resisting the emphasis on

*English* and debate. Rather, OSF-Lithuania creates space for the role of multiple languages in

debate: Lithuanian, Russian, English and Polish. In short, at least as these two programs suggest,

debate *is* constructed as essential to open society and civil society, but the skills of debate

("argumentation," "logical speaking, "listening," and "conducting tolerant discussion on urgent

questions") are constructed as more important than the language in which they take place.

According to the discourses of these foundations, then, English is not the only language needed

for "argumentation," "logical speaking," "listening," or "conducting tolerant discussion on

urgent questions." Accordingly, it is not the only language needed for civil society, "articulate

and socially aware citizens," or "freedom of expression," either.

*English, Open Society, and the Ideal of the International and the West*

One notable way the ELP discourses—and first, the ELP discourse of the Soros

Foundation-Moldova (1999)—discursively embed the necessity of English into the building of

open societies is through an as of yet un-discussed element of OSI/SFN's definition of what

makes an open society—"rule of law"—and particularly "rule of law" as regulated by

*international* standards. This is but one example of how "international standards" (with never an

exact definition of what those are) becomes another construct in which English is discursively

embedded. Furthermore, a discourse chain of the ideal of the "international" is likewise

reproduced throughout the ELP discourses of the countries of CESEE-fSU.

To illustrate the construct of "international standards" and its importance to this study, we

consider first the Soros Foundation-Moldova's (1999) "Annual Report" and its "English for

Lawyers" program, the mission of which is as follows:

> The process of the legal reform and the creation of the state based on the rule of law
> requires the adjustment of legislation to international standards. To this end, contacts
> between local and international professionals and, subsequently, foreign language
> proficiency are absolutely necessary. This is also relevant for law faculty and students.
> This is an essential condition for the examination, analysis and application of legal
> documents and international legal practice to the process of the legal reform. Therefore,
> in 1999 the Law Program of the SFM supported financially the development of an ESP
> course for lawyers. This course was taught to 16 representatives of the Moldovan legal
> community. At the same time, the program offered a number of individual grants to a
> group of law students and graduates. At present, 15 representatives of the courts and
> prosecution offices are taking a course of English, beginning level, at the Pro Didactica
> English Language School. (SF-Moldova, 1999)

Salient in this description of "English for Lawyers" is how "the process of the legal reform and

the creation of the state based on the rule of law requires the adjustment of legislation to

*international* standards" (italics added). The argument here brings in again the work of Hansen

(2006) on discourse and security, which explored how governments construct responsibility "if

only implicitly as applicable toward a *national* citizenry" and in such a way that "effectively

overrides any potential claim to an '*international* responsibility'" (p. 50; italics added).  As she

puts it, historically and traditionally, "inside the state, progress, order, democracy, ethics,

identity, and universal rights are promised; 'outside' is anarchy, power, difference, and

repetition" (Hansen, 2006, p. 34).

In the Soros Foundation-Moldova's "English for Lawyers" project, the discourse reverses

Hansen's (2006) claim, a move which may be predictable, given the *supra*national construction

of "open society": Clearly here, *international* legislation standards are constructed, if implicitly,

as promising "progress, order, democracy, ethics, identity and universal rights" (Hansen, 2006,

p. 34), whereas the current *national* (in this case, Moldovan) legislation standards undergoing the

process of reform contain (if implicitly, at least the risk of) "anarchy, power, difference, and

repetition" (Hansen, 2006, p. 34).  Like the Soros Yugoslavia Foundation's (1998) construction

of Montenegro, that is, the SF-Moldova implicitly constructs Moldova as likewise at risk of

"anarchy, power, difference, and repetition" (Hansen, 2006, p. 34).  And predictably, within the

SF-Moldova's ELP discourse, international legislation standards are assumed to be accessible

through "foreign language proficiency," which later in the discourse becomes reworded as

"ESP" (English for Specific Purposes). Further, the SF-Moldova ELP discourse reproduces the

necessity of English for open society in stronger terms than explored thus far: "Contact between

local and international professionals" and "foreign language proficiency"—in other words,

proficiency in English—are now constructed as "*absolutely* necessary" to (italics added), and,

indeed, an "essential condition" for, legal reform, such that "rule of law" can be established in

Moldova.  In turn, the need for English and ELT become discursively embedded as "absolutely

necessary" into both "rule of law" (explicitly) and "international legislation standards"

(implicitly).

Discursive references to "international standards" and the ideal of the construct "international" in other forms are plentiful throughout the ELP discourses of the countries of CESEE-fSU, which raises multiple questions and concerns explored in Chapter Two, the theoretical framework of this study. OSI-Croatia's "Community Spirit in Action Report" (1999) expresses concern that "liberal arts colleges and faculties (language departments) run traditional courses, instead of developing educational standards assessment tasks in accordance with international requirements"; at the same time, OSI-Croatia fails to specify *whose* "international requirements" should be implemented. The Open Society Education Programs-South East Europe describes how "teacher training guidelines (developed in 2000 for the entire network of foundations so that local EFL capacity building may meet international professional standards in the field) were widely implemented in 2001" ("Open Society Education," 2002), a statement which creates the potential for homogeneity and hegemony in teacher training, and subsequently, in teaching—as opposed to methodological diversity (Newby, 2000). OSI-Samara (2000), too, claims to have "fostered educational transition in order to meet international standards." The mission statement of Central European University's (2009) Center for Academic Writing seeks to ensure that students' work "meets high standards of academic English," and that their work "within and beyond the university meets the expectations of the international discourse community" ("Center," 2006). This mission, in turn, raises a compelling question first raised by Duszak (1997, p. 20): "Can an international discourse community be founded within fields, yet across languages?"

Another example of an ELP discourse constructing a form of "international standards" includes Kyrgyzstan's Lingua School, which re-scripts the discourse slightly in this heading: "Our Courses: Meeting World Standards in Language Education" (2005). The discursive choice

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of the word "world" versus "international" in the Kyrgyz ELP discourse raises questions about

what *this* differing discursive construction of space indicates.  Here it may be pertinent that

OSI/SFN discursively places Kyrgyzstan in "Central Eurasia," ("Central Eurasia," 2009) even as

elsewhere it is constructed as a part of "Central Asia": by the CIA, the U.S. State Department,

*The Lonely Planet Travel Guide,* and even by the American University of Central Asia, located

in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and also a recipient of funding and support from the Soros Foundation-

Kyrgyzstan (2009).  Accordingly, does the choice of "world standards" versus "international

standards" matter?  Pettman (2000) may provide some insight in exploring constructivist

differences between "world" versus "international" affairs. Like Hansen (2006), Pettman

believes that "international" is constructed as having strictly "politico-strategic" dimensions with

"statist and ethnic connotations that are problematic," whereas the term "world" (as in "world

affairs") "does not discriminate in this regard" (Pettman, 2000, pp. 27-28). The discursive

choices of "world" and "world community" are provocative, therefore, even if extensive analysis

thereof is beyond the scope of this study.

To return to "international standards" and other forms of "international" in regional,

national, and local ELP discourses, I say this: With all these examples (and there are many

more), while the attempt to develop such standards may be an interesting and potentially fruitful

exercise, to date, to my knowledge, and after extensive research, no such thing as "international

professional standards" for teaching English as a Foreign Language even exist, and if they did, it

would be worrying, suggesting as they do a top-down versus bottom-up imposition of standards.

Fairclough (1992a), similarly, worries that models of "appropriacy," inevitably linked to

"standards," work to reinforce dominant discourse types and practices by the constraints they

place on both.  As he writes, "Appropriateness models block a critical understanding by

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ideologically collapsing political projects and actual practices, and they block a creative and critical language practice by foregrounding normativity and training in appropriate behaviour" (Fairclough, 1992a, p. 66). Moreover, the assumption that "international standards" do exist again underlines how the ELP discourses reverse Hansen's (2006) descriptions, discursively rendering "international" and the "international community" (which a 2009 Noam Chomsky lecture bluntly described as consisting of "America" and "Imperialist" only), and perhaps, too, the "international discourse community" ("Center," 2006), as promising, again, "progress, order, democracy, ethics, identity and universal rights" (Hansen, 2006, p. 34). These constructs become then, if implicitly, embedded in the OSI/SFN ELP discourses of Soros foundations, programs, and projects which strive to meet such "international" standards for teaching English. This discursive move, like the embedding of English into democracy and democracy into "modern" ELT methodology, now discursively embeds English into yet another form of "international" along with previous discourse chains identified and explored in Chapters Four and Five: "international communication"; "international community"; "international discourse community." Moreover, the idea of belonging to or joining any form of international community leads us to questions of identity and a hypothesis I considered in the theoretical framework of this study: that OSI/SFN may be using its English Language Programs as a way of building supranational identities in the countries of the CESEE-fSU. In the next section, I share what critical discourse analysis of the ELP discourses of regional, national, and local Soros foundation programs and projects suggests about the role of English in shaping identities in the countries of CESEE-fSU.

*English and Identity: National, European, Global*

The above discussion of "international standards" (or "international" in any form) leads to the next part of this study, which shows how discursively the goal and "space" of "open society," at least the exact term as used and defined by OSI/SFN, becomes re-contextualized and transformed in the ELP discourses of national, regional, and local Soros foundations, programs, and projects. The end result of these re-contextualizations and transformations is that, in several key instances, ELP discourses work toward constructing European and global identities. In turn, this section explores the geopolitical implications of this "re-scaling" (Fairclough, 2006) of identities and the role of English and ELT in these processes.

To clarify, it is important to remember that Soros-funded ELP officially ran from 1994-2005. Many of the programs continue now in new forms (for instance, the Soros Educational Center in Romania; Romania's EuroEd Foundation; Soros International House-Lithuania, among multiple others), but, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, *all* acknowledge the role of OSI/SFN ELP in their establishment and early histories. They simply would not exist in their current forms without having had the initial support of OSI/SFN ELP. Therefore, I feel it is of central importance to also examine how these programs have evolved, and the geopolitical ramifications of their evolution.

First, we return to Romania's EuroEd Foundation, started in 1992 "with the support of the Soros Foundation and the British Council" ("EuroEd," 2008). This chapter has already demonstrated how EuroEd has been, according to its discourse, a leader in defining (or re-defining through specification) who has access to ELP programs and hence the work of building open societies. The chapter has further shown how EuroEd has discursively been at the forefront of promoting linguistic diversity through its many language course offerings and emphasis on

less widely taught languages, bolstering a new discourse chain which pushes against OSI/SFN

ELP's form of supranational language management. What we have not yet seen is the form of

"open society" which EuroEd discursively constructs and strives for, nor the implications of *its*

construction. We have also not seen how EuroEd constructs the discursive role of English and

ELT in these processes.

EuroEd's mission is stated as follows: "Our mission is to positively contribute to the

development of the Romanian civil society and of an active European citizenship in Romania"

("EuroEd," 2008). First conspicuous in this statement is the fact that—like OSI-Croatia, which

marked national identity in its goal of achieving an "open, democratic *Croatian* society"

(Puhovski, 1998; italics added)—EuroEd likewise articulates the importance of developing (first)

"*Romanian* civil society" (italics added), a discursive construction which again keeps *national*

identity at the discursive and political forefront, even if Romania's civil society is in need of

"development." At the same time, as discussed in the theoretical framework of this study

(Chapter Two), the European Union is a central factor in how current and candidate member

states define themselves (Romania joined the EU in 2007). Thus the mission statement of

EuroEd acknowledges not only national identity but also "European citizenship in Romania"—

that is, the development of a European identity along with a Romanian identity. In this sense,

identities as constructed by EuroEd, an organization founded and forcefully shaped by OSI/SFN

ELP and the British Council, become part of a larger political community than simply citizens of

a nation-state, even if that larger political community is not, here, called "open society." The

failure to use the term "open society" in this institution, however, may be immaterial, since

OSI/SFN has discursively constructed membership in the European Union as backdrop to and

benchmark of successful open society (see, e.g., "Overview: Central," 2004; "Overview: South," 2004).

Importantly, the "nested identities" of Romanian *and* European citizenship (Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, 2004) evidenced in the EuroEd discourse do not necessarily conflict with one another. We all have multiple (and fluid) identities which shape and are shaped by context. Such nesting of identities (like Russian Matryoshka dolls) only becomes pertinent when considering "whether a person identifies more, or more often, or more intensely, with regional, national, or international communities" (Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, 2004, pp. 8-12). Fairclough (2006), in his study of transition discourses in Romania, hints at this pertinence when noting how "European standards, practices, modes," for instance, co-exist still with "values and identities inherited from the communist period and even before" (2006, p. 69), in combinations not unlike the Soros Foundation-Tajikistan's discursive construction of "social-democratic institutes" ("UN," 1998) or OSI-Croatia's goal of an "open, democratic *Croatian* society" (Puhovski, 1998). Still, a question arises: what are the geopolitical implications in the discourse of this particular example of constructed nested identities, given the role of OSI/SFN ELP in constructing it?

First, we should note: In the above mission statement, the coordinator "and" suggests a balance of Romanian and European citizenship and identity. However, further description of EuroEd challenges that balance:

> Until 1995 our name was **International House** and our efforts were concentrated on offering language courses. In 1995 we became the **International Language Centre** and expanded our portfolio by founding the Kindergarten (1995) and the Primary School (1997). In 1998, also as a result of constantly growing services and addressability, we founded two more departments: the Regional Centre for Education and communication, and the Centre for European Integration. Since 2000 our name is **EuroEd Foundation**, a symbol of our overall approach. ("EuroEd," 2008; bold in original)

Strikingly, the last sentences of this description mark a social, political, and possibly linguistic metamorphosis, as the discourse (and names) change from "International House," one branch (and a former Soros foundation partner) of a language school functioning worldwide to offer (mostly) English courses, to an "International Language Centre" which adds a Kindergarten and Primary school, to the "EuroEd Foundation, a symbol," the discourse states, of the Foundation's "overall approach" ("EuroEd," 2008). In other words, what starts (in 1992) as an organization founded by the clearly supranational Soros Foundation for Open Society in partnership with the British Council is, first, reworded to become "International," and then discursively limited to a region (or "macro-region" in Fairclough's 2006 terms), to "Euro" (or European). The discourse, in other words, narrows or re-scales (Fairclough, 2006) space: from "international," to "regional," and finally to "European."

Such a re-scaling of space and identity as they relate to the European Union may perfectly coincide with OSI/SFN's construction of and hopes for open society, as discussed above. At the same time, we must keep in mind that "European" becomes a construct and identity against which are juxtaposed the "non-European" (such as the United States) or those on the "fringes" of Europe: the EU candidate countries of Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and/or other "European" countries for whom candidacy is not yet an option, such as Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, Moldova, Georgia, and Albania, to name but a few ("Europa," 2009). I return then, again, to Hansen (2006), whose study of the discourses of the Bosnian War provides this reminder:

> The Self is constituted through the delineation of Others, and the Other can be articulated as superior, inferior, or equal. It might be constituted as threatening, but it might also be an ally, a stranger, or an underdeveloped subject in need of help. (p. 76)

In the case of the Other of Romania and EuroEd, given Romania's entry into the EU in 2007, it is probably safe to argue here that EuroEd discursively constructs Romania as a "superior" Other

demarcated and constituted by what and who it is not—non-EU countries, including many of its

next-door neighbors.  Furthermore, as we shall soon see, Soros-funded English and ELT have

played a central role in the discursive construction of this "superior" Other.

First, though, lest there be any doubt about EuroEd's claim to converging identities,

European and Romanian, and in order to understand further the geopolitical ramifications of

national and European identity, consider the following aims of one of EuroEd's projects, the

Centre for European Integration:

> To positively contribute to the development of a European identity based on the
> appreciation and practice of values such as: non discrimination, multiculturalism, social
> inclusion etc. [and]

> To support the reform of the Romanian civil society and education in the EU integration
> context. ("EuroEd," 2008)

Here the discourse clearly constructs "a European identity" as based on values which may

contrast with those of "non-Europeans": "European," that is, becomes collocated with and

discursively and ideologically embedded in the constructs of "non-discrimination,"

"multiculturalism," and "social inclusion," just as earlier, we saw "English" embedded in

"freedom of expression," "successful communication," "international communication," and

"democracy," to name just a few examples. In short, EuroEd, like OSI/SFN, discursively

reproduces "European citizenship" as one benchmark of successful "open society," but in so

doing, it discursively differentiates itself—and now its values—from non-EU countries which

have not, cannot, or choose not to try and/or join the EU.

And the role of English and ELT in this process?  Anca Colibaba , the President of

EuroEd, helps shed light on this question in two ways.  First, in 2001, the British Council

awarded EuroEd "The British Council Award for the Effective Transfer of English Language

Skills," an award given for "the effective transfer of English-language skills and knowledge

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which directly contribute to sustainable development" ("Worldaware," 2001). In an article

describing the award and EuroEd's president, Colibaba, we find this description of EuroEd:

> EuroEd is based in Iasi, a city of 450,000 people near Romania's north-east border. Once the capital, it is the home of the oldest Romanian university and the centre of an impoverished farming region where unemployment is high, foreign investment low, and learning English is an avenue of hope. ("Worldaware," 2001)

English here is quite overtly constructed as an "avenue of hope" and hence as recourse to high

unemployment, low foreign investment and poverty. In the process, English thus becomes

ideologically embedded into "sustainable development," though in this instance, by the discourse

of the British Council and not OSI/SFN ELP.  However, the same article does cite Colibaba as

grateful to both the British Council *and* the Soros foundation for Open Society for coming in

"with cash and expertise" (Colibaba cited in "Worldaware," 2001).

Furthermore, the "Worldaware" (2001) article, on interviewing Colibaba on the history of

EuroEd, discursively ascribes to English and ELT more than just hope, as the following passage

indicates:

> Even in Communist times, English was the language which Romanians wanted to learn. It carried the promise of western democracy and standards of living. Despite this subversive sub-text, decision-makers (whose children wanted to learn English) began to promote it if only to empower the working class to fight imperialism. Nevertheless, when the Communist regime fell, Romania had only half as many teachers of English as of Russian. It was difficult to get your child into an English class. ("Worldaware," 2001)

Several fascinating observations can be made from this article about Colibaba and EuroEd. First,

English again becomes discursively equated with "the promise of western democracy and

standards of living," a (by-now) familiar discourse chain reproduced throughout the discourses

of regional, national, and local Soros Foundation ELP programs and projects. But it is also

fascinating how, under communism, English is constructed as a "subversive sub-text" promoted

"if only to empower the working class to fight imperialism" ("Worldaware," 2001).

Geopolitically and discursively, "communism" becomes reworded as "imperialism," and English

becomes a weapon against both, in much the way Canagarajah (1999) and Pennycook (1994) explored how English has been appropriated and used in former "Imperialist" colonies to reify post-colonial struggle and forward their own purposes (see also Chapters One and Two). The above passage from "Worldaware" (2001) also highlights an irony in the making: how Russian teachers in Romania would find their work suddenly obsolete after the fall of communism in 1989 (contributing to the discursive disappearance of identities in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse), during which time the British Council predicted the need for 100,000 teachers of English to meet the needs of 30 million learners in Central and Eastern European (Phillipson, 1992, p. 6).

The "Worldaware" description of EuroEd marks its flourishing and accomplishments in 2001, well before Romania joined the European Union in 2007.  In a presentation Colibaba (2006) gave at the international "English for Education and European Integration" conference in Bucharest, Romania, in 2006, just one year before Romania joined the EU, she again discursively constructs English in ways which echo how it once was "an avenue of hope" ("Worldaware," 2001). The title of her presentation, intriguingly, is "The Involvement of Romanian Educational Institutions in EU Projects: The Role of English for Lasting Success."  In her presentation, Colibaba (2006) first overviews the multiple EuroEd projects which promote linguistic diversity, discussed earlier in this chapter: "Steps to the World"; "Practice Makes Perfect: Promoting European Citizenship through Languages"; and "eEuroInclusion," among others.  She ends her presentation, however, by looking at both the "broad" and "specific" roles of English in the EU integration process.

Broadly speaking, she constructs English as "vehicular" in that it "gives access to international good practices and models" and "standards and benchmarks in all domains of activity" (Colibaba, 2006), a discourse chain we have just examined and challenged in some

depth.  She also constructs English as having "diplomatic" dimensions, in that "it markets itself

and gives access worldwide to information about the scientific, economic, social, organisational,

cultural values" and "trends, practices and news specific to the English speaking world"

(Colibaba, 2006).  Consequently, in Colibaba's (2006) first observations about "The Broad Role

of English," we find familiar presuppositions: that English is a vehicle for (or to) "international

good practices" and "standards and benchmarks in *all* domains of activity" (Colibaba, 2006;

emphasis added).  Further, the discursively totalizing constructions "international" and "all"

render, I argue, Colibaba's (2006) constructions of "international good practices and models" as

specific to and only accessible in "the English-speaking world."  This is another presupposition

which carries within it risky echoes of the discourses of colonialism (Pennycook, 1994), though

ironically from the point of view of the metaphorically "colonized."  Conceivably, here, the

English-speaking world is *her* "superior" Other (Hansen, 2006), superior, too, due to its

"diplomatic" dimensions as a provider of information, "values" and "news."

    If we turn next to the "Specific Role of English" as Colibaba (2006) constructs it, we find

her description of "Lessons Learned *through English* by the Romanian Society after 1990"

(2006; italics added).  In terms of "Practices and Approaches," she attributes—and thus

ideologically embeds within English and ELT—"new modes of working, learning, and

evaluation," which she delineates as follows: "projects"; "learning at the workplace"; "distance

education"; "life long learning"; "self and peer evaluation"; and "quality driven evaluation"

(Colibaba, 2006).  She further attaches to English the following "values": "diversity," "change,"

"continuous development," "innovation," "accessibility and transferability," and "competence."

Next, she lists the "attitudes" she believes English and ELT have taught Romanians: how to be

"appreciative & tolerant"; "flexible & risk-taking"; committed to "life long learning & learning

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to learn"; how to take "initiative" and use "strategic thinking"; how to "build on [their] own &

shared experience" and come to understand the differences between "skill vs. knowledge vs.

experience" (Colibaba, 2006). Her "Final Remarks" sum up her presentation this way: "English

has been the subtle carrier of ideological and cultural values," and "through all projects

[including ELP], a critical mass for change has been built up, preparing Romania for active

European citizenship" (Colibaba, 2006).

English, indeed (and, in CDA terms, all languages, all discourse) is "the subtle carrier of

ideological and cultural values" (Colibaba, 2006), a premise upon which this entire study is

based. What is startling here is to see how assured Colibaba is in her assertions of what English

carries ideologically, and how quickly and seemingly without hesitation she embraces and

discursively reproduces those "ideological and cultural values"—those discourse chains

identified in Chapter Four—particularly as she is the President of EuroEd, an organization which

is simultaneously at the forefront of promoting linguistic diversity and access in Romania and

throughout the EU. In the final analysis, however, at least according to the discourse of this

presentation and the characterizations of English in the "Worldaware" (2001) article and award,

English—and all the values, attitudes and practices discursively ascribed to it—remains at the

forefront of languages to be learned if full European integration, European citizenship, and

European identities are to be achieved. The title of her presentation, after all, is "The

Involvement of Romanian Educational Institutions in EU Projects: The Role of English for

Lasting Success," a title which may reinforce the role of English in *directly* contributing to

sustainable development ("Worldaware," 2001), and the conference title again, significantly, is

"English for Education and European Integration" (Colibaba, 2006). Accordingly, both the

conference *and* Colibaba's (2006) discourses construct "English" as important enough to

"European Integration" such that an entire international conference is devoted to that theme.  In

sum, through the influence of OSI/SFN ELP, EuroEd constructs a vision of open society which

is essentially *European* at its core, and English is likewise constructed as central to the European

integration process, at least for Romania, for it ideologically is also constructed as carrying the

promise of "Lasting Success" (Colibaba, 2006).

Much like EuroEd, a second institution initially launched by OSI/SFN and its English

Language Programs, the Soros International House-Vilnius, Lithuania, has likewise re-

contextualized and transformed its vision of open society through discursive constructions of

national, European, and global identity.  First, SIH-Vilnius has hosted international forums on

"National vs. European Identity," the fourth of which tackled such questions as

> What is national identity?  What is European identity?  How do you feel or think about
> yourself as a person?  Do you ever think of yourself not only as (nationality) citizen, but
> also as a citizen of Europe or only European? ("SIH-Vilnius," 2007)

The answers to these questions are somewhat startling and indicate a reproduction of the values

Colibaba (2006) and the EuroEd Foundation ascribed to European citizenship:

> Forum participants came to the conclusion that the two identities cannot be separated or
> be ignored. Like every coin that has three sides, (including the round one), a person living
> within the boundaries of E.U., nowadays must consider him/herself as having three sides:
> a) the national identity, that involves all those characteristics that make someone unique,
> b) the European, that deals with and guarantees all those ideals such as democracy,
> freedom, unity, brotherhood, personal rights, economic prosperity, etc, and c) the third
> side, that is the will needed to go on or to roll along the highway that will lead to the
> cherished full economic and political union in Europe. ("SIH-Vilnius," 2007)

Stated thus by these forum participants, "national identity" is discursively reduced to the one

word "unique," without explanation, which may well indicate the Soros International House-

Vilnius' attempt to, in turn, reduce affiliation with national identity. On the other hand,

"European Identity" "deals with and guarantees all those ideals such as democracy, freedom,

unity, brotherhood, personal rights, economic prosperity, etc" ("SIH-Vilnius," 2007).  Further,

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the "third side of the coin" actually seems to be but an extension of the second: "the will needed to go on or to roll along the highway that will lead to the cherished full economic and political union in Europe" ("SIH-Vilnius," 2007). Here, unequivocally, we find discursive emphasis placed on "full economic and political union in Europe," a goal which is even constructed as "cherished."

Equally prominent in this discourse on "economic and political union," a construction which, like OSI-Samara, Russia's (2000) construction of the need for ELP, the discourse lists "economics" first and "politics" second ("SIH-Vilnius," 2007). "Politics" *is* central to the OSI/SFN definition of open society in its discursive elements of "reliance on the rule of law" and "the existence of a democratically elected government" ("About Us: FAQs," 2005), but economics is discursively not. We find, then, quite a dramatic transformation of the vision of open society in the SIH-Vilnius discourse as it evolves from one of multiple schools in "The Soros English/Foreign Language School Network" (2003) to its own entity as a school in a member state of the European Union. We also find, once more, that participants in an SIH-Vilnius (2007)-sponsored "international" forum discursively construct European identity as a "guarantee" of "democracy, freedom, unity, brotherhood, personal rights, economic prosperity" and that always intriguing "etc.," which here can only promise good things. And once more, we find identities which are not "European" are, in turn, implicitly composed by juxtaposition: *non-EU* countries thus carry within their identities the risks of authoritarianism, anarchy, oppression, strife, the lack of human rights, economic poverty. Clearly, they become "inferior" Others (Hansen, 2006, p. 45).

To underscore and conclude this point, I include two objectives from another project started by SIH-Vilnius, "Practice Makes Perfect: Promoting European Citizenship Through

Language Practice," which at least discursively question the values described above. The first objective of "Practice Makes Perfect" is "to promote European Citizenship and intercultural exchange between adult learners on local, national and European levels" (SIH-Vilnius, 2007), an objective one seminar tried to achieve, somewhat chillingly, by "creating an image of the perfect European (SIH-Vilnius, 2007). The second objective, however, is as follows: "To induce critical thinking about our own country, and tolerance towards other European ones" (SIH-Vilnius, 2007). "Critical thinking" about one's country can only be good, yes, but the discursive limitation of "tolerance towards other *European*" countries constructs, at the very least, the discursive possibility of *intolerance* towards non-European countries, or even non-EU countries. Here I think again not only of the United States but those countries on the fringes of Europe, those countries not yet belonging to the EU, those in the post-Soviet and Central Asian borderlands who are farther still—geographically, culturally, economically, politically, religiously, linguistically—from the real and imagined political boundaries of "Europe" per se.

One last project example from SIH-Vilnius' "Practice Makes Perfect" may provide discursive hints of what is yet to come in terms of identity, society, and language. We have seen how EuroEd (2008) re-scaled its identity in moving from "international" to "regional" to "Euro," in name at least. We have further seen how English remains central to all these processes. In a sort of about-face, SIH-Vilnius, in collaboration with partners across Europe, has sponsored forums which have explored "national identity," summed up as "unique," and "European Identity," discussed in detail above. In 2006, SIH-Vilnius organized "a virtual conference, 'Become Global Through Your Identity,'" the aims of which were "to bring students into cultural discussion, to discuss how to become global through your identity" (SIH-Vilnius, 2006). While still far removed discursively from the originating construct of "open society," the

emphasis on "global identity" here does hark back to a starting "hypothesis" or question of this study: whether OSI/SFN seeks to use English as a means to diminish "national identity" and construct "supranational identity," in order, as Soros (1998) himself puts it, to help counter the fact that "the basic unit for political and social life remains the nation-state" (p. xx). He writes this believing that "international law and international institutions, insofar as they exist, are not strong enough to prevent war or the large-scale abuse of human rights in individual countries" (p. xx).

As we have seen above and in the theoretical framework of this study (Chapter Two), "European Citizenship" has been constructed as one step toward a supranational world with the clear motive of, indeed, "preventing war" and "the large-scale abuse of human rights in individual countries" (Soros, 1998, p. xx), particularly given the very bloody and brutal twentieth (and now, twenty-first) century. But the imaginary of Europe, too, retains borders, if now "macro-regional" ones (Fairclough, 2006), and inevitably, discursively, Europe thus becomes a "superior" construction of the Other for the transition countries of Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, just as the non-European becomes the "inferior."

So what happened during the SIH-Vilnius virtual conference "Become Global Through Your Identity"? The summary on SIH-Vilnius' website (2006) goes like this:

> The students wrote short presentations in advance and were prepared to discuss on the following questions such as: Do you like using the pmp-europe site? Or has the course helped you practise your English? And in what way has the virtual trip enriched your life? Or what have you learnt so far about your partner's country? (What things have you discovered we all have in common or are completely different?) and others. (SIH-Vilnius, 2006)

Unfortunately, the website description does not detail what is meant here by "virtual trip" or how students worked with a partner from another country. What it does make clear, however, is how SIH-Vilnius constructs English as central to global identity, and this through the unexpected

question, "has the course helped you practice your English?" (SIH-Vilnius, 2006). In other words, even in a conference about creating "global identity," English is discursively constructed to be at the heart of it, even as students seek to explore and discover commonalities and differences across countries, a more important question, I argue, but curiously here, bracketed by parentheses and thus seemingly less important. Of further note, students who were selected to participate in the conference from each partner institution had to have "good language skills and good computer literacy" ("SIH-Vilnius," 2006), discourse which—as we have seen previously—excludes participants with lower-level or no English skills. At the same time, it reproduces and even extends a central discourse chain from OSI/SFN: that English is no longer needed just for "international communication" ("Strategy," 1999), but it is also now discursively embedded in "global identity."

*English and the Discourses of Security*

One of the starting points for this study was my own experience working as a Peace Corps Volunteer teaching English in a Bosnian Muslim refugee camp during the 1990s, explained in Chapter One. The other volunteers and I who spent one summer there behind compound walls and high wire fences believed in what we were doing, if only to alleviate the boredom of the children in the camp, who had little other structure in their lives and only an uncertain future.

Given this experience and a recent summer spent teaching English in Afghanistan, as I analyzed the ELP discourses of the transition countries of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern and the former Soviet Union, I was especially struck by how English becomes embedded into discourses of security (or, as a Peace Corps English teacher, in discourses of peace), which I began to explore in Chapter Four. As stated there, the OSI/SFN ELP discourse consistently

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creates a larger system of signs or enunciations which point to a temporal construction of the

"Other" (directly, participants in OSI/SFN ELP programs throughout the countries of the

network) as it was constructed in the past—that is, before the fall of communism and the

intervention of development agencies and NGOs like OSI/SFN (see also Hansen, 2006, p. 49;

Waever, 1996). And it is a past, the discourse suggests, which harbors instability and, in some

cases (as in the former Yugoslavia), a (very) recent history (and present) of violence, strife, even

ethnic cleansing. The following italicized phrases discussing the exit strategy of OSI/SFN

English Language Programs suggest this:

> . . . we have endeavored to build local capacity so that our *programs may live on long after the foundations are gone.*
>
> . . . *secure the future of these projects* when the foundations *cease to exist.*
>
> Foundations may *safely disengage* when . . .
>
> *Secure the future* for the foundation-established schools . . .
>
> *Schools that may not survive* without the foundation . . .
>
> . . . which will help them [local teachers' associations'] *not only survive* without further foundation assistance but also take over . . . (Excerpted from "Strategy," 1999; italics added)

The ELP discourse here is obviously and perhaps deliberately a discourse of survival, safety,

existence, and security, what OSI/SFN and ELP discursively imply they have provided, and

arguably, not only to ensure the future of these English language programs and projects in the

newly opened or opening societies after OSI/SFN ELP and the Soros Foundations are gone.

Also, I posit, the discourse seeks to ensure that there is not a return to the past, before the

foundations, when there was insecurity of another kind, when it was "not safe to disengage,"

when even survival, perhaps, was in question. Following Hansen (2006) and Waever (1996), it is

the repeated and associated list of signs here, which, joined together, accomplish "discursive

stability" around—and hence reinforce the positive features of—survival, safety, and security.

At the same time, implicitly juxtaposed behind or next to these explicit signs stand what they are

different from: insecurity, danger, destruction.  These invisible but no less critical signs obtain

through how identity is discursively constructed: not only through a system of "sameness"

(safety, security, survival; new, young, youth) but also through a system of "difference" (Hansen,

2006, p. 45).

This discourse chain linking English and security, the last I will discuss, is reproduced,

bolstered dramatically, and articulated far more directly throughout the local ELP discourses, and

perhaps not surprisingly, especially in the discourses of ELP programs in the countries of the

former Yugoslavia.  For example, a Soros Yugoslavia Foundation (1994) "Annual Report"

describes one program, "Educta," this way:

> The current political and the economical crises are causing a brain drain of those who
> cannot find their place in the prevailing nationalism. The aim of this project is to offer
> programs and elements which enable the opening of perspectives and preparation of
> young people for their engagement in social activities. Gifted students aged from 15 to 18
> attend this program and are thus being prepared for university studies in seven scientific
> fields (law, sociology, economics, ecology, political sciences, English language,
> accounting). . . .The basic approach of the program in social sciences is based on the
> ideas of an open society.

Multiple observations can be made from analysis of this description.  First, English is one of

seven "scientific" fields constructed as a tool for the "opening of perspectives and preparation of

young people for their engagement in social activities" (1994). In this way, the discourse

implicitly constructs English as one of several weapons against "the prevailing nationalism"

arising from "current political and economical crises" (1994).  Further, given the program's

emphasis on "gifted students aged from 15 to 18," the discourse here once more clearly

constructs "young people" (Falk's "Citizen Pilgrims," 1994) as being most likely to "open" their

perspectives through English and other disciplines, a discursive move which also reproduces the

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construction of the implicit and en-aged and now perhaps *closed* "Other" (Hansen, 2006; Reisigl

& Wodak, 2002), those, the discourse suggests, who construct, contribute to, and reinforce "the

prevailing nationalism" (Soros Yugoslavia, 1994).

The Soros Yugoslavia Foundation report (1994) also sought to use English against

"prevailing nationalism" in other projects. It awarded, for instance, grants for two ESP projects

for journalists, "Media and War" and "Liberation and the Submission of the Media," both which

went to an independent research agency in Belgrade, Serbia. Its "English for NGOs" project

included "42 representatives of non-governmental organizations (humanitarian, peace, women,

ecological, human rights, etc.)," a project which evokes Ignatieff's (2003) observation that

"humanitarian action is not unmasked if it is shown to be the instrument of imperial power" (p.

22). In other words, I do not mean to argue here that OSI/SFN nor ELP nor English is

unquestionably "imperialist," but here and throughout these ELP discourses, English *is* plainly

constructed as a means to resist nationalism and its effects since the fall of the Soviet Union: in

this case, the brutal aftermath of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.

That brutal aftermath is evidenced further in the discourse of another Soros Yugoslavia

Foundation (1998) program, "The Kosovo Education Enrichment Program," which also

constructs "training" in English as one of multiple projects working to "overcome the dominant

national(ist) ideology that strongly influences the educational content in schools" (Soros

Yugoslavia, 1998). Here we see a stunning extension of the earlier analysis of how English

becomes discursively embedded in democracy and modern methodology. That discourse chain,

in other words, is profoundly strengthened in the Kosovo project, though now in the specific

context of security, constructed as follows:

> Furthermore, the educational system in Kosovo still relies on out-dated teaching styles
> and methodology which reinforces the authoritarian behaviour in teacher-student

relations that, in turn, feeds into the authoritarian political environment, where critical thinking and the questioning of authority is still something one would not venture to do easily. Therefore, the syllabus, teaching style and school setting (separate [ethnically-determined] schools) in Kosovo all help entrench national stereotypes and misconceptions thus posing a seemingly insurmountable obstacle for mutual understanding and tolerance. All initiatives to democratise the schools in Kosovo have only provided for initial attempts at challenging the dominant national paradigm by introducing the germs of critical thinking and modern school management. (Soros Yugoslavia, 1998)

Furthermore, the conditions and consequences of the "seemingly insurmountable obstacle[s] for mutual understanding and tolerance" are constructed in harsh terms:

The current problem in Kosovo's education as a whole comprises two dimensions: school reform and the issue of school space. Both dimensions represent a serious obstacle to inter-ethnic understanding in Kosovo, locking the two communities - the Albanian majority and the Serbian minority - into the "nationally pure" educational framework - both in terms of content and space. The outbreak of hostilities in Kosova this spring and summer has not only widened the gap between Serbs and Albanians, but also created new imperatives in the educational sphere: the repair of destroyed school buildings and the need to provide education for thousands of displaced youngsters.

Kosovo's "English Language Teaching Program," as a part of the "Kosovo Education Enrichment Program" is here, if again implicitly, constructed as having an enormous job ideologically and operationally: "instilling the seeds of democratic change and democratic thinking" in the midst of a "nationally pure educational framework" (Soros Yugoslavia, 1998), and this in the midst of schools in disrepair, in the midst of massacre and genocide.

Serbia and Kosovo are not alone in their strengthening of the discourse chain of English as a means toward larger security. OSI-Croatia's ELP discourse is rife with terms which connote war and conflict.  In reference to its "Alternative Education" strategy, OSI-Croatia constructs programs (including ELP, a part of "Alternative Education") such that "they become *hotbeds* of already developed curricula, methods and models that can, though with flexibility, be integrated in the educational system" ("Community," 1999; emphasis added).  Such a construction may not be surprising, given how the same report constructs its context:

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Context in which we run our program in the field of education is the result of ideologically rigid, politically strictly controlled and at organizational level highly centralised system on one hand, and, government that treats OSI as a political enemy on the other. Consequently, it is not possible to start changes within the educational system, but it has to be prepared in independent alternative institutions. ("Community," 1999)

In its attempt to develop "open education," in turn, OSI-Croatia constructs "pockets of resistance" in the field of education more broadly, its response to how it sees the "deterioration" of education evidenced as follows:

- a project of bilingual high schools has been drastically abolished because of political reasons

- the second foreign language teaching in elementary schools is threatened

- the early foreign language learning project is undergoing serious difficulties as a result of negligence and unwillingness to be further financially supported either by the Ministry of Education or city councils

- liberal arts colleges and faculties (language departments) run traditional courses, instead of developing educational standards assessments tasks in accordance with international requirements . ("Community," 1999)

Clearly in this discourse, "foreign language teaching" (including the teaching of English) is constructed as "political" and therefore as "threatened" by an "ideologically rigid and politically, strictly controlled" government and by "the negligence" and "unwillingness" of both the Ministry of Education (nationally) and city councils (locally).  English thus becomes again constructed as a "subversive sub-text" ("Worldaware," 2001) and, as part of OSI-Croatia's alternative education plan, "an educational guerrilla" ("Programmes," 1999) working against nationalism, rigid ideologies and centrally-administered (top-down) control.

Potentially less dramatic examples throughout the CESEE-fSU further the discourse chain of English and security. English students and teachers from Lithuania and Belarus, two countries which have experienced cross-border tensions since the fall of the Soviet Union, were brought together for "English Language Summer School" and "a summer school for non-

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specialist teachers of English," both funded by the Soros International House-Lithuania and the

Open Society Fund-Lithuania ("OSF-Lithuania," 1997; "OSF-Lithuania," 1998). While

unstated, it is probable that here is an example of SIH-Lithuania and its Open Society Fund

working to create "cross-cutting" identities, that is, "when some, but not all, members of one

identity group are also members of another identity group" with the goal of curtailing bias

towards in-groups and stereotyping of outgroups (Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, 2004, pp. 8-9).

English student and English teacher become, thus, shared identities which can potentially

diminish bias, stereotyping and their common result: hostility. As another example of how

English becomes discursively embedded in security—and its more positively constructed cousin,

peace—OSI-Macedonia (1996) funded English Language Courses for professors who would be

attending the "International Seminar 'Peace Education and Conflict Resolution' in Salzburg,

Austria." Relatedly, in 2005, OSI-Macedonia partnered with other groups to start a project

called "Re-Socialization of Ex-Combatants," including courses on computer skills, technological

literacy, and English (OSI-Macedonia, 2006). Here and throughout, English is again and again

embedded ideologically into security, a discourse chain which bolsters one hypothesis of this

study: namely, that OSI/SFN constructs English as a means to cross-cut identities, in the process,

reducing affiliation with national identity. Here—in terms of war and peace—the OSI/SFN ELP

discourse is soundly reproduced and amplified.

<center>Conclusion</center>

Analysis in this chapter has revealed the following:

1. Local written ELP discourses both reproduce a discourse chain of supranational language

    management as well as start a new discourse chain promoting linguistic diversity;

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2. Local written ELP discourses construct "access" and "actors" such that more people have opportunities to participate not only in the work of building open societies, but also to re-claim responsibility for that work, two new discourse chains resisting the OSI/SFN ELP discourse;

3. Local written ELP discourses both reproduce and resist discourse chains which embed English ideologically into the building of open societies; into local, national and regional needs; into the construct of democracy, which is in turn embedded into the construct of "modern" ELT methodology; in pathways to social and political consciousness; into the construction of "international standards" and the ideal of "international"; and into the work of forging European and global identities; and

4. Local written ELP discourses—particularly from countries which have experienced civil war, genocide, and cross-border tensions—construct English as a means of creating security, thus reinforcing a key discourse chain from OSI/SFN generally and its ELP programs specifically.

In the next chapter (Chapter Six), I will turn to the discourses of participants in OSI/SFN ELP throughout the countries of Central, Eastern, South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, collected through face to face and email interviews, in order to share their voices and views on the role of English in building open societies. Chapter Seven will conclude by exploring the implications of findings as they pertain to English language aid projects in transition and developing countries.

CHAPTER SIX: VIEWS OF PARTICIPANTS IN OSI/SFN ENGLISH LANGUAGE

PROGRAMS

In Chapter Five of this study, I mapped the flow of discourse chains from the New York-based OSI/SFN ELP discourse into the local written ELP discourses of Soros foundations, programs, and projects from across the countries of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (CESEE-fSU). Analysis in that chapter led to four main findings:

1. These discourses both reproduced the discourse chain of supranational language management identified in Chapter Four as well as started a new discourse chain promoting linguistic diversity;

2. These discourses constructed "access" and "actors" such that more people have opportunities to participate not only in the work of building open societies, but also to re-claim responsibility for that work, two new discourse chains resisting the OSI/SFN ELP discourse;

3. These discourses reproduced, re-contextualized, and resisted discourse chains which embedded English ideologically into multiple constructs, from the building of open societies to the work of forging global and European identities; and

4. Finally, these discourses ideologically embedded English even more deeply into the construct of security, particularly in countries which have experienced cross-border and ethnic tensions, civil war, and genocide.

In this chapter, I turn to the voices of participants in these programs in order to share their views on and experiences with English language schools, universities, programs, and projects funded by the Open Society Institute and Soros Foundations Network throughout the countries of

CESEE-fSU. My goal at this juncture is to share a broad range of participant perspectives in order to better understand "the core experiences and central, shared aspects or impacts of a program" (Patton, 1990, p. 172). I will also share previously-identified discourse chains which are reproduced, re-scripted, transformed or resisted by participants. I do so in order to continue mapping how various meanings (of open society, methodology, English, etc.) stabilize, become legitimized, and take on authority until finally they are accepted as taken-for-granted "knowledge" of a subject area. Awareness of these processes of meaning stabilization and construction can help us, I believe, re-examine and interrogate such "knowledge" as it is reproduced, re-scripted, transformed, or resisted by different people for different motives and purposes. From these voices and discourses, my ultimate aim is to identify and formulate policy and teaching implications for English language aid projects in developing countries and countries in transition, which Chapter Seven will share.

In total, I interviewed 18 people from 11 different countries, including English teachers, students, English language program directors, and employees involved in various OSI/SFN-funded aid activities. In all cases, English was the language of instruction and/or work for each of the participants. I interviewed as many participants from as many different countries as I could within the limits of funding and time. My decision to incorporate participant perspectives from countries throughout CESEE-fSU was guided by Jentleson (1999), who explained the value of interviewing participants in multiple countries, especially for researching topics with foreign policy implications, a field this study straddles:

> The essence of a comparative case study is to identify patterns rather than just single-case phenomena. The uniqueness of every case is to be respected, but the emphasis is on developing more general conceptual formulations, middle-range theories, and policy lessons. This amounts to more of an analytic than descriptive approach to the writing of case studies, with less need to "tell the whole story" of each case than to structure and

focus treatment of the case on a set of analytic questions. The cases as such are less ends in themselves than means to the ends of developing "conditional generalizations." (p. 15)

So guided, I traveled throughout the countries of CESEE-fSU during the summers of 2005 and 2006, during which time I conducted a series of semi-structured, face-to-face, and email interviews, including follow-up questions, with participants involved in OSI/SFN English language programs, schools, and activities. I then transcribed, verified, and coded the interview data according to emergent themes or "conditional generalizations" (Jentleson, 1999, p. 15). While identifying these themes, I paid special attention to those which linked both to my research questions as well as discourse chains identified in previous chapters. At the same time, following Maxwell (1996, p. 53) and Rubin and Rubin (1995), I worked hard to listen for unexpected responses, new ideas, and other possible understandings of the data so as not to be "blinded" (or deafened) by my pre-conceptions and possible misconceptions about my research questions. Rather, I sought to "develop an empathetic understanding of the world of others" (Rubin & Rubin, 1995, p. 35) by listening for wholly new local discourses.

Table 1, recopied here from Chapter Three, re-introduces my participants.

Table 1: *Participants Interviewed for this Study*

| Participants' Pseudonyms | Region | Relationships to OSI/SFN | English as LI or L2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Thomas | Western Europe | Teacher/Project Consultant | LI |
| Philip | Western Europe | Teacher/Director | LI |
| Andrew | Western Europe | Teacher | LI |
| Jeremy | Western Europe | Teacher | LI |
| Lauren | North America | Student/OSI Employee | LI |
| Irena | South Eastern Europe | Teacher/Head of OSI/SFN Teachers' Association | L2 |
| Ana | South Eastern Europe | Teacher | L2 |
| Klara | Central/Eastern Europe | Student/Teacher | L2 |
| Karolina | Central/Eastern Europe | Teacher | L2 |
| Bianca | Central/Eastern Europe | Teacher/Scholarship Abroad Recipient | L2 |
| Eva | Central/Eastern Europe | Teacher | L2 |
| Magda | Central/Eastern Europe | Teacher/Scholarship Abroad Recipient | L2 |
| Victoriya | Central Asia | OSI/SFN Employee/ Student | L2 |
| Ecaterina | Central/Eastern Europe | Student | L2 |
| Galina | Central/Eastern Europe | Student | L2 |
| Mihail | Central/Eastern Europe | Student | L2 |
| Dora | Central/Eastern Europe | Teacher | L2 |
| Elsa | Western Europe | Student/OSI employee | L2 |

All attempts have been made to protect participants' identities, including the use of pseudonyms and removal of mentions of specific countries, universities, schools, and programs. I will also on occasion not mention even participants' pseudonyms so as to further protect identities. The risk of this anonymity, I know, is that context-specific insights may be lost on readers unfamiliar with CESEE-fSU, OSI/SFN, and the regions as categorized in the table, but I believe the gains were greater: Identities ultimately were and are protected and participants, in turn, felt they could speak more openly. I do distinguish between L1 and L2 speakers (as opposed to native and non-native speakers of English) in order to alert readers to the different worldviews and experiences shaping participants' answers, divided roughly and at the risk of great reductiveness into expatriate and local, Western and Eastern.[32] Like Holliday (2005), my use of these various categories strives to be flexible, with a shared understanding with readers that I do not mean to use any term in a monolithic, essentializing, or totalizing way. I acknowledge, too, the unstable meanings especially behind discursive constructions of space and identity: For instance, most of my L2 participants speak four or more languages fluently. As participants themselves talked in these terms throughout the interviews, however, I decided to directly acknowledge the risk of reductiveness and proceed, knowing that all participants shared the common variable of having been involved in OSI/SFN English language aid projects in the countries of CESEE-fSU.

The research questions this chapter answers are the following:

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[32] For more, see Holliday's (2005) discussion of the divisiveness of many binary TESOL terms (TESOL included): Center versus Periphery; East versus West; Native versus Non-Native; BANA (British, Australian, North American) versus TESEP (State Tertiary, Secondary, and Primary Education around the world); modern versus traditional, and so forth. I also admit here that "expatriate" may be a misnomer, since many of my participants were expatriates at the time of the study, regardless of whether they were L1 or L2 speakers of English.

1.  How do participants involved in local OSI/SFN ELP or other OSI/SFN programs with an English language component construct open society, English, and the relationship between building open societies, English, and ELT? How do these constructions compare with constructions identified in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse and the local written ELP discourses?

2.  What other interests emerge from the discourses of these participants, and how do they compare with interests identified in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse and local ELP discourses?

3.  How do participants construct the actors in these programs: both L1 and L2 project personnel, teacher trainers, teachers, and students? How do these constructions compare with constructions of actors identified through analysis of previous discourses?

4.  What new, local discourses emerge from or are strengthened in interviews with research participants?

In answering these questions, I have organized this chapter into three major sections. First, in order to get at participants' understandings of the role of English in building open societies, and in order to provide some context for participants' understandings and experiences, I map the relationship between (a) the OSI/SFN constructions of open society and its mission; and (b) how participants construct and define open society, including barriers to building open societies, perceptions of the mission of OSI/SFN, and whether or not participants believe *their* societies are open or opening.

Second, given that OSI/SFN constructs membership in the European Union as having "profound and positive consequences for open society" ("Overview: Central and Eastern

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Europe," 2008), I next look at how participants construct the relationship between OSI/SFN, space, and language, including participants' constructions of East and West; the relationship between OSI/SFN and the European Union; the role of English in building open societies; the role of English in the EU and accession thereto; and how language and EU accession shape participants' senses of their identities.

Finally, I move to participants' broader constructions of English and ELT, analysis which provides important insights into participants' views on—and our assumptions underlying— education under communism, teachers and teaching then and now, how state language education compares with OSI/SFN-funded language education, who has ownership of and responsibility for OSI/SFN English language aid projects, the role of temporal identities in local discourses, and ultimately, how participants perceive the impact of OSI/SFN on their teaching, learning, and work in helping to build open societies. The perspectives and findings shared herein—along with analyses in previous sections and chapters—will be used to inform policy and teaching implications for English language aid projects in developing and transition countries.

<div align="center">Participants' Constructions of Open Society and Its Mission</div>

As I began this phase of the research, interviewing participants involved in OSI/SFN programs from across the countries of CESEE-fSU, I first wanted to understand how *they* understood open society and how their definitions compared with the OSI/SFN definition. I quote the OSI/SFN definition as follows:

> An open society is a society based on the recognition that nobody has a monopoly on the truth, that different people have different views and interests, and that there is a need for institutions to protect the rights of all people to allow them to live together in peace. Broadly speaking, an open society is characterized by a reliance on the rule of law, the existence of a democratically elected government, a diverse and vigorous civil society, and respect for minorities and minority opinions. ("About Us: FAQs," 2005)

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From this definition, we can see numerous discourse fragments and chains reproduced, re-

scripted, and/or transformed in participants' understandings of open society. Participants'

discourses challenged the construct of "truth"; they extended a discourse chain of inclusion; they

constructed a social democracy semantically distant from the U.S.; they emphasized the need for

competition, a potential new discourse chain; they extended the importance of civil society; and

finally, they raised questions around whose responsibility it is to set up democratic

infrastructures in countries where totalitarian governments have been overthrown.

*Definitions of Open Society*

Most participants, who did *not* have the official definition in front of them at the time of

the interview, nevertheless reproduced—in some cases, word for word—at least one aspect of

the OSI/SFN definition, particularly in relation to imperfect truths, democracy, respect for

diverse views, and respect for "minorities and minority opinions." Thomas, when asked how he

defines open society, reproduced Popper's words on truth almost exactly: "I read Popper, *Open*

*Society and Its Enemies*, it was ok, I read the classic skim [laughs] . . . and as Popper said it, we

are holders of imperfect truths." Then he expanded:

> I think the messiness of democracy, liberal democracy in fact, probably best reflects the
> realities of humanity. . . . I really like working for an organization which in most of its
> perspectives is pushing for the principle of democracy rather than a particular expression
> of how it should be like.

In addition to imperfect "truths" and the flexible model of democracy Thomas described here,

based on principles rather "than a particular expression thereof," he made equally central to his

definition the importance of acknowledging the value of all voices, language which reproduces

unequivocal respect for "different views" and "minority opinions" ("About Us: FAQs," 2005):

> So how would I describe open society?  Just like this. The fact that we can have a voice,
> or the fact that we understand each other as potentially having something to say, not

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potentially, *having*[33] something to say, and that it's worth hearing and worth hearing from everybody is a really, really strong thing.

Thomas' conclusion—that everyone has something to say and "it's worth hearing"—extends a discourse chain of inclusion, one echoed again and again in participants' responses, most often through the word "respect" reworded as, or in conjunction with, "tolerance."

Bianca's response was short and to the point: "In my opinion, an open society is appreciative and tolerant of alterity and diversity, while valuing and respecting the individual." Bianca's construction of open society, like Thomas' and as signaled by her use of the word "alterity," likely includes citizens and governments which hear and respect the voices and views of the individual Other, as opposed to trying to construct the Other as "a stranger, or an underdeveloped subject in need of help" (Hansen, 2006, p. 76). She, too, affirms a discourse chain of inclusion. Ecaterina described it similarly: "I would define an open society as a society where every citizen has the right of having own opinion and the right of freely expressing it, at the same time being tolerant to the opinions expressed by other people."

Galina began her definition with tolerance and democracy as well, before she added an economic element, one which, markedly, does not appear in the OSI/SFN definition. She thus re-scripts slightly the OSI/SFN vision of open society:

> Society which claims to be an open one should be informed by the spirit of tolerance and based on the firm democratic principles of government. It should also stand on the ground of free market economy complimented by some elements of welfare system to provide the best means of individual self-realization.

Here we again find tolerance and democracy along with "individual self-realization" reiterated as crucial to a society's openness, though Galina also carefully added "some elements of welfare system" along with a "free market economy." As a result, she expands on the OSI/SFN definition of open society, and she does so in language which subtly distinguishes between and

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[33] Unless otherwise noted, italics represent participants' emphases on words, not mine.

semantically distances, again, European and U.S. governments and societies by adding "some elements of welfare system"; she suggests a society closer to social democracy than democracy as currently realized in the United States. In the end, therefore, while Galina's definition may re-script and expand upon the OSI/SFN definition, she simultaneously reproduces a discourse chain identified in both the OSI/SFN ELP discourse and the local ELP discourses. This discourse chain sets Europe discursively, geopolitically, socially, and semantically apart from the United States.

Victoriya's vision of open society was not ontologically far from Galina's: "Open society is the one that supports a marketplace of ideas, because when there is no competition, there's no need for growth or improvement. Competition is necessary in any social sphere: politics, art, religion and economy." Like Galina, Victoriya augmented the OSI/SFN definition by articulating the role of economic elements and competition in multiple spheres, phrases and ideas notably absent in the OSI/SFN definition. At the same time, Victoriya returned to the theme of "imperfect truths" Thomas raised earlier, expressing her worry over "the *only* right way" (italics added) to do something: "I agree with Soros' definition that any society is imperfect, and open society is the one open to improvement. Once something is accepted as the only right way, the society is on the way to becoming a closed society." For Victoriya, it seems, "competition" is the factor that undergirds open society in that it forces a society to open itself to improvement in various spheres.

When asked about his definition of open society, Philip began with a similar challenge to the construct of "truth" before listing other specific features from the OSI/SFN definition: "nobody has a monopoly on the truth, civil society, free and open discussion, exchange of opinions." Philip also added something new, however, what I would argue is a Western and perhaps risky construct of responsibility, one Ignatieff (2003) explores and critiques at length

(see Chapter Two) in his work on nation building. Philip also added: "setting up the

infrastructure of democratic countries, setting up the kind of stuff that is not there when you have

overthrown a totalitarian dictatorship and had your first democratic elections." Importantly,

Philip did not say exactly who should be responsible for this work: presumably the "you" who

has "overthrown a totalitarian dictatorship" and then held "your first democratic elections."

Whether the "you" Philip refers to is a national or outside government—or some combination

thereof—remains unclear.

*The OSI/SFN Mission*

Other participants, when seeking to define open society, articulated elements closer to the

OSI/SFN mission statement ("About OSI: Mission," 2008)[34] rather than its definition of open

society. They asserted the need for free flow of information into and out of countries, thus

extending the discourse chain of two-way (or more accurately, multiple-way) exchange; they

made important the role of intellectual elites in the creation of open society, a point which may

answer questions around access raised by qualification in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse; they

introduced the construct of providing "equal opportunities," thus extending a discourse chain of

inclusion again, one begun in local ELP discourses; and finally, they touched upon support of

human rights and indirectly, the rule of law, as fundamental for open society.

Given the interconnectedness of the OSI/SFN definition of open society and its

subsequent mission statement, I first quote the mission statement below before returning to

participants' definitions and discussions thereof. As with the definition of open society, I did not

show the mission statement to participants beforehand. It reads as follows:

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[34] Notably, the OSI/SFN mission statement changes frequently and has changed since 2008. I use this version as it was active on the website at the time I began this study. The 2009 definition, interestingly, does include "freedom of information" ("About OSI, Mission," 2009), which was reproduced in the discourses of several participants. It would be fascinating to compare the evolution of the OSI/SFN mission statements over time, but such a venture is currently beyond the scope of this study.

The Open Society Institute (OSI), a private operating and grantmaking foundation, aims to shape public policy to promote democratic governance, human rights, and economic, legal, and social reform. On a local level, OSI implements a range of initiatives to support the rule of law, education, public health, and independent media. At the same time, OSI works to build alliances across borders and continents on issues such as combating corruption and rights abuses. ("About OSI: Mission," 2008)

From this statement, we can see other central components of open society and the mission of

OSI/SFN reproduced, re-scripted, or transformed in participants' discourses. Galina and

Victoriya already hinted at "economic" and "social reform" in their responses, though they

articulated *specific* ideas for reforms ("free market economy," "some elements of the welfare

system"). Other participants spoke of different elements, but elements which were no less

important in their perceptions.

*Freedom and Flow of Information Into and Out of Countries*

The OSI/SFN mission to support independent media was interpreted by several

participants as a primary component of defining and building open societies. Lauren, like

Thomas, acknowledged Popper's work before sharing her own views:

Well, unfortunately, I haven't read the book [laughs]. Well, we'll just say very broadly, I like to think of open society in sort of the most democratic way possible of exchanging information and resources in ways that are not hierarchical but which travel freely, I suppose, and there's constant debate and discussion on relationships and ideas and concepts and so on.

In Lauren's discussion, democracy matters as a way to exchange "information and resources"

freely as opposed to hierarchically, an exchange only possible through independent media and

through *understanding the language* in which the information and resources are reported and

broadcast. Furthermore, her emphasis on "exchange" echoes the local written discourses, which

resisted the OSI/SFN ELP emphasis on a one-way transfer of knowledge. Lauren further alluded

to the importance of debate and discussion, another discourse chain identified in Chapter Five

("If a language can't unite us, debate will!"[35]), and consonant, perhaps, with perceptions of many

Western educational practices and experiences.

Dora's definition of open society, on the other hand, both resembled Lauren's closely and

offered a desolate view of the consequences of hierarchical control of information—media, that

is, which is government-controlled, as she experienced before transition:

> I think open society means that the information can come in freely and can go out freely,
> so there's an outflow and inflow of information and there are no restrictions. . . . You
> know, in the communist times here, we were very closed, we did not know what was
> happening in the world and we were not supposed to know these things. So we had for
> example a TV broadcast only . . . two hours a day, and we could see only our leader on
> TV, nothing else, so there was no information at all, and when the changes come, so
> everything was so sudden. We were overwhelmed by the things happening in the world
> and that is, in my, my opinion, what open society means, that you have access to things
> that you want. I mean, I mean like physical access but mental access, too, to information,
> to knowledge, to news.

In this response, it may be significant that Dora did not use the specific word "democracy" in her

definition, but rather "the changes,"[36] which came suddenly and brought with them

"information," "knowledge," "news": the products, that is, of independent media. Failure to use

the word "democracy" may suggest, if not resistance, at least some uneasiness around use of the

term. At the same time, Dora, like Lauren, did articulate the need for *two-way* exchange, "an

*out*flow and inflow of information" (italics added).  Access to resources physically and mentally,

through travel and news, helped Dora define what open society means to her, while at the same

time she may well have been thinking about what the West might learn about and use from her

country and its people.

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[35] See the Soros Foundation-Moldova's 1997 Annual Report.

[36] Participants almost never used the word "transition," a discourse in and of itself which Fairclough (2006)
interprets as a "narrative" of what would or will happen eventually in post-communist countries: that they become
"market economies and Western-style multi-party democracies" (p. 57). Such differences between academic
discourses of "transition" and those of people living and working in transition countries underscore Fairclough's
observation that "the architects of transition" were predominantly "Western," just as I, a "Western" researcher, have
likewise used the term throughout the study.

Klara's definition was eerily like Dora's, emphasizing not only access to information, but other "freedoms" in their various forms, a word oddly absent in both the OSI/SFN definition of open society and its mission. She described these haltingly but poignantly:

> Open society, well, a society which, in which I can move freely, and I can access information, and, uh, express myself freely, and . . . that you can be free, so it's your choice  and somehow, because we have [had] this, these terrible times of, of, so far from freedom, we need to experience that. A freedom has, a lot of, a lot of levels, or a lot of faces, or, I don't know how to, to say, and, well, open society is, is freedom.

Klara's emphasis on freedom here—strengthened through six mentions of the word form—makes wrenchingly salient what open society means to her and what was not possible during the "terrible times." Like Dora, Klara, too, never mentioned the word "democracy"; instead, she spoke rather more broadly of freedom with all its "faces," many of which were likewise articulated in the local written discourses ("freedom of expression," "freedom of the press," "free access to information," and simply, "freedom"). On the other hand, the word "freedom" does not occur in any of the OSI/SFN ELP discourse: only "free expression" as made possible through English and ELP. The discourse here, as constructed by Klara, articulates profoundly the local experience of lacking such freedoms and access to news, and combined with the emphasis on freedom in local written discourses, a discourse of "freedom" far beyond what OSI/SFN ELP provided may well be argued as an important local discourse to emerge.

*Shaping Public Policy to Promote Democratic Governance: Creating Elites*

A second element of the OSI/SFN mission is to "shape public policy to promote democratic governance" ("About OSI: Mission," 2008). As previously noted, during the interviews, some participants used the word "democracy," while others did not, indicating, perhaps, if not resistance to the word, possibly an unease in using it at least at the point of time the interviews took place. Karolina, however, did use the term, even poetically, and in so doing,

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she introduces us to one way OSI/SFN aims to "shape public policy," through the construction of an intellectual "elite":

> If I'm to define this open society, well, I would say . . . well, open to attracting intellectuals, because they could be the driving force of such, of any country in fact, because sweet is democracy, and it is beautiful to talk about. But I think there should be still some leading power, and this leading power should be people. . . .

Here we hear Karolina's assessment: "sweet is democracy, and it is beautiful to talk about." At the same time, her thoughts on "attracting intellectuals" as the possible "driving force" of democracy introduce a new and intriguing component to open society and the OSI/SFN mission, and also a new explicit discourse chain started by Soros and reproduced in the discourses of program participants. Soros, in reference to his first foray into helping countries—Cape Town University in South Africa, 1979 (see also Chapter One)—is quoted as follows: "I would be helping to build a black elite, and I still think that the creation of elites among persecuted people is the most effective way to overcome prejudice" (quoted in Kaufman, 2002, p. 171). The "attraction" of an intellectual elite such as Karolina described above may parallel Soros' own thinking. It may further shed a bright light on initial questions around access and responsibility created by qualification in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse as identified in Chapter Four, explaining, to some degree, why OSI/SFN maintained discursive limits on who could participate in building open societies, in the process, creating an implicit discourse chain of *ex*clusion.

Elsa, a student and employee of one of three OSI/SFN-funded universities in the region, construed the mission of her university in the same way:

> Well, the mission of the university originally was a way to produce an elite that would, that would foster a liberal, liberal culture, atmosphere and this would result in an open society and debate and the whole thing, and I, I think it's working in a way, so, I think it's definitely not doing the opposite.

Elsa seems quite aware of Soros' strategy for overcoming persecution and prejudice through the creation of intellectual elites. Further, given that all three OSI/SFN-funded universities in the

region are English medium universities, the creation of such an elite necessarily assumes the centrality of English.[37] And Elsa believed it was working, "in a way," at least.

So did Thomas. During our interview, he emphasized and justified the regional need for and role of intellectual elites this way:

> Since 2000, '99 actually . . . OSI and [the university] . . . have been a very strong and very prominent . . . advocate for liberal values, and part of the liberal foreign form of strategy has been very much about the re-establishment of the elite, right? A burgeoning liberal intellectual class was missing and without that, there is no possibility for a liberal perspective or view to develop . . . deliberative democracy wasn't there. . . . And they've actually, to an extent, pretty much succeeded, because everywhere I go, I meet ex-students who are now directly in NGOs, and think tanks, and policy researchers, and politicians, advisors to governments, you know, people I personally taught.

Here, Thomas brings to life one way OSI/SFN has shaped public policy to promote democratic governance, through an intellectual elite created, in part, through English and English language teaching. Like Elsa, he affirms (with some qualification) the success of this mission, as they (OSI/SFN) have, "to an extent, pretty much succeeded." In our discussion, too, he took care to define his picture of elite:

> Now I don't accept that . . . elites have to come from a certain class. It should be merit-based . . . not only the best people . . . not just the brightest, but also those who are successful in representing large-scale constituencies.

Thomas went on to argue that for OSI/SFN as well, the idea of an "elite" was "a much more merit-oriented idea." He further remained adamant about what would happen if there were no intellectual elites in the countries of CESEE-fSU: "Without the development of that, let's say, more neutral word, that interface, then in fact, democracy's not going to happen." In the final analysis, according to Thomas, the lack of an intellectual elite, implicitly constructed here as English-speaking, is a lethal threat to democracy and, in turn, open society.

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[37] The mission statement of the American University of Bulgaria is "to educate students of outstanding potential" and "prepare them for democratic and ethical leadership" (2009). The American University of Central Asia, similarly, aims to develop "enlightened and impassioned leaders for the democratic transformation of Central Asia" (2009). Central European University strives to "educate students to be citizens and leaders of the world" (Shattuck, 2009). Each of these English medium universities, supported in part by Soros funds, clearly seeks to create elites.

*Equal Opportunities, Human Rights, Two-Way Exchange, and the Rule of Law*

Far from focusing on the elite, Magda had a different picture of open society, one closer

to the ELP discourses of local foundations in their emphases on "equal opportunities," another

phrase notably absent in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse:

> Well, equal opportunities, I believe that's what, what it would mean or it should mean, equal opportunities for everyone, no matter where you come from, which part of the country, what sort of social background you come from, you have equal opportunities, so you can study, you can achieve the same as anyone else.

Magda later shared her perspective on the OSI/SFN mission in terms prominent in her original

definition, "equal opportunities":

> Well, I think [my university] is still working towards this dream, you know, of equal opportunities, because after all, taking in these international students from Central Asia and, and, Central Europe, and, and, um, the former Soviet Union, basically it, it really serves this dream still, because, because we get students from, from very, very disadvantaged situations, and, and, and here they are *really* equal. I mean, it really doesn't matter at all whether your parents are rich or you have no parents at all, nobody, nobody, cares. What really matters is your, is your academic achievement, nothing else, and, and hopefully, you know, after graduation, they go back to their own countries then, and maybe they contribute to their, to their own country's development, so I think [this university] still serves this, this dream.

"Equal opportunities" are clearly paramount for Magda, with success marked by "academic

achievement, nothing else." Feasibly, one could argue that academic achievement still poses

barriers to "equal opportunities" in that many students *cannot* achieve it for numerous reasons.

This fact may help us understand again limitations around access first created by qualification in

the OSI/SFN ELP discourse and then countered by expansion of access in local written ELP

discourses. Magda did, however, list with care the barriers which can be overcome for her

students. As she said later in her interview, "We have to be optimistic." Such optimism was

apparent in Eva's response, too, as she also saw equal opportunities in the mission of OSI/SFN

and her work, with no limits to access: "[My school] is giving education for the local

community. We are a small town so if they wanted, everybody could attend a course."

Other participants reproduced and reiterated different discourse fragments from the OSI/SFN definition and/or mission statement. In an email interview, Mihail wrote: "Open Society is one free of oppression in terms of political views that individuals have. Democracy and observance of other basic human rights should be some of the main aspects of open societies." Mihail thus introduces the idea of "human rights" to the definition (it is present in the mission statement), one of which, in his words, is democracy.[38]

For Eva, open society meant "being open to accept and learn from the different societies," including her own, bolstering again the discourse chain of two-way exchange first heard in local ELP discourses. Expatriate Jeremy, in contrast, put his definition in educational terms which, he admitted somewhat shame-facedly, did *not* necessarily mean always learning from different societies.  He did, however, connect the need for local teacher responsibility, autonomy, and creativity with open society:

> Well, I mean, open society, it's sort of a wide term, educationally it could mean breaking free from a more centralized educational structure from the communist period where it was all passed down from the ministry, to allow teachers at a local level to, to, to experiment and to, to teach and to bring in new ideas from abroad and connect with other teachers from abroad, and to exchange ideas, but whether we took any ideas with us is an interesting point, whether we learned anything from them. I think it was pretty much a one-way street.

Jeremy's answer was honest and reflective. His take further mirrors a discourse chain identified in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse in Chapter Four: the construction of a one-way transfer of knowledge from foreign "expert" to local "novice," which he described as "pretty much a one-way street."

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[38] Mihail rewords Article 29 of *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,* part of which argues for "the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society."

When Irena articulated her vision of open society in an email interview, she turned first to

an extended analogy which implicitly underscores the OSI/SFN mission of supporting "rule of

law":

> It's hard to tell. It reminds me a little bit of deregulation in airspace. You see, you cannot
> eliminate all rules and have a perfectly organized air traffic. And yet, you want the
> airlines, passengers and others to feel free to do as they please (sort of – if you know
> what I mean). In my opinion, open society would have to mean a society that is open to
> all options that a person might choose in order to live a life he or she desires. On the other
> hand, with the human nature as it is, it would be a disaster to let people do as they please.
> So, what an open society should do – it should train and educate people to "live and let
> live" in a very democratic, free sort of way. To respect other people, their ways of living,
> their attitudes, their desires, strengths and weaknesses. People should be educated to do
> so.

Irena's definition captures a number of concepts fundamental to open society with the maxim

"live and let live," democratically and freely. Like Jeremy, she turned to the role of education as

essential to the process. She further hinted at the risks of open society as "it would be a disaster

to let people do as they please," words which stress dramatically the importance of "the rule of

law."

With the shadow of "disaster" cast by Irena's response, we come next to Elsa, who

concluded her definition of open society with what it is *not*. In so doing, she cast yet another

shadow over the construct, one which divided West and East, in her view, still:

> Open society could be where different opinions can clash and live side by side. I mean, I
> think you can talk endlessly about it, what an open society is. But . . . people have
> different opinions, but towards liberal, allowing people to live their lives in a moral way,
> as opposed to what Eastern Europe is and also many parts of the former Soviet Union still
> is.

After her first very powerful phrase, "where different opinions can clash and live side by side,"[39]

Elsa almost dismisses the question of defining open society in order to point out, in her view, the

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[39] This is an interesting inversion of Huntington's thesis of "The Clash of Civilizations" (1993). Elsa constructs, that
is, "clash" (along with "live side by side") as positive for *supranational* open society, which, I have argued, seeks to
transcend both the emphasis on conflict between nation-states and conflict between "different civilizations" *grouped*

geopolitical and possibly moral differences between Western Europe and the countries to the East. Elsa is from Western Europe, and the assumptions underlying her words suggest at the very least a struggle to live "in a moral way" if one lives in Eastern Europe or "many parts of the former Soviet Union."

With this perception of difference between West and East put starkly out there by Elsa, I turn next to participants' perceptions of the openness of their societies, in order to provide as complete a picture as I can of the contexts from which they speak and their thoughts on the "changes" since 1989. These points of view, too, should shed meaningful light on later discussion of perceptions of the role of English in building open societies.

*The Openness of Participants' Societies*

Exactly half of the 18 participants in this study had serious worries about and skepticism around whether open society was being successfully established in their countries or was even possible. Bianca followed her earlier answer in an email portraying what she saw as the grimmer reality:

> [My country] is still searching for its identity: a country whose population was mentally tortured for 50 years, who had to lie on a daily basis and be duplicitous to survive, a country where the individual knew that s/he had little worth except when reports were made about "per capita," with people preferring to take refuge in the anonymity of the mass rather than being singled out and exposed. As a result, today there is little respect for principles, truth, honesty, altruism, verticality, learning or mutual trust, and these do not bring social or economic status. Most of the young people either find refuge abroad (as *the borders are open*) or get swamped in the national bog. I have not seen many trying to fight a system which offers caricatures for models. Formally, there has been progress, from the admission to NATO to the upcoming admission to EU. However, I'm afraid this happened just because the political clique's selfish interests coincide with the national ones. (Italics in original email)

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according to nation-state. At the same time, Elsa's subsequent discussion of "living morally" in the countries of CESEE-fSU may paradoxically support Huntington's thesis, if she implies civilizations are divided primarily by cultural and religious identities.

Bianca's description painfully identifies the lack of clear identity in her country post the years of "mental torture" and "lies." Her phrase, "refuge in the anonymity of the mass," may help explain the multiple prior emphases we heard on individual self-realization and voice throughout participants' definitions of open society, what some did not have under the years of the "terrible times." This emphasis on "individual voice" and individuality, crucially, reproduces another discourse chain which began in local discourses, especially since the OSI/SFN ELP discourse consistently leveled individual difference. Finally, in Bianca's view, too, the open borders become more a means of escape than a way to simply move freely.

Bianca paints a bleak picture, then, of getting "swamped in the national bog," even in 2006, words which inevitably hark back to the OSI/SFN ELP construction of teachers "mired in an inflexible curriculum" ("Strategy," 1999). In Bianca's world, this construction may make perfect sense, though her voice is anything but "mired" or "primitive" as she describes the situation in her country. And all this in spite of some "formal progress" as she defined by "admission to NATO" and "the upcoming admission to the EU." In the main, however, Bianca's skepticism remained fierce:

> The political class treats the common [citizens] like figurants, extras; the civil society has a discrete voice for a nation which is used to believing everything they are told at the 7 o'clock news. The voice of the elite is also feeble, as it has been discredited in many ways; the worst paid jobs in the state sector are in education and health care, while all post-1989 governments declared these two fields their national priorities. Hopefully, after the accession to the EU, with international monitoring, the country will soon be different.

"International monitoring" and EU accession do become, for Bianca, an avenue of hope (and more so than the building of an elite), much like the reversal of Hansen's (2006) depictions of national versus international responsibility. In this case, the discourse chain of "the ideal of the international and the West" visible in most ELP discourses analyzed so far seems to promise, at least for Bianca, at least the possibility of "progress, order, democracy, ethics, identity and

universal rights" (Hansen, 2006, p. 34). Perhaps that is why her final summary of open society

offered both suggestions for change as well as highlighted the importance of what her OSI/SFN

scholarship abroad had provided her:

> I'm not saying that open-minded people cannot be found in [my country]. What I'm
> saying is that their voices remain mainly personal and individual and that they do not
> form that critical mass necessary for a significant change to take place. I believe none of
> the people who have significant positive experiences abroad and return to their home
> place (and there are tens of thousands of them) will ever accept to be treated otherwise
> than with respect by the officials.

Here Bianca provides a different picture of the individual voice. In her view, it must now

become part of a "critical mass" (as opposed to "the anonymity of the mass" she constructed as a

"refuge" before 1989) in order to effect change. And for Bianca (who herself went to the U.S. on

an OSI/SFN English teacher training scholarship), those who have gone to other countries and

then returned might well become a significant part of this "critical mass" and "change." Eva

seconded Bianca's position: "Most people, when they experience openness, they never go back

to close[d]ness."

Irena's comments on her society were almost as grim as Bianca's, though she at least

acknowledged her country's attempts at becoming an open society:

> I am extremely sorry to say – but I think [my country] is definitely far from being an
> open society. It is striving, though, investing great efforts – but again, mainly at the
> theoretical level. The one thing that bothers me most and which is in my opinion the
> biggest problem is that I do not have the feeling that [my] people, in general, and the
> political parties are fighting for [my country]. I have the feeling that they are only
> fighting to have the power to govern and rule, to do something different from their
> predecessors, just to show that they have the power to do it, but not really focusing on the
> interests and well-being of [my country] as a country which most certainly deserves
> better and, what is more important, has every potential to do better.

"Potential" may be a somewhat hopeful ending to this description, signaling as it does the future

populated by Falk's (1994) "citizen pilgrims," but this potential is challenged by the current

political fights over power Irena described and her own doubts about other citizens' willingness

to fight for the country's well-being. What is more, given the instability in her region, South

Eastern Europe, there is something troubling about even the discursive presence of "power" and

"fighting" in Irena's description. In her context, these words create an unmistakable discourse of

insecurity, which analysis of the ELP discourses in Chapters Four and Five identified as being

countered through English and ELT. English, that is, was ideologically embedded into the

construct of security, a claim (very) loosely supported here by the fact that Irena, an English

teacher in a region which may yet be politically unstable, nevertheless agreed to the interview

and was even eager and open to tell me her stories and share her experiences. There seems to be

no doubt that Irena has the country's "well-being," which surely includes its security, at heart.

Bianca and Irena were not alone in their pessimistic outlooks on their countries. Magda,

too, spoke with a mix of sorrow and anger about her country and open society:

> It's not [an open society], at, at the, at the moment. I feel that in [my country] and in
> Central Europe in general it's more and more of a dream . . . because there are no equal
> opportunities, and there is no open society. Actually, I'm rather disillusioned at this stage
> . . . because what I see now is that money is everything and, and if you have, if you have
> the money, if you have the funds, then, then you can do whatever you like, whatever you
> like. You can study, you can become a politician, you can, you know, manage whatever
> you like, and if you have no money, then, no hope at all.

Plainly, money and capitalism (though that word goes unspoken here) are at the heart of Magda's

disillusionment, so much so that she continued in a discourse which nears what Smith, Law,

Wilson, Bohr, and Allworth (1998, p. 12) described as a "statist" discourse of identity in the

post-Soviet borderlands, a discourse which, in the spirit of Bakhtin, hybridizes acceptance for the

"new" post-Soviet country while maintaining nostalgia for the past. Magda said:

> I feel that at the moment this situation is even worse than in the 1960s or 70s in [my
> country]. I think there were more equal opportunities at that point than today, which is
> very sad, very, very sad, but, but at that time, you know, if you were a Gypsy, Roma, or
> disadvantaged in any other way, then there were  possibilities. There were scholarships,
> there were ways that if, if you were talented and hardworking you could still, you know,
> make your way up. Today? No.

The hazards of capitalism Magda alluded to shaped Ana's thoughts on open society as well. When I asked Ana to define open society, she expressed doubt from the start:

> Actually, I'm not sure if there is an open society at all, anywhere in the world. I think it's a little bit of an idealistic concept, and I think there was a big, big, big false belief in Eastern Europe that once you have market economy there is democracy. I think we really don't see democracy but we see a market economy and we see a lot of ruthlessness that comes with market economy, so whether that was the ploy or whether that was an idealist's kind of belief, I don't know.

Ana's use of the word "ruthlessness" sums up Magda's response concisely and dismally.

Thomas, however, both acknowledged the risks of a market economy while simultaneously defending it:

> And then to go on to the more challenging aspect of open society, it's the more market-oriented idea of this, right? . . . I believe that individuals, and this is from my own personal experience, individuals who have the opportunity to compete with each other do think better by virtue of the fact of competition, and those people who are competitive by nature, in fact, we learn more, and that's not only advantageous to the individuals, that's also an advantage for the society they're working in.

Thomas' emphasis on competition re-introduces Victoriya's earlier argument for competition, a tentative new discourse chain. But Thomas was also careful to qualify his answer:

> Do I think that works for every single type of good that should be provided for society? No. . . . We should find solutions for the problems we have, not predetermine them by a set of values we want to push.

While it might be tempting to argue that Thomas' optimism around competition, the market, and problem-solving derives from his worldview as a Western European and an expatriate, I should point out here that at the time of his interview (2006), Thomas had been living and working in Central and Eastern Europe for well past a decade. He further worked on OSI projects in a number of countries throughout the region and Central Asia, so he spoke with confidence and passion about his beliefs around development as he saw it enacted through OSI/SFN.

Philip, on the other hand, another expatriate from Western Europe who had worked in the countries of CESEE-fSU for more than 20 years, was not in the least optimistic about the

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opening of societies. After describing the ideal of open society quoted earlier, Philip continued

this way:

> As my friend . . . is fond of saying, in [this country] there never was, there never was a
> [regime change]. There was a change in the way people chose the leaders to rule them.
> There was no change in the [regime]. It's exactly the same . . . as it was under
> communism and as it was under the [previous] monarchy. The infrastructure, the way
> people perceive, the way people perceive politics, the way people manipulate each other,
> the lack of decent civil society and the lack of, of, of some other perceptions that many
> Western countries who've had a longer heritage of, of, of democracy and civil society
> and, and values of open society have had more chance to develop, uh, they aren't there,
> and maybe there's a connection between that and the vast level of anti-Semitism in [this
> country].

Anti-Semitism—a disturbing opposite of tolerance everywhere, but particularly in the

post-Holocaust context of Central and Eastern Europe—along with the ruthlessness of market

economies, the lack of equal opportunities, political fights over power, and the threat of getting

"swamped in the national bog" all emerge through participants' voices as difficult downsides of

transition, downsides which call into question whether participants' countries are truly opening.

> Ecaterina was a little more mixed in her hopes for transition:
>
> Regarding the opening of the societies in Central and Eastern Europe, I think they are
> definitely opening. People have freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of
> actions, but on the other hand the burden of past experiences doesn't allow the
> development of these freedoms. Otherwise how can you explain corruption flourishing in
> those countries, although the extent of its spread is different?

In her interview, in spite of thinking societies were "definitely opening," Ecaterina still worried

not only about expanding corruption (the extent to which she was careful to qualify), but also

about specific "burdens" from the past, the legacy of communism, and especially those

"burdens" which related to her field of study and work, the environment:

> I've just finished a research about the development of renewable energy potential in [my
> country]. One of the conclusions is that the majority of people don't see the benefits of
> using wind mills or solar installations. This is because for years they were using cheap
> electricity produced by burning coal or by nuclear reactions. Using a wind mill is a
> symbol of something backward and inefficient.

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Ecaterina illustrates other constraints on open society which anyone in development work should be mindful of: how people in her country view "using a wind mill" (for instance) as something "backward and inefficient." Granted, perceptions of wind energy vary in the West (and globally), too, and our use and abuse of the environment are but one of many mistakes we in the West have made. Nor are these mistakes lost on participants, and they have never been lost on Soros.

Ana, for instance, put it bluntly: "I don't think Western Europe is open society either, or the U.S., for that matter." Here, Ana's language evokes OSI/SFN's definition of its work, discussed in depth in Chapter Four: "OSI has expanded the activities of the Soros foundations network to other areas of the world where the transition to democracy is of particular concern. The Soros foundations network encompasses more than 60 countries, *including the United States*" ("About OSI," 2008; italics added). OSI/SFN clearly implicates the United States as an "area of the world where the transition to democracy is of particular concern," a sentiment Ana also made plain. Victoriya, too, having spent some time in the U.S., expressed her apprehensions about open society in an email: "[My home country] is a perfect example of the closed society: one unchallenged leader, one party, one official party line, any dissent or even a suggestion for doing things differently is severely punished." Then she added, "United States probably comes the closest to being an open society, although the recent apathy and lack of civic engagement do not contribute to this image." Her interview took place in 2006, while we were still under the Bush presidency. I cannot help but wonder what she would say now.

In sum, participants from across East and West construct open society in high-minded terms which, for the most part, reproduce the OSI/SFN interpretation of Popper: they challenge "truths" and "the only right way"; they speak of tolerance, respect, the "clash" of opposing views living "side by side"; they define it as "free of oppression" and honoring the existence of basic

human rights and a place for "equal opportunity"; they speak of market economies and competition; they speak of democracy and of the *two*-way exchange of information; and freedom, freedom with all its "faces." At the same time, worries linger: a continued lack of opportunity; the failure of tolerance in the form of persistent anti-Semitism; the ruthlessness of a market economy; "flourishing corruption"; political instability; disappointments and disillusionment.

With this rather complicated vision of open society thus established by members of the OSI/SFN community who are or were studying and working across the countries of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union—people who live or have lived in these societies—I move next to participants' perceptions of obstacles to the OSI/SFN mission. I discuss these obstacles as they, too, illumine barriers to English language aid projects and other development work. They include the so-called "brain drain" of OSI/SFN-supported elites, nostrification, bureaucracy, unintended outcomes, and the political perception of George Soros himself and the legitimacy of OSI/SFN.

*Obstacles to the OSI/SFN Mission*

Earlier, Magda discussed part of the mission of OSI/SFN as preparing students to return and "contribute to their own country's development." Magda's perception of this part of the mission was mentioned by several other participants. Andrew, for example, stated the OSI/SFN mission as follows:

> It's all about, like the open society, uh, the idea of education being a valuable asset for life. We're training these young people to further themselves so that they could offer something back to their communities. You also think, sort of sounds a little bit idealistic, doesn't it?

Andrew, pragmatic, notes the idealism with skepticism while also reiterating Magda's belief that the purpose of an education supported by OSI/SFN was so that "these young people" "could

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offer something back to their communities." In this way, Andrew constructs the "citizen

pilgrims" (Falk, 1994) so conspicuous in the ELP discourse analyzed in Chapter Four. So, too,

did Victoriya, in her depiction of the OSI/SFN mission and her own work: "I think the overall

mission of [the university] is to promote open society and democracy worldwide by engaging

young leaders from different countries in learning, teaching and dialogue." Mihail conveyed a

similar view:

> Originally [the] mission was to prepare some select students from the Eastern Europe to
> make contributions to the economic, political and social development of their respective
> countries. However, I personally also see [the] mission as means of help to those
> individual students who were unable to realize their academic/professional dreams due to
> sad economic, political, etc. realities in their respective countries. The latter was
> definitely true in my case.

Mihail said this because he had emigrated with Galina (his wife) to another country. He did not

return, that is, to help "the economic, political and social development" of his country due to the

"sad economic, political" "realities." Victoriya, though still a powerful advocate working for

human rights at the time of the interview, had also moved to a Western country. Without

implying judgment on the decisions of these participants not to return—the social and political

conditions of whose countries may be unimaginable to many—I still must vocalize one clear

barrier to the building of open societies which emerges from these interviews: the so-called

"brain drain" of the potential intellectual elite and "citizen pilgrims" (Falk, 1994) of global civil

citizenship and open society.

Dora, who did not emigrate, did note the absence of those who had. Along with Klara,

she believed that the mission of OSI/SFN was first "to have English teachers, because there were

so few English teachers after that period" of transition. More broadly, Dora believed the mission

of OSI/SFN was to provide "a profession, that was the main thing." Then she stated, without any

bitterness:

I don't know where are these people, because a lot of them, [ my friend] for instance, lives in England, so for her it was a good use [laughs], but I think one or two of, of the students are here and they are teaching English, but only a few. So this was just a very nice step to them for something else, so they, they had a diploma and they got a diploma, and they could start with that another thing. It was successful.

Elsa, like Dora, commented on the students who did not return to their countries, and she, too, did so without judgment:

Of course, you have a lot of people coming for the free education, a trampoline to a further education in the West, but that's just how people are, we can't blame them for taking the opportunity . . . we talked sometime that not enough people are returning but . . . we looked at the statistics and actually a big chunk of the students are returning to their home countries. I mean, you can't expect 2000 people to change the world completely but I think that, I think this is, so I'm not a cynic, some people want to be cynics and say this is not working, but I do think it makes a difference.

In spite of Elsa's overall optimism, these interviews show that at the very least, the perception of the "brain drain" of OSI/SFN-supported students, teachers, and scholars who do not return to their countries persists for some participants.

In addition, those who do return may face a different obstacle: nostrification, the recognition (or lack thereof) in their home countries of their foreign academic degrees. Galina confronted this professional roadblock, which influenced her decision to emigrate:

I believe [the university's] mission is to help countries in transition to establish open society. It is, no doubt, a very noble mission, but judging from the number of students who chose not to go back to their home countries, I can say that this mission was only partially successful. . . . In [my country] any foreign academic degree remains officially unrecognized until a student translates his/her dissertation into [the national language] and defends it in the [national] Academy of Sciences. As far as I know, our president's pre-election promise to equalize foreign and [national] scholarly degrees has not materialized to date.

Eva recounted an experience with nostrification which was equally frustrating:

So I think they [OSI/SFN] managed to help a lot of people, even though this education has not, uh, come to an end, because these [English] teachers who got their diploma in this program, in the program [in another country], went through a lot of torture here in [their home country] when they had to legalize their certificate or degree or diploma, and they had to go to [this city] or [that city] or wherever, to have, uh, to go to exams and

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have these teachers from [this country] believe that those teachers, those teachers in [another country] did a good job.

Lauren, both a student and an employee of OSI/SFN, described an additional obstacle familiar in many scenarios, that of bureaucracy:

I suppose often, I feel like, through my [research], I'm criticizing what's going on with my work simply because it is, it is a huge bureaucracy and uh, you know, there's all these great ideas, for example with translating, we've been talking about translating this huge amount of resources for a year now and it's just so slow and there's, well, organizational obstacles which you, you have all these wonderful ideas about building open societies but really, to go through an organization that builds open societies, you have to go through this obstacle, get this approval, somebody says no, da, da da, da da.

Two other participants called attention to an unexpected and chilling consequence related to the work of OSI/SFN: namely, that several top politicians in the region who had been Soros scholarship recipients returned to their countries, were elected to high office, and then began to advocate for radical nationalist and increasingly anti-liberal political policies. As Ana questioned:

I mean, here in [this country] we have a clear example, we have somebody like [unnamed] who was a Soros recipient, so you have somebody who stands for completely different values and, and, how did that happen? Was it the fact that he didn't, he wasn't persuaded by all that training that he got, or was it the fact that he used it for his own purposes?

Magda, too, proclaimed her feelings about a similar irony in her country:

I was also aware of all the controversy, you know, surrounding Soros himself. Obviously, the, the, the right wing politicians were very much against him, and they thought that he was sort of imposing and intruding and, and doing a disservice to [this country], which I always thought was rubbish. . . .They said no, no, no Soros for us, and it was always very controversial, and, and this is something I never understood  because [unnamed] himself and a lot of politicians . . . had been on scholarships, you know, various big scholarships in the United States, in, in the UK, you know, using Soros money.

Magda's response not only reiterates the perhaps unavoidable risk of unintended outcomes of aid in any form. She further leads us to another factor which participants talked

about as determining the success or failure of open society: the perceived legitimacy of the

OSI/SFN mission and George Soros himself.

Thomas raised this issue, too:

Their mission has to exist, and to been seen to exist in those countries . . .I mean, when it comes to the elites that [OSI/SFN] is trying to build, those sort of people who are involved in politics and policy and education, you know, if you're in Belgrade, everybody knows everybody, right? So OSI can't go around supporting political parties and not be associated, especially, for example, in the Balkans, where everything tends to be hyper-politicized, immediately, you know, you have a real, a real challenge with that.

Then Thomas described how in his view OSI has handled that risk of perception:

OSI, in my own experience, has been quite successful in trying to stay away from [being associated with particular political groups], you know? Now, the only times I think they cross the line is when it comes to like more or less nearly despotic regimes as we've seen in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Ukraine. In fact, one of the biggest problems OSI has at the moment is that perception, you know, because the Uzbeks kicked them out because they say they are supporting [blank], whereas in fact, even in Georgia, the, the, the support was tacit, but nevertheless it was there, so I think they do draw a line there, when basically you have I suppose what they perceive to be rulers which are, who are completely illiberal, then they do support. The same thing happened in Serbia, you know, 'til Milosevic was out.

Thomas was forthright about crossing lines and drawing lines, an answer which deepens our

understandings of the complexity of English language aid work, development, aid organizations,

and politics, again. Nor was Thomas the only participant who spoke out about the political role

of OSI/SFN so directly.

Lauren, too, shared her perceptions of how Soros and OSI were perceived in Central Asia

during a time she was researching there. Lauren also shared her doubts about the accuracy of

these perceptions (quotation marks added for clarity):

It's very interesting too, because Russia, they overthrew their government and this was seen as something Soros funded. I was there. Well, a lot of it was, "this Soros is giving money to the opposition," "this is all outside money being channeled to overthrow the government," and "this is exactly what's happening in Georgia," da, da da, da da, but I don't think that was really the case.

Despite Lauren's doubts, her voice and Thomas' highlight the grave importance of local perception in an international aid organization's legitimacy, purpose, and success.

Taken together, the voices of these participants forcefully illustrate potential barriers to open society: There is no predicting what individuals or groups might do with the information, education, resources, and opportunities provided them, and it may be a difficult and even dangerous venture to try and do so. Unintended outcomes such as political turncoats and decisions to emigrate versus return home and work for open society—against, in some places, difficult and even life-threatening odds—block the path to open society, as these participants make clear. Nostrification, too, can be a social and political impediment which undermines the support of OSI/SFN and other donor groups working to open societies through education. Finally, local perception of an organization's motives, mission, and legitimacy are clearly central to the success of that mission.

It may be for these reasons, then, that OSI/SFN once made its "one overarching milestone" for most of these countries "accession into the European Union," not as a "panacea for open society deficits" such as described above, but for the promise of at least some "advancement of human rights, liberalized economic policies, increased government accountability" and a more "invigorat[ed] civil society" ("Overview: Central and Eastern," 2008). Keeping in mind that I interviewed participants in 2005 and 2006—when some countries had already become EU members, some were shortly to become members, and some were still not (and still are not) yet candidate countries— and given that English remains a point of sharp controversy with the European Union itself,[40] I also asked participants how they saw the relationship between the European Union and open society. Their answers to this question, and other ways participants spoke about Europe, the EU, the international, and East and West, pave

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[40] See, for instance, Phillipson, R. (2003). *English-only Europe? Challenging language policy*. London: Routledge.

the way to the next section of this chapter, which explores discursive constructions of space by interviewees. In turn, we then turn to their constructions of the role of English and other languages within these spaces.

## Open Society, Space, and Language

Analysis thus far has shown how a number of participants perceive the countries of CESEE-fSU, a region I will call the East with full acknowledgement of the problems such terminology and perspective entail.[41] Elsa believed it was a struggle to live morally in Eastern Europe and many parts of the former Soviet Union; Philip flatly decried the rampant anti-Semitism in the country he lived in; Ecaterina rued the flourishing political corruption and the short-sightedness of people who were used to depending on the state for "cheap" energy at the expense of the environment; Bianca mourned her country's search for identity after 50 years of "mental torture" and "lies." These constructions of space as we have heard them in participants' voices are joyless: Even upbeat Thomas described Bosnia as "a really, really sad place," though he was quick to add it is also "a great place full of great people with amazing enthusiasm."

In this section, I explore in more depth participants' constructions of open society, space, and language, since, to reiterate Hansen (2006), space is one of the "big three" components—along with responsibility and time—of building political communities such as open societies. This is a community, the OSI/SFN ELP discourse makes clear, which requires English. From this analysis, we shall see a continued discourse of Othering both people and *languages*, the latter of which becomes an explicit new discourse chain in this study. We shall also see a mix of optimism and pessimism around EU accession, constructions of English as the dominant language of the European Union, and finally, multiple constructions of the role of English in

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[41] In particular, see Iver B. Neumann's (1999) book, *Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation."*

building open societies. Participants construct English as a way to cross-cut and connect different national and ethnic identities, as a useful lingua franca simplified, "internationalized," and detached from culture, and as a force which contributes to security and peace. Finally, I present participants' multiple concerns over and resistances to English, concerns which, if heard and noted, should contribute fundamentally to improved policies and practices of English language aid projects.

I begin by looking at additional ways Western participants constructed and Othered the East as well as ways Eastern participants constructed and Othered the West.

*Western Constructions of East, Eastern Constructions of West*

First, I turn back to Elsa, who found it difficult to live in a moral way in Eastern Europe. She provided an example to illustrate, one which links the micro-level of classroom cheating with the macro-level political corruption Ecaterina worried about:

> I was writing for the school paper as well and we did an article about cheating. That was, I think, very strict in America and actually in [my country] as well, so it's a question of morals as well if you don't cheat, and I'm not talking about plagiarism which is, you know, over abundant, but, well, pure classical cheating in a sitting exam, and these [people] were cheating so much and I, I talked a lot about these Hungarians, Romanians, Russians, it just seemed to me that this was very common in all these countries that were demanding so much, so much lexical knowledge that the only way to cope with it was cheating.

Elsa then went on to say:

> I was talking to an American girl and she was very upset about this as well, but our classmates? Some of them didn't understand our points at all, they were just like, why don't you want to help. . . . I also think that it has really, really advanced with the whole political structure in the countries, this also upset me a little bit, here I was studying political science and we were talking about corruption in one class and then we're cheating in the other one, and for me, those two things are interrelated, but the students, I tried to have a conversation with the students about this, but they could not see the correlation.

Elsa's clear distress over "cheating" (not to mention plagiarism, which, in her words, was "over abundant"), derived, she believed, from cultural differences. In her interview, she acknowledged

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both the pressures placed on L2 speakers to succeed in an English medium academic setting as well as the lingering history of communist systems, in which teachers often looked away when students cheated in order that everyone survived the strange rigors of centralized and imposed education and languages. In spite of her recognition of the possible reasons for the cheating, Elsa was no less "upset," however, and so aligned herself with an American girl who felt the same way. This is one example of a Western perception of the East, one which seeks to explain a difference while jointly linking the microcosm of the classroom where cheaters get by with the macrocosm of corrupt governments. Elsa's example provides us, too, with an arresting inversion of how ELP discourses constructed English language classrooms and schools as democratic "sanctuaries" (like Olga's classroom from Chapter Five) necessary to the formation of democratic governments and open societies. In both cases, what happens in the classroom is constructed as happening also in the government.

To provide an Eastern perspective on the same topic, plagiarism and cheating, let us listen to Victoriya, who saw the import of the Western aversion to plagiarism as an example of a positive new practice in her Eastern university. She described this in an email:

> I think English was instrumental in bringing into [my university] a number of successful practices in terms of university policies, course structure and content. One example will be a constant fight with plagiarism. In many countries of the former Soviet Union writing a paper still implies going to the library, finding a book your professor likes the most and shamelessly copy-pasting paragraphs, or even whole pages. It is important that future leaders are taught to think critically and independently, so I think this "cultural" lesson was very useful.

Victoriya's discussion of plagiarism reminds us of the dangers of totalizing constructions such as Eastern and Western: She submits quite happily, it seems, to such "cultural lessons" which, she believes, help build better "future leaders." Ana, too, agreed that some "cultural lessons" from the West were needed and useful, for instance, the introduction of social work as a discipline: "Social work as a discipline simply did not exist in most of Eastern Europe [before 1989], for

some reason. There was sociology but not social work because [she laughs], there were no social problems."

Jeremy, on the other hand, a Western expatriate teacher, constructed the difference between Western and Eastern differently, with "guilt" a major factor in his construction. Jeremy further brought to the surface other moral quandaries Western English teachers and other development workers find themselves in:

> We always felt a little bit guilty, perhaps, but I think that was because of the financial, the economic difference between ourselves and them, and also the fact that we got paid more than them. I always felt uncomfortable about that, we were just these young teachers who'd come in from the West and we were getting paid the same as people who'd been there teaching for years, you know, and many of them had families to support, and all the rest of it, and we just went out and spent the money on drink, and travel, and it was all an experience. I could imagine that they must have felt quite a lot of resentment, but they never showed it which was amazing to me, they never showed it, so they kind of put you to shame in a way because they were so gracious about it. . . . You never got the impression that they took it out on you personally.

Like Thomas, Jeremy marveled at the graciousness of his colleagues who did not resent the fact that he was paid more merely for being a *Western L1* English-speaking teacher, and this in spite of the fact that his colleagues had many more years of experience, and "families to support, and all the rest of it." When I asked him why he believed there was no resentment, he answered this way:

> I suppose they were, they were astonished that we'd come, because it was a very isolated place in a way, we were a long way from anywhere, it wasn't the kind of place they got many Westerners I think at that point and they seemed to want to sort of interact with us, I'm not sure, I don't even know why, I don't think they were required to be on this course or not, I don't know, though jobs depended on it. I know they were giving up their summer holidays, and then we taught in the town as well, so yah, they gave up their holidays to come on this course.

Jeremy's experience exemplifies one aspect of the discourse chain of supranational language management in that his OSI/SFN-funded ELP project sent him "a long way from anywhere," hence discursively and literally infusing, through Jeremy, English and ELT into the "small, far-

off places" ("Strategy," 1999) as well as capitals and major cities. Furthermore, Jeremy's observation that the teachers he worked with on one project "had given up their holidays" to attend his course evidences a distinction between SPELT (American) and SELP (local) teachers in the OSI/SFN discourse: that local teachers were vulnerable to "interventions" beyond what the West at least considers the "legitimate range" (Fairclough, 1992)—in this case, the need for these teachers to attend trainings during their holidays. At the same time, Jeremy was unsure if it was required, "though jobs depended on it." The students may have gladly attended this course, and in Jeremy's interview it sounded as if they did gladly attend. Whether this is always the case is another matter.

Dora, Eastern, raised a possible explanation for the reactions of Jeremy's colleagues. She told me that "people here are, uh, delighted to receive anything that is Western," including a teacher like Jeremy, less-experienced, paid more money, but an L1 English speaker from a Western country. Lauren, however, a Western student studying in an OSI-funded university in the East, experienced a very different reaction from delight on the part of her Eastern peers:

> Depending on the students, some people were just shocked that a [North American] would want to come to [this] University because everything is in [North America]. Other people were assuming it would be just so easy for me because I'm a native speaker, but, you know, it wasn't [laughs].

Elsa recounted a similar feeling around how classmates from the countries of the CESEE-fSU perceived her as a Western European, and how she in turn perceived them:

> All the Easterners usually thought that I was a kind of native speaker, probably because my, my pronunciation was better than theirs, but a lot of people studying at [the university] had already done exchange programs or had participated in scholarships they got through the foundations from all this money pouring into Eastern Europe in the 90s, so I think a lot of my classmates had been more exposed or spent more time in English-speaking countries actually than I had, but they still had their Russian or whatever pronunciation, whereas my pronunciation is probably better.

As Elsa highlighted here, her pronunciation was enough for her peers to place her in the category of almost "native speaker" as opposed to an Easterner with a "Russian or whatever pronunciation," a provocative variable in the L2 language equation. Yet Elsa felt no less challenged by the coursework at her university. She further suggested that the Easterners were the better speakers of English *except for* their pronunciations. Still, as someone not from the East, she ultimately felt, like Lauren, that she was constructed as having a sort of natural advantage over her Eastern peers in the same class, just as she implicitly constructed her Eastern peers as having had the advantage, because of "exchange programs" and "scholarships" "from all this money pouring into Eastern Europe in the 90s."

Lauren, Elsa, and Jeremy provide some insights into constructions of Eastern and Western: Broadly, all three spoke of differences rather than similarities, as did Dora in her belief that her community "welcomed" all things "Western." But of course, such a welcome is not always the case. When Western English teachers lacked context-sensitivity, especially, Eastern locals were vocal in their criticisms, a point raised several times in the local ELP discourses discussing some Western teachers, and a point raised in these interviews, too.

Ana, for instance, told the story of one Western English teacher, a story which perfectly illustrates the importance of context-sensitivity. According to Ana, this teacher's first words upon landing in the country were "Oh terrible [national] airlines!" Ana then reported that this same teacher (affiliated with an OSI/SFN partner organization) complained at length about the "flat," "the socialist furniture," the bureaucracy and the police "who didn't speak any languages." The teacher further constructed Ana more as her "personal assistant" than a professional teaching colleague, asking Ana to help her find a "massage therapist," "get her papers done," and so on. Unsurprisingly, the students' evaluations of this teacher, according to

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Ana, were harsh: "She doesn't know anything about our traditions"; "she wasn't too sensitive." Ana went on to say that finally the university asked this teacher to leave, and her replacement arrived, another Westerner from another "cheaper" country in the region who also complained extensively and who, in Ana's words, was just "not professional." Her story concluded this way (quotation marks added for clarity):

> I knew more [about teaching than he did] and so did the students, too. Then in 97-98, there were announcements that bombing would start, so I would have to take over the teaching. He left, and people said, "Why doesn't the [donor organization] just send Ana to get a Ph.D.? Why do they send these guys who are really problematic?" And then there was the real bombing so he was sent home and then I left the country and that's it. So it was a good [professional] experience but it ended up not very happily.

No doubt, the (Western) bombing of Ana's country led to the unhappy ending she mentions above, but at the micro-level, the occasional struggles with and humiliations from Western teachers surely were also contributors.

A lack of context-sensitivity on the parts of Westerners and the presence of cultural differences between East and West led to other tensions reported by participants. To provide a Western perspective on this issue, Thomas, discussing the early history of an OSI/SFN-supported English language program he was formerly involved in, described the first (Western) director's difficulty getting local faculty "on board" to help with a needs analysis. The director was attempting what Thomas described as a "massive P.R. campaign," but she "was that sort of corporate American girl, and they [local faculty and administrators] didn't react well to that [laughs]. She had large reports and huge amounts of data. . . . She wasn't very successful, but it wasn't as if she didn't try." Though sympathetic with her efforts, Thomas was very aware of how the "corporate American" approach might fail miserably in another country and context.

Just as the "corporate American" approach did not always go over so well in an Eastern context, participants also shared another issue of East and West arising from the Cold War and

lingering still across the region: suspicions of spying. This issue underlines the necessity of the

perception of legitimacy to a project's success, and though only one of the following examples

involves someone working for OSI/SFN at the time, all three illustrate implications for teachers

and developers of English language aid projects.

Philip was the first to tell such a story, though he was referring to work he took part in

before 1989 and OSI/SFN:

> I was briefed by the foreign office before I went about the dangers of accepting parcels in
> the street, the dangers of being sexually compromised by young people of either sex who
> might lure me into bed and then use this in order to blackmail me . . . they were dead
> serious, I mean, this was the end of the era of spies and I was in their eyes a very low-
> grade spy.

This story may not be surprising in the context of the 1980s. But other participants narrated

similar events. Lauren described what happened when she first arrived in Central Asia and was

briefed by the sponsoring agency (this was much later):

> They sat us all down in a meeting room and told us how much danger we were going to
> be in and how we'll have spies after us [laughs] and this was obviously someone who'd
> come from the CIA or some security force [laughs] or a former security guard.

Lauren's work took place after 1989 though in a different context than Philip's. Even so, as a

Westerner she was constructed as "in danger" in the East, just as the West constructed the East

and its people, in turn, as dangerous.

Not only Westerners were suspect. Victoriya elucidated one source of suspicions in an

email:

> Bush administration significantly undermined America's global prestige and moral
> authority, and made the work of human rights educators and advocates around the world
> a lot more difficult. I was oftentimes confronted by the local activists, who would call me
> a "western spy" or a "Bush supporter", simply because we use the same words: freedom,
> democracy, human rights. . . . Also, many people started resenting the UN and UN-
> designed human rights instruments seeing it as increasingly US-dominated organization. I
> think English can play a great role . . . globally in bringing people together for peaceful
> debates, negotiation and reconciliation. All we need is the right leadership.

This last message, which Victoriya iterates over and over, must also inform the work of English language aid project developers and instructors. If we cannot control or endorse what our government is doing, or how, we can at least share our own critique of actions and return to the basic constructs Victoriya believes can bring people together globally: "peaceful debates, negotiation and reconciliation." And for Victoriya, English can "play a great role" in these processes.

To provide another picture of constructs of East and West, I must mention cultural clashes which occurred when Easterners traveled east and when Easterners traveled west. Ana went east, to Russia, and in so doing, she became acutely aware of the imprecisions behind social and discursive constructions of space, and the implications of such unstable meanings:

> We went there to teach university teachers, so these people, at that point, I had no Ph.D., but these people, most of them, they had their Ph.D.s, some of them were professors for a number of years, respected, so on and so forth . . . and I realized, though all the time in [my English medium university] I was like an Easterner but a successful Easterner, let's say, but I was like a little spice in our [office] soup, a necessary spice [laughs]. But then, I'm going to this Russia, and I realized, suddenly, I have, that people look at me as a Westerner, and they look at me as somebody with power, and it was really confusing, because I was not used to that, and I realized that actually that the power is the power that the institution has given me. That they're thinking, oh, she teaches at [blank university] so she must be really good, there must be something behind that, and that was very strange, and I remember thinking that this is how these native speakers . . . were feeling going to [my country] and being like seen as, I don't know, some higher mortals or something. And that was a little uncomfortable, because my background had nothing—I mean, it was giving you some power which you really didn't have. It was a little strange.

Ana here spotlights multiple issues around discursive constructions of space and implications for identity. First, her English medium university needed her "Eastern" presence to "spice" up the office soup, so to speak. She realized, too, when she herself traveled East as a representative of her university, the name of the institution alone endowed her with the Western "power" (or perception thereof) to "teach" Russian professors of English with higher degrees and likely many more years of teaching experience. Suddenly Ana could see the world as the Western teachers in

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her home country had seen it—as if they were "some higher mortals or something"—and the feeling as she conveyed must have been disconcerting, to say the least.

Bianca, another "successful Easterner" to use Ana's words, described her experiences on an OSI/SFN Teacher Training scholarship in the West, specifically, to the United States. In the process, she, too, highlighted how identities shift and change, rise and fall, and align with others, according to context. She wrote in an email:

> I realised that the Europeans, despite their specific national backgrounds, hold a lot in common, and above all, have similar academic traditions. We didn't find big differences in our initial training whether we were from Lithuania, Ukraine or Romania; our academic education was very similar. Although I met some wonderful Americans and made many friends among them, I couldn't help feeling I was European, and together with the other Europeans, developed a kind of solidarity based on our non-American-ness. Like the other Europeans, I resisted as much as I could the probing into my own self (I always had reservations in speaking about what I feel). I felt the strong pressure of having to comply with another style of behaving, another manner of approaching one another and the instructors.

Clearly wary in her new setting, Bianca reminds us of Fairclough's (1992) concerns over "intervention beyond the legitimate range"—in this example, intervention into the personal as well as the professional being. In Chapter Four, we saw American SPELT teachers discursively constructed as having such power to intervene, and we saw local SELP teachers vulnerable to the same. Bianca brings an example of such intervention to life in her story, in the process, aligning herself with other "Europeans" just as Elsa aligned herself with an American girl in her disgust at "Eastern" cheating." It is also interesting that Bianca was very comfortable in using "European" as an identity marker for herself and her colleagues from "Lithuania, Ukraine, and Romania": In this instance, in the context of America, the words "Central" and "Eastern" fell completely and significantly away.

At the same time, I must add that Bianca also voiced the impact she felt her scholarship to the U.S. had on her:

In the meantime I was widely aware of the depth of the experience I was living and I was learning from it. In a very profound way, I have become more sensitive to what is happening inside me and what is likely to happen to others when they work with me.

In the end, in spite of (or because of) tensions between East and West, Bianca came away from her experience changed, and profoundly so.

Such change may be why OSI/SFN constructed Westernization, especially "Europeanization"—by dint of accession to the European Union—as having "profound and positive consequences for open society" ("Overview: Central and Eastern Europe," 2008). Ana, however, pinpointed some of the more serious implications of such constructions of space and identity:

The region of Eastern Europe is partitioned, and now what we have as Central Europe is getting a much better sound because it's much more addressed and it's perceived as more democratic and more rule-governed, law and all these things, but actually we see in this treatment of this new Europe that it's still seen as something less than Western Europe, so there is still this divide, but what has managed to happen is that Central Europe is divided from Eastern Europe, and clearly, there is another divide towards the East of that, and then you have the South, which is the wild South, and the Southeast [her region], that's kind of completely untamed [she laughs].

With these words and Ana's wry laugh in mind, I felt it necessary to ask participants how they perceived the relationship between open society and the European Union. This question eventually led to how participants see the role of *English* as it relates to the EU, "the ideal of the international and the West," and the building of open societies.

*The European Union and Open Society*

Thomas first described the relationship between the European Union and open society with a vivid simile:

OSI has always seen itself as very much a frontline donor, you know, and in there getting its hands dirty when things are difficult, you know, and it sees the European Union as the truck that's coming behind. . . . The Commission is extremely liberal and . . . is the most important arm of the European Union in its expression of foreign policy and also in the development and delivery of development aid. . . . It's a completely idealistic

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organization and I love it for that, you know? I really do. It's great. We need some sort of idealism.

To illustrate, Thomas justified in particular the role of the European Commission with the example of Bosnia:

There's still an unbelievable danger there . . . and now there's much more this justice-based idea of engaging with those countries, not just appeasement, you know, engagement for the sake of it. I think they've made a very strong impression there . . . in the moving forward, in the going forward. They're setting the standards there.

Thomas' words here, like Bianca's much earlier in this chapter, embrace and extend the discourse chain of "the ideal of the international and the West"; in his perspective, OSI and the European Commission together can help provide Bosnia and other countries in transition "progress, order, democracy, ethics, identity and universal rights" (Hansen, 2006, p. 34). Reflective, too, Thomas did readily acknowledge failures of the EU, such as "the Balkan thing," which, he stated, "was a catastrophe for the EU. If you couldn't sort that out and you have to get the Americans to come in, then you have to invest in your own legitimacy." But overall, Thomas was decidedly quite positive about the EU and its relationship with OSI.

Jeremy basically agreed: "One of the key things about joining the European Union is that they can't question the borders. They have to accept the current borders and put aside, you know, national arguments, which I think is a very, very good thing." Implicit in Jeremy's words is the reason why the EU was founded in the first place: In the "aftermath of World War Two," the EU was set up "to bring peace, stability and prosperity to Europe" ("Europa," 2009; see also Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, 2004). Still, it is noteworthy in Jeremy's response that the "they" he refers to must be implicitly juxtaposed to an "us," which assumes a division between those with "current border" and other "national arguments" versus the rest of, or the original, member states. This division between "us" and "them," East and West, which Jeremy probably did not intend to bring to the conversation, is a division we have seen previously and which other

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participants affirmed. In other words, the discourse chain dividing people and groups into Self and Other, and even into "inferior" and "superior" Others, endures, regrettably, just as we saw in Chapters Four and Five.

Magda, for instance, shared these misgivings about the EU which end, significantly, on the word "colonization":

> European Union and Open Society? Probably the basic principles, the guiding principles, are very similar. The question is whether the end products are similar as well . . . I've heard lots and lots of people talking *against* the European Union rather than for . . . for example, an economist who's got a good job . . . he says that for, for [the neighboring country], joining, joining Europe will be a disaster, a catastrophe really. . . . Only the real poor will stay. . . . He sees it as a kind of, um, I don't know, third world position that [that country] will be in. . . . Colonization, I think that's the word he used . . . the rich Western European countries will be colonizing [that country] and it's got nothing to do with equal opportunities.

Magda's words when describing her friend's ideas about the EU are harsh. Shortly thereafter, she added this about her own country, in equally strong words: "Agriculture is suffering . . . probably there is more, more unemployment, probably this gap between the rich and the poor is growing, also as a result of the European Union." We see, then, already, a pronounced divergence in views: While Thomas acclaimed the idealism of the EU, Magda listened closely to and believed her friend, a local economist, who predicted catastrophe (for one country, at least) as a result of accession.

In like manner, Philip, in spite of acknowledging some "good stuff," was basically cynical in his perception of the EU and its relationship to open society. His complaints paralleled Magda's:

> My perception is that there's a lot of good stuff tacked on to the European Union, it does require that human rights are respected, it does require that sexual discrimination is minimized, that procedures should be regulated so that nasty things don't happen, which is all to the good, but it also, on the one hand it's very protectionist, and it's protectionist of the old members. The new members are not going to get any protections at all . . . you can make damn sure that if any venture in Eastern Europe threatens French cheese

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producers, then those people in Eastern Europe who threaten French cheese producers are going to be out of a job.

The divisiveness Philip identifies here—between the "us" and "them"; the old members and the new; Western Europe versus Eastern Europe—accords with Jeremy's more subtle Othering of new members or candidate countries. Philip was, no doubt, pessimistic, and his pessimism finally impelled him to articulate the divisions between Western and Eastern, "old" and "new," "us" and "them" in a fairly scathing tone. In so doing, he introduced the explicit role of language in this process of Othering (quotation marks added for clarity):

> I think that there is an "us" and there's a "them," and the "us" can be in small letters or it can be in big letters, and there is and there has been for a long time, uh, an idea that the "us" transmit the information to the "them," and it's a one-way thing, and that's why seeing as the language of "us" is English, that the "them" need to learn it, because it's our language and it's far more important than theirs are, and anyway, theirs have been the languages of communism and, and, and, and, and repression, and so on, and so the language of "us" is clearly the language of democracy.

> At this point in the interview, I was admittedly a little confused (or jet-lagged) and

missing some of Philip's irony, so I asked him to clarify who the "us" was. He replied stiffly, "I said in capital letters," and then went on to explain that he meant the United States and "Britain as its acolyte." He then strayed from the topic of the EU momentarily, and in so doing, he leads us more definitively to the issue of language in the EU:

> The other languages have already been marginalized for quite a while, because it's all happening in English, and because a lot of the research is happening in English-speaking countries or is being published in English. . . . Now that is beginning to change, and I don't want to imply that [my university] is doing that because the rector and other people have made statements on previous occasions about the importance of two-way exchange, that we want there to be a two-way exchange and that two-way exchange is a crucially important underpinning idea of [this university's] existence and I think of OSI's existence.

Here, Philip, interviewed in 2005, notes a change in policy, one which may explain the *lack* of two-way exchange in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse written at least six years earlier. Perhaps that meaning, that policy, had not yet discursively stabilized or had simply been resisted, an

uncertainty which may underline the need for future longitudinal research as well as hope for an increasingly inclusive approach to decision-making, one which hears and acknowledges multiple voices, including those from the East. Still, in spite of this capitulation to the importance of two-way exchange, Philip nevertheless saw open society and related concepts as mostly "Western." He also made one final, crucial connection explicit. He was speaking of the early days of transition, OSI, and the EU, and again he was speaking ironically:

> Not only Soros, other people said yes, let's get in there and we'll, because quite clearly in order to have access to all these concepts of open society, these people gotta have access to English first, because they're not going to be able to do it. We can't speak their languages so they're going to have to speak ours. Ok. Fair enough. Practical. So off we all go and we teach them English.

> Fair enough. Or is it? Philip's irony could easily be missed in a printed transcription only,

and of course it might not be (is not) fair that because "we can't speak their languages," "they're going to have to speak ours." For all that, the perception inherent in his main point stands out sharply: "In order to have access to all these concepts of open society, these people gotta have English first."

With this rather startling statement, Philip shepherds us to the next section of this chapter: participants' perceptions of the role of language and particularly the role of English in both the building of open societies and EU accession.

### *The Role of Language in Building Open Societies*

Philip leads us almost too neatly to the exploration of participants' views on the role of English in building open societies, particularly given his statement (no matter how ironically intended), "Theirs have been the languages of communism and, and, and, and, and repression, and so on, and so the language of us is clearly the language of democracy." Philip constructs, therefore, another dichotomy related to the "us" and "them," East and West: Now we encounter the dichotomy of "the language of democracy" versus "the languages of communism and

repression." This is a dichotomy reproduced in a number of participants' answers, along with the tensions inherent in such a split, and it may well explain one reason why the OSI/SFN ELP discourse constructs English as *the* language of open society.

*English versus Other Languages*

When asked how she saw the relationship between open society and English, Dora agreed with Philip to an extent, though not in regard to her own language: "English is a link to the world, in my opinion, because here we learn German and Russian but all of these were, uh, disappeared from the school syllabuses, and only English is left." When I asked her why German and Russian had disappeared, her answer took me by surprise:

> Because they are not used, they are not really used, so they are used in, in closed societies, not, not in the whole world, and the other interesting thing is that all the information, I'm now referring to my work, all the other information that, that we receive is in English, or they have some leaflets or some minor things in French, but all the important things are in English.

Dora here, like Philip above, reproduces a discourse chain identified in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse analyzed in Chapter Four: that English is the language of open society. What was unexpected in her answer and Philip's, again, was the *dichotomy between languages* that the discourse chain produces, one made explicit here through juxtaposition. For Dora, at least, if English is the language of open societies, then Russian and German become the languages of "closed" societies due, most likely, to their historical relationships with communist, repressive, and fascist governments. Antipathy for Russian may not have been surprising, since it was imposed as a compulsory language into multiple curricula across the CESEE-fSU for almost 40 years. Antipathy for German may be due to the persistence of memories of the horrors of World War Two. But surprisingly, Dora also almost dismissed French, which she dealt with through "leaflets or some minor things, but all the important things are in English." Dora thus not only

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reproduces a discourse chain identified in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse, but she adds to it, ideologically embedding within English access to "the important" information just as she ideologically embeds within Russian and German associations with closed societies. This is a wholly new "local" discourse in its explicitness.

Eva's views corresponded closely with Dora's:

Ten or 15, 10 years ago it was, we were at the beginning of the democratic society settling in, in our country, and up 'til 1990, '89,'90, many people learned the language that was assigned to them. After '89, people could, uh, started traveling and they saw how wonderful it is to be able to communicate in English . . . or they realized that their jobs required language more than their native tongue or [another local language], so what they were trying to do with learning English, I mean, the English they learned was to get a better job, to get a better paid job, or even travel just as tourists. They wanted to because the world opened up for us and English, and the other languages, I wouldn't say not, but English was of course the [laughs] most important one. It is now still, although we are closer to Germany than to England or any other English speaking country. But it [English] was bigger, larger, greater.

In this response, Eva did make room for other languages ("I wouldn't say not"), supporting the discourse chain of linguistic diversity identified in Chapter Five. But English to her was still "the most important one," "bigger, larger, greater." For Eva, English also led to economic benefits, "better *paid* jobs" (italics added), and it was "wonderful" to communicate in, as opposed, perhaps, implicitly, to the unnamed "language that was assigned to them."

Karolina concurred to a large extent. She, too, put the relationship between English and open society first into historical context: "It began after 1990 when people realized they couldn't do anything without speaking a language, and this language is, um, most of the time, English." Karolina did hedge a bit in her answer ("most of the time"), which is important: Like Eva, she created space for the importance of other languages, presumably for open societies, too. When I asked her why English is the language most taught and learned, however, her answer again led to dichotomy: "It's the most widespread, the easiest to learn, I mean, in comparison with German, which has a very strict and rigid model."

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While Karolina is likely referring here to the linguistic rather than the socio-political domain with her description of German as "very strict and rigid," she nevertheless introduces a connotation which leads to dichotomy: "very strict and rigid" versus "easy." A little later in the interview, Karolina discussed other languages available in the curriculum as well as languages which were no longer or scarcely available:

> French was also fashionable, in inverted commas, but, uh, English is more widespread, and actually, English and German are taught in our schools now, with a very few exceptions, of French. Russian has died out, I mean, unfortunately, nobody wants to learn Russian anymore, or very few of them, just for the sake of learning some words in Pushkin's language, for example, but they are not very serious about it.

Somewhat struck by her openness to Russian (indicated by her use of "unfortunately"), when I asked Karolina why she felt nobody wanted to learn Russian anymore, her answer was an important reiteration of Dora's thinking, which helps again to explain the relationship between *English* and open society. Karolina, who disliked politics and loved literature, answered this way:

> Politics. So, as the Soviet Union has disappeared as a union, well, I think the political interests have disappeared also and many of those old Russian teachers retired, I don't know, in very few villages where there is nobody to teach English or German or French, there are still some pensioned, some retired teachers, but actually it is not taught anymore. I heard that there is a revival of interest in Russian language and literature in [a neighboring country] and I think it will reach us as well. Well, I'm not really sure about it, though I think English as a foreign language which is primarily learned won't give its place to any other language, maybe German, but today the tendency is to learn two languages, first English, second German, or vice versa. But English is preferred.

In the final analysis, Karolina observes that "English is preferred" despite other language options and the possibility of a Russian language revival. Accordingly, Karolina, Eva, and Dora all provide insight into the role of English and ELT in building open societies as compared to other languages, insight which looks back to Philip's statement: that "theirs" have been the languages of "communism" and "repression," while "ours" has been the language of democracy. In the

process, all discursively create dichotomies between English and other languages, or English and the languages of the Other, or English as the language of the "superior" Other (Hansen, 2006).

Magda took a somewhat broader view in considering the role of English in building open societies, though she still ended up dichotomizing languages:

> Probably those people who spoke good English or, or at least could read English, contributed to the changes much more than those who had nothing to do with English at all. Probably. I mean, again, this would need to be studied but, but I believe that the initiators of all the changes in the 1980s, um, had, all had access to, to American, British, and Western European literature and, and thoughts, and philosophies. I believe, yes, yes, this must have been the case. Hard-line communists didn't speak any English and didn't have any contact at all with, with subversive ideas [laughs], but probably it wasn't just English. I would probably say that, that it was German and French as well, you know, because if, if you consider, you know, 1970s, 1980s, everything that was going on in, in Germany and France especially, and Italy as well, probably those events and movements and developments had a very strong impact on thinkers [in my country], so probably not just English, but all these European languages as well.

Clearly here, Magda expresses openness to the presence of "subversive ideas" in multiple "European" languages and not only English. All the same, she does assume that "hard-line communists" would not have spoken English, which in itself would have been a "subversive" act. Subsequently, the dichotomy Magda constructs is one between "European languages" and what must, by juxtaposition, become "non-European languages" or the languages of the "hard-line communists," including, presumably, Russian.

Participants also told stories about how tensions between English and Russian in particular played out even *within* OSI/SFN and the various universities and schools it supports. Lauren depicted it this way:

> Curious were tensions between people who come from sort of Russian-speaking contexts and maybe, you know, there is a huge number of people who come from [non-Russian-speaking countries], because Russian is often seen as the sort of second language of [this university], and a lot of people are like, oh those Russian speakers, and I know sometimes in class, people will just suddenly break into a conversation in Russian and it kind of, divides the group a little bit. Well, there's English speakers, and there's Russian speakers, and for a lot of those people, Russian isn't necessarily their native language.

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Lauren's last sentence heightens the divide between Russian and English speakers, even when Russian was used by someone whose native language was not Russian.

Elsa's portrayal of language tensions at her university was tantamount to Lauren's, with a slight exception:

> I think that everyone who went to [my university] have noticed that some in the former Soviet Union, some people even prefer, like Baltic peoples, would say they don't know any Russian and they don't want to speak Russian with the Russians, and they had lots of Russian in school and they should know Russian and they prefer to speak English and other Russians are a bit offended by that. . . . So I think that it was not that the Russians didn't want to speak English, it's just, maybe they tried speaking Russian with former Soviet Union states and some were not too happy with that.

Elsa's story here evinces how tensions linger around the use of Russian, at least on one side, "the Baltics" and the Western part of Eastern Europe. It is further striking how Elsa described Russians trying to speak Russian "with former Soviet Union states" as opposed to *people* from those states, a leveling—albeit, unconsciously so—of individual human difference through metonymic replacement of people with "states" (Reisigl & Wodak, 2002). Thus we return to a hypothesis formulated at the very beginning of this study, when trying to understand why *English* was constructed as the language of open society. In short, I wondered, would it be constructed as a means to cross-cut national identities and create a new "in-group" of English speakers with a reduced sense of national and ethnic identity and a stronger sense of supranational identity? Many participants affirmed at least one part of this idea.

*English as a Way to Cross-Cut and Connect Identities*

Philip stated earlier, "In order to have access to all these concepts of open society, these people gotta have access to English first." While Philip was being ironic and did not necessarily take this stand, another participant did. In the process, this participant approximated a different discourse chain identified in Chapter Four, one in which English is reworded to mean

"successful communication," and this person definitely constructed English as a means of bringing different groups together. It started with the participant's definition of open society:

> I would hope open society is people of different nationalities being able to, again, I mean, this is where the English comes in, people of different nationalities being able to communicate intelligently, freely, without prejudice against different nations, different colors, so that basically, I guess, this takes us back to what I was saying about trying to make more worldly-wide, worldly-wise people.

First, I must point out: the speaker, whether intentionally or not, ideologically embeds within English not only "successful communication" but also "free" and "intelligent" communication, "without prejudice." English becomes thus a sort of equalizer among "people of different nations, different colors," or, in identity theory, a way to cross-cut national and ethnic identities and hence reduce differences among groups (Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, 2004). Either way, the assumption that learning English will erase prejudice is clearly risky, though this participant took a solid stance:

> English is the only language that will let them do that. Whether you like it or not, English has become the medium for doing that and I'm sure when Soros set up the open society he set up his ideals as . . . he knew even then, going back 50 years, that, no, I mean it's a horrible cliché, you ain't going to get far in the modern world as a young intelligent person who has high qualifications but can't speak English, and I take that one step further. There ain't many of them around.

If we disregard the "ain'ts" in this answer and get down to the meaning, we can understand this participant as reproducing the discourse chain equating English with success and modernity. What is more, we again see emphasis on the "*young* intelligent person" (italics added), and so, like previous discourses, faith is lodged in the "citizen pilgrim" of Falk's (1994) global civil society, a term reworded here perhaps as "worldly-wise." Given the last sentence from the passage, however ("There ain't many of them around"), we can probably safely assume that the participant's faith in such "citizen pilgrims" is limited.

Other participants also saw English as a way of connecting different nationalities, though they expressed their views in more neutral terms. For Galina, "English became the media through which ideas can reach out [to] people of various nationalities. In this way it can contribute to the process of building open society." In a similar tone, Mihail offered the following:

> I do think that English plays a role in creating an open society. As basically language of international communication, English provides a medium of useful information exchange between societies where different degrees of openness and freedom are found. Thus, people from the more closed societies obtain a greater incentive to move towards greater freedom.

Mihail, not unlike Dora, expanded on the importance of "information exchange," since, in his view, such exchange provides "a greater incentive" for people "from more closed societies" "to move towards greater freedom," a sort of Western carrot offered in lieu of the Eastern stick. Further, Mihail reproduced the discourse chain of English as "the language of international communication," a construct most participants agreed with and took for granted as a reality without need of questioning.

Ecaterina qualified her description of English as a connector between multinational groups only a little: "First, since people have got the freedom of movement they can travel and see the experiences of different countries, participate in various conferences or debates. The English language plays an important communication role in this respect." She additionally acknowledged the role English plays in providing "access to a number of international news channels (BBC or CNN, for example) besides national ones. Consequently, you can compare different points of view on the same events." Ecaterina brings to the conversation the role of English in providing multiple viewpoints (though both her examples were Western news sources, even if from different countries and continents) and "the experiences of different countries." Klara put it more simply: English related to open society because it is "one of the official

languages in the European Communion [*sic*]"[42] and is "needed to be in touch with, to share the

information, to share the culture."

Elsa's answer to the question about the role of English and ELT in building open

societies coincided with both themes explored so far in this section: she constructed English as a

way to connect people, and she ended up laughing about the possibility of any other language as

having this capability, thus following other participants' trend of constructing a discourse chain

which dichotomizes languages:

> It's always helpful to have a language that connects people within different cultures and I
> think English is the only language. Sometimes people say, oh, but you know, we have
> one billion Chinese, but English is the only language which so many people have as their
> *second* language. And I think that's what matters. I don't think it matters if one million
> people have it as a mother tongue if they don't speak it with anyone else, and how many
> people learn Chinese? Almost no one.  And wherever you go, I think, I mean in Asia,
> wherever you go, you find people speaking some rudimental English, the whole East,
> maybe the exception is Latin America, South America, where still I think English is not
> so strong, so I think that if we have more people knowing English . . . it will help to
> spread those ideas between us more helpful for happy living, like democracy, or
> whatever.

Elsa was fairly convinced about the ability of English to connect people and help spread ideas

"for happy living, like democracy, or whatever." And while her answer initially ranged far and

wide geopolitically, from Asia to South America, she did eventually return to the role of English

in Europe:

> I don't know about Russia, but definitely in Eastern Europe, English is the first foreign
> language taught in the majority of cases, and I think in Russia and the Caucasus as well.
> And if you want to do anything in academia, there's no alternative to knowing English.

Elsa reminds us of one of the earliest constructions of English in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse:

English as the necessary language "for international communication in professional and

*academic* fields" ("Past and Spin-Off," 2007; italics added). This statement, as noted in Chapter

Four, at least constrained the necessity of English to "professional and academic" work, before

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[42] Klara's "mistake" here probably is a happy blend of the European Commission and the European Union.

the discourse eventually stated categorically that English was "critical" to the building of open

societies, a statement without discursive constraints. I therefore was curious how Elsa felt about

using English in both her studies and work. She answered by moving from many specific parts of

the real world where English is spoken, as mentioned above, to an imaginary world of

connectedness, one again made possible through English:

> I liked speaking English and it gives you a little separate world feeling that you are connected to a lot of other people, and we all speak the same language, but it's not the language of the country in which we live, and I was thinking before I met you whether it's a special set of people that come from the other countries that learn English, that maybe they are, tend to come from families that are more open to the West or more liberal.

Elsa was unsure in her assessment of whether people from other countries that learn English

"tend to come from families that are more open to the West or more liberal." Unequivocally,

however, she reveled in the connectedness it provided her, and in such reveling she 'imagined" a

"community" much like the "imagined communities" that Anderson (1983) deployed in

conceptualizing the nation-state, a construct in part formed by and dependent upon *a common

language*. And the more people that know English, according to Elsa, the more likely it was that

ideas for happy living—like "democracy, or whatever"—would spread. This was how she

connected English and ELT to the concept of open society—through the many connections

English helps facilitate, be they social, academic, or political. One might even interpret her as

implying (though this may be a risky stretch) that everyone in the world should speak English,

which leads to the next theme which emerged from interviews with participants, English as a

lingua franca.

*English as a Lingua Franca*

Thomas had no hesitation in describing English as the lingua franca of the region, though

he was much more cautious in attaching values to the language. He began as follows:

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I see it, I suppose, as more of a tool rather than some sort of post-colonial [indecipherable]. That doesn't mean it doesn't come with a certain value-set, but I think it's a big danger to over-read that. Because the thing you are forgetting is that, how individuals themselves re-negotiated the values of owning the language, even in the colonial setting . . . there was a negotiation between the colonizers and the colonized and that's exactly what's happening here. It's not colonization in any sense, it's a lingua franca, so it doesn't come with so super-imposed values, obviously people talk about those values, obviously there's an association, but you know, I've seen people argue for very socialist types of approaches, in English.

Thomas highlights here, and vitally, like Pennycook (1998) and Canagarajah (1999), the agency and responsibility of the individual who chooses to learn and use English, appropriating it for his or her own purposes, and he further points out that the language can be used to criticize democracy and liberalism as well as promote it: "I've seen people argue for very socialist types of approaches, in English." His point is very well taken, particularly in that, going back to the definition of open society, it demonstrates strongly that "different people have different views and interests" ("About OSI: FAQs," 2009). Thomas again demonstrates his respect for the same.

Thomas had further researched and reflected upon the role of English in building open societies long before I came along with my tape recorder. For instance, when pushed a bit on the relationship between lingua franca and linguistic imperialism, he turned to history:

Yes, of course, there's some sort of correlation, because it comes with that history of who won the world wars and who were the colonizers and all that, but now I don't know . . . I found some data that in India, it's the language of secondary schools and universities, because to choose anything else would be, would be to create some sort of ethnic tension. In fact, choosing the post-colonial language is the route out. It changes it totally, you know?

In this response, Thomas constructs English as a "route out" of ethnic tensions and thus a way to connect groups of differing nationalities and ethnicities. In this way, English is again embedded, if subtly, into a discourse of security. Ever reflective, Thomas also admitted the perceptions of neo-colonialism English carries by once again turning to the case of Bosnia:

Two examples of the much stronger influence of English, for example, would be in communities that are more or less international protectorate states, so Bosnia or Kosovo.

> Like, if you go to Bosnia and meet anyone involved in the international community at all, they speak phenomenal English, they really have to. . . . These countries are very interesting, and they have been most recently criticized as being neo-colonial situations, you know, and therefore you have a very strong, like English becomes, it's like the international community speaks English, it's there in a huge way and it's being very deterministic in how it operates . . . it's the same in Kosovo, you know?

Thomas is upfront in acknowledging that "the international community" is an English-speaking community, reproducing another discourse chain from previous ELP discourses. Therefore, locals, too, have to speak "phenomenal English." He also saw a connection between English and democracy, if, for him, a loose one, but more importantly for him, English as a lingua franca was about "trying to understand." In Central Europe in particular, he acknowledged that English has "been the lingua franca for a long time, especially seeing as a lot of the problems have been in the Balkans, especially in the Balkans." He went on to add that "in fact, if the international community is going to relate to those issues, then in fact, English is the path of least resistance."

As a well-established member of the international community, Thomas plainly sought "personal relationships" with the various people he worked with, without the barrier of a translator. Thus English, for Thomas and for the people in the Balkans (at least as Thomas believes), becomes "the path of least resistance" in working to build open—and I should add, secure—societies there. This argument bolsters again a discourse chain identified in all ELP discourses so far: the implicit embedding of English into the process of creating security.[43]

For all the reasons outlined above, it comes as no surprise, then, that for Thomas, English is the lingua franca of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe at least, a point he further attributed to George Soros himself along with Aryeh Neier, founder of Human Rights Watch and current president of OSI/SFN. As Thomas stated, both were refugees from Europe during World

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[43] As an interesting counter-discourse, in the U.S. now, much of the study of "critical languages" like Arabic, Russian, and Chinese is funded through National Security Education Programs such as the Boren Fellowship. In exchange, grant recipients have to dedicate a certain amount of time after graduation to government service related to national security.

War Two who eventually "found the promised land through English." He also added, importantly, "that a lot of people in OSI speak Russian, but of course, you know, Russian is probably associated with the old school as well, in and of itself." Thomas echoed, therefore, a dichotomy we heard earlier in participants' responses, but he also relayed the fact that OSI has been building up its team of Russian speaking trainers, since "English is *not* a lingua franca in the 'Stans.'"[44]

Bianca would probably disagree with Thomas on multiple points. She answered by email my question about the role of English and ELT in building open societies:

> English has a privileged status: not only is it the lingua franca of business, economic exchanges and politics, but it also has intrinsic characteristics which qualify it for the special status of language of globalisation. Its intrinsic qualities (logic and economy, among others), must have promoted it to this status, perhaps to the same extent as its appurtenance to more than one influential people.

Bianca then continued:

> Being the language of trade and business in the 20th century, English opened new doors and ways to its speakers (native and non-native). Politics immediately followed in the footsteps, when it did not open the way. First-hand experience of other countries and peoples, of other ways of living, thinking, doing and making things, all this creates respect for otherness and openness. In this way English has played a role in creating open societies.

Again, the prevailing theme in this group of responses is English as a lingua franca, a theme with which Bianca wholly agreed and even magnified considerably. For her, English is not only a lingua franca, but *the* "language of globalization." She argued that it is therefore "privileged" among languages, which she attributed both to what she believed are its "intrinsic qualities (logic and economy, among others)" as well as its role as an "appurtenance to more than one influential people" (a polite way of saying, perhaps, Great Britain and the United States). Ultimately,

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[44] Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and so forth.

according to Bianca, English "creates respect for otherness and openness,"[45] another new, local

discourse chain she makes explicit here.

Bianca then discussed what she saw as one result of English as a privileged language. To

contextualize this story, I had first found Bianca's email address on a Foreign Language

Teachers Listserv, where she had asked the question, "Are FL teachers agents of globalization?"

Now was my chance to ask her the same. She replied:

> I would answer that foreign language teachers are agents of globalisation to the extent
> that they teach a language which is itself a carrier of global values, which—as a *lingua
> franca*—gives access to European and global values and attitudes. If through a foreign
> language students become European and world citizens and start to understand the world
> differently, then the teachers who teach it are agents of global change. For instance, with
> the banal personal pronoun *you* the English teacher can introduce notions of self-
> appraisal, personal space and democracy. (Italics in original email)

Pointedly, Bianca speaks here of foreign language teachers generally, not just English teachers,

which should remind us that world language education in the West and globally can and should

provide broader understanding of global issues, if not "global values and attitudes." Nor does she

name English as the lingua franca "which is itself a carrier of global values," but I believe she

clearly implies it, especially by ending on the example of English. Also significant in this

answer, particularly in light of analysis in Chapter Five which explored constructions of English

as a means of creating European and global identities, Bianca reproduces and enlarges upon this

particular discourse chain by implying that English is the lingua franca which "gives access to

European and *global* values and attitudes" (italics added). Unlike the discourses on European and

global identities explored in Chapter Five, however, Bianca enunciates a much more profound

understanding of what global attitudes and being an agent of global change might mean: helping

students to "understand the world differently" by introducing "notions of self-appraisal, personal

space and democracy." Nor does she suggest a conflict between European and global values; she

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[45] How I wish it were so in our country.

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does not create an "us" and "them," but rather, a picture of "nested identities" which are not in conflict (Herrmann, Risse, & Brewer, 2004).

As for Ecaterina, she clearly implied that English was a lingua franca without actually using the term. She replied in a matter of fact tone:

> The reply to this question is very simple. English is the official language at [my university] as well as the first official language of the European Union[46] and one of the most spoken languages in the world. Consequently, all communication among people is in this language, at least in such multinational societies as [my university and workplace]. Otherwise it is impossible to unite so many people from different countries.

As Ecaterina speaks of "uniting people," she reminds us of the steady theme of English contributing to connectedness among people of different nationalities and ethnic groups, and this now *through* its role as a lingua franca.

> Lauren, on the other hand, had a different view of English as a lingua franca:

> English is not just the language of the Open Society Institute and [this university]. There are so many other networks globally, even, for example, when one of the local organizations I work with in Kyrgyzstan is very much involved in the Asia-Pacific, well, it's an organization for women from the Asia-Pacific and their language of communication is English, so it's not as if it's only from the West out per se. It really is a global language and any time you want to communicate with anybody, not just from the US or someone who is a native speaker, it is English.

Of great significance in her answer, Lauren geopolitically challenges a view of the role of English in building open societies as radiating out from West to East only, and she reminds us that global networks which use English abound and are certainly not limited to OSI/SFN.[47]

Lauren, fluent in Russian, further regretted the dominance of English:

> It doesn't matter what ideas we have, it just matters that we know English. That, that can be very frustrating, and it shouldn't be that English is necessarily seen that way. Of course, it would be better if multilingualism was, was more of what we were talking about instead of just English.

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[46] There is no "first official language" of the EU, though the "Europa" website does note that "English is most widely known as either the first or second language in the EU" ("Europa," 2009).

[47] I chose to look only at this particular organization. A comparative study of ELP discourses from other organizations, e.g. the State Department, Peace Corps, British Council, etc. would be fascinating.

Ana, herself a speaker of multiple languages as were most participants in this study, conveyed a mix of pragmatism, concern, and excitement in her thinking on English as a lingua franca. Being an English teacher, she had obviously spent substantial time researching and reflecting on the topic:

> It's not unique in that sense, paraphrasing Phillipson – there's a state of alarm in lots of really developed European countries like Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway, where's there a huge domain loss, that certain domains are completely lost to English, and people in the media, or fashion, or even scholarship, they just do not use their languages, but it's really absurd that their reports are written in Danish so it's not accessible, and I would really like to read that, so it's an issue. But I think this is a whole trend, so [this university] maybe, it wasn't intended that way, but it is part of a trend of English medium universities. So I think we can look at that as linguistic imperialism or we can look at that as uh, uh, I mean, some people like to think of it as, English as instrumentalized in terms of a–it's a lingua franca, it doesn't belong to anybody, we can use it for our own purposes, and even the standard English doesn't have to be the standard English of British or American English. It can be lingua franca standard, like people like Jenkins or Barbara Seidlhofer say,[48] so I'm not, I'm not so sure about this, but I think it's a very exciting thing.

Not only does Ana lead us to a new perspective on the role of lingua franca and its "exciting" implications for teaching, she also introduces a new theme reproduced by a number of participants: that English "doesn't belong to anybody." Alternately, I suppose, we might say English belongs to anybody who wants to learn and use it.

*English Detached From Culture*

To start this theme, I first want to share one of Ana's stories, basically, the role of English in her life, which leads eventually to the role of English in building open societies, but English detached from culture. Here is Ana's voice:

> Well, if I just look at my own personal history, English is something that has definitely given me a lot of things. First of all, it gave me a tool to leave the country in the state of crisis, and it was an economic strategy for me. In terms of cultural affiliation, as I was going through the education system, I was very much, I had very strong, I mean, my first

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[48] Seidlhofer's (2005) position, in short, is that in lingua franca settings, "general language awareness and communication strategies" are more useful than "striving for mastery of fine nuances of native-speaker language" (p. 340).

trip to an English country was in Britain and I was very kind of interested in that . . . but then I became disassociated from either British or America. I think I can use English without being culturally associated, to paraphrase Kumaravadivelu,[49] it's high time language and culture become delinked. I don't know if it's possible, but maybe. I don't know.

In Ana's story, we see a progression of first affiliating with British English before she eventually appropriates English as her own, severed from British (and American) culture, and one of multiple languages she speaks and loves.

Magda essentially agreed, seeing English, like Andrew much earlier, as a great "equalizer" among non-native speakers:

It's a good thing that, that we all speak English. It's really a good thing, uh, because most of us are not native speakers of English, so, it, it, it makes people more equal, sort of, because [among non-native speakers] it's nobody's mother tongue.

Later, Magda elaborated on the role of English in this process of equalizing non-native speakers. In doing so, she hinted at the very least of another language dichotomy, keeping Western European languages quite separate from Russian or the languages of Central Asia:

And no other language could, could serve the same purpose. I mean, what, it couldn't be Hungarian, it couldn't be Russian for obvious reasons. Then could it be Kyrgyz or Kazakh or Romanian? Well, obviously not, so, so, what else? Ok, it could be German or French but, but nowadays, unfortunately, the most, the majority of the world speak, speak English rather than German or French.

Strikingly, Magda's rejection of Russian as a possible lingua franca is echoed throughout parts of the region due to what some participants take as "obvious reasons." Russian, it seems, *cannot* yet be detached from its culture or history for many people.

Irena's reactions to English aligned closely with Magda's and Ana's, and she also spoke practically, like Ecaterina and Lauren. She expressed her views in an email, as follows: "I think English is necessary. Here, I am talking about the English language, detached of its either

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[49] In *Cultural Globalization and Language Education*, Kumaravadivelu (2007) makes a strong case for de-linking culture and language, as demonstrated, he argues, through the astounding proliferation of World Englishes (p. 22).

British, American or any other culture – a language on its own, serving the communication purposes." For Eva, in contrast, the English she described was local rather than global, with words of her own language and even Russian mixed in:

> The English that is spoken and used here is not the English of the United States or, or, the English of, of, Britain. Not at all. Or Australia for that matter. No. It's, it's a local [laughs], a local variety, we say.

Finally, I turn to the voice of Victoriya. She constructed the role of English in building open societies and its possible future function as a lingua franca with both pessimism and sensitivity:

> I am not sure this is the role English plays nowadays. Recent developments in Iraq, Israel, and Lebanon make a lot of people jaded about the ideals of open society, democracy, freedom, human rights. . . . In my experience with many multicultural groups, people get increasingly skeptical when they hear these "mantra" words that have become a part of any political discourse. Anything and everything is done in the name of these big ideals, and the linguistic battle is fought with English as a sword. Yet, I do believe that English could play a significant role in creating a global open society. Again, with the right leadership and time to rethink and regroup, such a role is possible.

As I earlier wondered, it would be fascinating to find out if Victoriya believes that we have the "right leadership" at this point in time (in 2009, with President Obama in his first term), in which case "English could play a significant role in creating a global open society." Her voice again calls attention to leadership and the perception of legitimacy, legitimacy created by following political discourse with political actions that, indeed, make manifest "democracy, freedom, human rights." In such a case, English could be less a sword and more a bridge between cultures, which Victoriya brings vividly to life. Her image of the sword, too, shows the way to the next theme of this chapter raised overtly by several participants, the role of English as it relates to security and also as it relates to peace.

*English, Security, War, and Peace*

Underneath the multiple constructs raised by this discussion of English and open society—human rights, tolerance, deliberative democracy, making connections with people from other countries in a multi-national society, two-way exchange—underneath these constructs flows, I believe, another element of the OSI/SFN definition of open society: "that there is a need for institutions to protect the rights of all people to allow them to live together in peace" ("About Us: FAQs," 2005). This chapter has alluded to war in multiple ways: through the failure of the EU during the Balkan catastrophe, through the origin of the EU as a response to the atrocities of World War Two, even to the personal stories of George Soros and Aryeh Neier fleeing Europe to "the promised land of English," to quote Thomas. For Ana, too, English was a "tool" for her to flee her country, which was in a "state of crisis."

I now want to look more closely at how several participants talked about English in their work with people from societies which are, or have recently been, in conflict, discussion which extends and strengthens the discourse chain of English ideologically embedded into security. We have already heard Thomas' example of Bosnia, where English "was the path of least resistance" for the international community working to protect it and Kosovo, even if it occurred in a "deterministic matter." We have heard a few specifics about Victoriya's work in the area of human rights, a term she worries may be only a "mantra" given events in "Iraq, Israel, Lebanon." Other participants had these insights to offer.

Eva, for example, talked about one teaching position she had at her OSI/SFN-founded language school due to the NATO presence in her country (quotation marks added for clarity):

> Well, I've been doing English teaching for, it was general English for beginners, elementary beginners [laughs], they are very low level classes, to people in the army, because we have an army center here in town, and, um, yeah, I mean, they were joking,

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"Oh, we're in the NATO and we need English." That's not a joke [laughs], that's totally the case. It's reality.

Eva also observed that, in other classes at the Soros school where she worked, ethnicities which have historically had tensions with each other came together easily and happily in her English class. In state schools, on the contrary, these ethnicities were separated into different schools.

Ecaterina, in her university, found dialogue between countries in conflict overtly and successfully promoted, which she shared in an email:

> I think the primary mission [of the university] is in the creation of a multicultural dialogue. Four years ago when I was an MS student this dialogue was mostly for the countries from Central European Region, while now I can talk about small United Nations within this University ☺. I have met a lot of people coming from countries which had armed conflicts with each other or there was a conflict between several ethnical groups within one country. For instance, Albanians and Serbs, Azeri and Armenians, Americans and Iraqis, etc. [The university] organizes a lot of workshops, roundtables and seminars where the nations can express themselves and have a peaceful dialogue. I think this is a great challenge to create such conditions where hostile nations could try to understand each other in a peaceful way and look at the reality from the other side of the fence. (Emoticon in original)

Ecaterina was enthusiastic in her assessment of the university's mission, and notably, she discussed "dialogue" rather than "debate." Like Elsa earlier, she further metonymically replaced people with "nations," constructs which, in this case, both emphasize national identity as well as put the work of resolving conflict onto "nations" rather than specific people (many of whom Ecaterina probably knows). Then she added one more specific illustration of this mission as it relates to peace, an illustration which highlights, in essence, the importance of individualizing people as opposed to generalizing about nations and cultures:

> Besides, this is also great to get acquainted with other nations' culture and experiences. Only yesterday one of new PhD students told me he had talked with a student from Bangladesh and her knowledge and expertise amazed him. He considered people from that part of the world very backward and underdeveloped but after talking with that girl he had completely changed his mind. I think this is also an important function [of the university], to destroy stereotypes one has about other nations and cultures.

Ana, speaking as a teacher rather than a student, recounted another story which indirectly relates English to security and peace. She talked about an English language writing class for Palestinian students of Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, whom she described this way: "Some of them are so patriotic and so interested in finding like a just solution for the country, for Israel, or whatever, Palestine—it was very sad, it was touching." Ana then described the growth of this program for the Palestinians, who were provided scholarships to join multiple other students from multiple other countries in a preparatory course for study abroad. This course took place in a different country from the first, and again, it was held in English. Ana's story reminds us once more of the need for two-way (or multiple-way) exchange, for dialogue:

> And then they added the Palestinian program to that [other country's] program, which I think is a great idea, because a lot of the people from the former communist world think they only share experiences with the former communist countries, and then, when they met the Palestinians, they realized, wow, this is the same . . . and it was really amazing. People discovered many more similarities than they originally thought.

In this example, as Ana tells it, all benefitted dramatically through the international connections made.

In another story Ana shared, the commonality of experiencing war helped her provide a group of Iraqi scholars the voice (and language) she believed they would need to share their worldviews, their experiences, and their professional knowledge. The story involved the Iraqi scholars expressing resistance to writing in "the American way." Ana began by describing the group:

> They're academics, in their 40s . . . and it's interesting, this is where I felt that it's really helpful that I'm a non-native speaker because we could discuss the ways these standards of writing, research writing that are internationally—well, the way they are imposed or not, or, how should we deal with that? I think maybe this issue came up when we were discussing the placement of the thesis and the aim of the research. Well, they said, in Arabic it's not that and I said, well, of course, in my language it is not, I mean, there are similarities but this is how it is, and then they said, but why should we all write like Americans, and then we talked about the idea of being bi-literal and how you can use

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your own strengths and how you can take audience into consideration, I mean, how you position yourself as a scholar from the periphery, basically.

I asked Ana whether the Iraqi scholars themselves had first raised the issue. She continued:

> Yeah, they raised it, and they had a discussion among themselves, I think maybe it's very acute because of Iraq and the situation there and one guy said, well, we are a loser nation, and we had better forget our roots and our history because this is just going to draw us back, and then the others disagreed and said no, without history we are nobody, and then I said well, Arabic has such a long tradition and of course this tradition has to continue, because they all published very much in Arabic but not much internationally, and especially there was a woman who had an amazing piece of research on the information systems used by the military, she's a librarian scholar, and I really think this is something that should be published because there are going to be masses of people going there to study Iraq . . . and this is what I tried to tell them, I said, it's important to publish internationally because there is going to be somebody else coming and studying you. You shouldn't allow that. And this is how I feel about the Balkans. We should publish about our own things.

At this point, Ana and I had a somewhat uncomfortable laugh, given my position as an American L1 English-speaker researching this subject throughout so-called periphery countries. I told her that her point was very well-taken and I would surely highlight it in my study. Her point further hints at what can be done to improve policy and teaching in English language aid projects, which I will elaborate on in my conclusion.

And, of course, Ana shared another commonality with these scholars beyond being an L2 speaker of English. Through English and *war*, that is, she could also reach and connect with the Iraqis:

> If I work with the Iraqis then it's really, very, it's a, it's a tool, I know, I've also been through the war and I know how it is and we can talk about this and they see it as something, you become closer to them, so it's a very strange thing . . . but it is about these issues of identity.

Thus Ana concluded that story, a story more intense, perhaps, than Eva's or Ecaterina's, given Ana's first-hand experience of war. But in each of these cases, the participants made clear, English was the tool that provided the dialogue which eased ethnic tensions, which prepared new NATO members, which brought students together from countries that had been in armed conflict

with each other, which helped reduce stereotypes, which allowed for identification and understanding of commonalities more than differences, and which provided "periphery" scholars a voice and language in which to publish and share their research and views internationally. To return to Victoriya's metaphor, given the right leadership (and critical pedagogical approach, I would add), English can be used as a sword or it can be used as something else entirely.

Ana's story and the concerns of the Iraqi scholars about having to write "like Americans" also lets me shift now to another important theme participants raised in their discussions of the relationship between English, ELT and open societies, namely, problems of or resistances to English expressed or encountered by participants. As participants made clear, the dominance of English as a lingua franca, as the unofficial first language of the EU, and as the language of "international communication" does not come without a cost. In particular, participants identified an undercurrent of resentment to having to write in English according to Western academic conventions; participants expressed discomfort over children in their countries learning English too soon; participants observed how English can temporally divide generations, the children of the "changes" divided from their parents, who feel somewhat "lost" in the new world; participants regretted the loss of nuances and subtleties when speaking and writing in English; and they made known the power imbalances they felt in meetings or discussions with "native speakers." In addition, participants discovered that the criterion of English for some fellowships can actually lead to the selection of the *wrong* people for the purpose of such fellowships. They expressed anxieties and annoyances over the impacts of English on their own languages. They described, too, the difficulties of translating and teaching the language of policy, development, and government to people who lack schematic understandings of concepts from those domains, a struggle born out of what one participant described as "an ideological and linguistic revolution."

One result? The creation of an English-speaking elite that, in turn, is unable to build local

capacity by building on local approaches to problems. Participants' stories are as follows.

*Concerns over and Resistances to English*

The first, raised by Elsa, was akin to Ana's description of the Iraqi scholars' resistance to

writing "like Americans." As a student, Elsa had worked as an editor of her English medium

university's school paper, which occasionally put her in awkward if not difficult positions:

> Everyone agreed, of course, in writing in English, but they wanted to write in their own way, some from Albania writing this long article starting with that and that happened and then and then and getting the most important thing in the middle somewhere [laughs] . . . everyone was writing English, but you still bring your own way of thinking and writing into English. . . . I want all the writings to be in English because you never know when you have to quit your position and someone has to follow after you and if you have a lot of archived material in [the local language], it's not very fair in an English speaking university. But when I've tried to point that out, well, it hasn't led to open conflicts but let's say there was something underneath, after all, [some staff members said] we are in [this country] and I'm [this nationality] so why should I write in English?

As editor, Elsa had to defend the role of English for an English newspaper for an English

medium university. This is not to say that she herself did not have concerns over English. She

had several, expressed below:

> I don't like it when in [my country], I don't like it when there are too many English speaking programs popping up on primary or secondary level, because I think we need to think in your own language to produce new words for that language and I don't think that 15- year-olds should be taught only in English with [national] classmates and often by speakers [of the national language] who have just learned English somewhere, I don't think that's good. On a university level, I think it's inevitable . . . but I think there's a danger that if you just write in English, everyone I've spoken to, a lot of people say they have difficulties in talking about their own topic, their own Ph.D. thesis, their own work in their mother tongue. On the other hand I would say you should also force yourself. Again, it's good being bilingual.

In this response, I was especially struck by Elsa's and other students' concerns over being able to

talk about their research in their "mother tongue," a point we will return to shortly. First,

however, Karolina, an English teacher, also worried about her students learning at too young of

an age: "In 1995, I think they introduced learning English in the second grade. In my opinion, it

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is a little bit early." She said this because before learning English, students in her community, which is ethnically mixed, already have to learn two languages from two very different language families.

Karolina expressed another worry, one which reproduces a discourse chain identified in previous analysis: that English could become a divisive marker of temporal identity given limited opportunities to learn English in many communist countries prior to transition. Karolina provided a rather moving example of this divide:

> So the parents don't know any English, but the kids already know some, and, well, some of the parents have this willingness to help their children in learning, and if they can't help them in learning English, they are a little bit lost, and some of them say, I can't help you because I don't know this language, some of them know some words but it is not enough and, well, they try to teach something to their kids.

While this is a scenario which may change in part over time, the "lost" feeling Karolina describes no doubt captures the feelings of many parents and grandparents who grew up under communism. It further reproduces a discourse chain of "inferior" and "superior" "Others," through the construction of temporal identities divided by markers of age.

For other participants who were students and/or employees of OSI or OSI/SFN-supported schools and universities, English was constructed as, to an extent, limiting their abilities to participate and express themselves in groups which combined, in their terms, "native" and "non-native" speakers. Thomas described the type of comments he usually heard as simply "God, I wish I spoke better English so I could understand better, you know, or I wish it wasn't in English because my English isn't good enough to fruitfully engage at this level, etc." Magda felt the limits first as a loss of "nuances" and "subtleties," a feeling she shared with her students:

> One thing that is really negative, well, it's unavoidable but it *is* still negative, that when you use a language that is not your mother tongue, then obviously your expression is more limited. . . . You will *never* probably, never achieve the same nuances, you will never be able to express the same subtle subtleties in English as in your mother tongue,

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in, in speaking as well as in writing, so that, that is a disadvantage  and our students feel it all the time and very often they voice it as well.

Magda further revealed her feelings related to power relations when in meetings with L1 speakers:

> You know, you talk to me, you are a native speaker, I'm not, then almost immediately, you have a kind of superior position, you are in a better position simply because, because you speak the language better, and this does happen, you know, this does happen. In meetings, you notice it quite a lot in meetings when there are, when let's say, half of the participants are native speakers, the other half are non-native speakers, then obviously, it's always the native speakers who speak up, you know, and control the flow of things, and the non-native speakers, even myself, well, too shy, what should I say, ok, I'll keep quiet, ok.

For Elsa, who did not seem the least bit shy, meetings in English which included people of multiple nationalities were a struggle due to what she felt were broader cultural differences which made communication a strain:

> When I went back [to my home country] and I went into a room where I had a meeting, I suddenly realized how it is when you're in a meeting where everybody speaks the same language as a native tongue. It's just everyone understands each other on a deeper level, and it's very difficult to put a word on what's missing sometimes when you're in a meeting with six, seven different nationals. It's just that, unconsciously, you have to try harder to understand what they actually mean, and you have to try harder to express your own thoughts. . . . It's just, it just translates into the, to the *something*, so everything is a bit more difficult or it takes more of your energy, that's what I would say. The end result is probably just as good, but when I came back to [the university], I realized how easy it was to work in [my home country].

To this theme, Ana added a different dimension, one which may shed light on the cultural "something" Elsa could not quite name. Ana was describing one of her first work meetings with Western English-speaking teachers and how different it was compared to faculty meetings in her home country:

> I remember the first meeting at the [university], I was kind of shell-shocked, I would say, because the meetings I had in my old department [in my home country], especially with the head of the department who was very authoritarian, basically it was like, he talks, and then, if we vote, we just raise our hands and that's it. You were never expected to speak . . . and the first meeting [at the English medium university], everybody spoke, [blank] spoke, and I didn't say anything and then [blank] said, but what do you think, and I was

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like, ummmmmmm. So it was like I understand, oh, you have to contribute . . . so it was *completely* the opposite, so that was very hard.

The authoritarian context of Ana's previous experiences with meetings discernibly impacted her early experiences in meetings with L1 English speakers, another potential limit imposed on voice, not just by language, but by one's history, experiences, and background.

Thomas confronted several different problems with English, each related to English as the language of policy and development. This issue parallels Elsa's earlier concern around the difficulty some L2 researchers had in talking about their research in their "mother tongues." In one of Thomas' cases, English was a requirement for a particular OSI/SFN fellowship in Central Asia, since the materials for the policy program were in English. As a result, according to Thomas, the accepted applicants were "the wrong people":

> They, in fact, had the wrong people because of the criteria of English, they didn't really have the policy people who were directly involved with the decision making, they had much more of those people who had maybe gone to universities outside of the country, you know? So it was the English that was dominating and not the real policy people who are on the ground dealing with the problems. They should be a voice at the end of this process.

Consequently, the following year, English as a criterion was dropped and Thomas and other "international mentors" were forced to work with a translator. It was not ideal, he said, but "they did pick the policy people" and ultimately, in his words, "the focus shouldn't be on us, it should be on them."

A second issue Thomas encountered dealt with the terminology of policy and development. When discussing the work of translating policy materials in the Balkans and attending regional conferences which were not in English, he cited problems that were not just with the words themselves, but with the "schematic understandings of the words and how they apply to public administration":

Why didn't this language exist? Because there wasn't a need for it, because people didn't talk about politics in this way, or policy in this way, and so now, through the influence of the international community undoubtedly, and also, maybe, also just getting so sick of the fact that in these countries that decisions are made in a purely politicized manner, that people have accepted the basic principles of a strategically-oriented public administration and not just a public administration, and gover*nance*, not government. Now they're negotiating not just what the terms mean but also the language, the language has to be negotiated, right? . . . and this is where we're at, at the cusp of not just an ideological evolution but also of a, a linguistic evolution, you know . . . and most of the conferences and discussion are done through translators, but you cannot believe the confusion that this causes, like literally, I've seen like, people are like, in terms of terminology, we are not speaking the same language. We are not understanding each other.

Lauren faced a similar struggle in her work in Central Asia, whereby development

terminology and the need to negotiate meanings often proved difficult. She first introduced this

issue generally:

Working internationally with the Open Society Institute, I see the ways people working in different contexts are using these sort of buzzwords, talking about things like "empowerment," and "capacity building," and just sort of putting these sort of words out there. I think most people in [North America] wouldn't really know what capacity building is.

When I asked her if such meanings were agreed upon in the NGO and development world or the

international community, Lauren laughed and then explained:

This is sort of a sticking point at some places, they certainly aren't agreed upon beforehand between Budapest and Bishkek, for example, but among groups of program managers within my organization they definitely are. We're also doing so much with the United Nations Development Programme and they have a program in the cross-border areas, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, which is called "preventative development" and this is because they don't want to talk about conflict anymore, so they're talking about preventative development [She laughs]. When you say that to a native Kyrgyz, they say, what? So they definitely have a lot of very specific conflict, conflict resolution, conflict prevention, concepts which have so much baggage behind them, and UNDP knows what they mean because you go through their set of trainings, but you go to the next organization and they have a whole different set, so it's interesting how that plays out.

Victoriya re-contextualized the issue of development, policy, and English by describing

the role English played in her human rights work. She told me first that she had deepened her

understanding through reading about, studying, and practice human rights work internationally

and in English:

> My response to this question will only refer to the English language education (not other languages), which undoubtedly played a significant role in Human Rights Advocacy work. Speaking of the word "advocacy", perhaps it will not surprise you that there is no similar word in many other languages, which most certainly makes it an Anglo-American invention. Most of Human Rights Advocacy expertise (publications, workshops, audio and video materials) is available, first and foremost, in English. Knowledge of English has certainly helped rather than hindered my work in this area. I was exposed to a number of resources that I would not have had a chance to benefit from had I not known English. (Quotation marks and parentheses in original email)

Then she added:

> On the other hand, based on my experiences at Soros Foundation [and elsewhere], I felt that we (staff) oftentimes relied solely on English-language resources. We translated, brought foreign experts, brought local activists to conferences and meetings abroad, which I still think is beneficial for the education of the local activists. However, I felt like in many ways we were creating an English-speaking elite, failing to build capacity locally, and bring in the unique local approaches. As a result (to give you an example from my country), local NGO community is as powerless and disorganized as it could be, now that [blank's] regime "purged" the country from most of international and foreign-supported groups. I think people who speak English (myself included and guilty as charged) do not always realize the responsibility we have for local communities to promote equality and inclusiveness. Instead, we were often responsible for creating a divide between a younger better educated minority and older disenchanted majority.

Victoriya's representation of an English-speaking elite strengthens one discourse chain identified

in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse and countered by local ELP discourses: that English, again, can

become a temporal marker dividing generations and thus creating a split between an "inferior"

and "superior" Other (Hansen, 2006), in this case, through the en-ageing of actors (Reisigl &

Wodak, 2002), or, to use Victoriya's words, by creating "the young better educated minority and

older disenchanted majority." She further makes explicit the creation of an "*English*-speaking

elite" (italics added), thus delineating one characteristic of the "intellectual elite" previously

constructed as compulsory for open society, one which failed to build "local capacity," she

implies, by an over-reliance on English. Her response vivifies the realities and consequences of

such divides, and she encourages us most earnestly to "realize the responsibility we have for local communities to promote equality and inclusiveness."

An additional issue raised by participants was how English was impacting their own languages. Mihail spoke for himself and on behalf of Galina, his wife:

> From our own experience—I mean, me and Galina—we noticed that after living for a number of years in an English speaking environment, we often tend to use English words and expressions in our conversation. Sometimes we even find it difficult to find the right words in our own language. . . . And when we do (we normally talk in [our first language] between ourselves), English words inevitably crop up because it is so much easier to use them. At first it was kind of cool, but after a while I started to feel that we are doing disservice to both [languages]. . . . [Our first language] is a very rich language on its own and one should be perfectly capable of expressing anything they want in it. . . . Also, on a more general note, [our language] as well as other languages I believe, have been heavily influenced by English as new terms "from the West" are introduced into their vocabulary almost daily. And this takes place while authentic terminology is often readily available. (Parentheses and quotation marks in original email)

Mihail then added, honestly and reflectively: "There is also a bit of a show-off factor to all this as well, I think—it is so cool to use fancy Western terms rather than banal local ones." Mihail thus brings to light a new issue with English—its impact on other languages—even though, as Mihail states, "authentic terminology is often readily available." This viewpoint, to an extent, conflicts with the experiences of Thomas and Lauren, who both found a lack of schematic understandings for the development and policy concepts and terms they were attempting to use and apply in their work. But the contexts may have varied widely.

As honest as Mihail, Karolina admitted her annoyance at seeing English signs and words throughout one capital city, though she simultaneously felt no worry that English was any threat to her language or people:

> It's my personal experience that I saw only English inscriptions in [one city] which is supposed to be the [country's] capital, it annoyed me a lot, but I think if we don't want to pretend that we are what we are not, then there is no problem. If we are aware of the values of our language, culture, and community, and if we don't tend to take on masks, then, no problem.

Notably here, Karolina's point that "there is no problem" as long as there is no pretense that "we are what we are not"—no masks, no role-playing—illuminates how her "we" and the values that belong to her "language, culture, and community" are still constructed as Other than those values indicated by the presence of English in one cityscape. They may even be implicitly constructed as "superior" to the English-language Other, an important converse to the assumptions underlying much of this chapter, which reminds us that the process of Othering is, by no means, purely Western.

We can infer a similar process of Othering in the words of Eva, who actually made identity explicit in her thoughts on English. Like Karolina, she did not sound particularly worried. Rather, she seemed proud of her local community and its people and she even suggested that they may be stronger than more "advanced" nations:

> Everything is in English, so yes, it is happening, but it's not new, I mean, people were trying to get to a common language, there were trials, like Esperanto, to get a common language, and they just didn't succeed because it was not a natural language. . . . So [learning languages] is a positive thing. One might say, oh, you know what? I'd rather accept English because it brings in culture available for everybody, more than any other already materialized form of colonization.

Here Eva paused a minute to consider in more depth. Then she continued in a tone like Karolina's above:

> Valentine's Day, it's not ours, but my students, you know, have got used to it. We have our own nice customs and if we don't give those up, Valentine's day can also stay in the calendar, and this is why I think it's not a danger, not yet, not yet, and hopefully we will learn from other advanced countries' example, how they lost lots of their identity in the process of modernization, and we won't get there because, because, there's meaning to those customs, deep roots.

Conclusively, it seems, with her clear embrace of outside customs (like Olga's classroom in Chapter Five) alongside local customs with "deep roots," Eva is happy and proud to be multicultural along with multilingual and to model both for her students. These are customs she clearly takes pride in and she has confidence that her community will not lose its identity in the

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face of modernization, a faith that reverses the earlier embrace of all things "modern" in both the

OSI/SFN ELP discourse and the partial embrace in the discourses of local OSI/SFN programs

and projects. It is equally important to note that *Eva* raised the issue of "modernization" as a risk

to identity, a point which indicates at least some resistance to what "modernization" brings.

Not everyone was so confident, however. Ana thoughtfully outlined the situation in her

country by linking social change with linguistic change, words which amplify Thomas' vision of

both an "ideological" and "linguistic" revolution:

> There is now a big debate, for example, in my country about a lot of Anglicisms coming
> into [our language] and a lot of people are alarmed about that, I mean, it's the process
> everywhere, but I'm telling you about this context, and there's a lot of opposition to that
> for all sorts of reasons . . . these words that are coming are words from particular
> registers, and these are economy, media, so these are the things that are new and they are
> imported and obviously they come at such a speed that you cannot invent new words at
> such a speed. So we can talk about whether that's good or not but just looking at the fact,
> this is coming with social changes. It's not just language coming. So we can think, if
> there is a social change and it's coming with English, that means it's imported, it's not
> bottom up, it's coming from somewhere.

Ana's description of English and social change as "imported" "from somewhere" brings us back

to the questions of from where, and why. It also brings us back to a starting hypothesis of this

study: that OSI/SFN constructs English as necessary for open society because it could contribute

to the creation of a supranational identity, in the process, reducing affiliations with national

identity, which have too often been the sources of war. Ana helps clarify this connection for us:

> If we look at any kind of process of national identity building, there's always language
> which is a basis, and that is the language which is chosen, you choose one dialect, you
> standardize it, it becomes the national language and that's how it goes.

Ana's words here help explain the anxiety some participants expressed about the impact of

English on their languages. Her words further provide a bridge to the next section of this chapter.

We have heard participants' views on problems with English they have or have encountered; we

have heard participants share their views on the role of English in building open societies; we

have begun to hear about issues of identity, if only tangentially so far. The next theme I turn to is how participants talk about English in relationship to the European Union, which expands on perceptions of the impact of both on participants' identities.

### *English, the European Union, EU Accession, and Participants' Identities*

Several participants readily acknowledged the dominance of English within the EU as well its work to promote multilingualism. These conversations led, in due time, to discussions of identity. First, however, participants were steadfast in their perceptions of the dominance of English in the EU.

*English, the EU, Multilingualism, and Plurilingualism*

Lauren spoke first to this issue: "Well, obviously [English] is the dominant language, but, well, it's been good to see the European Union or at least program initiatives within it are doing so much to promote multilingualism in different contexts." She then went on to share the work of her office as it related to the European Union and languages:

> I don't really have enough connection with schools . . . but there is always a discourse about it and a lot of emails I receive are related to the latest conference on promoting multilingualism or bilingualism and how to make this work.  For example, in Kyrgyzstan there'll be an upcoming, we're hoping to organize a conference on language policy in Kyrgyzstan, and there'll be speakers invited from the European Union to go there and speak about their experiences in various contexts or even, I think even, more project-based work.

Lauren's answer suggests a turnabout from an almost English-only discourse in the OSI/SFN ELP documents to a discourse more in line with the linguistic diversity promoted in local ELP discourses. At the same time, her answer raises a question of identity which emerged from earlier analysis of constructions of space. Kyrgyzstan, that is, a country in Central Asia but described by OSI/SFN as a part of *Eur*asia, will be hosting a conference featuring EU speakers on language policy, who will go in an attempt to share their experiences in a context which, Philip predicted, "will never, ever be a member," regardless of how much reform takes place there. This, in spite

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of the fact that Lauren and others view English as the dominant language of the EU, while

Thomas marks Russian as the lingua franca of the "Stans." This instance provides one example

of the discourse chain of discursively re-scaling space (Fairclough, 2006) and even, perhaps, the

role of language in that process of re-scaling: In the simplest of terms, there is something almost

paradoxical about an English-dominated Europe seeking to aid a Russian-dominated Central

Asia (or *Eur*asia?) in the area of multilingualism.

Bianca was equally firm in her constructions of the strength of the role of English in the

EU, but she took care to explain that she meant an "international" version of English, much like

Seidlhofer's (2005) "lingua franca" standard of English we heard Ana earlier refer to as an

exciting direction for ELT:

> My anticipation is that English will preserve and strengthen its role of lingua franca of
> the European Union. Even now, a simplified variety of English, which is called
> "international English," can be heard in the European institutions and international
> meetings. English is already the most widely spoken foreign language in Europe and I
> cannot see any challenger in the future. International English is probably becoming the
> second language of all the European Union nations. It has been and it will remain the
> most practical choice for the people of the EU countries who are free to travel across the
> Continent and to choose to work anywhere on the common labour market.

Like other participants, Bianca emphasizes the practicality of "international English" as a second

language among the nations of the EU; she does not question the dominance of English, the

usefulness of which she highlights especially for people choosing to travel and work in the

"common labour market," a phrase embedding within English, if not prosperity, then at least

employment, and a familiar embedding by now. At the same time, Bianca had more to say on the

relationship between the EU, English, and multilingualism, lengthening for us the discourse

chain of linguistic diversity identified in local ELP discourses, a diversity she lauded:

> Design of and work on the European projects *elancenet* and *eEuroInclusion* is a personal
> example of how English teachers are "affected" by European trends and developments.
> While *elancenet* was meant for Language Resource Centres offering language services
> for widely spoken languages, the *eEuroInclusion* project built a portal which gives a

stronger voice to those language services providers which deal with LWULT [Less Widely Used Less Taught] languages. The preservation of the LWULT languages in a common Europe is an important issue for many countries and a major preoccupation of many linguists and language teachers. (Italics in original email)

Bianca identifies the importance of Less Widely Used Less Taught languages for a "common Europe," which she describes as a part of "European trends and developments," and she suggests these projects impact English teachers, though without specifying that impact. Still, she does make clear that it is the "linguists and language teachers" of "a common Europe" who are working for the "preservation" of these languages, work which strongly implies a threat to those languages—the threat, clearly, of a dominant language.

When I asked Magda her views on the role of English in the EU, she took a slightly different position from Bianca. She also brought up the financial cost of multilingualism:

Well again, English is vitally important. It's a good thing, though, that the European Union has got all these languages as well, so it's not English only at all, but all the major languages of the European Union are recognized and used and translated into, although some people say it's, it's a waste of money, because probably it does cost billions and billions of Euros, you know, to have everything translated into all those languages. But of course, if you speak English, then you get by everywhere now in Europe, everywhere.

Again the dominance of English in Europe emerges through Magda's words, though she praises the EU for recognizing "all the major European languages," a description which simultaneously raises the question of minor languages, the preservation of which Bianca identified as a "major preoccupation" of linguists and teachers. From both responses, we see another discourse chain emerging both implicitly and explicitly: that of "threat" to the "minor" or LWULT languages, introduced first in local written discourses. Further, another dichotomy emerges, the split between major and minor languages.

When I asked Andrew about his views on English, the EU, and its impact on identity in the countries of CESEE-fSU, he too remarked first upon the costs of translation before returning to the dominance of English and how, in his views, it brings people together:

> We see at work, you know, six students of six nationalities speaking to each other. We see it on holiday, you know, French, German, Italian tourists who are all speaking in English, and they're all one common—you know that they've all got the same values.

Andrew asserts the dominance of English without mention of other languages. Moreover, he riskily ventures into the territory of English as the carrier of "the same values," and in his context, probably "European" values ("French, German, Italian"), which local ELP discourses constructed implicitly as juxtaposed to the non-European, creating, again, an inferior Other of values.

Victoriya, too, was resolute in her view of the role of English in the EU and EU accession. She explained her views in an email, in the process, discursively embedding English into a number of "Western" principles and values, though she also critiqued these to some extent:

> As far as the accession countries are concerned, I think English has a tremendous role to play to help the accession process. The Copenhagen criteria stipulate that to become a part of the EU countries should have a stable democratic government, respect for human rights, market economy, etc. Many of these principles come from the modern-day Western tradition (although, I still maintain that human rights is not a western invention), and leaders in accession countries are in need of resources and expertise to help them create an infrastructure that is in line with these principles. Thus, English is instrumental in this education and empowerment process.

Victoriya's answer is logical, clear, and difficult to argue with: She is firm in her belief that English will provide leaders in accession countries "with the resources and expertise to help them create an infrastructure that is in line" with the principles of "modern-day Western tradition." Who can question "stable democratic government" and "respect for human rights," after all? Concurrently, however, Victoriya's answer recalls one of Hansen's (2006) claims again: the need for the developing "Other" to emulate the "Western Self" (p. 40). Victoriya's answer extends the discourse chain of "the ideal of the International and/or the West," with the "West" in particular accentuated here.

Elsa was of the same mind regarding translation costs, the role of English in the EU, and its future:

> I think, I mean eventually, 50 years, English will be the working language of the European Union although today it is unthinkable but I think as well especially now with all the ten new members, English is the language we speak . . . you can't go on for 50 more years and have those costs for translation . . . you have to have common languages and I think 80% of that will be English and the longer that goes on, I think English, maybe to the sorrow of some English, Britains [laughs], they'll feel their language being abused [laughs], but really, you speak the language that is efficient for your aims. But again I think the good outweighs the negative of this, maybe I'm wrong, maybe everyone will speak German, French, and English [laughs] or all languages, and we will have even more translators.

Elsa's laughter may evidence the strength of her belief that, regarding the dominance of English, "the good outweighs the negative," and though she believes such dominance may be "unthinkable today" (though clearly it is not), she is emphatic in her construction of English as the language of the future.

Jeremy, in contrast, first outlined the history behind the role of English in the EU before extending its importance spatially and temporally, like Elsa, into the future:

> So it was a conscious decision by the authorities . . . to break away from one form of imposed foreign language, which was Russian, to another, not exactly imposed but seen as necessary, so it was a whole looking to the West rather than to the East . . . so they were introducing English, so yah, English was seen as sort of the language of the future and the route to a new sort of way of life, really, that they were hoping for anyway.

Jeremy's and Elsa's constructions of English "as the language of the future" invokes inevitably, again, Falk's (1994) utopic picture of global civil society, one which mirrors open society as we have seen it and its mission constructed and defined, and one which, in line with Anderson's (1983) ideas on nations as "imagined communities," is grounded in the necessity of a common language. When I asked Jeremy to characterize the new life or new order as he saw it, he continued:

> Yeah, well I think [this country] was wanting to break away from Russian domination and communist, the communist past, and, you know, and join Europe, the rest of Europe,

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which inevitably meant embracing free market economy and democracy and openness and transparency, and I think an economic aspect was probably central to the whole thing, they wanted obviously to improve their lot economically, from what they had before. Whether or not that's happened because of English as a language, it hasn't, obviously, but without it they wouldn't have the people necessary to come abroad and communicate and attract investment from big companies and things. Lots of European companies, I mean, English is the language really of the European Union and the West and NATO and all the rest of it, so it was possibly part of that, the need to find a new position because their old paymasters had disintegrated on them and they had to find some other, some other, something else to attach themselves to.

Here Jeremy extends the discourse chain of English as the dominant language of the European Union, to the dominant language of the "West," "NATO," "and all the rest of it," including the future, with the disintegration of the "old paymasters" of communism and the need for the countries of the CESEE-fSU to "attach themselves to something new." He further notes, quite frankly, that the hoped-for economic improvement due to English "hasn't happened, obviously."

Along the same lines as Jeremy, Thomas first integrated history into his explanation for the dominance of English in the European Union while at the same time pointing to battles over language, including battles still fought today:

Again, I think the European Union is trying to resist on some levels, there's way more combative forces, if you like, in the European Union about English, I think, than probably, generally, in the international community because you have all the post-colonial states there or ex-colonial states who wanted to build a Francophone world or a Germanic one world or whatever and had those, especially with the French, you know, so you have that or have had that competition for a long time, so here you have the six main languages of the European Union, the core languages, English is one . . . most of the people I would meet would be from the Commission, if they're in this part of the world they speak English, even if they're French, you know, because it is such, it's the established language. They've lost [laughs].

Here Thomas creates a compelling distinction between the international community and the European Union, with the European Commission operating perhaps as the bridge between the two while simultaneously being a member of both. Thomas further observes the heated discussions around English in the EU as fueled by past attempts at building Francophone or Germanic "one worlds," thus alluding to ex-colonial states, an allusion which may, even if

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intended in the spirit of play ("They've lost"), give prominence to the neo-colonial powers who

have "won."

Ana, too, acceded to the dominance of English in the EU; she also observed other fall-out

from EU accession and membership, fall-out which leads again to split identities and "superior"

and "inferior" "Others." First, however, like Lauren at the start of this section, Ana began with

the role of plurality of languages in the EU:

> I read some of the stuff, some of the documents, like the European framework for
> languages, there's a lot of talk about, I mean, I think they really don't know how to deal
> with that, but the idea is that the European Union should be this plurilingual—they're
> very careful not to use multilingual but plurilingual—people should be plurilingual
> individuals, and language learning should be a lifelong kind of activity and we should all
> know bits and pieces of different languages and stuff, but in reality, what happens is that
> people tend to use English.

Ana then reiterated the divisiveness brought about by the EU in its decisions about who had met

the minimum standards for accession:

> I think of course it's a little ridiculous, just take a look at the countries that were
> accepted, there's such a vast difference and I think there are different reasons for which
> certain countries have been accepted and not others. It will obviously be the case with
> further countries as well. I mean Turkey is such an obvious example.

Ana, like other participants, was keenly aware of the differences between which countries had

been accepted and which not, and why. She also condemned the impacts on some languages:

> I mean, this is what they're pushing for, that everyone should learn some foreign
> languages, but of course, of these two, one will certainly be English and I'm sure the
> second one will be German or French, but definitely not Hungarian or Estonian, so again,
> I mean, there are second rate languages and these inequalities of course are reflected in
> language as well. . . . I think the process is already so far away that the national languages
> are losing out.

Ana then spoke enthusiastically again about the idea of English as a lingua franca, with its own

grammar and pronunciation and phonology, but without the idioms of Britain or America or

Australia or Canada, truly an international language in that it is used between L2 speakers

already and naturally, with their own "mixed" idioms and creative, common vocabulary.[50]  But

in the end, she remained skeptical about the EU, in large part, it seems, because of the

divisiveness in determining which country is a member and which is not. The East/West division

persisted in her discourse, in spite of what she saw as the EU's attempts to counter that division:

> Emphasizing the common but also embracing the diversity, I mean, it's very
> contradictory, but, in the teaching of history . . . what is it called, teaching history at the
> transnational level, which is very evident in the EU, they try to emphasize the
> commonalities, the common roots, they downplay any conflicts and they foreground like
> anything that was kind of in common . . . it's mainstreaming, it's talking about
> Christianity but not Islam, it's again marginalizing some other Others, it's a very strange
> process.

Ana's point here—the priority placed on "commonalities" as opposed to differences, such as

"Islam"—calls into serious question issues of identity: what commonalities between people or

groups are highlighted, what differences are leveled. To these issues I next turn, particularly

given a hypothesis at the start of this study: that OSI/SFN may construct English as way to cross-

cut identities, reduce affiliations with national identity, and create instead a form of supranational

identity for citizens of open societies.

*Languages, The EU, and Identity*

Participants had mixed views particularly regarding the creation of a European identity, a

construction which in itself is both supranational (though regional rather than global) and

questionable. Ana, above, was very frank in her observation that the European Union, in its

search for commonalities, ends up erasing or "marginalizing some other Others." To illustrate,

she cited the case of the EU's embrace of "Christianity but not Islam," an example which

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[50] Ana provided one example: "I was sitting with, uh, all girls, Romanian, Italian, Croatian, and myself, and we were a little drunk and we were talking in English, and the [blank] girl said, Oh, he jumped from the donkey to the horse, and we all laughed, and I understood what she meant . . . but then they didn't understand, we explained, and then the [other] girl said something which didn't make any sense but then she explained, and then later in the conversation we said oh, the donkey from the horse, and we started using this, and it became part of our common vocabulary … so these things can develop also."

accords with her earlier mention of Turkey's exclusion from the EU, what she called "such an

obvious example," in spite of its secular government.

> Philip was of the same mind in his thoughts on languages, the EU, and identity:

> If you're shown a picture of, uh, Austria, or, or, or Germany or, or France or whatever, then you can pretty quickly fit it into your, your schema of, of being European. If you're shown a picture of Norway, if you've got any common sense, you can fit it into your picture of being European, uh, unless you're a Eurofanatic. If you're shown a picture of Turkey [Philip falls silent, then laughs]. Yah, well, you know, there are a lot of Muslims out there and we in Europe, we're not, um, you know, and geographically, they're on the territory of Asia, and, you know, and they're, uh, uh, uh, *poor* to boot!

Philip, sardonic as always, accents the Othering (in this case, of Muslims) which the process of

EU accession seems unable to escape. I then asked Magda if she perceived herself as European,

which led at first to laughter on her part:

> We've got a loooong way to go, we've still got a very, very long way to go before we think of ourselves as European. I mean, even myself, if you ask me what you know about my identity, I would say [nationality] and, well, maybe I would say I'm half-Jewish, I'm half-Catholic. I would say, I would also say, well yes, I know my grandparents came from [a neighboring country] and my other grandparents came from [a different neighboring country], I suppose that's what I would answer. And then, if you really challenge me, I would say, oh yes, I'm European, yes [laughs], oh, by the way, but I don't think I would, you know, give this answer, not in the first, second, third, fourth place [laughs again].

In Magda's answer, despite her appreciation for and knowledge of major European languages,

she still connects first to national identity, which she sees as far from European though her

country was an EU member at the time of our interview. When asked about the role of English

on her identity, however, she pondered and then offered the following:

> Because I read English and listen to English all the time, obviously I get very much interested in what's going on in all these English speaking countries, and    probably it creates a distance between myself and these very, very uh [nationalist] thoughts and, and politicians and ideologies, you know . . . I do notice that when I speak English, you know, my body language might change a bit.[51]

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[51] Unfortunately, I somehow missed following up on this point before my IRB approval ran out, but the relationship between paralinguistic changes and speaking another language certainly invites more research.

When I asked Andrew about the impact of English and the EU on identity, on the other hand, he was short and to the point: "American culture," he stated, "is a far more forbidding influence." In response to a question about the possibility of a supranational identity, he was equally curt. "It's not going to happen," he said.

The impossibility of a supranational identity then became a theme echoed throughout my interviews. Jeremy described it as follows:

> It's just a mode of communication. I don't think it changes peoples' ideas of their national identity. I don't think it does at all. And the French are still the French and the English are still the English and the Germans are still the Germans and they've been in the European Union together for the better half of part a century, and it hasn't lessened national sentiment. There isn't a supranational, there isn't a common supranational culture particularly.

For Eva, too, she saw no connection between language learning, EU accession, and identity:

> Well, we have a very strong sense of belonging to this place, so globalization is here, McDonald's is here, you know, television channels are here, but even the most advanced countries in Europe like Denmark are very nation—how would I say that? Nation-focused. . . . Globalization has and will have a very hard job to do here, because we are very conscious of what we are.

While Eva was conscious and overtly proud of who she and her people "are," Klara was amused at the thought of language impacting her identity: "The fact that I speak English [laughs] does not affect my identity. Well, I speak German, I speak French, and I'm learning . . . Jewish, Hebrew, Hebrew. It doesn't touch my identity." Later she explained that while the British Council had supported one project for her English classroom, "they didn't ask to me to become English [laughs]."

Karolina, however, did feel an influence on her identity:

> Every experience I've had in the field of teaching English, learning English, reading English, reciting English, makes me more open, more tolerant, more understanding, um, more receptive which is, uh, equally good for my students, because I can become a better person, and they can all benefit from it. It seems a little bit idealistic, but I think I believe in it.

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For Karolina, English had a noticeable impact on her identity and her sense of herself, as it made her feel "more open, more tolerant, more understanding," even more "receptive," even "a better person." Her analysis differs distinctly from previous assertions made by participants who felt no impact upon their identities as a result of English and/or accession or future accession into the EU. Nor was Karolina the only participant to appreciate at least some of the impact she perceived English as having on her identity.

Mihail was at first jubilant when talking about English, but by the end he expressed definite concern at how English might impact cultural identity, if not his own:

> I personally celebrate English becoming a standard of international communication. As I wrote before, I think it is capable of providing a lot of people with many opportunities they couldn't enjoy previously. But it would also be nice to keep it from penetrating into the realms of other languages too much. The latter spoils authenticity and cultural identity of the original languages, at the same time, making English sound alien and sometimes even ridiculous to a native ear. This trend, if allowed to continue to an extreme, could lead to a general confusion causing an irreparable damage to the ethnic colloquial authenticity and, ultimately, cultural identity as a whole. So, let us exercise a degree of caution and separate the "just" from the "wicked."

Mihail's biblical turn at the end provides an interesting perspective on English language use and *over*-use, in that, by dint of the latter, he does worry about the risk of "irreparable damage" to "ethnic colloquial authenticity" and "cultural identity as a whole." *Over*-reliance on English is the problem, then, just as Victoriya described in her human rights in Central Asia.

Mihail's feelings were reiterated, too, in some part by Irena, who wrote a long email on this issue, complicating issues of language and identity yet further:

> There are people who are "afraid" of the English language and connect it usually with the Americans and the fear of being "invaded" by the English expressions. There has been much talk in [my country], especially after having gained our independence, about the purity of [our] language and there has always been this fight against the English words that get integrated into our language.

Pure language equals pure identity/ethnicity/nationality to some of the people in Irena's country, a country which, like Ana's, has been through a war whose "sides" were demarcated by ethnic,

religious, and national identity. This is one link between language and identity which emerged from Irena's email as well as testament again to the relationship between English and security: In this case, the "fight" against English occurs in spite of (or in response to?) an international community which uses English as "the path of least resistance" to working to end conflict in the Balkans. On the whole, however, Irena's approach to language and languages—like the approaches of most participants, actually—was one of respect and fascination:

> As for myself, I think that all the words have their special places and cannot *always* be substituted or translated. One of the things I admire in English (and most probably the native English speakers will not share my opinion on this matter) is that it accepts words of foreign origin like a sponge. As I see it, English is constantly expanding. [My language] is at a great disadvantage here. As a small nation, which is probably the reason for this, we are desperately trying to make our language something quite "unique" and "special." In the attempt to do this, it seems to me that we are gradually depriving our language of the richness it should have. Although it is a fact that we should certainly be doing our best in preserving [my language's] words/ expressions as much as possible . . . some words are being banned because they have a foreign origin.

In this arena of language and identity, Irena notes another dichotomy between English and her language at least: English, it seems, has nothing to lose by taking in words from across the world (an image not unlike Ellis Island?), whereas for Irena's first language, she portrays people as almost desperate in their attempts to make it "unique." Also salient here, the word choice "unique" reproduces exactly the Soros International House-Vilnius' description of national identity, which "involves all those characteristics that make someone unique" (2007). Language is obviously one such characteristic, and certainly one that for many people exists as an integral marker of who they are, perhaps especially when their language differs from the "international language" of English.

Lauren takes us even farther East. She already illuminated for us complicated questions of language, space, and identity when discussing the language context in Kyrgyzstan. Here is more:

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> In Kyrgyzstan, it was interesting because people were so surprised to find a foreigner who could speak Russian, because not many people could, but now you have more Peace Corps volunteers who are going directly into the villages and they don't know Russian, and they learn Kyrgyz and a lot of the Kyrgyz think this is just the most wonderful thing in the world, but at the same time, there are a lot of ethnic Kyrgyz who don't speak Kyrgyz very well because they grew up in Bishkek and only learned Russian, and this is always a point of tension.

This story illustrates a number of points, not only the re-scaling of space (Fairclough, 2006) through the geopolitical construction of "Europeanizing" Central Asia as Central *Eur*asia, as highlighted by Lauren's discussion of the upcoming conferences. It further shows how Russian remains a lingua franca "in the Stans," to quote Thomas, so much so that some Peace Corps volunteers speak better Kyrgyz than ethnic Kyrgyz who grew up in the capital city, where Russian was dominant. Lauren also told me how she was at first dismissed by Kyrgyz nationals when she spoke Russian, until they discovered she was a foreigner. At that point, *Russian* was the language which allowed for the cross-cutting of identities, just as Kyrgyz was for the Peace Corps volunteers. The multiple impacts of language on identity in this example are inescapable.

And so they were too for Dora, who, when asked about the impact of English and EU accession on her identity, imparted a Latin proverb which she expressed first in her first language before translating it into English: "The more languages you speak, the more people you are." Here there seem to be no contradictions or conflicts of identity, unlike, for instance, Lauren's example of Kyrgyzstan. Dora, rather, by turning to this proverb, lends us a vision again of nested identities, one tucked into another, with each identity, each known language, available for use as needed or chosen. This is another participant perspective we need to hear. I like it so much I close this section with it.

Time, Teaching, Ownership, Responsibility:

How OSI/SFN Has Impacted Participants' Work and Lives

In this, the last section of this long chapter, I draw together the remaining themes which emerged from interviews with my research participants. Time, as one of Hansen's three components of building political societies, becomes important in this section in several ways: I first address how participants talked about education, teachers, teaching, and learning during the time of the Soviet Union, in order to unravel to a very small extent assumptions we in the West may hold about those days and places, the education system of which was totalized in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse as "rigid," "inflexible," "very old and ineffective," where teachers were "mired" down and struggling with all they lack. Some participants did confirm, even with anguish, the "mental torture" of those times, as we have heard. Yet Harvey (1996), as paraphrased in Fairclough (2006), reminds us that "the construction of a cartography of space-time [e.g., the countries of the CESEE-fSU pre-1989] is simultaneous with a construction of a repertoire of social practices, social relationships, power relationships, social (e.g. gender) identities and values" (p. 22). These constructions as applied to the countries of Central, Eastern, South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union vary dramatically. In my interviews, I learned that in many cases, Western perceptions of these space-time practices and values under communism differed distinctly from those who had lived and experienced the same, and it was those same Western perceptions that helped create the space needed for OSI/SFN and other development organizations to move in with their money and begin the process of developing (or Westernizing) so critical to their work. Most vitally for this study, it was those perceptions, too, which allowed Western aid organizations like OSI/SFN to take responsibility for the infusion of English and ELT by means of supranational language management.

After I share participants' perceptions of life under communism, I next share how participants constructed the differences between state education and the "guerrilla" education ("Community," 1999) offered through OSI/SFN, a view which serves as a backdrop to participants' excitement about and resistances to the "modern ELT methodology" OSI/SFN constructed itself as bringing ("Strategy," 1999). We shall further see that participants construct the two sources of education (OSI/SFN versus state schools) as having distinctly different atmospheres and approaches, created in part by methodology *and* in larger part by resources. Further, we will see disparate perceptions of program ownership and local responsibility: Both Westerners and Easterners emphasize the importance of local ownership and responsibility, as we saw in the local ELP discourses. But Western perceptions, following Holliday (2005), assume the need to *give* or create ownership through "negotiation," which in turn suggests a "culturally problematic Other" (p. 20). In spite of these differing constructions and the questions behind them, the discourse chain of explicit local ownership and responsibility does, in the end, grow stronger.

Third, we revisit critical themes from previous analysis to see how they play out in the voices of participants. In particular, we hear their views on native speakers and "native speakerism" (Holliday, 2005), constructions participants reproduce and complicate in important ways. Similarly, we hear participants construct temporal identities which go beyond the focus on "citizen pilgrims" targeted so strongly in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse. Participants speak about and speak for temporal identities in even more inclusive ways, thus making visible again identities which had discursively disappeared or been erased in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse.

Finally, I turn to participants' descriptions of how the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network has impacted their lives. This will be the last word and last opportunity in

this study for us to hear how this particular organization and its English language aid projects have influenced teachers, students, project directors, and project developers in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. These voices—along with analysis of the discourses of local and New York-based OSI/SFN ELP—provide compelling and pivotal insights and lessons for English language aid project instructors and developers.

I begin with a return to Soviet times and how participants talked about education under communism. This section deepens our understanding of context and provides a warning *not* to totalize or essentialize cultures, countries, or contexts.

*Education under Communism: Teachers, Teaching, Students, Learning*

Chapter Four of this study—analysis of the New York-based ELP discourse—revealed how teachers *seem* to be constructed as subjects or agents through grammatical metaphor and passive voice. A closer look revealed, however, that they were actually objects or patients of the sentences: Local teachers were trained by OSI/SFN SPELT "experts," constructed without much agency, and even in Chapter Five described as "unable to innovate" under the Soviet system, all obvious markers of what Holliday (2005) describes as "culturally problematic Others" (p. 19). These and other assumptions continue to flow beneath the discourses analyzed in this dissertation, yet these are assumptions which some participants' stories distinctly belie.

The Western expatriate teachers constructed education, teachers, and students under communism in problematic ways. We have already heard Jeremy's perception of education at that time: "a more centralized educational structure from the communist period where it was all passed down from the ministry." He saw open society as a way to let teachers "break free," "experiment," and be more "creative." Another participant constructed education under

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communism in much the same way. This participant began by pointing out how most Soviet

post-graduate theses and dissertations did not require a review of the literature:

> Who's interested in what anybody else did? It's your ability to design the research that matters, not your ability to have read other people's books. Of course, there's a lower level of the Soviet system where you are only concerned with learning other people's work and no originality is required at all. Once you get to the Ph.D. level, it's assumed that you've read everybody's work. You can go out now and you can do independent research and independent research means you, you don't need to cite anybody else, so yah, I mean, those are conventions that the Russian researcher, the Russian junior researcher might not be aware of still, and that's going to impede that person if they're trying to communicate within the international discourse community.

Like Jeremy, this participant underlines first a perception of the lack of creativity and originality

under the Soviet system; from this comes an echo, implicitly, of Elsa's and Victoriya's

frustrations at plagiarism, since under communism "you [didn't] need to cite anybody else." Part

of this participant's work, therefore, was to bring these researchers into the arms of the

"international discourse community" by teaching "international" citation and other conventions.

This construction may initially seem no different than Ana's depiction of teaching Iraqi scholars

to become "bi-literal" so they could publish internationally (i.e., in English) and research their

*own* issues as scholars from the "periphery." The difference between the two is this: Though Iraq

was not a communist country by any means, Ana was quick to acknowledge to those scholars the

long traditions of writing in Arabic, which, as she said, "have to continue." The other participant,

in contrast, seems to assume that scholars under the Soviet system had no interest in reading

others' works, nor did they have originality as it simply was not needed. These assumptions

totalize and simplify a perception of authoritarian systems which many scholars worked their

way very successfully around, Bakhtin, key to this study, among them.

 Thus we begin with Western participants' perceptions of a lack of creativity and

originality under communism, perceptions which lead again to a construction of what Holliday

(2005) terms the "culturally problematic Other" (pp. 19-20). The following perceptions were also

shared, though clearly the next participant struggled with the implications of the constructions of students in the process:

> I don't want to be stereotypical here, but a lot of students in these countries, the former Soviet Union and all the Eastern European countries, uh, Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic Republics, the Caucasus, Georgia, Armenia, uh, the Stans, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, etc., and then countries like Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, of course a lot of them, not all of them, and it's very difficult to generalize, I don't want to sound stereotypical, is that they don't, none of, not a lot of them have got very little experience of actually expressing their own thoughts, because they've come from a background where they have been expected to, uh, respect and recognize authority, and they've not had much chance before, much need to actually question that authority.

The participant's obvious exertions in expressing this sentiment divulges, I believe, extreme discomfort with such a construction, probably because the participant knew so many students personally as individuals and worked closely together with them. Nevertheless, the stance taken here is fairly firm in its inevitable stereotyping: In spite of disclaimers, the participant almost says that *none* of the students from *any* of these countries—from Tajikistan to Hungary—have experience at "actually expressing their own thoughts" (another way to describe originality and creativity). Such a persistent assumption allows Western participants to view Easterners as lacking the needed agency to participate and take ownership over—in whatever ways *they* choose—the building of open societies.

Another participant grounded perceptions of education under communism in the operation of systems rather than in how these systems socially engineered students and others, as suggested above. As this participant read the situation, the so-called lack of originality, creativity, and critical thinking were the products of "singular, deterministic critical systems that don't include any stakeholders in decision-making, etc. etc. etc." This representation may not differ dramatically from the previous representations in that all implicate communist *systems* in their constructions. But the first three participants mentioned, including Jeremy, highlight their

perceptions of *people* from those systems, especially when talking about the early days of

reform, even before OSI/SFN.

> So did a fourth participant:

> Nobody was interested in development of uh, of uh, English language teaching at the time, they were interested in getting free teachers, and it was far too early in the day for any kind of reform, none of those teachers, none of whom had any sort of practical education, who'd all been, uh, trained in the old Soviet applied science approach, I mean none of this [Western teaching ideas and development of ELT] meant anything to them. The last thing they wanted was reform.

Obviously, one voice here is dubious of the motives behind much of the work of early reform, a

voice which well may have experienced firsthand attitudes as described above. But the

constructions of "none of them" and "none of this" are totalizing, again, and it is hard to imagine

all were so closed, as the participant portrays.

It is harder still to imagine such closed constructions of people under communism when

we hear the voices of participants who were teachers and students under communist systems

(which varied, of course, and dramatically, from country to country). First, in my interviews, I

encountered excitement around the creativity of lesson planning, creativity that was a driving

force long before the days of Soros, British Council, Peace Corps, and the fall of the Berlin wall.

Irena, who had been teaching since the early 1980s, described her work this way:

> In my classes, being a young teacher then, I tried to be creative and since children do like English in [my country], and liked the subject as it is, it was not so difficult to tackle their interest and make them do the necessary work. Of course, there was always the paperwork which I hated most, but the contact with pupils and things going on in the classroom was something I always used to look forward to.

Here Irena clearly demonstrates creativity and originality alive and well in the communist period

without Western intervention of any sort. She did hate the paperwork, as many of us do, but she

looked forward to "the contact with the pupils" and "the things going on in the classroom," a

phrase suggesting lively activity and repudiating a picture of top-down learning. Her creativity,

further, persists to this day, as she now teaches adults. Nor did she suggest in her interview that her perceptions of teaching and herself as a teacher were dramatically impacted by Western intervention into her work, with the possible exception of the availability of more journals:

> The challenges are always present – I hardly ever read or watch something without looking for the materials that would be suitable for my students. I think I belong to that majority of teachers who always try to do better, rarely satisfied with lessons they had just given. By reading journals and other materials for teachers, I am always trying to find new ideas, to implement them in class – see whether they work with my students as well. I like to think of being the one who can somehow enlighten the students, make them aware of the huge possibilities, diversities, varieties around them and the ways in which they can grasp and become aware of them, on their own as well.

In this response, Irena highlights not only her own reflectiveness, creativity, and critical thinking, she further sounds out the importance of self-discovery on the part of students, their need to "grasp and become aware" "on their own as well." Moreover, she constructs a teacher identity which totalizes (yes) in a way which transcends geography, politics, subject matter. She describes, rather, "that majority of teachers who always try to do better, rarely satisfied with lessons they had just given."

Ana furnished her perspective as a student under communism, one which enlightens our perceptions of ELT methodology as well as our perceptions of education under communism. Ana attended an English language primary school, which she described as offering a variation of audiolingualism:

> So we would have to repeat these sentences and structures. We were never taught any grammar or any writing, it was all about repetition and drills, drills, drills, and I kind of liked it. It was like a game to me.[52]

Moreover, Ana also had only good things to say about her secondary education, which in her school focused on students becoming an "Organizer of Cultural Activities." Her description energetically contested assumptions of education under communism described above:

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[52] Having had Junior High and High School Spanish in much the same way, I understand. I kind of liked it, too.

> My secondary school . . . was fantastic. I had teachers who were involved in the 1968 revolution and they were really liberal and kind of progressive and open. . . . The syllabus was there but there were no textbooks or anything, so these teachers actually subverted the whole system, so they taught whatever they wanted . . . we studied McLuhan and the history of Mass Media, the teachers were very good, they kind of encouraged us to explore things so after that, going to college, it was very academic and dry and not exciting at all, so that was a big disappointment.

It may be no wonder, after such an exciting high school, that Ana was less than thrilled about her new college environment, which may be closer to what is so often assumed about education under communism.

Ana was not alone in her assessment of positive educational experiences as a student under communism. Ecaterina was punctilious in pointing out how all classes were mandatory under the Soviet system, but she likewise sounded quite pleased overall:

> My parents sent me to a school specializing in the English language. This means that curriculum of the school stipulated lessons of English from primary classes until our graduation. The number of English language lessons per week and the variety of subjects we studied in English gradually increased. In the final year of my school studies we had four courses taught in the English language: English *per se*, English and American Literature, World Culture and Technical Translation. In later classes we also studied French.

Then she continued:

> As I had passion for studying languages, I wanted to become a translator/interpreter. Besides, I always liked traveling and seeing other places. Our family had a car and we used to travel across the Soviet Union during summertime when my parents had their holidays. As my studies at school were basically the last years of the Soviet Union and at that period its borders started opening, working as a translator could give one a chance to travel abroad and earn a good salary.

This brief glimpse into Ecaterina's school life seems a bright one: She studied multiple languages, which were her "passion," and she even studied those languages Magda had doubted that hard-line communists would study (or presumably authorize study thereof), given their "subversive" nature. Ecaterina also provides a gratifying glimpse of her parents and herself in the

family car criss-crossing the Soviet Union. What basically ensues from this portrait is a sense of a strong education and, for Ecaterina, a good family life, complete with car.

Other participants seemed at least satisfied with the education received under the Soviet system. Galina described herself and her new friends at university this way: "most of us came from families of modest means, that sort of poor but well educated middle class so typical of the [now post] Soviet countries." Mihail, too, spoke of his "good previous preparation in Mathematics" under communism. Moreover, he told me, at university "I found out that a student with mediocre English but superb math skills will do much better than a student with perfect English but so-so math skills." Excelling at both, he was eventually able to emigrate with his wife and he wrote of a life of happiness.

The examples described herein are in no way intended to undermine or dispute the bleaker portraits of life under communism as we saw from Bianca and Dora and Klara. Each individual's experience was shaped by context, family, country, community, and so much more. I include these instances to show how the OSI/SFN ELP discourses of communist times, discourses which are totalizing and forbidding, could be used to discursively create the void (or carve open the space) that OSI/SFN ELP and other English language aid projects eventually filled. No doubt, OSI/SFN ELP had many positive implications for the region, but there were bright lights even under communism.

These bright lights shone through most compellingly when I heard participants talk about former teachers. Ana recalled one professor of methodology who inspired her deeply:

And then again, there was the war in [the country] started, and some of the people from the department there came to [my city] and got jobs, and there was a professor of methodology, so he became the main professor, I was his assistant, and he was a very, very [she pauses] fantastic personality, and he was very knowledgeable, but he was at the point where, he was, basically, he was already killed by that war, he was an idealist, and he didn't believe until the last moment that the war would break out, and he and his wife

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and his daughter literally came with a plastic bag, and he was, he was not in the mood to start a new program, a new life, you know, so . . . but he was very, very sort of friendly, very helpful to me, but he was, he was, in terms of the profession he was tired and he died very soon after that. Yah, it was very sad, but he was a fantastic personality.

This story lends insight not only into the troubled context of a region, its people, and its teachers and students living through conflict. More importantly for the purposes of this study, Ana's remembrance of this teacher *makes visible* those identities which disappeared (or never appeared) in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse with its emphasis on the young "citizen pilgrims" (Falk, 1994). Ana makes visible what the OSI/SFN ELP discourse constructed implicitly as the en-aged, "inferior" Other, those educated under communism, whom Victoriya described so aptly as the "older disenchanted majority." Participants like Ana quite naturally traveled back in space-time during our interviews to remember and honor influential and idealistic teachers, in this case, one who was "tired" and in some ways "already killed" by that war.

Karolina, too, shared such a memory:

Well, I have a colleague who is very old, she has taught everyone in the town [laughs], and she keeps telling us that there is a moral greatness in every teacher or there should be a moral greatness in every teacher, whatever the people says, don't contradict him or her in that way, you shouldn't prove at the moment that you understand that he's not right or she's not right, you should somehow let him realize that or let her realize.

The back-story to this memory involved difficulties Karolina was having with some teens misbehaving in her English class. Remarkably, the advice of the very old teacher is advice of self-discovery, of creating conditions for self-discovery, and of becoming reflectively aware, a visible form of praxis in practice. Clearly, the colleague's experiences as a person and a teacher had already taught her the same, which is, indeed, a form of "moral greatness" which, coupled with the professor in Ana's story, attests to what could and should be (or could have been and should have been) heard as principal voices in the process of educational reform.

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Eva, too, in our interview, honored a teacher who had inspired her and her community. As she told it, this teacher had a vision which he started and brought to life, and only in the last stages with the help of George Soros. The teacher himself had first laid the groundwork for the program's success:

> He thought that it would be good to let the people work and at weekends you give them the opportunity to learn . . . so [this teacher] wanted these people to become teachers with a degree and still be able to go on with their lives. Some of them had already had families, others were younger but they were committed to the village, to the place they grew up in and where they taught [without a degree], so this was the vision first of all: to not, to force or not to, uh, have people move to a university center. Let knowledge and expertise and whatever is needed to gain a degree come here. So this was a very interesting open university [laughs] . . . it's just our genuine open university.

Eva's story proffers insight into rural education in particular, where teachers at first or often had no degrees but were willing to take on the job anyway. Then along came the teacher Eva so admired, whose name I wish I could use, a teacher who sought to educate local teachers by bringing "a college" and a "degree" to them through arranging regular weekend visits by trained teachers from other colleges and universities in the country and beyond. This story may help explain in large part the OSI/SFN decision to discursively infuse English and ELT spatially and temporally into sweeping constructions of space and time, including the "far-off" regions such as Eva lived in, and including the weekends, the only time teachers could get their degree. But in this instance, critically, it was a *local* educator who started the program:

> Eva: He was one of the founders of this whole thing and he was a very charismatic, very nice gentleman, and he had a vision of accomplishing this whole thing, and, uh, he managed. He managed. I feel very sorry that he cannot see what he managed.
>
> Amy: He died?
>
> Eva: Yes, he died. He was, he was old, he died 70-something, but he was full of energy and he did a lot for this region.

In this story, in the final stages, OSI/SFN did help fund the project this teacher had started, but it was his vision which drove it with force and "energy," as Eva put it. Again, in this study, he

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becomes an actor who should not be invisible. Doubtless, he contributed powerfully to the development of one community and to the development of multiple teachers who have remained in that community and not gone abroad, committed as they are to their villages, their families, their schools.

Eva's tale of this teacher temporally and spatially leads us out of the space-time constructions of communist countries behind the Iron Curtain and into a world undergoing transition, upheaval, and to varying degrees, more openness. What Eva's teacher had started long before the fall of the Berlin Wall, OSI/SFN was able to help finish, once countries had begun to open. And yet, many new states were slow to change and reluctant to open after transition, as we have heard from participants who believed their countries were *still* not open societies in 2005 and 2006. Furthermore, we have heard participants retell stories in which governments and locals alike challenged and doubted the legitimacy of OSI/SFN and George Soros himself. In part, such suspicions may have arisen due to what OSI-Croatia described in one report as its "guerrilla education" strategy ("Community," 1999).

As many of the participants I spoke with worked both in state schools as well as OSI/SFN-funded or supported schools (guerrilla education cells, perhaps), I wanted to hear more about how participants perceived the differences between these workplaces. And there were many. In particular, participants talked at length about methodologies, atmospheres, responsibilities, and ownership, four themes which continue to evidence both reproduction and transformation of discourse chains we have heard previously.

*State Education versus Education Supported by OSI/SFN*

In previous analyses of OSI/SFN ELP discourses, we encountered a number of constructions of the "modern ELT methodology" SPELT teachers and OSI/SFN brought to the

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countries of CESEE-fSU. Most notably, OSI/SFN constructed ELT methodology as "modern,"

"student-centered," and a way to integrate technology and distance education into the

curriculum. These discourse fragments were frequently reproduced in the local ELP discourses,

eventually forming a fairly stable discourse chain with some slight but important re-scripting.

They constructed "modern ELT methodology" as "American"; they encouraged methodological

diversity through, for example, the use of both "modern" *and* "traditional" methods; the local

discourses also encouraged the use and adaptation of methodologies *appropriate to local context*

*and student need*. At the same time, all discourses constructed the transfer of ELT methodology

to other subject areas as seamless and necessary, thus reifying "modern ELT methodology" such

that it appears to be "something other than human products—such as the facts of nature, results

of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will" (Berger & Luckman, 1979, quoted in Holliday,

2005, p. 22). Such a statement may seem extreme, I know, but from the OSI/SFN ELP discourse

and on, "modern ELT methodology" is constructed with almost missionary zeal, so much so that

finally, the OSI/SFN ELP discourse constructs "modern ELT methodology" as *necessary* for

open societies, along with English. Multiple local Soros foundations reproduced that

construction, describing "modern ELT methodology" as essential to democracy and other

changes which would open countries to the world.

My interview participants were enthusiastic about learning new metholo*gies*, and one,

at least, made a connection between "modern ELT methodology" and larger reforms within the

country. But participants did not accept new methodologies wholesale or without concerns.

Many reproduced a need again to *adapt* methodologies to local context, a discourse chain begun

in local discourses, and one which inevitably requires that there be *two-way* exchange between

students and teachers. Participants further observed some negative impacts from these

methodologies, problems which might have been forestalled had teachers or program directors

conducted a local needs analysis beforehand.

*Perceptions of and Experiences with "Modern ELT Methodology"*

Some participants shared the OSI/SFN ELP missionary zeal around "modern ELT

methodology," Philip among them. He spoke with fervor:

> We teach them English using our up-to-date methods that have been developed by people like International House . . . because they've been teaching English rather unsuccessfully with these old grammar translation methods, you know, ok, we've got to have teacher training, we've got to try and get things moving, get into like the teacher training colleges . . . and the universities. . . . Let's get modern methodology, get people motivated. . . . I think that was one of the great strengths of English language teaching, that it did have this *marvelous* methodology which was, wasn't bogged down in decades or centuries of tradition.

Philip went on to describe his "enthrallment" and "fascination" with ELT methodology, a

construction which led, inevitably it seems, to dichotomy (quotation marks added for clarity):

> I've met a lot of people in former communist countries who've said, "I had a wonderful teacher, she had so much personal charisma, she motivated us," I mean, there have been many marvelous teachers like that and that's fantastic but that's not a method. You can't develop the [pauses] Elizabeth Matushka personality method. . . . I worked with a guy . . . who was like that, he was fantastic, everybody loved him, but his methodology wasn't very up-to-date, he motivated people because he was such a great guy and he spoke to people and they could see that he really cared about them, but, I mean, there was no method there.

Here Philip constructs methodology as higher and more important, somehow, than even the

teachers themselves, a construction which dismisses, in turn, the experiences and feelings of

many students and teachers in former communist countries. His description of methodology

"bogged down in decades or centuries of tradition" parallels the OSI/SFN ELP construction of

teachers "struggling" and "mired in an inflexible curriculum" ("Strategy," 1999). His caricature,

moreover, of the "Elizabeth Matushka personality method" collides regrettably with the earlier

stories of teachers under communism that participants shared with great feeling. These

constructions exemplify what can happen when "modern ELT methodology" is reified so: alternatives thereof may be dismissed or derided.

While Jeremy sounded much less zealous than Philip, he nevertheless reproduced a number of discourse fragments from the OSI/SFN ELP discourse, in the process, creating another dichotomy between methods, if a less conspicuous one than Philip. He described a teacher training course he taught:

> Their system to date had been based . . . on learning by rote and very traditional teacher led instruction and we were taking in ideas, perhaps, of group work and pair work and, um, allowing the students to have a little bit more freedom and a bit more creativity in learning the language and actually communicating in the language rather than just learning it as if it was Latin or mathematics or copying stuff down off the board.

As we saw earlier from Jeremy, "freedom" and "creativity," "group work and pair work," and the creation of opportunities to communicate helped him define ELT methodology and, to an extent, open society. These features he "modernized" implicitly by setting them in opposition to "rote" and "very traditional teacher led instruction." Remembering that earlier we heard directly from participants about their creativity in the classroom—and long before the Berlin Wall fell— we know that Jeremy's assumptions were not always the reality. It is also striking that he describes ELT methodology as providing "*a little bit* more freedom" and "*a bit* more creativity" (italics added), language which still constrains the teachers he refers to and which supports Holliday's (2005) argument that communicative language teaching, too, is mainly teacher-led, just more covertly.[53]

Certainly, some local teachers appreciated the "modern methodology" OSI/SFN ELP sought to bring to the region. Klara saw the emphasis on methodology in her education as a feature which distinguished her from teachers educated in state universities:

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[53] For more detailed discussion, see Holliday's (2005) chapter three, "The Legacy of Lockstep."

I feel proud, because, um, you know I went to an exam, uh, two years ago . . . it means here in [my country], if you want to have a teaching job . . . you have to take an exam. There when I met a lot of English teachers . . . I realized that we learned very differently. They didn't learn methodology. They learned grammar, they learned literature, they learned linguistics, everything, but they didn't learn methods.

Later in her interview, she described her exposure to and learning about methods as a "treasure," though she also admitted pragmatically, "Some worked, some not."

Other participants were similarly positive. Ana noted first that her teaching in one OSI/SFN-supported school was "similar to the kind of private school kind of ideology because it was very communicative based and everybody's active . . . and also the students responded really, really great . . . to the methods." Magda spoke even more ardently about methodology by contrasting an example of a state school with the OSI/SFN-supported university at which she worked:

What I do notice is that that the way we teach here . . . is very different from say a [public/state] university . . . [where] there is much more formality and, and the distance between professors and students is, is wider. . . . Even the seating arrangements immediately suggest, you know, that there are the students in the traditional lecture hall, and there is the lecturer standing there and, and lecturing, and of course offering very, very valuable material, but still, you know, in a different way. Here [at her OSI/SFN-supported university] . . . these big names [famous professors and former politicians], they, they just walk around and sit with the students and they ask questions and students challenge them and they say, no, that's wrong, that's not the way it is, no, and then they don't say, ahhh, how come you say a thing like this to me, but they justify their point and whatever, so there is a difference.

In her excitement describing the less formal atmosphere at her OSI/SFN-supported university, where students are comfortable challenging professors, Magda was also circumspect in not condemning state forms of education, where professors are "of course offering very, very valuable material" in lectures. Even her word choice of "offering" as opposed to, for example, "delivering," suggests that students have a choice in what they accept and what they refuse. But ultimately, Magda juxtaposes the traditional lecture hall with a different kind of classroom, one centered on students versus their professors.

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Magda's construction of methodology thus lines up with those of Philip, Jeremy, and Ana: Education for these teachers was student-centered, active, communicative, more creative, freer, and even "modern" as stated directly by Philip and as implied by Jeremy and Magda. Several of these teachers further confirmed a two-way exchange in their teaching, which they attributed in some part to methodology. Thomas, for instance, characterized his teaching "as a conduit to learning and if it works well, then it's a two-way conduit"; in addition, he communicated how student feedback led to changes in the curriculum and teaching at his university, where students "wanted a much more focused kind of support." Klara talked about one class she taught in which "there were a lot of waiters," so they "made an interactive curriculum." In Klara's words, "they told what they need there so we made the language together." Ana, too, relished how she would learn from her students, as did Karolina, who explained how her students would pick up vocabulary from American films, advertisements, and song lyrics, even "slang and bad words" (Eminem was implicated here). Her main point was that her students "come with their own vocabulary, they teach this vocabulary to each other, they even teach me."

Bianca reinforced a discourse chain which connects what happens at the micro-level of the classroom with the macro-level of country and state. She observed first that "after the events of 1989, many of the seeds of the reform were sown here by the foreign language teachers," which she attributed to the aid and influence of multiple international organizations, including OSI/SFN, and their English language aid projects. Bianca described, too, how ELT methodology influenced the teaching of other subjects as well as education reform nationally:

> The teachers of foreign languages, and those of English were and still are the ferments of many changes that have taken place in [my country's] education in the last 16 years, as through the languages they teach and the contacts they have made they have more frequent access to international bibliography, practices and models.

Bianca unequivocally extends again the discourse chain of "the ideal of the international and the West" here, constructing her own country and its people as in need of emulating and adapting international (Western) practices and models. She likewise strengthens the discourse chain of two-way exchange, noting how the Ministry of Education in her country opened up space for schools and parents to help create the curriculum by "proposing optional subjects" with "multidisciplinary approaches." According to Bianca, English teachers took the lead in such proposals:

> This has resulted in the design of quite a few projects dealing with syllabi for various topics taught in English, from history and geography, to human rights, and to icons in Orthodox religion. Why there have been more teachers of English interested in this new opening can be explained by their familiarity with the concept and practice of project work and team work, by their different values and attitudes, including openness to change, innovation, and interest in continuous development.

These examples illustrate Bianca's chief point: that "much of the reform the officials boast about, especially at the level of teaching methodology, started from ELT through the teachers of English." They illustrate, too and again, how "openness to change," "innovation," and "continuous development" become discursively and ideologically embedded into English.

Looking back on these teachers' experiences with "modern ELT methodology," we see they are enthusiastic and open to learning, to trying new ways to teach. But they were also discriminating and willing to critique both methods and implementation. Bianca, for instance, in spite of much enthusiasm, did ascribe a serious concern in part to "modern ELT methodology":

> Another recent development is the change in the foreign language skills that our students possess. While in the past, they used to write pretty well, and a written test could gauge correctly the general knowledge of a foreign language, now we are confronted with students who may be fluent in the foreign language but unable to spell or write down a complex sentence. This is partly explained by the ever more extensive use of the communicative approach in the secondary school, partly by their exposure to English outside the classroom, and perhaps, also by today's culture in general, which does not value work with or exposure to written texts in any language.

Karolina, in the same vein, worried that her students—the same who learned English vocabulary from American films, advertisements, and Eminem song lyrics, which they shared in group and pair work—"read less in English and even less in [their own language; she laughs]." Then she added, "I mean, not less than English but they tend to read less and less in every language, unfortunately."

Jeremy identified another tendency he encountered while conducting OSI/SFN teacher training and focusing on "modern ELT methodology": "I remember some of them liking it and some of them being a bit [pause] not dismissive, but very doubtful about this system really, and not exactly comfortable with the idea of *not* being the sage on the stage." Ana had a comparable experience, only her students (who were Russian English teachers) expected *her* to be "the sage on the stage":

> One of the things that was really interesting in the feedback was, of course, we had this methodology which was very different, you don't go with your own opinions, you ask them, and you kind of keep your quiet, and then you juxtapose different opinions, and then you sort of contribute, so the whole idea is that this kind of has to evolve, but some of the people really didn't like that, and they wanted me, if I'm coming here as an expert, I should give them something, and that came up in some of the feedback, and I remember somebody said, well this is very strange, that the teacher gives us the handouts and acts like, as if she doesn't know what to say. And I was really shocked, because I was so much convinced that this was a good methodology. It gives voice to the people, and I'm not dumping something on them, but actually they wanted to hear what is it I have to say, so that's one of the things that got me thinking.

Ana's thinking led her to eventually challenge her own views on communicative language teaching. At first she described her early teacher self laughingly as very much a "convert" to this methodology, which looked professional and seemed "very well thought out: "When I saw those [ELT] textbooks, I thought, look, someone's really thinking about teaching, and they invested a lot of effort, and they must, they must know what they're doing." Some years later and with a lot of teaching experience behind her, Ana's views changed. With confidence, she stated, "Now I don't believe that [laughs]."

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Jeremy and Ana shared another concern which they felt impeded the success of their early teacher training. Jeremy, in retrospect, questioned the purpose and design of one course he taught:

> I think the design was to introduce these methodologies but whether that was in the interests of those particular teachers who we were teaching or whether that was something that the, the Ministry or the schools themselves wanted, I don't know. I don't remember doing a needs analysis with the students at the beginning of the course.

Ana similarly noted the importance of a needs analysis: identifying from local stakeholders what they want and need from a particular program or workshop.[54] Her concern sprang from our discussion of the teacher training workshop she conducted in Russia. When I asked her how she would have planned it differently, she replied:

> Well, I would probably want to get more input from them in the beginning, I mean, before going there, I mean, I know it's difficult to organize, but it's crucial. We were very naïve, we asked the wrong questions . . . so we didn't ask them about their expectations of what the teachers would like. So yah, that would be a good thing.

Thomas, too, grappled with resistances to "modern ELT methodology" which he described with some disdain as "very much a skills-oriented type of teaching." He and his colleagues (Western and Eastern) eventually adapted the curriculum to the needs of the local student population, a strategy which has been suggested throughout local written, and now, participants' discourses. To put it simply, developers of and instructors in English language aid projects need to be context-sensitive and willing to adapt according to context. This is another local discourse people involved in English language aid projects need to heed.

*Contrasts in the "Atmospheres" of State and OSI/SFN-Supported Schools*

Karolina, who worked both at a state and OSI/SFN-funded school, introduced another difference when describing her two workplaces: a marked distinction between the general

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[54] Compare these views with Benesch (2001), who argues rather for "rights analysis."

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classroom atmospheres. Discussing the state school where she was employed, she painted this portrait:

> The students have loads of things to learn and, um, some of the teachers who are very strict and serious can impose a very, um, how should I say, a very strict and horrifying atmosphere simply because they are demanding, you know, and they want their students to learn everything that they are supposed to report for the baccalaureate exam, for this [final, school-leaving] exam, and some of the teachers, especially language teachers, are considered too indulgent.

Such indulgence, as Karolina puts it, may derive from these language teachers' work at the local OSI/SFN-supported private school. There, Karolina observed, the atmosphere is quite different:

> I sometimes tell the students they shouldn't confuse the [Soros school] with the high school because it's not the same. You come here because you want to, you go to school both because you want to, and they laugh, and because you are supposed to go there, because you can't go anywhere without any education. And they go there [to the Soros school] for each other's sake, for the games' sake, for their parents' sake, for the exams' sake, and if you are, if you can create that atmosphere or if they in the group create that particular atmosphere, then they feel absolutely at ease and they feel that and they absolutely enjoy it a lot more than the [state] school.

Eva described this difference in atmosphere according to how it impacted her as a teacher. She worried about getting "stuck" in the state school because "it's nice to teach, but after a while if you don't do anything else, you just get [pause], the ceiling comes down on you." In contrast, she described her second job at an OSI/SFN-funded school as "a wonderful opportunity to open up, and to further my education so that I can face the students." Eva had worked hard at both schools and thus she could speak with assurance and pleasure about what she had learned— about teaching *and* English: "It was just wonderful to see that I was, uh, being used in the proper way and my knowledge was made good use of."

In this description of the rather vague term "atmosphere," I should also add here the differences in resources participants talked about, differences which no doubt contributed to the divergent perceptions of atmosphere. In short, Eastern participants in these programs almost

rhapsodized about the resources OSI/SFN ELP provided and *could* provide, unlike many of the

state education systems in the countries of CESEE-fSU.[55]

Jeremy recalled his work in the very early days of transition and his shock at the lack of

resources then:

> I remember writing the tests, and we had to write it all down because there weren't any
> facilities at all really, there was nothing, we just went with pads of paper and pens, there
> was absolutely nothing, there were no materials, we had a classroom to teach in, there
> was a whiteboard or flipchart or something, but we had nothing else, so we wrote out the
> final exam by hand.

In comparison, Eva celebrated the resources her OSI/SFN-funded school had provided

just a few years later:

> We were one of the luckiest institutions that had computers, you know, that was a new
> thing at that time . . . at that time it was something like wow! . . . There were these, um,
> nice shiny furniture, tables, good chairs, because up to then, all the chairs and tables were
> wood and made of wood and they were not so elegant, I wouldn't say that they were not
> long-lasting or they were not suitable for the purpose, but, well, it [the OSI/SFN-
> supported school] was *modern*, it was like a drop of modernity, of progress in this
> godforsaken place [laughs].

Eva's use of the word "modern" here is one of the few times I noticed Eastern participants using

the term, and it is striking that the word surfaces not over computers but over the "nice shiny"

furniture (but then again, Eva earlier had noted how "modernized" nations had lost their sense of

identity). She further extolled access to new English language textbooks, dictionaries, and

grammar books, as did all local participants. She concluded her description of the OSI/SFN-

funded school this way: "The most wonderful thing, one of the most wonderful things was the

whiteboard! . . . We didn't have to swallow all that chalk powder!" Eva's ending her list on the

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[55] One of my most vivid memories teaching in one of these countries is, after sunset and a day of bright winter light, huddling together and laughing with students under one bare light bulb in a room without heat. In another instance (same school), I slashed my hand open on the slate of a broken blackboard, only to discover there was no running water in the building. One student took care of me with clean snow and the gift of a hankie.

whiteboard ironically lends even more insight into Western expectations, as Jeremy began this

theme by talking about having *only* "a whiteboard or flipchart or something."

In addition to participants' excitement over textbooks and grammar books and

whiteboards and furniture, Karolina spoke almost with veneration about a library OSI/SFN had

built in one city:

> I used to get to know something about the Soros when I was a still a student in [one city] because they set up a big library there and you could find amazing books, in English, English, English, they were from America, most of them, I think the most recent books and magazines in English appeared there and we used to go there to check the most recent, most current literary news, well, we went to the Soros library for that reason . . . of course many of the books were not for philologies, but you could still find some books which were suitable for you if you wanted to deepen your studies in something.

Irena, on the other hand, like Jeremy, was keenly aware of one vital resource her

OSI/SFN-supported English Teachers' Association lacked and which had been denied by the

local city council: physical space, a place to meet and work. However, she described and

resolved the problem of the lack of resources resourcefully: "It is a problem when having

meetings (always held at some school in a kind of 'private' arrangement with somebody who

works at the respective school)" (parentheses in original email). Here, the teachers who were

members of the OSI/SFN-supported Teachers' Association, with the help of their leader Irena,

solved the problem of the lack of space by taking ownership over and responsibility for

meetings, which were scheduled regularly at alternating schools. In so doing, they exercised

unabashed agency, agency which was discursively absent in the New York-based OSI/SFN ELP

constructions of local actors, but reclaimed in local ELP discourses. Participants' discourses, too,

for the most part, took agency, responsibility, ownership of language, workplaces, and projects

staunchly in hand.

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*Local Responsibility and Ownership*

We have already heard multiple examples of participants claiming responsibility and ownership over projects. Eva laughingly described "our own genuine open university" started by a local teacher who wanted to serve and preserve his local community; Klara explained how she and the waiters had made their own English language curriculum—and their language—together. We have heard how Irena and other local teachers who were denied a place to meet by the local city council solved the problem by simply meeting at alternating schools, without reliance on outside resources. Ana and Dora further told me that they had always felt invited to participate in building curriculum for OSI/SFN ELP in their schools, another show of ownership and responsibility.

I now want to revisit these themes as they emerged from discussions with participants in order to underscore other perceptions of local ownership and responsibility. Of particular salience from these interviews, Western expatriate and local actors talked about these concepts in markedly different ways. Two expatriate participants I spoke with constructed *negotiation* as central to the creation of local ownership of and responsibility for projects begun and/or funded by OSI/SFN, a construction which may partially constrain ownership in that (a) it presupposes a need to grant partial ownership in the first place; and (b) it involves Western as well as Eastern voices. Further, ownership of and responsibility for these projects usually depend upon local actors' knowledge of English, a point which, paradoxically, may shed light on why local ownership was discursively withheld in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse.

Thomas, in his work, insisted on the necessity of local ownership and responsibility, almost making the establishment thereof (ironically) his charge. In the process, he emphasized "negotiation":

> We're all about, what do *they* need in order to help them to make a better decision. The universality in this is the focus on problem solution, the universality in this is a focus on developing evidence that feeds into decision-making. . . . But it's always negotiated: they take the bits they like and they leave the bits they don't like.

Thomas here is transparent in his efforts to communicate *choices* local teachers, students, and development workers have when solving problems or researching issues in order to become better decision-makers. This is an assumption, of course, which still presupposes that locals need outside help to make better decisions: Thus they *must* negotiate if they want funding and outside assistance, which may be fair, especially as, in the end, the choice of accepting such help is theirs, not Thomas' or OSI/SFN's. And Thomas was keenly aware of the complexities behind negotiation, a viewpoint informed by his own experiences as a teacher and then a project developer and consultant for OSI/SFN:

> The irony is the fact that you want them to do it autonomously and without your involvement, yet you want to take all of the credit for it, you know? So there's a problem there and it's not just in education, you know, half of the researchers I work with, they first start off by doing impact evaluations and this also goes back to all the donors, donors are the ones who are so concerned about trying to link themselves to particular projects, when in fact, exactly the same model holds, they wanted local ownership. . . . You know, the jet-in jet-out expert comes, say, for two days of experience that doesn't relate to anything that happens on the ground, then people have to somehow digest it and they [the "experts"] said that *they* made the inputs [into the project], right? Now, everyone realizes the value of local ownership. Everyone realizes that negotiated sort of outputs are important.

Thomas is upfront in acknowledging the human desire to "take credit" for successes, whether it be teachers taking credit for students' successes or donor organizations working to link their names to successful projects. In the final analysis, however, Thomas is unyielding: "Now everyone realizes the value of local ownership." He attributes this change in the world of development (as compared to development in the 1980s and earlier) in large part to a change in leadership of the World Bank in the mid-1990s. This was the point, he believes, when local ownership, two-way exchange, and the subsequent inclusion of local voices became central to

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development work. He further held up OSI/SFN as a leader in such an approach to development, a conviction that *seems* to clash with findings from critical discourse analysis of the OSI/SFN English Language Programs discourse discussed in Chapter Four. Thomas described OSI/SFN as follows:

> One of the unique features is the combination of network programs and local foundations. It's big, it's a big thing, you do have local foundations on the ground staffed by local people who in fact were established and are in fact autonomous.  And the boards themselves are all local people, it's not, there's no foreigners, so when you go and work in those places, then they go to the regional meetings, they go to New York, then they come back and they go, I like this, I don't like this, we're gonna do that, we're not gonna do that, unless if, of course, it's a directive of a broad-scale strategic change.

With his final sentence, Thomas inadvertently helps explain how New York-based English Language Programs may have differed from most other OSI initiatives. If ELP was a "broad-scale" and "strategic" initiative, which it seems to have been, then the discourse chain of supranational language management becomes, ironically, stronger, in spite of local autonomy and local staff in charge of local Soros foundations and programs. In other words, New York-based ELP as it ran from 1994-2005 may have been the exception to the rule of "local control" over local programs, but through its spread of English and ELT, it equipped multiple local actors to autonomously take responsibility over and ownership of various *other* OSI/SFN projects, *because of English*. Capacity, we might say, has been built, but in large part due to OSI/SFN ELP.

Lauren also constructed "negotiation" as a key contributor to local ownership and responsibility, demonstrating, perhaps, a common lexicon of Western development workers:

> I think when I first started to do my research in [Central Asia], there was a lot of talk that "NGO equals women's movement," for example, and people were just sort of taking "women's movement" as that's what it is, and now I think there's more kind of, what do we mean by "women's movement," how do we want to see this and do we have it, so people are really starting to debate more with these issues [She pauses]. I like to think that [laughs], but I'm sure it's not across the board.

Lauren's response evidences a subtler form of negotiation, whereby a local group in Central Asia takes a concept introduced by a Western NGO and decides how they "want to see this." Lauren was pleased over such debate, obviously, though not entirely convinced that such negotiation was yet systemic. Still, she concluded, "They're able to sort of negotiate with these concepts and translate them in ways that maybe they weren't doing five years ago," a statement which suggests again, if faintly, the East developing in the image of the West. But as with Thomas, Lauren's goal seems to be about providing local agency, ownership, choice, and responsibility in the process.

Notwithstanding the emphasis Lauren and Thomas place on local ownership and responsibility, we should also remember here what Victoriya said about local ownership, responsibility, capacity building, and English. In an email, she worried about the creation of an English-speaking elite and the subsequent implications for local communities:

> I think people who speak English (myself included and guilty as charged) do not always realize the responsibility we have for local communities to promote equality and inclusiveness. Instead, we were often responsible for creating a divide between a younger better educated minority and older disenchanted majority.

Victoriya delivers another forceful viewpoint we should attend to. Local ownership and responsibility may be helped by actors' knowledge of English, but they can also be limited or excluded because of English. The English language capacity OSI/SFN has built not only helps— but also has the potential to undercut—local capacity building in other contexts such as, in this case, in the Central Asian "Stans."

Other participants talked about ownership and responsibility in less explicit but no less important ways. Ana was excited to claim English for her *own* purposes with its own lingua franca standards; multiple teachers talked about *their* schools with the possessive pronoun "our." Eva spoke excitedly when she told me that, at her Soros-supported school, "we are copying and

*tailoring* in *our* way of thinking, different programs, different projects" (italics added).

Participants further spoke about *their* countries' new independence[56], and they spoke about *their*

universities, *their* departments, *their* futures, *their* environment—all with the pronoun "our."

Teachers, especially, seemed to search for ways for students to take responsibility over

and ownership of their own learning. Andrew summed it up this way:

> What I'm saying is the [tutoring] is the most valuable way of one to one communication and one to one discussion of a paper, but it is a two way process. I guess I would suggest most of my colleagues would say the same. One of the most rewarding things of the of the job is a very good [tutoring session], and I don't mean whereby a student says yes yes yes yes yes, or the teacher says this is brilliant, we don't need to do too much about it, I mean, even sometimes a difficult one when there's been a lot of conversation and a lot of exchange of ideas, maybe disagreements, but if you come to the end of that maybe in half an hour, an hour . . . I think, yah, that was that was useful, a student takes something away and even if it's not agreement, at least it's some kind of their own critical thinking, going away, thinking about their own writing, and  if that manifests itself in later drafts, that's what it's all about.

Magda described a similar process in wanting students to be the final arbiters of their

papers. She described the process this way:

> Sometimes it's, it's really teaching and, and lecturing, and telling them, oh no, you shouldn't be doing this . . . more frequently it's, it's really a conversation, why are you doing this, do you think you could do that, and not telling them what they should do but, but rather, you know, asking questions that, that might make them aware of what is right and what is not so good for them, for their papers.

While Magda is candid in admitting that sometimes "it's really teaching and, and lecturing," she

does discursively return at least partial ownership of papers and content to her students through

raising students' awareness of "what is right and what is not so good." As in Irena's discussion

of teacher identity and Karolina's story of her colleague of "moral greatness," Magda creates

space for self-discovery in her teaching and tutoring by asking questions and hoping, in the

process, her students might become more aware of "what is right" and "what is not so good,"

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[56] This relatively new independence may suggest one reason many participants' resist considering European or supranational identity.

according, of course, to international discourse conventions and individual teachers'
expectations.

Magda's account of her teaching practices—along with the voices of Andrew, Lauren,
Victoriya, Thomas, and other participants in this study—attest to some forms of local ownership
and responsibility, just as did the local ELP discourses. Thus participants reaffirm several
discourse chains integral to this study and either absent or constrained in the OSI/SFN ELP
discourse: the discourse chains of local ownership, local responsibility, two-way exchange, and
inclusion of *all* voices. These "local discourses" provide clear and reoccurring messages for
teachers, developers, and other decision-makers involved in English language aid projects,
including the need to first expose assumptions underlying Western perceptions of Eastern need
and then verifying that those perceptions are accurate.

*Native and Non-Native Speakers and Temporal Identities*

Adrian Holliday, in *The Struggle to Teach English as an International Language* (2005),
drew upon Phillipson (1992) and Fairclough (1995) in order to describe a theme repeated
throughout his book: "native-speakerism," which Holliday believes is still "so deep in the way in
which we think about TESOL that people are 'standardly unaware' of its presence and impact"
(p. 10).[57] Holliday's work came out just after I had finished my first research trip and my first
round of interviews, and I was intrigued that my participants discussed "non-native and native
speakers" in ways which mostly mirrored Holliday's findings. His findings are expressly based
upon texts about English students from the Far East, North Africa, Arab countries, Iran, and also
"under-achieving mainstream US students" (2005, p. 20). In the interview transcripts which
follow, we see that English students, teachers, and project developers from Central, Eastern, and
South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are likewise constructed (or construct the

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[57] See also Davies (1991, 2003), Phillipson (1992), Medgyes (1994), and Braine (1999).

Western Other) in ways which strongly reinforce Holliday's matrix. These were the same ways we saw actors constructed in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse, constructions which were both reproduced *and* resisted in the local discourses. Frequently, that is, "native speakers" were constructed as experts *because* they were "native," while local teachers were those in need of change in the image of the Western Self (Hansen, 2006). Holliday terms these differences the "unproblematic Self" and the "culturally problematic Other" (2005, pp. 19-20).

My participants reproduced some of those discourse chains, perpetuating the myth and polemic of the native speaker as expert. But my participants added further dimensions to the issue, exposing ways English can undercut local development, as we have already heard from Victoriya. Local teachers, too, revealed what Ana called "the hidden clashes," what "native speaker experts" might not, but should, see.

First, Galina's thoughts reproduced Holliday's (2005) construct of "native speakerism" almost to a tee:

> English became a lingua franca in Europe. In a way, European nations' mastery of this language became a criterion of their (or actually, their country's) cultural level. Finns, for instance, can speak English en masse, while [people from my country], unfortunately, lag behind in this respect. Teaching of English should be strengthened in [my country] and perhaps, sending more native speakers [there] would be the best means to get more young people interested in this language.

Ana, too, in her early teaching days, bought fully in to this construction of the expert "native speaker," in spite of "culturally problematic" encounters she had had with native English speakers in her home country (a provocative inversion of Holliday's constructions, whereby the Western Other becomes the "culturally problematic"). When she was forced to leave her country due to war, a friend encouraged her to apply for an English teaching position in another country. But Ana had her doubts: "I believed at that point that you could not get a job as an English teacher if you were not a native speaker in the country where you lived."

Ana interviewed for the position, however, and while she was initially rejected, the

university did eventually hire her. Here was how she reacted:

> I was in awe, I was in complete awe, I come from a university where there were hardly
> any native speakers and suddenly I am the only non-native speaker, that's how it was at
> the beginning, and I was under terrible pressure to perform. Not to make a mistake . . .
> not to be worse than anybody else . . . I really struggled a lot, I would go home at 7:00
> and just drop dead. I lost a lot of kilos at that time, but I also got really interested, and
> that's where I got my idea to start my Ph.D.

In due time, Ana became more and more comfortable in her role as a non-native teacher teaching

in English. She realized, too, that her university *needed* a teacher from the region, and not just to

add Eastern "spice" to the Western soup (her words):

> I think I gave them more legitimacy, because it was a university for the region, so they
> should also have somebody from the region. And this was something that I felt my
> strength was in because there were little things that I could understand immediately such
> as transfer from something, not necessarily in language but maybe a concept, and I knew
> immediately what they were talking about. . . . I came to understand I had some
> advantages.

Ana's students were likewise grateful for the insights she could add as "somebody from the

region." But when Ana thought about taking a position in a *Western* English speaking country,

her doubts arose again:

> I really would hesitate to go and leave and professionally deal with these issues in an
> English-speaking country because I would feel second-rate, or I would be treated second-
> rate, because I would be "non," but here I am not, here I'm an English language educator
> like anybody else and that gives me [pause], it's part of my identity and I can see myself
> on an equal footing with other people who are the same.

Ana's stories both confirm and abnegate the myth of the expert native speaker. She did

eventually move to an English speaking country, and she did eventually land a prestigious

teaching position. But she had to suffer a lot of anxiety and doubts throughout the process,

doubts which corroborate the myth of the native speaker and how deeply that myth is entrenched

in the field of TESOL.

Lauren's experiences also evince a reproduction of this myth while further demonstrating its negative impact on local development. When describing her research work in Central Asia, Lauren explained how she was constructed by her local colleagues as someone who could bring "English and culture to the uninitiated" (Holliday, p. 12)—just because she was a native speaker. She had no background in TESOL:

> I met a local woman who was in charge of the local Fulbright foundation and she had invited me to lead English classes at the [school], and there were some students there who were using the Soros foundation as a place to learn English, so they were going there regularly, and one of them invited me and said it would be great for you to come and just meet up with the students, they'd be interested in talking with a native speaker, so we ended up meeting regularly.

Lauren's primary work, however, was to research Women's NGOs, not teach English. She was further fluent in Russian and thus well-prepared to conduct her research *in* Russian, but the local women she worked with still had different expectations:

> It was also strange for me that so many of the women in the NGOs that I worked with were not actually using [the Soros foundation] at all, they were always asking *me* for English lessons for them and I would say, well, there's places offering English, you could do it on your own, so I just told them that.

Lauren held firm, that is, in order to accomplish her research goals and not get side-tracked by the constant demand for English lessons. Still, her story illustrates how English can actually get in the way of *other* work in transition and developing countries. Further, it echoes Victoriya's concern over the construction of an English-speaking elite at the cost of failing to build *local* capacity; and it echoes Thomas' realization that the criterion of English for a particular fellowship actually led to the wrong people receiving the award. This, too, is the tentative start to a new discourse chain or at the very least a red flag: how English might distract from, undermine, or even contribute to a project's failure, especially in regions where "native speakers" might yet be few and far between.

Ana told a similar story she had heard while conducting outreach teaching in another country:

> There was another person there who was [from another] Soros network program to do his own research. He was a [specialist in another discipline], but he was teaching English, and these teachers went to the courses . . . he was hired as an English teacher but he was not qualified as an English teacher, so I think his teaching was really boring, I mean, I saw some idioms, why on earth did they need some slang from, I don't know where, Texas or something like that, and actually these teachers said, "you know, you know, you understand where we come from, you understand the context, I mean, these guys, we come here just because of his accent," so they were going to improve their pronunciation, and the poor guy, he thought he was teaching them the language, so, that's how I became aware of all these hidden clashes.

Here is another case where a "native speaker" sent to do research in another subject takes a job as an English teacher, though he did not have any background in education or TESOL. As a novice researcher who is also teaching, it is difficult for me to imagine that his teaching did not take away from his research. But perhaps of more interest, the Russian teachers were astutely aware of what he could *not* offer, so they took what he could: exposure to his "accent," so as to "improve their pronunciation," though he thought "he was teaching them the language."

Jeremy presented another angle on local perceptions of "native speakers," one akin to his earlier description of "native speaker" guilt. Among my interview participants, native and non-native alike, Jeremy alone expressed these feelings:

> I don't think there was a resentment there, there *should* have been a resentment there, to have these Westerners come in, but I think it's because they wanted Westerners to come in. It wasn't being rammed down their throat, they were offering jobs to Westerners, they wanted Westerners to come and teach English, so it was something they invited in, I think, and I think it was because they wanted to change and to find a different route from, from what they had in the past.

Jeremy constructs local teachers here as welcoming, offering jobs, wanting change, wanting Westerners, much like Dora, who welcomed anything Western. What sets Jeremy's perceptions apart from Holliday's and others' portrayals of "native speakers"—and other "native speakers" in this study—is Jeremy's explicit "native speaker guilt," his expectations of resentment and

surprise at what seemed to be the absence thereof, and his vague shame, expressed earlier, at

earning more, even though he was much less experienced and educated than his local

counterparts. Where Jeremy's words correspond with Holliday's and other participants' is in his

perception of local colleagues wanting "change." And clearly many participants in this study did

want change, though *not* without mixed feelings.

Karolina may provide one explanation for this mixed desire, which she related to age.

She was describing the choice of many young people in her community to emigrate to another

country:

> Maybe you will discover yourself in a totally different culture and a totally different
> language and you feel that it suits you, but I think this might be exceptional. I mean, not
> at this age, maybe when you are young and you just start to get to know something about
> the world. For adults, it is a little bit difficult because of the many connections you
> already have, because of all those experiences and maybe because of their other
> relationships, but it's not excluded, I think.

Karolina's distinction here between the *young* and older *adults* harks back, of course, to the

OSI/SFN ELP discourse targeting Falk's "citizen pilgrims" of global civil citizenship (1994), a

discourse which, in the process, erased multiple generations raised under communism—the

missing, forgotten, the en-aged and entirely absent. In local discourses, these identities began to

re-appear in important ways. In participants' discourses, these identities and their importance

surfaced even more vividly.

Thomas, for instance, described multiple projects he worked on which were "firmly

based on principles of adult learning":

> They were people from 25-45, NGO leaders, doctors, advisors to presidents, and
> everybody in between . . . and they bring an unbelievable amount of experience to the
> training . . . they bring the experience of their own involvement but also of the decision
> making processes, of the individuals who are involved there, of what politics is like, of
> what their particular interactions are like with that world.

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These examples animate why Thomas and his colleagues drew upon the principles of adult learning, including clear acknowledgement of and incorporation into the curriculum of the "unbelievable amount of experience" participants brought. Moreover, Thomas' excitement when speaking testifies to his respect for and desire to learn from these trainees, as much as to train.

Karolina, in her teaching for OSI/SFN, found that the age range in her English class likewise varied widely and benefitted all: "The youngest was 17 years old and the eldest was 47 years old, and it worked out *very* well." In the same manner, Klara had multiple experiences with adult learning supported by her local Soros foundation. She joined a club put together by OSI/SFN and Peace Corps, which she told me about with enthusiasm: "It was free, and there was an American girl . . . and different people from [my town]. There was a judge, and three or five teachers, and there was a nurse, an accountant, so different people." Here again, Klara indicated adult learning was alive and well, if informally, in her community. Equally important, the club also included adults of different ethnicities who have historically been in conflict with one another, the same whose children attend separate schools, and Klara reported that they got on well with each other: "no problems." Klara also taught adults in another OSI/SFN-funded program:

> Through this school I'm working in now, they made an investigation, or they made a survey, on the schools in the area which work also with adults, with adult training, because in our school, we accept even in the forties, fifties, so students, so there is no age limit.

"No age limit" opens up multiple opportunities without "en-aging" actors (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) through discursive emphasis solely on youth as the future leaders of a country. The involvement of Klara and her colleagues in these various OSI/SFN-supported English language projects and schools for adults exhibits local control of ELT and learning English—and in these

cases, control which strengthens the discourse chain of inclusion, without any split between "superior" (young) and "inferior" (middle-aged, old) Others.

Lauren saw the same inclusive mix of ages at a Soros foundation in Central Asia, which she described this way: "I'm not sure how the language classes were organized there but it was constantly busy, and people of all ages, so it wasn't just college kids, there were also older people, probably most of them were affiliated with NGOs." Bianca and Dora both taught adults and teenagers at OSI/SFN-supported NGOs and schools. Irena, too, worked with adults, as we saw previously. And on top of her teaching, we hear in Irena's voice the voice of a life-long learner as well, a voice which further upholds the importance of including all ages in English language aid projects and other development work:

> Although I am 49 years of age, I still wonder about the world around me and feel that small things can make me very happy. I feel sad when students have the "I-will-never-need-this" attitude, and my students know that such thoughts simply make me furious. However, I do try (at least I think so) to adapt my teaching methods, objectives, subjects, to students' needs. With the changing world of today, this is no easy task.

Despite the positive notes struck in these voices, ageism does persist as well and must be made explicit. Eva communicated quite fiercely her perceptions of the erasure of those generations raised under communism, an erasure she felt was very evident in *her* community:

> What I think is missing is a third age education, I think that's missing. Nobody's looking at pensioners, nobody's looking at, uh, retired people. I think that's uh, it will come, it will come, and I'm, I'm sorry I cannot steer it, but some people some time will, because, oh yes, I'm thinking about giving my parents a computer, I can think about it, and many people would be very interested and they would just love it, and I don't think we should dispose of them after they are sixty or fifty-five because they did, they gave their lives to what we have now. So that would be nice, but it will come. It will come.

Eva's call for a "third age education" may differ slightly from descriptions above in that she is talking about pensioners specifically, who may not have participated in adult English programs that were available to them. Or perhaps there were no available programs in her community. Either way, Eva's voice reminds us—as did Victoriya's—that in some places there is still a

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divide between the old and "disenchanted" (perhaps) and the "better educated young." Irena expressed this concern, too: "Many older people regret not having learned English in their lifetime and think it is too late now." Consequently, without special attention and effort, the elderly may be the first to lose out in the new world of transition. If we recall the stories of teachers under communism whom participants honored, we can glimpse the loss, if briefly. This worrisome prospect of excluding the elderly is another possibility that English language aid and other development projects must attend to.

*Work and Studies with OSI/SFN ELP Programs and Projects: Outcomes and Impacts*

In thinking about how to close this last section of this last chapter, I contemplated the options, the order of the parts: Should I end on the stories of teachers my participants revered, their discussions of negotiation and local ownership, how they felt as native and non-native speakers moving through the new world of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union? I decidedly, finally, based on *my* overall perceptions of their experiences, to close with participants' depictions of how OSI/SFN English language projects, programs, and schools have impacted their work and their lives. What follows are but some of the outcomes they shared; the responses quoted here best exemplify the variety of accomplishments, transformations, and impacts participants talked about.

I begin with Victoriya, who found that OSI/SFN fostered her professional growth and human rights activism in multiple ways. She began by describing work at her local Soros foundation:

> Many of the projects I was coordinating . . . were focused on student-centered participatory methodology, critical thinking skills, civic and human rights education. I had some notion of human rights and democracy, because I took some courses from [another university], but I realized that I lacked some knowledge to adequately fill the content of my programs. That same year I went to . . . to discuss education strategy with [an OSI/SFN office]. It was the first time I visited [an OSI/SFN university]. In the course

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of that trip I met some students from 5 (!) different countries and we had a lot of
interesting discussions about human rights and democracy. This is when I first started
thinking about applying to [the University]. What attracted me the most was the fact that
students came from all over the world and there was no dominant national culture.

Even as I re-read this passage, I realize how striking that last phrase is: In Victoriya's pursuit of

learning about *human* rights, she sought a place where there was no *dominant national culture*,

the absence of which in her OSI/SFN-supported university proved a great attraction for her.

Ostensibly, in spite of many participants' flat-out rejections of even the possibility of a

*supranational* identity, Victoriya revives this possibility: through her work in human rights,

participatory methodology (a vibrant contrast to "modern ELT methodology"), and "civic and

humans rights *education.*" These are what she gained from the local Soros foundation and the

OSI/SFN-supported university where she studied. And while she did express some

disappointment at the abundance of theory in her studies as opposed to "more hands-on

experience with human rights and local community," Victoriya took matters into her own

capable hands: "I networked with local NGOs and helped [other students] . . . to get involved in

community projects." In the final analysis, she brought a lot *to* OSI/SFN as well, no doubt, and

there she was able to both network and influence multiple other students to work for community

projects. She continues to be a dynamic voice and advocate for human rights to this day. And to

sound a point again I have sounded over and over, English both helped *and* helped undermine

her work.

Just as OSI/SFN and English (to some extent) helped Victoriya in her human rights work,

so also did it enable Ecaterina to contribute to environmental issues in a way which brings

countries and regions together:

I can say that the majority of environmental problems are of common character. This
means it is impossible to completely solve a problem if all concerned nations are not
involved. Take the Danube River which flows into the Black Sea and crosses many
European countries. If the problem of its pollution is solved in Austria, there can still be

many problems downstream in Romania, for instance. Romania is not capable of solving these problems but Austria can help. Consequently, our department helps to bring concerned people together, establish a dialogue between them and solve problems with common efforts. It's also an investment into the future. There are strong ties between alumni of our department and this network becomes bigger year by year. This means that there are people who are concerned with the state of our common environment and they are ready for peaceful co-operation.

OSI/SFN helped Ecaterina in her studies and networking. Ecaterina now helps the environment. OSI/SFN helped Victoriya, who helped OSI/SFN *and* countless people globally. Karolina came to a kindred realization in discussing her work as an English teacher for both OSI/SFN and a state school, work which wore her out and restored her continuously:

> Many of the things that I use at the Soros I also use at the Secondary school, or first I try at the school and then I use at the Soros, so vice versa . . . and it is interesting because, especially when you learn something new, you have to try it out somewhere and you can see the reactions, so the reactions will teach you how to use that particular thing with others, devise variations if that way doesn't work or something like that, so, it, um, it makes you more a teacher I think, it provides you with experiences which you can use further along . . . and this opens your horizons a little bit because you work with more people, you get to know other people or the same people in other circumstances, it counts a lot, I think, and it's, so, human.

Karolina ends on the word "human," a term which, I posit riskily, seems here to transcend other trappings of identity—nationality, ethnicity, age, occupation, gender, language—in much the same way Ecaterina noted the commonality of the environment and Victoriya the universality of human rights. She further embodies creativity in her work, which again flows both ways: What she learns and tries while teaching English at her Soros school, she takes to her state classroom. What works in the state classroom, she takes to her Soros classes. Her willingness to "devise variations" if an activity does not work refutes the automaton picture of a teacher slavishly following any prescribed methodology, be it "modern" or grammar translation or audiolingualism or something else. She demonstrates, too, like Victoriya and Ecaterina, a micro-level substantiation of two-way exchange which reminds us that while institutions and NGOs can shape people in powerful ways, people likewise make up—and shape—institutions just as

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powerfully. In this regard, these participants push OSI/SFN in new ways, new directions, perhaps, which are "human," first. Her living teaching being outshines how "non-native" "local" teachers were constructed in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse or are constructed in multiple other TESOL discourses.

For Bianca, her opportunity to study teacher training in the U.S. due to an OSI/SFN scholarship revolutionized her teaching and thinking about teaching in ways which defy Holliday's (2005) construction of modern ELT methodology as "the legacy of lockstep" (see his Chapter Three). In spite of some hesitance early on in her scholarship and her strong identification first with other European students in her program, Bianca came to this conclusion:

> The learning experience I had was deep and memorable above all. The study groups were made up mostly of American teachers of all ages but also of other European teachers working in the OSI network. On the second summer there was a Kyrgyz teacher, too. All these people had various backgrounds, different teaching philosophies and strategies and various learning habits. It was again, for the first time when I was able to see how surrounding diversity can make one understand oneself better. Comparing and confronting my beliefs with those of the instructors and classmates, seeing how my own learning habits and opinions about how learning takes place are either similar to or different from the other participants'. Having to constantly reflect on commonality and variety in learning and teaching, having to write about these on a daily basis, led not only to an important number of highlights and insights but also changed me deeply, making me a more reflexive and flexible teacher.

Bianca's journey takes her not only to the U.S., but also to "commonality and variety in learning and teaching," to reflection and self-awareness, certainly to methodological diversity, and ultimately, to reflexivity and flexibility in teaching, all which contribute to a complex mosaic of "non-native" teacher identity which should, like Ana's story earlier, humble "native-speakerists."

And there were other impacts. Galina's study at an OSI/SFN-funded university brought her together with students from other post-communist countries and beyond, connections which, through English, helped them heal from the shocks of transition: "We also lived through painful experience of transitional period and had much to talk about." In much the same way, Ana

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identified having been through a war as a way to connect with Iraqi and Palestinian scholars. As for Klara, who survived "the terrible times" before transition, OSI/SFN helped her achieve a basic desire, access to—and a chance to deepen her learning of—a language she loved, along with additional employment:

> I wanted English, I don't know why, I, I liked the way English sounds, and I read a lot from English writers, and I wanted to learn English, and I made a year at the people's university with this teacher and we made twelve lessons from an ancient book which is very boring but I, I loved, I adored it [she laughs] yes . . . and then I read every English book from the beginning [laughs], even the bibliography, and made notes and I even copied a book [laugh], so when the democracy came . . . then a few colleagues of mine asked me to teach their children, but I said, "I have no books, how to teach them, I don't know myself," but [they said] "please, we'll be happy if you teach them what you know" [laughs], so I began.

So she began, and she teaches still. In Klara's case, the Soros foundation and school in her town metaphorically built on another foundation laid by an "ancient book," one teacher, the eager requests of a few colleagues, and Klara's own "ancient" desire to learn English. Just as with teaching, she continues learning languages—begun long before OSI/SFN came to exist—and probably will do so for the rest of her life.

Other participants chronicled different impacts from their work with OSI/SFN. Philip made it his mission to help induct non-Western scholars into a community constrained by international academic discourse conventions and disciplinary boundaries, a mission which, for him, was both rewarding and a troubling reality:

> In an ideal world, in an ideal world, the way I see myself . . . if you have to have a personal mission, I saw myself then and I think I might modify it now . . . that there are a lot of people out there who are disempowered because they don't have the skills to participate . . . that the whole academic debate that's going on  requires to an extent, and this is the one part that I feel uncomfortable about, it requires that you be able to communicate in English, because sadly, the international scholarship in [other languages] is sorely limited . . . it also requires that you be able to communicate according to the conventions . . . the socially constructed norms of the discipline . . . this is our bailiwick, that you have to abide by . . . the boundary of the discipline.

Philip ends (or I end Philip) on "the boundary of the discipline," a border he respects, but he also believes he can create passports for scholars to cross that border through providing them "skills" and awareness of "socially constructed" "convention" and "norms." Here I would like to think that, in his mention of the "socially constructed" nature of those norms, Philip invites a challenge to those constructions, or at least creates an opening for scholars and editors from around the world to shape norms and open disciplinary boundaries, just as many societies we've seen in this chapter are beginning to open.

Magda lent credence to this argument even as she paradoxically observed the impacts of OSI/SFN ELP and other English language aid projects on writing in her country. In reference to the norms and conventions of the "international discourse community," first she stated:

> I've heard different views . . . and one view is that it's still sort of centered in the U.S. and Britain and then another view is that those conventions or guidelines are, are being shaped by scholars whose first language isn't English . . . so they have input into the whole process.

When she continued, however, she discursively turned the table:

> But another point is that students realize and I realize as well that, for instance, journals [in my country] . . . more and more comply with Anglo-Saxon rules, or international rules if you like . . . such a thing as a topic sentence has crept into [secondary school] course books  . . . which is a *completely* new thing . . . and how to build an argument, that's part of the secondary school curriculum now . . . and a relatively new feature of journals [in my country] is that . . . very often there is an abstract to start with, key words as well, I mean, you *must* have them because otherwise, you know, in the age of the internet you need those key words, and then, and then, journals more and more, you know, want you to have a proper introduction in the introduction, please say what your thesis statement is, that's a new thing again, then break up the body of your paper, you know, into small units . . . and probably this is based on, you know, international standards.

Magda transmits practically a whole curriculum in her overview of impacts which OSI/SFN ELP and other English language aid projects have had on writing in her language and scholarly journals in her country. Quite prominently, she rewords "Anglo-Saxon rules" shortly thereafter as "international" rules, a switch or slip which evidences the source of such rules obscured by the

word "international." Magda reproduces another familiar discourse chain, accordingly: In this study, we have seen "New York" become "international," "American" become "international," and now Western conventions of writing have likewise become the conventions of the "international discourse community," without nearly enough discussion yet, I think, of the implications of socially constructing such a community. With the help of Galtung, Phillipson, Pennycook, Canagarajah, Kumaravadivelu, Hansen, Fairclough, Wodak, and many others scholars, we can now notice how easily and dangerously meaning drifts. Magda loved her job at an OSI/SFN-supported university which socially and politically contrasted with other schools she worked for: "I always thought that [this] was the sort of place that I fitted in." This is what she gained. And her country? At the risk of great reductiveness and over-simplification, I know, her country and its curriculum gained the placement of topic sentences; abstracts and keywords; "please say what your thesis statement is." I return to questions posed by Duszak (1997):

> Can an international discourse community be founded within fields yet across languages? If so, what would happen to its socio-rhetorical foundation? What effect could internationalization of scholarship have on academic rhetoric in *regional* academic styles? (p. 20)

Magda supplies one answer, though we do not know exactly what was lost by these outcomes.

The last impact I include here I choose because it is most familiar to me as a teacher and novice researcher, and because it was just such an impact which started this study. Jeremy thus opens a space for me to close, in that his words resonate forcefully with my own experiences working in the region. Jeremy observed another opportunity OSI/SFN English language programs and other English language aid projects have provided, in this case, for Western teachers (like myself). I use his words to conclude.

Conclusion

When I asked Jeremy to describe his motives for involvement in OSI/SFN English

language aid projects, he replied:

> To, to, to visit other countries, to see another culture, not to transform it into my culture, I had no missionary zeal [laughs]. Actually, I think it's something quite the opposite with English teachers, they've got an interest in foreign cultures as individuals, TEFL teachers are not people who want to go over to other countries and transform them into their own image, I think quite the opposite, they're the kind of people who want to escape from their own country and experience other cultures, and in a sense they are using the English language for the opposite reason, it's their passport *out* of Western society [laughs].

Jeremy's perspective was certainly my own for quite some time, totalizing as it does—without

hedges of any sort—Western TEFL teachers in search of a "passport *out* of Western society." I

was once of the same mind, or, to quote Victoriya, "myself included and guilty as charged."

However, by listening to the voices of participants in these programs—participants from many

different countries and contexts—and by analyzing both the New York-based *and* local written

discourses—I have gained so much more than merely a chance to travel. I have met my research

goals: to identify patterns, "conditional generalizations" (Jentleson, 1999), "themes" (Maxwell,

1996, p. 53), and discourse chains and resistance from the totality of OSI/SFN ELP discourses.

My goal, again, was, to learn how English language aid project developers and teachers might

improve their practices. My research provides some insights, which I share in my conclusion.

So saying, I now push my way across the border of disciplinary conventions and the

traditional norms of the "the international discourse community" and I move directly to Chapter

Seven, which will take the findings from this chapter and set them alongside findings from

Chapters Four and Five. Lined up next to each other, the totality of patterns, conditional

generalizations, and discourse chains should help us identify multiple lessons learned from the

voices in this chapter and the study as a whole, lessons which may inform English language aid

projects in developing and transition countries in important ways.

CHAPTER SEVEN: IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

This study actually began 16 years ago, when, first as a Peace Corps volunteer and then as a consultant, I traveled to and worked in Hungary, Romania, and Serbia. My job was to teach English and writing, and to teach teachers how to teach English and writing. I was needed, said Peace Corps and President George H. W. Bush, since after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian was being bitterly wiped off the syllabi of many post-communist countries and English was just as quickly being added on. According to Phillipson (1992, p. 6), the British Council was saying the same thing: that at least "100,000 new teachers of English are needed for 30 million learners in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s." Off I went.

Now I am back, after nine years in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe; too brief a respite of learning and reflection at the Indiana University of Pennsylvania; and almost six years as a teacher at a technical college, a position I took, in large part, to fund this research. In the interim, I also spent the summer of 2008 in Afghanistan on a World Bank English language aid project, a place where I found little time or electricity to write, but lots of time to think about the implications of this research, the goal of which was and is to help make such projects less about "linguistic imperialism" or "supranational language management" and more about what local English teachers and students need and want from the language, the project, the funding. Another goal: to learn from them about teaching and project management. This may sound simple, but it is not. My research has, however, provided some insights into English language aid projects from which, I hope, project developers and teachers can draw lessons.

Advice From Those Who Have Gone Before

Before I discuss what lessons this study offers, I first want to quickly revisit and reinforce suggestions for English language education and aid projects offered previously by Fairclough

(1992a) and Pennycook (1994). Fairclough (1992a) believed (and still believes, I am sure) that "critical language awareness" is an absolute must for "effective democratic citizenship," so much so it should be integrated into state education curricula from primary school all the way through university (pp. 2-3). Language education should be re-conceptualized from the teaching of mere, easily-applicable skills which are context-free, to a view of skills and knowledge as "always provisional and indeterminate, contested, and moreover at issue in social relationships which all teachers and learners are positioned within" (Fairclough, n.d.). In other words, we should help our students question "knowledge" as it comes their way and not just receive it, just as we should question the "knowledge" of our disciplines and what we can learn from other disciplines. Fairclough's beliefs here prefigure Lauren's and Thomas' emphases on "negotiating knowledge," especially when, to the outside educator or development worker, the learner does not seem to have a schematic understanding of the concepts presented, whether that concept be a women's movement, governance versus government, or a thesis statement.

Fairclough adds another important dimension to my thinking about English language aid projects, one which I did not really notice until writing this conclusion, because, *almost* without exception, I interviewed the "intellectual elite" Thomas believed was so necessary for democracy. Fairclough reminds us, that is, that students in technical and vocational programs— including multiple English for Specific Purposes such as we saw proliferate in local written discourses—likewise need opportunities to become critically aware of language and discourses so that they see how their training may be bound up in "the needs of the economy" or the nation or other structural systems and interests. This is a belief I wholly agree with (Fairclough, n.d.). In my current workplace, a technical college, I observe daily that it is in the interests of the *institution* to construct our learners first as FTEs (Full Time Equivalencies) as a part of a funding

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formula; and second, as a future workforce, with limited (if any) opportunities created for

program students (as opposed to liberal arts students) to actually question what they are taught,

or why. Nor are teachers encouraged (on a five/five load) to reflect on their practices and get

students reflecting on and co-creating knowledge through participatory methodology. Worse, for

our ESL students, many of whom are refugees or immigrants with university degrees from their

home countries, if their English is limited, they are given the option of either becoming furniture

upholsterers or CNAs.

This distinction or "stratification" (Fairclough's term)—ranging from the "intellectual

elites" to technical college students or workers in the service industry—bears on English

language aid projects, too, unquestionably. I think here of Eva's soldiers who *had* to learn

English because now they were a part of NATO, or Klara's waiters in her English class

anticipating new customers, a growth in tourism, and eventually, "development" of a region in

which currently, the nearest McDonald's is still some 50 miles away, and the roads remain

crowded by ox-drawn carts. What impact would "critical language awareness" have on these

language learners? This may be lesson number one, not originating in this study, but certainly

bolstered by it. Create room for learners to question what they are learning and why, and if

students' language abilities are not yet at the point where they can ask these questions in a

language the instructor understands, then find a translator. Better yet, learn the local language.

Pennycook (1994), like Fairclough, promotes a form of "critical language awareness,"

though oddly, without reference to Fairclough. He suggests strategies such as "discursive

interventions," for instance, which help make plain connections between English and other social

domains such as pop culture and Christianity (his examples). For my study, I think again of how

NATO membership resulted in a course I would guess was called something like English for

New NATO Soldiers. Students learning English in *this* domain, like Pennycook's example of Christianity, could only benefit from being invited to question and learn more about the relationship between English and NATO and the implications both have on their lives, especially as military service is compulsory in most of the countries I visited and worked in (and yes, I met NATO soldiers from countries I visited in Afghanistan). And if students do raise questions? I think of Ana's Iraqi scholars resisting writing in the "American" way, and Ana's answers informed by her experiences self-described as a scholar from the periphery. I paraphrase her in much less elegant language than she would use: Would you rather Western scholars come and study you? Don't you want the world to learn from *your* research? Make the connections plain, indeed.

Pennycook also suggests "linguistic action," which creates a space for teaching both "standard" and individual uses of English. Several of my participants quite happily challenged the idea of "standard" English, not wanting to construct English as belonging to the standard of British or American or any other "native speaker's" English. Instead, they enthused over "lingua franca" standard (Seidlhofer, 2005), or simplified forms of international English, or plurilingualism, drawing upon a mix of languages in order to communicate with other people from different language backgrounds. So "standard" is already questioned, and fiercely, and rightfully so, I think. As for "individual uses" of English, these individual uses are already clearly in play. As Eva said laughingly, the English spoken in her community is "a local variety," or as Ana narrated in a footnoted anecdote, "he jumped from the donkey to the horse," an idiom which makes no sense to the "native" speaker of English but which quickly spread amongst a group of (yes, tipsy) L2 English speakers from many different countries relaxing after a long day of learning and working together. English language instructors (and journal editors) can also

create multiple opportunities for learners and scholars to "individualize" their uses of English by opening their assignments and journals up to local conventions and rhetorics, which can shape if not transform in creative ways the conventions of the "international discourse community." If it really were an *international* discourse community, conventions, I believe, would open up wonderfully and to the benefit of all as we learn to read and write in new ways, to take risks, to be true to ourselves and our own appropriation and ownership of the language we write in. And one more comment here: I think of Irena's observation that English takes in "foreign words like a sponge," a phrase which brought to my mind an image of Ellis Island (first, and not the fences erected along the U.S./Mexican border). What if we spent time with our learners of English showing them how "impure" or "rich" it is by exploring many words of foreign origin which are now in common use? How would this project impact especially those learners (and here I think of Mihail, the people of Irena's country, Ana's too) who worry about language (and ethnic) purity?

<div align="center">Other Thoughts On and Lessons Learned From This Study</div>

<div align="center">*Language*</div>

Returning to my own study, *all* participants and discourses reproduced the discourse chain of the necessity of English to the creation of open societies and for international communication, for multiple reasons: in order to access *and* share information and research; in order to ensure a *two-way* exchange of information and learning (I think here again of Ana's description of the Iraqi librarian's research into military information systems, which Ana described as "amazing"); in order to cross-cut identities and create connections among different national and ethnic groups globally; in order for countries to be able to work together to solve problems which affect us all. Here I think of Ecaterina's discussions of the Danube flowing

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through multiple countries, many of which have been in conflict. These same countries must work together to keep the river clean and living, and a common language, according to one impassioned participant, may help them do so. Ironically, even as a TESOL instructor involved in English language aid projects, I walked into this study fully prepared to fall down hard on the side of Phillipson (1992) in the linguistic imperialism debate. Instead, as I listened to my participants and tracked the discourses, I came to realize the value and sheer practical necessity of a common language in a globalized world. I quote Eva again here: "I'd rather accept English because it brings in culture available for everybody, more than any other already materialized form of colonization." Colonization, imperialism, supranational language management: these were and still are realities, I am sure, which perpetuate power structures and the foreign policies of dominant nations. But my participants focused mostly on what it had provided them: opportunities to travel, news about the world, economic capital, a way to flee a country during war.

At the same time, local discourses served up a stern reminder. They showed how English helps, indeed, as discussed in brief above, but they also told us we need linguistic diversity. Local foundations embodied this diversity: I was thrilled to see that multiple OSI/SFN programs and projects which began as *English* language programs and projects quickly branched out to include other languages (at the time of the analysis, I counted 27 different language courses and/or projects connected to OSI/SFN). Local discourses further paid special attention to Less Widely Used Less Taught languages, such as Romany, and two participants discussed that their work, in part, was the preservation of these languages. I was, moreover, awed and humbled that my interview participants spoke anywhere from one to seven languages. The United States, at

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least, would do well to look east (and north and south) for ideas on how to expand its language learning opportunities at all levels of education.

However, while English may be a necessary language of open societies and the language of international communication, a claim which, to my surprise, met no arguments from my research participants, English is by no means the language of all international education projects and can even, as Victoriya, Lauren, Thomas, and Ana reminded us, distract from, undermine, or contribute to a project's failure, especially in regions where L1 English speakers are few and far between. A carefully-conducted needs analysis beforehand—along with the preparation of English project developers and teachers in learning multiple languages or at least the language of the country in which they would work—could forestall such failures.[58]

*Access, Age, Elites, Ownership, Inclusion*

The OSI/SFN ELP discourse discursively limited who has access to ELP (and thus other OSI/SFN projects), thus creating a discourse chain of very subtle *exclusion* through consistent qualification and other discursive constraints. One such constraint was the construction of "youth" and "young" as the targets of ELP, a discursive strategy which emphasized the "citizen pilgrims" of Falk's (1994) global civil society. Such a strategy does not come without a cost, though. By so "en-aging" actors, (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001), the discourse erases and excludes whole generations raised and educated under communism, thus creating a split between "superior" and "inferior" Others (Hansen, 2006). Middle-aged, older, and elderly people are, in turn, discursively denied access in the New York-based ELP discourse to the work of building open societies, simply by not being acknowledged, and by their invisible juxtapositions next to the overly visible youth: the young professionals, the new generations for the new millennium, the Wonder Kids.

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[58] In this regard, I must say, Peace Corps serves as a model, a point I was delighted that Lauren saw in action.

Local discourses *did* create special access to opportunities for the very talented students who had financial need, such as merit-based scholarships to Western countries. But these discourses also *expanded* dramatically on constructions of access, beginning, in turn, a distinct new discourse chain of *inclusion* which takes the OSI/SFN ELP discourse to task. Marginalized identities such as the Roma are addressed and included in these discourses, as are the middle-aged and the elderly, for whom special programs, adult learning, and life-long learning were made available. Participants, too, shared multiple ways they either employed the principles of adult learning in their work or ways they created or took advantage of such opportunities. Klara took part in one English club for adults after another; Thomas was careful to incorporate the principles of adult learning into the curriculum of his projects; teachers at local OSI/SFN schools marveled at the range of ages in their classes and how the students enjoyed them. On the other hand, Victoriya, Karolina, and Irena did express alarm about the "older disenchanted majority" who had not had the opportunity to learn English and may think that it is now too late, or who have felt divided from their English-speaking children, just as age in the OSI/SFN ELP discourse became an implicit and divisive marker of temporal identity. Eva, too, rued that pensioners in her community were being forgotten, though she remained hopeful that one day "third age education" would come. Many of the local written discourses did construct space for adult education, which was a refreshing change after the OSI/SFN emphasis on young professionals, and which may suggest that Eva's hope for third age education would be realized sooner rather than later.

This gap in whom English language aid projects serve serves as another lesson I take to heart in this study, especially after hearing Ana, Eva, and Karolina honor their "old old" teachers who had inspired and taught them so much (even under communism and even during wartime).

My recent project work in Afghanistan, I think, could have benefitted dramatically had it been sanctioned not only by the World Bank and the Ministry of Higher Education, but also by the tribal elders of the local community, who either expected their sons and daughters to achieve top marks, regardless of ability, or who refused them the opportunity to work with Americans (women in particular) as that would have put their children and families in danger. But I also saw UNICEF workers, women from many countries—Tajikistan, Tanzania, Chad—dialoguing with those same elders about creating education opportunities for girls at the primary level, in some cases successfully. And the UNICEF workers told me the elders themselves were interested in learning English. So far it is mostly dialogue, and we hear on the news the horrors of schools being burned down. But the UNICEF workers provide a start, and a discourse chain of much greater *inclusion* may well lead to achievements that are currently unimaginable.

Closely related to access or restriction thereto, strikingly, it was only in the *participants'* discourses that an overt discussion of the creation of an "intellectual elite" began. Karolina raised the possibility of the need for an intellectual elite in her discussion of "sweet" democracy, whereas Elsa and Thomas identified the "creation of elites" as part of the mission of OSI/SFN. Thomas even saw the lack of intellectual elites—whose positions he (and OSI) believed should be merit-based—as a lethal threat to democracy. In the same way, several participants defined OSI/SFN as educating young leaders and scholars in order that they become the future leaders, problem-solvers, and decision-makers (i.e., the elite) in their home countries. As I was mainly interviewing "the elite" themselves, these beliefs were not particularly surprising. As suggested above, however, it is dangerous and age-ist to exclude the middle-aged and elderly from decision-making in any realm.

Victoriya was the only participant to note that the intellectual elite of OSI/SFN was, by default, *English*-speaking, which had serious consequences. For one, it risked dividing generations between English-speaking children and their parents and grandparents who may not have had the opportunity to study English. In Victoriya's case, the creation of an English-speaking elite contributed dramatically to the failure to build capacity locally in particular contexts, which contributed, in turn, to the failures of the local NGO community in her country once OSI/SFN had pulled out. Other participants indirectly brought to light that an "elite"—even a merit-based one—by definition, *excludes* some, be it the elderly, the less talented, or the very, very poor. Magda spoke strenuously about the dream of "equal opportunities" which she believed OSI/SFN and its English language programs and schools were still serving. Eva believed anyone in her community could take an English class at the local Soros school. Local written discourses also constructed "equal opportunities" as central to their missions. Yet these assertions inevitably clash with the idea of "merit," even though the New York-based OSI/SFN ELP discourse sought to remain (though in qualified discourse again) "accessible to all segments of society in as many regions of the country as possible" ("Strategy," 1999).

This clash raised questions which Thomas, I believe, inadvertently answered. He made a point in his interview to emphasize that local foundations had local autonomy and decision-making powers, *unless there was a "broad-scale strategic change"* (italics added). In the New York-based OSI/SFN ELP discourse, English language programs was not officially described as a "broad-scale strategic initiative," but it was designated as "a New York-based network/regional program" ("Strategy," 1999). Given that "network/regional" translates into more than 60 countries, I think it is safe to say that ELP was both "broad-scale" and "strategic." The end result is this: ELP as a "broad-scale" and "strategic" initiative, or as a network/regional program, first

reinforced the discourse chain of supranational language management, which in turn *excluded* local actors to a significant extent from the processes of local autonomy, responsibility, and decision-making, as we saw in Chapter Four. On the other hand, New York-based ELP (1994-2005), through its spread of English and ELT, did prepare in due time multiple local actors to autonomously take responsibility over and ownership of various *other* OSI/SFN projects, the majority of which—if not all—require a good command of English. In short, the OSI/SFN ELP discourse may have excluded just enough people from access to ensure that a structure of merit-based intellectual elites was first in place, people who were and are ready and willing to work for open societies, now that they speak English.

So what other policy and teaching lessons might we take from these insights related to access, age, elites, and ownership? First, the needs (and rights—see Benesch, 2001) of local stakeholders must first be assessed, and local stakeholders must be involved in that assessment and in the project design whenever possible, a point Ana and Jeremy raised in retrospect of their projects. In other words, the sooner local ownership and responsibility of projects are realized, the more respect is shown to local knowledge and context, and, I am confident, the more likely a project is to succeed. When, in Afghanistan, I should have failed fourth year English students by my standards and expectations, I asked the local teachers, who explained what the consequences would be for those students: in most cases, shame on the family, the lack of future opportunities to continue learning, and even more anger at a Westerner's creation of such a problem. I handed the grading over to them, though not without a sick conscience. But I would have felt worse failing them, given what my Afghan colleagues had said, and they later thanked me for respecting their views. It was just not time, they said, to be so harsh, not until the education system has grown stronger. Translated into development terms, this means "not until local

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capacity is built," and local ownership and responsibility are inevitably entwined with local

capacity building. One of Victoriya's stories illustrated this. In her case, English became a

barrier to local capacity building in her human rights work, when Russian or another language in

the "Stans" may have worked better. Thomas, too, shared how the criteria of English for one

project doomed it, a result that could have been forestalled had local stakeholders had more of a

say in the development of the project.

Second, local stakeholders include the young, the middle-aged, the older, *and* the elderly,

and their voices need to be heard. In my interviews, *all* participants, Western and Eastern, young

and older, wanted to be heard. We need to be inclusive in the design, development, execution,

and assessment of English language aid projects, and we need to create space for two-way or

multiple-way exchange of voices, not unlike a multiparty government which apportions

representation in as equal a way as possible. Obviously, programs likewise should be designed

according to different populations, whether they target future presidents or a grandmother who

wants to learn how to use a computer and so become a voice of deliberative democracy in

Habermas' terms (1994), or just be able to email or skype her son and his wife who have

emigrated. If one organization cannot meet the varying demands of the local population of the

project, partnership with other English language aid organizations can prevent overlap and widen

the opportunities. OSI/SFN ELP—in its vast array of projects and purposes, its local foundations,

and with its multiple partner organizations on the ground—seemed well-structured to meet the

different demands of the different populations. But key again, and always: *inclusion* of local

voices, and *adaptation* to local need.

Additionally, inclusion means in the discourses too. I believe more than ever that how we

say or write something matters—what tense, what subject, what object, what voice—and the

OSI/SFN ELP discourse at the text dimension unfortunately did not do service to all actors, other languages, or what English can truly bring to a community, and this had ramifications at the social dimension as well. As participants discussed whether their societies were opening or not, we heard one grim tale after another. English alone cannot provide economic security, cannot provide democratic governance, cannot lead to social and political consciousness, no matter how often it is said. Moreover, English can become a real threat to other languages, which in Ana's words "lose out"; its dominance in the European Union contributes not only to the Othering of other languages (English Open, Russian Closed) but to the Othering of the people who speak those languages, whether or not they had anything to do with their governments' oppressive regimes or totalitarian policies. This came to life when hearing about Russian students in classes with students from countries which had one time been a part of the Soviet Union. Divisions linger still, and while English it seems can be easily detached from culture, Russian clearly cannot. Not yet. Nyet.

## Other Findings

What else? The discourses constructed English as an "avenue of hope," an invitation to foreign investment, an answer to poverty, and the language of democracy. Looking across the region, from Hungary to Tajikistan, 20 years (exactly) from the fall of the Berlin Wall, we see many of these promises as yet unfulfilled. Nor have "democratic" classrooms via English and "modern" English methodology resulted in democratic states, not yet. Participants were mostly discriminating where methodologies were concerned, seeing them less as modern than as "American." There was thus not a whole-sale uncritical acceptance of communicative language teaching. Some participants even noted the problematic outcomes of these methodologies: students less able to write, and students less able to talk about their research in their first

languages. More optimistically, English has, perhaps, helped raise awareness of the importance of having an individual voice, of being able to vote, of the rights of freedom of expression. But certainly not all findings were sunny.

One hypothesis from the beginning of this study was that OSI/SFN sought to foster supranational identities and reduce affiliations with national identities, as a means of fostering larger connections which cross-cut borders and "national arguments." Very little participant evidence supports this hypothesis. The discourse may be trying to re-scale space and hence, re-scale identity, as I have shown, but participants themselves mostly found the idea amusing and posing little to no threat to their identities, whether they were national, local, or religious. Nor did participants see themselves as European yet, with the exception of Bianca when she was in America, in spite of some countries' accession to the EU. At the time of my interviews, accession still seemed practically meaningless, or worse, colonizing, with perhaps the exception of easier travel across the region, more mobility, made easier still by the dominance of English in the EU. All the same, the discourses touted the ideal of the international and the West, though most participants were significantly less swayed by these ideals.

## Conclusion to My Conclusion

I started this project unknowingly as a Peace Corps volunteer just after the fall of communism. I had the profound experiences of working in the stunning region of Transylvania, in a refugee camp where the children delighted in Uno and chess and juggling more than in English, in Serbia where I saw bridges bombed by NATO planes. Many years later, I set off again, for Afghanistan, where dust storms and guns and checkpoints and the Hindu Kush provided the backdrop for another experience working on an English language aid project. *That* summer in particular was a bit traumatic, and enlightening, too, in so many ways.

And my conclusion now?  The more aware I become of the implications of being a

Western L1 speaker of English, the more likely I am to keep a bag packed and my passport at the

ready, for what I have learned from my participants and this study and the literature I have read

and the professors who have taught me and the languages I speak and the conferences I have

attended and the countries I have traveled to is just this: that English language aid projects, now

more than ever, carry a great responsibility globally, and we must take great care in their

development and execution, *especially* as Americans who lost so much global capital under the

policies and actions of the last decade, a point Victoriya reminded us of on several occasions.

And for me, this dissertation has been both a flight through the past and a trip into the future, for

it reminded me again of the incredible rewards I have reaped through my work, the incredible

friendships I have made on these projects, and the vast expanse of what we have yet to learn.

I am not alone. As I write these last paragraphs, on November 9th, 2009, on the 20th

anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, I visit again the OSI/SFN homepage. There I find

multiple images of the wall coming down and Soros chronicling the work of OSI/SFN (2009).

He talks about who has acceded to the European Union and who has not; the "bitter legacy" of

Russia, The Caucasus, Central Asia; societies opening and societies closed. He also includes

reflections of multiple voices: dissidents, journalists, presidents, and playwrights, from Vaclav

Havel to Aryeh Neier. These are the voices of the elites of the region. The articles are in English.

They honor Soros, they worry over expanding divisions between East and West, they recall the

communist days of vodka parties and French cheese and reading a smuggled *Rolling Stone* and

the quality of Soviet toilet paper. They see hope in President Obama and the Orange Revolution

in Ukraine. But, like Bianca, they also attest to how many who have lived under communism

remain uneasy in their identities. Slavenka Drakulic (2009) describes their experiences as

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"prisoners of a collective pronoun," the safety of "we" and the fear of "I." It is such grammar in *any* language which highlights the link between discourse and society, reproduction and transformation, the word and the world.  It is such grammar which highlights the instability of language and knowledge, like the instability of borders, nations, time, and space.

In this dissertation, I have provided a precarious map of the intricate workings of supranational language management, a sketch of the pressures Phillipson (1992) questioned regarding how English is propelled forward, and how it is reproduced, re-scripted, transformed, and resisted. It is an unstable map, but that same instability creates discursive space for change and creativity, as we have seen in the discourses of OSI/SFN ELP programs, projects, participants, and schools. And that open space—discursively, politically—is a good thing, a reason to hope, a place to speak and struggle with meaning, and another reminder of our responsibilities, globally and locally, as participants in English language aid projects.

OSI/SFN is now turning its attentions and projects toward a truly supranational mission, one dedicated to helping emerging democracies across the globe. Its list of regions on its drop-down menu has changed. "Central" and "Eastern" are gone, subsumed into "Europe." There is no Russia, Ukraine, or Belarus.  No doubt the "regions" will continue changing, and no doubt English and ELT will remain a central factor in this process. Hopefully, this study has provided some insights into how we might proceed and to what we should attend.

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COVER LETTER AND INFORMED CONSENT SENT TO PARTICIPANTS

## **Informed Consent Form**

You are invited to participate in this research study. The following information is provided in order to help you to make an informed decision whether or not to participate. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to ask. The purpose of this study is to explore the role of English in creating open societies throughout Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. You may further be asked to share your experiences with the English language programs and projects of the Open Society Institute/Soros Foundations Network, and your views on the role of English in the European Union.

If you agree to participate, I will meet you at your convenience for an interview which will last about an hour. The interview will be audio-recorded and later transcribed. Alternately, interviews may be conducted by email if we cannot arrange to meet. You will have the opportunity to clarify, retract, or have omitted any statement which you are not comfortable sharing. Your identity will remain completely confidential through the use of pseudonyms or initials of your choosing. I will also share with you research findings as they emerge, and you will be invited to review and comment on them. There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this research. The information gained from this study is intended to help make English Language Teaching practice and policy more sensitive and appropriate to local and regional concerns and contexts, and to explore how English as a global language is perceived in different countries.

Your participation in this study is <u>voluntary</u>. You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without adversely affecting your relationship with the investigator. Your decision will not result in any loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  If you choose to participate, you may withdraw at any time by notifying the researcher or project director.  Upon your request to withdraw, all information pertaining to you will be destroyed.  If you choose to participate, all information will be held in strict confidence.  The information obtained in the study may be published in scholarly journals or presented at conferences but your identity will be kept strictly confidential.

If you are willing to participate in this study, please sign the statement below.

| Researcher: | Amy Jo Minett | Project Director: | Dr. Dan Tannacito |
|---|---|---|---|
| | MATC | | Eicher 212 |
| | 211 N. Carroll St. | | |
| | Madison, WI 53703 | | Indiana University of Pennsylvania |
| | USA | | Indiana, PA 15701 |
| | mhbl@iup.edu | | USA |
| | 1-608-259-2923 | | 1-724-357-6944 |

*This project has been approved by the Indiana University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (Phone: 724/357-7730).*

**Voluntary Consent Form for Interview**
**for Study of English Language Teaching and Learning**
**and the Role of English in Building Open Societies**
**(Signature Page)**

I have read and I understand the information on the Informed Consent Form for the study about English Language Teaching and Learning and the Role of English in Building Open Societies.  I understand that my participation in this study is completely voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time.  I understand that my responses in the interview will be kept confidential.

I have received an unsigned copy of this Informed Consent Form to keep in my possession.

Name: (PLEASE PRINT)  _____

Signature:        _____

Date:        _____


**From the Researcher:**
I certify that I have explained to this research participant the nature and purpose of this study.  I have answered any questions that the participant has raised about the study, and I will provide the participant with a debriefing sheet that discusses the ways the participant can follow up if s/he has any questions about the study.  I have witnessed the above signature.

Name:        Amy J. Minett

Signature:        _____

Date:        _____


**This project has been approved by the Indiana University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (Phone: 724-357-7730).**

APPENDIX B:

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THE STUDY


1. I first found your name on the [Blank] webpage, which was linked to the Soros English Language Programs page on [x project page].

Could you talk about your past work [or studies] with [project]: what were its goals and mission? What other projects did it support? How did you get involved with [the project]? What was it like to be a part of this organization? Anything else about your experience with [project] you'd like to share?


2. More generally, could you talk about your experiences as an English language learner and teacher [or other position] in [your country]? Why did you choose to get involved with this project? What have been the bright spots of the project [e.g. being an English teacher?} What have been the particular challenges of your work? Here you could talk about your current work, or previous experiences with OSI/SFN, or both.


3. It has been argued that English is necessary to the building of open societies in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe. Do you agree with this view? Why or why not?

4. How would you define open society? Do you think your country is an "open society"? Why or why not?

5. You mentioned that you attended [e.g.] one session on "open societies." Could you share what you remember about that meeting (its purpose, etc.)?


6. Finally (for now), in your view, what role do you think English might play in the European Union? In your country's accession to the EU? Any other thoughts on this topic?


Thank you in advance for your answers. I will email with follow-up questions.

INFUSION OF ENGLISH AND ELT INTO MULTIPLE OSI/SFN PROJECTS AND PEOPLE

| Country & Foundation | ELP in Support of Other Soros Foundations Projects |
|---|---|
| SF-Tajikistan ("UN-Tajikistan," 1998) | • Teacher Training<br>• Trainer Training<br>• Textbook Development<br>• Curriculum Development<br>• English Language Educational NGOs<br>• English in Support of Debate |
| OSI-Yugoslavia (1994, 1998) | • English for Art Marketing/Management<br>• English for NGOs<br>• English in Support of Debate<br>• English for Journalists<br>• English for Visual Artists<br>• Business English<br>• ESL/EFL Teacher Training Seminars<br>• English Language Teachers Association<br>• Internet and Email in ESL/EFL Teaching<br>• Listserv for Teachers of English<br>• Other ESP Courses such as English for Medics, English for Librarians, and English for Roma<br>• Soros Professional English Language Teaching<br>• ELP programs for Albanian and Serbian Physicians and Nurses from Pristina |
| OSI-Macedonia (1996-1998) | • English Courses for Roma Children and Adolescents<br>• English for Journalists (Media)<br>• English for Public Attorneys<br>• Business English for Managers of Loss Making Enterprises<br>• English for Judges |
| OSF-Lithuania (1997) | • Lithuanian-English theatre magazine<br>• Lithuanian-English textbooks (including Nutrition and Your Health; Alcohol and Other Drugs; Smoking; Introduction to Human Sexuality; AIDS; Environment; and Our Global Community) |

| Country & Foundation | ELP in Support of Other Soros Foundations Projects |
| --- | --- |
| SF-Moldova (1996-1998) | • English Language Scholarships for Lawyers<br>• English Language Scholarships for Journalists<br>• English for Fine-Arts Artists<br>• English for Artists<br>• English for Librarians<br>• Effective Communication in an Administrative English-Speaking Academic Environment |
| Mongolian Foundation for Open Society (1999-2003) | • English for Interpreters<br>• English for Business<br>• English for Economics<br>• English for Banking<br>• English for Finance<br>• English for Veterinary Medicine<br>• English for Medicine<br>• General English<br>• Scientific English<br>• Technical English |
| Soros Educational Center-Romania (1996-1998) | • English for Labor Force Working in Hotels and Restaurants in Rural Harghita County |
| OSI-Samara, Russia (2000) | • ESP Teacher Training in Megaproject Education including English for Economics, Sociology, Culture Studies, History, Philosophy, Political Science, and International Relations<br>• Distance Learning in ELT<br>• Creation of an ESP website |
| OSF-Slovakia (2003) | • English for Doctors |
| Ukraine (Burdina, 2000) | • Business English for Students of International Economic Relations |
| OSI-Croatia (1999) | • "Wide Range of ESP courses [unspecified]"<br>• Creation of ESP materials<br>• Support for HUPE (English Language Teachers Association)<br>• English for Interpreters/Translators |

APPENDIX D:

## A DISCOURSE CHAIN OF LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY

| Country | Languages and Language Programs Now Available | Country | Languages and Language Programs Now Available |
|---------|----------------------------------------------|---------|----------------------------------------------|
| Moldova (1997) | English<br>French<br>Romanian<br>Romanian as a Foreign Language | Romania EuroEd (2008) | Bulgarian<br>Dutch<br>English<br>Estonian<br>Colloquial Estonian<br>French |
| Moldova (1998) | English<br>French<br>German<br>Spanish | | German<br>Greek<br>Hungarian<br>Italian<br>Lithuanian |
| Lithuania (1998) | Debate Programs:<br>English<br>Lithuanian<br>Polish<br>Russian | | Maltese<br>Romanian<br>Romany<br>Slovenian<br>Spanish |
| Kyrgyzstan (1998) | English<br>Kyrgyz<br>Russian for Foreigners | Romanian Soros Educational Center (2006) | English<br>French<br>German<br>Hungarian<br>Italian<br>Romanian |
| Tajikistan (UN,1998) | English<br>Italian<br>Russian | IH-Kyiv (2007) | English<br>German<br>Russian<br>Ukrainian |
| Bosnia Herzegovina Foreign Language (1995) | Financial support for language textbooks:<br>French<br>German | IH-Lviv (2008) | English<br>General Russian<br>General Ukrainian |
| | | IH-Kharkiv (2009) | English<br>French<br>German<br>Russian |

| Country | Languages and Language Programs Now Available | Country | Languages and Language Programs Now Available |
|---------|----------------------------------------------|---------|----------------------------------------------|
| Bosnia Syllabus School (2008) | Bosnian<br>English<br>French<br>German<br>Italian | SIH-Vilnius (2007) | English<br>Estonian<br>Greek<br>Lithuanian<br>Polish<br>Swedish |
| Kosovo (1998) (Soros Yugoslavia) | Albanian<br>English<br>Serbian | Macedonia (1996) | English<br>Romany |
| Yugoslavia (1998) | Albanian ("Publishing in Minority Languages Project")<br>English<br>Romany | | |
| Mongolia (2001) | English<br>Mongolian<br>Russian | | |
| Hungary (Center, 2006) | English (Academic Writing)<br>French<br>German<br>Hungarian<br>Other (Academic Writing via outreach in unspecified local languages) | | |
| IH-Tallinn, Estonia (2007) | Dutch<br>English<br>Estonian<br>Hungarian<br>Latvian<br>Lithuanian<br>Maltese<br>Slovenian | | |

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