12-21-2009

Police Crime: A Newsmaking Criminology Study of Sworn Law Enforcement Officers Arrested, 2005-2007

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POLICE CRIME: A NEWSMAKING CRIMINOLOGY STUDY OF SWORN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ARRESTED, 2005-2007

A Dissertation

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies and Research

in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

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December, 2009

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Title: Police Crime: A Newsmaking Criminology Study of Sworn Law Enforcement Officers Arrested, 2005-2007

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This study, conceptualized as newsmaking criminology, is an exploration of police crime in the United States, as measured by arrests of sworn law enforcement officers with general powers of arrest employed by nonfederal law enforcement agencies. Data were collected from published news reports primarily using the Google News search engine. This analysis includes data on 2,119 cases involving 1,746 sworn law enforcement officers employed by 1,047 state and local (nonfederal) law enforcement agencies representing all 50 states and the District of Columbia who were arrested for committing one or more criminal offenses during the period of January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2007. The findings of this study show that police crime occurs in nonmetropolitan, urban, suburban, and rural communities, and affects officers employed by primary state police agencies, sheriff's departments, county police departments, municipal police departments, and special police departments (e.g., university/college police departments, park police departments, etc.). It involves officers at all ages and years of service levels (from entry level rookies to those officers in the sunset of their careers, and at all periods in between), at all ranks within law enforcement agencies, off duty and on duty, and against victims known and unknown to the arrested officers, and against victims of all ages. Both the typology of police crime and Ross' taxonomy of

police crime provide useful conceptualizations to examine and reliably predict factors relating to arrests of sworn law enforcement officers. Police crime is multidimensional and involves crimes against the citizenry, internal crimes against the organization, official capacity and individual capacity crime, economically-motivated crime, violent crime, sex-related crime, drug-related crime, and alcohol-related crime.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people who I am indebted to for their support as I have wrestled with my dissertation over the past several years. First and foremost, I am grateful to my son, Matthew Stinson, and my parents, Richard and Anne Stinson, for putting up with me over the past four years. I am well aware of the sacrifices made by members of my family so that I could achieve my goals, and I love them very much. I would also like to thank each of the members of my committee for their willingness to work with me on this research study for the past several years: Daniel R. Lee, Ph.D. (my chair), David L. Myers, Ph.D., Dennis Giever, Ph.D., and R. Paul McCauley, Ph.D. Several other individuals at Indiana University of Pennsylvania have also been very gracious in their support of me during the past several years, including Rosemary Gido, Ph.D., Dottie Hillard, Karen Lemasters, Josh Muscatello, Theo Turner, Jason Spraitz, Jeni Huck, and James Bowers. Another group of individuals to whom I owe thanks are people who have been sounding boards each helping to guide the focus of some aspect of my research, including Willard Oliver, Ph.D., Sam Houston State University, Brian K. Payne, Ph.D., Georgia State University, Jeffrey Ian Ross, Ph.D., University of Baltimore, Dian Williams, Ph.D., West Chester University of Pennsylvania, and John Liederbach, Ph.D., Bowling Green State University. Finally, there are several friends without whose support and willingness to accept my middle of the night phone calls on many occasions would have led to my complete disintegration, including Mari Pierce, Ph.D., Western Oregon University, Alison Burke, Ph.D., Southern Oregon University, and Tina Freiburger, Ph.D., University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Very little is known about the crimes committed by police officers in the United States, even though indications are that, on average, more than one police officer is arrested every day in this country (see pilot study findings below in Chapter III). More alarming is that many more police officers commit crimes – serious crimes that could send anyone else to prison – for which they are rarely prosecuted, let alone disciplined administratively by the law enforcement agency that employs them (Deutsch, 1955, p. 40). This is because (1) the police are, to a large extent, exempt from law enforcement and the long arm of the criminal law (Reiss, 1971a), and (2) crime, in a very real sense, is ultimately caused by the criminal law (Chambliss, 2004, p. 250; Sutherland, 1939, p. 5). Although the federal government is now required to acquire data about the use of excessive force by law enforcement officers (see "Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act," 1994), no statistics are available about the nature, prevalence, and incidence of crime committed by sworn law enforcement officers (Barak, 1995a). The absence of reliable data impairs the ability of the public and policymakers alike from being able to judge the extent and degree of police crime and also mitigates the ability to make comparisons of crime committed by sworn law enforcement officers and crime that is committed by other populations of criminals (Ross, 2001, p. 180).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the instant study is to explore the nature, prevalence and incidence of police crime – that is, that crime committed by sworn law enforcement officers who

are employed by federal, state, county, municipal and/or special law enforcement agencies and have general powers of arrest at the time that the crime(s) charged was committed – within the United States. A secondary purpose of this study is to explore the propriety of using the internet-based Google News™ search engine and its Google News Alerts™ automated search tool to conduct criminological quantitative content analyses.

Theoretical Perspective

Researchers make use of theory to make predictions about expected results and to explain relationships about variables in quantitative studies (Creswell, 2009). The theoretical perspective for this research study is fourfold.

First, theories relating to the subculture of police deviance are closely aligned with police crime. Subculture theories provide rationale and attempt to explain factors that might cause a police officer to commit a crime for which he or she might be arrested. For example, Westley (1956) and Stoddard (1968) posited that there is an informal code in policing that dictates how many sworn law enforcement officers behave in their dealings with each other. Building on the work of Key (1935), Westley (1956) argued that there is an informal code of secrecy within police departments. Stoddard (1968) expanded this theoretical conceptualization by arguing that police recruits are socialized into an unlawful and informal code of secrecy that perpetuates as a process of group deviation into on-duty illegal behaviors. Similarly, Niederhoffer (1967) described a police subculture of cynicism where young police officers quickly replace what they have learned in the police academy with the realities of police, resulting in anomie when the original values of the social system are replaced with a new code of cynicism. Others have argued that Sykes and Matza's (1957) various techniques of neutralization serve

within the police subculture as justifications for police crime (Foster, 1966; Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1998).

Next, Black's (1976) behavior of law theory (also referred to as Black's theory of law) helps to explain why some sworn law enforcement officers are arrested for their crimes while other sworn law enforcement officers are not arrested. Black's theory is also beneficial in making predictions about expected results in this research study. Behavior of law theory posits that law is governmental social control and a quantitative variable for which it is possible to formulate propositions that explain the quantity and style of law in every setting. Each of the theory's propositions state a relationship between law and one or more aspects of social life – stratification, morphology, culture, organization, and social control – that explains the behavior of law in all situations, places, times, and societies (p. 6). For example, one of the theory's propositions relating to stratification and the behavior of law is that "law varies directly with rank" (p. 17). Thus, when applying behavior of law theory to police crime one can predict, when all else is equal (i.e., controlling for age and years of experience as a sworn law enforcement officer), that a patrol officer is more likely to be arrested for a crime than is a police chief.

Third, police crime is conceptualized in this study as hidden, or invisible, crime. Invisible crimes are those categories of crime that are not recorded in official crime statistics promulgated by the government (Jupp, 2006). The features of police crime that make it invisible crime (see Jupp, Davies, & Francis, 1999) within this theoretical perspective include: a lack of knowledge of police crime; a lack of statistics on police crime; a lack of research on police crime; no control of police crime; a lack of any political agenda for police crime; and, no moral panic about police crime.

Finally, this research study is conducted within the perspective of newsmaking criminology. Barak (2006) defines newsmaking criminology as the "processes whereby criminologists use mass communications for the purpose of interpreting, informing and altering the images of crime and justice, crime and punishment, and criminals and victims" (p. 268). According to Barak (2007), newsmaking criminology "refers to the conscious efforts and activities of criminologists to interpret, influence or shape the representation of 'newsworthy' items about crime and justice" (pp. 191-192). Generally speaking, there are two paradigms of newsmaking criminology. One paradigm of newsmaking criminology is concerned with empirical research that analyzes news/media messages in pursuit of knowledge about some aspect of crime and justice and/or media coverage of crime-related issues. A second paradigm of newsmaking criminology focuses on criminologists' manipulation of public discourse by becoming part of the newsmaking process. This research falls within the research paradigm of newsmaking criminology and not within the newsmaking paradigm of newsmaking criminology.

Conceptual Perspective

After a lengthy review of the literature (in the pages that follow) and in conducting the pilot study analysis (discussed in Chapter III below), it is readily apparent that this research study should be conceptualized in two alternative paradigms. The first is Ross' (2001) taxonomy of police crime, which states that "police crime is multi-dimensional and directional, representing ranges that can differ in opportunity-ratios, necessary conditions, potency, stability, values, and other basic demands" (p. 184). The taxonomy also states that four bipolar distinctions of police criminality can be made. The first distinction is "between violent and nonviolent actions" (p. 184). The second

distinction is "between economically motivated and non-economically motivated police behavior" (p. 184). The third distinction is "between police crime committed by individual law enforcement officers while performing their duty and those by the police organization itself against the citizenry of potential opposition" (p. 184). And finally, the fourth distinction of the taxonomy is "between crimes committed by police officers against the police organization versus crimes committed by the organization against law enforcement officers" (p. 184). Although Ross treats crimes committed by a police officer in their official capacity as a component of internal crimes, herein it is dichotomized as a fifth distinction in the taxonomy: between police crimes committed by individual law enforcement officers in their official capacity as a sworn law enforcement officer and those committed by an officer in their individual capacity as a private citizen.

The second conceptual perspective for this research is a typology of police crime. Nearly all criminal offenses for which sworn law enforcement officers were arrested in cases included in the 2005-2006 pilot study data fall into one or more of four categories: drug- and alcohol-related police crime; sex-related police crime; violence-related police crime; and profit-motivated police crime.[1] As with the bipolar distinctions of police crime in Ross' (2001) taxonomy, the categories in this typology of police crime are not mutually exclusive of each other.

Definition of Terms

Arrest – For the purposes of this research study, an arrest is the formal initiation of criminal charges in a state or federal court of competent jurisdiction against an individual accused, with probable cause and under oath, of behavior in violation of the criminal law.

Crime – Officially, and for purposes of the instant research study, crime is only behavior that is in violation of the criminal law (Williams, 1999, p. 85). Persons who commit crime are subject to, at the discretion of the state, physical arrest, prosecution, and, upon a finding of guilt, the imposition of punishment, including, among others, potential judicial imposition of sanctions of incarceration, fines, and/or restitution.

Drugs – For the purposes of this research study, drugs are any illicit narcotic or nonnarcotic substance – including, but not limited to, those controlled substances regulated by federal law (see "Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, as amended,") – ingested for the purpose of experiencing either (1) the psychoactive effects of the substance and/or (2) the nonprescribed therapeutic effects of the substance (Carter, 1990a, p. 85). In the context of this definition, illicit means that "possession of the substance is unlawful, or, in the case of prescription drugs, the prescription was obtained or used fraudulently" (p. 85).

Invisible Crime – Also sometimes referred to as hidden crime, invisible crime are those categories of crime that are not recorded in official crime statistics promulgated by the government (Jupp, 2006; Jupp et al., 1999).

Newsmaking Criminology – The concept of newsmaking criminology refers to the practices of criminologists to make use of mass communications, including information reported in the news media, to interpret, shape, and inform public discourse, policymakers, scholars, and others – on matters relating to crime, criminal justice, criminals, punishment, and victims – by a variety of means and methods, including social/criminological research (Barak, 1988, 1995a, 2006, 2007).

Police Corruption – Organized deviance by police officers falls under the umbrellas of deviant behaviors considered to be police corruption. There are numerous types of police corruption, including corruption of authority, kickbacks, opportunistic theft, shakedowns, protection of these illegal activities, the fix, direct criminal activities, and internal payoffs (Roebuck & Barker, 1974, pp. 428-434). Not all acts of police corruption are illegal (i.e., crimes), in that numerous types of corrupt activities engaged in by police officers are acts committed in violation of recognized norms within the law enforcement community, and barred by departmental policies, rules, and standard operating procedures (that may subject police officers who violate these standards to administrative discipline and/or adverse employment action), but are not acts committed in violation of criminal statutes subject to criminal arrest, prosecution, and punishment.

Police Crime – Crime committed by sworn law enforcement officer(s) who, by virtue of their employment, are empowered with the general powers of arrest pursuant to their statutory authority, are police crimes (subject to the parameters of conceptualization herein).

Police Deviance – The term police deviance includes those behaviors by sworn law enforcement officers in the areas of (a) occupational deviance (i.e., acts, both criminal and noncriminal, of police corruption and/or police misconduct committed while on-duty and/or under the guise of police authority) and (b) abuse of authority (e.g., physical abuse [including police brutality], verbal abuse [including harassment], and legal abuse [including civil rights violations]) (Barker & Carter, 1994b, pp. 6-9).

Police Misconduct – Police misconduct involves those behaviors by sworn law enforcement officers that are violations of administrative policies, rules, and/or standard

operating procedures promulgated internally by the public agency employing the officer(s) that are typically investigated, sanctioned, and/or disciplined administratively (Punch, 2000, pp. 302-302).[2]

Police Officer – A police officer is defined as, for the purposes of this research study, a sworn law enforcement officer (see definition below) who is employed in that capacity on either a full-time or part-time basis by a public agency within the United States.

Police Sexual Violence – Police sexual violence refers to those situations where a female "experiences a sexually degrading, humiliating, violating, damaging, or threatening act committed by a police officer through the use of force or police authority" (Kraska & Kappeler, 1995, p. 93).

Police Violence – Behavior by any police officer – acting pursuant to their authority and/or power as a sworn law enforcement officer – that includes any use of physical force (including, but not limited to, the application of deadly force), whether justified or unjustified, against any person (Sherman, 1980, p. 69).

Sworn Law Enforcement Officer – A sworn law enforcement officer is a peace officer with general powers of arrest who is employed by a public agency within the United States that is in one of the following categories: federal law enforcement agency, primary state police agency, sheriff's department, general purpose county police department, general purpose municipal police department (e.g., city, town, or township), special police department (e.g., university, park, natural resources, or marine), constable, tribal police department, or regional police department.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundation for the research conducted herein. Although a great deal has been written about police corruption, the body of literature on police crime is limited. In the sections that follow, police crime is defined in the context of the literature, conceptualized as a taxonomy, discussed in the context of measurement, and operationalized in categories of drug- and alcohol-related police crime, sex-related police crime, violence-related police crime, and profit-motivated police crime. In the second half of the literature review, the theoretical framework of police crime is discussed in four areas. They are: the subculture of police deviance, behavior of law theory, police crime as invisible/hidden crime, and newsmaking criminology.

Identifying, Describing & Measuring Police Crime

Very little is known about the nature and prevalence of police crime in the United States. No statistics are maintained by the government, and rarely is the subject of crime committed by police officers the subject of empirical research. Even when the subject is broached by scholars, politicians, and members of the media alike, it is often coached in the vagueness of terms such as corruption and misconduct. For these reasons, it is important to conceptualize and operationalize police crime with specificity. That is done in the pages that follow.

Defining Police Crime

The Relationship between Police Crime, Corruption and Misconduct

There are a variety of criminal or deviant behaviors that can be committed by police officers. Wilson (1963) defined police criminality as "illegally using public office

for private gain without the inducement of a bribe," whereas he defined police corruption as accepting bribes (p. 190). He differentiated both police crime and police corruption from police brutality, which was defined as "mistreating civilians or otherwise infringing their civil liberties" (p. 190).[3] In delineating the differences between the various forms of police deviance – police corruption, police misconduct, and police crime – Punch noted that police crimes "are crimes committed by criminals in uniform" (Punch, 2000, p. 305). Police corruption is an "illegal use of organizational power for personal gain" (Sherman, 1978, p. 30) and, as Wilson noted, involves an exchange relationship – typically money or gifts – and an agreement to do or not to do something with an "external corrupter" (Punch, 2000, p. 302). Police misconduct involves violations of administrative rules, procedures, and/or policies of an officer's employing law enforcement agency that are typically investigated, sanctioned, and/or disciplined internally (pp. 302-303).

Police crime, police corruption, and police misconduct are not mutually exclusive categories (Fyfe & Kane, 2006); some police corruption is also police crime (if the offenses are committed in violation of a criminal statute) and some police misconduct is, likewise, police crime. By definition, all police crime likely constitutes police misconduct. Conversely, not all crime committed by police officers can be defined as corruption (i.e., those crimes committed by the police "that do not in some way involve the misuse of authority") (Fishman, 1978, p. 9). The operative distinction in categorizing the various forms of police deviance is that all police crime violates criminal statutes and is subject to criminal prosecution, but not all acts of police corruption and/or police misconduct violate a criminal law (Wilson, 1963). Sherman (1978, p. 3, n. 2) treated this as a distinction without a difference, because his research interest is in the vein of

considering police corruption as organizational deviance. Most scholars of police crime, however, consider characteristics of and variation among individual offenders who are employed as sworn law enforcement officers at the time of commission of their criminal offense(s) (see, e.g., Fyfe & Kane, 2006; Ross, 2000). Often scholars write of "police deviance," as there has seemingly been great reluctance among policymakers, law enforcement practitioners, and researchers to embrace, let alone use, the term "police crime" (Ross, 2001). The mere fact that scholars, policymakers, and others commonly define such behavior as corruption, and not crime, is in itself symbolic of the reluctance to deal with the problem of police crime (Reiss, 1978). All of this is complicated in that "the definition of corruption has changed over time to include more types of official and private conduct" (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. xiv).

Police Crime as the Product of a Secret Occupational Subculture

Foster (1966) studied police crime from his perspective in the academic discipline of public administration. As such, his interest was not in the details of the crimes themselves, but rather, in the response of the bureaucracy – specifically, the response of high level public administrators in Denver in the context of crisis management – to police crime. Foster was not concerned with what he viewed as petty graft and political corruption, because he discounted those practices as business-as-usual (Foster, 1966, p. 169). As a scholar of public administration, Foster's view of police crime was conceptualized to serve his own purpose: "it exists largely outside the control and participation of administrators and command officers who, in general, oppose it" (p. 170). Given this biased perspective, he defined police crime as follows:

> Police crime is voluntary, conscious, innovative and avowedly criminal activity among sworn police officers, which depends upon occupational codes, not on political influence, for protection and is largely confined to small groups at the technical or working level within the structure of the police sub-society itself. (Foster, 1966, p. 170)

Foster perceived police crime to be crime committed in the context of a group, and that those groups were largely confined to small groups of patrol officers, working together (as burglars, in the case of the Denver police officers in Foster's research), who adhered to a code of secrecy that was strictly enforced within its membership (in the manner described by Westley, 1953, 1956).

Blue-Coat Crime

Building on Foster's (1966) definition of police crime, Stoddard also defined police crime, which he referred to as "blue-coat crime," as police group deviancy perpetuated by an informal code of accepted (often criminal) conduct practiced by members of the group of police officers in secrecy (Stoddard, 1968). Stoddard defined various types of police crime in the context of defining the various practices composing the informal code of blue-coat crime, listed from least serious (some of which may not constitute violations of criminal law) to most serious in rank order: mooching, chiseling, favoritism, prejudice, shopping, extortion, bribery, shakedown, perjury, and premeditated theft (Stoddard, 1968, p. 205).

Excluded from Stoddard's definition of police crime are crimes of violence committed by the police (Ross, 2001). Although Stoddard did mention "the use of 'illegal' violence by policeman," the parenthetical bracketing of the word "illegal" is

quite telling and written with deliberation and purpose to negate the seriousness of what he acknowledged are "practices of questionable legality" (Stoddard, 1968, p. 203). Stoddard legitimized police violence (albeit, felony crimes) on grounds of necessary and justified social control and, as such, does not recognize police crimes of violence as police crime (see also, e.g., Westley, 1953, p. 41, 1970, pp. 120-138; Wilson, 1963, p. 209 for discussion of the justifications of police violence). To that end, Stoddard was contemptuous of then-recent decisions of the US Supreme Court in civil rights cases that resulted in the prohibition of certain police practices that the Court held to be violative of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution (see, e.g., Stoddard, 1968, pp. 202-203, n. 16).

Police Crime as Power: A Marxist Perspective

Box (1983) defined police crime from a criminological perspective of Marxist sociology as "law violations by police in their official capacity as police officers" (p. 81). From this perspective, "Marxian tradition in sociological theory" is drawn upon "to explicate the dimensions of crime and its control that revolve around class, power and state" (Sheptycki, 2006, p. 242). As such, Box argued that the only people who have directly experienced exposure to police crime are those people who are relatively powerless in society, typically poor and/or minorities. This "ugly face" of the police is concealed from the majority of citizens through a carefully orchestrated process of projecting an idealized law-and-order image for the police that "also mystifies the extent and nature of police crime against particular segments of the public" (Box, 1983, p. 80). Through a process of mystification, the existence of police crime is not denied, but rather,

police crime is justified as "bending the rules" within the context of police work in order to achieve the goals of law enforcement and the criminal justice system (pp. 80-81).[4]

Police Crime as Occupational Crime

Occupational crime is defined as "crime committed by persons during the performance of their legitimate occupation" (Davis, 2002, p. 183). Police crime as occupational crime is crime committed by a sworn law enforcement officer "during the course of normal work activities" (Barker, 1978, p. 265) or "committed under the guise of the police officer's authority" (Barker & Carter, 1994b, p. 6; see also Ross, 2001). These are primarily acts of corruption by police officers (Friedrichs, 2004). The opportunity structure and socialization practices within law enforcement agencies often result in tolerance for and acceptance of occupational crimes that are police crime (Barker, 1977).

Police Crime as Political Crime & State Crime

Political crimes are those "crimes that undermine or otherwise threaten the authority or stability of a government" (Davis, 2002, p. 199). Ross (2001, 2003) argued that, by definition, crime committed by sworn law enforcement officers (i.e., police crime) are political crimes, because the police are agents of the government. It is likely more accurate, however, to limit those police crimes that also constitute police corruption as being political crime (Ross, 2003). It is often difficult to distinguish between police crime that is state-organized crime (e.g., those police crimes involving abuse of power by sworn law enforcement officers) and police crime that is occupational crime (e.g., those police crimes involving corruption). The difficulty is that "it is not always possible to

differentiate between organizational and personal motivations or objectives" in instances of police crime (Friedrichs, 2004, p. 133).

Closely related to political crime is state-organized crime. Chambliss (1989) defined the concept of state-organized crime as those "acts defined by law as criminal and committed by state officials in the pursuit of their jobs as representatives of the state" (p. 184). Chambliss specifically excluded from the definition of state-organized crime those "criminal acts that benefit only individual officeholders, such as the acceptance of bribes or the illegal use of violence by the police against individuals, unless such acts violate existing criminal law and are official policy" (p. 184). Here, too, it is often difficult to differentiate between individual and organizational benefit when attempting to categorize crime committed by government employees, including that committed by sworn law enforcement officers (Friedrichs, 2004). Although it may be a matter of semantics, there is a reluctance among many criminologists to embrace conceptual issues relating to the study of state crime (Ross & Rothe, 2007). That should not, however, serve to marginalize its relevance to, and defining of, police crime.

Setting the Perimeters: Determining when Crime by Police is Police Crime

Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert (1998, pp. 20-21) argued that not all crime committed by police officers can be classified as police crime, and suggested that "the factor which distinguishes police crime is the commission of the crime while on the job or by using some aspect of the occupational position to carry out the illegality" (see also Sherman, 1978, pp. 30-31). To illustrate their point, Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert offered four "examples where police engaged in criminal activity that had little to do with their employment" as sworn law enforcement officers:

▪ A Fairfax, Virginia police officer, Jeffrey Hand, a 23-year veteran on the force, was charged with robbery. He was charged with forcibly taking $71,782 from a bank. [*USA Today*, 6/6/97, p.10A]

▪ A Carlisle, Kentucky police officer, Daryl McFarland, was convicted of several burglaries. The charges stemmed from the burglary of a Foodtown grocery store and a car wash. Officials claimed that the officer acted as a lookout for others who stole $300 in change from the store. [*Carlisle Mercury*, 8/20/92, p. 1]

▪ A Glendale, California police officer, Victor Felix,[5] broke into his ex-wife's residence. He shot and killed her and her boyfriend in front of the woman's three children. The officer later killed himself. [*USA Today*, 5/14/91, p. 4A]

▪ A Broward County, Florida sheriff's deputy was charged with aiding his wife in prostitution.[6] [*USA Today*, 7/31/91, p. 3A] (as cited by Kappeler et al., 1998, pp. 20-21)

Contrary to the presentation of Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert, these cases should be considered examples of police crime, because in each case the criminal conduct by the officers arrested arose out of their specialized law enforcement training, skills, and knowledge. The mere fact that the officers cited above were each, perhaps, off-duty at the time of commission of their crimes should not negate the fact that their offenses, for other reasons, constitute police crime. As Fyfe and Kane (2006, p. 22) noted, "it is very difficult in practice to draw a bright line that clearly delineates police crime." The Mollen Commission, for example, reported the following:

> [Several officers] had off-duty, civilian connections, most of whom were personal friends and neighbors. They sold them the drugs they stole while on-duty in New

> York City for distribution in the localities where they resided. In fact, the arrests of these officers resulted from their involvement in a drug ring in Suffolk County rather than their criminal activities while on police duty in Brooklyn. (Mollen Commission, 1994, p. 34)

In discussing off-duty robberies committed by New York City police officers, the Mollen Commission noted that in each case they reviewed, "the knowledge, gun, and badge that comes with being a police officer facilitated their crimes" (p. 30). Those factors may be more important in terms of analyzing police crime than trying to differentiate between police crime and crime that happens to be committed by police officers (see Fyfe & Kane, 2006, pp. 13-14, 52).

Conceptualizing a Taxonomy of Police Crime

A greater problem than poorly defined notions of police crime and a reluctance of policymakers, scholars, and others to embrace the terminology is a general failure of scholars to conceptualize police crime in any way that could enable methodologically rigorous empirical research into the problem (Ross, 2001). Theory development in this area has been lacking, in great part, because of a lack of meaningful research into police crime (Box, 1983; Ross, 2001). Likewise, the concept of police crime has been regarded as "theoretically unmanageable" by scholars because of the wide variety of acts that could constitute police crime, depending on how the term – and phenomenon – is defined, conceptualized, and/or operationalized in research (p. 179).

Ross' Taxonomy of Police Crime

Ross (2001) developed a taxonomy to assist researchers and to better conceptualize police crime in a way that could lead to developing relevant public policy

reforms through empirical research. Ross' purpose in promulgating his taxonomy of police crime was to facilitate social research; however, to date no published research has been theoretically grounded in this taxonomy (Personal communication with J.I. Ross, May 23, 2008). His taxonomy of police crime is:

> Police criminality is multi-dimensional and directional, representing ranges that can differ in opportunity-ratios, necessary conditions, potency, stability, values and other basic demands, That being said, roughly four bipolar distinctions of police criminality can be made:
>
> ▪ The first is between violent and nonviolent actions.
>
> ▪ The second is between economically motivated and non-economically motivated police behavior.
>
> ▪ The third is between police crime committed by individual law enforcement officers while performing their duty and those by the police organization itself against the citizenry or potential opposition.
>
> ▪ And finally between crimes committed by police officers against the police organization versus crimes committed by the organization against law enforcement officers. (Ross, 2001, p. 184)

Ross noted that this taxonomy, as with any scientific taxonomy, "also needs to be sufficiently flexible so as to include changes over time and to be appropriately sensitive to the effects of inclusivity-exclusivity" (p. 179).

Violent police crime. A great deal of scholarly research on police violence has been conducted and written about in the past century (see discussion below). Included within the terms generally considered to fall within the umbrella of police violence

studied are police coercion, police violence, police abuse, police brutality, police use of extra-legal and/or excessive force, police torture, death squad activities, deaths in police custody, police riots, and police use of deadly force (Ross, 2001, pp. 184-190). It is sometimes difficult to differentiate between "legitimate and illegitimate police violence and legal versus illegal police violence" (p. 191).

Nonviolent police crime. Nonviolent police crimes include violations of civil legal procedure and police corruption (Ross, 2001, pp. 190-191). Included within those offenses that are violations of civil procedure are certain warrantless searches and evidentiary procedures that are unconstitutional – typically under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and actionable civilly, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 ("Civil Rights Act of 1871, as amended,"), or criminally, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §242 ("Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law,") – as well as, for example, planting contraband, obtaining evidence illegally, coercing witnesses, lying under oath, and falsifying affidavits in support of search warrants (pp. 190-191). Police corruption is, typically, both nonviolent and economically motivated. For the purposes of this taxonomy, Ross sees no distinction between corruption that is criminal in nature and corruption that is noncriminal in nature because all corruption is illegal (p. 192). In that regard, Ross' view of police corruption varied from that of other scholars, such as Roebuck and Barker (1974), who included in their definition of police corruption those behaviors that transgress normative structures, including violations of departmental policies, rules, and standard operating procedures, as well as violations of criminal laws (Roebuck & Barker, 1974, p. 424).

Economic versus noneconomic distinctions in police crime. As discussed above, police corruption is typically found to be economically motivated. Not all police crime,

however, is economically motivated. The distinction of whether an act of police crime is motivated economically or by some other reward is a distinction drawn on a case-by-case basis and should be fact-driven (Ross, 2001, p. 192).

Individual versus organizational police crime. Ross (2001) drew a distinction between individual police crime and organizational police crime. Individual police crimes are criminal acts routinely committed in pursuit of everyday goals, serve the selfish needs of individual officers, and include many of the crimes discussed above (i.e., virtually all types of criminal offenses in the course of a police officer's work: acts of corruption, assault and other crimes of violence, and theft) (p. 192). Ross excluded from individual police crime those crimes committed by sworn law enforcement officers who are off-duty at the time the offense was committed "(e.g., wife abuse, homicide, etc.)" (p. 192). It would be a mistake, however, to exclude these off-duty crimes committed by police officers from a taxonomical definition of individual police crime.[7] Whereas individual police crime serves the selfish interests of individual sworn law enforcement officers, some police crime is committed for the primary purpose of furthering/serving the organizational needs – i.e., police crimes that are mission-driven in pursuit of otherwise legitimate law enforcement purposes – of the law enforcement agency. Included in the category of organizational police crime are instances when a law enforcement agency (and not an individual acting in their official capacity on behalf of the agency) is held responsible for federal civil rights violations (Reiss, 1983; Ross, 2001).

Internal crimes by individual law enforcement officers versus internal crimes by the organization. Internal crimes are those crimes committed by individual sworn law enforcement officers in the context of illegally taking advantage of the resources of the

law enforcement agency that employs them (Ross, 2001). Most theft-related crimes committed during the course of employment fall within this category, including theft of materials, illegal use of materials (including gasoline meant for agency-owned vehicles) or services of the organization for personal use, theft from agency evidence rooms (including theft of money, drugs, and consumer goods such as electronics being held as evidence in either pending cases, cold cases, closed cases, and/or cases under appeal). Ross included within this category fraud-related crimes committed by individual law enforcement officer(s) against the agency of employment, including inappropriate use of sick, injury and disability leave (and benefits), and collection of overtime pay for hours not worked (obtained through the submission of false time/pay records) (p. 193).

Included in the trichotomous category of internal crimes relating to the organization (i.e., the employing law enforcement agency) are those crimes perpetuated by the organization against its employees (Ross, 2001, p. 193). Ross included within this category a variety of actions that are related to violations of workplace safety regulations, illegal labor practices (e.g., retaliatory/adverse employment actions against employees who are labor organizers, shop stewards, or union representatives, as well as unfair labor practices in the context of collective bargaining or contract negotiations), and unfair employment practices (e.g., illegal terminations, discriminatory hiring practices, and discriminatory promotion practices).

Finally, Ross (2001) included a third category of police crimes – those crimes committed by the police in their official capacity – in the classification of internal crimes. These are police crimes that are generally considered to be an abuse of authority by law enforcement officers acting under the color of law and include a variety of offenses,

including “warrantless searches (those in excess of what is specified in a warrant), false arrest, illegally obtained evidence/seizures, perjury, planting of evidence, false charging, overcharging hoping to convict the offender due to plea bargaining, and violations of due process” (p. 194). Although Ross included those police crimes committed by the police in their official capacity as internal crimes, there is overlap within the taxonomy in that crime committed by sworn law enforcement officers committed in their official capacity also fall within the classifications of police crime that is corruption and/or organizational police crime. Thus, the classifications within the taxonomy of police crime are not mutually-exclusive categories.

Ross’ Conceptualization of Police Crime

Using his taxonomy of police crime as a precursor to measurement, Ross conceptualized police crime as:

> a subset of behaviors generally subsumed by the concepts of police coercion, police deviance, occupational crime, and political crime. These actions can be carried out at all levels of the police hierarchy, in all types of political systems, and include crimes for the police organization, crimes against the police organization committed internally by police, crimes committed by the organization against its own police officers and other employees, and crimes committed by police officers in or connected with their role as police officers. They may be violent or nonviolent, and involve economic and noneconomic targets. Finally, police crimes are acts of deviance, are classified in legal codes (criminal and civil), create social injury or harm, or are violations of basic human rights. (Ross, 2001, p. 194)

Measuring Police Crime

Closely related to the process of conceptualization is the process of measurement, which has also been a long neglected area in social science research (Blalock, 1979a). In very simple terms, measurement is "the process of attaching numbers to objects" (Blalock, 1982, p. 35). Its purpose in the social sciences, as with all science, is "to quantify, count, or assign meaningful scores to variations in some phenomenon, using valid and reliable methods" (Maguire & Uchida, 2000, p. 4). Measurement is performed through operational definitions that specify the procedures used in measurement (Blalock, 1979b). Inherent in much of the social science research on the police has been a failure to invoke operational definitions and inadequate measurement methodologies (Maguire & Uchida, 2000).

Scholars have struggled with the dilemma of measuring most forms of police crime (as well as police corruption and other forms of public corruption), because there is virtually no official nationwide data collected, maintained, disseminated, and/or available for research analyses (see, e.g., Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996; Barak, 1995a; Collins, 1998; Kane, 2007; Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2003, 2005; Sherman & Langworthy, 1979). Further, crime committed by sworn law enforcement officers is often unreported or underreported because, to a large extent, law enforcement officers are, by matter of social fact, de facto exempt from law enforcement (Reiss, 1971a). As a result, researchers have resorted to a variety of measurement methodologies in their efforts to learn more about the nature and extent of police crime, including surveys, experiments, sociological field studies, investigations by independent commissions, internal agency records, and criminal justice system records (Fishman, 1978; Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2003), as well as a few content

analyses of news reports (see, e.g., Ross, 2000). Additionally, investigative reporting by the media has contributed to the body of knowledge on police crime (Burnham, 1977; Collins, 1998).

Measuring Police Crime using Surveys

Numerous research studies have used a survey methodology to study the closely related problems of police corruption and police misconduct, but none have explicitly used a survey methodology to measure police crime. Since the phenomena of police crime, police corruption, and police misconduct are analogous and overlapping, some survey research does provide limited insight into the measurement of police crime.

Surveys of the police. Researchers have long reported problems in gaining access and maintaining access to law enforcement agencies for research purposes (see, e.g., Fox & Lundman, 1974; Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005; Lundman & Fox, 1978). Other researchers have suggested that police departments "are more open than ever" to outside researchers (Maguire & Uchida, 2000, p. 538). Nevertheless, there is very little empirical survey research of police officers and their propensity to engage in acts of police crime (Barker, 1978; Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2003). None of the survey research reported in the literature directly measures police crime. Rather, it measures correlates of police crime and tends to indicate the level of tolerance for such misconduct within some police agencies (see, e.g., Fishman, 1978).

In one study of police deviance other than corruption, 43 police officers in a police department of 45 sworn officers (in a Southern city, east of the Mississippi River, with a population of over 25,000 residents) were surveyed on indirect measures by asking each of them on a questionnaire to make an estimate as to the percentage of fellow

police officers in the department who engage (or had engaged) in any of five patterns of police deviance (police brutality, perjury by lying in court, having sex on duty, drinking alcoholic beverages on duty, and sleeping on duty) (Barker, 1978). Of relevance, the respondents, on average, believed that 39.19% of their fellow officers in the department engage (or had engaged) in police brutality in the nature of using excessive force on a prisoner(s) (Barker, 1978, p. 270). Likewise, the respondents, on average, indicated that 22.95% of their fellow officers in the department lie or have lied while testifying in court; 31.84% had sex while on duty; and, that 8.05% drink alcoholic beverages while on duty (p. 270). When queried on whether they would report a fellow officer to superiors within the police department for engaging in these practices, 46% of the officers surveyed indicated that they would never or rarely report a fellow officer for police brutality, and 54% indicated that they would never or rarely report a fellow officer who they know/knew to commit perjury by lying in court (p. 271).

Other research studies have examined police officers' integrity – a correlate to police misconduct and police crime – using survey methodologies. As part of a larger multi-method study into police integrity and accountability within the Philadelphia Police Department, a survey was administered to a random sample of 504 officers, sergeants, and lieutenants assigned to patrol to collect information on, among other things, beliefs and attitudes "toward what the 'police culture' might define as negative or inappropriate officer behavior" (Greene, Piquero, Hickman, & Lawton, 2004, p. 52). One part of the survey asked police officer respondents to read and respond to a number of vignettes involving ethical issues and police behaviors.[8] In one scenario on the survey, respondents were asked to consider this ethical dilemma:

> A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, the officer takes a watch; worth about two days pay for that officer. The officer reports the watch had been stolen during the burglary. (Greene et al., 2004, p. 77)

When asked to indicate the seriousness of the behavior described in the scenario, 88.6% of the respondents said the behavior was "very serious," 5.0% indicated it was "serious," and 1.0% said the behavior was "not serious" (p. 78). They were next asked to indicate how serious most other police officers in the Philadelphia Police Department would consider the behavior described in the survey scenario; 73.1% said their fellow officers would consider the behavior as "very serious" and 15.2% indicated "serious" (p. 78). When respondents were asked whether they would report a fellow officer they observed engaging in the behavior described in the scenario, 68.9% indicated they would report a fellow officer in the fact pattern described and 7.2% said they would not report the fellow officer; 17.8% were unsure if they would report a fellow police officer in that situation (p. 79). Similarly, when presented with another scenario in the survey where an on-duty police officer keeps cash from a wallet found in a parking lot, 82.6% of the respondents indicated that this was "very serious" misconduct, but when asked if they thought their fellow officers would report a fellow officer who kept the cash found in the wallet, only 51.9% indicated that most other Philadelphia police officers would report the officer who engaged in the behavior described in the scenario (pp. 80-82). Interestingly, the research did find district-level (i.e., from precinct-to-precinct) variability within the Philadelphia Police Department for respondents to the behavioral scenarios (p. 83).

Using the same data, Chappell and Piquero (2004) examined the relationship between police officers' attitudes and perceptions of peer behavior and citizen complaints alleging police misconduct in a research study applying Akers' social learning theory to police misconduct (see Akers, 1994, pp. 91-108; Akers & Sellers, 2009, pp. 85-122). Logistic regression was used for analysis, with police misconduct measured by the presence of citizen complaints as a dependent variable (Chappell & Piquero, 2004, p. 97). Independent variables were obtained in the respondent officers responses to hypothetical vignettes (as in Greene et al., 2004) to gauge police behavior in a variety of scenarios. Akers posits that the perception of peer behavior may be more relevant than the actual peer behavior (Akers & Sellers, 2009, p. 109). "Even if peer behavior is misperceived as more (or less) … than it actually is, the peer influence will come through that perception" (Akers, 1998, p. 119). The independent variables in this study were designed as indirect measures of that perception of peer police behavior (Chappell & Piquero, 2004, p. 98). Consistent with the premise of the theory – that peer associations, attitudes, reinforcement, and modeling are predictors of criminal behavior (see, e.g., Akers & Sellers, 2009) – the findings indicate that the police officers surveyed believe that stealing and police brutality are serious violations of accepted norms of police behavior. The same officers, generally, did not consider accepting gratuities as a serious violation of accepted norms of police behavior. Further, those officers who do not consider police brutality to be a serious problem are likely to have a positive history of citizen complaints against them (Chappell & Piquero, 2004, pp. 99-100). Contrary to expectations based upon social learning theory, police officers who think that their fellow police officers (i.e., their peers) consider theft to be non-serious are less likely to have a positive history

of citizen complaints being filed against them (Chappell & Piquero, 2004, p. 100; cf. Pogarsky & Piquero, 2004, who used similar vignettes in a survey of 210 police officers employed by a mid-sized police department in the southwestern United States and found support for deterrence theory to explain police misconduct).

The findings in the survey research studies of Barker (1978) and, more recently, Greene and his colleagues (2004), are not unique to the law enforcement community and are not inconsistent with findings in surveys of professionals in other fields. In a recent study of practicing physicians in the US, 96% of 1,662 respondent physicians indicated that they believed physicians should report impaired or incompetent colleagues to relevant authorities, but 45% of the respondents who had encountered colleague physicians who were impaired or incompetent had not reported them (Campbell et al., 2007).

Measurement error in surveying the police. There are some indications that police administrators and other police personnel may be less than truthful in responding to surveys by exaggerating (Maguire & Uchida, 2000). In one study on community policing, error with the datasets stymied and "doomed" researchers' ability to make any meaningful findings (Maguire & Mastrofski, 2000, p. 27). In that instance, the researchers proffered several alternative possible explanations for the inability to ascertain meaningful variance, including suggestions that the "responses represent more about the image they wish to portray to the external world than about their agencies' actual activities" (p. 30); that the responses represent presentations of self (see Goffman, 1959); and, "that the factors might represent how police agencies … wish to present themselves" (Maguire & Mastrofski, 2000, p. 31). Indeed, researchers have long

questioned the value of asking police officers to complete questionnaires that ask questions about corrupt practices within law enforcement agencies, because it is widely assumed that the police code of silence would be maintained by police officer respondents, thus negating the validity of survey responses (Fishman, 1978).

The problem of measurement error in survey response, especially self-reports, is not unique to research of police organizations. Social science researchers in a variety of academic disciplines have found that when surveying any socially desirable or undesirable issues, "respondent self-reports may bias survey data in favor of commonsense models of the world" (Presser & Traugott, 1992, p. 77). For example, research in the past two decades has often revealed that Americans misreport (i.e., lie about) their frequency of church attendance (see, e.g., Hadaway, Marler, & Chaves, 1993; Presser & Stinson, 1998) and even their religious affiliation (Caplow, 1998). What is unknown is if the social desirability effect found in police survey respondents is merely the result of a somewhat typical social desirability effect (Fowler, 2002) or whether it is the result of something inherently different about the police, such as the police subculture and its code of silence (Fishman, 1978).

Measuring Police Crime using Experiments

There are no scientific experiments that objectively and directly measure police crime reported in the literature. A quasi-experimental study of career-ending misconduct of police officers employed by the New York Police Department (NYPD) conducted by Fyfe and Kane (2006) using a nonequivalent comparison group research design is discussed below.

Measuring Police Crime using Sociological Field Studies

In a seminal field study of the behavior of police officers in Chicago, Boston, and Washington, D.C., Reiss (1971a) found that roughly 20% of observed police officers engaged in on-duty crime, not including assaults and syndicated crime (p. 156). Most of the police criminal behavior observed was limited to thefts of money and goods (e.g., accepting bribes, taking merchandise from burglarized businesses, taking money and/or property from businesses), even though the police officers committing the criminal acts were aware they were being observed by researchers.[9] Reiss concluded that the bulk of the police crime observed by the researchers "provide income supplements derived from exchange relationships" (Reiss, 1971a, p. 160). No other field research has attempted to determine the prevalence of police officers committing crime while on-duty, although field researchers in the Project on Policing Neighborhoods research study of policing behavior in Indianapolis, Indiana, and St. Petersburg, Florida (see, e.g., Mastrofski et al., 1998) "observed many instances of police behavior that could have been cause for disciplinary action" (Paoline & Terrill, 2007, p. 194). The Project on Policing Neighborhoods study used the Systematic Social Observation methodology for field observation of police officers designed by Reiss (1971a, 1971b), and his colleague, Black (1968).

Measuring Police Crime using Independent Commissions and Organizations

On numerous occasions in the past five decades independent commissions have been established to investigate matters relating to allegations of police corruption, typically by a governor or large city mayor, only after public disclosure and outcry over a police scandal (Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005). Additionally, every twenty years since the 1890s

has brought a new special commission to investigate allegations of police corruption within the NYPD: the Lexow Commission in 1895; the Curran Commission in 1913; the Seabury Commission in 1932; the Gross Commission in 1954; the Knapp Commission in 1973; and, the Mollen Commission in 1994 (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996). Generally, these commissions are established by issuance of an executive order granting the commission, through its appointed commissioners and investigatory staff under their control, legal authority to grant immunity to cooperating witnesses and the power to issue subpoenas to command the appearance of individuals before the commission to offer testimony under oath and/or command the production of documents to be delivered to the respective commission, all under the threat of contempt. Several of the various commissions (as well as one human rights organization) that have investigated allegations of police corruption – namely, the Knapp Commission, the Pennsylvania Crime Commission, the United States Commission on Civil Rights, the Christopher Commission, the Mollen Commission, and Human Rights Watch – are particularly relevant to a discussion of measurement of police crime.

Knapp Commission. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the City's Anti-Corruption Procedures was established by Executive Order of New York City Mayor John V. Lindsay in May, 1970. Among its charge was the task of determining the nature, extent, and patterns of corruption within the NYPD. Two years later, the Commission – widely referred to as the Knapp Commission in deference to its chairman, US District Court Judge Whitman Knapp – issued a report outlining widespread corruption within the NYPD (Knapp Commission, 1972). Mayor Lindsay was prompted to appoint the Knapp Commission after a series of news articles

by reporter David Burnham were published in the *New York Times* outlining an atmosphere of corruption that permeated the NYPD (see, e.g., Burnham, 1970). Prior to joining the news staff of the *New York Times* a few years earlier, from 1965 to 1967 Burnham was Assistant Director of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in Washington, D.C. (Maas, 1973). Although Burnham was hired by the *New York Times* to cover general news about the criminal justice system, he ultimately became an advocate of the role of the media in controlling public corruption (Burnham, 1977).

The Knapp Commission was authorized to hold whatever hearings it deemed necessary and appropriate, and was also granted the power of subpoena to support its investigatory mandate. The Commission relied on a variety of methods in its efforts to assess and determine the nature, extent, and patterns of corruption within the police department, including field investigations, issuance of hundreds of subpoenas for document production, interviews of police personnel and citizens, and hearings (both public hearings and private hearings) (Knapp Commission, 1972, pp. 42-47).

In assessing patterns of police corruption, the Commission identified two types of corruption-involved police officers within the department: "grass-eaters" and "meat-eaters" (pp. 65-66). The Commission defined grass-eaters as those police officers who engaged in petty acts of corruption, such as accepting gratuities and soliciting payments of five to twenty dollars from businesses on a regular basis. According to the Commission, the vast majority of police officers who engage in corrupt practices are grass-eaters. Meat-eaters, on the other hand,

> probably only a small percentage of the force, spend a good deal of their working hours aggressively seeking out situations they can exploit for financial gain, including gambling, narcotics, and other serious offenses which can yield payments of thousands of dollars. (p. 65).

The Commission acknowledged that corruption in the form of petty offenses by grass-eaters was pervasive throughout the NYPD, at least at the local (precinct) level of the organization. Officers accepted this form of corruption as part of the police subculture where "relatively small payoffs were a fact of life, and those officers who made a point of refusing them were not accepted closely into the fellowship of policemen" (p. 65). The Commission concluded that "corruption among grass-eaters cannot be met by attempting to arrest them all" and would only change if the police commissioner (at that time, Patrick Murphy) was somehow able to change the then-prevailing acceptance of corruption that permeated throughout the police department (p. 65). The Commission took a different view of corruption by meat-eaters, and recognized that changes in attitudes toward corruption among the rank and file officers would not eliminate serious – felonious – forms of corruption when they concluded that "probably the only way to deal with them will be to ferret them out individually and get them off the force, and, hopefully, into prisons" (p. 66). In addition to distinguishing between those corrupt police officers who were grass-eaters and those who were meat-eaters, the Commission identified five factors that influence the level, nature, and extent of an officer's involvement in corrupt activities: (1) the character of the officer; (2) the branch of the police department to which an officer is assigned; (3) the geographic area to which an officer is assigned; (4) the officer's assignment (e.g., foot patrol on guard at city hall

versus a patrol vehicle in Harlem); and, (5) the officer's rank within the department (pp. 67-68).

Although the Knapp Commission was primarily concerned with patterns of police corruption within the NYPD, they did provide information on the numbers of individual police officers investigated as of December 26, 1972, the date their report was transmitted to Mayor Lindsay. As of that date, the Commission had investigated specific allegations of corruption involving 627 police officers (in 310 separate cases); 26 police officers had been indicted in cases that originated in the Commission's investigation (of those, 2 police officers had pleaded guilty, 1 had been acquitted at trial, and 23 then-awaited criminal trials); 34 officers (including 24 of the indicted officers) had been suspended from their jobs with the police department; and, 57 officers had been charged administratively for discipline within the police department (pp. 193-194). Additionally, the Commission identified 66 police officers who had engaged in corrupt activities deemed by the Commission investigators to be crimes; another 36 officers whose names appeared on a list of Christmas gratuities at a New York hotel; 660 officers whose names were found on logs at various midtown New York hotels as having received use of free hotel rooms; and, another 1,700 citizen complaints involving 286 police officers not yet investigated (pp. 194-195). The Commission expressed frustration at their efforts to measure police crime:

> Mere numbers of corrupt acts are not as significant as the patterns of behavior which they reflect. The number of people caught and convicted for participating in any type of criminal activity is always a small fraction of those actually involved. It is difficult to make arrests and even more difficult to satisfy standards

> of proof necessary for convictions with respect to many crimes which, nevertheless, are quite apparently being committed on a large scale. … Using criminal convictions to measure the extent of police corruption is particularly worthless because the transactions are necessarily secret and those involved in them are extremely unlikely to complain. (p. 195)

With that caveat, the Commission also reported that, in addition to the investigation discussed above, they analyzed records at the district attorney offices in each of the five boroughs in the city, as well as court records, and determined that during the four and a half year time period of January 1, 1968, through the end of June, 1972, prosecutors had initiated criminal prosecutions against 218 police officers, including 158 patrol officers, 39 detectives, 9 sergeants, 11 lieutenants, and 1 assistant chief inspector, all employed by the NYPD (p. 252). As of December, 1972, 63 of those officers had pleaded guilty to criminal charges, 28 were convicted at trial, 46 were acquitted at trial, and 81 were then-awaiting trial. Of the 91 officers who had been convicted (i.e., the 63 officers who pleaded guilty and the 28 officers convicted at trial), 80 had been sentenced by the courts on their criminal convictions; 49 were given no period of incarceration or received suspended sentences, and 31 of the convicted officers received sentences that included a period of incarceration (14 of whom received jail sentences of less than one year) (p. 252).

Pennsylvania Crime Commission. The Pennsylvania Crime Commission was established by an executive order of the Governor of Pennsylvania in March, 1967, in response to a recommendation of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) in their seminal report that each state create an agency to

plan and implement reforms in policing. Ultimately, by 1970, the mandate of the Pennsylvania Crime Commission evolved into one primary area of responsibility: "the investigation of criminal justice problems and particularly organized crime and official corruption" (Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 1974, p. 39). A year later, in early 1971, the Pennsylvania Crime Commission began to investigate allegations of police corruption within the Philadelphia Police Department. The commission's investigators reviewed official records, conducted interviews, and used its subpoena power in attempts to gather information. Their efforts were widely hampered by a general refusal to cooperate and systemic code of silence that permeated throughout the ranks of the Philadelphia Police Department. Ultimately, the Commission had to resort to catching police officers committing crimes before they were willing to cooperate in exchange for leniency in, or immunity from, criminal prosecution.

In 1974, the Pennsylvania Crime Commission issued a lengthy report outlining widespread and systematic corruption permeating throughout all levels of the Philadelphia Police Department (Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 1974, p. 5). During its investigation, "the Commission came across more than 150 officers who could be indicted," as well as "an additional 250 who could be dismissed or disciplined," and "more than 300 other officers who should be investigated" (p. 3). Unlike other commissions investigating police corruption (and specifically, the Knapp Commission), the efforts of the Pennsylvania Crime Commission to investigate, let alone measure, police corruption within the Philadelphia Police Department were met with hostility and hampered by interference and a lack of cooperation from state and local officials, including the mayor and police commissioner in Philadelphia (p. 48). Numerous state

police investigators assigned to the Commission were repeatedly arrested and detained illegally by the Philadelphia Police Department on bogus charges (McKetta, 2000, pp. 110-121; 31-34), and the Pennsylvania Attorney General was forced to resign and the Commissioner of the State Police was fired in the wake of the illegal wiretapping of hotel rooms belonging to Commission investigators (McKetta, 2000, pp. 116-118; 792-804). Ultimately, the Commission was unable to pursue criminal prosecutions of corrupt police officers in the Philadelphia Police Department due to conflicts of interest by the Philadelphia District Attorney, Arlen Specter, and his staff, who "consistently went to the aid of the Philadelphia Police Department when police conduct was challenged by the Commission" (p. 807).

United States Commission on Civil Rights. Independent commissions have also made significant findings related to police misconduct and its relationship to identifying officers who are at risk of or susceptible to committing acts of police crime. The US Commission on Civil Rights (1981, p. ii) reported the first evidence documenting a phenomenon well known within law enforcement circles.[10] The US Commission on Civil Rights (1981, pp. 83-85, 166) examined records of the Houston Police Department's Internal Affairs Division (IAD) and determined that a very small number of police officers accumulated a high number of complaints and are chronic offenders. For example, one officer was the subject of 12 citizen complaints in a 2-year period (including a complaint stemming from a shooting death and 5 complaints for excessive force), and yet there was no indication that the pattern was even noticed by police officials in the department records reviewed by the Commission (p. 84). This Commission also examined records of the Philadelphia Police Department, made similar

findings, and determined that the police department routinely ignored obvious early warning signs of problem officers (p. 85). With these findings in hand, the Commission was the first government entity to endorse the use of early warning systems to identify problem police officers, although their recommendation was limited to identifying violence-prone police officers (p. 159). These are not isolated findings limited to the police departments in Houston and Philadelphia; the implementation of early warning (also known as early intervention) systems in law enforcement agencies to measure misconduct-prone police officers has proliferated as a result (see, e.g., Alpert & Walker, 2000; Walker, 2005; Walker, Alpert, & Kenney, 2000, 2001).

Christopher Commission. In their report investigating the police beating of Rodney King, the Christopher Commission (1991, pp. 35-48) likewise "identified 44 problem officers in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) with extremely high rates of citizen complaints. The Commission commented that these officers were 'readily identifiable' on the basis of existing LAPD records" (Walker et al., 2000, pp. 134-135). In reviewing records for use of force reports and officer-involved shooting reports, they found:

> When these data are sorted by officer and serial number, the responses are remarkable and disturbing:
>
> *Complaints*. Of approximately 1,800 officers against whom an allegation of excessive force or improper tactics was made from 1986 through 1990, over 1,400 officers had only one or allegations. But 183 officers had four or more allegations, 44 had six or more, 16 had eight or more, and one had 16 allegations. The top

10% of officers ranked by number of excessive force or improper tactics allegations accounted for 27.5% of all such allegations.

Use of Force Reports. Of the nearly 6,000 officers identified as involved in a use of force in use of force reports from January 1987 through March 1991, more than 4,000 had less than five such reports each. But 63 officers had 20 or more reports each. The top 5% of officers ranked by number of reports accounted for more than 20% of all reports, and the top 10% accounted for 33%.

Shootings by Officers. Of 662 officers involved in any shooting from 1986 through April 1991, 19 officers were involved in three or more. (Christopher Commission, 1991, pp. 36-37)

The Christopher Commission was formed on April 1, 1991, by Tom Bradley, Mayor of the City of Los Angeles, in the wake of the videotaped beating of Rodney King at the hands of several uniformed Los Angeles police officers, and was charged with the tasks of, *inter alia*, reviewing (a) the effectiveness of the police department's citizen-complaint system; (b) the impact of the police department's practices and procedures relating to the investigation and prosecution of allegations of the use of excessive force by city police officers; and, (c) the level of responsiveness and accountability of the police department to community concerns (Bradley, 1991). The Commission was chaired by attorney Warren Christopher, who later served as Secretary of State from 1993 to 1997 in the Clinton Administration.

Mollen Commission. Two decades after the report of the Knapp Commission (1972), New York City Mayor David N. Dinkins issued an Executive Order in July, 1992, establishing the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and

the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department. The Commission – which was commonly referred to as the Mollen Commission in recognition of its chairman, Milton Mollen, a retired state trial court judge who was then serving as Dinkins' Deputy Mayor of Public Safety – was given a three-fold mandate: "to investigate the nature and extent of corruption in the Department; to evaluate the Department's procedures for preventing and detecting corruption; and to recommend changes and improvements in those procedures" (Mollen Commission, 1994, p. 1). The appointment of the Mollen Commission by Mayor Dinkins was prompted by the arrest of Michael Dowd, a New York City police officer assigned to the 94th Precinct, who in May, 1992, "was arrested by Suffolk County Police for running a cocaine ring out of a Brooklyn bodega with five other police officers" (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 164).

The Mollen Commission found systemic changes in the nature of police corruption in the NYPD since that found by the Knapp Commission (1972). No longer was there a prevalence of grass-eater corruption (i.e., petty acts of corruption that were common among many police officers in the early 1970s) and rare acts of meat-eater corruption (i.e., serious corruption consisting of felony crimes by a few officers). Now, the situation was reversed and the more serious form of corruption was prevalent; police corruption in the 1990s within the NYPD was "primarily characterized by serious criminal activity" (p. 17). The Commission's investigation determined that most serious police corruption arises from the drug trade, and, specifically, drug trade related to the dramatic rise of cocaine trafficking that created new opportunities for corruption that was fueled by the drug money on the streets of some city neighborhoods.

Much drug-related police corruption involves police officers using their authority as sworn law enforcement officers to allow open air drug markets to flourish in the city (Mollen Commission, 1994). In this way, the Commission concluded that the bulk of drug-related police corruption involves police officers using their police powers to actively assist, facilitate, and strengthen the drug trade in the city. The Commission learned from numerous sources that street drug dealers often pay corrupt police officers to work hand-in-hand with them to facilitate their drug-related criminal activities and enterprises. To that end, the Commission determined that the victims of police corruption are no longer drug dealers who are the victim of shakedowns by corrupt police officers; now, the drug dealers are often the direct beneficiaries of police corruption. As a result, as the Commission noted, the actual victims of police corruption are often the law-abiding people who reside in the inner-city neighborhoods of the densely-populated, drug-ridden, high-crime police precincts within the city where drug-related police corruption now thrives. The Commission developed an erosion theory of police corruption (see pp. 60-63). Many officers who fall prey to corrupt activities in their role as law enforcement officers seemed to be the result of regular and constant exposure to conditions and opportunities of corruption in crime-ridden police precincts that worked to change the attitudes and behaviors of some police officers. The Commission hypothesized that this also worked as erosion on many honest police officers who developed a tolerance for widespread police corruption among their colleagues.

The Mollen Commission found that patterns of corruption had evolved over the past few decades due to the changing nature of the illegal drug trade and the new opportunities for drug-related police crime resulting from the explosion of cocaine-

related open-air drug markets. The Commission found that some corrupt police officers were drug dealers motivated by profit, and others were drug users themselves. Some officers acted as drug dealers in the course of their police duties. They cultivated connections with drug dealers who lived in the precincts where they worked as police officers, and soon these police officers were selling drugs while on-duty (and often, while off-duty) in full police uniform. Other corrupt officers used fellow police officers as fences to sell their stolen drugs. Some officers acquired illegal drugs while on-duty as police officers in the city, and then, in turn, distributed the drugs while off-duty in their home neighborhoods and towns, often outside the city. Other corrupt officers committed off-duty robberies of drug dealers (see pp. 30-31). This represented the first acknowledgement that some police crime occurs while off-duty (contra Kappeler et al., 1998; Ross, 2001). Finally, the Commission determined that drug abuse among police has grown considerably in recent years, especially the use of cocaine and steroids (Mollen Commission, 1994, p. 34).

The Mollen Commission concluded its report with a determination that the anticorruption controls within the LAPD, "primarily the IAD and decentralized field units, were a complete failure" (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 166). The failure was "no accident" and was a deliberate and willful result of a police department whose management became "more concerned about the bad publicity that corruption disclosures generate than the devastated consequences of corruption itself (Mollen Commission, 1994, p. 2)" (as cited by Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 166).

Human Rights Watch. In the mid-1990s, staff investigators at Human Rights Watch (an international human rights advocacy organization) extensively researched

issues relating to accountability for police brutality (as a form of human rights violations) in fourteen cities across the United States. They found that local and federal authorities systematically (a) fail to prosecute abusive police officers for crimes committed in their capacity as sworn law enforcement officers and (b) fail to collect adequate data on prosecution of police crimes, making it impossible to assess the nature and extent of police crime in this country (Collins, 1998). The ensuing report, *Shielded From Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States*, offers detailed, rich, and thick accounts of governmental disdain for, and lack of, criminal prosecutions of sworn law enforcement officers who commit police crime in cities throughout the United States:

> *Atlanta*. The already difficult task of prosecuting police officers accused of criminal offenses is compounded by Georgia state law that allows special privileges for public officials, including police officers, during grand jury proceedings. Defendant police officers are allowed to be present, with legal counsel, throughout the proceedings. At the conclusion of the hearing, the defendant may make a statement to the jurors, while the prosecutors are not allowed to rebut the officer's account (Collins, 1998, p. 135).
>
> *Boston*. IAD claims to work closely with the district attorney's office of Suffolk County. In rare cases, prosecutors initiate investigations into alleged criminal police misconduct, but the D.A.'s office reportedly does not maintain a list of cases involving police officers as defendants (p. 151).
>
> *Chicago*. Local prosecutions of Chicago police officers accused of criminal acts are rare. According to press reports, the Cook County State's Attorney's office has prosecuted only a handful of cases against officers accused of brutality during

the past fifteen years. As in most cities surveyed for this report, the district attorney's office does not acknowledge tracking criminal cases against police officers (p. 173).

Detroit. Both OCI and IAD representatives told Human Rights Watch that criminal prosecution of officers was rare, except for very high-profile cases. The Wayne County prosecutor's office does not record criminal prosecutions of police officers (p. 184).

Indianapolis. Local criminal prosecution of Indianapolis police officers is rare, but the exact frequency is difficult to ascertain because the prosecutor's office does not record the number of officers prosecutors. According to [the police chief], on average just one Indianapolis police officer each year is criminally prosecuted (pp. 197-198).

Los Angeles. Criminal prosecution of police officers for alleged brutality is extremely rare in Los Angeles. According to the [internal affairs] Commander, at most one officer a year is prosecuted for an on-duty abuse-related incident, while prosecutions are "common" for other types of charges, such as drunk driving or domestic violence. The district attorney's office does not specifically track or tally cases in which police officers are defendants (p. 231).

Minneapolis. Local prosecution against police officers does occur in Minneapolis, where the Hennepin County prosecutors have a reputation for pursuing such cases. According to the Hennepin County attorney's office, an "informal" file is kept of police defendants by the adult prosecution division (p. 248).

New Orleans. Despite the New Orleans police force's reputation as abusive, local prosecution of officers accused of human rights violations is rare (p. 264).

New York. Each borough's district attorneys are quite different in their approach to police brutality cases, with some district attorneys much more likely than others to bring a case against an accused police officer, leading to an arbitrary application of the laws block-by-block in the city (p. 311).

Philadelphia. Criminal prosecution of police officers accused of using excessive force is rare in most cities, and Philadelphia is no exception. Advocates claim that the district attorney's office relies too heavily on flawed IAD investigations when deciding whether to prosecute a case, rather than interviewing involved parties. … The D.A.'s office, like most we investigated, does not even acknowledge tracking cases against officers and reportedly cannot tell the public how many officers have been indicted or convicted for on- or off-duty crimes. D.A. Lynne Abraham explains that the problem with criminal prosecution of bad cops is that if they are acquitted, they almost always win their jobs back through arbitration. For this reason, her office looks for rock-solid cases (p. 333).

Portland. Criminal prosecution of officers for brutality-related offenses is rare in Portland. … Attorneys who frequently file police misconduct civil lawsuits say that local prosecution is usually for drug-related offenses or perjury. … The Multnomah County District Attorney's office is unusual in that it reports keeping a log of criminal cases involving police officers as defendants. The office tracks police who are indicted or convicted (p. 347).

Providence. Despite the Justice Department's own statistics showing the Providence area as problematic in terms of civilian complaints of excessive force, prosecutions of officers there is rare (p. 356).

San Francisco. The district attorney's office rarely prosecutes officers for crimes relating to excessive force. Nor does the district attorney's office acknowledge compiling information that would allow its staff to identify and monitor prosecutions of police officers (p. 370).

Washington, DC. The US Attorney's office is responsible for all criminal prosecutions in the District of Columbia. According to press reports, twenty-nine officers have been prosecuted "for assaultive behavior" since 1990 … with the figure including off-duty incidents; the relatively high number of prosecutions may reflect poor background screening during the 1989-1990 hiring period (p. 382).

It is well documented that the problems relating to a spike in police crime, as well as police misconduct and police corruption, in the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, DC, stem from a systemic failure to conduct pre-employment background screening on applicants for sworn law enforcement officer positions in the department in the late 1980s, and, specifically, as to those police officers hired in 1989 and 1990 (see, e.g., Carlson, 1993).

Measuring Police Crime using Internal Agency Records

Numerous reports/studies have examined internal agency records as part of an examination of police corruption and/or police misconduct, including, among others, the Knapp Commission (1972), the Pennsylvania Crime Commission (1974), the US

Commission on Civil Rights (1981) the Christopher Commission (1991), and the Mollen Commission (1994), all discussed *supra*, as well as research studies conducted by scholars (see, e.g., Sherman, 1978; Sherman & Langworthy, 1979).

The most extensive study of police crime using internal agency records is Fyfe and Kane's (2006) study of career-ending misconduct by New York City police officers, which compared the "personal and career histories of all 1,543 officers who were involuntarily separated from the NYPD for cause during 1975-1996 with a randomly selected stratified sample of their Police Academy classmates who have served honorably" (p. i).[11] The population of police officers separated from the NPYD for cause (i.e., fired from their jobs as police officers for reasons of misconduct) did not include those officers who failed to successfully complete the police academy recruit training program. During the time period of the study, 1975-1996, the number of full-time sworn officers employed by the NYPD "averaged well over 30,000 uniformed officers, and its personnel strength ranged between 21,500 in the late 1970s to 38,000 at the end of the study. In all, the NYPD employed about 78,000 different individuals as police officers," including those officers employed by the New York City Housing Authority Police Department and the New York City Transit Police Department, during the years studied by Fyfe and Kane (p. xiii).[12] Thus, the "population of 1,543 officers separated for cause represents about two percent of all officers employed by the NYPD during 1975-1996" (p. xiii).

Although not all misconduct that resulted in employment termination from the NYPD equates to police crime (and some police misconduct is not criminal in nature, but rather violates some policy or standard of conduct within the department/agency), there

are numerous findings in the Fyfe and Kane research study that are relevant to the study of police crime because much (but certainly not all) police misconduct that is severe enough to warrant employment termination with the police department could result in criminal proceedings against the offending officer(s). Fyfe and Kane's study, however, did not differentiate career-ending misconduct on the basis of crime, police crime, and/or criminal prosecution.

Finding that the NYPD's then-existing system of classification for police misconduct was ambiguous and difficult to apply, as well as realizing that there is not always a clear distinction between police misconduct and off-duty bad acts unrelated to status as a police officer, Fyfe and Kane developed a classification system for their research study consisting of 8 categories of police misconduct:

1. *Profit-motivated crimes:* All offenses, other than drug trafficking and whether on-duty or off-duty, in which the end or apparent goal of officers' wrongdoing was a profit.

2. *Off-duty crimes against persons:* All assaultive behavior, except for profit-motivated robberies, by off-duty officers.

3. *Off-duty public order crimes:* All offenses, other than drug trafficking or possession, against public order, including driving while intoxicated and disorderly conduct.

4. *Drugs:* Possession and sale of drugs, and related conspiracies, as well as failing or refusing to submit to departmental drug tests.

5. *On-duty abuse:* All offenses by on-duty officers involving use of excessive force, psychological abuse, or discrimination based on citizens' membership status in a class (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity, sexual preference).

6. *Obstruction of justice:* Conspiracy, perjury, official misconduct, and all offenses in which the apparent goal is obstruction or subversion of judicial proceedings.

7. *Administrative/failure to perform:* Failure to abide by departmental regulations concerning attendance, performance, obedience, reporting, and other conduct not included in other offense types.

8. *Conduct-related probationary failures:* All misconduct-related terminations of probationary officers in which misconduct in types 1-7 is not specified, and excluding simple failure in training programs. (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, pp. 37-38)

Profit-motivated police crime. The most frequent profit-motivated crime was bribe taking (n = 72), followed by grand larceny (n = 66), insurance fraud (n = 33); burglary (n = 28) and petit larceny (n = 28); receiving stolen property (n = 15); government fraud, such as welfare fraud (n = 12); accepting gratuities (n = 10) and working in a business that sells alcoholic beverages (n = 10), which is illegal for police officers under New York state law; and, operating or working for illegal gambling enterprises (n = 7) (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, pp. 133-136).

Off-duty police crime. Some police crime occurs while off-duty, including offenses involving weapons and violence (Fyfe, 1980, 1987, 1998). Fyfe and Kane (2006) found that police engage in off-duty crimes as varied as those committed by the general public, including, but not limited to, off-duty incidents in which officers "abused

their police authority to resolve personal disputes; domestic violence; bar fights; drunk driving and related vehicle accidents, including hit and run collisions; acts of vandalism; sex offenses; and such property crimes as larceny and burglary" (p. 31).

Analyses of the NYPD by Fyfe and Kane (2006) determined that it was not always easy to draw the line between off-duty conduct by police officers that is not job-related versus off-duty conduct by police officers that is job-related (i.e., criminal conduct engaged in by an off-duty police officer that is in some way associated to their status as a police officer). They identified three factors that blur the lines and make it difficult in many instances to determine when off-duty criminal conduct is not "line of duty" police crime (p. 31). First, "most obviously, … police officers' guns, badges, authority, special knowledge, and access to contraband and criminal opportunities while on-duty may facilitate off-duty criminality" (pp. 31-32). Second, in New York City, and many other jurisdictions around the country, police officers have full law enforcement authority, off-duty, "24 hours a day, seven days a week, both within the municipalities and counties that employ them and throughout the state" (p. 32). Many police departments require that their off-duty officers carry their service weapon with them at all times. This combination of full law enforcement authority and carrying guns while off-duty, has resulted in countless incidents of off-duty police violence and concerns related to governmental civil liability for misconduct by off-duty police officers in New York City and throughout the country (Fyfe & Kane, 2006). Third, "other ambiguities" likely dictate whether police officers will be arrested for their off-duty crime (p. 36); Fyfe and Kane note that many studies of the police have reported on the existence of a police culture and code of silence (e.g., Reiss, 1971a; Skolnick, 1994; Stoddard, 1968; Westley,

1953); as have numerous official investigations into policing behaviors (e.g., Christopher Commission, 1991; Knapp Commission, 1972; Mollen Commission, 1994).These other ambiguities often come into play with off-duty police crime:

> To what extent is off-duty misconduct job-related in the sense that offending officers trust that other officers who may discover it will treat them differently from ordinary citizens caught in the same circumstances? Can an officer who drives recklessly or while intoxicated, beats his spouse, or engages in street brawling, for example, do so in some confidence that, even if caught, he will not be subjected to the same formal processing that would befall one who could not flash a badge and ask for a professional courtesy? Examples of such extraordinary treatment, mostly in agencies other than the NYPD, appear in the press or in the courts with sufficient frequency to suggest that at least some officers may engage in off-duty misconduct only because they believe their police status will grant them immunity from punishment. (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, pp. 36-37)

Regional correlates of police crime. Fyfe and Kane noted that the literature suggests that there are regional correlates within the United States to police misconduct in the nature of police crime (see, e.g., Christopher Commission, 1991; Knapp Commission, 1972; Lopez & Thomas, 2004). Cites in the eastern part of the country, including New York City, "are marked by profit-motivated police misconduct rather than the brutality and other non-profit abuses that often have scandalized departments in other parts of the country" (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, p. 115). For example, discussions of police corruption in New York City often conjure up images from the early 1970s of Detective Frank Serpico and other New York police officers engaged in graft-related crimes (see,

e.g., Maas, 1973), whereas discussions of police corruption in Los Angeles are more likely to conjure up images of police violence, such as the 1991 beating of Rodney King by Sergeant Stacy Koon and other Los Angeles police officers (see, e.g., Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993, pp. 1-22). Thus, Fyfe and Kane hypothesized in their study that "more involuntary separations are attributable to profit-motivated corruption than to brutality and other non-profit abuses of citizens" in the NYPD (p. 116). The hypothesis was confirmed as the data showed that (a) 252 officers terminated from the department in instances where the primary offense against the officer involved a profit-motivated crime, while only 58 officers were terminated for on-duty abuse offenses (p. 131), and (b) profit-motivated crime (n = 387) vastly outnumbered on-duty abuse charges (n = 119): "whether using officers or the charges against them as the unit of analysis, the number of separations involving profit-motivated offenses is three to four times higher than the number that involved on-duty abuse" (p. 133).

Gender and police crime. Gender-specific data were not available for the years 1975-1985, and Fyfe and Kane's gender-based analysis of career-ending misconduct within the NYPD was limited to the later years of the study, 1986 – 1996 (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, p. 184). During those years, they found that as the percentage of female police officers in the NYPD increased, the rate at which female officers were involuntarily separated from the department decreased (p. 180). The downward trend for involuntary separation rates by gender was almost identical for male police officers during 1986 – 1996 (pp. 180-182). The difference, however, for female police officers in the NYPD, is that the rates of involuntary separation for male police officers in the NYPD "have decreased as their representation in the department has decreased, and, that, like the rates

for Hispanics and Asians, the rates for females have decreased as the percentage of females in the department have increased" (p. 182). From this, Fyfe and Kane concluded that, although the experience of Black officers (as a group) is markedly different than other groups, "as the NYPD had become more diverse, a smaller percentage of its officers of all genders and races has been fired or forced to resign" (p. 182).[13]

Fyfe and Kane hypothesized that the rate of involuntary separations for corruption-related offenses would be greater among male police officers than among female police officers in the NYPD (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, p. 184). In testing this hypothesis, they included in their analysis those cases involving profit-motivated offenses (noting that it would be "a daunting task" to try and remove corruption from other forms of profit-motivated police crime), and found that the hypothesis must be rejected because the analysis showed that the female trend is significantly higher than the male trend for career-ending corruption offenses by NYPD police officers (p. 184). Their analysis "derived mean annual separation rates per 1,000 officers of 0.55 and 0.95 for males and females, respectively," and found that profit-motivated offenses by females "is more frequently related to narcotics and to misconduct that, while job-related, frequently occurs off-duty (e.g., various frauds and other larcenies) than is true of male officers" (p. 186). A cursory examination of the rates, however, can be misleading, as the rate of involuntary separations for female officers involved in profit-motivated offenses is higher than that of male officers, but the annual number of male police officers separated for profit-motivated misconduct typically far exceeds the number of female police officers separated from the NYPD for profit-motivated police crime each year (p. 186).

Next in their gender-specific analyses, Fyfe and Kane hypothesized that "the rate of involuntary separations for brutality and other non-profit abuses is greater among male officers than among female officers" (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, p. 191). Surprisingly, during the years 1986-1996, 44 male officers (4 per year) and 12 female officers (1.1 per year) were fired from the NYPD on charges that included on-duty abuse-related offenses; this calculates to a rate per 1,000 police officers that is almost 2 times higher for female than male police officers (.026 per 1,000 versus .014 per 1,000) (p. 191). Fyfe and Kane, however, surmised that this is misleading in that their initial analysis included cases in which lesser forms of abuse (e.g., being discourteous to a citizen or using an ethnic slur) were merely secondary, lesser included offenses, in cases where the most serious offense(s) against the officer may have been, for example, a profit-motivated felonious police crime. Indeed, "in such cases, whatever on-duty abuse occurs is merely secondary to officers' purposes and intent" (p. 191). Additional analyses, therefore, were limited to cases where the primary, or only, charge against the officer(s) involved any of nine categories of serious on-duty abuse (i.e., "criminal assault; excessive force; race and ethnic slurs; race, ethnic, and gender discrimination; improper arrest; improper stop and frisk or search; improper summons; and, verbal altercation" (pp. 192, 194)). Finding that the data were so obvious that they did not cut their analysis at the year 1986: during 1975-1996, there were a total of 33 such cases, and all of involved officers who were fired in these instances were male police officers; no female police officers were fired from the NYPD in the years 1975-1996 in cases where the primary, or only, disciplinary charge against the officer(s) were serious abuse-related offenses (pp. 192-194).

Although the distinction of on-duty versus off-duty police crime offending is typically not difficult to substantiate, it is often a more difficult task to distinguish from those criminal offenses committed by police officers that occurred in the line of duty from those that did not occur in the line of duty (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, p. 194). Some line of duty police crime is committed by police officers while off-duty. In that regard, they hypothesized that "the rate of involuntary separation for non-line of duty criminal conduct (e.g., off-duty thefts and fraud; drug crimes) is greater among male officers than among female officers" in the NYPD (p. 194). Analysis was limited to two articulable classifications of off-duty criminal offenses: crimes of violence and public order offenses (e.g., disorderly conduct, driving while intoxicated, and public intoxication) (pp. 194, 196). The hypothesis was rejected, as the analysis determined that during 1986-1996, there were 216 male officers and 43 female officers that met this criteria (with a mean rate of 1.02 per 1,000 female police officers, and a mean rate of 0.77 per 1,000 male police officers) (p. 196).

Age and police crime. The only analysis performed by Fyfe and Kane relating to age of police officers was age of hire comparing those officers later involuntarily separated from the NYPD for career-ending misconduct with a control group of matched officers who served honorably and were not fired from their jobs with the NYPD. No survival analyses or other analysis was made relating to age (or, for that matter, years of service as a police officer) at time of offending and/or time of employment termination. Instead, Fyfe and Kane's interest was to test several hypotheses relating to age of hire in order to determine whether statistically significant support could be found to empirically justify a 1994 policy change whereby the NYPD increased the minimum age for new

hires as entry level police officers from age 20 to age 22 (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, p. 238). They tested the various age-of-hire hypotheses by constructing chi-square tables where they "dichotomized age at hiring into values of 'under 22' and '22 and over' and compared the percentages of officers subsequently separated for each of these offense types with their matching control officers" (pp. 238-239). Although not statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level, the chi-square tests they conducted suggested "that people who were hired by the NYPD at ages 20 and 21 were more likely than their older Police Academy classmates to have ended their careers with involuntary separations" (p. 244).

Measuring Police Crime using Criminal Justice System Records

A threshold issue in using records of the criminal justice system (i.e., individual case files flagged as defendant(s) being employed as a sworn law enforcement officer and/or aggregated records, tallies, and/or statistics that are maintained by prosecutors' offices, clerks of criminal courts, or local, state, or federal agencies) to measure police crime is that very few agencies keep (and/or admit to keeping) such records (see, e.g., Collins, 1998; Ross, 2001). As discussed throughout this prospectus, the data and research are lacking in the realm of using records of the criminal justice system to measure police crime.

Some data regarding federal prosecutions and convictions on federal criminal charges relating to public corruption and criminal violations of civil rights statutes are available through the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University for research analyses (see Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, n.d.). TRAC obtains case-specific data from the Executive Office for United States Attorneys pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) ("Freedom of Information Act of

1966, as amended,"). The data do not, however, categorize defendants who are public employees by their job or employment classification (e.g., municipal police officer, etc.). As such, it is not currently possible using the TRAC dataset to differentiate police officers who are arrested and charged under various federal criminal statutes (e.g., "Conspiracy to Commit Offense or to Defraud the United States; Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law; Fraud and Related Activity - ID Documents; Mail Fraud - Attempt and Conspiracy; Mail Fraud - Frauds and Swindles; Public Money, Property or Records; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) - Prohibited Activities; Theft or Bribery in Programs Receiving Federal Funds,") from other public officials/employees who are charged criminally in the federal courts (Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005, p. 57). Further, the TRAC data, in any event, do nothing to measure the prevalence of police crime, as (1) the overwhelming majority of police crime that is prosecuted is prosecuted in state courts (not federal courts), and (2) the extent of police crime that goes unreported (and unprosecuted police crime is assumed to represent the majority of police crime) and, thus, invisible to the public and unknown to researchers, is probably the vast majority of police crime (see, e.g., Chambliss, 1999, pp. 133-139).

Measuring Police Crime through Investigative Media Reporting

Investigative media reports and consistent publication of thematic articles have resulted in awareness of patterns of corruption and other abuses within police departments, often serving as the catalyst for reforms within law enforcement agencies (Burnham, 1977; Collins, 1998), the impetus for the appointment of an independent commission to investigate allegations of police corruption and/or brutality (see, e.g., Knapp Commission, 1972; Mollen Commission, 1994), and at other times foreshadowing

problems to come (cf. Terry, 2008, p. 549, acknowledging the media's role in calling attention to the extent of sexual abuse of children by priests in the Catholic Church). While these types of reports do not constitute scholarly research and have not been subject to the rigors of an institutional review board and/or academic peer review, they do provide some information relevant to the measurement of crime. Such investigative reports are often cited by scholars as evidence of problems related to police corruption and/or police crime (see, e.g., Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996; Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005), and, on occasion, have significant policy implications (Burnham, 1977).

Problems in Washington, D.C.'s Metropolitan Police Department. Carlson (1993) identified systemic problems within the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) in Washington, DC. Among them, Carlson reported that the MPD had lowered hiring standards in the late 1980s in a push to place large numbers of officers on the street (in great part, to replace a few thousand police officers hired in the late 1960s around the time of the civil rights protests and riots in Washington, DC, and other cities, who were soon to be eligible for retirement from the police department). Specifically, Carlson reported that the MPD had hired over 1,400 police officers in 1989 and 1990 without conducting a background check on any of the newly hired police officers (Carlson, 1993). That served as the impetus for reporters with the *Washington Post* to engage in investigatory reporting on the problem-plagued MPD. They "reviewed hundreds of court files and internal department records on training and disciplinary actions and interviewed scores of police officers, prosecutors, judges and defense lawyers" (Harriston & Flaherty, 1994, p. A1). Following up on the work of Carlson a year earlier, the *Washington Post*

reporters found that MPD police officers who graduated from the DC Police Academy in 1989 and 1990 accounted for some troubling numbers:

> ▪ More than half of the 201 DC police officers arrested since 1989 on charges ranging from shoplifting and forgery to rape and murder. Some have been arrested more than once and in more than one year.
>
> ▪ More than half of those involved in departmental disciplinary proceedings for breaches such as neglecting duty, making false statements and failing to obey orders, which have doubled since 1989.
>
> ▪ Half of those on a list of 185 DC officers so tainted by their own criminal problems that prosecutors won't put them on a witness stand as officers of the law. (Harriston & Flaherty, 1994, p. A1)

In many respects, these issues were business as usual and symptomatic of a police department awash in longstanding systematic corruption (e.g., patterns of widespread police crimes of violence, profit-motivated police crimes, and illegal police drug trafficking) and routine political cover-ups fueled by an impenetrable code of silence among police officers across all ranks within the MPD (Kappeler et al., 1998, pp. 211-213). The difference, however, was that now these problems were becoming known to the public (p. 189).

The case of Tacoma, WA, police chief David Brame. In another example of investigative journalism by newspaper reporters that helped to measure police crime, reporters with *The News Tribune* spent several months investigating the tenure of the late David Brame, who was chief of police in Tacoma, Washington, in 2002-2003. Brame murdered his wife and then committed suicide on April 26, 2003. Starting with a 3-part

article series published in September, 2003, Robinson (2003a, 2003b), Modeen (2003), and other reporters at *The News Tribune* exposed to the public a plethora of information on Brame's various alleged acts of police misconduct and crime committed throughout his career as a police officer (including an unsubstantiated claim of on-duty rape against him in the late 1980s), as well as the greater problem of police officers who commit acts of domestic violence against their spouses, significant others, and family members (including elderly in-laws, children, and step-children).

Meanwhile, the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* conducted their own investigation into the Brame case and collateral issues, and found that during the period from 1998 until mid-2003, at least 41 police officers employed at agencies in King and Pierce counties had been involved as defendants in either civil or criminal proceedings related to domestic violence. Among those on the list were nine members of the Seattle Police Department, one of whom resigned his position as a result of the domestic violence charge(s); seven members of the King County Sheriff's Office, three of whom were fired as a result of the domestic violence charges; three members of the Bellevue Police Department; ten members of the Tacoma Police Department, one of whom resigned in the wake of the domestic violence charge; two members of the Pierce County Sheriff's Department; and, one member of the Redmond Police Department (Teichroeb, 2003b). Most of the 41 police officers identified by the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* as having been accused of domestic violence, however, faced little or no adverse employment action or discipline, and some, reportedly, continued to work in the same police departments as uniformed patrol officers who regularly respond to domestic violence calls for service in their respective communities (Teichroeb, 2003a).

As a direct result of the investigative reporting by reporters with the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* and *The New Tribune* into circumstances and events relating to the Brame murder-suicide and Chief Brame's history of domestic violence, the State of Washington enacted a law concerning domestic violence by police officers. The statute requires that all law enforcement agencies in the state promulgate written policies regarding how cases are to be handled when there are allegations made of domestic violence against any sworn law enforcement officer. Additionally, the statute includes a mandatory self-reporting provision for law enforcement officers who are accused of domestic violence in jurisdictions other than where they are employed as a police officer and also includes specific provisions for victims of domestic violence in situations where the defendant is employed as a sworn law enforcement officer ("Domestic Violence by Law Enforcement Officers," 2004).

A Typology of Police Crime

An interesting pattern become evident in analyzing the offense types represented in the data of the pilot study for this dissertation. Nearly all criminal offenses for which sworn law enforcement officers were arrested in the pilot study data fall into one or more of four categories: drug- and alcohol-related police crime; sex-related police crime; violence-related police crime; and, profit-motivated police crime (see Table 9 in the pilot study chapter below). For the purposes of this research, they are collectively referred to as a typology of police crime. In the pages that follow, the literature is reviewed regarding each of the categories in this typology.

Drug- & Alcohol-Related Police Misconduct

The rate of alcoholism and drug abuse is said to be high when compared to other occupations (Kappeler, Blumberg, & Potter, 1993, p. 136). On-duty drinking by police officers is a fairly common occurrence (Barker, 1978, p. 269). In one survey of 43 police officers in a city of 25,000 in the South then employing 50 sworn police officers, the perceived extent of officers drinking alcoholic beverages while on-duty was 8.05% (whereas the perceived extent of police officers sleeping on-duty was 39.58%, police brutality was 39.19%, having sex on-duty was 31.84%, and having committed police perjury was 22.95%) (pp. 270-271). It is intuitively surmised that alcohol and drug use among police officers is underestimated, although researchers have commented that it is difficult to assess the prevalence of on-duty police alcohol/drug use and/or abuse due to underreporting that stems from the secrecy and code of silence that permeates the police subculture (Kappeler, Blumberg et al., 1993, pp. 136-138; Violanti, Marshall, & Howe, 1985, p. 106). In an ethnographic field observation study of police officers in Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C., during the Summer of 1966, the rate of on-duty police officers who were observed drinking alcoholic beverages while on-duty ranged from a low of 3.2% in one city to 18.4% in one of the other cities (Reiss, 1971a, p. 165, Table 3.5). Within the NYPD, approximately 25% of adverse personnel actions (i.e., disciplinary suspensions and employment terminations) against police officers are for illegal use of drugs (Mollen Commission, 1994, p. 34).

While it is not necessarily a crime for a police officer to imbibe in the consumption of alcoholic beverages while on-duty, it could be a precursor to other

behaviors on-duty that are criminal in nature. Further, this dissertation research shows a correlation (at least, in this census) between alcohol-related police crime and other types of police crime and/or other variables of interest. The use of alcohol as a social and psychological device for coping with the routine stress of policing is generally accepted, and often encouraged, among law enforcement officers within the police subculture (Violanti, 1999, 2003). Alcohol use by police officers as a coping strategy for the stress of police work might actually make things worse and not better (Beehr, Johnson, & Nieva, 1995, p. 15). In a stratified random sample of 115 police officers employed by a police agency (with a population of 934 police officers) in the Northeast who were surveyed on suicidal ideation, Violanti (2004, p. 281) found that symptomatology of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and a continued exposure to work-related stress appear to significantly increase suicide ideation and alcohol use among police officers. Of note, the same study found through logistic regression that veteran police officers with ten to nineteen years of service (M = 13.16, SD = 8.81) as a police officer had less risk of PTSD and suicidal ideation than those police officers with one to nine years of service (OR = .560) (Violanti, 2004, p. 279).

In a recent study to learn about the alcohol consumption and risk of police officers in comparison to alcohol consumption rates of the general population, Lindsay distributed 27-item questionnaire surveys that included the World Health Organization's Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT) instrument (see Babor, Higgins-Biddle, Saunders, & Nieva, 1995) to 1,328 full-time sworn law enforcement officers employed by municipal, county, and state law enforcement agencies in Mississippi (Lindsay, 2008). Of these, 663 completed questionnaires were returned, resulting in a 49.92% response

rate (p. 79). Using AUDIT's scoring scale to rank respondent groups (no risk, harmful, and hazardous), chi-square analyses were used to determine if any relationships existed (p. 80). No statistically significant differences were found between alcohol use and risk when comparing rates and scores for police officers in Mississippi against the general public (pp. 84-86). Lindsay also conducted a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to determine if there was any statistically significant difference between risk groups according to age, length of service as a sworn law enforcement officer, and other demographic factors. The demographic differences were not found to be statistically significant (pp. 83-86).

Drug-Related Police Crime

The extent and prevalence of drug-related police crime is largely unknown because, as with other types of police crime, data are not collected nationally identifying party-defendants by employment type (e.g., in this instance, sworn law enforcement officers). Thus, it is not possible to estimate the true nature and extent of the problem of drug-related police crime (United States Government Accounting Office, 1998, p. 3). There are at least four areas of drug use by police that help understand the nature of the problem: (1) recreational drug use by police officers; (2) drugs and police corruption; (3) on-duty drug use by police officers; and (4) police officers' drug(s) of choice (Carter & Stephens, 1994, pp. 102-107).

Recreational drug use by police officers. Not all illicit drug use by police officers should be construed as police crime. There are many people in virtually every community across this country who, on occasion and without consideration to their vocation, imbibe from time to time in the recreational use of illicit drugs (see, e.g., Robinson & Scherlen,

2007, pp. 59-92; Walker, 2006, pp. 261-265). The policing profession is unique, however, in that police officers have access to the drug subculture – including its drug dealers, supplies of drugs, and other aspects of the drug culture – that is available to them in the regular course of their employment, without the threat of law enforcement or arrest, and hidden from the awareness of the general public. As we know, sworn law enforcement officers are generally exempt from law enforcement (Reiss, 1971a). Even when they are off-duty, nobody polices the police.

Carter (1990a, pp. 89-90, 1990b, pp. 91-93) argued that police officers who are recreational users of illicit drugs are at risk of evolving into a "user-driven cycle" of drug-related police corruption. Carter postulated that these casual and/or recreational drug-using police officers sooner or later find themselves at a "threshold at which the officer decides that rather than buying the drugs he or she can 'confiscate' them from users/dealers or take them from the police property process" (Carter, 1990a, p. 89). The threshold is a virtual saturation point, as described in this analogy offered by one investigator who was interviewed during Carter's qualitative research study:

> Taking bribes is like having sex – the first few times are both scary and exciting. After having it the first time, you'll know you'll have it again; you're just not sure when. After a while it becomes something you expect, and you worry more about the reward than the risk. (Carter, 1990a)

The user-driven cycle of drug-related police crime is the slippery slope process described by Katz (1988, pp. 312-317) as the "seductions of crime."

Drugs and police corruption. Much police crime is derived from drug-related police corruption that occurs in a variety of fairly common scenarios among corrupt sworn law enforcement officers:

- Accepting bribes from drug dealers/traffickers in exchange for "tip" information regarding drug investigations, undercover officers, drug strategies, and names of informants, etc.
- Accepting bribes from drug dealers/traffics in exchange for interference in the justice process such as non-arrest, evidence tampering, perjury, etc.
- Theft of drugs by the officer from property rooms or laboratory for personal consumption of the drug or for sale of the drug.
- Street "seizure" of drugs from users/traffickers without an accompanying arrest with the intent of converting the drug to personal use.
- Robbery of drug dealers of profits from drug sales and/or the drugs for resale.
- Extorting drug traffickers for money (and sometimes property such as stereos, televisions, etc.) in exchange for non-arrest or non-seizure of drugs. (Carter, 1990b, pp. 90-91)

Of the officers engaging in these type of activities, it is not uncommon to find that many are involved in more than one of the above varieties of drug-related police corruption (Kappeler et al., 1998, p. 167). These drug-related corruption scenarios are consistent with the types of drug-related police corruption found by the Mollen Commission (1994) to be operative in many precincts of the NYPD, citywide, in the early to mid-1990s. Additionally, as discussed in more detail earlier, the Mollen Commission reported that many corrupt police officers engaged in a variety of organized crime behaviors to assist

and protect drug dealers conducting business in certain city police precincts (pp. 31-34), and that many corrupt police officers within the NYPD were more personally involved as drug dealers themselves than previously recognized (pp. 34-35). Unfortunately, there is very little knowledge, information, and/or research to know whether this type of police behavior – all of it constituting drug-related police crime – is anomalistic to New York City or whether it is typical of police behavior in other jurisdictions across the country. Even within the NYPD (where police officers are subjected to random drug tests as a condition of continued employment) it is very difficult to determine the nature and extent of illicit drug use by police officers in New York City; during the years 1986 to 1996, 332 police officers (260 male and 72 female) were terminated from their employment with the NYPD for refusing to take drug tests (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, p. 194; see also Mollen Commission, 1994, pp. 127-128).

On-duty drug use by police officers. In the only known mixed-methods research study on on-duty police use of illegal drugs, Kraska and Kappeler (1988) found that in one medium-sized police department in the South, approximately 20% of the police officers (n = 10) used marijuana twice a month, or more, while on-duty. Likewise, 10% of the officers (n =5) admitted to being on-duty functioning as a police officer, at some point, while under the influence of hallucinogens, stimulants, and/or barbiturates not prescribed to them (Kraska & Kappeler, 1988, p. 14). They also found that almost half of the drug-using police officers (47.1%) had between 4 and 9 years of experience as police officers, and most of the drug-using police officers had exemplary performance records (pp. 16-17). As to the ages of the marijuana-smoking police officers, 28.0% of those officers ages 21-28 admitted to using marijuana while on-duty, 26.7% of those officers

ages 31-38 admitted to using marijuana while on-duty, and 12.5% of those officers ages 39-48 admitted to using marijuana while on-duty. No officers ages 49 and older admitted to using marijuana while on-duty working as a police officer (p. 16). These findings, although arguably limited in their generalizabilty to other law enforcement agencies, led Kraska and Kappeler to formulate observations of four unique critical factors relating to drug use – especially on-duty drug use – by police officers:[14]

> ▪ Illegal drug by police use is seen as hypocritical and damages public confidence in the competence and quality of police services.
>
> ▪ Illegal drug use by police is potentially corrupting.
>
> ▪ Because they have a mandate to use violence and must exercise critical judgments under duress, the effects of drugs on police officers are even more dangerous and are of greater social concern than they would be in ordinary workplace settings.
>
> ▪ Police drug use raises public safety and hazard issues, including the use of firearms, police pursuit, and interdiction and arrest of fleeing suspects. (Kraska & Kappeler, 1988, pp. 4-6).

(see also Kappeler et al., 1998, pp. 165-185).

Police officers' drug(s) of choice. Marijuana is likely the most commonly used drug by police officers, in great part likely because there is less social stigma associated with the recreational use of marijuana compared with other illegal drugs (Carter & Stephens, 1994, p. 106). Cocaine use by police officers is likely the second most common in terms of frequency and prevalence (Carter & Stephens, 1994, pp. 106-107; Mieczkowski & Lersch, 2002, p. 596; Mollen Commission, 1994, p. 34). There are likely

regional aspects related to officers' choice of drugs in the many law enforcement agencies in jurisdictions across the country. For example, there have been reported indications that in the early 1990s crack cocaine was popular with drug-using police officers in Detroit (Carter & Stephens, 1994, p. 107). During the same time period, there were indications that personal steroid use was popular, "even among officers who do not engage in other kinds of corruption," with NYPD officers assigned to precincts throughout New York City (Mollen Commission, 1994, p. 34).

There are some recent indications that cocaine may be replacing marijuana as the drug of choice among drug-using police officers. One large police department in the Eastern part of the country used random drug testing of its police officers and found that cocaine was overwhelmingly the drug of choice; over 80% of police officers testing positive for illegal drugs had cocaine in their system, whereas only 17% of drug-using police officers tested positive for only marijuana use (Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005a). Similarly, between 1999 and mid-2006, 75 police officers in the Boston Police Department tested positive for recent use of illegal drugs, and 26 of those officers failed a second drug test and were fired from the police department. Another 20 of the Boston police officers who tested positive for illegal drug use resigned from their positions before termination. Of these 75 drug-using police officers, 61 (81.3%) tested positive for cocaine use, 14 (18.6%) tested positive for marijuana use, 2 (2.6%) tested positive for ecstasy use, and 1 (1.3%) tested positive for heroin use (Smalley, 2006).

Alcohol-Related Police Crime

There are no known research studies in the area of alcohol-related police crime. Based on the results of the pilot study for this research, it would appear that the criminal

offense for which police officers in the United States are most frequently arrested is driving under the influence (DUI) (i.e., drunk driving). It is unknown to what extent use of alcohol, drunkenness, and/or alcoholism play a role, if any, in crime committed by police officers. Preliminary data suggest that it is not entirely uncommon for police officers to drive police vehicles while intoxicated, as evidenced by the number of on-duty police officers arrested for DUI who are included in the pilot study.[15] This preliminary finding tends to substantiate the research to date that found that some police officers drink alcoholic beverages while on-duty (see, e.g., Reiss, 1971a).

Sex-Related Police Crime

Police Sexual Misconduct

Police officers have unique opportunities to engage in sexual misconduct (Maher, 2003, p. 355). To a great extent, police officers work with very little supervision, are afforded the opportunity to go wherever they want while on duty, possess the coercive power and law enforcement authority of the state in exercising their duties, and interact with members of the public in isolation from other police officers that is, often, out of view of the general public (p. 355). Additionally, police organizations are largely male-dominated work environments where violence is experienced regularly (Crank, 2004, pp. 229-235). More specifically, on-duty violence is not only permitted, but in many instances, police violence (through the use-of-force continuum) is required (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, p. 163). For these reasons, policing is conducive to sexual misconduct. One recent research study surveyed police chiefs in 20 law enforcement agencies in a major metropolitan area within the United States and found that police chiefs acknowledge that police sexual misconduct is a problem, and that the less serious, often noncriminal, forms

of police sexual misconduct (e.g., "flirting on duty, consensual sex on duty, and pulling over a driver to get a closer look") are more common than the more serious, criminal, forms of police sexual misconduct (e.g., "rape, sexual assault, and sex with a juvenile) (Maher, 2008, p. 239).

Not all police sexual misconduct, as noted above, is criminal in nature. Indeed, there are many opportunities for police officers to engage in on-duty consensual sexual relations with willing members of the public during routine encounters in their day-to-day activities as law enforcement officers in virtually any police department – urban, suburban, and rural – in the country (see, e.g., Maher, 2008). Often these encounters are initiated by young women who are "police groupies" infatuated with uniformed police officers (Sapp, 1994, p. 196). Other citizen-initiated sexual contacts with police officers are with "lonely or mentally disturbed women who seek attention and affection from an officer" (p. 196). A third type of police-citizen sexual encounter involves a person, most often a woman, who offers to exchange sexual services or favors as a *quid pro quo* of sorts to buy leniency, preferential treatment, and/or to cash in as a "get out of jail free card" from a police officer (Barker, 1978, pp. 267-268; Sapp, 1994, p. 197). This is not to suggest that all police officers avail themselves of the sexual services and favors offered from people they encounter while on-duty, although these types of sexual police-citizen encounters are likely far more prevalent than realized by most citizens. Prior research suggests that about one-third of police officers surveyed have engaged in some form of on-duty sexual misconduct (Barker, 1978; Maher, 2003). It would likely be a mistake, however, to suggest or infer that the majority of on-duty sexual encounters of police officers involve willing participants and an absence of coercion (Vaughn, 1999).

The Police as Sexual Predators

Some recent research recognizes a phenomenon whereby some police officers engage in patterns of on-duty predatory sex-related crimes most often directed at adolescent and young adult women.

Driving while female. Walker and Irlbeck (2002) examined the problem of police officers who use their police powers and authority during on-duty motor vehicle traffic stops to abuse women. The crimes committed by police officers against women motorists that while under the umbrella of "driving while female" encounters run the gamut from verbal harassment to sexual assault (ranging from simple assaults to those felonies in the nature of aggravated felonious sexual assault) to crimes of violence (ranging from physical assault/battery to murder) (Walker & Irlbeck, 2002, pp. 1-2). They called this phenomenon "driving while female" to symbolize the parallels of this type of abusive police misconduct to the widely known problem of racial profiling by sworn law enforcement officers in jurisdictions across the country (see, e.g., Harris, 1999). This includes the police practice of "bimbo-hunting," identified by Kraska, where some on-duty police officers "wait outside the bars, pull over women who 'should be home with their boyfriends,' and sexually harass them" (Kraska & Kappeler, 1995, p. 104).

Abusive behaviors against women and girls by on-duty police officers in "driving while female" encounters are not anomalies or isolated incidents. In their initial cursory research study, Walker and Irlbeck (2002) found an average of approximately 20 such cases reported by the media annually in the years 1996-2001 and hypothesized that those cases were "clearly only the tip of the iceberg" (p. 2). Their initial contact analysis of the media-reported cases indicated that media-generated publicity of one such incident

reported to law enforcement authorities by an alleged victim of abuse by a police officer in a "driving while female" encounter often led to the filing of complaints by multiple other alleged victims of the *same* police officer during traffic stops. This pattern indicates that female motorists who are victimized by police officers following a traffic stop while driving often "do not come forward because of humiliation and fear of reprisal" (p. 2). Finally, Walker and Irlbeck (2002) found that many police departments fail to investigate allegations and complaints of "driving while female" abuses by police officers and that, by failing to investigate such allegations and complaints, law enforcement agencies are tolerating the police crimes committed by their officers.

Police sexual abuse of teenage girls. In a follow-up study to their 2002 report on "driving while female," Walker and Irlbeck (2003) discovered numerous patterns of police sexual abuse and exploitation of teenage girls (and, to a lesser degree, teenage boys), including thirty-one cases of police sexual abuse of teenagers who were members of police department-sponsored Exploring programs in jurisdictions across the country that were reported in newspaper articles from 1993 to mid-2003 where some official action had been taken against the accused officer(s).[16] The types of action taken against the police officers in these cases ranged from suspensions, terminations, and resignations from sworn law enforcement positions as police officers, as well as indictments, convictions, or acquittals in criminal cases, and/or initiation of a civil lawsuit against a police officer and/or police department (Walker & Irlbeck, 2003, p. 3). In sum, a total of 183 cases of police sexual abuse of woman were identified in a twelve year period; almost 40% of the cases involved teenagers as victim, 34% of the cases involved traffic cases of the "driving while female" scenario, and in nine cases the victims were

prostitutes who were victims of sexual abuse/assaults by on-duty police officers (p. 3). In seven of the cases involving prostitute victims, the victims each alleged that they were coerced into performing fellatio on one or more on-duty police officers in lieu of being arrested (p. 5). As with all manifestations of police crime, the prevalence of police sexual offending is unknown: "many cases are undoubtedly not reported, either because of shame or fear of retaliation on the part of the victims, or because some of the girls involved may not feel that they were victimized" (p. 4).

Police Sexual Violence

Kraska and Kappeler (1995, p. 93) defined police sexual violence as including "those situations in which a female citizen experiences a sexually degrading, humiliating, violating, damaging, or threatening act committed by a police officer through the use of force or police authority" (see also Kelly, 1988, for a discussion of sexual violence in the feminist theoretical perspective). The "imputed intentions to the violator" are not relevant to this definition, which is grounded in feminist theory (Kelly, 1988, p. 40; Kraska & Kappeler, 1995, pp. 89-91, 93). Likewise, Kraska and Kappeler acknowledge that their own definition of police sexual violence may be poorly conceptualized, as it doesn't include encounters which are at face value degrading and exploitative, but the victim fails to recognize them as such (see Kraska & Kappeler, 1995, p. 93, n. 4). Acts of police sexual violence fall outside the scope of the more generic forms of police sexual misconduct described by Sapp (1994) and discussed above.

To address the perspectives of (1) the policing literature – much of which assumes that a great deal of police sexual misconduct includes consensual sex, sexual favors, and/or rogue officers using their power and authority – and (2) the feminist literature –

that "makes clear that the traditional police culture, along with the occupational role and structural position of the police, may provide the appropriate organizational and cultural context for police sexual violence against women" (Kraska & Kappeler, 1995, p. 91) – Kraska and Kappeler developed a theoretical framework in the form of a continuum of police sexual violence. The continuum starts with (a) unobtrusive behavior, extends to (b) obtrusive behavior, and ends with (c) criminal behavior (pp. 93-94). Within the continuum of police sexual violence, the range of behaviors is as follows:

- *Unobtrusive Behavior* – viewing victims, photographs, and sexually explicit videos, invasions of privacy, and secondary victimization.
- *Obtrusive Behavior* – custodial strip searches, body cavity searches, warrant-based searches, illegal detentions, deception to gain sexual favors, provision of services for sexual favors, and sexual harassment.
- *Criminal Behavior* – sexual harassment, sexual contact, sexual assault, and rape. (Kraska & Kappeler, 1995, p. 94)

Some of the behaviors falling within the category of obtrusive are clearly criminal in nature, but often not prosecuted as such (pp. 101-102). While not discounting the egregious nature of all police behavior within this continuum, this research study is only concerned with that police sexual violence that is criminal behavior and in violation of a criminal law.

Noting that data on police sexual violence are virtually unavailable to researchers, Kraska and Kappeler (1995) turned to two alternative data sources for their research study to explore the nature of their continuum of police sexual violence. First, they conducted a content analysis of news accounts published in the "Across the Nation"

section of *USA Today* during the period January, 1991, through June, 1993. In some instances, they supplemented the information obtained in *USA Today* with local newspaper accounts of the incidents of police sexual violence that they first learned of in *USA Today*. Second, they examined all of the published court decisions from the United States District Courts from 1978 to 1992 where one of the causes of action giving rise to the filing of the civil action in federal court was pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Civil Rights Act of 1871, as amended,"). They noted that there are two obvious limitations of these data; first, the newspaper accounts provide a convenience sample, and, second, those civil cases in federal court resulting in a published decision/opinion represent only a small fraction of the cases filed in court (Kraska & Kappeler, 1995, p. 92) (see also Kappeler, Kappeler, & Del Carmen, 1993, for a more extensive content analysis of police civil liability in Section 1983 cases filed in federal district courts). Using both sources, they found 124 cases of police sexual violence; 33 cases were located in newspaper stories and 91 cases were located in published court decisions/opinions, and there was no overlap of cases appearing in both sources (pp. 94-95).

In the context of the categories of their continuum of police sexual violence, of the 33 cases from the news source, 12.1% (n = 4) were categorized as unobtrusive police sexual violence, 21.2% (n = 7) were categorized as obtrusive police sexual violence, and 66.7% (n = 22) were categorized as criminal police sexual violence (p. 95). Thus, the majority of those cases found in the news source were categorized as being criminal sexual police violence. This is not so when categorizing the cases found in the published federal district court decisions/opinions where, of the 91 cases in the court sample, 9.9% (n = 9) were categorized as unobtrusive police sexual violence, 73.6% (n = 67) were

categorized as obtrusive police sexual violence, and 16.5% (n = 15) were categorized as criminal sexual police violence. Of note, the majority of the cases of police sexual violence cases litigated in federal court (at least, thus few cases litigated to the point of a published decision and/or opinion by a federal trial court judge) were in the nature of obtrusive police sexual violence. Very few of those cases litigated in court involved incidents that could be categorized as being in the nature of criminal police sexual violence. This finding suggests that few victims of the most egregious forms of police sexual violence come forward and file a formal complaint. Further, it is likely that few women who are targeted and victimized by a police officer in an act of police sexual violence have the resources to pursue civil remedies in a federal civil rights action filed in a federal district court (typically which would be done so with the benefit of legal counsel skilled in federal civil rights litigation).

Violence-Related Police Crime

Police Violence

A great deal of research has been conducted and written about police violence (see, e.g., Chevigny, 1995; Crank, 2004; Geller & Toch, 1996; Johnson, 2003; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2005b; Ross, 2000; Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993; Westley, 1953, 1956, 1970). Although there are numerous definitions of police violence, it is generally recognized as "the justified and unjustified use of any physical force (including deadly force) against citizens" (Sherman, 1980, p. 69). This research study is only concerned with measuring and analyzing unjustified police violence; that is, police violence that results in the imposition of criminal charges being filed against a sworn law enforcement officer and is, as such, construed as violence-related police crime. Since data and research are scant,

however, for police violence resulting in criminal charges being initiated against sworn law enforcement officers in agencies throughout the country, the short discussion that ensues will address a broader spectrum of police violence in this country. Although police sexual violence is discussed above in the section on sex-related police crime, it could just as appropriately be discussed in this section on violence-related police crime; no inferences or conclusions should be drawn as it is outside the scope of this research study as to whether criminal offenses of sexual violence are, in fact, per se sex crimes or crimes of violence.

As with all forms of police crime, "most acts of police violence never come to the attention of the public, governmental entities, and the wider police department" (Ross, 2000, p. 8). Nevertheless, in an effort to learn more about the prevalence and nature of police violence in the wake of the beating of Rodney King, legislation was passed in 1994 calling for the U.S. Department of Justice to collect data regarding the use of excessive force by police officers ("Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994," 1994). As part of its effort to meet the requirements of this Congressional mandate, the Justice Department developed two survey instruments to collect data on police use of excessive force. First, a supplement was developed for the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) (Hickman, 2006, p. 2). The supplemental survey, the Police Public Contact Survey (PPCS), was first administered to a sample in 1999, and each three years thereafter (see, e.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005). Second, the instrument for the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey was expanded to include data collection regarding formal complaints about police use of force made by citizens to large law enforcement agencies (those law

enforcement agencies employing more than 100 full-time sworn law enforcement officers) (p. 2).

The 2003 administration of the LEMAS survey was the first to collect data on the number and disposition of formal citizen complaints about police use of force in large police departments (p. 7) (see, e.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003a). The LEMAS survey is administered to a sub-sample of approximately 3,000 law enforcement agencies completing the more extensive periodic Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (CSLLEA) that is sent to all of the 18,000 +/- law enforcement agencies in the country every three years. Of the approximately 3,000 agencies asked to complete the LEMAS survey are all of those law enforcement agencies employing 100 or more sworn law enforcement officers, of which there are almost 900 such agencies throughout the country (Reaves & Hickman, 2004, p. x).

In 2003, 798 large agencies (i.e., those employing more than 100 sworn law enforcement officers) completed the PPCS, including 496 municipal police department, 32 county police departments, 221 sheriff's offices, and the 49 primary state law general law enforcement agencies.[17] These 798 large law enforcement agencies "comprise about 5% of all general purpose state and local law enforcement agencies, but employ 59% of all full-time sworn officers" in the country (Hickman, 2006, p. 2). In that survey, departments provided information regarding the previous calendar year, 2002. In that year, 26,556 formal citizen complaints were received by large law enforcement agencies, corresponding to "overall rates of 6.6 per 100 full-time sworn officers and 10.9 per 100 full-time sworn officers responding to calls for service" (p. 2). Of these complaints, 84% of the complaints were lodged against officers employed by large municipal police

departments (at rates of 9.5 per 100 full-time sworn officers and 15.4 per 100 officers responding to calls for service); 11% of the complaints were lodged against officers employed by large sheriff's offices (at rates of 3.4 per 100 full-time sworn officers and 7.1 per 100 officers responding to calls for service); about 3% of the complaints were lodged against officers employed by large county police departments (at rates of 2.9 per 100 full-time sworn officers and 4.5 per 100 officers responding to calls for service); and, about 3% of the complaints were lodged against officers employed by primary state law enforcement agencies (rates of 1.3 per 100 full-time sworn officers and 1.7 per officers responding to calls for service) (p. 2). Ninety-four percent of the cases had been closed with a final disposition; only 8% of all citizen complaints about police use of force in 2002 were sustained ("meaning there was sufficient evidence to justify disciplinary action against the officer(s)") (p. 3). Even so, this provides us with very little information regarding the prevalence and nature of police use of force and/or police violence, because it is widely assumed that very few victims of police violence file a formal complaint with an officer's employing law enforcement agency.

Police Burnout as a Precursor to Police Violence

Boulin-Johnson (2000) suggests that police officers with a high level of job burnout demonstrate a high level of violence and that male officers are more likely to externalize their burnout and intense job dissatisfaction through behaviors such as "treating civilians like objects or becoming callous toward people," whereas female officers are more likely to internalize their burnout and intense job dissatisfaction through behaviors such as "feelings of fatigue and emotional depletion" (p. 111). She surveyed 457 male police officers (47 Black and 410 White) and 139 female police officers (39

Black and 100 White) employed in two police departments using a 333-item questionnaire that covered numerous topics and included a seven-point scale on violence and two scales that measured job burnout. About 80% of the male police officers (and about 65% of the female police officers) who scored high on the internal burnout scale reported losing control and acting violently toward their spouse, children, fellow police officers, and citizens. Likewise, about 75% of the police officers (male and female) who scored high on the external burnout scale also reported having lost control and acted violently toward their spouse, children, fellow officers, and citizens (p. 116).

Police Domestic Violence

The murder-suicide by David Brame, chief of police in Tacoma, Washington, in April, 2003 (discussed earlier), where Brame killed his estranged wife and then himself in front of the couple's children, has brought researchers' attention to the oft-ignored and clearly underestimated problem of domestic violence involving police officers (Lonsway, 2006, pp. 397-398). Until recently, very little criminological research has focused on police domestic violence and much of the existing research is of poor methodological rigor (p. 398).

One study from the 1990s offers some perspective of the nature of police-involved domestic violence. As part of an NIJ-funded study to assess the impact, if any, of the Lautenberg Amendments to the federal gun control law (discussed below), Gershon and her colleagues collected data from internal affairs records maintained by a large urban police department employing approximately 2,500 sworn officers in the mid-Atlantic area of the country. They found 106 cases of officer-involved domestic violence reports from the years 1994-1998. Approximately three-fourths of the cases were from

incidents that occurred in 1996 or 1997. Police-involved domestic violence reports were filed during the period 1994-1998 at the rate of 1.2 per sworn police officer, and yet for years prior to 1994 (when the Lautenberg Amendments went into effect) the rate was calculated at 0.2 per 100 officers, which is significant at $p < .05$ (Erwin, Gershon, Tiburzi, & Lin, 2005, p. 15). Of the 106 cases, demographic information of the sworn officers accused of domestic violence are: 58.1% ($n = 61$) of the officers were age 34 or younger; 69.5% ($n = 73$) were ethnic/racial minorities; 84% ($n = 89$) were males; 55.7% ($n = 59$) had 7 or more years of service on the police department; 89.6% ($n = 95$) were unranked officers; and, 73% ($n = 69.5$) were assigned to patrol duty (Erwin et al., 2005, p. 15). As to the alleged victims (referred to as accusers by Erwin et al.), most often made by a woman against male officers ($n = 89$): 48% ($n = 43$) were filed by the officer's wife; 27% ($n = 24$) were filed by the officer's ex-wife or a former girlfriend; and, 25% ($n = 22$) were filed by the officer's then-present girlfriend (p. 16). In cases where the complaint was filed against a female officer, 35% ($n = 6$) were filed by a then-present boyfriend; 35% ($n = 6$) were filed by her then-present girlfriend; 18% ($n = 3$) were filed by an ex-husband or former boyfriend; and, 12% ($n = 2$) were filed by the officer's husband (p. 16). Of all allegations, 77% ($n = 81$) were involving assaults by the complaints' police officer intimate partner (pp. 16-17). Case dispositions varied: 64% ($n = 68$) of the officers were immediately suspended from duty; 26% ($n = 28$) were subject to a court-issued restraining order against them; and, 17% ($n = 18$) were immediately arrested. Nevertheless, 92% of the cases were dismissed and/or not subject to any adverse administrative action (p. 17).

The Lautenberg Amendments to the federal Gun Control Act. The federal gun control law ("Gun Control Act of 1968," 1968) was amended in 1996 to prohibit any individual who had been convicted of any crime of domestic violence, including any misdemeanor domestic violence conviction, from carrying a gun or other weapon ("Lautenberg Amendment," 1996). The 1996 legislation was enacted, in part, due to a convergence of anecdotal reports and research data documenting high incidence of domestic violence involving police officers as the aggressors and/or perpetrators (Van Hasselt & Malcolm, 2005, p. 1). The Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act – which is retroactive – provides no exception under the statute for police officers (or, for that matter, military personnel in the US Armed Services and/or federal law enforcement agents) who are convicted of a crime of domestic violence. The net result is that any domestic violence conviction, including any such conviction that may have happened many years ago prior to (a) that person's employment as a sworn law enforcement officer, and (b) enactment of the Lautenberg Amendment in 1996, disqualifies that individual's ability to own, carry, and/or use any firearm, even while on-duty in the regular course of employment carrying out official duties as a police officer (Boulin-Johnson, Todd, & Subramanian, 2005, p. 3).

Profit-Motivated Police Crime

Greed is the primary motive behind much corruption-based police crime (Mollen Commission, 1994, p. 10). This is likely true if police corruption is conceptualized in the traditional context of, for example, accepting bribes to refrain from enforcing criminal laws. It is, however, "less clear whether officers who perform robberies or burglaries, shoplift, sell drugs, or engage in welfare or insurance fraud during their off-duty time are

engaging in a variety of police corruption" (Fyfe & Kane, 2006, p. xv). For this reason, Fyfe and Kane (2006) created a category of wrongdoing they labeled "profit-motivated misconduct," and recommended "that future scholars and administrators rethink the notion of police corruption" because "police corruption is not as easy to define as we formerly may have believed" (p. xv). Likewise, Carter (1990a, pp. 89-90, 1990b, pp. 91-94) noted that drug-motivated police corruption is characterized by a "profit-driven cycle" as one of two behavioral motivations.[18] The classification of some police misconduct as profit-motivated is consistent with Ross's taxonomy of police crime, where the second of four bipolar distinctions of police crime is between "economically motivated and non-economically motivated police behavior" (Ross, 2001, p. 184). Ross conceptualized police crime to include "a subset of behaviors generally subsumed by the concepts of police coercion, police deviance, occupational crime, and political crime … may … involve economic and noneconomic targets" (p. 194). The pilot study that gives rise to this research formerly conceptualized this fourth category of police crime as greed-related police crime (see Stinson, 2007). This research will, however, adopt and extend the taxonomical framework of Ross (2001) and Fyfe & Kane (2006) by creating the category of profit-motivated police crime.

Theoretical Framework

Researchers make use of theory to make predictions about expected results and to explain relationships about variables in quantitative studies (Creswell, 2009, p. 51). The theoretical framework for this research study is fourfold.

First, theories relating to the subculture of police deviance are closely aligned with police crime. That is to say, subculture theories provide rationale and attempt to

explain factors that might cause a police officer to commit a crime for which he or she might be arrested. For example, Westley (1956) and Stoddard (1968) posited that there is an informal code in policing that dictates how most sworn law enforcement officers behave in their dealings with each other. Building on the work of Key (1935), Westley (1956, 1970) referred to a code of secrecy. Stoddard (1968) expanded this theoretical conceptualization into a theory that stated that police recruits are socialized into an informal and unlawful code of secrecy that perpetuates as a process of group deviation into illegal behaviors. These and other theories of and relating to police crime are discussed in the pages that follow.

Next, Black's (1976) behavior of law theory may explain why some sworn law enforcement officers are arrested when others are not arrested and may also be beneficial in making predictions about expected results in this research study. Behavior of law theory posits that law is a governmental social control and a quantitative variable for which it is possible to formulate propositions that explain the quantity and style of law in every setting. The lengthy discussion of behavior of law theory later in this chapter provides the foundation for the findings discussed in the final chapter (*infra*).

Third, police crime is conceptualized as hidden, or invisible, crime. Invisible crimes are those categories of crime that are not recorded in official crime statistics promulgated by the government (Jupp, 2006; Jupp et al., 1999). The seven features of invisible crime are discussed near the end of this chapter. In many respects, police crime is a phenomenon largely hidden from public view; it is something that the government would prefer we did not dwell on as a problem. That alone justifies this research.

Finally, this research study is presented as being in the realm of newsmaking criminology (see Barak, 1988, 2007, 1995b). In a few respects, this research study is odd. The subject matter is unpleasant and the initial findings of the pilot study (in the next chapter) are alarming. The research methodology is novel, at least, in terms of the mode and scope of data collection. The potential policy implications of the expected findings are great. According to Barak (2007), newsmaking criminology "refers to the conscious efforts and activities of criminologists to interpret, influence or shape the representation of 'newsworthy' items about crime and justice" (p. 191). This research is a newsmaking criminology study of police crime in the United States from 2005 to 2008. The theoretical framework of newsmaking criminology is discussed at the end of this chapter.

The Subculture of Police Deviance

The Brotherhood of Policing: Living by the Code

Police crime perpetuates due to the nature of the police subculture; it has long been recognized that the police operate in a social environment whereby systemic secrecy allows a subculture to thrive based on an unwritten set of norms leading to a permeation of police deviance, corruption, and police crime. Writing for the Wickersham Commission in 1931, Vollmer noted that "it is an unwritten law in police departments that police officers must never testify against their brother officers" (Wickersham Commission, 1931, p. 48). Key (1935, p. 624) noted that police graft (i.e., financial compensation for police protection of underworld organized crime syndicates) is "facilitated by the police rule of silence." Westley conducted extensive research of members of the police department in Gary, Indiana, in the 1950s, and found that a code of secrecy was used as a shield against outsiders by police officers who "tend to regard

the public as an enemy" (Westley, 1956, p. 256; see also Westley, 1970, p. 160).[19] Although this code of secrecy among police officers serves as a social bond, "an unanticipated consequence of the emphasis on secrecy is that the police become intensely suspicious of each other … [whereby] … they are constantly testing each other to find out if the other is a stool pigeon" (Westley, 1956, p. 256).

Building on the concept of an informal social code within policing, Stoddard (1968) argued that police recruits are socialized into an unlawful informal code of secrecy that perpetuates as a process of group deviation into illegal behaviors. Stoddard called this group process "blue-coat crime," which he defined as a "functioning informal social system whose norms and practices are at variance with legal statutes" commonly referred to by police officers simply as "the code" (Stoddard, 1968, p. 201). Stoddard offered a list of a variety of practices under the code: mooching, chiseling, favoritism, prejudice, shopping, extortion, bribery, shakedown, perjury, and premeditated theft (Stoddard, 1968). Herbert (1998) rejected the notion of informal group processes of socialization leading officers into a police subculture of "we versus they," and instead argues that the police subculture is shaped by six normative orders: the law, bureaucratic control, adventure / machismo, safety, competence, and morality. According to Herbert, police officers are both enabled and constrained by each of these normative orders, which he defined as "a set of rules and practices centered around a primary value" (Herbert, 1998, pp. 348, 351). Herbert's conceptual definition of a police subculture, however, failed to account for neither police deviance nor, more specifically, police crime.

Police Cynicism

Niederhoffer (1967) described a police subculture of cynicism where young police officers quickly replace what they have learned in the police academy with the realities of police work:

> The rookie begins with faith in the system. He tries to follow the book of rules and regulations. Then, he discovers that many cases have repercussions of which the book seems wholly ignorant. He is chastised by his colleagues for being naïve enough to follow the book. Gradually he learns to neglect the formal rules and norms and turns elsewhere for direction. Individual interpretation replaces the formal authoritative dictum of the official book and the young policeman is an easy prey to cynicism. (pp. 52-53)

Niederhoffer suggested that this ultimately leads to anomie when the original values of a social system are replaced with a new code; "the process leading to cynicism and anomie may be viewed as a continuum stretching from commitment at one end to anomie at the other, with cynicism at the critical intervening stage" (p. 103). Niederhoffer illustrates the process as follows:

> Differences in the patterns of cynicism are apparently related to a policeman's age and experience. The following classification scheme indicates that there is a succession of typical stages in the growth of cynicism that runs parallel to the occupational career. The preliminary stage, pseudo-cynicism, is recognizable among recruits at the training school. This attribute barely conceals the idealism and commitment beneath the surface. The second stage, romantic cynicism, is reached in the first five years of the police career. The most idealistic young

> members of the force are precisely the ones who are most disillusioned by actual police work, and most vulnerable to this type of cynicism. The third stage, aggressive cynicism, depends on the conjunction of individual cynicism and the subculture of cynicism. It corresponds to *resentiment* [sic] because resentment and hostility become obvious in this period, must prevalent at the ten year mark. In the last few years of the police career, resigned cynicism replaces the former, more blatant type. This detachment may be passive and apathetic or express itself as a form of mellow if mild good will. It accepts and comes to terms with the flaws of the system. (pp. 103-104)

Niederhoffer's theory of police cynicism was based on eleven hypotheses, one of which – the fourth hypothesis – is especially relevant to the instant proposal for a crime prevention program to reduce police crime, "Among patrolmen, those with college educations will reveal a higher level of cynicism than other patrolmen because their expectations for promotion (still unfulfilled) were greater" (p. 106). Niederhoffer found support for this hypothesis in his research of New York City police officers (pp. 241-243). His research, however, was limited to patrol-level non-supervisory police officers viewed as being frustrated over their failure to gain promotions in rank in the NYPD. Assuming that a high level of police cynicism is positively related to the commission of police crime, Niederhoffer's fourth hypothesis is arguably at odds with research suggesting that police officers with college educations are less likely to engage in police misconduct (e.g., Cascio, 1977; Fyfe & Kane, 2006, pp. 262-267; Kappeler, Sapp, & Carter, 1992). Research has yet to correlate police cynicism with police crime.

Police Deviance

A typology of police deviance. Noting the difficulties in developing adequate definitions of deviant police behavior, Barker and Carter (1994b) offered a two-pronged typology of police deviancy: (1) occupational deviance, and (2) abuse of authority, whereby,

> ▪ Police occupational deviance is the deviant behavior – criminal and noncriminal – committed during the course of normal work activities or committed under the guise of the police officer's authority … manifesting itself in two forms – police corruption and police misconduct – both of which specifically apply to the officer's role as an employee rather than to the practice of policing, per se.
>
> ▪ Abuse of authority may be defined as any action by a police officer without regard to motive, intent, or malice that tends to injure, insult, trespass upon human dignity, manifest feelings of inferiority, and/or violate an inherent legal right of a member of the police constituency in the course of performing "police work." (Barker & Carter, 1994b, pp. 6-7).

In the context of abuse of authority, three areas of police deviance are included in the second prong of the typology: physical abuse (e.g., police brutality and police brutality); psychological abuse (e.g., verbal abuse by a police officer, harassment or belittling a person so as to damage their self-esteem); and, legal abuse (i.e., when the police act under the color of state law to violate a person's federally protected constitutional rights) (pp. 7-8). In this typology abuse of authority "has an external locus as an action against the police clientele" (p. 8), whereas occupational deviance "has an internal locus …

concerned with how an officer performs as an organizational member rather than the method by which the officer discharges his/her police duties" (p. 9).

Barker and Carter specified three other distinctions between occupational deviance and abuse of authority in their typology of police deviance. The first distinction is motivation; occupational deviance is typically prompted by motivations related to a personal benefit to the police officer and abuse of authority more likely is motivated by a police officer's intent to achieve some police goal (Barker & Carter, 1994b, p. 9). The second distinction relates to tort liability of the police department. Police deviance in the nature of abuse of authority, with an external locus, can expose the employing police department to civil liability for constitutional torts committed by its police officers (e.g., "Civil Rights Act of 1871, as amended,"). A third distinction dealing with motivation "is that there is greater peer tolerance for abuse of authority than for occupational deviance" (Barker & Carter, 1994b, p. 9).

Techniques of neutralization. Sykes and Matza (1957) offered a theory of delinquency whereby they argued that offenders minimize and justify their deviant behavior through techniques of neutralization. The techniques are (1) denial of responsibility; (2) denial of injury; (3) denial of the victim; (4) condemnation of the condemners; and (5) appeal to higher loyalties (pp. 666-669). In the half century since Sykes and Matza proffered their theory, techniques of neutralization have been applied to a variety of contexts relating to criminal offenders outside the scope of their initial conceptualization in the context of juvenile delinquency as an extension of the theory. Among them, techniques of neutralization have been applied to the context of hate crimes against the Amish (Byers, Crider, & Biggers, 2003), Medicaid fraud by physicians

(Jesilow, Pontell, & Geis, 1993), elder abuse and neglect (Quinn & Tomita, 1997), and in an effort to explain gamblers' rationalizations to continue betting on horses while dealing with the consequences of monetary losses (Rosecrance, 1986). As conceptualized in all of the various formulations and theoretical extensions for techniques of neutralization, it is hypothesized that, through the various justification techniques to neutralize their culpability, offenders can alleviate feelings of guilt.

In the context of corruption and deviant subcultures in the workplace, these neutralization techniques serve as "rationalizing ideologies [that] negate negative interpretations – and possibly substitute positive ones – by articulating why the specific corruptions are justifiable or excusable exceptions to the general normative rules, or they gerrymander the very boundaries of corruption to exclude those acts" (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p. 16). The rationalizing ideologies come about when the belief system of the deviant subculture routinely normalize the behavior to such an extent that the potential stigma of corruption is neutralized (pp. 16-17). In this regard, "individuals involved in organizational corruption tend not to view themselves as corrupt" (Joshi, Anand, & Henderson, 2007, p. 237).[20]

Police officers commonly invoke a variety of socially acceptable rationalizations (in both the general culture as well as the police subculture) for misbehavior in an effort to justify and/or excuse their own police crimes (Hunt & Manning, 1991; cf. Pogarsky & Piquero, 2004, p. 381, who found that considerations of deterrence appear to figure prominently in police misconduct decisions). Foster (1966) was the first scholar to apply Sykes and Matza's (1957) theoretical framework of techniques of neutralization to the context of police crime. Foster studied the response of public administrators in Denver,

Colorado, to a publicized scandal within the Denver Police Department resulting in the criminal prosecution of several police officers. He found that three techniques of neutralization were "directly demonstrable" to his study of police crime: denial of injury ("the criminals in many cases viewed their acts as petty enough to be unnoticed and, if not, losses were covered by insurance anyway"); condemnation of condemners ("the brass had their forms of 'larceny,' why should we not have ours?"); and, appeal to higher loyalties ("loyalties to the police solidarity group") (Foster, 1966, p. 459, n. 6). Kappeler, Sluder, and Alpert (1998, pp. 113-125) also argued that techniques of neutralization are applicable to various forms of police deviance including police crime, and noted that the neutralization technique of police denial of injury is often invoked to justify police theft from a suspect or crooked merchant under the guise of "no innocent got hurt" (p. 117). Similarly, the Philadelphia Police Department justified an unconstitutional mass arrest policy as having the benefit of reducing the supply of illegal drugs on the streets of the city even though the actions of the police officers in carrying out the policy were criminal (Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 1974, p. 673).

Police falsification: lies, perjury, and "testilying." An act of deception is a falsehood that is intentionally produced by someone who is not taken in by their own fabrication (Goffman, 1974, p. 112). Lying, a type of deception, includes a narrower range of behavior and "refers to (intentional) deception that (1) comes in the form of a verifiable assertion, and (2) is literally false" (Green, 2006, p. 77). The practice of deception, including lying, is an integral part of policing (Barker & Carter, 1994a, p. 139; Panzarella & Funk, 1987). Some forms of police deception are widely accepted as legitimate law enforcement practices, such as in instances when police officers use

deception and trickery to elicit incriminating statements from criminal suspects (see, e.g., "Illinois v. Perkins," 1990; Vaughn, 1992). As such, not all lies by police officers are construed as being improper and/or deviant. Some police lies are even encouraged. To that end, the secrecy associated with police lying typifies the nature of (1) law enforcement agencies as bureaucratic organizations and (2) the police subculture (Manning, 1978, p. 244).

In an effort to distinguish the various forms of police lies, Barker and Carter (1994a) formulated a motivation-based taxonomy of police lies: (1) accepted police lying, (2) tolerated police lying, and (3) deviant police lying. Accepted police lies include those lies necessary for a legitimate law enforcement purpose, such as lies and deception to further an undercover law enforcement investigation as well as lies to the media by police administrators and supervisors in order to preserve the integrity of an ongoing criminal investigation (Barker & Carter, 1994a, pp. 139-142). Lies that are tolerated in law enforcement agencies include those lies that are deemed by police officials as "necessary evils" to achieve legitimate law enforcement objectives, even though the police often recognize these lies as potentially inappropriate. Tolerated lies in policing are situational lies where the lies are deemed morally right in the limited context of the situation at hand (cf. situation ethics in Fletcher, 1959, 1966).[21] Deviant police lies include all lies by sworn law enforcement officers that violate a criminal defendant's procedural and/or substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Barker & Carter, 1994a, pp. 146-147).

One serious form of police crime relates to perjury and falsifying documents by sworn law enforcement officers. There are three primary manifestations under the

umbrella of police falsification: (1) testimonial perjury (i.e., lying under oath in a court proceeding); (2) documentary perjury (i.e., sworn or unsworn written false statements in an affidavit or criminal complaint); and, (3) falsification of police records (i.e., false statements written in a police report) (Mollen Commission, 1994, p. 36).

Perjury by police officers is so pervasive that it is generally regarded as a cultural phenomenon (Crank, 2004, p. 295). The Mollen Commission reported that several police officers in the NYPD told Commission investigators that the practice of police falsification – particularly in cases involving narcotics and/or weapons cases – is so common within the police department that officers refer to the practice of police perjury as "testilying" (p. 36). The widespread practice of testilying is "an open secret among prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges" in state and federal courts throughout the country (Dershowitz, 1994, p. 233). Its purpose is to obtain guilty verdicts at trial against criminal defendants whose guilt is legally questionable (Crank, 2004, p. 295). The practice of testilying is seemingly encouraged by prosecutors who, in many jurisdictions, are driven by a "win at all costs" mentality (Davis, 2007, p. 141).[22] Here, once again, the due process model takes a backseat to a crime-control model that is compromised further by the practice in many jurisdictions of promoting prosecutors based on their "win record" of high conviction rates (pp. 140-141).

Unlike other forms of police crime and police corruption that are often crimes that are profit-motivated by greed, crimes of police falsification are often motivated by a skewed sense of what some police officers wrongly perceive as legitimate law enforcement ends (Mollen Commission, 1994, p. 37). In this way, a profound moral commitment to a crime-control model of law enforcement resulting in a willingness by

police officers to do whatever it takes to "get the bad guys" is sometimes referred to as noble cause corruption (Caldero & Crank, 2004). Officers engaging in noble cause corruption are only concerned with the "good end," and justify their often illegal means in pursuit of their larger law enforcement purposes and what they perceive as the greater social good (e.g., typically an arrest and criminal conviction) (Crank, Flaherty, & Giacomazzi, 2006, pp. 103-106).

Police deviance as the norm. Chambliss and Seidman (1971) argued that the police are deviant. "They act illegally, breaching the norms of due process at every point: in committing brutality, in their searches and seizures, in arrests and interrogation" (p. 391). Their argument is based on the premise that the police are legally (i.e., constitutionally) required to adhere to a due process model in conducting their business, but that there are constant demands on the police to embrace a "get tough" on crime modus operandi in the nature of crime-control (p. 349). The problem inherit in this dichotomy is that "since the police do not by law have any authority themselves to punish offenders, the proponents of a 'get tough' policy are in fact urging the police to act illegally" (pp. 349-350).

The vast majority of people in the middle class – i.e., the powerful property owners – expect that the police will interact with them (and their presumably law-abiding family members, friends, neighbors, and co-workers) in the legal context of the due process model, while, at the same time, demanding that the police invoke a crime-control model that is unconcerned with the niceties of constitutionally-mandated considerations of due process and fundamental fairness in dealing with the lower-class and powerless members of society. Thus, the police adopt a dual standard in dealing with the citizenry:

"crime-control practices prevail in dealings with the poor, and due process is observed in dealings with the privileged" (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971, p. 359).

Given (a) the wide latitude of discretion that the police are granted in carrying out their duties as sworn law enforcement officers and (b) the pressures placed upon them to balance the requirements of invoking a due process model (as required by the law) versus the demands to invoke a get tough control-control model (as required by those people in society with power), the police subculture embraces a norm of deviance in carrying out all aspects of policing (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971, p. 391). In arguing that the police are deviant – as a norm of the police subculture in the vein conceptualized by Stoddard (1968) – Chambliss and Seidman were not suggesting that the police are inherently evil or bad, but, rather, that the deviant motivations of the police are, institutionally, rooted in their internalization of a crime-control model rather than the due process model in performing their law enforcement duties (Chambliss & Seidman, 1971, p. 358).

Behavior of Law

Law as Social Control and a Quantitative Variable

Law can be defined simply as governmental social control (Black, 1972). There are other definitions of law (p. 1096, n. 35), and there are other forms of governmental social control (e.g., aspects of social control that are part of the "everyday life of government service, such as a post office or fire department" that control its employees, not citizens) (Black, 1976, p. 2). As conceptualized by Black in the theoretical paradigm of sociology of law, law is a quantitative variable:

> It increases and decreases, and one setting has more than another. It is possible to measure the quantity of law in many ways. A complaint to a legal official, for

example, is more law than no complaint, whether it is a call to the police, a visit to a regulatory agency, or a lawsuit. Each is an increase in the quantity of law. … In criminal matters, an arrest is more law than no arrest, and so is a search or an interrogation. An indictment is more than none, as is a prosecution, and a serious charge is more than a minor charge. Any initiation, invocation, or application of law increases in quantity, even when someone brings law against himself, as in a voluntary surrender, confession, or plea of guilty. Detention before trial is more than release, a bail bond more than none, and a higher bail bond more than one that is lower. A trial or other hearing is itself an increase of law, and some outcomes are more law than others: … a conviction is more than acquittal. … And the same applies to the severity of punishment as described in each setting: the greater the fine, the longer the prison term, the more pain, mutilation, humiliation, or deprivation inflicted, the more law. A court order or command of any kind, by any legal official, is more law as well. A pardon, commutation, or parole is less law, but a revocation or parole is more. If a government provides treatment for a deviant, such as hospitalization or rehabilitation, this is also more law. … But if a defendant wins a reversal, this is less law. More generally, the quantity of law is known by the number and scope of prohibitions, obligations, and other standards to which people are subject, and by the rate of legislation, litigation, and adjudication. As a quantitative variable, law is all of this and more. (Black, 1976, p. 3).

Black further delineated social control in terms of the style of law, which is also a quantitative variable: penal social control, compensatory social control, therapeutic social

control, and conciliatory social control (Black, 1976, pp. 4-6). Penal social control prohibits certain conduct (i.e., those regarded as crimes) and enforces the prohibitions with the punishment of offenders who are found guilty (pp. 4-5). The standard of compensatory social control is civil obligation and remediates debt (i.e., specific money due by agreement or otherwise) by ordering the payment of monies owed by a debtor to a creditor (where the judgment creditor is viewed as a victim). Both penal and compensatory styles of social control are accusatory with parties (i.e., a complainant and a defendant) and eventual winners and losers (pp. 4-5). Therapeutic social control (i.e., helping people in need) and conciliatory social control (i.e., resolving conflicts through dispute resolution) are remedial methods of social control where the standard is helping people in trouble and, in theory, nonadversarial (p. 4). The quantity and style of law both vary across time (e.g., centuries, decades, years, months, weeks, days, hours, etc.) and space (e.g., societies, countries, states, regions, cities, towns, communities, neighborhoods, families, and relationships, etc.) (pp. 3, 5). The instant research study is concerned with the quantity of law and only one style of social control: penal social control. And, within penal social control, this study is limited to the aspect of criminal arrest.

The Social Organization of Criminal Arrest

One of Black's earliest theoretical formulations of the behavior of law involved the social context under which police officers make arrests during routine encounters with citizens while on patrol (see Black, 1971). The theoretical framework evolved out of research for his dissertation, and is the same research and data that are the basis for numerous other studies, including Reiss (1971a), as well as much of Black's later

theoretical formulations on the behavior of law (e.g., Black, 1973, 1976, 1980, 1989, 1998). The research involved ethnographic field observation of police officers in Chicago, Boston, and Washington, D.C., during the summer of 1966 (see also Black, 1968; Black & Reiss, 1967; Reiss, 1971a). Researchers accompanied police officers on patrol duty shifts and, at the end of the shifts, recorded certain observations about police behavior, including the behaviors of police officers in 5,713 interactions or encounters (called "incidents") with citizens during the course of the shift (Black, 1971, pp. 1088-1089). For the purposes of his research and theoretical framework for the social organization of arrest, Black defined "arrest" as referring "only to transportation of a suspect to a police station," and, for his purposes, did "not require formal booking of a suspect with a crime" (pp. 1089-1090, n. 7).

Police encounters in routine situations involving both a suspect and a complainant. Some 176 encounters recorded by the ethnographers involved both a suspect and a complainant. Of these, about one-third of the incidents involved felony allegations, and the remainder of these incidents involved allegations of offenses that were classified as misdemeanors. In terms of arrests, 58% of the felony encounters resulted in an arrest being made by the police, whereas 44% of the misdemeanor encounters resulted in an arrest being made. As such, Black found that roughly 50% of those persons suspected of crimes were released by the police, and about half were arrested by the police (Black, 1971, pp. 1092-1093). In each of these incidents, the ethnographers assumed that legal probable cause existed to substantiate a decision by the police to arrest a suspect, and, yet, the police only exercised their discretion to effect an arrest about half of the time. Of note, the ethnographers recorded 6 situations where

police officers physically observed suspects engaged in felonious activity, but only arrested 4 of the 6 suspects; two of the persons physically observed by police officers engaged in the commission of a felony were simply released by the police and not charged with a crime nor arrested. Likewise, arrests were made in misdemeanor encounters about two-thirds of the time when commission of the criminal offense was observed by the police, and about one-third of the time when the crime was reported by a complainant but not observed by the police. Clearly, "the police do not use all the legal power they possess" (p. 1094).[23]

Police encounters in routine situations without a complainant. These are, in other words, those encounters with crime suspects that are police-initiated encounters. Although Black's sample small size did not lend itself to inferential statistic analyses, he did find that most police-initiated encounters with crime suspects involve misdemeanor offenses, and, in those encounters, the only evidence is a police officer's claim that he or she witnessed that person commit a crime (Black, 1971, p. 1101).

Generalizations regarding police behavior in routine situations where arrest is a possibility. Black (1971) made several empirical generalizations regarding police behavior in routine encounters where an arrest by the police of a citizen is a possibility. First, most situations where an arrest can be made by the police during routine encounters on patrol arise through citizen (complainant) initiative, rather than by police initiative (p. 1104). Black referred to this process as "mobilization," where citizen involvement mobilizes the criminal law (pp. 1104-1105; see also Black, 1973). Thus, in a very real sense, "all legal systems rely to a great extent upon private citizens" (Black, 1971, p. 1105). Second, decisions of the police to make an arrest of a citizen sharply reflect the

preferences of citizen complainants, especially when a complainant pushes for leniency by the police in their dealings with an alleged offender (p. 1105). Third, the police are lenient in their routine arrest practices; they exercise their discretion to make arrests less often than the law allows (p. 1106). Fifth, the likelihood that the police are going to make an arrest is higher in situations involving serious, felonious, situations than in situations involving minor, misdemeanor, offenses (p. 1107). Next, there is a greater likelihood of the police making an arrest in those encounters where there is greater relational distance between a suspect and a complainant (pp. 1107-1108). The police are most likely to make an arrest when a citizen complainant and suspect are strangers, less likely to make an arrest when the complainant and suspect are friends or neighbors, and least likely to make an arrest when the complainant and suspect are family members. Finally, the probability that a suspect will be arrested by the police increases when a suspect acts in a manner that is disrespectful of the police (pp. 1108-1109). These are the suspects who are viewed by the police as assholes because they do not accept the police definition of the situation (Van Maanen, 1978). Indeed, assholes are always more likely to be arrested by the police than those suspects who do not act like assholes during routine encounters with the police (cf. Laporte, 2000, who noted that, historically, cities have been cleansed through the elimination of people who smell like shit).

Black's Theory of Law

Black's (1976) theory of law states that law is governmental social control and a quantitative variable for which it is possible to formulate propositions that explain the quantity and style of law in every setting. The theoretical propositions each state a relationship between law and one or more aspects of social life – stratification,

morphology, culture, organization, or social control – that explains the behavior of law in all situations, places, times, and societies (Black, 1976, p. 6). According to Black, the theory and its propositions predict and explain the behavior of law, not individuals. Thus,

> It is possible, for instance, to explain arrest with the proposition that law varies inversely with other social control. Hence, a proposition that pertains to legislation, litigation, and adjudication, even to the evolution of law over the centuries, also explains why a policeman makes an arrest in one encounter and not another. But is does not explain the behavior of the policeman as an individual. It explains the behavior of the law (Black, 1976, p. 8).

The theory "does not assume or imply that society ultimately benefits from the or that any particular segment of society ultimately benefits" from the law, nor does it "assume or imply anything about the purpose, value, or impact of law … it explains the behavior of law, and that is all" (p. 8). In this regard, the theory of law implies the same set of facts as any criminological theory (i.e., any theory of crime), but differs only to the extent that the theory of law explains them using different logic (Black, 1998, p. 164).

Deviant behavior. In the theoretical framework of Black's theory of law, deviant behavior is that conduct subject to social control (i.e., "social control defines what is deviant") (Black, 1976, p. 9). In this way, the more social control to which conduct is subjected, the more deviant the conduct is. This is so because "the seriousness of deviant behavior is defined by the quantity of social control to which it is subject" (p. 9). It stands to reason, then, that (a) deviant behavior is an aspect of social control, (b) illegal behavior is an aspect of the law, and, thus, (c) the theory predicts illegal behavior. (p. 9). Black argued that the theory of law is as useful for predicting illegal behavior as other

criminological theories of crime and delinquency (e.g., Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Hirschi, 1969), but that the theory of law is unique in that "explains illegal behavior with the same principles that explain the law itself" instead of explaining "illegal behavior with the motivation of the individual" (p. 9).

Stratification. Stratification, the first variable aspect of the behavior of law, is the vertical aspect of social life (Black, 1976, p. 11). Stratification refers to the uneven distribution of wealth and property in society. In our society, there can be vertical mobility during one's life, as stratification varies across time and space and among, within, and between individuals, families, organizations, and groups (p. 12). According to Black, stratification explains law, in both quantity and style, because those people with more wealth generally have advantages in the legal system. Likewise, there is more law in societies where there is more stratification. In terms of the vertical direction of law, it moves along this stratification whenever moving through ranks and at every stage of a legal process (e.g., a criminal prosecution) (p. 21). In a criminal case, the law is more likely to have a downward direction, meaning that "upward deviance is more serious than downward deviance" (p. 21):

> In the case of a crime, for instance, a victim who is above the offender in rank is more likely to call the police than a victim whose rank is lower than the offender's. In the aggregate, in fact, more calls to the police pertain to upward crimes than to downward crimes. In modern American, for example, the police handle more crime committed by blacks against whites than the reverse, by juveniles against adults than the reverse, and, in general, by poorer people against wealthier people than the reverse. (Black, 1976, pp. 21-22)

The difference (i.e., the vertical distance) between the ranks of individuals, depending on the direction of law in a case, also explains and predicts the quantity of law; "downward law increases with this distance, whereas the behavior of upward law is just the opposite" (Black, 1976, p. 24). As such, in a criminal case:

> The seriousness of an offense by a lower against a higher rank thus increases with the difference in wealth between the parties, whereas the seriousness of an offense by a higher against a lower rank decreases as this difference increases. Hold the victim's rank constant, then, and law varies inversely with the offender's rank. The wealthier a thief is, instance, the less serious is his theft. (Black, 1976, p. 25)

Likewise, a person of higher rank in terms of social stratification has other distinct advantages, even if tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison in a criminal case, than a person of lower rank. "He is more likely to be pardoned or paroled, for instance. If imprisoned, he is more likely to have privileges" (p. 25). Finally, "stratification also predicts and explains the style of law, whether it is penal, compensatory, therapeutic, or conciliatory" (p. 29). Thus, assuming that police officers are granted significant rank in terms of social stratification merely by virtue of their designation as sworn law enforcement officers, stratification – as the first component of Black's theory of the behavior of law – offers relevant context to help form a theoretical framework to start to develop an understanding of the phenomenon that is police crime.

Black's (1976) theory stated these propositions relating to stratification and the behavior of law:

- Law varies directly with stratification (p. 13).
- Law varies directly with rank (p. 17).

- Downward law is greater than upward law (p. 21).
- Downward law varies directly with vertical distance, but upward law varies inversely with vertical distance (pp. 24-25).

Morphology. The second variable aspect of the behavior of law is morphology, which is the horizontal aspect of social life (Black, 1976, p. 37). Morphology is "the distribution of people in relation to one another, including their division of labor, networks of interaction, intimacy, and integration," and it "varies across social settings of every kind, whether societies, communities, neighborhoods, or organizations, public places or events, marriages or friendships" (p. 37). According to Black, "morphological variables explain many of the patterns of social life" (p. 37). Inherent to the concept of morphology is differentiation (i.e., "a specialization of function across the parts of a whole") (p. 38). Social differentiation has increased during the past few centuries in conjunction with societal evolution and changes in cultural life (see Durkheim, 1893/1984), and although in many instances social life differentiates as a result of an increase in population, Black (1976) argued that population increases do not necessarily result in a corresponding increase in social differentiation. To this end, within society "smaller groups may display more differentiation than larger groups" (Black, 1976, p. 38). Regarding differentiation, "law varies directly with differentiation, to a point, then reverses itself" (Black, 1976, p. 39). In essence,

> Law increases with differentiation to a point of interdependence but declines with symbiosis. There is less law where people are undifferentiated by function, with little or no exchange among themselves, and, at the other extreme, where each is completely dependent upon the next. (Black, 1976, p. 39)

Another aspect of morphology is relational distance between people. Simply stated, "people vary in the degree to which they participate in one another's lives" (Black, 1976, p. 40). According to Black, as an element of morphology, relational distance predicts and explains the quantity of law; "law is inactive among intimates, increasing as the distance between people increases but decreasing as this reaches the point at which people live in entirely separate worlds" (p. 41).

> In a modern society, with people moving from place to place, from one large organization or city to another, strangers are encountered everywhere, and law is an ever-present possibility. But little law enters the sanctuaries of intimacy. Thus, intimates are less likely to call the police about each other. If they do, the police are less likely to handle their problem as a crime, and, in any case, they are less likely to make an arrest. If an intimate is arrested, he is less likely to be prosecuted. In fact, an intimate's associates may shield him from the law: They are less likely to cooperate with the investigation of his offense; they are more likely to lie for him; they are more likely to hide him. The court may even excuse family members from testifying against each other. In many ways, then, intimacy provides immunity from law. (Black, 1976, p. 42).

Similarly, Black argued that relational distance also predicts and explains the outcomes of legal proceedings, including criminal cases (Black, 1976, p. 44). For example, judges are reluctant to rule against, and/or convict in a criminal proceeding, anyone who is a personal friend and/or family member of the judge (p. 44). In civil cases, lawyers who are close personal friends are more likely to settle clients' cases out-of-court when representing parties with opposing legal interests (p. 44). The same can be

predicted for citizen interactions with the police; police officers are less likely to arrest (or even issue a traffic ticket to) one of their own friends or members of their families than a stranger who commits a crime in their presence. Likewise, relational distance as an aspect of behavior of law explains why police officers who commit crimes themselves are often never arrested and/or prosecuted for their crime(s).

In many respects, police officers are only arrested when they have expended all of their political capital and other officials are left with no other choice than to publicly resolve the problem through the formal mechanisms of the criminal justice system. This is because, as the behavior of law theory states, "the radial location of a person or group is a status that confers privileges and disabilities" (Black, 1976, p. 48). So, a person who is employed has more status than a person who is unemployed; "patterns of participation define the integration of people into social life" (p. 48). In this respect, a person who is well integrated into social life is less likely than a person on the margins of society to engage in criminal activities (Laub & Sampson, 2003; Sampson & Laub, 1993). It is a matter of social control. Similarly,

> All else constant, an offense between two employed men is more likely to result in legal action than an offense between two who are unemployed, one between two socialites more than one between two isolates, one between two residents more than one between two transients. If a vagrant victimizes another vagrant, for instance, the police are less likely to make an arrest, and, if they do, a prosecutor, judge, or jury is less likely to be severe. In other words, an offense between marginal people is less serious than an offense between people more integrated into social life. (Black, 1976, p. 49)

That being said, Black is not suggesting that people only interact socially – and, for our purposes, committing a crime against another person is a social act albeit socially disfavored – with other people of their own radial status. So, socially integrated people may victimize and commit crimes against marginal people, or vice versa (Black, 1976, pp. 49-50).

Black defines radial direction of morphology in terms of centrifugal deviance and centripetal deviance (Black, 1976, pp. 49-54). Although social life is said to be concentric, social deviance implicates people in different radial locations (p. 49), and can be explained as follows:

> Centrifugal deviance offends outwardly, with the deviant more integrated than his victim, whereas centripetal deviance offends inwardly. In each case, the direction of law is opposite that of the deviant behavior, with centrifugal law defining and responding to centripetal deviance, and centripetal law to centrifugal deviance. Moreover, the quantity of law varies accordingly: centrifugal law is greater than centripetal law. This means that the offense of a marginal person or group against an integrated person or group is more serious than an offense in an opposite direction. … Integration is a matter of degree, however, and the difference between people in this respect – the radial distance between them – also predicts and explains the quantity of law. Centrifugal law increases with this distance, whereas centripetal law decreases. … Thus, the likelihood of a complaint by an integrated person against a marginal person increases with the difference in integration between them, as does the likelihood that the complaint will succeed. But the likelihood of a complaint in the opposite direction, from a marginal

> person against someone more integrated, decreases as the difference between them increases, and the same applies to the success of a complaint. (Black, 1976, pp. 50-51)

Thus, a crime that is committed by a person who is unemployed is considered to be a more serious offense than is a crime that is committed by an employed person, and more serious if an unemployed offender is a transient person unknown to the local community and/or has no family in the area (p. 51) (see also Laub & Sampson, 2003). In fact, Black argues that "marginality itself may even be defined as illegal" (Black, 1976, p. 51).

Given this context, Black (1976) offered these propositions as to the morphology of behavior of law:

- The relationship between law and differentiation is curvilinear (p. 39).
- The relationship between law and relational distance is curvilinear (p. 41).
- Law varies directly with integration (p. 48).
- Centrifugal law is greater than centripetal law (p. 50).
- Centrifugal law varies directly with radial distance, but centripetal law varies inversely with radial distance (p. 50).

Culture. Culture, another variable aspect, is the "symbolic aspect of social life, including expressions of what is true, good, and beautiful" (Black, 1976, p. 61). It includes things such as folklore, religion, science, and technology, as well as notions of right and wrong, good and bad, and conceptions about what ought to be in terms of morality, values, and ideology (p. 61). Additionally, "culture includes aesthetic life of all sorts, the fine arts and the popular, such as poetry and painting, clothing and other decorative art, architecture, and even the culinary arts" (p. 61). As a variable aspect of

social life, the quantity of culture varies from one setting to another for individuals, groups, organizations, communities, and societies (and even among, between and within regions of a society, country, state, city, and/or neighborhood) (pp. 63-64). Black argued that law varies directly with culture; "where culture is sparse, so is law; where it is rich, law flourishes. The more culture, the more law" (p. 63). According to Black, it is possible to examine the quantity of culture and then predict and explain the quantity of law. This is possible because (a) law varies directly with culture, and (b) legal control is greater where legal culture is greater (pp. 64-65). For example, literacy and education are aspects and measurements of culture (p. 64). A person with nine years of formal education (i.e., someone who dropped out of school after the 9th Grade) is considered to have less culture than a person who received nineteen years of formal education and earned their Ph.D. Thus, Black argued that people who are literate and educated are more likely to prevail in legal proceedings than people who are illiterate and uneducated (pp. 64-65).

Cultural direction impacts on the behavior of law. Deviant behavior may have "a direction between different quantities of culture" (e.g., people who have obtained different levels of formal education), as well as "a direction between different degrees of conventionality" (e.g., an Amish farmer in Smicksburg, Pennsylvania, versus a drug dealer in North Philadelphia, Pennsylvania). Thus,

> The seriousness of deviant behavior depends upon the conventionality of both the offender and the victim. The most serious is the deviant behavior of an unconventional person or group against someone more conventional, followed by deviant behavior between people equally conventional, then between people equally unconventional, and lastly by the deviant behavior of a conventional

person or group against someone less conventional. All else constant, the quantity of law decreases in this order. (Black, 1976, p. 73)

The above examples of an Amish farmer in rural Pennsylvania and a drug dealer in urban Pennsylvania also provide context for cultural distance (Black, 1976, pp. 73-79). Cultural distance refers to both (a) differences in the quantity of culture, and differences in the frequency of culture. This, too, predicts and explains the quantity of law according to Black; "law is less likely at the extremes, where there is little or no cultural diversity, and also where it is great. This applies to every expression of law … to litigation and adjudication … to the severity of punishment across cases" (Black, 1976, p. 74).

Black's (1976) theory included numerous propositions about culture as a variable aspect of social life in predicting and explaining behavior of law. They are:

- Law varies directly with culture (p. 63).
- Law is greater in a direction toward less culture than toward more culture (p. 65).
- In a direction toward less culture, law varies directly with cultural distance, but in a direction toward more culture, law varies inversely with cultural distance (pp. 65-66).
- Law varies directly with conventionality (p. 68).
- Law is greater in a direction toward less conventionality than toward more conventionality (p. 69).
- In a direction toward less conventionality, law varies directly with cultural distance, but in a direction toward more conventionality, law varies inversely with cultural distance (p. 70).

▪ The relationship between law and cultural distance is curvilinear (p. 74)

Organization. A fourth variable of the behavior of law, organization, is the corporate aspect of social life (i.e., the "capacity for collective action") (Black, 1976, p. 85). Organizations can take the form of any group, such as a family, workplace, corporation, club, community association, church, political party, municipality, governmental entity, or a state (p. 85). As with other aspects of social life, organization is a quantitative variable that can be measured. Some measures of organization are "the presence and number of administrative officers, the centralization and continuity of decision making, and the quantity of collective action itself" (p. 85). Black described the quantity of organization in these terms:

> Organization varies in time and space. A society may be more or less organized as a state, for instance, and its people may be more or less organized into smaller groups, whether hunting parties, secret fraternities, clans, voluntary associations, or corporations. One church may be more organized than another, one army more than another, one legal system more than another. Even one individual may be more organized than another – as measured by his memberships. Finally, any group is, by definition, more organized than an individual on his own. (Black, 1976, p. 86).

Some aspects of organization are specifically relevant to police crime. Black argued that "organization provides an immunity from law, and the more organized the offender, the more of this immunity is enjoyed" (Black, 1976, p. 93). This is consistent with the observation that law enforcement officers are typically immune from law enforcement (Reiss, 1971a). Law varies inversely with an offender's organization and/or

organizational membership. Likewise, law varies directly with a victim's organization and/or organizational membership (Black, 1976, p. 93). Black also noted that some states are more organized than other states, and that the criminal law varies from state to state (p. 96). The same can be said for law enforcement agencies, including police departments and sheriff's departments. Some law enforcement agencies are highly organized, whereas other law enforcement agencies are loosely organized, disorganized, poorly organized, incompetently organized, or, perhaps in some instances, unorganized. The implications can be significant: "as the organization of criminal law increases, the demand for law increases, and it intrudes ever deeper into society, with ever more conduct defined as criminal and ever more violations discovered" (p. 96). Thus, the application of criminal law (i.e., penal law in the context of Black's theory of law), all else constant, varies directly with the organization of the state (p. 98). It goes to reason, arguably then, that a police officer is more likely to be arrested for police crime if the offense occurs during the course of the officer's employment in a highly organized police department than in a less organized police department. Further, a police officer who is employed by a less organized police department is more likely to be arrested for police crime committed while off-duty if the offense occurs in the jurisdiction of some other police department that is more organized than the law enforcement agency employing the offending police officer.

Black's (1976) theory of law included these propositions about organization as a variable aspect of social life:

- Law varies directly with organization (p. 86).

▪ Law is greater in a direction toward less organization than toward more organization (p. 92).

▪ In a direction toward less organization, law varies directly with organizational distance, but in a direction toward more organization, law varies inversely with organizational behavior (p. 93).

Social control. Social control is the normative aspect of social life (Black, 1976, p. 105). Law is one form of social control; "it divides people into those who are respectable and those who are not; it disgraces some, but protects the reputation of others" (p. 105). As with the aspects of social life – stratification, morphology, culture, and organization – social control is a quantitative variable. There are different amounts of social control in different settings, times, and places. In this regard, social control can explain deviant behavior and the commission of criminal acts (pp. 105-107). Law is strongest where other forms of social control are weaker. Thus, problems are less likely to be handled in the formal context of the law and legal system when there is a significant amount of social control within and/or between groups (pp. 107-108). Hence,

> Family disputes are less likely to go to law than disputes of other kinds, and the stronger the family, the less likely this is. The police are less likely to hear about a crime within a family than a crime between strangers who have no other social control of their own. If the police hear about a crime within a family, they are less likely to recognize it as such, whether by writing an official report or by making an arrest. It is less likely to be prosecuted, and, if it goes to court, a conviction is less likely. If convicted, an offender against a member of his own family is less likely to receive a severe sentence. But some families have more social control

> than others, and their members have all the more immunity from law. Thus, the more parental control to which a juvenile is subject, the less likely he is to be subject to the law. (Black, 1976, p. 108)

This is because law varies with all of the other types and amount of social control (p. 109). Law becomes less important in settings "where people closely watch each other's conduct and readily criticize and punish deviants in their own way" (p. 109). Conversely, when a person is free from social control, for whatever reason, he/she is more likely to be subject to criminal arrest, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration (p. 110). If a person is not respected, even within their own group/organization(s), they are more likely to be subject to law. Complaints to the police by a respectable/respected person against an unrespectable person or more likely to be subject to more law, whereas a complaint to the police by an unrespectable person against a respectable person is likely to be subjected to little or no law (pp. 114-117).

These propositions relating to social control stem from this conceptualization of behavior of law as formulated by Black (1976) in his theory of law:

- Law varies inversely with other social control (p. 97).
- Law varies directly with respectability (p. 112).
- Law is greater in a direction toward less respectability than toward more respectability (p. 114).
- In a direction toward less respectability, law varies directly with normative distance, but in a direction toward more respectability, law varies inversely with normative distance (p. 117).

Anarchy. Anarchy, another quantifiable variable, is "social life without law, that is, without governmental social control," and is the inverse of law (Black, 1976, p. 123). Communal anarchy is found where people are "equal, symbiotic, intimate, homogeneous, and unorganized" and there are bonds of "closeness, similarity, and stability" (p. 125). There are forms of social control in anarchy (e.g., in some settings "social control ranges from banishment and beatings to ridicule and teasing") (pp. 126-127). Black argued that over many centuries in time, law has increased and continues to increase while, at the same time, social control decreases (pp. 131-132). The result is that anarchy has declined, but may only be dormant.

Empirical Tests of Black's Theory of Law

Numerous research studies of varying degrees of methodological rigor have found little or no empirical support in tests of Black's (1976) theory of law using large datasets of crime victim data (see, e.g., Avakame, Fyfe, & McCoy, 1999; Gottfredson & Hindelang, 1979a). Some criminologists have found the theory to be untestable and have been highly critical of the theory (see, e.g., Braithewaite & Biles, 1980; Gottfredson & Hindelang, 1979a, 1979b, 1980). Bernard (2002) has suggested that there is has been great confusion among criminologists testing the theory as to which variable(s) are appropriate as dependent variables pursuant to the theory, and that poor operationalization has resulted in muddled research results. Others have found some usefulness in and mixed support for Black's theory of law, especially as it relates to mobilization of law (see Black, 1973). For example, support for the behavior of law theory has been found in recent research explaining police response to domestic violence calls for service (Smith, 2001) and in predicting the quantity of law in civil remedies for

sexual harassment claims (Dawson & Welsh, 2005). Likewise, Chappell and Maggard (2007) found mixed support for Black's theory of law in research designed to understand sentencing discrepancies in criminal cases involving powder cocaine or crack cocaine. Finally, although only finding limited support for Black's (1976) theory of law in research examining factors affecting clearance of homicide investigations by the police, Litwin argued that Black's theory "should remain an important theoretical framework for understanding police discretion" (Litwin, 2004, pp. 346-347).

Police Crime as Invisible Crime

The Features of Invisible Crime

Hidden crime, or invisible crime, are those categories of crime that are not recorded in official crime statistics promulgated by the government (Jupp, 2006). Jupp, Davies, and Francis (1999) identified seven features of hidden crimes. First, there is little or no individual knowledge or public knowledge that a crime has been committed. In instances where there is individual awareness of the commission of a crime, the act is viewed as a normal event and not acknowledged as criminal in nature (pp. 6-8). Second, official crime statistics fail to record and/or classify the event as crime (pp. 8-12). A third feature of hidden or invisible crime is that there is no criminological theory to explain the crime (and/or its existence and its causes) (pp. 12-15). Fourth, there is little or no criminological research into hidden or invisible crimes (pp. 15-18). Often the lack of research is due to a lack of data available for analyses, or because there is some vested interest by those individuals or groups in power to withhold access to information on a certain category of crime. Researchers who pursue study of hidden crime often, by necessity, resort to novel methodologies in order to gather data and study the area of

interest to them and inevitably become "open to the, often unjustifiable, criticism of being non-scientific and biased" (Jupp, 2006, p. 204). A fifth feature of hidden or invisible crime is that there are no mechanisms of systematic or formal control for the crimes (Jupp et al., 1999, pp. 18-20). Sometimes this is the result of not treating the events as crime and/or a "blurring of boundaries between what is legitimate and illegitimate" (p. 204). Another feature of hidden or invisible crime is that the crime is not on the political agenda of politicians; there are no politics focused on the crime as a serious problem (Jupp et al., 1999, pp. 20-22). Finally, there is no moral panic surrounding hidden or invisible crime, because the bad actors are not viewed as part of anything more than individual instances, and are rarely, if ever, perceived as involving any greater societal problem (pp. 22-23).

The Features of Police Crime that make it Invisible Crime

Within the paradigm of invisible crimes there are "degrees of invisibility" that vary with different acts and events that constitute invisible crime, and these degrees of invisibility are directly related to the mechanisms of enforcement, regulation, and control (Jupp et al., 1999, p. 5). Jupp and his colleagues refer to this process as "relative invisibility," because there are numerous factors that make certain crimes more or less invisible, and hidden from public view (p. 5). This is especially true with most forms of police crime. Researchers have often acknowledged that police corruption is an invisible crime that is largely hidden from the public (see, e.g., Box, 1983, p. 98; Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005, p. 8). As discussed in the paragraphs to follow, most forms of police crime are, to a large extent, invisible crime, and this feature of police crime is not limited to those offenses in the nature of corruption.

No knowledge of police crime. As Box (1983) noted, "there is more to crime and criminals than the state reveals. But most people cannot see it" (p. 15). Very little is known about the nature, incidence, and prevalence of police crime (see, e.g., Barak, 1995a, pp. 24-25; Box, 1983, pp. 80-82; Chambliss, 1999, p. 133; Ross, 2000, p. 3). Jupp and his colleagues identify four problems that typify the no knowledge feature of invisible crimes. They are an awareness problem, a normalization problem, a problem of ideology, and a collusion problem (Jupp et al., 1999, pp. 7-8). Police crime clearly suffers from an awareness problem. Not only is very little known about the nature and prevalence of police crime, but very few people are aware of the phenomena as being anything other than occasional instances of criminal acts being committed by rogue police officers. Second, those people who are aware of police crime normalize the behavior, often by refusing to call it crime; more often than not, crime committed by police officers is referred to by public officials and members of the media alike as instances of police misconduct and/or police corruption. It is not unusual to read news accounts of police crime that never use the word "crime" even when describing felonious conduct by sworn law enforcement officers.

Third, there is a problem of ideology, where fundamental aspects of police crime and theoretical framework are framed in such a way to legitimize the criminal conduct of police officers who commit crimes. For example, some researchers have questioned the mere existence of a police subculture that tends to corrupt sworn law enforcement officers (see, e.g., Herbert, 1998; Walker & Katz, 2008, p. 164). Others have been so bold as to question the propriety of prosecuting police officers who commit on-duty crimes as a remedy for police corruption (Walker & Katz, 2008, p. 469). Last is the problem of

collusion "where individuals collude in their own potential victimization" (Jupp et al., 1999, p. 8). Collusion in this regard is a very real impediment to awareness of police crime. Consider, for example, scenarios where citizens bribe police officers with cash payoffs or sexual favors in consideration for leniency in a traffic citation and/or arrest. In these types of instances, the victims (most likely not even realizing and/or acknowledging that they are victims of crime) perpetuate the police crime phenomenon.

No statistics on police crime. As discussed throughout this prospectus, there are no statistics maintained and/or categorized of crime committed by sworn law enforcement officers in this country, at any level of government. This creates an interesting aspect of the hidden nature of police crime; it is generally accepted among criminologists that official crime statistics underreport the extent of crime (Jupp et al., 1999, pp. 8-9). Here, no one has any statistical/empirical basis to even conjure an estimation of the extent of police crime in the United States.

No research on police crime. All of the features of invisible crime discussed above – no knowledge, no statistics, and no theory – lead to a dearth of research into police crime (Jupp, 2006, p. 204). Indeed, no known has research grounded in Ross' (2001) taxonomy of police crime has been published. Some research that would advance the knowledge of police crime has not received formal publication and/or widespread distribution (see, e.g., Fyfe & Kane, 2006; Walker & Irlbeck, 2002, 2003).[24] Other research has been ancillary to the problem of police crime. Most is categorized under the auspices of the more generic and misleading heading of police corruption (see, e.g., Kutnjak Ivkovic, 2005). The bulk of recent research studies published in peer-reviewed refereed journals have avoided the central issues by focusing on perceptions of police

ethics, integrity, misconduct, and/or corruption (see, e.g., Dowler & Zawilski, 2007; Hunter, 1999; Klockars et al., 1997; Maher, 2008; Micucci & Gomme, 2005; Seron, Pereira, & Kovath, 2006; Weitzer, 1999). Rarely does even the term "police crime" appear in the recent literature. Another problem related to the paucity of research on police crime is the unavailability of datasets for rigorous analysis. The lack of research stifles knowledge of invisible crimes by eliminating the possibility for extensive theoretical development and assessment (Jupp et al., 1999, p. 15).

No control of police crime. All indications are that one or more police officer is arrested every day in the United States for crimes of every type imaginable (see results of the pilot study for this research study below). Yet, very little is known about the nature and extent of police crime. It has long been recognized that many more police officers commit crimes – serious crimes that would send anyone else to prison – for which they are rarely prosecuted, let alone disciplined administratively by the law enforcement agencies that employs them as sworn law enforcement officers (Deutsch, 1955, p. 40; Reiss, 1971a, pp. 156-163). Yet, there are no systematic mechanisms for the control of police crime. Again, much of this likely stems from the code of silence that permeates police departments across the country and the lack of official statistics tracking and categorizing crimes committed by police officers (nor arrests, prosecutions, and/or convictions).

No political agenda for police crime. Invisible crimes are characterized by a lack of politics; that is "they do not typically appear as a significant part of the political agenda" (Jupp, 2006, p. 204). Politicians, including prosecutors, often go to great lengths to make sure that knowledge of police crime remains hidden and, thus, not a part of the

political agenda (see, e.g., Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 1974, for a discussion of the efforts of the Philadelphia District Attorney, Arlen Specter, and his efforts to derail a state investigation into systemically-permeating crime and corruption within the Philadelphia Police Department during the early 1970s). This part of the political landscape serves to limit research funding into areas of police crime because "politics is also an important element in the political economy of research funding and in determining what kinds of research influences policy and with what effect" (Jupp et al., 1999, p. 20).

No moral panic about police crime. A moral panic is characterized by a "disproportional and hostile social reaction to a condition, person, or group defined as a threat to societal values, involving stereotypical media representations and leading to demands for greater social control and creating a spiral of reaction" (Murji, 2006, pp. 250-251). The perpetrators of the moral panic come to be regarded as an enemy – a folk devil – of society (Cohen, 2002). As a moral panic takes hold by large numbers of people, these folk devils come to be viewed as evildoers that pose a serious threat to the morals of society and that, as a result, "something should be done" to stop the evil folk devils (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994, p. 31). Examples of moral panics include hysteria relating to illegal immigration, AIDS and HIV, school violence, and registration and punishment of sex offenders (Cohen, 2002; Thompson, 1998).

Crimes committed by police officers that constitute the plethora of police crime, as with all invisible crimes, are not regarded as moral panics and their perpetrators are not portrayed to the public as folk devils (Jupp, 2006, p. 204; Jupp et al., 1999, pp. 22-23). Indeed, in the case of police crime as a type of invisible crime, there is "an absence of the

social construction of moral outrage and of folk devils" (Jupp et al., 1999, p. 23). Citizens encountering a police officer on the streets of their communities are generally not enraged into a panic by the mere presence of a uniformed police officer. To the contrary, most people view the presence of a uniformed police officer as personifying law and order (and not a folk devil there to victimize them through the commission of violent, drug-related, sex-related, and/or profit-motivated police crimes against them).

Newsmaking Criminology

Based upon existing limitations regarding the identification and measurement of police crime, newsmaking criminology (see Barak, 1988, 2007, 1995b) offers an appropriately viable opportunity to add to what is known about the phenomenon. Barak (2006) defines newsmaking criminology as the "processes whereby criminologists use mass communications for the purposes of interpreting, informing and altering the images of crime and justice, crime and punishment, and criminals and victims" (p. 268). According to Barak (2007), newsmaking criminology "refers to the conscious efforts and activities of criminologists to interpret, influence or shape the representation of 'newsworthy' items about crime and justice" (pp. 191-192). Generally speaking, there are two paradigms of newsmaking criminology. One paradigm of newsmaking criminology is concerned with empirical research that analyzes news/media messages in pursuit of knowledge about some aspect of crime and justice (see, e.g., Beard & Payne, 2005; Boulahanis & Heltsley, 2004) and/or media coverage of crime-related issues (see, e.g., Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006; Robbers, 2008). A second paradigm of newsmaking criminology focuses on criminologists' manipulation of public discourse by becoming part of the newsmaking process (see, e.g., Barak, 2007; Fox & Levin, 1993). The instant

research falls within the parameters of the newsmaking research criminology paradigm and not within the realm of the newsmaking process criminology paradigm.

Newsmaking Criminology and its Relationship to the Phenomena of Police Crime

The government – more specifically, the Bureau of Justice Statistics at the U.S. Department of Justice – does not collect nor disseminate meaningful data on most police crime (or, for that matter, sufficient data on police misconduct and police corruption) (Barak, 1995a). This creates a conundrum for the news media, criminologists, and the general public alike:

> In short, since the government does not widely disseminate records of police misbehavior for public consumption, its agencies and the reporting media cannot tell us either how common or uncommon police brutality and violence is or in what cities it is most prevalent. Consequently, neither criminologists nor the public can study or compare how the police are doing in different localities across the country, establishing, if you will, a "quality of police" index for rating cities.[25] (Barak, 1995a, p. 24)

In the wake of the Rodney King beating at the hands of Los Angeles police officers in 1991, Chevigny (1992) and others called for the federal government to collect data on police violence (specifically, police brutality). As a result, legislation signed by President Clinton in 1994 requires the US Attorney General to "acquire data about the use of excessive force by law enforcement officers" ("Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994," 1994). To date, however, only limited data has been disseminated by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, and the limited reports promulgated all carry the caveat that some agencies did not report or provide complaints data and that

"citizen complaints data must be interpreted with caution … [because of] differences in how agencies receive, process and record complaints …" (Hickman, 2006, pp. 4, 7). Moreover, the legislation has done nothing to further knowledge about the extent and nature of police crime. As a result of having only minimal knowledge of the phenomena of police crime and, more specifically, police crimes of violence, the media often fails to ask the right questions when investigating and reporting on such instances. In many respects, the media lack an understanding of the nature of the problem and its prevalence. This, together with a lack of appropriate data sources for newsmaking criminologists, works to perpetuate the problem that "much about police work remains unknown, or at least, hidden from mass consumption. And, therefore, much about police behavior that might change remains in place" (Barak, 1995a, p. 25).

Newsmaking Criminology Content Analyses Research

Very few criminological content analyses of news articles affirmatively state that the methodology can be – and should be – grounded in the newsmaking criminology paradigm. In one newsmaking criminology study, Beard and Payne (2005) obtained newspaper articles from 1999-2003 from the LexisNexis database to determine how elder abuse is portrayed in the nation's newspapers. Their search netted 540 articles from 11 major large city newspapers of record, and a content analysis was conducted using "standard rules of manifest and latent content analysis … [that] revealed a variety of reoccurring themes pertaining to elder abuse" (Beard & Payne, 2005, p. 274). Among their conclusions, Beard and Payne suggested future research implications for newsmaking criminology:

> [I]t seems plausible to argue that the field of newsmaking criminology should be expanded to include a sub-field called newsmaking victimology. Newsmaking victimology would call for more intensive research on the way that victims are portrayed in the press. As a sub-field of newsmaking criminology, the focus would be primarily on the experiences of victims. (Beard & Payne, 2005, p. 280)

Using similar content analysis methodologies specifically stated as being grounded in the newsmaking criminology paradigm, Payne and his colleagues have published research studies involving electronic monitoring of offenders in community-based corrections as an alternative sanction (Payne & Gainey, 2003), and an examination of rural law enforcement activity in one community across a year (Payne, Berg, & Sun, 2005).

Much of the criminological research that invokes a newsmaking criminology methodology is interested in analyzing the media message, and not per se in learning about the nature and/or extent of the underling crime about which the media reports. Chermak, for instance, has conducted content analyses of crime stories reported in newspapers, but his focus has been on the media presentation of the news story and addressed variables relating to the placement and size of a news article (e.g., number of column inches in print articles, number of words per article, etc.) (Chermak & Chapman, 2007; Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006). Chermak has stressed the need to improve methodological rigor through the use of multivariate statistical techniques in content analysis criminological research studies (Chermak, 1998, pp. 68-69; Chermak & Chapman, 2007; see also Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005).

CHAPTER III

PRELIMINARY STUDY AND PILOT TEST

Preliminary Conceptualization and Purpose

The pilot study was conceptualized to explore the extent of information that could be captured using free internet-based search engines regarding arrests of police officers for the commission of crimes. The pilot study is purely exploratory in nature and was conducted prior to the development of the formal research questions and hypotheses for the instant research study. Since no data are maintained and/or compiled by the government (i.e., the United States Department of Justice and its instrumentalities) on police officers who are arrested and the phenomenon of police crime, it was conceptualized that information could be obtained through a surrogate source; namely, news articles published in local newspapers of record in locales throughout the country. The preliminary purpose of the pilot study was to determine whether substantive data on the phenomenon of police crime could be compiled using a no-cost internet-based beta-version search engine designed to cull newspaper articles, and, if so, whether such data are suitable for measurement and quantitative analyses.

Preliminary Pilot Methods

Research Design

Content Analysis

In addition to being a search engine, Google is a research tool (Brin & Page, 1998, Sec. 6.4). Google was originally designed to support academic search engine research based on architecture that supports novel research activities on large scale web data (Sec. 1.3.2). Google News is a computer-generated news site developed and

operated by Google that aggregates news articles from several thousand news sources (Google, 2008a). Using the Google News search engine, this study located news articles for subsequent content analysis. Multiple search terms were entered into the Google News Alerts automated search tool to run daily automated searches of several thousand newspaper sources that are available through the Google News search engine (see Appendix A). Whenever the automated daily searches identify a news article matching the relevant pre-designated search terms, a link to the URL for the news article is sent as an e-mail message. A few of the news articles were obtained from other sources, including serendipitous reviews of print newspapers. Each news article was then examined in a cursory fashion for relevancy, and those news articles seeming to have relevant content to the study were printed and archived for later use.

Definition of Relevant Content

Relevant content is limited to incidence of arrest(s) for misdemeanor and/or felony crimes of any defendant who, at time that the crime charged was committed, was then employed (either full-time or part-time) within the United States as a sworn law enforcement officer with general arrest powers, by a primary state police agency; sheriff's department; general purpose county police department; general purpose municipal police department (city, town, township); special police department; constable; tribal police department; or, regional police department, and was arrested during the time period of January 1, 2005, and June 30, 2006. Relevant content includes:

(1) *offender demographic information* – including age at arrest; years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer; sex, duty status at time of offense(s) charged;

(2) *agency of employment information* – including type of agency, jurisdiction/state, and number of sworn personnel (in full-time position equivalents);

(3) *offense information* – including category/categories of criminal offense(s) charged; and,

(4) *victim demographic information* – including sex, age, and relationship of the victim to their offender (e.g., current spouse, ex-spouse, etc.), as well whether the victim is also a sworn law enforcement officer.

Formal Design

Application was made on April 26, 2006, to the university's Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRB) by way of a Human Subjects Review Protocol to conduct a research study entitled, "Assessing police criminality: A content analysis of newspaper articles." Approval was granted by the IRB for the study, Log No. 06-088, as an expedited review on May 8, 2006. An annual request for continuing review was timely filed with the IRB on April 26, 2007. It was subsequently approved in due course as an expedited review on May 2, 2007. Thereafter, a second annual request for continuing review was timely filed with the IRB on April 22, 2008. Again, approval as an expedited review was granted by the IRB on May 1, 2008, and May 5, 2009.

Sample and Population

The population for the pilot study consists of all sworn law enforcement officers formally charged with a crime during the time period January 1, 2005, through the end of June, 2006. The sample is those cases (with one case per victim if the defendant was charged with criminal counts for more than one defendant; otherwise, a case is one per defendant officer) reported in a news article and located/tabulated for this study. Any sample derived from internet-based sources, including content analyses of news/media reports, is generally construed as a convenience sample because of inconsistency of indexing from site to site and missing information (Riffe et al., 2005, p. 118; Stempel & Stewart, 2000). As such, this pilot study should be recognized as employing a convenience sample.

The sample consists of 695 arrests (cases) of 657 individual sworn law enforcement officers; 38 of the cases represent officers who were arrested more than once. Included in this sample are officers employed by 449 law enforcement agencies (i.e., primary state, sheriff, county, municipal, special and tribal agencies) in 49 states and the District of Columbia. Wyoming is not represented in the sample. All of the officers in the sample were employed as sworn law enforcement officers at a public agency within the United States at the time of commission of the offense(s) for which they were arrested.

Operationalization: Coding Protocol and Sheets

Coding Protocol

Operational definitions for much of the content of interest (i.e., that content coded as variables) for this study are manifest because it is observable on its face (Riffe et al.,

2005, p. 125). For example, many of the news articles analyzed in this study report the age in years for the officer(s) arrested. The counting of this type of content data is not difficult and subject to recording without concerns for reliability. Other content coded in this study is of a more latent nature. That is, there is often meaning embedded in the content in need of interpretation by a coder/observer (pp. 125-126). Different jurisdictions within the United States use different terminology and labels for the same underlying criminal offense. For example, some states base criminal offenses in their crimes code on common law definitions. In the jurisdictions where the common law criminal offenses are still codified and in effect, there are often separate crimes for the property offenses of larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses. Other jurisdictions, however, have adopted a consolidation pursuant to the provisions of the Model Penal Code whereby the crimes of larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses have been statutorily consolidated into one larger crime of theft, together with the common law offenses of extortion, blackmail, and receiving stolen property (LaFave, 2000, pp. 844-851). Thus, in many articles analyzed, a subjective decision needed to be made in coding the content when counting and classifying offenses because different labels are attached to similar underlying criminal conduct in the news articles reported in the media. To ensure coding reliability of criminal offenses in this study, the data collection guidelines of the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) for criminal offenses are adopted as the coding protocol for the pilot study (see United States Department of Justice, 2000, pp. 21-52).[26]

Coding Sheets

The coding sheet developed for this pilot study is attached as Appendix B. The coding sheet includes a number of criminal offenses to be counted that are grouped together (and, thus, treated as unclassified offenses) in the NIBRS data collection guidelines as either "all other offenses" or a generic catchall category of "fraud offenses." These additional offense categories on the coding sheet are civil rights violations (criminal), destroying/tampering with evidence, indecent exposure, false reports/statements (falsification), obstructing justice, restraining order violations, and wiretapping (illegal). The offense category of on-line solicitation of a child was also added to the coding sheet and is not an offense recognized in the NIBRS data collection guidelines.

Preliminary Pilot Results

This pilot study is exploratory. It seeks to learn more about the phenomenon of police crime and whether the research design lends itself to a larger research study serving as a basis for continued research. In that regard, the pilot analysis and reporting or preliminary results is paramount in the formulation of research hypotheses for future research. To that end, the preliminary pilot results largely consist of descriptive statistics and do not include any inferential statistics and related analyses to test hypotheses.

Descriptive Statistics – Offenders

Demographic Characteristics of Officers Arrested

Missing data is of concern due to the nature of the news articles serving as the data source for the content analysis in this pilot study, however, for most variables of interest there were sufficient data to provide context to the preliminary analysis. Age, at

time of arrest, for offending officers was available in 77% of the cases, with a mean of almost 36 ½ years of age, a minimum age of 20, and a maximum age of 64. Over 95% of the officers arrested are male (see Table 1). Half of the officers in the pilot study were age 35 or younger at arrest (see Table 2).

Table 1

Demographic Characteristics (N = 695)

Characteristic	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*Min/Max*
Age	535	36.43	8.08	20-64
Years of Service	414	9.51	7.43	0-36
Male	663 (95.4)			
Female	32 (4.6)			

Table 2

Age of Officer at Arrest - Categorical (N = 695)

Age	*n*	%	Valid %
20-23	9	1.3	1.7
24-27	54	7.8	10.1
28-31	96	13.8	17.9
32-35	107	15.4	20.0
36-39	106	15.3	19.8
40-43	74	10.6	13.8
44-47	31	4.5	5.8
48-51	34	4.9	6.4
52-55	13	1.9	2.4
56 and older	11	1.6	2.1
Subtotal	535	77.0	100.0
Missing	160	23.0	

Years of service, at time of arrest, for each officer arrested was more problematic in terms of missing data, with data for that variable available from the news sources analyzed in 60% of the cases. Years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer averaged almost 10 years for those officers in this sample, and ranged from 0 (representing rookie police officers arrested with less than 1 year of service at time of arrest) to 36 years of service at time of arrest. Over half of the officers arrested had 8 years or less years of experience working as a sworn law enforcement officer at time of their arrest (although missing data for this variable account for 40% of the total number of cases). Overall, 11% of those officers arrested had 18 or more years of service at time of arrest, and 5% of the officers arrested had 21 or more years of service at time of arrest (see Table 3). Zero years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer represents those officers who are arrested for the commission of a crime (or crimes) while in the police academy and/or in their first year of service as a law enforcement officer. Duty status, at time of commission of the criminal offense(s) charged, for each officer arrested was determined in the content analysis for 94% of the sample; over half of the crimes were committed while off-duty (see Table 4).

Table 3

Years of Service as a Sworn Law Enforcement Officer - Categorical (N = 414, 59.6%)

	n	%
0-2 years of service	69	9.9
3-5 years of service	94	3.5
6-8 years of service	61	8.8
9-11 years of service	54	7.8
12-14 years of service	30	4.3
15-17 years of service	28	4.0
18-20 years of service	41	5.9
21-23 years of service	20	2.9
24-26 years of service	7	1.0
27 or more years of service	10	1.4

Table 4

Duty Status of Officer at Time of Their Crime(s) (N = 695)

	n	%
On-duty at time of offense	282	40.6
Off-duty at time of offense	375	54.0
Missing	38	5.5

Descriptive Statistics – Agencies Employing the Offenders

Agency Type

Approximately 75% of the sworn law enforcement officers arrested in the pilot study sample were employed by a general purpose municipal police department at the time the crime(s) for which each officer was accused of committing. Sheriff's departments were the next most frequently represented agency type in the pilot study sample. The sample does not include offenses committed by jail-based correctional officers employed by sheriff's departments. Also represented are officers employed by primary state police agencies, special police departments (e.g., park police agencies, marine police, college/university police, etc.), general purpose county police departments, and tribal police departments (see Table 5).

Table 5

Agency Type (N = 695)

	n	%
Primary state police agency	37	5.3
Sheriff's department	90	12.9
General purpose county police department	21	3.0
General purpose municipal police department	520	74.8
Special police department	25	3.6
Tribal police department	2	0.3

Agency Size

Supplemental data for one variable in this study, agency size (by number of sworn employees), were obtained from the publicly-available dataset for the 2000 wave of the Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (CSLLEA) (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003b). Agency size represents a count of the number of sworn employees (i.e., sworn law enforcement officers). Where applicable, the number of part-time sworn employees is included in the census. For the purposes of this pilot study, the counts are based on the number of full-time equivalent officers employed. The size of law enforcement agencies in the United States varies greatly; the smallest law enforcement agencies represented in the sample (by virtue of their employing an officer who was charged with a crime) employ one sworn law enforcement officer, whereas the largest law enforcement agency in the sample – the NYPD – employs 40,435 sworn officers. Roughly half of the law enforcement agencies represented in the sample employ less than 250 officers, and the other half employ 250 or more officers (see Table 6).

Table 6

Agency Size, by Number of Sworn Employees - Categorical (N = 695)

Sworn Officers Employed	*n*	%	Valid %
1	3	0.4	0.5
2-4	34	4.9	5.2
5-9	39	5.6	5.9
10-24	61	8.8	9.2
25-49	55	7.9	8.3
50-99	67	9.6	10.2
100-249	76	10.9	11.5
250-499	87	12.5	13.2
500-999	67	9.6	10.2
1,000 or more	171	24.6	25.9
Subtotal	660	95.0	100.0
Missing	35	5.0	

Note. Positions are full-time equivalent.

The counts for numbers of sworn employees employed by each law enforcement agency in the census are approximate in that they represent the true counts on a date certain in the year 2000, five to six years prior to the events that constitute the basis for this content analysis research project. Also, in the intervening years, several events occurred that may constitute potential threats to internal validity; namely, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, and their

respective aftermaths. Both events dramatically affected the organizational structure and manpower levels of numerous large law enforcement agencies, including the NYPD and the New Orleans Police Department. Nevertheless, the categorical groupings for agency size used as a collapsed variable in this pilot study provide context and valid ranges for comparison purposes.

Agency Geographic Distribution

The 449 law enforcement agencies represented in the sample are located in the District of Columbia and all states, except Wyoming. For analytical purposes, the locales are grouped into geographic regions of the country, and then divided into smaller divisions within each region. These are the same widely recognized geographic groupings used by the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Map of the United States showing geographic regions and divisions. (United States Department of Justice, 2007).

Over 40% of the cases in the sample are involving defendant law enforcement officers employed by law enforcement agencies located in the South region of the United States, and approximately one-fourth (23.7%) of the cases stem from law enforcement officers arrested who are/were in the employ of a law enforcement agency located in the Northeast region of the country. A smaller percentage (20.4%) of the cases in the sample represent officers arrested while employed by a law enforcement agency in the Midwest Region, and less than one-fifth (15.4%) of the cases involve officers employed at the time of commission of the crime(s) charged by law enforcement agencies in the West region of the United States (see Table 7).

Table 7

Geographic Distribution of Cases by Regions (N = 695)

	n	%
Northeastern States	165	23.7
Midwestern States	142	20.4
Southern States	281	40.4
Western States	107	15.4

Greater precision is gleaned from assessing the geographic distribution of cases by breaking the four geographic regions of the United States into smaller geographic divisions derived from the larger regions. Two-thirds (67.0%) of the cases in the sample involve officers arrested who were, at time of commission of their crime(s) charged, employed by a law enforcement agency located in the eastern part of the country (i.e., east of the Mississippi River). The geographic divisions most frequently represented in

the sample of cases, in terms of location of the defendant's employer, are the South Atlantic division (21.3%) of the South region, followed by the Middle Atlantic division (18.0%) of the Northeast region, and the East North Central division (15.3%) of the Midwest region of the United States. The least frequent areas of defendants' agency-employers in the sample are the Mountain division (5.8%) of the West region and the Northeast division (5.8%) of the New England region, followed by the East South Central division (6.8%) of the South region of the country. Almost three-fourths of the cases (73.9%) stem from officers employed by law enforcement agencies located in jurisdictions/states within the populous coastal divisions of the country (i.e., Pacific, Gulf, and/or Atlantic coasts) (see Table 8).

Table 8

Geographic Distribution of Cases by Regions and Divisions (N = 695)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	125	18.0
Northeastern States – New England	40	5.8
Midwestern States – East North Central	106	15.3
Midwestern States – West North Central	36	5.2
Southern States – South Atlantic	148	21.3
Southern States – East South Central	47	6.8
Southern States – West South Central	86	12.4
Western States – Mountain	40	5.8
Western States – Pacific	67	9.6

Descriptive Statistics – Crimes

Crimes by Offense Types and Categories of Police Crime

Offenses were originally coded on the pilot study coding sheet on the assumption that officers arrested would likely be charged with no more than four offenses in a case, and that the most serious charge would be coded as the main offense (see Appendix I, variables 16-19). It become readily apparent, however, that such a method of coding did not lend itself to proper statistical analysis using SPSS or some similar software package. In the end, each of the 64 offense categories listed on the coding sheet was set up in an SPSS data file for this project as a binary dummy variable (whereby 0 = no charge under that offense category was charged in that case, and 1 = a charge under that offense category was filed against the officer/defendant in that case).

As a binary variable, only one count was included per offense category in any one case. In instances where an officer/defendant was charged with multiple counts of the same offense, the crime was only listed once. Also, in instances where an officer was charged with multiple counts of the same offense, but with different individual victims, each victim constituted a separate case (thus, there are only 657 individual officers/defendants represented in the sample, but there are 695 cases in the sample; in 38 cases, an officer was arrested more than once and/or had more than one crime charged against them with different victims in each respective case). For example, one of the police officers who was arrested and included in the sample (a 26 year-old male officer with 3 years of service as a police officer with the El Cajon Police Department in California at the time) was arrested on February 3, 2006, and charged with multiple crimes alleged to have been committed while on-duty against multiple victims, each of

whom was a female motorist. For the purpose of this study, each victim was treated as an individual case. The officer was charged as follows: Case #1: bribery, sexual assault with an object, forcible fondling, and obstructing justice; Case #2: bribery; Case #3: bribery; Case #4: bribery; Case #5: bribery. On April 20, 2006, after the initial five cases against the El Cajon police officer were publicized extensively by the San Diego area news media in Southern California, several more victims came forward to authorities, resulting in more charges against the officer being filed: Case #6: bribery, sexual assault with an object; Case #7: bribery; Case #8: bribery, larceny, sexual assault with an object.[27]

The most common offense in the content analysis of the cases in the sample is a catchall category of unclassified offenses (*n* = 114, 16.4%). These include a variety of crimes, none of which fall within the definitions of any of the 63 specific-offense categories designated on the coding sheet for this study. These uncategorized offenses include, among others, reckless driving; fleeing and eluding; vehicular hit-and-run; illegal possession and/or selling of a police badge; official misconduct; official oppression; dereliction of duty; reckless endangerment; animal abuse, and, child abuse, all of which are charged as either misdemeanor or felony offenses.

The most frequent specific criminal offense in the sample cases is driving under the influence (DUI/DWI) (*n* = 95, 13.7%), followed by simple assault (10.8%) and aggravated assault (8.8). Combined, however, misdemeanor (simple) and felony (aggravated) assault charges account for almost one-fifth (*n* = 136, 19.6%) of the charges filed against sworn law enforcement officers arrested in the pilot study sample. Fifty-five of the 64 offense types on the coding sheet are represented in those offenses charged against the individual officers arrested and included in the sample (see Table 9).

Table 9

Crimes Charged, by Offense Type & Category of Police Crime (N = 695)

Offense Type	*n*	%	Category of Police Crime
Unclassified offenses	114	16.4	
Driving under the influence	95	13.7	Drug- / alcohol-related
Simple assault	75	10.8	Violence-related
Aggravated assault	61	8.8	Violence-related
Forcible fondling	59	8.5	Sex-related / Violence-related
Forcible rape	40	5.8	Sex-related / Violence-related
Drug / narcotic violation	38	5.5	Drug- / alcohol-related
Weapons law violation	37	5.3	Violence-related
Intimidation	36	5.2	Violence-related
Larceny (other/unclassified)	35	5.0	Profit-motivated
Liquor law violation	33	4.7	Drug- / alcohol-related
Statutory rape	33	4.7	Sex-related
False report / statement	29	4.2	
Pornography / Obscenity	29	4.2	Sex-related
Sex crimes (other/unclassified)	28	4.0	Sex-related
Forcible sodomy	26	3.7	Sex-related / Violence-related
Murder & Non-negligent Homicide	22	3.2	Violence-related
Extortion / Blackmail	21	3.0	Profit-motivated
Bribery	19	2.7	Profit-motivated
Kidnapping / Abduction	18	2.6	Violence-related
On-line solicitation of a child	18	2.6	Sex-related
Disorderly conduct	17	2.4	Violence-related
Indecent exposure	16	2.3	Sex-related
Civil rights violation (criminal)	11	1.6	
Destroying / tampering Evidence	11	1.6	
False Pretenses / Swindle / Confidence game	11	1.6	Profit-motivated
Robbery	11	1.6	Profit-motivated
Burglary / Breaking & Entering	10	1.4	
Property destruction / Damage / Vandalism	10	1.4	Violence-related
Sexual assault with an object	9	1.3	Sex-related / Violence-related
Gambling (operating / promoting)	8	1.2	Profit-motivated
Impersonation	8	1.2	
Theft from building	8	1.2	Profit-motivated
Restraining order violation	7	1.0	Violence-related
Drunkenness	6	0.9	Drug- / Alcohol-related
Embezzlement	6	0.9	Profit-motivated
Prostitution	6	0.9	Profit-motivated / Sex-related
Arson	5	0.7	Violence-related and/or Profit-motivated
Negligent Manslaughter	5	0.7	
Counterfeiting / Forgery	4	0.6	Profit-motivated
Shoplifting / Retail theft	4	0.6	Profit-motivated
Stolen property offenses	4	0.6	Profit-motivated
Trespass of real property	4	0.6	
Drug equipment violation	3	0.4	Drug- / Alcohol-related
Credit card fraud / ATM fraud	2	0.3	Profit-motivated
Family offense (non-violent)	2	0.3	
Incest	2	0.3	Sex-related
Liquor law violation	2	0.3	Drug- / Alcohol-related
Motor vehicle theft	2	0.3	Profit-motivated
Pocket-picking	1	0.1	Profit-motivated
Theft from motor vehicle	1	0.1	Profit-motivated
Theft of motor vehicle parts	1	0.1	Profit-motivated
Wire fraud	1	0.1	Profit-motivated
Wiretapping (illegal)	1	0.1	

Another pattern become evident in analyzing the offense types represented in the data. As shown in Table 9, nearly all criminal offenses for which sworn law enforcement officers were arrested in the pilot study data fall into one or more of four categories: drug- and alcohol-related police crime; sex-related police crime; violence-related police crime; and, profit-motivated police crime. I am referring to these collectively as a typology of police crime (see discussion earlier in the literature review chapter). Each of the categories in the typology of police crime are discussed in the pages that follow.

Drug-related police crime. In some cases, it was not possible to determine when coding and analyzing the content of the news articles whether certain criminal offenses committed by sworn law enforcement officers were committed while the respective officers were on-duty or off-duty at commission of the crime(s) charged. Such a determination was made in 84.2% of the cases (32 of 38) where an officer was charged with a criminal drug/narcotic violation. In those cases, almost half (43.8%) of the crimes charged were alleged to have occurred while the officer(s) charged was/were on-duty in their vocational role as a sworn law enforcement officer (i.e., a police officer, state trooper, or sheriff's deputy), and just over half (56.3%) were off-duty (see Table 10).

Table 10

Duty Status at Time of Their Crime(s) - Drug-related Offenses

		On-Duty		Off-Duty	
	N	*n*	%	*n*	%
Drug / narcotic violation	32	14	43.8	18	56.3

Alcohol-related police crime. In 6 cases, officers were charged with being drunk in public (a/k/a drunkenness), and half (50%) of those cases resulted in an arrest for being drunk while on-duty working as a police officer. Likewise, 8 of 94 (8.5%) officers

arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) were on-duty at the time that they alleged operated a motor vehicle while impaired as a result of alcohol intoxication (see Table 11). For the purposes of the coding protocol in this pilot study, any incident whereby a sworn law enforcement officer was arrested for DUI while driving a marked police vehicle – whether their arrest occurred during that officer's assigned/designated shift of work hours or not – was coded as an on-duty offense. It is not uncommon in many jurisdictions for sworn law enforcement officers, especially state troopers, deputy sheriffs in rural areas, and municipal/county police officers with specialized assignments (e.g., canine officers, detectives, crime scene investigators, emergency response unit team members, and supervisors) to be assigned the use of a marked police vehicle on a take-home basis. In all such instances, those officers assigned the use of a take-home police vehicle are on-call at all times and required to be respond to any emergency call for service, and otherwise render assistance to the public, whenever driving the take-home government-owned vehicle. Since there is a reasonable expectation of the general public that anyone driving a marked police vehicle (i.e., with agency markings, paint scheme, emergency lights, etc.) is an on-duty police officer, the coding of all arrests of officers for DUI while driving a take-home police car as on-duty is justified and appropriate.

Table 11

Duty Status at Time of Their Crime(s) - Alcohol-related Offenses

		On-Duty		Off-Duty	
	N	*n*	*%*	*n*	%
Drunkenness	6	3	50.0	3	50.0
Driving under the influence	94	8	8.5	86	91.5

The distribution of DUI arrests across agency types of defendants' employers indicates that three-fourths (75.8%) of the officers arrested were employed, at time of the DUI incident, by a general purpose municipal police department (see Table 12). The distribution and percentages of DUI cases by agency type (n = 95) employing defendants is closely in line with the distribution of all cases by agency type (N = 695) (see Table 5). As with much of the data analyzed in the pilot study, most chi-square relationships are statistically insignificant and low cell counts (due to the small sample size) for each variable of interest hinder inferential analyses.

Table 12

Driving Under the Influence, by Agency Type (N = 95)

	n	%
Primary state police agency	3	3.2
Sheriff's department	15	15.8
General purpose county police department	3	3.2
General purpose municipal police department	72	75.8
Special police department	1	1.1
Tribal police department	1	1.1

Sex-related police crime. Over one-third (38.3%) of all the charges includes in the cases in the sample are sex offenses (i.e., forcible fondling, forcible rape, statutory rape, pornography/obscene material, other unclassified sex crimes, forcible sodomy, on-line solicitation of a child, indecent exposure, assault with an object, prostitution, and incest) (see Table 9). Some sex crimes for which sworn law enforcement officers are arrested are

more likely than others to be committed while the officer was on-duty (i.e., working as a police officer, deputy sheriff, or state trooper at time the alleged sex offense was committed). On-duty sex crimes most frequently represented in the sample are often violent in nature: sexual assault with an object (75% committed on-duty); forcible fondling (51.7%); forcible sodomy (50.0%); and, forcible rape (43.6%). These are offenses that are recognized in the literature as crimes that constitute police sexual violence. Half of the officers in the sample charged with crimes of prostitution were alleged to have engaged in the offenses while on-duty. Statutory rape (i.e., sexual intercourse with a willing sexual partner who is under the legal age of consent in the jurisdiction where the act is alleged to have occurred) involving a police officer and a young teenager usually occurred when the officer was not working (17.2% while on-duty; 82.8% while off-duty). Likewise, on-line solicitation of a child by a sworn law enforcement officer was only alleged to have occurred in the pilot study sample while the defendants were off-duty (n = 16) (see Table 13).

Table 13

Duty Status at Time of Their Crime(s) - Sex Offenses

		On-Duty		Off-Duty	
	N	*n*	%	*n*	%
Sexual assault with an object	8	6	75.0	2	25.0
Forcible fondling	58	30	51.7	28	48.3
Forcible sodomy	26	13	50.0	13	50.0
Prostitution	6	3	50.0	3	50.0
Forcible rape	39	17	43.6	22	56.4
Pornography / Obscene Material	28	10	35.7	18	57.1
Indecent exposure	16	3	18.8	13	81.3
Statutory rape	29	5	17.2	24	82.8
On-line solicitation of a child	16	0	0.0	16	100.0

No statistically significant findings were found in terms of measures of association when examining sex offense variables and defendants' years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer. When the years of service variable was collapsed into arbitrary categorical variables (e.g., 0-2 years of service, 3-5 years of service, 6-8 years of service, etc.), however, a manifest pattern was plainly visible on bar graphs created using Microsoft Excel software. Typically, the highest proportion of arrests occurs early in police careers; a general reduction visually appears, in a downward slope, to correlate with more years of service. Then, there are visible jumps in criminal arrests for sworn law enforcement officers at 18-20 years of service in most offense categories analyzed in the pilot study. The pattern held true for sex offenses, where a plainly visible burst of

offending in the area of forcible fondling is noted, and, to a lesser degree, in forcible sodomy and forcible rape charges filed against police officers (see Figure 2). Here, there is a clear acceleration of arrests of officers in the range of 18-20 years of service – just prior to the number of years of service needed for retirement eligibility in many law enforcement agencies – that is not present in the categories adjacent on the bar graph, namely, at 15-17 years of service and 21-23 and 24-26 years of service. As with numerous other offenses analyzed in the pilot study (i.e., non-sex crimes), there is also a jump in arrests of sworn law enforcement officers at 27+ years of service. Of note, some law enforcement agencies require 30 years of service for retirement eligibility.



Figure 2. Forcible rape, sodomy & fondling: Years of service at arrest - categorical.

The same manifest patterns exist when examining years of service categorical data for statutory rape, on-line solicitation of a child, and child pornography displayed in a bar graph (see Figure 3). Offending by officers, at least in terms of criminal arrests, is highest in the first years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer (i.e., very early in officers' careers). Here, too, there is a visual jump for these sex offenses grouped around 18-20 years of service, although upon visual examination there is less kurtosis in the peak

and the pattern appears to bleed over to some extent, depending on the specific offense of interest, to 15-17 and 21-23 years of service. It is possible that other factors, such as age and marital status of the defendant in each case, may contribute to this apparent pattern.



Figure 3. Statutory rape, on-line solicitation of a child, and child pornography: Years of service at arrest - categorical.

The greatest percentage of crimes of police sexual violence – forcible rape (35.0%), forcible fondling (32.2%), and forcible sodomy (26.9%) – occurred in the Middle Atlantic division of the Northeast region of the United States, followed by South Atlantic division of the South region, the West South Central division of the South region, and the Pacific division of the West region of the country. The fewest crimes of police sexual violence occurred in the New England division of the Northeast region of the country, where no forcible rapes and no forcible fondling charges against officers are included in the pilot study sample, and only one arrest of a police officer for forcible sodomy (3.8%) was found in the content analysis (see Table 14). These summary statistics, however, may be misleading as they do not account for divisional and/or regional disparities in population, population density, or contextual ratios (e.g., a ratio of arrests per 100,000 – or even 1,000 – police officers), nor do they control for other

potentially confounding variables (e.g., agency size, by number of sworn employees employed) at this preliminary stage of the research.

Table 14

Forcible Sex Crimes, by Geographic Regions and Divisions

	Forcible Rape (N = 40)		Forcible Sodomy (N = 26)		Forcible Fondling (N = 59)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	14	35.0	7	26.9	19	32.2
Northeastern States – New England	0	0.0	1	3.8	0	0.0
Midwestern States – East North Central	0	0.0	2	7.7	2	3.4
Midwestern States – West North Central	2	5.0	3	11.5	3	5.1
Southern States – South Atlantic	9	22.5	4	15.4	15	25.4
Southern States – East South Central	3	7.5	3	11.5	2	3.4
Southern States – West South Central	5	12.5	2	7.7	9	15.3
Western States – Mountain	3	7.5	0	0.0	2	3.4
Western States – Pacific	4	10.0	4	15.4	7	11.9

Violence-related police crime. A great deal of the charges against law enforcement officers are violence-related (in addition to the offenses that constitute police sexual violence discussed above). Certain violence-related criminal offenses allegedly committed by officers are more likely to be on-duty offenses than others. Arson, for example, was alleged to have been committed while on-duty at a higher rate (80.0 %) than any other violence-related offense in the sample.[28] Other violence-related crimes were often alleged to have occurred while on-duty: kidnapping/abduction

(76.5%); robbery (60.0%); aggravated assault (44.6%); weapons violations (36.1%); simple assault (31.5%); murder or non-negligent manslaughter (27.3%); and, disorderly conduct (11.8%), among others (see Table 15).

Table 15

Duty Status at Time of Their Crime(s) - Violence-related Offenses

		On-Duty		Off-Duty	
	N	*n*	%	*n*	%
Arson	5	4	80.0	1	20.0
Kidnapping / abduction	17	13	76.5	4	23.5
Robbery	10	6	60.0	4	40.0
Aggravated assault	56	25	44.6	31	55.4
Weapons law violation	36	13	36.1	23	63.9
Simple assault	73	23	31.5	50	68.5
Murder / non-negligent manslaughter	22	6	27.3	16	72.7
Disorderly conduct	17	2	11.8	15	88.2
Restraining order violation	6	0	0.0	6	100.0

The same pattern that was observed in bar graphs for sex crimes regarding years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer at time of their crime(s) for which they were arrested exists in 3-year categorical groupings for the violence-related offenses of intimidation, simple assault, aggravated assault, murder, and non-negligent manslaughter. Once again, there is a manifest jump and peak observed in the bar graph for each of these offenses in terms of officers arrested at 18-20 years of service, preceded and followed by a marked lower frequency of arrests in the categorical years of service on either side for

all of the offense categories outside of the initial peak with low years of service (i.e., at 12-14 and 15-17 years of service on the one side, and also at 21-23 and 24-26 years of service categories on the other side) (see *Figure 4*).



Figure 4. Intimidation, simple assault, aggravated assault, murder, and non-negligent manslaughter: Years of service at arrest - categorical.

In terms of agency type (i.e., the law enforcement agencies that employ the sworn officers who were arrested and included in the pilot study sample) for crimes of violence, there are some interesting findings. For assault (both simple/misdemeanor assault and aggravated/felonious assault), the frequency distributions and percentages by agency type are typical of what is expected based on distribution of the larger population of cases in the content analysis (see Table 16; cf. Table 5 and Table 12).

Table 16

Assault, by Agency Type

	Simple Assault (N = 75)		Aggravated Assault (N = 61)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Primary state police agency	2	2.7	0	0.0
Sheriff's department	7	9.3	6	9.8
General purpose county police department	3	4.0	2	3.3
General purpose municipal police department	61	81.3	51	83.6
Special police department	2	2.7	2	3.3
Tribal police department	0	0.0	0	0.0

Restraining order violations – in other words, a criminal arrest for violating a court's order to stay away from some person, typically, due to a history of domestic violence or a threat thereof – are limited in the pilot study to officers employed by a general purpose municipal police department (57.1%) and deputies employed by sheriff's departments (42.9%) (see Table 17). Of note, sheriff's deputies are the designated officers of a court typically tasked with the legal responsibility of serving official court orders, including restraining orders. Clearly, sheriff's deputies, as such, are aware of the purpose of, and ramifications of violating, court-issued restraining orders. It is unclear at this preliminary stage of research into police crime whether the pattern of sheriff's deputies being arrested for violating court-issued restraining orders more frequently than sworn law enforcement officers employed by other types of law enforcement agencies (e.g., county police departments, state police agencies, etc.). At this juncture, the finding is not statistically significant.

Table 17

Restraining Order Violation, by Agency Type (N = 7)

	n	%
Primary state police agency	0	0.0
Sheriff's department	3	42.9
General purpose county police department	0	0.0
General purpose municipal police department	4	57.1
Special police department	0	0.0
Tribal police department	0	0.0

Next, two categories of criminal offenses – unlike most in the pilot study – have statistically significant relationships to agency type within this sample. Murder and non-negligent manslaughter offense categories have higher than expected counts and percentages for primary state police agencies and special police departments, and lower than expected counts and percentages for sheriff's departments, county police departments, and municipal police departments (see Table 18). The chi-square is $\chi^2(5, N = 695) = 22.03$, $p = .001$. The Cramer's V calculation is $V = .178$, indicating a weak association between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for the crime of murder and non-negligent manslaughter and agency-type employment. Similarly, sheriff's officers/deputies are charged with a high percentage of arson crimes (80.0%) (see Table 19). Here, there is a statistically significant chi-square of $\chi^2(5, N = 695) = 20.12$, $p = .001$, and a Cramer's V of $V = .170$, again indicating a weak association between agency-type employer and arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for the crime of arson.

Table 18

Murder & Non-Negligent Manslaughter, by Agency Type (N = 22)

	n	%
Primary state police agency	5	22.7
Sheriff's department	1	4.5
General purpose county police department	0	0.0
General purpose municipal police department	13	59.1
Special police department	3	13.6
Tribal police department	0	0.0

Table 19

Arson, by Agency Type (N = 5)

	n	%
Primary state police agency	0	0.0
Sheriff's department	4	80.0
General purpose county police department	0	0.0
General purpose municipal police department	1	20.0
Special police department	0	0.0
Tribal police department	0	0.0

Profit-motivated police crime. Over one-fifth (21.6%) of the offenses charged against sworn law enforcement officers in the sample can be classified as profit-motivated crimes where the primary motivation, on its face, is monetary. There are a few

offense categories, such as arson, where the categorization is not as clear; some scholars maintain that arson is always a crime of violence, whereas in many instances where arson is profit-motivated (e.g., instances of insurance fraud where a property owner burns down a building with the intent of collecting insurance benefits for their own financial enrichment). For these purposes, all crimes of theft are categorized in this content analysis as profit-motivated offenses.

Within the pilot study, some types of profit-motivated criminal offending by sworn law enforcement officers always occurs while on-duty. All cases (100%) of extortion/blackmail, embezzlement, credit card fraud, theft from a motor vehicle, and theft of a motor vehicle were committed while on-duty. Almost all instances of bribery (94.7%) were committed, allegedly, while on-duty (see Table 20). There is a statistically significant, but weak, association between on-duty status at time of commission of the offense(s) for which officers were arrested and specific categories of offenses within the pilot study sample for extortion/blackmail, where $\chi^2(1, N = 657) = 28.85, p = .000, V = .21$; embezzlement, where $\chi^2(1, N = 657) = 8.05, p < .05, V = .111$; and, bribery, where $\chi^2(1, N = 657) = 21.44, p < .001, V = .181$. Of note, for these three offense types, the statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where all of the cells have expected counts that are ≥ 5. This is a departure from most of the other variables analyzed in the pilot study where there are multiple cells for each category on the various contingency tables that have too many cells with expected counts less than 5, calling into question the validity of any potential preliminary findings at this early juncture of the research.

Table 20

Duty Status at Time of Their Crime(s) - Profit-motivated Offenses

		On-Duty		Off-Duty	
	N	*n*	%	*n*	%
Extortion / blackmail	21	21	100.0	0	0.0
Embezzlement	6	6	100.0	0	0.0
Credit card / ATM fraud	2	2	100.0	0	0.0
Theft from motor vehicle	1	1	100.0	0	0.0
Theft of motor vehicle	1	1	100.0	0	0.0
Bribery	19	18	94.7	1	5.3
Larceny (unclassified)	31	28	90.3	3	9.7
Theft from building	7	6	85.7	1	14.3
Gambling (operating / promoting)	8	5	62.5	5	37.5
Burglary / breaking & entering	7	1	14.3	6	85.7
Shoplifting	3	0	0.0	3	100.0

Shoplifting is rare among police officers, at least within the pilot study sample and this content analysis study ($n = 4$), and limited here to state troopers (25%) and police officers employed by municipal police departments (75%) (see Table 21). Due to the small number of shoplifting offenses included in this pilot study, it is difficult to assess the nature and prevalence of shoplifting offenses for which sworn law enforcement officers are arrested. Within this preliminary study, half (50%) of those officers arrested for shoplifting are female officers, and most (75%) of the offenses were committed by the officers while off-duty. In one of the four cases coded in the content analysis, duty status

at time of commission of the alleged crime could not be determined. Missing data also hamper the ability to assess other aspects of the nature of shoplifting as police crime. For instance, years of service data were not included in the news articles coded in this preliminary content analysis for three of four cases involving shoplifting by a sworn law enforcement officer. In the fourth case, the officer who was arrested had 15 years of service as a municipal police officer at time of her arrest for shoplifting.

Table 21

Shoplifting, by Agency Type (N = 4)

	n	%
Primary state police agency	1	25.0
Sheriff's department	0	0.0
General purpose county police department	0	0.0
General purpose municipal police department	3	75.0
Special police department	0	0.0
Tribal police department	0	0.0

Occupational police crime. There are several categories of police crime that constitute occupational deviance, and, as such, are more likely than other categories of criminal offenses to be committed while on-duty. For example, by definition only public officials (i.e., public employees who are sworn law enforcement officers in a local law enforcement agency) can be charged with committing the federal crime of violating someone's civil rights (see "Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law," as amended, 1996). Consistent with that definition of the offense, all (100%) of the officers in the pilot

study sample who were charged with the crime of acting under the color of law to deprive a person of their federally protected constitutional rights were alleged to have done so while on-duty and while acting in their official capacity as sworn law enforcement officers. It also stands to reason, then, that the crime of destroying or tampering with evidence when committed by a law enforcement officer stems from their status as a police officer. Here, almost three-fourths (72.7%) of the officers in the pilot study arrested for destroying or tampering with evidence were alleged to have committed the crime(s) while on-duty. The same holds true for the criminal offense of falsification by a sworn law enforcement officer (65.5%) and, to a lesser extent, the crime of obstruction of justice (48.4%) (see Table 22).

Table 22

Duty Status at Time of Their Crime(s) - Occupational Offenses

		On-Duty		Off-Duty	
	N	*n*	*%*	*n*	%
Civil rights violations (criminal)	11	11	100.0	0	0.0
Wiretapping	1	1	100.0	0	0.0
Evidence: destroying / tampering	11	8	72.7	3	27.3
Impersonation	7	5	71.4	2	28.6
False report / statement	29	19	65.5	10	34.5
Obstruction of Justice	31	15	48.4	16	51.6

Descriptive Statistics – Victims

Many of the news articles collected and coded in the content analysis for the pilot study lacked complete data on victims of police crime. Missing data on victims in news articles on crime, in general, are common due to a variety of reasons. In some instances, courts and/or law enforcement agencies redact public information relating to victims so as to protect their privacy. In other instances, even when full identifiable information is readily available from a variety of news sources (including public records), news media journalists decline to publish the information. This is especially so in terms of victims of sex crimes as well as victims who are juveniles. Nevertheless, sufficient descriptive data are available from the pilot study content analysis to help understand the nature of crimes for which sworn law enforcement officers are arrested. In that regard, a number of patterns are self-evident in this content analysis. As with other data analyzed in this pilot study, however, the small sample size, high prevalence of missing data, and resulting potential for measurement error, result in an inability at this juncture to draw inferences that are statistically significance with a high degree of confidence.

Victim Relationship to the Officer-Offender

Data were available in the news articles on the relationship of the victim to the offender (i.e., the sworn law enforcement officer who was arrested for commission of the crime) in a majority of the cases involving police sexual violence offenses of forcible rape (67.5%), forcible sodomy (69.2%), and forcible fondling (77.9%). Most of the offenses – over 80% in each category – involved victims who were non-family members (coded in this study generically as "strangers"). In terms of victims who are family members of the offending law enforcement officers in cases involving police sexual

violence, offenders' children and/or step-children (as well as non-defined relatives mentioned in news articles who are likely children but not identified by the press) account for over 10% of the victims in cases involving forcible rape, forcible sodomy, and forcible fondling. Of note, within the pilot study sample, spouses, ex-spouses, and intimate domestic partners (current and former boyfriends/girlfriends) are rarely the victims of police sexual violence (see Table 23). Preliminarily, this research suggests (1) that those people most susceptible to being victims of police sexual violence are strangers encountered while on-duty, and (2) that children living with sworn law enforcement officers are more likely to be victimized by them through forcible sex offenses than are other family members who are also potential victims.

Table 23

Victim Relationship to Officer-Offender: Forcible Rape, Sodomy, and Fondling

	Forcible Rape (N = 27)		Forcible Sodomy (N = 18)		Forcible Fondling (N = 46)	
Victim's Relationship to Offender	*n*	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Current Spouse	1	3.7	0	0.0	0	0.0
Ex-Spouse	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Current Boyfriend / Girlfriend	1	3.7	0	0.0	0	0.0
Former Boyfriend / Girlfriend	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Child / Stepchild	2	7.4	1	5.6	5	10.9
Other Relative	1	3.7	1	5.6	4	8.7
Stranger (non-family member)	22	81.5	16	88.9	37	80.4

Domestic violence in families of police officers appears to account for a high percentage of violent crimes – and those crimes with a high potential for violence – for which sworn law enforcement officers are arrested. In cases where an officer was arrested for intimidation/harassment, current spouses (24.1%) and former girlfriends/boyfriends (20.7%) were the most prevalent non-stranger victims, whereas children/stepchildren and ex-spouses of officers arrested were less likely to be victimized. In instances where an officer was arrested for disorderly conduct, the non-stranger victims most represented in the pilot study are ex-spouses (33.3%) and current girlfriends/boyfriends (22.2%). Current spouses (57.1%) are most often the victims of officers arrested for restraining order violations (see Table 24).

Table 24

Victim Relationship to Officer-Offender: Intimidation, Disorderly Conduct, and Restraining Order Violation

	Intimidation (N = 29)		Disorderly Conduct (N = 9)		Restraining Order Violation (N = 7)	
Victim's Relationship to Offender	*n*	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Current Spouse	7	24.1	0	0.0	4	57.1
Ex-Spouse	0	0.0	3	33.3	0	0.0
Current Boyfriend / Girlfriend	1	3.4	2	22.2	1	14.3
Former Boyfriend / Girlfriend	6	20.7	1	11.1	1	14.3
Child / Stepchild	2	6.9	0	0.0	1	14.3
Other Relative	1	3.4	0	0.0	0	0.0
Stranger (non-family member)	12	41.4	3	33.3	0	0.0

Strangers and non-family members account for most of the victims in the cases where officers were charged with simple assault (50%), aggravated assault (65.5%), and murder or non-negligent manslaughter (71.4%). In terms of victims known by the offending officer(s), current spouses are victimized most often in offenses of police violence: simple assault (24.3%), aggravated assault (14.5%), and murder or non-negligent manslaughter (14.3%). Children and stepchildren of police officers who are arrested are sometimes victims of their assaults (8.6% of the simple assault cases, and 7.3% of the aggravated assault cases), but no children or stepchildren of officers were murdered by their parent/stepparent employed as a sworn officer and included in the cases that make up the pilot study sample (see Table 25).

Table 25

Victim Relationship to Officer-Offender: Simple Assault, Aggravated Assault, and Murder & Non-Negligent Manslaughter

	Simple Assault (N = 70)		Aggravated Assault (N = 55)		Murder & Manslaughter (N = 21)	
Victim's Relationship to Offender	*n*	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Current Spouse	17	24.3	8	14.5	3	14.3
Ex-Spouse	4	5.7	0	0.0	1	4.8
Current Boyfriend / Girlfriend	5	7.1	4	7.3	0	0.0
Former Boyfriend / Girlfriend	1	1.4	1	1.8	1	4.8
Child / Stepchild	6	8.6	4	7.3	0	0.0
Other Relative	2	2.9	2	3.6	1	4.8
Stranger (non-family member)	35	50.0	36	65.5	15	71.4

Victim Gender

Females are more likely to be victims of crimes against persons committed by sworn law enforcement officers than males in most categories of offenses, with the notable exception of aggravated assault (63.2% male victims), murder, and non-negligent manslaughter (77.3% male victims). Females are somewhat more likely than males to be victims of simple assaults committed by officers. Some crimes against persons committed by sworn law enforcement officers in this sample, including extortion/blackmail and indecent exposure, are always committed against female victims. Not all victims of sex crimes committed by police officers are female: forcible rape (97.4% female victims), statutory rape (92.9% female victims), forcible fondling (89.1% female victims), and sexual assault with a foreign object (88.9% female victims). Within this preliminary study, some sex crimes by sworn law enforcement officers are also committed against males on a somewhat more prevalent basis than others: on-line solicitation of a child (16.7% male victims), forcible sodomy (17.4% male victims), and child pornography (33.3% male victims) (see Table 26).

Table 26

Victim Sex, by Offense Category

		Female		Male	
	N	*n*	%	*n*	%
Extortion / Blackmail	5	5	100.0	0	0.0
Indecent exposure	11	11	100.0	0	0.0
Forcible rape	38	37	97.4	1	2.6
Statutory rape	28	26	92.9	2	7.1
Forcible fondling	55	49	89.1	6	10.9
Kidnapping / Abduction	18	16	88.9	2	11.1
Sexual assault with an object	9	8	88.9	1	11.1
On-line solicitation of a child	12	10	83.3	2	16.7
Restraining order violation	6	5	83.3	1	16.7
Forcible sodomy	23	19	82.6	4	17.4
Robbery	4	3	75.0	1	25.0
Civil rights violation (criminal)	7	5	71.4	2	28.6
Intimidation	29	20	69.0	9	31.0
Pornography / Obscenity	12	8	66.7	4	33.3
Disorderly Conduct	9	6	66.7	3	33.3
Simple Assault	71	39	54.9	32	45.1
Aggravated Assault	57	21	36.8	36	63.2
Murder / Non-negli. Manslaughter	22	5	22.7	17	77.3

Victim Age

Children and young adolescents may be at-risk to being victims of offending sworn law enforcement officers who commit crimes of police sexual violence. In the pilot study, a moderate association was found between forcible rape and victim age, χ^2 (8, N = 30) = 17.25, $p < .05$, $V = .283$. Victims of alleged officer-perpetrators arrested for forcible rape include birth to age 11 (26.7%), ages 12-13 (3.3%), ages 14-15 (23.3%), and ages 16-17 (6.7%). Underage victims of forcible fondling include birth to age 11 (29.8%), ages 12-13 (21.3%), ages 14-15 (21.3%), and ages 16-17 (4.3%) (see Table 27). This association is also statistically significant, χ^2 (8, $N = 47$) = 49.08, $p < .001$, and strong, V = .478. Victims of forcible sodomy include birth to age 11 (10%), ages 12-13 (15%), ages 14-15 (20%), and ages 16-17 (15%). There is also a moderate association between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for sexual assault with a foreign object and victim age, χ^2 (8, $N = 2$) = 16.85, $p < .05$, $V = .280$, but the small number of cases for that offense category might negate the generalizability of such a preliminary finding. As to adult victims represented in this pilot study sample, ages 20-24 (16.7% for rape) and ages 18-19 (20% for forcible sodomy) are most often victims of police sexual violence.

Table 27

Victim Age: Forcible Rape, Sodomy, and Fondling

Victim's Age	Forcible Rape (N = 30) *n*	%	Forcible Sodomy (N = 20) *n*	%	Forcible Fondling (N = 47) *n*	%
Birth - 11	8	26.7	2	10.0	14	29.8
12-13	1	3.3	3	15.0	10	21.3
14-15	7	23.3	4	20.0	10	21.3
16-17	2	6.7	3	15.0	2	4.3
18-19	1	3.3	4	20.0	2	4.3
20-24	5	16.7	0	0.0	3	6.4
25-32	2	6.7	0	0.0	3	6.4
33-41	3	10.0	3	15.0	3	6.4
42 and older	1	3.3	1	5.0	0	0.0

About 4% of the cases in the pilot study included criminal charges being filed against a sworn law enforcement officer for the criminal offense of statutory rape. It should be noted, on the onset, that the age of consent for a minor to engage in sexual intercourse varies from state to state within the United States and, in some states, the age of consent is different for boys and girls. Here, officers were arrested for statutory rape involving children and adolescents ages 12-13 (13.8%), ages 14-15 (44.8%), and ages 16-17 (41.4%). Less than 2% of the cases included arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for the criminal offense of on-line solicitation of a child (e.g., communicating on-line via the Internet in a chatroom or using instant messaging on the AOL, Yahoo, or similar

portals), where the alleged victims were ages 12-13 (25%), ages 14-15 (50%), and ages 16-17 (25%). Within the cases in the pilot study, no victims were ages 11 or younger in cases involving offenses of statutory rape or on-line solicitation of a child (see Table 28).

Table 28

Victim Age: Statutory Rape and On-Line Solicitation of a Child

	Statutory Rape (N = 29)		On-Line Solicitation Of a Child (N = 12)	
Victim's Age	*n*	%	*n*	%
Birth - 11	0	0.0	0	0.0
12-13	4	13.8	3	25.0
14-15	13	44.8	6	50.0
16-17	12	41.4	3	25.0

A moderate association was found between arrest for assault and victim age: simple assault, χ^2 (8, N = 35) = 19.94, p < .05, V = .305, and aggravated assault, χ^2 (8, N = 27) = 31.40, p < .001, V = .382. Over a quarter of the simple assaults (25.7%) and aggravated assaults (29.6%) for which officers were arrested involved victims ages 18-24, whereas minors (ages birth-17) were victims less often in simple assault (22.9%) and aggravated assault (14.8%) cases. Although lacking statistical significance in their association, close to half the victims of cases where officers were arrested for kidnapping or abduction were ages 18-19 (42.9%) and over a quarter of the victims were ages 14-17 (28.6%). Finally, over a quarter of the cases where officers were arrested for murder or non-negligent manslaughter involved victims ages 33-41 (26.3%) (see Table 29).

Table 29

Victim Age: Simple Assault, Aggravated Assault, Kidnapping/Abduction, and Murder & Non-Negligent Manslaughter

	Simple Assault (N = 35)		Aggravated Assault (N = 27)		Kidnapping / Abduction (N = 7)		Murder & Non-Negligent Manslaughter (N = 19)	
Victim's Age	*n*	%	*n*	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Birth - 11	1	2.9	2	7.4	0	0.0	0	0.0
12-13	0	0.0	2	7.4	0	0.0	1	5.3
14-15	4	11.4	0	0.0	1	14.3	0	0.0
16-17	3	8.6	0	0.0	1	14.3	2	10.5
18-19	7	20.0	4	14.8	3	42.9	3	15.8
20-24	2	5.7	4	14.8	1	14.3	2	10.5
25-32	5	14.3	5	18.5	0	0.0	4	21.1
33-41	6	17.1	1	3.7	0	0.0	5	26.3
42 and older	7	20.0	9	33.3	1	14.3	2	10.5

Discussion of Preliminary Pilot Study

For the purposes of this pilot study, reporting and interpretation of the data/content analyzed for this preliminary content analysis is limited to the lengthy results section above. No effort is made to discuss the results in the context of the body of literature on police crime outlined in the literature review at this juncture, as that will follow in Chapter VI below. There are, however, a number of limitations that need to be addressed prior to designing the dissertation research study.

Limitations of the Preliminary Pilot Study

There are a number of limitations with the research design of the pilot study, as well as with the nature of the data. Limitations of the preliminary pilot study fall into three general areas. They are: limitations in the research design relating to the sources of data and data collection; limitations in the research methodology and the operationalization thereof presented by the coding protocol and coding sheets; and, limitations in the statistical operations invoked in the quantitative content analysis.

Sources of Data and Data Collection

This content analysis, as with all social research content analyses, is only as strong and valid as the source data collected. This preliminary study relied almost exclusively on the relevant content identified initially by an automated daily query of newspapers published on-line on the internet with free access in the Google News search engine using search terms set up at the onset of data collection for daily delivery via the Google News Alerts tool within the Google News engine (see Appendix A). Although the Google News search engines crawls internet content of over 4,500 news sources (i.e., published newspapers with an internet presence and free on-line access) daily, the service is limited – by virtue of agreement between Google and each of the news publishers owning the content of the respective newspapers – to retrieval of news content published within the previous 30 days of each crawl (Google, 2008b).[29] In this regard, the Google News search engine is not an archival database of news sources (cf. Nexis, Dow Jones News Retrieval), nor a news wire service (e.g., Associated Press, United Press International). This presents a unique logistical limitation for content analysis research because a retroactive search is limited to current news (published within the previous 30

days) and necessitates a research design that collects data in a real-time fashion. For this reason, content analysis of news articles collected using Google News over an extended period of time requires a lengthy data collection process. For example, in this pilot study, data were collected in a near contemporaneous period as news stories later analyzed were originally published: every day from January 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006.

Further, the data collected and later subjected to content analysis here are almost exclusively only from news sources that are included in the Google News service. Upon information and belief, no list of the newspapers that are included in the Google News service has been promulgated publicly by Google, and the information appears to be treated by Google as proprietary. That being said, although this information was not coded as a variable in the preliminary content analysis, it appears that Google has made efforts to include news sources in the Google News search engine that equate to most or all newspapers of general circulation in each county/city across the United States that are the official newspapers of record. For this reason, another limitation of this pilot study is there is no way to know the extent to which the sample captures the population on police officers arrested for commission of crimes during the 18 month period examined.

Finally, as with all research of mass media reports of any social and/or newsworthy phenomena, this study is unable to determine the validity of the content reported in the news article analyzed. Similarly, this research is limited to the extent that the news reported – and those cases of police officers arrested for the commission of crimes – is filtered and presented in the context desired by news reporters, editors, and publishers. Indeed, the mass media control the flow of information (see, e.g., Barak, 1995b; Lovell, 2003).

Coding Protocol and Sheets

In the course of conducting the pilot study and in reviewing the literature above, it became apparent that the initial coding protocol and coding sheets used in the preliminary content analysis herein (see Appendix I) did not capture data on a number of variables that are relevant to empirical research on the nature and extent of police crime where such information is readily available in many of the news articles analyzed. The exclusion of these data serve as a limitation of the pilot study. Inclusion of variables that answer that will collect data answering the following questions are included in the current study analyzing content relating to police officers arrested during the calendar years 2005-2007:

- Is the law enforcement agency employing the officer(s) arrested located in a urban, suburban, or rural area?
- Is the law enforcement agency effectuating the arrest(s) or officer(s) the same law enforcement agency that employs the offending officer(s)?
- What is the rank (within the employing law enforcement agency) of each officer arrested for commission of crime(s)? Categories for this variable may include, e.g., officer/deputy, detective, corporal, supervisor, sergeant, lieutenant, captain, major, colonel, assistant chief, deputy chief, chief, sheriff, etc.
- What type of media source is the entity publishing the news article? Categories for this variable may include, for example, local newspaper of general circulation, national newspaper of general circulation, newspaper of special interest circulation, local and/or network affiliate television news web-site, news blog, news magazine, etc.

- Is there a byline naming a reporter who authored the news article?
- Does the byline indicate that author is employed by the newspaper publishing the article or is the reporter employed by another news entity (e.g., a wire service or other news publication)?

Quantitative Content Analysis

The content analysis design and methodology for the pilot study is based in great part on the framework to analyze media messages using quantitative content analysis in research developed by Riffe, Lacy, and Fico (2005). One major purpose of the pilot study was to assess whether the data collected on police crime using Google News and Google News Alerts as a primary method of data collection lends itself to quantitative data analyses, and, if so, does this type of content analysis expand knowledge of the nature and prevalence of police crime within our society. While the preliminary answer to both questions is clearly in the affirmative, there are a number of limitations in this preliminary research study relating to quantitative content analysis of the collected data that needs to be addressed for the benefit of future research, including, but not limited to, the dissertation research study in the chapters that follow.

Levels of measurement. Most of the variables of interest in the pilot study content analysis collected data at the nominal level of measurement (see Table 30). There are no variables included in the content analysis that included data at the ordinal or interval level of measurement. Data collected at the ratio level of measurement – that is, data with an equal difference between numbers and a meaningful zero point – are limited in the dataset developed through this preliminary quantitative content analysis to information

relating to counts of years (e.g., age and length of service) and counts of numbers (e.g., number of employees).

Table 30

Variables - Levels of Measurement

Variable of Interest	Level of Measurement
Year / Date of Offense	Nominal
Age of Offender	Ratio
Years of Service at Time of Arrest	Ratio
Gender of Offender	Nominal
Offender's Duty Status at Time of Offense	Nominal
Agency Type (Employing Offender)	Nominal
State (of Employing Agency)	Nominal
Number of Full-Time Sworn Officers	Ratio
Number of Part-Time Sworn Officers	Ratio
Gender of Victim	Nominal
Is Victim also a Law Enforcement Officer?	Nominal
Age of Victim	Ratio
Relationship of Victim to Offending Officer	Nominal
Criminal Offense Category	Nominal
Collapsed/Grouped Categorical of Above	Nominal

Sample and population. The nature of the data collection methodology in this study likely render the sample of collected cases a nonprobability sample. That is not to suggest, however, that the data are not useful nor their analysis without merit. A longer period of data collection and/or larger sample in future research, including the dissertation research in the chapters that follow, can invoke inferential statistical operations by (a) treating the sample of collected cases as the population and drawing random samples from it for further quantitative analysis, or (b) recognizing the cases collected in this study for content analysis as a census that is, by definition, devoid of sampling error and lends itself to inferential statistical operations.

Measurement error and missing data. All quantitative research includes a degree of measurement error. The goal is to reduce the likelihood of research error. In a content analysis of news articles, it is not possible to eliminate errors of fact within the content. Coding errors can be reduced by high inter-rater reliability and/or (when there is a sole coder, as in this research study) strict adherence to the established coding protocol. This preliminary study is limited to some extent by missing data in many of the cases included in the content analysis (and discussed earlier). As with other limitations within the pilot study, it is assumed that a larger sample in the context of the larger research study proposed will significantly reduce the incidence of missing data on all variables of interest.

Statistical operations. The lack of interval-level and ratio-level data in this preliminary content analysis study limits the application of advanced inferential statistical procedures, including multiple regression (see Riffe et al., 2005, pp. 84-85). Even statistical operations normally appropriate to measure association and strength of

relationships between variables with nominal level of measurement, such as chi-square and Cramer's *V*, are hampered in their utility and statistical significance because of low cell counts in contingency tables – even after combining categories into collapsed variables – resulting from the dataset developed in this preliminary study (see, e.g., Elliott & Woodward, 2007, pp. 115-116). A larger sample may alleviate this limitation.

Conclusions Regarding the Preliminary Pilot Study

When the pilot study was first conceptualized in November, 2004, Google News had been in operation for several months, and was an untested source of news content for social research. As of this writing, Google News is still a beta application offered by Google and, largely, ignored by social scientists, including criminologists, as a potential source of information/data for research studies. Nevertheless, a number of conclusions can be drawn from this pilot study on police crime. First, the Google News search engine provides access to a rich and largely untapped wealth of raw data appropriate for quantitative content analyses within the context of newspapers published on-line by the mass media that would, otherwise, be unmanageable and not available as a source of news information data. Second, retroactive longitudinal data collection is not possible using the Google News search engine and the application only lends itself to lengthy real-time data collection contemporaneous with event publication. It is not a searchable database. Third, the Google News Alerts tool within the Google News application search engine provides an automated data collection that is orderly and efficient to collect news content on a scale otherwise not possible. Fourth, the knowledge base of information about nature and extent of police crime can be expanded through the content analysis of news articles. Finally, at this preliminary juncture in the research of police crime, it is not

possible to know the extent to which the use of Google News, as applied here, captures the full incidence and prevalence of police crime within the United States.

There are a number of statistically significant, albeit weak to moderate, associations between variables among the findings in the pilot study:

- There is a statistically significant, but weak, association between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for the crimes of murder and non-negligent manslaughter and agency-type employing the officer.
- There is a statistically significant, but weak, association between arrest for the crime of arson and agency-type employing the officer.
- There is a statistically significant, but weak, association between duty-status at time of commission of the offense(s) for which officers were arrested and the crimes of extortion, blackmail, and bribery.
- There is a statistically significant moderate association between arrest of sworn law enforcement officers for the crime of forcible rape and victim age.
- There is a statistically significant moderate association between arrest of sworn law enforcement officers for the crime of sexual assault with a foreign object and victim age.
- There is a statistically significant moderate association between arrest of sworn law enforcement officers for assault crimes (i.e., simple assault and aggravated assault) and victim age.

These are preliminary findings, and these associations may not remain statistically significant with a larger number of cases whereby there are sufficient numbers in all contingency table cells.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Restatement of the Purpose and Conceptualization

As stated earlier, the purpose of this research is to explore the prevalence and nature of police crime – that is, that crime committed by sworn law enforcement officers who are employed by federal, state, county, municipal and/or special law enforcement agencies and have general powers of arrest at the time that the crime(s) charged was committed – within the United States. It is exploratory research. A secondary purpose of this study is to explore the propriety of using the internet-based Google News search engine and its Google News Alerts automated search tool to conduct criminological quantitative content analyses.

After a lengthy review of the literature and after conducting the pilot study analysis, it is readily apparent that this research study should be conceptualized in two alternative paradigms. The first conceptual perspective for this research is Ross' (2001) taxonomy of police crime, which states that "police crime is multi-dimensional and directional, representing ranges that can differ in opportunity-ratios, necessary conditions, potency, stability, values, and other basic demands" (p. 184). The taxonomy also states that four bipolar distinctions of police criminality can be made. The first distinction is "between violent and nonviolent actions" (p. 184). The second distinction is "between economically motivated and on-economically motivated police behavior" (p. 184). The third distinction is "between police crime committed by individual law enforcement officers while performing their duty and those by the police organization itself against the citizenry of potential opposition" (p. 184). And finally, the fourth distinction of the taxonomy is "between crimes committed by police officers against the police

organization versus crimes committed by the organization against law enforcement officers" (p. 184). The second conceptual perspective for this research is a typology of police crime. Nearly all criminal offenses for which sworn law enforcement officers were arrested in cases included in the 2005-2006 pilot study data fall into one or more of four categories: drug- and alcohol-related police crime; sex-related police crime; violence-related police crime; and profit-motivated police crime.

First Research Question

What descriptive information and associations can be learned about the nature and prevalence of police crime in the United States during the years 2005-2007?

H_a1: There is a statistically significant relationship between years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer and arrest for a crime in all offense categories.

H_a2: There is a statistically significant relationship between agency-type (employer of officer arrested) and some offense categories.

H_a3: There is a statistically significant relationship between officer duty status (i.e., on-duty or off-duty) at time of offense and some offense categories.

H_a4: There is a statistically significant relationship between some offense categories for which sworn law enforcement officers are arrested and victim age.

Second Research Question

Does Ross' (2001) taxonomy of police crime provide a useful conceptualization to reliably predict factors relating to arrests of sworn law enforcement officers?

H_05: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for an economically-motivated crime versus a crime that is not economically-motivated.

$H_0$6: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for committing a violent crime versus a nonviolent crime.

$H_0$7: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for an organizational police crime versus a crime that is against the citizenry.

$H_0$8: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for an internal crime against the organization versus a crime committed by the organization against a law enforcement officer.

$H_0$9: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for an official-capacity crime versus a crime committed by an officer in their individual capacity.

Third Research Question

Does the typology of police crime provide a useful conceptualization to reliably predict factors relating to arrests of sworn law enforcement officers?

$H_0$10: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for a drug-related crime versus other crime types.

$H_0$11: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for an alcohol-related crime versus other crime types.

$H_0$12: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for a sex-related crime versus other crime types.

$H_0$13: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for a violence-related crime versus other crime types.

$H_0$14: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for a profit-motivated crime versus other crime types.

Fourth Research Question

Is Google News a useful tool for criminological research?

CHAPTER IV

METHODS

The purpose of this research study is to learn more about the nature and extent of police crime in the United States. Police crime is defined herein as crime committed by sworn law enforcement officer(s) who, by virtue of their employment, are empowered with the general powers of arrest pursuant to their statutory authority. Using Ross' (2001) taxonomy of police crime as a precursor to measurement, police crime is conceptualized for this research as:

> a subset of behaviors generally subsumed by the concepts of police coercion, police deviance, occupational crime, and political crime. These actions can be carried out at all levels of the police hierarchy, in all types of political systems, and include crimes for the police organization, crimes against the police organization committed internally by police, crimes committed by the organization against its own police officers and other employees, and crimes committed by police officers in or connected with their role as police officers. They may be violent or nonviolent, and involve economic and noneconomic targets. Finally, police crimes are acts of deviance, are classified in legal codes (criminal and civil), create social injury or harm, or are violations of basic human rights. (Ross, 2001, p. 194)

Included in the conceptualization of police crime for this research are those crimes charged to have been committed while on-duty, as well as those crimes charged to have been committed while off-duty (see n. 7).

Research Design

Content Analysis – Conceptualization

This study invokes a quantitative content analysis research design. Quantitative content analysis is defined as follows:

> Quantitative content analysis is the systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have been assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules and the analysis of relationships involving those values using statistical methods, to describe the communication, draw inferences about its meaning, or infer from the communication to its context, both of production and consumption. (Riffe et al., 2005, p. 25)

Specifically, relevant news content reported by the mass media in news articles published in newspapers was coded pursuant to a coding protocol (discussed below) and quantitatively analyzed using appropriate statistical operations. Additionally, the content analysis includes subjective coding of the bipolar distinctions of police crime outlined in Ross' (2001) taxonomy. Content analysis research consists of three phases: conceptualization, design, and execution (Riffe et al., 2005, p. 62). The conceptualization phase was addressed in the preceding pages. The design and execution phases of this content analysis research study are discussed in the pages that follow.

Definition of Relevant Content

Independent variables. Relevant content is limited to incidence of arrest(s) for misdemeanor and/or felony crimes of any defendant who, at time that the crime charged was committed, was then employed (either full-time or part-time) within the United States as a sworn law enforcement officer with general arrest powers, by a nonfederal law

enforcement agency: primary state police agency; sheriff's department; general purpose county police department; general purpose municipal police department (city, town, township); special police department; constable; tribal police department; or, regional police department, and was arrested for the commission of crime(s) during the time period from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2007. Relevant content includes:

(1) *Offender demographic information* – including age at arrest, years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer, sex, duty status at time of offense(s) charged, rank within offender's employing law enforcement agency (e.g., officer/deputy, detective, corporal, sergeant, lieutenant, caption, major, colonel, deputy chief, chief, etc.).

(2) *Agency of employment information* – including type of agency, locale (i.e., urban, suburban, or rural), jurisdiction/state, and number of sworn personnel (in full-time position equivalents and, where applicable, part-time position equivalents).

(3) *Arresting agency* – indicate whether offender's employing law enforcement agency is the same as the arresting law enforcement agency (i.e., agency of record filing criminal charges).

(4) *Offense information* – including category/categories of criminal offense(s) charged. Offense categories include all offenses coded in the pilot study, as well as official misconduct / official oppression / violation of an oath, resisting arrest, and hit-and-run.

(5) *Victim demographic information* – including sex, age, and relationship of the victim to their offender (e.g., current spouse, ex-spouse, etc.), as well whether the victim is also a sworn law enforcement officer.

(6) *News source* – including type of news source (e.g., local newspaper, national newspaper, local/affiliate television news web-site, national / network news web-site, news blog, news magazine, etc.), and article byline (e.g., news reporter for the specific news source, wire service author, or no byline).

Dependent variables. The bipolar distinctions identified in Ross' taxonomy of police crime will be coded as binary/dichotomous variables on the basis of coder subjectivity:

(7) *Economic versus noneconomic distinction* – Crimes with an economic motivation include offenses with any pecuniary interest, including police corruption.

(8) *Violent versus nonviolent police crime* – Police violence includes acts of "police abuse/brutality; police use of excessive or illegal force; police torture; 'death quad' activity; deaths in police custody; police riots; and police use of 'deadly force'" (Ross, 2001, p. 186). Violent police crime consists of those crimes charged involving acts of police violence as well as off-duty crimes involving physical violence. Nonviolent police crimes are all forms of crimes charged against sworn law enforcement officers not involving violence, including police corruption.

(9) *Individual versus organizational police crime* – Individual police crime "serves the selfish needs of individual officers," whereas organizational police crime "helps the organizational interests of law enforcement agencies" employing those officer(s) charged with the commission of crime(s) (Ross, 2001, p. 192).

(10) *Internal crimes committed by sworn law enforcement officers against the organization (i.e., their employing law enforcement agency)* – Included in this category are offenses where the agency is the victim of the crime committed by a sworn law enforcement officer in its employ.

(11) *Crimes committed by sworn law enforcement officers in their official capacity* – Included in official capacity crimes are those committed by sworn law enforcement officers under the color of law.

The categories in the typology of police crime will also be coded as binary (i.e., dichotomous) variables on the basis of coder subjectivity:

(12) *Drug-Related Police Crime.*

(13) *Alcohol-Related Police Crime.*

(14) *Sex-Related Police Crime.*

(15) *Violence-Related Police Crime.*

(16) *Profit-Motivated Police Crime.*

Content Analysis – Design

The data that are subject to the content analysis in this research study were collected pursuant to IUP IRB Log No. 06-088. The news articles were collected using the Google News search engine to cull the internet daily from January 1, 2005, to early

2009, with potentially relevant content being identified by computer analysis based on hits to automated search terms that were entered into the Google News Alerts automated search tool (see Appendix A). Whenever the automated search terms hit on a news article matching any of the 47 pre-designated search terms, a link to the URL for the news article was sent to the researcher via e-mail. Although these automated daily searches using the Google News Alerts automated search tool served as the primary method of data collection, a few of the news articles collected were obtained from other sources, including print newspapers, and located through chance reading. Each article identified by Google as being potentially relevant content through the search terms was read in a cursory fashion for relevancy, and those articles seeming relevant to the research study were printed and archived for later use.

As noted in the pilot study, the Google News service is limited – by virtue of agreement between Google and each of the news publishers owning the content of the respective newspapers – to retrieval of news content published within the previous 30 days of each crawl (see Google, 2008b). This presents a unique logistical limitation for content analysis research because a retroactive search is limited to current news (published within the previous 30 days) and necessitates a research design that collects data in a real-time fashion. For this reason, as invoked here, content analysis of news articles collected using Google News over an extended period of time requires a lengthy data collection process.

Operationalization

Coding protocol. Operational definitions for much of the content of interest coded as variables in this study are manifest because it is observable on its face (e.g., years of

service, age, gender, employing agency, etc.). The data collection guidelines of the NIBRS are adopted as the coding protocol for criminal offenses (see United States Department of Justice, 2000, pp. 21-52). Ross (2001) serves as the coding protocol for the bipolar distinctions of police crime identified in Ross' taxonomy (i.e., economic versus noneconomic crimes, violent versus nonviolent crimes, individual versus organizational crimes, and internal versus official capacity crimes).

Coding sheets. A copy of the coding sheet used in this research study is attached as Appendix C. Cases that were coded in the pilot study were all recoded using the revised coding sheet.

Population and Sampling Plan

This research design uses a census in lieu of a sample. It is a census because every unit in the population is included in the content analysis (Riffe et al., 2005, p. 98). The population consists of all of the cases that were collected and meet the inclusion criteria of relevant content for the content analysis.

Reliability Procedures

The research is exploratory and uses a subjective coding based on researcher interpretation. Thus, the researcher's knowledge, skills, experience, and judgment are paramount in order to assure reliability. Since the research design relies on one researcher as the study coder of content, a second coder was employed to code a small percentage of cases in the census to assess coder reliability. Coder reliability tests consist of three components: (1) generation of a random sample of cases for the second coder, (2) tests of simple agreement for each variable and category of interest, and (3) calculation of a

coefficient to test for chance agreement (Riffe et al., 2005, pp. 141-155). For this research, the first and second tests of coder reliability are calculated and reported.

Analysis Procedures

Processing of Data

Following the coding of all relevant content, the data recorded on the coding sheets was entered into an SPSS data file. Although the news articles have not been counted (other than those included in the pilot study), it was estimated in the prospectus that there would be well in excess of 2,000 cases included in the content analysis census. In the end, there were 2,119 cases included in the census as analyzed and discussed in the chapters that follow.

Application of Statistical Procedures

A summary of the analytical plan is below (see Table 31). The first phase of the analytical plan explored the nature and extent of police crime in the United States through descriptive statistics and identification of statistically significant associations between variables in the same fashion as presented in the pilot study (see Chapter 3 above). Significance testing procedures of contingency tables are Chi-Square and Cramer's V analyses where $p < .05$. The second phase of the analytical plan includes five models to predict factors relating to arrests using Ross' (2001) taxonomy. The third, and final, phase of the analytical plan includes five models to predict factors relating to arrests using the typology of police crime. Logistic regression is the appropriate statistical procedure here because the dependent variable in each model is dichotomous (Menard, 2002). Stepwise logistic regression is used to select predictors for each of the ten models (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989, pp. 106-117; Menard, 2002, pp. 63-67).

Table 31

Analytical Plan

Nature of Analysis	Proposition or Hypothesis Tested	Statistical Procedure
Descriptive statistics and associations between variables.	Exploring the nature and extent of police crime in the United States.	Frequencies, Contingency Tables, Chi-Square, Cramer's V
Associations between variables.	H_a1: Relationships between years and arrest for a crime.	Chi-Square Cramer's V
Associations between variables.	H_a2: Relationships between agency-type and offense categories.	Chi-Square Cramer's V
Associations between variables.	H_a3: Relationships between officer duty status and offense categories.	Chi-Square Cramer's V
Associations between variables.	H_a4: Relationships between offense categories and victim age.	Chi-Square Cramer's V
Predicting factors relating to arrests using Ross' taxonomy.	$H_0$5: Factors to predict the odds of arrest for an economically-motivated crime.	Binary Logistic Regression (Backward Stepwise)
Predicting factors relating to arrests using Ross' taxonomy.	$H_0$6: Factors to predict the odds of arrest for a violent crime.	Binary Logistic Regression (Backward Stepwise)
Predicting factors relating to arrests using Ross' taxonomy.	$H_0$7 Factors to predict the odds of arrest for an organizational police crime.	Binary Logistic Regression (Backward Stepwise)
Predicting factors relating to arrests using Ross' taxonomy.	$H_0$8: Factors to predict the odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization.	Binary Logistic Regression (Backward Stepwise)
Predicting factors relating to arrests using Ross' taxonomy.	$H_0$9: Factors to predict the odds of arrest for an official-capacity crime.	Binary Logistic Regression (Backward Stepwise)
Predicting factors relating to arrest using Stinson's typology.	$H_0$10: Factors to predict the odds of arrest for a drug-related crime.	Binary Logistic Regression (Backward Stepwise)
Predicting factors relating to arrest using Stinson's typology.	$H_0$11: Factors to predict the odds of arrest for an alcohol-related crime.	Binary Logistic Regression (Backward Stepwise)
Predicting factors relating to arrest using Stinson's typology.	$H_0$12: Factors to predict the odds of arrest for a sex-related crime.	Binary Logistic Regression (Backward Stepwise)
Predicting factors relating to arrest using Stinson's typology.	$H_0$13: Factors to predict the odds of arrest for a violence-related crime.	Binary Logistic Regression (Backward Stepwise)
Predicting factors relating to arrest using Stinson's typology.	$H_0$14: Factors to predict the odds of arrest for a profit-motivated crime.	Binary Logistic Regression (Backward Stepwise)

Stepwise regression refers to decisions that are made by computer algorithms – in this case, by SPSS – instead of choices manually made by a researcher. In this instance, automated and manual stepwise logistic regression is used to select a set of predictors for removal from numerous models. While often viewed as inappropriate to use stepwise logistic regression when testing a theory, stepwise logistic regression is appropriate for purely predictive research and for exploratory research (Menard, 2002, p. 63). The current research is both predictive and exploratory. As predictive research, this research study is not concerned with causality. Rather, the second and third phases of the analytical plan are intended to identify various models, including a set of predictors in each model, which will provide accurate predictions about arrests for police crime (p. 63). As exploratory research, stepwise logistic regression is appropriate because little is known empirically about the specific factors responsible (Wofford, Elliott, & Menard, 1994, p. 220) for arrests of sworn law enforcement officers who are accused of committing a crime. In many respects, existing theories about the phenomenon of interest amount to "little more than empirically unsupported hunches about explanations for the phenomenon" (Menard, 2002, p. 63).

Backward stepwise elimination (instead of forward stepwise inclusion) is appropriate for the logistic regression procedures in the second and third analytical phases of the current research (see, e.g., Menard, Mihalic, & Huizinga, 2001; Wofford et al., 1994).[30]

> Backward elimination begins with all the variables in the model. Then, at each step, the likelihood ratio statistic is used to select variables for removal from model until the final model is achieved. At each step, the least statistically

significant influence on the dependent variable is removed. (Wofford et al., 1994, pp. 208-209)

The statistical significance criterion for inclusion in each regression model in this research is set at $p < .20$, as is the standard practice in stepwise linear or logistic regression research (Bendel & Afifi, 1977, pp. 51-52; Menard, 2002, pp. 64-66). The relaxed criterion for statistical significance is justified here because this is exploratory research interested in determining all relevant/likely predictors of arrests for police crime. An "alpha $\leq .05$ is too stringent and often excludes important variables from the model" (Wofford et al., 1994, p. 209). Finally, summary statistics for evaluation of each logistic regression model (Menard, 2002, pp. 17-41) and logistic regression diagnostics (Menard, 2002, pp. 67-91), as appropriate, are assessed and reported (contingent upon suitability of the data).

Anticipated Ethical Issues in the Study

This dissertation research is eligible for expedited review by the university's IRB pursuant to the provisions of IRB Expedited Category #3, 45 C.F.R. § 46.110, and 65 Fed. Reg. 60,664-60,667 (Nov. 9, 1998) because the research involves the study of existing data, documents, and records.[31] All of the data subject to the content analysis are matters of public record; everything has been published in a newspaper of general circulation. There are no anticipated ethical issues in this study.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Introduction

This analysis includes data on 2,119 cases involving 1,746 sworn law enforcement officers employed by 1,047 state and local (nonfederal) law enforcement agencies representing all 50 states and the District of Columbia who were arrested for committing one or more criminal offenses during the period of January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2007. Of these cases, roughly 20% of the arrests occurred in 2005, 40% occurred in 2006, and 40% occurred in 2007. This chapter consists of two main sections. The first part of the chapter reports frequencies, descriptive statistics, and bivariate analyses relating to the first through fourth research hypotheses (see Table 31, *supra*). The second part of the chapter reports the results of binary logistic regression models relating to the fifth through ninth research hypotheses predicting factors relating to Ross' taxonomy of police crime, and the tenth through fourteenth research hypotheses predicting factors relating to the typology of police crime.

The purpose of the exhaustive bivariate analyses in the first part of this chapter is to assess nominal level categorical variables as part of preliminary diagnostic assessment of the data for logistic regression analyses. Specifically, the many tables presented here are necessary to examine zero cell counts in nominal level categorical variables that will later serve as independent variables in logistic regression models.[32] Problems resulting from zero cell counts can include high standard errors in logistic regression models, although such problems typically do not affect the overall fit of the regression models (see Menard, 2002, pp. 78-80). Through this diagnostic process, numerous variables that

will serve as independent variables have been collapsed and recoded in preparation for the logistic regression analyses.

The study employs a census methodology in lieu of a sample methodology. The census reports the findings of all the relevant cases located using the Google News search engine whereby a sworn law enforcement officer employed by a nonfederal law enforcement agency within the United States was arrested for a crime during the years 2005 through 2007. As discussed earlier, the designated search terms using the Google News Alerts tool to automate daily searches using the Google News search engine were honed, expanded, and revised throughout the first 18 months of data collection until 48 search terms were developed (see Appendix A). This, in part, likely explains the lower number of cases collected during 2005 (19.2%) versus those collected in 2006 (40.3%) and 2007 (40.5%) (see Table 32). One facet of the data collected over time using the Google News Alerts is that it was common throughout the data collection process to receive additional information about a case several years after a law enforcement officer's arrest was first reported by the media. This often was in the context of new articles reporting a development in a case relating to a trial (e.g., an adjudication of acquittal, conviction, or dismissal), appellate court orders of affirmation or reversal, subsequent arrests of the same officer(s) in different criminal cases, or mention of a case and its then-current status in an otherwise unrelated news article about some scandal within a specific police department or sheriff's office. As a result of the publication of additional news articles in the months and years following arrests of sworn law enforcement officers, more cases were found for 2005 and the first six months of 2006 than were included in the pilot study (see Table 33). Whereas 358 cases from the year

2005 were included in the pilot study sample, there are 407cases from the year 2005 included in this census: the same 358 cases in the pilot study, plus an additional 49 cases mentioned in articles that were published sometime after June 31, 2006, and located by the Google News Alerts set up for this study.

Table 32

Cases by Year (N = 2,119)

	n	%
2005	407	19.2
2006	854	40.3
2007	858	40.5

Table 33

Pilot Study Cases by Year (N = 695)

	n	%
2005	358	51.5
2006	337	48.5

Coder Reliability

Coding of content was completed by one researcher. To ensure coder reliability in this research study, a two-step procedure is invoked. First, a random sample of 106 cases (5% of the population of cases in the census) was generated using the random case generator in SPSS (see Appendix D). A second coder was employed to independently code 105 of the 109 variables on the coding sheet (see Appendix C). Four variables were

not coded by the second coder because the data for those variables were acquired from sources other than the articles coded in the content analysis (i.e., census data on county population, numbers of full- and part-time sworn law enforcement officers employed by each agency). The variable on date of arrest was not tested for coder reliability, as it is not a variable of interest in this study (although year of arrest was coded for each case by the second coder). The second coder was provided a copy of the coding protocol and trained in a one hour session on the specific definitions and procedures in the coding protocol. Upon completion by the second coder of coding the 106 cases in the test sample, percentages of simple agreement were calculated for each variable (see Appendix E). Overall simple agreement (97.24%) between the two coders across all variables of interest establishes an acceptable level of coder reliability for the study (see, e.g., Riffe et al., 2005, p. 147, noting that "the acceptable level of agreement necessary will depend on the type of research conducted ... a minimum level of 80% is usually the standard" for percentage of agreement in coder category reliability tests). Percentages of agreement for categories of interest that are analyzed in the pages that follow are: typology of police crime variables (V93-V97, 99.62%), offense categories variables (V15-V80, 98.74%), personal demographic variables (V3-V5, V7, 93.86%), victim demographic variables (V81-V85, 95.65%), and Ross' taxonomy of police crime variables (V88-V92, 89.99%). Additionally, percentages of agreement for news source variables (V86-V87, 95.27%) were calculated, as they may be used in future research involving this dataset.

Frequencies, Descriptive Statistics, and Bivariate Analysis

In this section, the frequencies, descriptive statistics, and bivariate analyses are organized into several areas: offenders' (i.e., sworn law enforcement officers who were

arrested and their cases included in the analysis) demographic and other information; agencies employing the offenders (i.e., nonfederal state primary, sheriff's departments, county police departments, municipal [city, town, regional] police departments, special police departments [e.g., nonprimary state, alcoholic beverage enforcement, fish and game, natural resources, park, college/university, and school district police departments], and tribal police departments); crimes by typology of police crime categories (i.e., drug-related, alcohol-related, violence-related, sex-related, and profit motivated crime); and, victims of crimes by sworn officers.

Offenders

Age, Gender, and Years of Service at Time of Arrest

Due to the nature of the content analyzed, missing data are present for the demographic variables. Not every news article, for example, mentions the age of an offender at arrest. Age of offending officers was available in 82.5% of the cases (an improvement over the 77% in the pilot study cases), with a mean of 36.81 years of age, a minimum age of 20 years, and a maximum age of 79 years at time of arrest. Exactly 95% of the officers in the census are male, and 5% are female (see Table 34). Under half (46.5%) of the officers in the census were age 35 years or younger at arrest (see Table 35). The age category groupings were regarding the outliers on the upper end of the age spectrum for individuals employed as sworn law enforcement officers in state and local law enforcement agencies, only two officers were above age 70 years (one was 73 years old, and one was 79 years old) at time of arrest, and 99% of the individuals included in the census were age 60 years or younger at time of their arrest(s).

Table 34

Demographic Characteristics (N = 2,119)

Characteristic	*n*	*M*	*SD*	*Min/Max*
Age	1,749	36.81	8.18	20-79
Years of Service	1,434	9.66	7.52	0-47
Male	2,014 (95.0)			
Female	105 (5.0)			

Table 35

Age of Officer at Arrest - Categorical (N = 2,119)

Age	*n*	%	Valid %
20-23	32	1.5	1.8
24-27	172	8.1	9.8
28-31	292	13.8	16.7
32-35	317	15.0	18.1
36-39	353	16.7	20.2
40-43	252	11.9	14.4
44-47	158	7.5	9.0
48-51	84	4.0	4.8
52-55	44	2.1	2.5
56 and older	45	2.1	2.6
Subtotal	1,749	82.5	100.0
Missing	370	17.5	

As in the pilot study, years of service at time of arrest continues to be plagued by missing data. The amount of missing data for this variable, however, has declined from the pilot study (40.4% missing data for the years of service variable) (see Table 3, *supra*) to less than one-third (32.3%) in this census. In other words, the known years of service has increased from the pilot study (59.6%) to this study (67.7%) (see Table 36). When looking at the data for the years of service variable in known cases only, over half (52.2%) of the officers arrests have eight or fewer years of service at time of their arrest, and almost one in six (17.4%) of the officers arrested have 18 or more years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer at time of their arrest (see Table 37). The years of service variable was coded as years of service at time of arrest, and not years of service at time of commission of the alleged criminal offense(s) charged. In a few cases (probably less than 5 in the census), there was a substantial gap in time (sometimes two or more decades elapsed) between the occurrence of the alleged crime and arrest of the officer(s) as a defendant charged in that case. Those rare instances typically involved murder charges where an arrested officer, for whatever reason, not charged earlier.

Table 36

Years of Service as a Sworn Law Enforcement Officer - Categorical (N = 2,119)

	n	%
Unknown	685	32.3
0-2 years of service	237	11.2
3-5 years of service	312	14.7
6-8 years of service	199	9.4
9-11 years of service	183	8.6
12-14 years of service	146	6.9
15-17 years of service	107	5.0
18-20 years of service	128	6.0
21-23 years of service	55	2.6
24-26 years of service	27	1.3
27 or more years of service	40	1.9

Table 37

Years of Service, Known Cases - Categorical (N = 1,434)

	n	%
0-2 years of service	237	16.5
3-5 years of service	312	21.8
6-8 years of service	199	13.9
9-11 years of service	183	12.8
12-14 years of service	146	10.2
15-17 years of service	107	7.5
18 or more years of service	250	17.4

Rank at Time of Arrest

Police organizations in the United States have long been organized as quasi-military organizations with a war-like mission (Bittner, 1978, p. 41), dating back to 1833 when Sir Robert Peel's Principles served as the foundation for organizing the NYPD. The first of Peel's Principles – promulgated in 1829 when Peel was Home Secretary of England and introduced the Metropolitan Police Act before Parliament – states that "the police must be stable, efficient, and organized along military lines" (Sullivan, 1977, p. 11). The typical rank structure of state and local law enforcement agencies follow some version of military-style ranks for supervisory personnel (e.g., sergeant, lieutenant, and captain) (Walker & Katz, 2008, p. 93).

Rank was not coded as a variable in the pilot study, on the (now erroneous) basis that rank might not be generalizable from one agency to another. The variable was added, however, to this analysis because (a) virtually all state and local law enforcement agencies employ a military-style rank structure in their organization, and (b) the information of officer rank is typically included in news articles reporting the arrest of sworn law enforcement officers. Over three-fourths (77.3%) of the officers arrested in this census held the non-supervisory rank of officer (in the case of municipal and special – town, township, borough, city, regional, tribal, park, college/university, and county – local law enforcement agencies), deputy (in the case of sheriff's offices/departments), or trooper (in the case of primary state police agencies) (see Table 38). Law enforcement agencies vary in the number of (and titles of) supervisory ranks depending on the size of the organization in terms of number of sworn employees. Nevertheless, most agencies – even the smallest ones – include the positions of detective (i.e., criminal investigators),

sergeant (i.e., first-line supervisors of non-rank officers, deputies, and troopers), and chief (i.e., the chief executive of the agency) in their rank structure. This is demonstrated in the census in terms of the most frequently arrested law enforcement officers (after the non-supervisory rank of officer, deputy, and trooper) are sergeants (9.2%), detectives (4.4%), and chiefs (3.1%).

Table 38

Rank of Officer at Time of Their Arrest (N = 2,119)

	n	%
Officer/Deputy/Trooper	1,638	77.3
Detective/Investigator	93	4.4
Corporal	40	1.9
Sergeant	194	9.2
Lieutenant	50	2.4
Captain	18	0.8
Major	2	0.1
Colonel	2	0.1
Deputy Chief/Chief Deputy	16	0.8
Chief/Sheriff	66	3.1

The personnel at most state and local law enforcement agencies are organized into patrol and street-level policing (i.e., nonsupervisory officers, deputies, and troopers, as well as detectives and investigators), line and field supervision (i.e., corporals, sergeants, and lieutenants), and management (i.e., captains, majors, colonels, deputy chiefs, and

chiefs) functions, although not all ranks/titles exist in every agency, and titles can vary from one agency to another (e.g., in some state and local law enforcement agencies the chief executive officer holds the rank of colonel, superintendent, or commissioner) (see Figure 5). In this census, the bulk of officers arrested for criminal offenses are patrol and street-level personnel (81.7%), followed by line- and field-supervisors (13.4%), and management personnel (4.9%) (see Table 39).



Figure 5. Rank by organizational function in law enforcement agencies.

Table 39

Rank of Officer by Organizational Function (N = 2,119)

	n	%
Patrol / Street-Level Officers	1,731	81.7
Line / Field Supervisors	284	13.4
Management Personnel	109	4.9

Duty Status at Time of Their Crime(s)

Over half (53.1%) of the crimes for which officers were arrested occurred while the officer was off duty (see Table 40). A weak association was found between duty status (at time of commission of the criminal offense(s) charged) and rank (at time of arrest), χ^2 (9, N = 2,119) = 18.128, $p < .05$, $V = .092$ (see Table 41). Likewise, a weak association was found between duty status and organizational function, χ^2 (2, N = 2,119) = 8.262, $p < .05$, $V = .062$ (see Table 42). Whereas crimes for which nonsupervisory officers, deputies, and troopers were arrested occurred while on duty in less than half (45.6%) of the cases, on duty crimes for which chiefs and sheriffs were charged occurred in almost two-thirds (65.2%) of the cases. Similarly, when categorizing rank by organizational function, arrests for on duty crimes for patrol and street-level nonsupervisory officers and detectives (46.2%) and line- and field-supervisors (46.1%) occurred in under half of the cases, while on duty crimes for those sworn officers in management (60.6%) occurred in well over half of the cases.

Table 40

Duty Status of Officer at Time of Their Crime(s) (N = 2,119)

	n	%
On-duty at time of offense	993	46.9
Off-duty at time of offense	1,126	53.1

Table 41

Duty Status of Officer by Rank at Time of Arrest (N = 2,119)

	Off Duty		On Duty	
	n	%	*n*	%
Officer / Deputy	891	54.4	747	45.6
Detective	41	44.1	52	55.9
Corporal	20	50.0	20	50.0
Sergeant	108	55.7	86	44.3
Lieutenant	25	50.0	25	50.0
Captain	11	61.1	7	38.9
Major	0	0.0	2	100.0
Colonel	1	50.0	1	50.0
Deputy Chief	6	37.5	10	62.5
Chief / Sheriff	23	34.8	43	65.2

Table 42

Duty Status of Officer by Organizational Function at Time of Arrest (N = 2,119)

	Off Duty		On Duty	
	n	%	*n*	%
Patrol & Street-Level	932	53.8	799	46.2
Line/Field Supervisors	153	53.9	131	46.1
Management	41	39.4	63	60.6

Agencies Employing the Offenders

Agency Type

Almost three-fourths (72.3%) of the sworn law enforcement officers arrested in the census were employed by a general purpose municipal police department at the time of the crime(s) for which each officer was accused of committing. Sheriff's departments are the next most frequently represented agency type (15.1%) in the census. The census does not include offenses committed by jail-based correctional officers employed by sheriff's departments. Also represented in the census are officers employed by primary state police agencies, special police departments (e.g., park police agencies, marine police, natural resources police, college/university police, and transportation/port authority police), general purpose police departments, constable agencies, and tribal police departments (see Table 43).

Table 43

Agency Type (N = 2,119)

	n	%
Primary state police agency	104	4.9
Sheriff's department	321	15.1
General purpose county police department	93	4.4
General purpose municipal police department	1,532	72.3
Special police department	59	2.8
Constable (Texas only)	2	0.1
Tribal police department	8	0.4

Agency Size

Supplemental data for agency size (by number of sworn law enforcement employees with general powers of arrest) were obtained from the year 2000 wave of the Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies (CSLLEA) (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003b) and coded as a categorical variable scaled/coded for the number of full-time equivalent sworn officers employed (see Table 44). The categories for agency size (per number of full-time equivalent sworn law enforcement officers employed) are those used in the CSLLEA. Over half (55.1%) of the law enforcement agencies included in this census of officers arrested employ less than 250 full-time sworn law enforcement officers, and the balance of law enforcement agencies (44.9%) employ 250 or more sworn law enforcement officers. A second categorical scale variable was coded for the number of part-time sworn officers employed (see Table 45). Of the cases in this census

(*N* = 2,119), over three-fourths (76.1%) do not include law enforcement agencies that employ part-time sworn officers. Agencies employing 2 to 4 part-time officers (7.7%), 5 to 9 part-time officers (5.9%), and 10 to 24 part-time officers (6.5%) make up the bulk of those agencies (23.9%) represented in the census employing part-time officers.

Table 44

Agency Size, by Full-Time Sworn Employees - Categorical (N = 2,119)

Full-Time Sworn Officers Employed	*n*	%	Valid %
0	8	0.4	0.4
1	9	0.4	0.4
2-4	102	4.8	4.9
5-9	144	6.8	6.9
10-24	215	10.1	10.3
25-49	196	9.2	9.4
50-99	210	9.9	10.0
100-249	267	12.6	12.8
250-499	208	9.8	9.9
500-999	143	6.7	6.8
1,000 or more	589	27.8	28.2
Subtotal	2,091	98.7	100.0
Missing	28	1.3	

Table 45

Agency Size, by Part-Time Sworn Employees - Categorical (N = 2,119)

Part-Time Sworn Officers Employed	*n*	%
0	1,612	76.1
1	42	2.0
2-4	163	7.7
5-9	126	5.9
10-24	138	6.5
25-49	20	0.9
50-99	15	0.7
100-249	3	0.1
250-499	0	0.0
500-999	0	0.0
1,000 or more	0	0.0

Agency Geographic Distribution

The 1,047 non-federal law enforcement agencies represented in the census (as the employer, at time of commission of the crime(s) charged) are located in all 50 states and the District of Columbia (see Appendix D). These agencies account for approximately 6% of all state and local (i.e., non-federal) law enforcement agencies in the United States. For this analysis, the states were coded categorically into 4 geographic regions of the United States, and then into 9 smaller geographic divisions of the country, using the same geographic groupings used by the UCR (see Figure 1, *supra*). Agencies located in the

South region make up the largest group in the sample (43.3%), followed by agencies located in the Northeast region (23.0%), the Midwest region (20.9%), and the South region (12.8%) (see Table 46).

Table 46

Geographic Distribution of Cases by Regions (N = 2,119)

	n	%
Northeastern States	488	23.0
Midwestern States	442	20.9
Southern States	918	43.3
Western States	271	12.8

Greater precision is gleaned from assessing the geographic distribution of cases by breaking the four geographic regions of the United States into smaller geographic divisions derived from the larger regions. Over two-thirds (70.8%) of the cases in the census involve officers arrested who were, at time of commission of their crime(s) charged, employed by a law enforcement agency located in the eastern part of the country (i.e., east of the Mississippi River). The geographic divisions most frequently represented in the census, in terms of location of the defendant's employer, are the South Atlantic division (22.6%) of the South region, followed by the Middle Atlantic division (17.4%) of the Northeast region, and the East North Central division (16.6%) of the Midwest region of the United States. The least frequent areas of defendants' agency-employers in the census are the Mountain division (4.1%) of the West region and the West North Central division (4.2%) of the Midwest region, followed by the Northeast division (5.7%)

of the New England region of the country. Three-fourths of the cases (75.1%) stem from officers employed by law enforcement agencies located in jurisdictions/states within the populous coastal divisions of the country (i.e., Pacific, Gulf, and/or Atlantic coasts), and over half (54.5%) involve officers employed by divisions abutting the Atlantic or Pacific coasts (see Table 47).

Table 47

Geographic Distribution of Cases by Regions and Divisions (N = 2,119)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	368	17.4
Northeastern States – New England	120	5.7
Midwestern States – East North Central	352	16.6
Midwestern States – West North Central	90	4.2
Southern States – South Atlantic	479	22.6
Southern States – East South Central	181	8.5
Southern States – West South Central	258	12.2
Western States – Mountain	87	4.1
Western States – Pacific	184	8.7

Supplemental data were also used to categorically code population areas of each law enforcement agency represented in the census with the rural-urban continuum codes developed by the Economic Research Service at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (see United States Department of Agriculture, 2003). The majority of cases (84.5%) involve officers arrested who were/are employed by law enforcement agencies located in counties

that are in metropolitan areas. The remaining cases (15.4%) involve officers arrested who were/are employed at law enforcement agencies located in counties that are in nonmetropolitan areas. A very small number of cases (1.2%) involve officers employed by agencies located in counties that are in completely rural areas (see Table 48).

Table 48

Distribution of Cases by County Size (N = 2,119)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	1,173	55.4
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	439	20.7
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	179	8.4
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	131	6.2
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	37	1.7
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	99	4.7
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	34	1.6
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	20	0.9
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	7	0.3

Crimes

Crimes by Offense Type, Generally

Frequencies for crimes charged, by offense type, for which officers included in the census (N = 2,119) were arrested during the calendar years 2005, 2006, and 2007, are reported in the three-part tables on the pages that follow (see Table 49, Table 50, and Table 51). The most prevalent crime in the pilot study was "unclassified" offenses (i.e., those that did not fit the criteria for inclusion in any of the categories coded). By adding several additional offense categories, the percentage of cases with unclassified offenses has been reduced from the pilot study (n = 114, 16.4%) to the census (n = 92, 4.3%).

Official misconduct offenses. The most prevalent crime, by offense type, are those offenses falling under the umbrella of state-level charges known as official misconduct, official oppression, and violation of oath (n = 301). The names of the offenses and specific elements of the related offenses change from state to state, and generally serve as a catch-all mechanism to charge a sworn law enforcement officer with a crime when the elements of a crime for the underlying offense may or may not be charged separately. Typically, the prosecution's burden of proof is less in these offenses than the underlying crime, and may be related to official misconduct that is violence-related, sex-related, drug-related, and/or related to a financial crime. In some instances the underlying misconduct is not, per se, criminal in nature, but becomes a crime in the context of committing the acts of misconduct while on duty as a sworn law enforcement officer (such as in instances where an officer is caught *in flagrante delicto* during their shift).

Table 49

Crimes Charged, by Offense Type - Part 1 of 3 (N = 2,119)

Offense Type	*n*	%
Official Misconduct/Oppression	301	14.2
Simple Assault	277	13.1
Driving under the Influence	261	12.3
Aggravated Assault	236	11.1
Forcible Fondling	185	8.7
Drug/Narcotic Violation	162	7.6
Intimidation	140	6.6
False Report/False Statement/Perjury	120	5.7
Forcible Rape	118	5.6
Weapons Law Violation	118	5.6
Gambling: Operating/Promoting	10	5.0
Forcible Sodomy	93	4.4
All other offenses (uncategorized)	92	4.3
Statutory Rape	81	3.8
Obstructing Justice	80	3.8
Civil Rights Violation	76	3.6
False Pretenses	72	3.4
All other Larceny	71	3.4
Kidnapping/Abduction/False imprisonment	65	3.1
Murder & Nonnegligent Manslaughter	61	2.9

Table 50

Crimes Charged, by Offense Type - Part 2 of 3 (N = 2,119)

Offense Type	*n*	%
Robbery	61	2.9
Bribery	59	2.8
Pornography/Obscene Material	60	2.8
Burglary	58	2.7
Embezzlement	57	2.7
Extortion/Blackmail	50	2.4
Disorderly Conduct	50	2.4
Other Sex Offense	49	2.3
Evidence: Destroying/Tampering	49	2.3
Indecent Exposure	41	1.9
Property Destruction/Vandalism	38	1.8
Theft from Building	32	1.5
On-line Solicitation of a Child	30	1.4
Stolen Property Offense	29	1.4
Hit and Run	30	1.4
Counterfeiting/Forgery	26	1.2
Liquor Law Violation	23	1.1
Impersonation	21	1.0
Negligent Manslaughter	21	1.0
Prostitution	20	0.9

Table 51

Crimes Charged, by Offense Type - Part 3 of 3 (N = 2,119)

Offense Type	*n*	%
Drunkenness	15	0.7
Restraining Order Violation	13	0.6
Trespass of Real Property	13	0.6
Arson	11	0.5
Shoplifting	10	0.5
Sexual Assault with an Object	11	0.5
Family Offense, Nonviolent	10	0.5
Wiretapping, Illegal	10	0.5
Drug Equipment Violation	9	0.4
Theft from Motor Vehicle	8	0.4
Credit Card/ATM Fraud	6	0.3
Wire Fraud	7	0.3
Incest	7	0.3
Motor Vehicle Theft	4	0.2
Theft of Motor Vehicle Parts	2	0.1
Assisting or Promoting Prostitution	2	0.1
Welfare Fraud	1	< 0.1
Gambling: Betting/Wagering	1	< 0.1
Pocket-Picking	1	< 0.1

Crimes by Typology of Police Crime Categories

Each case was coded as to the type of criminal offense pursuant to the five category typology of police crime (see discussion, *supra*). The categories of the typology are coded as dichotomous variables and are not mutually exclusive. Many cases were, as such, coded as meeting the criteria of two or more typology categories. For example, in a case where an on duty police officer was arrested for the crime of forcible rape, it was coded as both sex-related police crime and violence-related police crime. If a news article mentioned that the same forcible rape was committed while the officer was intoxicated, the case would have been coded as sex-related, violence-related, and alcohol-related police crime. Similarly, in a case where an officer was charged with stealing a large quantity of narcotics (with a reported street value in excess of one million dollars) from a police department's evidence room, the case would be coded as both drug-related and profit-motivated police crime. The most prevalent category of offenses in the census were cases coded as violence-related police crime (50%), followed by sex-related police crime (25.9%), profit-motivated police crime (24.6%), alcohol-related police crime (17.8%), and drug-related police crime (10.5%) (see Table 52). All cases in the census met the coding protocol criteria of at least one category in the typology; they are not mutually exclusive.

The Chi-Square results reported in this section lack a meaningful control or comparison group, as all of the contingency tables include a column whereby officers were arrested for a variable of interest, and the second column whereby officers were arrested for some other crime (that is, a variable not of interest to the Chi-Square analysis). That is to say, all Chi-Square associations reported are between a variable of

interest and "all other arrests" in the census. As such, all of the Chi-Square results are reported here with the caveat that statistical significance might be meaningless in terms of inferential statistical operations; the Chi-Square analyses here serve the purpose of differentiating/selecting which bivariate associations to report in these pages; they are not reported for the purpose of being generalizable to any population outside this census. Similarly, the full Chi-Square contingency tables are not reported in the tables herein. The tables in this section merely display one side of the contingency tables (i.e., the variables of interest) for the limited purpose of presenting frequencies and percentages in this study and as a pre-operational diagnostic tool to assess for zero cell counts that would interfere with the ability to utilize certain variables of interest in logistic regression models (see, e.g., Menard, 2002).

Table 52

Cases by Police Crime Typology (N = 2,119)

	n	%
Drug-related Police Crime	222	10.5
Alcohol-related Police Crime	377	17.8
Sex-related Police Crime	548	25.9
Violence-related Police Crime	1,059	50.0
Profit-motivated Police Crime	521	24.6

Note. Percentages are not mutually exclusive, as cases may be coded in more than one category.

Drug-related police crime. Drug crimes include those cases where an officer was arrested for a drug-narcotic offense (i.e., conspiracy, sale, distribution, and/or possession of an illegal drug) (n = 162, 7.5%), drug equipment violations (e.g., possession of illegal drug paraphernalia) (n = 9, 0.4%), as well as those crimes that are otherwise drug-related (n = 222, 10.5%). Drug-related offenses include instances, for example, where an officer was charged with official misconduct, robbery, theft, extorting a known drug dealer during a traffic stop (but the officer may not, for whatever reason, have been charged with the underlying drug offense). In numerous instances, an officer charged with the crime of tampering with evidence (when she/he allegedly stole cocaine from a police evidence locker) was, likewise, not charged with the underlying drug offense. For these reasons, the prevalence of drug-related crimes (10.5%) by officers who were arrested during 2005, 2006 and 2007 likely provides a more accurate estimation of drug crimes among sworn law enforcement officers than does the prevalence of arrests for drug/narcotic offenses (7.6%) in the census.

One-third (33.4%) of the officers who were arrested for drug/narcotic offenses (n = 162) had under six years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer at the time of their arrest. One in ten (10.5%) had 18 or more years of service at the time of their arrest (see Table 53). Similar percentages for years of service at arrest were found for those cases coded as drug-related crime (n = 222) pursuant to the typology of police crime (see Table 54).

Table 53

Drug/Narcotic Violation: Years of Service at Arrest - Categorical (n = 162)

	n	%
Unknown	37	22.8
0-2 years of service	22	13.6
3-5 years of service	32	19.8
6-8 years of service	20	12.3
9-11 years of service	17	10.5
12-14 years of service	13	8.0
15-17 years of service	4	2.5
18-20 years of service	9	5.6
21-23 years of service	5	3.1
24-26 years of service	1	0.6
27 or more years of service	2	1.2

Table 54

Drug-related Police Crime: Years of Service at Arrest - Categorical (n = 222)

	n	%
Unknown	57	25.7
0-2 years of service	24	10.8
3-5 years of service	44	19.8
6-8 years of service	28	12.6
9-11 years of service	19	8.6
12-14 years of service	19	8.6
15-17 years of service	6	2.7
18-20 years of service	13	5.9
21-23 years of service	8	3.6
24-26 years of service	1	0.5
27 or more years of service	3	1.4

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between drug/narcotic offenses and age of the officer at time of arrest, where $\chi^2(9, N = 1{,}749) = 23.964$, $p < .01$, $V = .117$, with higher than expected cell counts at ages 28-31 (expected count is 23.4), ages 32-35 (expected count is 25.4), ages 48-51 (expected count is 6.7), and ages 56 or older (expected count is 3.6). The expected cell counts in each of the other age categories are lower than expected (see Table 55). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where three cells (15.0%) have counts less than 5; the minimum expected count here is 2.56. The data indicate that arrests for drug-related crimes tend to occur at the early and late stages of an officer's law enforcement career.

Table 55

Drug/Narcotic Violation: Age at Arrest - Categorical (n = 140)

Age	*n*	%
20-23	2	1.4
24-27	13	9.3
28-31	37	26.4
32-35	31	22.1
36-39	22	15.7
40-43	17	12.1
44-47	3	2.1
48-51	10	7.1
52-55	1	0.7
56 and older	4	2.9

The majority of those officers in the census arrested for drug/narcotic offenses hold the nonsupervisory rank of officer, deputy, or trooper (81.5%) at time of their arrest, followed by those holding the rank of sergeant (6.8%), detective (4.3%), and chief or sheriff (3.7%) (see Table 56). The proportions of percentages by rank are similar in the census for all drug-related police crime (see Table 57). These findings are consistent with the proportion of percentages for the overall population in the census of sworn law enforcement officers arrested (see Table 38, *supra*).

Table 56

Drug/Narcotic Violation: Rank at Arrest (n = 162)

	n	%
Officer/Deputy/Trooper	132	81.5
Detective/Investigator	7	4.3
Corporal	2	1.2
Sergeant	11	6.8
Lieutenant	2	1.2
Captain	2	1.2
Major	0	0.0
Colonel	0	0.0
Deputy Chief/Chief Deputy	0	0.0
Chief/Sheriff	6	3.7

Table 57

Drug-related Police Crime: Rank at Arrest (n = 222)

	n	%
Officer/Deputy/Trooper	177	79.7
Detective/Investigator	10	4.5
Corporal	3	1.4
Sergeant	15	6.8
Lieutenant	6	2.7
Captain	2	0.9
Major	0	0.0
Colonel	0	0.0
Deputy Chief/Chief Deputy	1	0.5
Chief/Sheriff	8	3.6

Most of the sworn law enforcement officers in the census arrested for drug/narcotic offenses (85.8%) are street-level (nonsupervisory) patrol personnel (i.e., officers, deputies, and troopers) (see Table 58). All of the sworn officers arrested for drug equipment (e.g., paraphernalia) offenses (n = 9, 100%) are street-level (nonsupervisory) patrol personnel (see Table 59). The percentage proportions of rank by organizational function, at time of arrest, for all drug-related police crime are substantially similar to those for drug/narcotic offenses as reported in Table 58 (see Table 60).

Table 58

Drug/Narcotic Violation: Rank at Arrest by Organizational Function (n = 162)

	n	%
Patrol/Street-Level Officers	139	85.8
Line/Field Supervisors	15	9.3
Management Personnel	8	4.9

Table 59

Drug Equipment Violation: Rank at Arrest by Organizational Function (n = 9)

	n	%
Patrol/Street-Level Officers	9	100.0
Line/Field Supervisors	0	0.0
Management Personnel	0	0.0

Table 60

Drug-related Police Crime: Rank at Arrest by Organizational Function (n = 222)

	n	%
Patrol/Street-Level Officers	187	84.2
Line/Field Supervisors	24	10.8
Management Personnel	11	5.0

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between drug/narcotic offenses and officer duty status at the time the crime(s) charged were committed, where $\chi^2(1, N = 2{,}119) = 11.932, p < .01, V = .075$, with a higher than expected cell count for drug/narcotic offenses committed while on duty (expected count is 75.9) and a lower than expected cell count for off duty offenses (see Table 61). There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between all drug-related police crime and officer duty status at time of commission of the crime(s) charged, where $\chi^2(1, N = 2{,}119) = 29.127, p < .001, V = .117$, with a higher than expected cell count for drug-related police crime committed while on duty (expected count is 104.0) and a lower than expected cell count for off duty offenses (see Table 62), suggesting that drug-related criminal activity among officers, as measured by arrests, is often committed by virtue of opportunities encountered during the course of employment as a law enforcement officer.

Table 61

Drug/Narcotic Violation: Duty Status at Time of Crime(s) (n = 162)

	n	%
On-duty at time of offense	97	59.9
Off-duty at time of offense	65	40.1

Table 62

Drug-related Police Crime: Duty Status at Time of Crime(s) (n = 222)

	n	%
On-duty at time of offense	142	64.0
Off-duty at time of offense	80	36.0

The proportions of percentages for sworn officers arrested with criminal charges of drug/narcotic offenses, as well as for arrested in all cases of drug-related police crime pursuant to the typology of police crime, and agency type (i.e., offender's employing law enforcement agency at the time of alleged crime commission for criminal offense(s) charged) are consistent with the proportions of percentages for the population census-wide (see Table 63 and Table 64). These associations are not statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level. The majority of cases where officers were arrested for drug/narcotics offenses (72.8%), as well as cases in the census that are drug-related police crime (76.1%) involve municipal police departments as the arrestee-employer law enforcement agencies.

Table 63

Drug/Narcotic Violation: Agency Type (n = 162)

	n	%
Primary state police agency	6	3.7
Sheriff's department	27	16.7
General purpose county police department	5	3.1
General purpose municipal police department	118	72.8
Special police department	5	3.1
Constable (Texas only)	1	0.6
Tribal police department	0	0.0

Table 64

Drug-related Police Crime: Agency Type (n = 222)

	n	%
Primary state police agency	6	2.7
Sheriff's department	35	15.8
General purpose county police department	5	2.3
General purpose municipal police department	169	76.1
Special police department	6	2.7
Constable (Texas only)	1	0.5
Tribal police department	0	0.0

The associations are also not statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level for drug/narcotic offenses and agency size (i.e., number of sworn law enforcement officers employed by the agency employing the officer arrested in each case included in the census), as well as for all drug-related police crime and agency size (see Table 65 and Table 66). The percentages and proportions here are substantially similar to those found for agency type in the population of all cases included in the census (see Table 44, *supra*).

Table 65

Agency Size, by Full-Time Sworn Employees: Drug/Narcotic Violation (n = 157)

Full-Time Sworn Officers Employed	*n*	%
0	0	0.0
1	0	0.0
2-4	5	3.2
5-9	11	7.0
10-24	15	9.6
25-49	14	8.9
50-99	17	10.8
100-249	15	9.6
250-499	16	10.2
500-999	10	6.4
1,000 or more	54	34.4

Table 66

Agency Size, by Full-Time Sworn Employees: Drug-related Police Crime (n = 217)

Full-Time Sworn Officers Employed	*n*	%
0	1	0.5
1	1	0.5
2-4	7	3.2
5-9	13	6.0
10-24	32	14.7
25-49	15	6.9
50-99	20	9.2
100-249	18	8.3
250-499	23	10.6
500-999	11	5.1
1,000 or more	76	35.0

The data indicate that there are regional correlates to drug-related police crime arrests. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between drug/narcotic offenses and the geographic region within the United States where the law enforcement agency employing the arrested officer is located, where χ^2 (3, N = 2,119) = 10.187, $p < .05$, $V = .069$, with a higher than expected cell count for drug/narcotic arrests of sworn law enforcement officers in the South region (expected count is 70.2) (see Table 67). Similarly, there is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between drug-related police crime and the geographic region within the United States

where the law enforcement agency employing the arrested officer is located, where χ^2 (3, N = 2,119) = 9.809, p < .05, V = .068, with a higher than expected cell count for drug-related police crime in the southern states region (expected count is 96.2) (see Table 68). When analyzing the cases of the census within the smaller geographic divisions within the regions, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association between arrests for drug/narcotic offenses and the geographic divisions where officers' employer is located, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 51.967, p < .001, V = .157, with higher than expected cell counts in the South Atlantic (expected count is 36.6) and East South Central (expected count is 13.8) divisions of the South region (see Table 69). There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association between drug-related police crime and the geographic location of employing law enforcement agencies of cases in the census, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 43.962, p < .001, V = .144, with higher than expected cell counts in the South Atlantic (expected count is 50.2) and East South Central (expected count is 19.0) divisions of the South region, as well as in the East North Central division (expected count is 36.9) of the Midwest region of the country (see Table 70).

Table 67

Drug/Narcotic Violation: Geographic Distribution by Regions (n = 162)

	n	%
Northeastern States	33	20.4
Midwestern States	25	15.4
Southern States	89	54.9
Western States	15	9.3

Table 68

Drug-related Police Crime: Geographic Distribution by Regions (n = 222)

	n	%
Northeastern States	43	19.4
Midwestern States	46	20.7
Southern States	115	51.8
Western States	18	8.1

Table 69

Drug/Narcotic Violation: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 162)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	24	14.8
Northeastern States – New England	9	5.6
Midwestern States – East North Central	21	13.0
Midwestern States – West North Central	4	2.5
Southern States – South Atlantic	41	25.3
Southern States – East South Central	37	22.8
Southern States – West South Central	11	6.8
Western States – Mountain	4	2.5
Western States – Pacific	11	6.8

Table 70

Drug-related Police Crime: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 222)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	31	14.0
Northeastern States – New England	12	5.4
Midwestern States – East North Central	41	18.5
Midwestern States – West North Central	5	2.3
Southern States – South Atlantic	57	25.7
Southern States – East South Central	41	18.5
Southern States – West South Central	17	7.7
Western States – Mountain	3	1.4
Western States – Pacific	15	6.8

As to county size by population, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between drug-related police crime and the population of the county where the employing law enforcement agency is located, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 25.608, $p < .01$, $V = .110$, with higher than expected cell counts for drug-related police crime arrests in three categories (going from urban to rural in a continuum that was coded on a scale of 1 to 9): urban counties of metropolitan areas with a population of one million of more residents (expected count is 122.9); nonmetropolitan counties with urban populations of 20,000 or more, located adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 13.7); and, nonmetropolitan counties with urban populations of 2,500 to 19,999, located adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 10.4) (see Table 71). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where four cells (22.2%) have counts less 5; the minimum expected count is .73. This suggests that arrests for drug-related police crimes tend to occur in very large cities, small cities, and large towns, although a meaningful interpretation of these data is difficult without controlling for type of drug.

Table 71

Drug-related Police Crime: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 222)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	125	56.3
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	36	16.2
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	17	7.7
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	20	9.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	21	9.5
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	3	1.4
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0

Alcohol-related police crime. Cases coded as alcohol-related police crime (*n* = 377) in the census include alcohol offenses (e.g., driving under the influence, drunkenness, and public intoxication), as well as other offenses where consumption of alcoholic beverages was alleged to have contributed to the incident in such a way to result in an arrest. Numerous instances where the police were called to the residence of a sworn officer (who was often employed by a law enforcement agency other than the one responding to the officer's home) in response to a call for service relating to a domestic disturbance resulted in an arrest for a charge other than domestic assault (usually booked as disorderly conduct, public intoxication or drunkenness, or even resisting arrest). Other times, articles coded for this study specifically stated that an officer who was arrested was drunk at time of the incident.

Years of service at arrest was coded as "unknown" in over one-third (35.5%) of the cases that were coded as alcohol-related police crime, because the article(s) included in the content analysis did not include information on that variable (see Table 72). When excluding the "unknown" category from the analysis (*n* = 243), over one-third of the cases (36.3%) involved officers with under six years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer. Cases involving officers arrested for driving under the influence (*n* = 261) are more prevalent in the early years of officers' careers, although one-fifth (20.5%) of the cases involved an officer with 18 years or more of service as a sworn law enforcement officer (*n* = 34) at time of their arrest (see Table 73).

Table 72

Alcohol-related Police Crime: Years of Service at Arrest - Categorical (n = 377)

	n	%
Unknown	134	35.5
0-2 years of service	40	10.6
3-5 years of service	48	12.7
6-8 years of service	34	9.0
9-11 years of service	29	7.7
12-14 years of service	30	8.0
15-17 years of service	18	4.8
18-20 years of service	19	5.0
21-23 years of service	14	3.7
24-26 years of service	6	1.6
27 or more years of service	5	1.3

Table 73

Driving Under the Influence: Years of Service at Arrest - Categorical (n = 261)

	n	%
Unknown	95	36.4
0-2 years of service	32	12.3
3-5 years of service	25	9.6
6-8 years of service	23	8.8
9-11 years of service	22	8.4
12-14 years of service	16	6.1
15-17 years of service	14	5.4
18-20 years of service	14	5.4
21-23 years of service	10	3.8
24-26 years of service	6	2.3
27 or more years of service	4	1.5

The data suggest that arrests for alcohol-related offenses tend to occur at the very early and journeymen stages of an officer's law enforcement career. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between alcohol-related police crime and age of the officer at time of their arrest, where χ^2 (9, N = 1,749) = 40.473, $p < .001$, $V = .152$, with higher than expected cell counts in the age categories of 20-23 years of age (expected count is 5.5), 24-27 years of age (expected count is 29.3), 28-31 years of age (expected count is 49.8), 36-39 years of age (expected count is 60.1), and 44-47 years of age (expected count is 26.9). The cell counts in the other age

categories are all lower than expected (see Table 74). Likewise, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between driving under the influence and age of the officer at time of their arrest, where χ^2 (9, N = 1,749) = 21.569, p < .01, V = .111, with higher than expected cell counts for the age categories of 20-23 years old (expected count is 3.7), 24-27 years old (expected count is 19.7), 28-31 years old (expected count is 33.4), 36-39 years old (expected count is 40.4) , and 44-47 years old (expected count is 18.1). Here, too, the expected cell counts in the other age categories are considerably lower than expected (see Table 75).

Table 74

Alcohol-related Police Crime: Age at Arrest - Categorical (n = 298)

Age	*n*	%
20-23	12	4.0
24-27	38	12.8
28-31	52	17.4
32-35	36	12.1
36-39	66	22.1
40-43	29	9.7
44-47	43	14.4
48-51	9	3.0
52-55	6	2.0
56 and older	7	2.3

Table 75

Driving Under the Influence: Age at Arrest - Categorical (n = 200)

Age	*n*	%
20-23	8	4.0
24-27	23	11.5
28-31	39	19.5
32-35	24	12.0
36-39	42	21.0
40-43	22	11.0
44-47	27	13.5
48-51	5	2.5
52-55	5	2.5
56 and older	5	2.5

The association between alcohol-related police crime and officer rank at time of their arrest is statistically significant, but weak, in the census, where $\chi^2(9, N = 2{,}119) = 19.346$, $p < .05$, $V = .096$, with higher than expected cell counts for the nonsupervisory street-level rank of officer, deputy, and trooper (expected count is 291.4), as well as for the ranks of sergeant (expected count is 34.5) and deputy chief/chief deputy (expected count is 2.8) (see Table 76). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 6 cells (30.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count here is .36. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for driving under the

influence offenses and rank at time of arrest, where χ^2 (9, N = 2,119) = 17.292, p < .05, V = .090, with higher than expected cell counts for the rank of sergeant, lieutenant, caption, colonel, and deputy chief/chief deputy (see Table 77). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations for driving under the influence arrests and rank at time of arrest resulted from contingency tables where seven cells (35.0%) have counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .25.

Table 76

Alcohol-related Police Crime: Rank at Arrest (n = 377)

	n	%
Officer/Deputy/Trooper	299	79.3
Detective/Investigator	13	3.4
Corporal	1	0.3
Sergeant	37	9.8
Lieutenant	9	2.4
Captain	3	0.8
Major	0	0.0
Colonel	1	0.3
Deputy Chief/Chief Deputy	7	1.9
Chief/Sheriff	7	1.9

Table 77

Driving Under the Influence: Rank at Arrest (n = 261)

	n	%
Officer/Deputy/Trooper	199	76.2
Detective/Investigator	10	3.8
Corporal	1	0.4
Sergeant	31	11.9
Lieutenant	7	2.7
Captain	3	1.1
Major	0	0.0
Colonel	1	0.4
Deputy Chief/Chief Deputy	5	1.9
Chief/Sheriff	4	1.5

The majority of cases coded in the census as alcohol-related police crime involve officers who, at the time of their arrest, held nonsupervisory ranks and whose duties were primarily street-level patrol functions (82.8%) within the organization. Line/field supervisors (12.5%) and management personnel (4.8%) account for much smaller proportions of the cases coded as alcohol-related police crime (see Table 78). Similar proportions were found for cases in the census involving officers charged with the offense of driving under the influence (see Table 79). These findings are not statistically significant, as they closely resemble frequencies census-wide for rank by organizational function (see Table 39, *supra*).

Table 78

Alcohol-related Police Crime: Rank at Arrest by Organizational Function (n = 377)

	n	%
Patrol/Street-Level Officers	312	82.8
Line/Field Supervisors	47	12.5
Management Personnel	18	4.8

Table 79

Driving Under the Influence: Rank at Arrest by Organizational Function (n = 261)

	n	%
Patrol/Street-Level Officers	209	80.1
Line/Field Supervisors	39	14.9
Management Personnel	13	5.0

There is a statistically significant and moderate association in the census between alcohol-related police crime and officer duty status when the crime charged was committed, where χ^2 (1, N = 2,119) = .002, p < .001, V = .311, with a much higher than expected cell count in a two by two contingency table for off duty status (expected count is 200.3) (see Table 80). Likewise, there is also a statistically significant and moderate association between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for driving under the influence and officer duty status when the crime charged occurred, where χ^2 (1, N = 2,119) = .013, p < .001, V = .251, with a much higher than expected cell count for off duty status (expected count is 138.7) (see Table 81).

Table 80

Alcohol-related Police Crime: Duty Status at Time of Crime(s) (n = 377)

	n	%
On-duty at time of offense	51	13.5
Off-duty at time of offense	326	86.5

Table 81

Driving Under the Influence: Duty Status at Time of Crime(s) (n = 261)

	n	%
On-duty at time of offense	35	13.4
Off-duty at time of offense	226	86.6

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between alcohol-related police crime and agency type (i.e., the type of nonfederal law enforcement agency employing the officer arrested), where χ^2 (6, N = 2,119) = 30.578, p < .001, V = .120, with higher than expected cell counts for primary state police agencies (expected count is 18.5), sheriff's departments (expected count is 57.1), and tribal police departments (expected count is 1.4) (see Table 82). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where three cells (21.4%) have counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .36. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for the offense of driving under the influence and agency type employer of arrestees, where χ^2 (6, N = 2,119) = 28.994, p < .001, V = .117, with a higher than expected cell count for

primary state police agencies (expected count is 12.8), sheriff's departments (expected count is 39.5), and tribal police departments (expected count is 1.0) (see Table 83). Here, again, the statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where three cells (21.4%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .25.

Table 82

Alcohol-related Police Crime: Agency Type (n = 377)

	n	%
Primary state police agency	21	5.6
Sheriff's department	61	16.2
General purpose county police department	15	4.0
General purpose municipal police department	265	70.3
Special police department	7	1.9
Constable (Texas only)	1	0.3
Tribal police department	7	1.9

Table 83

Driving Under the Influence: Agency Type (n = 261)

	n	%
Primary state police agency	18	6.9
Sheriff's department	49	18.8
General purpose county police department	12	4.6
General purpose municipal police department	171	65.5
Special police department	5	1.9
Constable (Texas only)	1	0.4
Tribal police department	5	1.9

The associations are not statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level for cases coded in the census as alcohol-related police crime and agency size (i.e., arrestees' employing nonfederal law enforcement agency) as measured categorically by the number of full-time equivalent sworn law enforcement officers employed. Over half of the cases (57.8%) involve officers arrested who were employed by a law enforcement agency employing 100 or more sworn law enforcement officers (see Table 84). There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between cases where officers were arrested for the offense of driving under the influence and agency size of their employing law enforcement agency, where $\chi^2 (10, N = 2{,}091) = 25.396, p < .01, V = .110$, with higher than expected cell counts for all of the large size agency categories (i.e., those employing 25 or more) except those agencies employing 1,000 or more sworn law enforcement officers, suggesting that officers employed by very small and very large law

enforcement agencies are the least likely to be arrested for driving under the influence (see Table 85). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations for the weak association between the offense of driving under the influence and agency size resulted from a contingency table where 2 cells (9.1%) have expected counts of less than 5; the minimum expected count is .98.

Table 84

Agency Size, by Full-Time Sworn Employees: Alcohol-related Police Crime (n = 370)

Full-Time Sworn Officers Employed	*n*	%
0	0	0.0
1	1	0.3
2-4	18	4.9
5-9	16	4.3
10-24	40	10.8
25-49	34	9.2
50-99	47	12.7
100-249	51	13.8
250-499	41	11.1
500-999	29	7.8
1,000 or more	93	25.1

Table 85

Agency Size, by Full-Time Sworn Employees: Driving Under the Influence (n = 257)

Full-Time Sworn Officers Employed	*n*	%
0	0	0.0
1	0	0.0
2-4	6	2.3
5-9	11	4.3
10-24	19	7.4
25-49	28	10.9
50-99	34	13.2
100-249	43	16.7
250-499	28	10.9
500-999	26	10.1
1,000 or more	62	24.1

The associations are not statistically significant at $p < .05$ for cases coded in the census as alcohol-related police crime and the geographic region within the United States where the law enforcement agency employing the arrested officer is located (see Table 86). The same is true for cases coded in the census as arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for driving under the influence (see Table 87). When analyzing the cases of the census within the smaller geographic divisions within the regions, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association between cases coded in the census as arrests for alcohol-related police crime and the geographic divisions where each arrestee's

employing law enforcement agency is located, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 27.650, p < .01, V = .114, with higher than expected cell counts for cases in the Middle Atlantic division of the Northeast region (expected count is 65.5), the East North Central (expected count is 62.6) and West North Central (expected count is 16.0) divisions of the Midwest region, and the Mountain division (expected count is 15.5) of the West region of the United States (see Table 88). There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association between arrests included in the census for the offense of driving under the influence and geographic divisions where the law enforcement agency employers are located, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 24.214, p < .01, V = .107, with higher than expected cell counts for cases in the East North Central (expected count is 43.4) and West North Central (expected count is 11.1) divisions of the Midwest region, the South Atlantic division (expected count is 59.0) of the South region, and the Mountain division (expected count is 10.7) of the West region of the country (see Table 89).

Table 86

Alcohol-related Police Crime: Geographic Distribution by Regions (n = 377)

	n	%
Northeastern States	92	24.4
Midwestern States	90	23.9
Southern States	146	38.7
Western States	49	13.0

Table 87

Driving Under the Influence: Geographic Distribution by Regions (n = 261)

	n	%
Northeastern States	57	21.8
Midwestern States	64	24.5
Southern States	106	40.6
Western States	34	13.0

Table 88

Alcohol-related Police Crime: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 377)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	71	18.8
Northeastern States – New England	21	5.6
Midwestern States – East North Central	71	18.8
Midwestern States – West North Central	19	5.0
Southern States – South Atlantic	83	22.0
Southern States – East South Central	22	5.8
Southern States – West South Central	41	10.9
Western States – Mountain	29	7.7
Western States – Pacific	20	5.3

Table 89

Driving Under the Influence: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 261)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	45	17.2
Northeastern States – New England	12	4.6
Midwestern States – East North Central	51	19.5
Midwestern States – West North Central	13	5.0
Southern States – South Atlantic	62	23.8
Southern States – East South Central	17	6.5
Southern States – West South Central	27	10.3
Western States – Mountain	22	8.4
Western States – Pacific	12	4.6

The associations are not statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level for cases coded in the census as alcohol-related police crime and the population of the county where arrested officers are employed by non federal law enforcement agencies (see Table 90), as well as for cases involving officers arrested for the offense of driving under the influence and county population (see Table 91). Most of the census cases involving alcohol-related police crime (85.1%) and arrests for driving under the influence (87.0%) involve sworn law enforcement officers arrested employed by nonfederal law enforcement agencies located in metropolitan areas. Metropolitan counties are defined as those with urbanized areas regardless of total area population (United States Department of Agriculture, 2003).

Table 90

Alcohol-related Police Crime: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 377)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	198	52.5
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	84	22.3
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	39	10.3
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	19	5.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	6	1.6
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	22	5.8
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	5	1.3
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	2	0.5
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	2	0.5

Table 91

Driving Under the Influence: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 261)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	140	53.6
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	55	21.1
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	32	12.3
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	14	5.4
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	6	2.3
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	9	3.4
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	3	1.1
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	2	0.8
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0

Sex-related police crime. Sex-related police crime includes those criminal offenses that are inherent sex crimes (e.g., forcible rape, statutory rape, and child pornography), as well as those instances when an officer is charged with an innocuous sounding offense, such as official misconduct, in lieu of the underlying sex offense in cases that news reports clearly indicate are crimes that are sexual in nature. Sometimes these instances result in cases where a victim is unavailable to testify against a police officer at trial. In other instances there are apparent difficulties in meeting the evidentiary burden in prosecution for a specific sex crime, and a decision is made by a prosecutor to file a charge of official misconduct (i.e., criminal failure to conform to the oath of office) so that the evidentiary burden is lessened. There is considerable overlap between those cases that were coded as sex-related police crime and violence-related police crime. Those cases that overlap, as well as those that meet the definition of police sexual violence are discussed in greater detail in the section below on violence-related police crime.

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between sex-related police crime and years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer at time of arrest, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,119) = 58.059, p < .001, V = .166, with higher than expected cell counts for all years of service categories of sex-related police crime except "unknown" and 6-8 years of service. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for forcible rape and years of service, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,119) = 25.241, p < .01, V = .109, with higher than expected cell counts for the following categories: 0-2 years of service at arrest (expected count is 13.2), 3-5 years of service at arrest (expected count is 17.4), 12-14 years of service at arrest (expected count

is 8.1), 15-17 years of service at arrest (expected count is 6.0), 18-20 years of service at arrest (expected count is 7.1), and 27 or more years of service at arrest (expected count is 2.2). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 3 cells (13.6%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 1.50. Lastly, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for forcible fondling and years of service, where $\chi^2(10, N = 2{,}119) = 19.849$, $p < .05$, $V = .097$, with higher than expected cell counts for the following categories: 0-2 years of service at arrest (expected count is 20.7), 3-5 years of service at arrest (expected count is 27.2), 6-8 years of service (expected count is 17.4), 12-14 years of service (expected count is 12.7), 15-17 years of service (expected count is 9.3), 18-20 years of service (expected count is 11.2), and 21-23 years of service (expected count is 4.8). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 3 cells (13.6%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 2.36 (see Table 92). These results suggest that officers at the rookie/recruit, mid-career, and pre-retirement stages of their law enforcement careers are overrepresented in arrests for sex crimes.

Table 92

Rape, Fondling, and Sex-related Police Crime: Years of Service at Arrest - Categorical

	Rape (*n* = 118)		Fondling (*n* = 185)		Sex-related (*n* = 548)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Unknown	22	18.6	37	20.0	112	20.4
0-2 years of service	22	18.6	24	13.0	78	14.2
3-5 years of service	21	17.8	38	20.5	100	18.2
6-8 years of service	7	5.9	20	10.8	49	8.9
9-11 years of service	9	7.6	14	7.6	63	11.5
12-14 years of service	11	9.3	15	8.1	39	7.1
15-17 years of service	9	7.6	13	7.0	37	6.8
18-20 years of service	10	8.5	15	8.1	34	6.2
21-23 years of service	1	0.8	5	2.7	15	2.7
24-26 years of service	1	0.8	1	0.5	10	1.8
27 or more years of service	5	4.2	3	1.6	11	2.0

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for child pornography offenses and years of service at time of arrest, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,119) = 24.682, p < .01, V = .108, with higher than expected cell counts for the following categories: 3-5 years of service (expected count is 8.8), 6-8 years of service (expected count is 5.6), 24-26 years of service (expected count is 0.8), and 27 or more years of service (expected count is 1.1). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 6 cells (27.3%) have expected counts of less than 5; the minimum expected count is .76. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn officers for prostitution offenses and years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer at time of arrest, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,119) = 21.472, p < .05, V = .101, with higher than expected cell counts for the following categories: 3-5 years of service (expected count is 2.9), 6-8 years of service (expected count is 1.9), 9-11 years of service (expected count is 1.7), 15-17 years of service (expected count is 1.0), 21-23 years of service (expected count is 0.5), 24-26 years of service (expected count is 0.3), and 27 or more years of service (expected count is 0.4). These results should be treated with caution, as the statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 10 cells (45.5%) have expected counts of less than 5; the minimum expected count is .25. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of officers for indecent exposure and years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer at time of arrest, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,119) = 44.844, p < .001, V = .145, with higher than expected cell counts for the following categories: 6-8 years of service (expected count is 3.9), 9-11

years of service (expected count is 3.5), 12-14 years of service (expected count is 2.8), 15-17 years of service (expected count is 2.1), 21-23 years of service (expected count is 1.1), 24-26 years of service (expected count is 0.5), and 27 or more years of service (expected count is 0.8). Again, due to the small number of cases (n = 41), the statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 9 cells (40.9%) have expected counts of less than 5; the minimum expected count is .52 (see Table 93). Interestingly, whereas less than fifteen percent of the forcible rape and forcible sodomy offenses in the census were charged against officers with 18 or more years of service, that is not the case with child pornography (16.7% ≥ 18 years of service), prostitution (30.0% ≥ 18 years of service), and indecent exposure (17.0% ≥ 18 years of service).

Table 93

Pornography, Prostitution, and Indecent Exposure: Years of Service at Arrest - Categorical

	Pornography (n = 60)		Prostitution (n = 20)		Indecent Exp. (n = 41)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Unknown	13	21.7	2	10.0	6	14.6
0-2 years of service	6	10.0	2	10.0	1	2.4
3-5 years of service	14	23.3	3	15.0	1	2.4
6-8 years of service	6	10.0	3	15.0	5	12.2
9-11 years of service	5	8.3	2	10.0	10	24.4
12-14 years of service	3	5.0	0	0.0	4	9.8
15-17 years of service	3	5.0	2	10.0	7	17.1
18-20 years of service	3	5.0	1	5.0	1	2.4
21-23 years of service	0	0.0	3	15.0	3	7.3
24-26 years of service	4	6.7	1	5.0	2	4.9
27 or more years of service	3	5.0	1	5.0	1	2.4

The associations are not statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level for sex-related police crime and officer age at arrest (see Table 94). The percentages and proportions categorically are substantially the same as those found in the population of all cases included in the census (see Table 35, *supra*). There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of officers for the offense of forcible rape and age of the officer at time of their arrest, where $\chi^2 (9, N = 1{,}749) = 18.106$, $p < .05$, $V = .102$, with higher than expected cell counts in the following age categories: ages 20-23 (expected count is 2.0), ages 28-31 (expected count is 18.7), ages 36-39 (expected count is 22.6), ages 44-47 (expected count is 10.1), ages 52-55 (expected count is 2.8), and age 56 or older (expected count is 2.9). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations, however, resulted from contingency tables where 3 cells (15.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 2.05. Likewise, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of officers for the offense of forcible sodomy and age of the officer at time of their arrest, where $\chi^2 (9, N = 1{,}749) = 19.215$, $p < .05$, $V = .105$, with higher than expected cell counts in the following age categories: ages 20-23 (expected count is 1.6), ages 36-39 (expected count is 17.8), ages 40-43 (expected count is 12.7), ages 44-47 (expected count is 7.9), ages 52-55 (expected count is 2.2), and ages 56 or older (expected count is 2.3). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 4 cells (20.0%) have expected counts of less than 5; the minimum expected count is 1.61. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of officers for the offense of forcible fondling and age of the officer at time of their arrest, where $\chi^2 (9, N = 1{,}749) = 18.069$, $p < .05$, $V = .102$, with higher than

expected cell counts in the following age categories: ages 20-23 (expected count is 3.1), ages 32-35 (expected count is 30.6), ages 36-39 (expected count is 34.1), ages 40-43 (expected count is 24.3), and ages 44-47 (expected count is 15.3). Here, too, the statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 3 cells (15.0%) have expected counts of less than 5; the minimum expected count is 3.09 (see Table 95).

Table 94

Sex-related Police Crime: Age at Arrest - Categorical (n = 511)

Age	*n*	%
20-23	9	1.8
24-27	40	7.8
28-31	72	14.1
32-35	85	16.6
36-39	117	22.9
40-43	73	14.3
44-47	57	11.2
48-51	30	5.9
52-55	14	2.7
56 and older	14	2.7

Table 95

Forcible Rape, Sodomy, and Fondling: Age at Arrest - Categorical

Age	Forcible Rape (*n* = 112)		Forcible Sodomy (*n* = 88)		Forcible Fondling (*n* = 169)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
20-23	5	4.5	2	2.3	4	2.4
24-27	9	8.0	7	8.0	7	4.1
28-31	21	18.8	9	10.2	20	11.8
32-35	8	7.1	9	10.2	35	20.7
36-39	29	25.9	19	21.6	39	23.1
40-43	14	12.5	15	17.0	25	14.8
44-47	12	10.7	16	18.2	25	14.8
48-51	5	4.5	3	3.4	7	4.1
52-55	5	4.5	3	3.4	3	1.8
56 and older	4	3.6	5	5.7	4	2.4

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for incest and age of the officer at time of their arrests, where χ^2 (9, N = 1,749) = 31.055, p < .001, V = .133, with higher than expected cell counts in the age categories of ages 48-51 (expected count is 0.3) and ages 56 or older (expected count is 0.2). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 10 cells (50.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .13. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of officers for indecent exposure and age of the officer at time of their arrests, where χ^2 (9, N = 1,749) = 17.114, p < .05, V = .099, with higher than expected cell counts for the age categories of ages 36-39 (expected count is 7.7), ages 40-43 (expected count is 5.5), ages 44-47 (expected count is 3.4), and ages 48-51 (expected count is 1.8). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 6 cells (30.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .70. Similarly, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association between officer arrests for child pornography offenses and officer age at time of their arrest, where χ^2 (9, N = 1,749) = 28.222, p < .01, V = .127, with higher than expected cell counts for the older age categories: ages 40-43 (expected count is 8.5), ages 44-47 (expected count is 5.3), ages 48-51 (expected count is 2.8), ages 52-55 (expected count is 1.5), and ages 56 or older (expected count is 1.5). Consistent with the findings as to other nonviolent sex offenses and their association to age at arrest in this census, the statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 4 cells (20.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 1.08 (see Table 96).

Table 96

Incest, Indecent Exposure, and Pornography: Age at Arrest - Categorical

Age	Incest (n = 7)		Indecent Exp. (n = 38)		Pornography (n = 59)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
20-23	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
24-27	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.7
28-31	0	0.0	2	5.3	8	13.6
32-35	0	0.0	5	13.2	9	15.3
36-39	2	28.6	14	36.8	6	10.2
40-43	1	14.3	8	21.1	10	16.9
44-47	0	0.0	5	13.2	13	22.0
48-51	2	28.6	3	7.9	5	8.5
52-55	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	6.8
56 and older	2	28.6	1	2.6	3	5.1

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between sex-related police crime and officer rank at time of arrest, where χ^2 (9, N = 2,119) = 21.216, $p < .05$, $V = .100$, with higher than expected cell counts for the rank categories of officer/deputy/trooper (expected count is 423.6), corporal (expected count is 10.3), and chief/sheriff (expected count is 17.1). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 6 cells (30.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .52 (see Table 97).

Table 97

Sex-related Police Crime: Rank at Arrest (n = 548)

	n	%
Officer/Deputy/Trooper	431	78.6
Detective/Investigator	18	3.3
Corporal	17	3.1
Sergeant	48	8.8
Lieutenant	8	1.5
Captain	3	0.5
Major	0	0.0
Colonel	0	0.0
Deputy Chief/Chief Deputy	0	0.0
Chief/Sheriff	23	4.2

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for the offense of forcible sodomy and officer rank at time of arrest, where χ^2 (9, N = 2,119) = 35.098, $p < .001$, $V = .129$, with higher than expected cell counts for the rank categories of corporal, sergeant, and chief. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 10 cells (50.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .09 (see Table 98).

Table 98

Forcible Sodomy: Rank at Arrest (n = 93)

	n	%
Officer/Deputy/ Trooper	70	75.3
Detective/Investigator	0	0.0
Corporal	8	8.6
Sergeant	9	9.7
Lieutenant	0	0.0
Captain	0	0.0
Major	0	0.0
Colonel	0	0.0
Deputy Chief/Chief Deputy	0	0.0
Chief/Sheriff	6	6.5

The association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for the charge of indecent exposure and officer rank at time of arrest is statistically significant, but weak, where χ^2 (9, N = 2,119) = 34.020, p < .001, V = .127, with higher than expected cell counts for the ranks of detective, corporal, sergeant, and lieutenant. Additionally, the cell count for the nonsupervisory patrol-level rank of officer (or, deputy, as to sheriff's officers, and troopers, as to primary state police agency officers) is much lower than the expected count of 31.7, suggesting that this offense may be one that not likely to be committed while wearing a uniform. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 11 cells (55.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .04 (see Table 99).

Table 99

Indecent Exposure: Rank at Arrest (n = 41)

	n	%
Officer/Deputy/Trooper	21	51.2
Detective/Investigator	4	9.8
Corporal	4	9.8
Sergeant	9	22.0
Lieutenant	3	7.3
Captain	0	0.0
Major	0	0.0
Colonel	0	0.0
Deputy Chief/Chief Deputy	0	0.0
Chief/Sheriff	0	0.0

The majority of sex-related police crime offenses in the census are charged against sworn law enforcement officers holding the lower, nonsupervisory ranks that are primarily street-level and patrol functions (81.9%). Small proportions of sex-related police crime arrests involve sworn officers holding line/field supervisory ranks (13.3%) and management functions (4.7%) in the organization (i.e., their employing nonfederal law enforcement agency). These frequencies are consistent with cases census-wide (see Table 39, *supra*). There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for incest offenses and rank by organizational function, where $\chi^2(2, N = 2{,}119) = 8.535$, $p < .05$, $V = .063$, with a higher than expected cell count for high-ranking officers in management (expected count of 0.3), and a lower than expected count for those officers in nonsupervisory patrol and street-level functions within the organization (expected count of 5.7). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 2 cells (33.3%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .34. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for indecent exposure and rank by organizational function within their respective law enforcement agencies, where $\chi^2(2, N = 2{,}119) = 24.727$, $p < .001$, $V = .108$, with a higher than expected cell count for line- and field-supervisors (expected count of 5.5), and lower than expected cell counts for street-level and patrol officers (expected count of 33.5) and management (expected count of 2.0). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 1 cell (16.7%) has an expected count less than 5; the minimum expected count is 2.01 (see Table 100).

Table 100

Sex-related Police Crime, Incest, and Indecent Exposure: Rank at Arrest by Organizational Function

	Sex-related (n = 548)		Incest (n = 7)		Indecent Exp. (n = 41)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Patrol/Street-Level Officers	449	81.9	4	57.1	25	61.0
Line/Field Supervisors	73	13.3	1	14.3	16	39.0
Management Personnel	26	4.7	2	28.6	0	0.0

Turning to associations between sex offenses and officer duty status at time of the commission of the offense(s) charged, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for sex-related police crime and duty status, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 2{,}119) = 5.788, p < .05, V = .052$, with a higher than expected cell count for offenses committed while on duty (expected count of 256.8) and a lower than expected cell count for those offenses charged that were committed while off duty (expected count of 291.2). There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for forcible sodomy and duty status, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 2{,}119) = 17.030, p < .001, V = .090$, with a higher than expected cell count for forcible sodomy offenses committed while on duty (expected count of 43.6) and a lower than expected cell count for those offenses charged that were committed while off duty (expected count of 49.4). Similarly, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for forcible fondling and duty status, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 2{,}119) = 11.833, p < .01, V = .075$, with a higher than expected cell count for forcible fondling offenses committed while on duty

(expected count of 86.7) and a lower than expected cell count for those offenses charged that were committed while off duty (expected count of 98.3) (see Table 101). The data indicate that certain types of sex crimes (as is the case with drug-related crimes) tend to be committed by virtue of opportunities presented during the course of an officer's employment with a law enforcement agency.

Table 101

Sex-related Police Crime, Forcible Sodomy, and Forcible Fondling: Duty Status at Time of Crime(s)

	Sex-related Police Crime (n = 548)		Forcible Sodomy (n = 93)		Forcible Fondling (n = 185)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
On-duty at time of offense	281	51.3	63	67.7	109	58.9
Off-duty at time of offense	267	48.7	30	32.3	76	41.1

Some arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for sex offenses, however, are more likely to result from alleged crimes that occurred while off duty. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for criminal offenses relating to online solicitation of a child for sexual purposes and officer duty status, where $\chi^2(1, N = 2{,}119) = 19.744$, $p < .001$, $V = .097$, with a higher than expected cell count for offenses charged that occurred while off duty (expected count of 15.9) and a lower than expected count for off duty online solicitation of a child (expected count of 14.1). Likewise, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for criminal offenses relating to child pornography and officer duty status, where $\chi^2(1, N = 2{,}119) = 22.609$, $p < .001$, $V = .103$, with a higher than expected cell count for conduct committed while off

duty (expected count of 31.9) and a lower than expected cell count for on duty offending (cell count of 28.1). There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for statutory rape and duty status at time the offense charged was committed, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 2{,}119) = 20.533$, $p < .001$, $V = .098$, with a higher than expected cell count for off duty statutory rape (expected count of 43.0) and a lower than expected cell count for statutory rape offenses charged that were alleged to have occurred while the officer was on duty (expected cell count of 38.0) (see Table 102).

Table 102

On-Line Solicitation of a Child, Child Pornography, and Statutory Rape: Duty Status at Time of Crime(s)

	On-Line Child Solicitation (n = 30)		Child Pornography (n = 60)		Statutory Rape (n = 81)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
On-duty at time of offense	2	6.7	10	16.7	18	22.2
Off-duty at time of offense	28	93.3	50	83.3	63	77.8

The association in the census between agency type and numerous variables for specific sex offenses are not statistically significant. There are two, however, that present differences equating to statistically significant associations. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association between the typology category of sex-related police crime and agency type (i.e., the type of nonfederal law enforcement agency employing the arrested officer) where $\chi^2 (6, N = 2{,}119) = 12.769$, $p < .05$, $V = .078$, with higher than expected cell counts for primary state police agencies (expected count of 26.9), sheriff's departments (expected count of 83.0), and special police departments (expected count of

15.3). The expected cell count for county police departments (expected count of 24.1) is lower than expected. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 3 cells (21.4%) have counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .52. Also, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association between arrests of police officers for forcible fondling and the officers' agency type, where $\chi^2(6, N = 2{,}119) = 13.994$, $p < .05$, $V = .081$, with a higher than expected cell count for the category of special police departments (expected count of 5.2), and lower than expected cell counts for primary state police agencies (expected count of 9.1) and county police departments (expected count of 8.1), Here, again, the statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 3 cells (21.4%) have counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .17 (see Table 103).

Table 103

Sex-related Police Crime and Forcible Fondling: Agency Type

	Sex-Related Police Crime (n = 548)		Forcible Fondling (n = 185)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Primary state police agency	29	5.3	8	4.3
Sheriff's department	91	16.6	28	15.1
General purpose county police department	15	2.7	3	1.6
General purpose municipal police department	389	71.0	133	71.9
Special police department	23	4.2	12	6.5
Tribal police department	1	0.2	1	0.5

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between cases where officers were arrested for offenses that constitute sex-related police crime in the typology of police crime and agency size of their employing law enforcement agency, where $\chi^2(10, N = 2{,}091) = 64.734, p < .001, V = .176$, with higher than expected cell counts for the following agency size (by the number of full-time equivalent sworn law enforcement officer) categories: those agencies employing zero full-time officers (i.e., agencies that only employ part-time sworn law enforcement officers) (expected count is 2.1), agencies employing 2-4 full-time officers (expected count is 26.4), and agencies employing 5-9 full-time officers (expected count is 37.3). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 2 cells (9.1%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 2.07. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between cases where officers were arrested for offenses relating to child pornography and agency size, where $\chi^2(10, N = 2{,}091) = 28.507, p < .01, V = .117$, with higher than expected cell counts for agencies employing 10-24 full-time sworn officers (expected count of 6.2) and agencies employing 250-499 full-time sworn law enforcement officers (expected count of 14). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 5 cells (22.7%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .23. Additionally, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between cases where officers were arrested for statutory rape and agency size, where $\chi^2(10, N = 2{,}091) = 51.405, p < .001, V = .157$, with higher than expected cell counts for the following categories: 2-4 full-time officers (expected count is 4.0), 5-9 full-time officers (expected count is 5.6), and, to a lesser degree, those law enforcement

agencies employing 10-24 full-time officers (expected count is 8.3) and those agencies employing 25-49 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 7.6) (see Table 104).

Table 104

Agency Size, by Full-Time Sworn Employees: Sex-related Police Crime, Child Pornography, and Statutory Rape

Full-Time Sworn Officers	Sex-related Police Crime (n = 541)		Child Pornography (n = 60)		Statutory Rape (n = 81)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
0	8	1.5	0	0.0	0	0.0
1	1	0.2	0	0.0	0	0.0
2-4	41	7.6	5	8.3	9	11.1
5-9	61	11.3	4	6.7	19	23.5
10-24	48	8.9	12	20.0	10	12.3
25-49	52	9.6	4	6.7	8	9.9
50-99	43	7.9	7	11.7	7	8.6
100-249	68	12.6	4	6.7	9	11.1
250-499	55	10.2	14	23.3	6	7.4
500-999	34	6.3	4	6.7	4	4.9
1,000 or more	130	24.0	6	10.0	9	11.1

Considering the forcible sex offenses, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between cases where officers were arrested for forcible rape and agency size, where $\chi^2(10, N = 2{,}091) = 18.701, p < .05, V = .095$, with higher than expected cell counts for the following categories of law enforcement agencies: those

employing zero full-time sworn law enforcement officers (i.e., those employing only part-time officers) (expected count is 0.4), those employing 2-4 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 5.7), as well as large law enforcement agencies employing 250-499 full time officers (expected count is 11.5), 500-999 full-time officers (expected count is 7.9), and 1,000 or more full-time sworn officers (expected count is 32.7). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 2 cells (9.1%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .44. There is a statistically significant moderate association in the census between cases in which officers were arrested for forcible sodomy and agency size, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,091) = .019, $p < .001$, V = .303, with higher than expected cell counts for law enforcement agencies employing zero (expected count is 0.4), 2-4 (expected count is 4.5), 5-9 (expected count is 6.3), and 250-499 (expected count is 9.2) full-time sworn law enforcement officers. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 3 cells (13.6%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .35. There is also a statistically significant moderate association in the census between arrests for forcible fondling and agency size, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,091) = 90.089, $p < .001$, V = .208, with higher than expected cell counts for those law enforcement agencies employing zero full-time sworn officers (i.e., part-time officers only) (expected count is 0.7), 2-4 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 8.8), 5-9 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 12.4), 10-24 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 18.5), and those employing 25-59 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 16.9). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V

calculations result from contingency tables where 2 cells (9.1%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 0.69) (see Table 105).

Table 105

Agency Size, by Full-Time Sworn Employees: Forcible Rape, Sodomy, and Fondling

Full-Time Sworn Officers	Forcible Rape (n = 116)		Forcible Sodomy (n = 92)		Forcible Fondling (n = 180)	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
0	3	2.6	8	8.7	7	3.9
1	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.6
2-4	7	6.0	9	9.8	19	10.6
5-9	7	6.0	10	10.9	18	10.0
10-24	11	9.5	4	4.3	21	11.7
25-49	10	8.6	4	4.3	22	12.2
50-99	9	7.8	4	4.3	14	7.8
100-249	12	10.3	12	13.0	15	8.3
250-499	14	12.1	12	13.0	16	8.9
500-999	9	7.8	4	4.3	8	4.4
1,000 or more	34	29.3	25	27.2	39	21.7

Once again, the data support the existence of regional correlates of police crime. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between cases coded as sex-related police crime and geographic region within the United States where the law enforcement agency employing the arrested officer is located, where χ^2 (3, N = 2,119) = 41.424, $p < .001$, $V = .140$, with higher than expected cell counts for sex-related

police crime arrests in the South region (expected count is 237.4) and the West region (expected count is 70.1) of the country. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for crimes relating to child pornography and geographic region, where $\chi^2 (3, N = 2{,}119) = 11.277$, $p < .05$, $V = .073$, with higher than expected cell counts for pornography arrests in the South region (expected count is 26.0) and the West region (expected count is 7.7) of the United States (see Table 106).

Table 106

Sex-related Police Crime and Child Pornography: Distribution by Geographic Regions

	Sex-Related Police Crime (n = 548)		Child Pornography (n = 60)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Northeastern States	109	19.9	6	10.0
Midwestern States	76	13.9	8	13.3
Southern States	263	48.0	34	56.7
Western States	100	18.2	12	20.0

When analyzing the cases of the census within the smaller geographic divisions within the regions of the United States, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association between arrests for sex-related crimes (under the typology of police crime) and the geographic divisions where the employing law enforcement agency is located, where $\chi^2 (8, N = 2{,}119) = 75.849$, $p < .001$, $V = .189$, with higher than expected cell counts in the South Atlantic division (expected count of 123.9) and the West South Central division (expected count of 66.7), both of the South Region, as well as in the

Pacific division (expected count of 47.6) of the West region of the country (see Table 107). There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for forcible fondling offenses and geographic divisions, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 19.960, p < .05, V = .097, with higher than expected cell counts in the Middle Atlantic division (expected count of 32.1) of the Northeast region, the South Atlantic division (expected count of 41.8) and the East South Central division (expected count of 15.8), both in the South region, as well as in the Pacific division (expected count of 16.1) of the West region of the United States (see Table 108). Further, there is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for the offense of statutory rape and geographic divisions within the country where the arrested officer is employed by a nonfederal law enforcement agency, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 23.507, p < .01, V = .105, with higher than expected cell counts for arrests in the Middle Atlantic division (expected count of 14.1) of the Northeast region, the West South Central division (expected count of 9.9) of the South region, and the Pacific division (expected count of 7) of the West region of the United States. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 3 cells (16.7%) have expected counts of less than 5; the minimum expected count is 3.33 (see Table 109). Finally, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for offenses relating to child pornography and geographic divisions of the country, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 24.006, p < .01, V = .106, with higher than expected cell counts for the South Atlantic division (expected count of 13.4) of the South region, and the Pacific division (expected count of 5.2) of the West region of the United States. The statistically significant Chi-

Square and Cramer's V calculations, however, resulted from contingency tables where 3 cells (16.7%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 2.46 (see Table 110).

Table 107

Sex-related Police Crime: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 548)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	95	17.3
Northeastern States – New England	14	2.6
Midwestern States – East North Central	59	10.8
Midwestern States – West North Central	17	3.1
Southern States – South Atlantic	139	25.4
Southern States – East South Central	45	8.2
Southern States – West South Central	79	14.4
Western States – Mountain	16	2.9
Western States – Pacific	84	15.3

Table 108

Forcible Fondling: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 185)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	39	21.1
Northeastern States – New England	5	2.7
Midwestern States – East North Central	17	9.2
Midwestern States – West North Central	5	2.7
Southern States – South Atlantic	47	25.4
Southern States – East South Central	21	11.4
Southern States – West South Central	21	11.4
Western States – Mountain	6	3.2
Western States – Pacific	24	13.0

Table 109

Statutory Rape: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 81)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	16	19.8
Northeastern States – New England	0	0.0
Midwestern States – East North Central	7	8.6
Midwestern States – West North Central	5	6.2
Southern States – South Atlantic	17	21.0
Southern States – East South Central	5	6.2
Southern States – West South Central	15	18.5
Western States – Mountain	1	1.2
Western States – Pacific	15	18.5

Table 110

Child Pornography: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 60)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	6	10.0
Northeastern States – New England	0	0.0
Midwestern States – East North Central	7	11.7
Midwestern States – West North Central	1	1.7
Southern States – South Atlantic	24	40.0
Southern States – East South Central	3	5.0
Southern States – West South Central	7	11.7
Western States – Mountain	1	1.7
Western States – Pacific	11	18.3

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between sex-related police crime and the population of the county where the employing law enforcement agency of those officers arrested are located, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 22.326, p < .01, V = .103, with higher than expected cell counts for sex-related police crime arrests in the following categories (coded from urban to rural in a continuum): counties in metropolitan areas with a population of 250,000 to 1,000,000 (expected count is 113.5), metropolitan counties in areas of fewer than 250,000 population (expected count is 46.3), nonmetropolitan counties with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 33.9), nonmetropolitan counties with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 9.6), and nonmetropolitan counties that are completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metropolitan area. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 1 cell (5.6%) has an expected count less than 5; the minimum expected count is 1.81 (see Table 111).

Table 111

Sex-related Police Crime: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 548)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	281	51.3
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	118	21.5
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	55	10.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	37	6.8
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	11	2.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	25	4.6
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	7	1.3
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	13	2.4
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	1	0.2

As to the forcible sex crimes, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for forcible rape and the population of the county where they are employed with a law enforcement agency, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 15.608, p < .05, V = .086, with higher than expected cell counts for counties in metropolitan areas of 250,000 to 1,000,000 population (expected count is 24.4) and counties in metropolitan areas of fewer than 250,000 population (expected count is 10.0). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations results from contingency tables where 4 cells (22.2%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .39 (see Table 112). There is s statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for forcible sodomy and county population where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 24.498, p < .01, V = .108, with higher than expected cell counts for counties in metropolitan areas of 250,000 to 1,000,000 (expected count is 19.3), counties in metropolitan areas of fewer than 250,000 (expected count is 7.9), nonmetropolitan counties in completely rural areas or with less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 0.9), and nonmetropolitan counties that are in completely rural areas or have less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 0.3).The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 5 cells (27.8%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .31 (see Table 113).

Table 112

Forcible Rape: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 118)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	66	55.9
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	29	24.6
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	17	14.4
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	2	1.7
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	1	0.8
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	2	1.7
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	1	0.8
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0

Table 113

Forcible Sodomy: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 93)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	44	47.3
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	25	26.9
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	13	14.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	2	2.2
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	1	1.1
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	3	3.2
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	4	4.3
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	1	1.1

Additionally, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for forcible fondling and county population, where $\chi^2(8, N = 2{,}119) = 34.832$, $p < .001$, $V = .128$, with higher than expected cell counts for counties in metropolitan areas of fewer than 250,000 population (expected count is 15.6), nonmetropolitan counties with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 11.4), nonmetropolitan counties with urban population of 2,5000 to 19,999, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 8.6), and nonmetropolitan counties that are completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 1.7). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 4 cells (22.2%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .61 (see Table 114).

Table 114

Forcible Fondling: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 185)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	86	46.5
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	38	20.5
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	24	13.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	12	6.5
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	3	1.6
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	12	6.5
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	2	1.1
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	8	4.3
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0

There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between officers who were arrested for statutory rape and the population of the county where they are employed as sworn law enforcement officers, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 19.912, $p < .05$, $V = .097$, with higher than expected cell counts in counties in metropolitan areas with a population of 25,000 to 1,000,000 (expected count is 16.8), nonmetropolitan counties with an urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 5.0), nonmetropolitan counties with urban populations of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 1.4), nonmetropolitan counties with an urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 1.3), and nonmetropolitan counties that are completely rural or have an urban population less than 2,500, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 0.8). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 5 cells (27.8%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .27 (see Table 115).

Table 115

Statutory Rape: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 81)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	31	38.3
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	26	32.1
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	5	6.2
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	8	9.9
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	4	4.9
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	3	3.7
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	2	2.5
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	2	2.5
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0

Violence-related police crime. Articles coded as violence-related arrests are those incidents in the census whereby an officer was arrested for a crime that involved the threat or use of unlawful physical force exercised with the intent to harm another person. Not included in this category are cases where an officer lawfully exercised the use of physical force in the course of their official duties as a sworn law enforcement officer and were arrested for an unrelated crime arising from the same incident. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between violence-related police crime and years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer at time of arrest, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,119) = 31.548, p < .001, V = .122, with higher than expected cell counts for the following categories: 3-5 years of service at arrest (expected count is 155.9), 12-14 years of service at arrest (expected count is 73.0), and 15-17 year of service at arrest (expected count is 53.5). There is also a statistically significant, but weak association in the census between cases that meet the coding protocol criteria for classification as police sexual violence and years of service at time of arrest, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,119) = 29.402, p < .01, V = .118, with higher than expected cell counts for the years of service at arrest categories of 0-2 years of service (expected count is 28.6), 3-5 years of service at arrest (expected count is 37.7), 9-11 years of service at arrest (expected count is 22.1), 12-14 years of service at arrest (expected count is 17.6), 24-26 years of service at arrest (expected count is 3.3), and 27 or more years of service at arrest (expected count is .48) (see Table 116).

Table 116

Violence-related Police Crime and Police Sexual Violence: Years of Service at Arrest - Categorical

	Violence-related Police Crime (n = 1,059)		Police Sexual Violence (n = 256)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Unknown	335	31.6	59	23.0
0-2 years of service	101	9.5	38	14.8
3-5 years of service	191	18.0	51	19.9
6-8 years of service	99	10.0	19	7.4
9-11 years of service	90	8.5	32	12.5
12-14 years of service	79	7.5	21	8.2
15-17 years of service	56	5.3	13	5.1
18-20 years of service	60	5.7	7	2.7
21-23 years of service	20	1.9	6	2.3
24-26 years of service	8	0.8	4	1.6
27 or more years of service	20	1.9	6	2.3

There are several specific violence-related criminal offenses in the census that exhibit statistically significant associations with years of service at time of arrest for sworn law enforcement officers who were arrested. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for the offense of aggravated assault (i.e., felony assault/battery) and years of service at time of arrest, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,119) = 38.440, p < .001, V = .135, with higher than expected cell counts for the years of service categories 3-5 years of service at arrest (expected count is 34.7) and 12-14 years of service at arrest (expected count is 16.3). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables were 2 cells (9.1%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 3.01. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for offenses relating to kidnapping, abduction, and false imprisonment criminal charges and years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer at time of their arrest, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,119) = 20.449, p < .05, V = .098, with higher than expected cell counts in the early career categories of 0-2 years of service at arrest (expected count is 7.3) and 3-5 years of service at arrest (expected count is 9.6), as well as in the late career categories of 21-23 years of service at arrest (expected count is 1.7) and 27 or more years of service at arrest (expected count is 1.2). Here, the statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 6 cells (27.3%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .83. Finally, there is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for the offense of robbery and years of service at arrest, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,119) = 29.333, p < .01, V = .118, with higher than expected cell counts in the early

journeymen categories of 3-5 years of service at arrest (expected count is 9.0), 6-8 years of service at arrest (expected count is 5.7), 9-11 years of service at arrest (expected count is 4.2), and 12-14 years of service at arrest (expected count is 4.2). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 6 cells (27.3%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .78 (see Table 117).

Table 117

Aggravated Assault, Kidnapping/Abduction/False Imprisonment, and Robbery: Years of Service at Arrest - Categorical

	Aggravated Assault (n = 236)		Kidnapping & Abduction (n = 65)		Robbery (n = 61)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Unknown	99	41.9	18	27.7	15	24.6
0-2 years of service	12	5.1	9	13.8	2	3.3
3-5 years of service	46	19.5	12	18.5	20	32.8
6-8 years of service	20	8.5	6	9.2	7	11.5
9-11 years of service	13	5.5	3	4.6	8	13.1
12-14 years of service	23	9.7	1	1.5	7	11.5
15-17 years of service	10	4.2	3	4.6	1	1.6
18-20 years of service	10	4.2	4	6.2	1	1.6
21-23 years of service	1	0.4	6	9.2	0	0.0
24-26 years of service	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
27 or more years of service	2	0.8	3	4.6	0	0.0

We next turn to analyzing the association between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for violence-related criminal offenses and officer age at arrest. The association between the typology of police crime category of violence-related police crime and age at arrest is not statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level in the census, where $\chi^2 (9, N = 1{,}749) = 15.462, p = .079, V = .094$.There is, however, a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for the charge of simple assault (i.e., misdemeanor assault/battery) and age at arrest, where $\chi^2 (9, N = 1{,}749) = 22.489, p < .01, V = .113$, with higher than expected cell counts for the age at time of arrest categories of ages 32-35 at arrest (expected count is 38.2), ages 40-43 at arrest (expected count is 30.4), and ages 52-55 at arrest (expected count is 5.3). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 1 cell (5.0%) has an expected count less than 5; the minimum expected count is 3.86. Also, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for robbery and age at arrest, where $\chi^2 (9, N = 1{,}749) = 34.538, p < .001, V = .141$, with higher than expected cell counts for age at arrest categories of ages 28-31 at arrest (expected count is 10.0) and ages 40-43 at arrest (expected count is 8.6). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 4 cells (20.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 1.10 (see Table 118).

Table 118

Violence-related Police Crime, Simple Assault, and Robbery: Age at Arrest - Categorical

Age	Violence-related Police Crime (*n* = 874)		Simple Assault (*n* = 211)		Robbery (*n* = 60)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
20-23	15	1.7	3	1.4	1	1.7
24-27	82	9.4	19	9.0	3	5.0
28-31	152	17.4	31	14.7	24	40.0
32-35	176	20.1	56	26.5	11	18.3
36-39	172	19.7	33	15.6	8	13.3
40-43	134	15.3	36	17.1	12	20.0
44-47	73	8.4	15	7.1	0	0.0
48-51	31	3.5	8	3.8	1	1.7
52-55	22	2.5	9	4.3	0	0.0
56 and older	17	1.9	1	0.5	0	0.0

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for offenses that meet the criteria for violence-related police crime in the typology of police crime and officer rank at the time of arrest, where χ^2 (9, N = 2,119) = 25.382, p < .01, V = .109, with higher than expected cell counts for rank categories of officer/deputy/trooper (expected count is 818.6) and corporal (expected count is 20.0), suggesting that officers primarily engaged in street-level/patrol policing activities account for the majority of violence-related arrests. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 4 cells (20.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 1.0 (see Table 119). There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between officer arrests for offenses that meet the coding protocol criteria for police sexual violence and rank at time of arrest, where χ^2 (9, N = 2,119) = 23.956, p < .01, V = .106, with higher than expected counts for the rank categories of officer/deputy/trooper (expected count is 197.9), corporal (expected count is 4.8), and chief/sheriff (expected count is 8.0. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 7 cells (35.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .24 (see Table 120).

Table 119

Violence-related Police Crime: Rank at Arrest (n = 1,059)

	n	%
Officer/Deputy/Trooper	850	80.3
Detective/Investigator	45	4.2
Corporal	26	2.5
Sergeant	80	7.6
Lieutenant	23	2.2
Captain	6	0.6
Major	0	0.0
Colonel	0	0.0
Deputy Chief/Chief Deputy	6	0.6
Chief/Sheriff	23	2.2

Table 120

Police Sexual Violence: Rank at Arrest (n = 256)

	n	%
Officer/Deputy/Trooper	211	82.4
Detective/Investigator	5	2.0
Corporal	10	3.9
Sergeant	18	7.0
Lieutenant	1	0.4
Captain	0	0.0
Major	0	0.0
Colonel	0	0.0
Deputy Chief/Chief Deputy	0	0.0
Chief/Sheriff	11	4.3

As with drug-, alcohol-, and sex-related police crime in the typology of police crime, the majority of arrests (84.5%) for violence-related police crime offenses are charged against nonsupervisory officers holding the rank of officer/deputy/trooper or detective/investigator that perform patrol and/or street-level organizational functions within their respective law enforcement agency. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for criminal offenses that are violence-related police crime and rank by organizational function, where $\chi^2 (2, N = 2{,}119) = 15.506, p < .001, V = .086$, with a higher than expected cell count for patrol/street-level ranks (expected count is 865.1). Likewise, there is also a significantly significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for aggravated assault (i.e., felonious assault and/or battery) and rank by organizational function, where $\chi^2 (2, N = 2{,}119) = 6.789, p < .05, V = .057$, with a higher than expected cell count for arrests of officers at the patrol/street-level ranks within the organization (expected count is 192.8) (see Table 121).

Table 121

Violence-related Police Crime and Aggravated Assault: Rank at Arrest by Organizational Function

	Violence-related Police Crime (n = 1,059)		Aggravated Assault (n = 236)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Patrol/Street-Level Officers	895	84.5	204	86.4
Line/Field Supervisors	129	12.2	28	11.9
Management Personnel	35	3.3	4	1.7

The association in the census between violence-related police crime and duty status at time of an officer's arrest is not significantly significant at the $p < .05$ level, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 2{,}119) = 3.758$, $p = .053$, $V = .042$. There is a statistically significant and moderate association in the census between crimes classified in the census coding protocol as police sexual violence for which sworn law enforcement officers were arrested and officer duty status at time of their crime(s), where $\chi^2 (1, N = 2{,}119) = .028$, $p < .001$, $V = .369$, with a much higher than expected cell count for arrests stemming from alleged acts of police sexual violence committed while on duty as a sworn law enforcement officer (expected count is 120.0) (see Table 122).

Table 122

Violence-related Police Crime and Police Sexual Violence: Duty Status at Time of Crime(s)

	Violence-related Police Crime (n = 1,059)		Police Sexual Violence (n = 256)	
	n	%	*n*	%
On-duty at time of offense	474	44.8	247	96.5
Off-duty at time of offense	585	55.2	9	3.5

Arrests in the census for assault result more often from off duty offenses (63.1%). There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for aggravated assault (i.e., felonious assault and/or battery) and duty status at time of the alleged offense, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 2{,}119) = 10.659$, $p < .01$, $V = .071$, with a higher than expected cell count for arrests resulting from off duty offenses (expected count is 125.4). Likewise, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for simple assault (i.e., misdemeanor assault and/or battery), where $\chi^2 (1, N =$

2,119) = 59.654, $p < .001$, $V = .168$, with a higher than expected cell count for arrests resulting from off duty offenses (expected count is 125.4) (see Table 123). There are, however, other types of violent crimes for which sworn law enforcement officers were arrested in the census that result from on duty alleged criminality. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for kidnapping, abduction, and/or false imprisonment and on duty status at time of the alleged crime(s), where $\chi^2 (1, N = 2,119) = 10.023$, $p < .01$, $V = .069$, with a higher than expected cell count for on duty status at time of commission of the crime(s) charged against the sworn law enforcement officer (expected count is 30.5). Similarly, there is a statistically significant, but, weak, association in the census between arrests for robbery and duty status at time of the crime(s) charged, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 2,119) = 31.084$, $p < .001$, $V = .121$, with a higher than expected cell count for on duty robberies charged (expected count is 28.6) against sworn law enforcement officers (see Table 124).

Table 123

Aggravated Assault and Simple Assault: Duty Status at Time of Crime(s)

	Aggravated Assault (*n* = 236)		Simple Assault (*n* = 277)	
	n	%	*n*	%
On-duty at time of offense	87	36.9	70	25.3
Off-duty at time of offense	149	63.1	207	74.7

Table 124

Kidnapping/Abduction/False Imprisonment and Robbery: Duty Status at Time of Crime(s)

	Kidnapping & Abduction (*n* = 65)		Robbery (*n* = 61)	
	n	%	*n*	%
On-duty at time of offense	43	66.2	50	82.0
Off-duty at time of offense	22	33.8	11	18.0

Turning next to agency type, there is a statistically significant, but weak association in the census between officers arrested for offenses meeting the typology of police crime criteria in the coding protocol for violence-related police crime and agency type, where χ^2 (6, N = 2,119) = 36.238, p < .001, V = .131, with a higher than expected cell count for officers employed by municipal police departments (expected count is 765.6. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 4 cells (28.6%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 1.0. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for intimidation offenses (e.g., intimidation, threats, terroristic threats, harassment, stalking) and the type of nonfederal law enforcement agency employing the officers arrested, where χ^2 (6, N = 2,119) = 21.656, p < .01, V = .101, with a higher than expected cell count for primary state police agencies (expected count is 6.9). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 4 cells (28.6%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 0.13 (see Table 125).

Table 125

Violence-related Police Crime and Intimidation Offenses: Agency Type

	Violence-Related Police Crime (n = 1,059)		Intimidation Offenses (n = 140)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Primary state police agency	43	4.1	18	12.9
Sheriff's department	127	12.0	19	13.6
General purpose county police department	33	3.1	6	4.3
General purpose municipal police department	824	77.8	95	67.9
Special police department	29	2.7	2	1.4
Tribal police department	3	0.3	0	0.0

Two other violence-related criminal offenses in the census – aggravated assault and simple assault – manifest statistically significant associations between arrest and agency type. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association for arrests for aggravated assault and agency type, where χ^2 (6, N = 2,119) = 13.769, $p < .05$, $V = .081$, with a higher than expected cell count for municipal police departments (expected count is 170.6). Here, the statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 3 cells (21.4%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .22. Likewise, there is also a statistically significant, but weak, association between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for simple assault and agency type, where χ^2 (6, N = 2,119) = 19.091, $p < .01$, $V = .095$, also with a higher than expected cell count for the agency type of municipal police departments (expected cell count is 200.3). As above with aggravated assault in the census, the statistically

significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations for simple assault result from contingency tables where 3 cells (21.4%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .26 (see Table 126).

Table 126

Aggravated Assault and Simple Assault: Agency Type

	Aggravated Assault (n = 236)		Simple Assault (n = 277)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Primary state police agency	10	4.2	4	1.4
Sheriff's department	23	9.7	36	13.0
General purpose county police department	11	4.7	10	3.6
General purpose municipal police department	185	78.4	225	81.2
Special police department	4	1.7	2	0.7
Tribal police department	3	1.3	0	0.0

Agency size, by number of full-time equivalent sworn law enforcement officers employed, is the next area of analysis for violence-related criminal offenses. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between agency size and violence-related police crime as a category in the typology of police crime, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,091) = 44.652, p < .001, V = .146, with higher than expected cell counts for law enforcement agencies employing zero full-time sworn officers (i.e., agencies that only employ part-time sworn law enforcement officers) (expected count is 4.0) and for those law enforcement agencies employing 1,000 or more sworn officers (expected count is 293). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from

contingency tables where 4 cells (18.2%) have expected counts less 5; the minimum expected count is 3.99. A different pattern emerges in the census for offenses coded in the content analysis coding protocol as meeting the criteria for police sexual violence. There is a statistically significant moderate association in the census between arrests for offenses that are acts of police sexual violence and agency size, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,091) = 97.976, p < .001, V = .216, with higher than expected cell counts for the small-size agency categories of nonfederal law enforcement agencies: those agencies employing zero full-time sworn officers (expected count is 1.0), those agencies employing 1 full-time sworn officer (expected count is 1.1), those agencies employing 2-4 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 12.3), and those agencies employing 5-9 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 17.4). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations for arrests that stem from acts of police sexual violence result from contingency tables where 2 cells (9.1%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .97. Another pattern emerges in the census for robbery arrests. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for robbery and agency size, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,091) = 58.463, p < .001, V = .167, with a slightly higher than expected cell count for agencies employing 10-24 sworn officers (expected count is 6.3), and a much higher than expected cell count for the very large nonfederal law enforcement agencies employing 1,000 or more sworn law enforcement officers (expected count is 17.2). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 5 cells (22.7%) have expected counts less than 5, the minimum expected count is .23 (see Table 127).

Table 127

Agency Size by Full-Time Sworn Employees: Violence-related Crime, Police Sexual Violence, and Robbery

Full-Time Sworn Officers	Violence-Related Police Crime (n = 1,043)		Police Sexual Violence (n = 253)		Robbery (n = 61)	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
0	8	0.8	8	3.2	0	0.0
1	5	0.5	2	0.8	0	0.0
2-4	51	4.9	25	9.9	0	0.0
5-9	60	5.8	30	11.9	3	4.9
10-24	86	8.2	13	5.1	7	11.5
25-49	91	8.7	16	6.3	0	0.0
50-99	97	9.3	17	6.7	2	3.3
100-249	129	12.4	32	12.6	1	1.6
250-499	102	9.8	22	8.7	5	8.2
500-999	65	6.2	17	6.7	1	1.6
1,000 or more	349	33.5	71	28.1	42	68.9

The data suggest that arrests of officers for violent felony crimes against persons are most likely to occur in employing law enforcement agencies that are very small or very large, whereas arrests for violent misdemeanor crimes tend to occur in agencies of all sizes. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for charges of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter (to include charges of vehicular manslaughter unless specifically charged as negligent vehicular manslaughter) and the size of their employing law enforcement

agency, where $\chi^2(10, N = 2{,}091) = 32.956, p < .001, V = .126$, with slightly higher than expected cell counts for agencies employing 1 full-time sworn law enforcement officer (expected count is 0.3) and those agencies employing 25-49 sworn law enforcement officers (expected count is 5.5), and much higher than expected cell counts for the large law enforcement agencies employing 500-99 sworn officers (expected count is 4.0) and 1,000 or more sworn law enforcement officers (expected count is 16.6). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 5 cells (22.7%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .23. Different patterns emerge for the association between assaultive offenses charged and agency size. There is a statistically significant moderate associations in the census between cases where officers were arrested for aggravated assault and agency size, where $\chi^2(10, N = 2{,}091) = 91.547, p < .001, V = .209$, with higher than expected cell counts for agencies employing zero full-time sworn law enforcement officers (i.e., agencies employing only part-time sworn law enforcement officers) (expected count is 0.9), agencies employing 25-49 sworn officers (expected count is 21.8), agencies employing 50-99 sworn officers (expected count is 23.4), and much higher than expected cell count for agencies employing 1,000 or more sworn law enforcement officers (expected count is 65.6). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 2 cells (9.1%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .98. Lastly, there is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between cases where officers were arrested for simple assault and agency size of their employing law enforcement agency, where $\chi^2(10, N = 2{,}091) = 33.156, p < .001, V = .126$, with higher than expected cell counts for agencies employing 25-49 sworn

officers (expected count is 25.7), agencies employing 50-99 sworn officers (expected count is 27.5), agencies employing 100-249 sworn officers (expected count is 35.0), agencies employing 250-499 sworn officers (expected count is 27.3), and, to a lesser degree, agencies employing 500-999 sworn officers (expected count is 18.7). As with aggravated assault above, the statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations for the association between arrests in the census for simple assault and agency size resulted from contingency tables where 2 cells (9.1%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 1.05 (see Table 128).

Table 128

Agency Size, by Full-Time Sworn Employees: Murder & Non-negligent Manslaughter, Aggravated Assault, and Simple Assault

Full-Time Sworn Officers	Murder & Nonnegligent Manslaughter (*n* = 59)		Aggravated Assault (*n* = 233)		Simple Assault (*n* = 274)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
0	0	0.0	7	3.0	0	0.0
1	1	1.7	0	0.0	1	0.4
2-4	2	3.4	3	1.3	9	3.3
5-9	1	1.7	8	3.4	12	4.4
10-24	1	1.7	16	6.9	21	7.7
25-49	6	10.2	22	9.4	28	10.2
50-99	1	1.7	25	10.7	37	13.5
100-249	4	6.8	22	9.4	51	18.6
250-499	4	6.8	18	7.7	38	13.9
500-999	7	11.9	10	4.3	22	8.0
1,000 or more	32	54.2	102	43.8	55	20.1

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between cases coded as violence-related police crime and geographic regions within the United States where arrested officers are employed as sworn law enforcement officers at time of the commission of the crime(s) charged, where χ^2 (3, N = 2,119) = 18.223, p < .001, V = .093, with higher than expected cell counts for violence-related police crime arrests in the Midwest region (expected count is 220.9) and the West region (expected count is 135.4) of the country. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests coded as acts of police sexual violence and geographic regions where χ^2 (3, N = 2,119) = 25.135, p < .001, V = .109, with higher than expected cell counts for arrests coded as acts of police sexual violence in the South region (expected count is 110.9) and the West region (expected count is 32.7) of the country (see Table 129).

Table 129

Violence-related Police Crime and Police Sexual Violence: Distribution by Geographic Regions

	Violence-related Police Crime (n = 1,059)		Police Sexual Violence (n = 256)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Northeastern States	241	22.8	46	18.0
Midwestern States	245	23.1	39	15.2
Southern States	418	39.5	116	45.3
Western States	155	14.6	55	21.5

Turning next to specific criminal offenses, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for criminal charges of kidnapping, abduction, and/or false imprisonment and the geographic region of the employing nonfederal law enforcement agency, where $\chi^2 (3, N = 2{,}119) = 32.809$, $p < .001$, $V = .124$, with a slightly higher than expected cell count for arrests in the Midwest region (expected count is 13.6), and a significantly higher than expected cell count for arrests in the West region (expected count is 8.3) of the United States. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for robbery and geographic region, where $\chi^2 (3, N = 2{,}119) = 8.450$, $p < .05$, $V = .063$, with a slightly higher than expected cell count in the South region (expected count is 26.4) and much higher than expected cell count in the Midwest region (expected count is 12.7) (see Table 130).

Table 130

Kidnapping/Abduction/False Imprisonment and Robbery: Distribution by Geographic Regions

	Kidnapping, Abduction & False Imprisonment (n = 65)		Robbery (n = 61)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Northeastern States	12	18.5	7	11.5
Midwestern States	14	21.5	20	32.8
Southern States	16	24.6	28	45.9
Western States	23	35.4	6	9.8

Similar to the much higher than expected cell count in the Midwest region of the country for robbery arrests of sworn law enforcement officers, there is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn officers for simple assault (i.e., misdemeanor assault) and geographic region of employing law enforcement agencies, where χ^2 (3, N = 2,119) = 15.491, p < .01, V = .086, with a much higher than expected cell count for simple assault arrests of officers in the Midwest region (expected count is 57.8). Contrary to that pattern, however, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for intimidation offenses (e.g., harassment, stalking, terroristic threats) and geographic region, where χ^2 (3, N = 2,119) = 35.058, p < .001, V = .129, with a much higher than expected cell count for intimidation arrests of sworn law enforcement officers in the Northeast region (expected count is 32.2) and a slightly higher than expected cell count in both the Midwest region (expected count is 29.2) and the West region (expected count is 17.9) (see Table 131).

Table 131

Simple Assault and Intimidation: Distribution by Geographic Regions

	Simple Assault (n = 277)		Intimidation (n = 140)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Northeastern States	61	22.0	56	40.0
Midwestern States	82	29.6	33	23.6
Southern States	106	38.3	31	22.1
Western States	28	10.1	20	14.3

When analyzing cases of the census at the small geographic division level (within the larger geographic regions of the country), there is a statistically significant, but weak, association between arrests for violence-related police crime offenses within the typology of police crime and the geographic divisions where the employing agency is located, where $\chi^2 (8, N = 2{,}119) = 32.577, p < .001, V = .124$, with a slightly higher than expected cell count in the Mountain division of the West region (expected cell count is 43.5); higher than expected cell counts in the New England division of the Northeast region (expected count is 60.0) and in the West South Central division of the South region (expected count is 128.9); and, much higher than expected cell counts in the East North Central division of the Midwest region (expected count is 175.9) and in the Pacific division of the West region (expected count is 92.0) (see Table 132). There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for criminal offenses coded in the content analysis as police sexual violence, where $\chi^2 (8, N = 2{,}119) = 54.875, p < .001, V = .161$, with higher than expected cell counts for arrests in the East South Central division (expected count is 21.9) and the West South Central division (expected count is 31.2) of the South region. There is also a much higher than expected cell count in the Pacific division (expected count is 22.2) of the West region of the country (see Table 133).

Table 132

Violence-related Police Crime: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 1,059)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	176	16.6
Northeastern States – New England	65	6.1
Midwestern States – East North Central	203	19.2
Midwestern States – West North Central	42	4.0
Southern States – South Atlantic	198	18.7
Southern States – East South Central	86	8.1
Southern States – West South Central	134	12.7
Western States – Mountain	45	4.2
Western States – Pacific	110	10.4

Table 133

Police Sexual Violence: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 256)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	42	16.4
Northeastern States – New England	4	1.6
Midwestern States – East North Central	32	12.5
Midwestern States – West North Central	7	2.7
Southern States – South Atlantic	49	19.1
Southern States – East South Central	30	11.7
Southern States – West South Central	37	14.5
Western States – Mountain	7	2.7
Western States – Pacific	48	18.8

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between the arrest of sworn law enforcement officers for kidnapping, abduction, and/or false imprisonment offenses and geographic divisions where the employing nonfederal law enforcement is located, where $\chi^2(8, N = 2{,}119) = 45.290$, $p < .001$, $V = .146$, with slightly higher than expected cell counts in the East North Central (expected count is 10.8) and West North Central (expected count is 2.8) of the Midwest region, as well as in the Mountain division (expected count of 2.7) of the West region of the country. Additionally, there is a much higher than expected cell count in the Pacific division (expected count is 5.6) of the West region. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 3 cells (16.7%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 2.67 (see Table 134). There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for robbery and geographic divisions within the larger regions, where $\chi^2(8, N = 2{,}119) = 58.529$, $p < .001$, $V = .166$, with a somewhat higher than expected cell count in the Pacific division (expected count is 5.3) of the West region, and much higher than expected cell counts in the East North Central division (expected count is 10.1) of the Midwest region and in the East South Central division (expected count is 5.2) of the South region. Here, too, the statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations resulted from contingency tables where 3 cells (16.7%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 2.50 (see Table 135).

Table 134

Kidnapping / Abduction / False Imprisonment: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 65)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	10	15.4
Northeastern States – New England	2	3.1
Midwestern States – East North Central	11	16.9
Midwestern States – West North Central	3	4.6
Southern States – South Atlantic	7	10.8
Southern States – East South Central	2	3.1
Southern States – West South Central	7	10.8
Western States – Mountain	3	4.6
Western States – Pacific	20	30.8

Table 135

Robbery: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 61)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	7	11.5
Northeastern States – New England	0	0.0
Midwestern States – East North Central	20	32.8
Midwestern States – West North Central	0	0.0
Southern States – South Atlantic	6	9.8
Southern States – East South Central	18	29.5
Southern States – West South Central	4	6.6
Western States – Mountain	0	0.0
Western States – Pacific	6	9.8

Moving next to assault charges against sworn law enforcement officers, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for aggravated assault (i.e., felonious assault and/or battery) and geographic divisions, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 23.678, p < .01, V = .106, with higher than expected cell counts in the New England division (expected count is 13.4) of the Northeast region, the East North Central division (expected count is 39.2) of the Midwest region, and the Pacific division (expected count is 20.5) of the West region. Further, the cell counts are much higher than expected in the West South Central division (expected count is 28.7) of the South region and in the Mountain division (expected count is 9.7) of the West region (see Table 136). There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for simple assault and geographic divisions, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 39.308, p < .001, V = .136, with higher than expected cell counts in the West North Central division (expected count is 11.8) of the Midwest region, the South Atlantic division (expected count is 62.6) of the South region, and the Mountain division (expected count is 11.4) of the West region. Additionally, there are much higher than expected cell counts in the New England division (expected count is 15.7) of the Northeast region and the East North Central division (expected count is 46.0) of the Midwest region (see Table 137). Lastly, as to specific crimes of violence offense categories as coded in this content analysis, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for intimidation offenses (including harassment, terroristic threats, and stalking) and geographic divisions where employing law enforcement agency is located, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 43.702, p < .001, V = .144, with higher than expected cell counts in the East North Central division (expected count is 23.3) and West North Central division

(expected count is 5.9) of the Midwest region, as well as in the Pacific division (expected count is 12.2) of the West region. The expected count is much higher than expected in the Middle Atlantic division (expected count is 24.3) of the Northeast region of the country (see Table 138).

Table 136

Aggravated Assault: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 236)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	35	14.8
Northeastern States – New England	16	6.8
Midwestern States – East North Central	43	18.2
Midwestern States – West North Central	6	2.5
Southern States – South Atlantic	44	18.6
Southern States – East South Central	12	5.1
Southern States – West South Central	39	16.5
Western States – Mountain	19	8.1
Western States – Pacific	22	9.3

Table 137

Simple Assault: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 277)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	32	11.6
Northeastern States – New England	29	10.5
Midwestern States – East North Central	66	23.8
Midwestern States – West North Central	16	5.8
Southern States – South Atlantic	64	23.1
Southern States – East South Central	15	5.4
Southern States – West South Central	27	9.7
Western States – Mountain	12	4.3
Western States – Pacific	16	5.8

Table 138

Intimidation Offenses: Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 140)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	48	34.3
Northeastern States – New England	8	5.7
Midwestern States – East North Central	24	17.1
Midwestern States – West North Central	9	6.4
Southern States – South Atlantic	14	10.0
Southern States – East South Central	5	3.6
Southern States – West South Central	12	8.6
Western States – Mountain	5	3.6
Western States – Pacific	15	10.7

The last area of bivariate analysis for crimes of violence in the census is in analyzing the association between various offenses and the population of the county where the officers arrested in the census cases were employed at the time of commission of the crime(s) for which they were arrested. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between violence-related police crime in the typology of police crime and county population, where $\chi^2 (8, N = 2{,}119) = 44.928, p < .001, V = .146$, with higher than expected cell counts in metropolitan counties with a population of 1,000,000 or more (expected count is 586.2) and in nonmetropolitan counties that are completely rural or have less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 10.0). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 2 cells (11.1%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 3.50 (see Table 139). There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between crimes coded as incidents resulting in arrest that are police sexual violence and county population, where $\chi^2 (8, N = 2{,}119) = 43.441, p < .001, V = .143$, higher than expected cell counts in nonmetropolitan counties in areas of fewer than 250,000 population (expected count is 21.6), nonmetropolitan counties with urban populations of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 15.8), nonmetropolitan counties that are completely rural or have less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metropolitan area, and nonmetropolitan counties that are completely rural or have less than 2,5000 urban population, not adjacent to a metropolitan area (see Table 140).

Table 139

Violence-related Police Crime: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 1,059)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	648	61.2
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	190	17.9
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	89	8.4
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	49	4.6
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	17	1.6
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	37	3.5
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	12	1.1
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	15	1.4
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	2	0.1

Table 140

Police Sexual Violence: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 256)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	137	53.5
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	42	16.4
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	26	10.2
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	23	9.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	4	1.6
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	9	3.5
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	3	1.2
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	11	4.3
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	1	0.4

There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for aggravated assault and population of the county where they are employed, where $\chi^2(8, N = 2{,}119) = 31.749$, $p < .001$, $V = .122$, with a higher than expected cell count in counties in metropolitan areas of one million population or more (expected count is 130.6). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 4 cells (22.2%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .78 (see Table 141). Similarly, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for robbery and county population, where $\chi^2(8, N = 2{,}119) = 31.884$, $p < .001$, $V = .123$, with a higher than expected cell count in counties in metropolitan areas of one million population or more (expected count is 33.8). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 6 cells (33.3%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .20 (see Table 142).

Table 141

Aggravated Assault: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 236)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	168	71.2
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	28	11.9
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	20	8.5
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	8	3.4
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	3	1.3
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	7	3.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	2	0.8
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0

Table 142

Robbery: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 61)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	55	90.2
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	2	3.3
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	2	3.3
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	1	1.6
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	1	1.6
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0

Profit-motivated police crime. Profit-motivated criminal offenses include a variety of theft offenses (e.g., embezzlement – theft by unlawful disposition, false pretences – theft by deception, larceny – theft), as well as drug-related offenses with an underlying profit motive (e.g., conspiracy to possess narcotics with the intent to distribute) and some violence-related offenses (e.g., robbery). When analyzing profit-motivated police crime in the census, the association between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for profit-motivated criminal offenses and years of service (as a categorical variable) is not statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level, where $\chi^2 (10, N = 2{,}119) = 8.940$, $p = .538$, $V = .065$. There is, however, a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for bribery and years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer at time of arrest, where $\chi^2 (10, N = 2{,}119) = 34.136$, $p < .001$, $V = .127$, with higher than expected cell counts at 3-5 years of service at arrest (expected count is 8.7), at 9-11 years of service at arrest (expected count is 5.1), and at 27 or more years of service at time of arrest (expected count is 1.1), suggesting, here again, that arrests of officers tend to occur most often at the early-journeymen, mid-career, and late-career/pre-retirement stages of law enforcement officers' careers. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 6 cells (27.3%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 0.75 (see Table 143). There are also statistically significant, but weak, associations in the census between several arrests for several specific criminal offenses and years of service at time of arrest, but, in each instance the low number of cases, low contingency table cell counts, and unequal marginals violate the assumptions of Chi-Square: wire fraud ($n = 7$), where $\chi^2 (10, N = 2{,}119) = 19.285$, $p < .05$, $V = .095$; gambling: operating/promoting (*n*

= 10), where χ^2 (10, N = 2,119) = 24.901, p < .01, V = .108; and, counterfeiting/forgery (n = 26), where χ^2 (10, N = 2,119) = 22.794, p < .05, V = .104.

Table 143

Profit-motivated Police Crime and Bribery: Years of Service at Arrest - Categorical

	Profit-motivated Police Crime (n = 521)		Bribery (n = 59)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Unknown	168	32.2	10	16.9
0-2 years of service	53	10.2	4	6.8
3-5 years of service	72	13.8	17	28.8
6-8 years of service	56	10.7	4	6.8
9-11 years of service	43	8.3	13	22.0
12-14 years of service	43	8.3	4	6.8
15-17 years of service	23	4.4	0	0.0
18-20 years of service	30	5.8	3	5.1
21-23 years of service	15	2.9	1	1.7
24-26 years of service	4	0.8	0	0.0
27 or more years of service	14	2.7	3	5.1

Moving next to analyzing associations between profit crime and age at arrest, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for conduct coded in the content analysis as profit-motivated police crime and age (categorically) at time of arrest, where χ^2 (9, N = 1,749) = 18.382, $p < .05$, $V = .103$, with slightly higher than expected cell counts for arrests at ages 24-27 (expected count is 42.6) and ages 52-55 (expected count is 10.9), and higher than expected counts at ages 28-31 (expected count is 72.3), ages 40-43 (expected count is 62.4), ages 48-51 (expected count is 20.8), and ages 56 or older (expected count is 11.1). There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for bribery and age (categorically) at time of arrest, where χ^2 (9, N = 1,749) = 27.662, $p < .01$, $V = .126$, with higher than expected cell counts for the following age categories: ages 24-27 (expected count is 5.5), ages 28-31 (expected count is 9.3), ages 36-39 (expected count is 11.3), ages 48-51 (expected count is 2.7), ages 52-55 (expected count is 1.4), and ages 56 or older (expected count is 1.4) (see Table 144), tending to suggest a now familiar pattern whereby early-journeymen, mid-career, and pre-retirement stages are overrepresented in the arrests. Once again, there are statistically significant, but weak, associations in the census between arrests for several specific criminal offenses and age at time of arrest, but, in each instance the low number of cases and low contingency table cell counts violate the assumptions of Chi-Square: wire fraud (n = 7), where χ^2 (9, N = 1,749) = 49.581, $p < .001$, $V = .168$; counterfeiting and forgery (n = 23), where χ^2 (9, N = 1,749) = 25.254, $p < .01$, $V = .120$; and, embezzlement (i.e., under the Model Penal Code: theft by unlawful disposition) (n = 42), where χ^2 (9, N = 1,749) = 18.082, $p < .05$, $V = .102$.

Table 144

Profit-motivated Police Crime and Bribery: Age at Arrest - Categorical

	Profit-motivated Police Crime (n = 433)		Bribery (n = 56)	
Age	*n*	%	*n*	%
20-23	3	0.7	0	0.0
24-27	43	9.9	9	16.1
28-31	79	18.2	11	19.6
32-35	72	16.6	6	10.7
36-39	83	19.2	13	23.2
40-43	65	15.0	1	1.8
44-47	30	6.9	2	3.6
48-51	30	6.9	7	12.5
52-55	11	2.5	3	5.4
56 and older	17	3.9	4	7.1

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for offenses that meet the criteria for violence-related police crime in the typology of police crime and officer rank at time of arrest, where $\chi^2 (9, N = 2{,}119) = 17.500, p < .05, V = .091$, with higher than expected cell counts for all rank categories except the lowest three rank categories as coded in the content analysis: sergeant (expected count is 47.7), lieutenant (expected count is 12.3), caption (expected count is 4.4), major (expected count is 0.5), colonel (expected count is 0.5), deputy chief / chief deputy (expected count is 3.9), and chief / sheriff (expected count is 16.2). The statistically

significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations for the association between arrests for profit-motivated police crime and rank at time of arrest result from contingency tables where 6 cells (30.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .49 (see Table 145).

Table 145

Profit-motivated Police Crime: Rank at Arrest (n = 521)

	n	%
Officer/Deputy/Trooper	384	73.7
Detective/Investigator	22	4.2
Corporal	7	1.3
Sergeant	56	10.7
Lieutenant	15	2.9
Captain	6	1.2
Major	2	0.4
Colonel	1	0.2
Deputy Chief/Chief Deputy	4	0.8
Chief/Sheriff	24	4.6

There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for embezzlement offenses (to include arrests in those states that have codified the Model Penal Code and now refer to the former common law crime of embezzlement as theft by unlawful disposition) and rank at time of arrest, where $\chi^2(9, N = 2{,}119) = 51.196, p < .001, V = .155$, with higher than

expected cell counts for the rank categories of detective (expected count is 2.5), corporal (expected count is 1.1), sergeant (expected count is 5.2), lieutenant (expected count is 1.3), colonel (expected count is 0.1), deputy chief / chief deputy (expected count is 0.4), and chief of police or sheriff (expected count is 1.8). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations assessing the association between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for embezzlement offenses and rank at time of arrest result from contingency tables where 10 cells (50.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .05 (see Table 146).

Table 146

Embezzlement: Rank at Arrest (n = 57)

	n	%
Officer/Deputy/Trooper	29	50.9
Detective/Investigator	4	7.0
Corporal	2	3.5
Sergeant	10	17.5
Lieutenant	2	3.5
Captain	0	0.0
Major	0	0.0
Colonel	1	1.8
Deputy Chief/Chief Deputy	2	3.5
Chief/Sheriff	7	12.3

There are other offense variables that exhibit statistically significant associations with rank at time of arrest in the census through Chi-Square and Cramer V analyses, but violate the statistical assumptions of Chi-Square because they include too much error resulting from low number of cases, low cell counts, and unequal marginals in the resulting contingency tables; they are: theft of motor vehicle parts ($n = 2$), where $\chi^2 (9, N = 2{,}119) = 19.533$, $p < .05$, $V = .096$; credit card fraud and ATM fraud ($n = 6$), where $\chi^2 (9, N = 2{,}119) = 21.404$, $p < .05$, $V = .101$; wire fraud ($n = 7$), where $\chi^2 (9, N = 2{,}119) = 36.440$, $p < .001$, $V = .131$; and, stolen property offenses (e.g., receiving stolen property) ($n = 29$), where $\chi^2 (9, N = 2{,}119) = 52.862$, $p < .001$, $V = .158$.

When looking at rank by organizational function for profit-motivated crime for which sworn law enforcement officers were arrested during 2005-2007 and included in the census, a different pattern emerges for the amount of crime for which management-level sworn law enforcement officers were arrested. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for profit-motivated police crime and rank by organizational function within officers' respective nonfederal law enforcement agencies, where $\chi^2 (2, N = 2{,}119) = 9.240$, $p < .05$, $V = .066$, with higher than expected cell counts for line- and field-supervisors (expected count is 69.8) and management-level sworn personnel (expected count is 25.6). Likewise, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census for arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for embezzlement offenses and rank by organizational function, where $\chi^2 (2, N = 2{,}119) = 28.558$, $p < .001$, $V = .116$, with higher than expected cell counts for the rank by organizational function categories of line- and field-supervisors (expected count is 7.6) and management-level ranks (expected count is 2.8). The statistically significant Chi-

Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 1 cell (16.7%) has an expected count less than 5; the minimum expected count is 2.80 (see Table 147). Once again, there are two offenses where there appear to be statistically significant, but weak, associations in the census with rank by organizational function, but those results are deemed to be violating the assumptions of the Chi-Square statistic because of a low number of relevant case and contingency tables with low cell counts and unequal marginals: theft of motor vehicle parts ($n = 2$), where $\chi^2 (2, N = 2{,}119) = 11.929$, $p < .01$, $V = .075$, and wire fraud ($n = 7$), where $\chi^2 (2, N = 2{,}119) = 8.535$, $p < .05$, $V = .063$.

Table 147

Profit-motivated Police Crime and Embezzlement: Rank at Arrest by Organizational Function

	Profit-motivated Police Crime ($n = 521$)		Embezzlement ($n = 57$)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Patrol/Street-Level Officers	406	77.9	33	57.9
Line/Field Supervisors	78	15.0	14	24.6
Management Personnel	37	7.1	10	17.5

The majority of profit-motivated criminal offenses for which officers in the census were arrested resulted from crimes that were alleged to have occurred while on duty working as a sworn law enforcement officer. There is a statistically significant moderate association in the census between arrests for profit-motivated police crime and duty status at time of alleged offenses for which an officer was arrested, where χ^2 (1, N = 2,119) = .020, p < .001, V = .309, with a higher than expected cell count for arrests resulting from on duty offenses (expected count is 244.1) (see Table 148). There are four offenses coded in the census that are almost always the result of alleged crime committed while on duty as a sworn law enforcement officer. First, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for bribery and duty status, where χ^2 (1, N = 2,119) = 60.318, p < .001, V = .169, with a higher than expected cell count for on duty crimes (expected count is 27.6). Second, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for extortion/blackmail and duty status, where χ^2 (1, N = 2,119) = 53.778, p < .001, V = .159, with a higher than expected cell count for arrests resulting from on duty offenses (expected count is 23.4) (see Table 149). Third, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for embezzlement and duty status at time of crime(s) charged, where χ^2 (1, N = 2,119) = 50.036, p < .001, V = .154, with a higher than expected cell count for arrests resulting from allegedly committed while on duty (expected count is 26.7). Fourth, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for theft from buildings and duty status, where χ^2 (1, N = 2,119) = 32.636, p < .001, V = .124, with a higher than expected cell count for crimes charged that were committed while on duty (expected count is 15.0) (see Table 150).

Table 148

Profit-motivated Police Crime: Duty Status at Time of Crime(s)

	Profit-motivated Police Crime (*n* = 521)	
	n	%
On-duty at time of offense	385	73.9
Off-duty at time of offense	136	26.1

Table 149

Bribery and Extortion & Blackmail: Duty Status at Time of Crime(s)

	Bribery (*n* = 59)		Extortion & Blackmail (*n* = 50)	
	n	%	*n*	%
On-duty at time of offense	57	96.6	49	98.0
Off-duty at time of offense	2	3.4	1	2.0

Table 150

Embezzlement and Theft from Buildings: Duty Status at Time of Crime(s)

	Embezzlement (*n* = 57)		Theft from Buildings (*n* = 32)	
	n	%	*n*	%
On-duty at time of offense	53	93.0	31	96.9
Off-duty at time of offense	4	7.0	1	3.1

There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers employed at nonfederal law enforcement agencies who were arrested for unclassified (i.e., all "other") larceny offenses and duty status at time of commission of the crime(s) charged, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 2{,}119) = 32.949$, $p < .001$, $V = .125$, with a higher than expected for arrests stemming from crimes alleged to have been committed while on duty (expected count is 33.3). Similarly, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for stolen property offenses and duty status at time of crime(s) charged, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 2{,}119) = 7.709$, $p < .01$, $V = .060$, with a higher than expected cell count for arrests of alleged crimes committed while on duty (expected count is 13.6) (see Table 151). Additionally, there is an apparently statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for theft from motor vehicles and duty status at time of crime(s) charged, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 2{,}119) = 9.106$, $p < .01$, $V = .066$, but this calculation violates the assumptions of Chi-Square statistics due to unequal marginals (100% of cases are in one cell: on-duty status at time of crime(s) charged), low cell count ($n = 8$), and calculations that result from contingency tables where 2 cells (50.0%) have expected counts less than 5 where the minimum expected count is 3.75.

Table 151

All "Other" Larceny and Stolen Property Offenses: Duty Status at Time of Crime(s)

	All "Other" Larceny (n = 71)		Stolen Property Offenses (n = 29)	
	n	%	*n*	%
On-duty at time of offense	57	80.3	21	72.4
Off-duty at time of offense	14	19.7	8	27.6

As to profit-motivated crime for which sworn law enforcements were arrested during the years 2005-2007, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between officers arrested for profit-motivated police crime and agency type, where χ^2 (6, N = 2,119) = 16.274, p < .05, V = .088, with a slightly higher than expected cell count for officers employed by sheriff's departments (expected count is 78.9), a higher than expected cell count for officers employed by special police departments (expected count is 14.5), and a much higher than expected cell count for officers employed by county police departments (expected count is 22.9). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 3 cells (21.4%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .49 (see Table 152). Looking at specific profit-motivated criminal offenses, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between officers arrested for bribery and agency type, where χ^2 (6, N = 2,119) = 15.732, p < .05, V = .086, with higher than expected cell counts for officers employed by primary state police agencies (expected count is 2.9) and officers employed by sheriff's departments (expected count is 8.9). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency

tables result from contingency tables where 6 cells (42.9%) have expected cell counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is .06. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between officers arrested for extortion and blackmail and agency type, where $\chi^2(6, N = 2{,}119) = 20.146$, $p < .01$, $V = .098$, with higher than expected cell counts for officers arrested who were employed by sheriff's departments (expected count is 7.6), county police departments (expected count is 2.2), and special police departments (expected count is 1.4). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 6 cells (42.9%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 0.5 (see Table 153).

Table 152

Profit-motivated Police Crime: Agency Type

	Profit-motivated Police Crime (n = 521)	
	n	%
Primary state police agency	23	4.4
Sheriff's department	80	15.4
General purpose county police department	36	6.9
General purpose municipal police department	362	69.5
Special police department	19	3.6
Constable (Texas)	1	0.2
Tribal police department	0	0.0

Table 153

Bribery and Extortion & Blackmail: Agency Type

	Bribery (n = 59)		Extortion & Blackmail (n = 50)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Primary state police agency	8	13.6	2	4.0
Sheriff's department	14	23.7	10	20.0
General purpose county police department	2	3.4	4	8.0
General purpose municipal police department	35	59.3	28	56.0
Special police department	0	0.0	6	12.0
Tribal police department	0	0.0	0	0.0

Two other statistically significant associations relating to profit-motivated offenses and agency type must be discounted as they violate the statistical assumptions of Chi-Square. There is a statistically significant, but weak association in the census between officers arrested for gambling (operating and promoting) and agency type, where $\chi^2(6, N = 2{,}119) = 32.103$, $p < .001$, $V = .123$, but there is a low count (n = 10) and Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations that result from contingency tables where 7 cells (50.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 0.01. Additionally, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between officers arrested for theft from motor vehicles and agency type, where $\chi^2(6, N = 2{,}119) = 16.459$, $p < .05$, $V = .088$. There is a low count (n = 8) and, here again, Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations that result from contingency tables where 7 cells (50.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 0.01.

Moving next to assessing the relationship between profit-motivated crimes for which sworn law enforcement officers were arrested during the years 2005-2007, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between agency size and profit-motivated police crime in the typology of police crime, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,091) = 27.374, p < .01, V = .114, with higher than expected cell count for nonfederal law enforcement agencies employing 2-4 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 25.2), agencies employing 10-24 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 53.1), and agencies employing 1,000 or more full-time sworn law enforcement officers (expected count is 145.3), tending to suggest that profit-motivated police crime is a problem for the smallest and largest law enforcement agencies. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 2 cells (9.1%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 1.97. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between agency size and officers arrested for extortion and/or blackmail, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,091) = 30.414, p < .01, V = .121, with higher than expected cell counts for agencies employing 5-9 full-time sworn law enforcement officers (expected count is 3.4), agencies employing 10-24 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 5.1), and agencies employing 500-999 full-time sworn officers. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 7 cells (31.8%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 0.19. Finally, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between agency size and officers arrested for unclassified (all "other") larceny offenses, where χ^2 (10, N = 2,091) = 20.104, p < .05, V = .098, with higher than expected cell counts for agencies employing one full-time sworn officer

(expected count is 0.3), agencies employing 2-4 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 3.5), agencies employing 25-49 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 6.7), agencies employing 50-99 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 7.1), and agencies employing 250-499 full-time sworn officers (expected count is 7.1). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 5 cells (22.7%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 0.27 (see Table 154).

Table 154

Agency Size by Full-Time Sworn Employees: Profit-motivated Police Crime, Extortion/Blackmail, and All "Other" Larceny

Full-Time Sworn Officers	Profit-motivated Police Crime (n = 1,043)		Extortion & Blackmail (n = 50)		All "Other" Larceny (n = 71)	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
1	2	0.4	0	0.0	2	2.8
2-4	27	5.2	2	4.0	7	9.9
5-9	32	6.2	5	10.0	3	4.2
10-24	71	13.8	15	30.0	6	8.5
25-49	37	7.2	1	2.0	8	11.3
50-99	50	9.7	4	8.0	8	11.3
100-249	53	10.3	0	0.0	7	9.9
250-499	45	8.7	5	10.0	10	14.1
500-999	28	5.4	4	8.0	1	1.4
1,000 or more	171	33.1	14	28.0	19	26.8

Turning now to assessing associations between profit-motivated criminal offenses for which law enforcement officers were arrested during the years 2005-2007 and the geographic regions within the United States where they were employed as sworn law enforcement officers in nonfederal law enforcement agencies, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between profit-motivated police crime arrests and agency location by geographic regions, where $\chi^2 (3, N = 2{,}119) = 16.591, p < .01, V = .088$, with a slightly higher than expected cell count for arrests of sworn law enforcement officers employed in the Northeast region (expected count is 120.0) and a much higher than expected count in the South region (expected count is 225.7) (see Table 155). There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for bribery and geographic regions where they are employed, where $\chi^2 (3, N = 2{,}119) = 28.418, p < .001, V = .116$, with higher than expected cell counts in the Northeast region (expected count is 13.6) and in the West region (expected count is 7.5). There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between officers who were arrested during 2005-2007 for extortion and/or blackmail and the geographic regions where they were then employed when the crime(s) charged was/were committed, where $\chi^2 (3, N = 2{,}119) = 19.590, p < .001, V = .096$, with a higher than expected cell count in the Midwest region (expected count is 10.4) and a much higher than expected cell count in the South region (expected count is 21.7) (see Table 156). Here, again, the data supports the notion that there are regional correlates to police crime within the United States.

Table 155

Profit-motivated Police Crime: Distribution by Geographic Regions

	Profit-motivated Police Crime (n = 521)	
	n	%
Northeastern States	122	23.4
Midwestern States	108	20.7
Southern States	250	48.0
Western States	41	7.9

Table 156

Bribery and Extortion/Blackmail: Distribution by Geographic Regions

	Bribery (n = 59)		Extortion & Blackmail (n = 50)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Northeastern States	19	32.2	2	4.0
Midwestern States	9	15.3	11	22.0
Southern States	12	20.3	35	70.0
Western States	19	32.2	2	4.0

As with other parts of the analysis of profit-motivated crimes in the census for which sworn law enforcement were arrested, there are several statistically significant associations between criminal offense categories and geographic regions where the arrested officers were employed at time of commission of the offenses that need to be scrutinized closely as each violate assumptions of the Chi-Square statistic. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census for geographic region and arrests for shoplifting (n = 10), where χ^2 (3, N = 2,119) = 9.369, p < .05, V = .066, but violates the assumptions of the Chi-Square statistic: the count (n = 10) is too low and the statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 4 cells (50.0%) have expected counts less than 5 (the minimum expected count is 1.28). Similarly, there is an association in the census that is apparently statistically significant, but weak, between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for gambling (operating and/or promoting) offenses and geographic regions, where χ^2 (3, N = 2,119) = 8.608, p < .05, V = .064. Once again, the count is too low (n = 10) and the statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 4 cells (50.0%) have expected counts less than 5 (the minimum expected count is 1.28). Lastly, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census that is suggested between geographic regions and arrests of officers for stolen property offenses (e.g., receiving stolen property), where χ^2 (3, N = 2,119) = 14.491, p < .01, V = .083, with a higher than expected cell count in the Northeast region (expected count is 6.7) and a slightly higher than expected cell count in the West region (expected count is 3.7). The count (n = 29), however, is just below the minimum number of cases needed (typically, 30 cases) and is generally viewed as violating an assumption of the

Chi-Square statistic. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 1 cell (12.5%) has an expected count less than 5; the minimum expected count is 3.71.

When analyzing the cases of the census at the level of the smaller geographic divisions within larger geographic regions, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association between arrests for offenses meeting the coding protocol for profit-motivated police crime (in the typology of police crime) and geographic divisions, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 51.802, p < .001, V = .156, with slightly higher than expected cell counts in the New England division (expected count is 29.5) and Middle Atlantic division (expected count is 90.5), both in the Northeast region of the country, as well as much higher than expected cell counts in the South Atlantic division (expected count is 117.8) and East South Central division (expected count is 44.5), both in the South region of the country (see Table 157). There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for bribery and geographic divisions, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 54.383, p < .001, V = .160, with higher than expected cell counts in the Middle Atlantic division (expected count is 10.2) of the Northeast region, the West North Central division (expected count is 2.5) of the Midwest region, and in both the Mountain division (expected count is 2.4) and the Pacific division (expected count is 5.1) of the West region of the United States. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 3 cells (16.7%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 2.42 (see Table 158). Lastly, there is also a statistically significant, but weak, association, in the census between geographic divisions and officers arrested for extortion and/or blackmail, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 29.371, p <

.001, $V = .118$, with higher than expected cell counts in the East North Central division (expected count is 8.3) of the Midwest region, as well as in the South Atlantic division (expected count is 11.3), the East South Central division (expected count is 4.3), and the West South Central division (expected count is 6.1) of the South region of the country. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 5 cells (27.8%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 2.05 (see Table 159).

Table 157

Profit-motivated Police Crime: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 521)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	91	17.5
Northeastern States – New England	31	6.0
Midwestern States – East North Central	86	16.5
Midwestern States – West North Central	22	4.2
Southern States – South Atlantic	125	24.0
Southern States – East South Central	77	14.8
Southern States – West South Central	48	9.2
Western States – Mountain	9	1.7
Western States – Pacific	32	6.1

Table 158

Bribery: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 59)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	18	30.5
Northeastern States – New England	1	1.7
Midwestern States – East North Central	2	3.4
Midwestern States – West North Central	7	11.9
Southern States – South Atlantic	5	8.5
Southern States – East South Central	4	6.8
Southern States – West South Central	3	5.1
Western States – Mountain	3	5.1
Western States – Pacific	16	27.1

Table 159

Extortion/Blackmail: Geographic Distribution by Regions and Divisions (n = 50)

	n	%
Northeastern States – Middle Atlantic	1	2.0
Northeastern States – New England	1	2.0
Midwestern States – East North Central	11	22.0
Midwestern States – West North Central	0	0.0
Southern States – South Atlantic	15	30.0
Southern States – East South Central	5	10.0
Southern States – West South Central	15	30.0
Western States – Mountain	0	0.0
Western States – Pacific	2	4.0

The final area of bivariate analysis for profit-motivated crime in the census is in analyzing the association between criminal offenses for which sworn law enforcement officers were arrested during 2005-2007 and the population of the county where they are employed by a nonfederal law enforcement agency. Using the Department of Agriculture's rural-urban continuum codes, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between county population and arrests for offenses coded as profit-motivated police crime, where $\chi^2 (8, N = 2{,}119) = 34.092, p < .001, V = .127$, with higher than expected cell counts in counties in metropolitan areas of 1,000,000 population or more (expected count is 288.4), nonmetropolitan counties with urban populations of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 32.2), nonmetropolitan counties with urban populations of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 24.3), nonmetropolitan counties with urban populations of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 8.4), and nonmetropolitan counties completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 1.7). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 2 cells (11.1%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 1.72 (see Table 160).

Table 160

Profit-motivated Police Crime: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 521)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	300	57.6
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	99	19.0
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	21	4.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	44	8.4
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	9	1.7
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	35	6.7
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	10	1.9
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	1	0.2
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	2	0.4

Moving next to specific profit-motivated criminal offenses, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between county population and arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for bribery, where $\chi^2 (8, N = 2{,}119) = 25.357$, $p < .01$, $V = .109$, with higher than expected counts in counties in metropolitan areas of 1,000,000 population or more (expected count is 32.7), nonmetropolitan counties with urban populations of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 3.6), and nonmetropolitan counties completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 0.2). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 7 cells (38.9%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 0.19 (see Table 161). There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between county population and arrests for embezzlement, where $\chi^2 (8, N = 2{,}119) = 22.715$, $p < .01$, $V = .104$, with higher than expected counts in six of the nine categories along the rural-urban continuum codes: counties in metropolitan areas of 250,000 to 1,000,000 population (expected count is 11.8), nonmetropolitan counties with urban populations of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 3.5), nonmetropolitan counties with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 1.0), nonmetropolitan counties with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 2.7), nonmetropolitan counties with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 0.9), and nonmetropolitan counties completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 0.2). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where

7 cells (38.9%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 0.19 (see Table 162). There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between county population and officers arrested for extortion and/or blackmail, where χ^2 (8, N = 2,119) = 57.611, p < .001, V = .165, with higher than expected cell counts in counties in metropolitan areas of fewer than 250,000 population (expected count is 4.2), nonmetropolitan counties with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 3.1), and in nonmetropolitan counties with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metropolitan area (expected count is 2.3). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 7 cells (38.9%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 0.17 (see Table 163).

Table 161

Bribery: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 59)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	39	66.1
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	4	6.8
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	3	5.1
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	10	16.9
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	1	1.7
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	1	1.7
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	1	1.7

Table 162

Embezzlement: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 57)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	22	38.6
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	17	29.8
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	1	1.8
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	7	12.3
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	2	3.5
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	4	7.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	3	5.3
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	1	1.8

Table 163

Extortion/Blackmail: Distribution of Cases by County Size (n = 50)

	n	%
County in metro areas of 1 million population of more	15	30.0
County in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million	9	18.0
County in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population	5	10.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area	14	28.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area	7	14.0
Nonmetro county with urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0
Nonmetro county completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area	0	0.0

There are also statistically significant associations in the census between three other offense categories and county population (as coded using the rural-urban continuum codes), but the statistical calculations violate the assumptions of the Chi-Square statistic due to low number of cases. They are: counterfeiting and forgery ($n = 26$), where $\chi^2 (8, N = 2{,}119) = 20.151$, $p < .05$, $V = .098$, resulting from contingency tables where 7 cells (38.9%) have expected counts less than 5 (the minimum expected count is 0.09); impersonation (e.g., identity theft) ($n = 21$), where $\chi^2 (8, N = 2{,}119) = 44.365$, $p < .001$, $V = .145$, resulting from contingency tables where 8 cells (44.4%) have expected counts less than 5 (the minimum expected count is 0.07); and, theft of motor vehicle parts ($n = 2$), where $\chi^2 (8, N = 2{,}119) = .015$, $p < .001$, $V = .266$, resulting from contingency tables where 9 cells (50.0%) have expected counts less than 5 (the minimum expected count is 0.01). Of note, the statistically significant association for county population and theft of motor vehicle parts, with the two relevant census cases even distributed between only the very largest and very smallest counties in the United States: a county in metropolitan areas of 1,000,000 population or more and a nonmetropolitan county that is completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metropolitan area.

Victims

The next, and final, area of bivariate analysis is to assess the statistical significance of the associations in the census cases between variables regarding victim attributes and various categories of criminal offenses for which sworn law enforcement officers were arrested during the years 2005-2007 and included in this census. Due to the nature of news reports and the ability of journalists/reporters to gather relevant information on crime victims, there is a great deal of missing data for these variables of interest. In some cases, victim relationship to the offender was difficult to ascertain from published news reports, as the information was often presented in vague descriptions so as to protect the identity of sex crime victims and minors.

Victim Relationship to the Officer-Offender

Sex-related crime. There is a statistically significant strong association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for sex-related police crime in the typology of police crime and relationship of victims to the arrested officer, where χ^2 (7, N = 1,403) = .034, $p < .001$, V = .498, with higher than expected cell counts for victims who are an "other" relative (other than spouse, significant other, ex-spouse, ex-boy/girlfriend, child or stepchild) of the officer arrested (expected count is 13.4) and for victims unrelated to the arrested officer (expected count is 101.4) (see Table 164). It is difficult to offer a meaningful interpretation of this finding, as the news articles serving as the data source often lacked specific information on the relationship of any victim of a sex crime charged against an officer resulting in missing data for this analysis.

Table 164

Victim Relationship to Officer-Offender: Sex-related Police Crime

Victim's Relationship to Offender	Sex-related Police Crime (n = 521) n	%
Current Spouse	2	0.4
Ex-Spouse	4	0.8
Current Boyfriend/Girlfriend	6	1.2
Former Boyfriend/Girlfriend	4	0.8
Child/Stepchild	22	4.2
Other Relative	20	3.8
Unrelated Child	224	43.0
Stranger (non-family member)	239	45.9

Moving to specific sex offenses, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for forcible rape and relationship of victims to the arrested officer, where $\chi^2(7, N = 1{,}403) = 16.988, p < .05, V = .110$, with higher than expected cell counts for the following categories of victims: victims who are current boy/girlfriend of arrested officer (expected count is 3.8), victims who are former boy-girlfriend of arrested officer (expected count is 3.5), victims who are child or stepchild of the arrested officer (expected count is 5.5), victims who are "other" relative of the arrested officer (expected count is 3.0), and victims who are an unrelated child (expected count is 23.0), suggesting that police-perpetrated rapes cannot be typified as "stranger rapes." Rather, the data suggest that arrests of officers for the crime of rape, and other

categories of violent sex crimes, often involve a relative and/or child victim. The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 4 cells (25.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 2.10. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests for forcible sodomy and relationship of victims to the arrested officer, where $\chi^2(7, N = 1{,}403) = 21.111, p < .01, V = .126$, with higher than expected cell counts in the following categories of victims: victims who are the former spouse of the arrested officer (expected count is 1.7), victims who are the child or stepchild of the arrested officer, (expected count is 4.3), victims who are "other" relatives of the arrested officer (expected count is 2.4), and victims who are an unrelated child (expected count is 18.1). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 5 cells (31.3%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 1.66. Additionally, there is a statistically significant moderate association in the census between arrests for forcible fondling offenses and relationship of victims to the arrested officer, where $\chi^2(7, N = 1{,}403) = 99.625, p < .001, V = .266$, with higher than expected cell counts in the following categories of victims: victims who are the child or stepchild of the arrested officer (expected count is 8.6), victims who are "other" relative of the arrested officer (expected count is 4.7), and victims who are an unrelated child (expected count is 36.0). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 2 cells (12.5%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 3.30 (see Table 165).

Table 165

Victim Relationship to Officer-Offender: Forcible Rape, Sodomy, and Fondling

Victim's Relationship to Offender	Forcible Rape (n = 118)		Forcible Sodomy (n = 93)		Forcible Fondling (n = 185)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Current Spouse	2	1.7	0	0.0	0	0.3
Ex-Spouse	2	1.7	2	2.2	1	0.5
Current Boyfriend/Girlfriend	6	5.1	0	0.0	0	0.0
Former Boyfriend/Girlfriend	4	3.4	0	0.0	0	0.0
Child/Stepchild	10	8.5	8	8.6	12	6.5
Other Relative	6	5.1	4	4.3	15	1.1
Unrelated Child	28	23.7	26	28.0	70	37.8
Stranger (non-family member)	60	50.8	53	57.0	87	47.0

Violence-related crime. The victims of violence-related crimes for which officers are arrested are often relatives or acquaintances of the officer charged. There is a statistically significant moderate association in the census between violence-related police crime and relationship of victims to the arrested officer, where χ^2 (7, N = 1,403) = .017, $p < .001$, V = .356, with higher than expected cell counts in the following categories of victims: victims who are the current spouse of the arrested officer (expected count is 76.3), victims who are the former spouse of the arrested officer (expected count is 17.8), victims who are the current boy/girlfriend of the arrested officer (expected count is 32.1), victims who are the former boy/girlfriend of the arrested officer (expected count is 30.0), victims who are the child or stepchild of the arrested officer, and victims who are not a

relative of the arrested officer (i.e., strangers and/or acquaintances that are neither relatives or intimate) (see Table 166).

Table 166

Victim Relationship to Officer-Offender: Violence-related Police Crime

Victim's Relationship to Offender	Violence-related Police Crime (n = 1,001) n	%
Current Spouse	107	10.7
Ex-Spouse	21	2.1
Current Boyfriend/Girlfriend	43	4.3
Former Boyfriend/Girlfriend	40	4.0
Child/Stepchild	54	5.4
Other Relative	26	2.6
Unrelated Child	119	11.9
Stranger (non-family member)	591	59.0

Moving next to specific crimes of violence, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for aggravated assault (i.e., felonious assault and/or battery) and relationship of victims to the arrested officer, where χ^2 (7, N = 1,403) = 49.576, $p < .001$, $V = .188$, with higher than expected cell counts in the following categories of victims: victims who are the current spouse of the arrested officer (expected count is 17.9), victims who are the current boy/girlfriend of the arrested officer (expected count is 7.5), victims who are the former boy/girlfriend of the arrested officer (expected count is 7.0), victims who are the child or

stepchild of the arrested officer (expected count is 10.9), and victims who are unrelated acquaintances and/or strangers (expected count is 135.7). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 1 cell (6.3%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 4.19. There is also a statistically significant strong association in the census between arrests of officers for simple assault (i.e., misdemeanor assault and/or battery) and relationship of victims to the arrested officer, where $\chi^2(7, N = 1{,}403) = .023$, $p < .001$, $V = .408$, with higher than expected cell counts in each of the following categories of victims: victims who are currently the spouse of the arrested officer (expected count is 20.6), victims who are the former spouse of the arrested officer (expected count is 4.8), victims who are the current boy/girlfriend of the arrested officer (expected count is 8.7), victims who are the former boy/girlfriend of the arrested officer (expected count is 8.1), and victims who are the child or stepchild of the arrested officer (expected count is 12.5). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 1 cell (6.3%) has an expected count less than 5; the minimum expected count is 4.81. There is also a statistically significant moderate association in the census between arrests of officers for intimidation offenses (i.e., harassment, intimidation, threats, and/or stalking) and relationship of victims to the arrested officer, where $\chi^2(7, N = 1{,}403) = 67.653$, $p < .001$, $V = .220$, with higher than expected cell counts for the following categories of victims: victims who are the current spouse of the officer arrested (expected count is 9.7), victims who are the former spouse of the arrested officer (expected count is 2.3), victims who are the former boy/girlfriend of the arrested officer (expected count is 3.8), and victims who are either unrelated acquaintances or strangers (expected count is

73.3). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 4 cells (25.0%) have expected counts less than 5; the minimum expected count is 2.26 (see Table 167).

Table 167

Victim Relationship to Officer-Offender: Assault and Intimidation

Victim's Relationship to Offender	Aggravated Assault (n = 235)		Simple Assault (n = 270)		Intimidation Offenses (n = 127)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Current Spouse	24	10.2	68	25.2	12	9.4
Ex-Spouse	3	1.3	7	2.6	5	3.9
Current Boyfriend/Girlfriend	12	5.1	25	9.3	4	3.1
Former Boyfriend/Girlfriend	9	3.8	12	4.4	17	13.4
Child/Stepchild	17	7.2	21	7.8	2	1.6
Other Relative	6	2.6	5	1.9	2	1.6
Unrelated Child	9	3.8	12	4.4	10	7.9
Stranger (non-family member)	155	66.0	120	44.4	75	59.1

Sometimes the victims of violent crime for which sworn law enforcement officers are arrested are other sworn law enforcement officers. There is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of officers for aggravated assault and victims who are officers, too, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}396) = 10.480, p < .01, V = .087$, with a higher than expected cell count for victims who are also sworn law enforcement officers (expected count is 10.6). Likewise, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of officers for simple assault and victims who are also officers, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}396) = 10.641, p < .01, V = .087$, with a higher than expected cell count for victims who are also officers (expected count is 12.0) (see Table 168).

Table 168

Victims Who Are Sworn Law Enforcement Officers: Assault

	Aggravated Assault (n = 235)		Simple Assault (n = 267)	
	n	%	*n*	%
Civilian Victim	215	91.5	245	91.8
Victim is Sworn Law Enf. Officer	20	8.5	22	8.2

Victim Age

Sex-related crime. The data indicate that young children and teenagers are often the victims of sex crimes charged against officers. There is a statistically significant strong association in the census between officers who were arrested for crimes coded as sex-related police crime in the typology of police crime and victim age, where $\chi^2 (8, N = 679) = .021, p < .001, V = .558$, with higher than expected cell counts in the following

victim age categories: ages birth to 11 (expected count is 31.1), ages 12-13 (expected count is 24.0), ages 14-15 (expected count is 49.5), and ages 16-17 (expected count is 44.8). Turning to specific sex crime offenses, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between officers arrested for forcible rape and victim age, where $\chi^2(8, N = 679) = 22.864, p < .01, V = .184$, with higher than expected cell counts in the following victim age categories: ages birth to 11 (expected count is 7.5), ages 12-13 (expected count is 5.8), ages 18-19 (expected count is 6.7), and ages 20-24 (expected count is 8.2). There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between officers arrested for forcible sodomy and victim age, where $\chi^2(8, N = 679) = 18.317, p < .05, V = .164$, with higher than expected cell counts in the following victim age categories: ages birth to 11 (expected count is 5.7), ages 12-13 (expected count is 4.4), ages 14-15 (expected count is 9.1), ages 18-19 (expected count is 5.1), and ages 33-41 (expected count is 7.0). The statistically significant Chi-Square and Cramer's V calculations result from contingency tables where 1 cell (5.6%) has an expected count less than 5; the minimum expected count is 4.43. Lastly, there is a statistically significant moderate association in the census between officers arrested for forcible fondling offenses and victim age, where $\chi^2(8, N = 679) = 85.570, p < .001, V = .355$, with higher than expected in the following victim age categories: ages birth to 11 (expected count is 11.9), ages 12-13 (expected count is 9.2), and ages 14-15 (expected count is 18.9) (see Table 169).

Table 169

Victim Age: Sex-related Police Crime, Forcible Rape, Sodomy, and Fondling

Victim's Age	Sex-related Police Crime (n = 320)		Forcible Rape (n = 77)		Forcible Sodomy (n = 59)		Forcible Fondling (n = 122)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Birth - 11	42	13.1	17	22.1	10	16.9	29	23.8
12-13	39	12.2	8	10.4	5	8.5	17	13.9
14-15	92	28.8	11	14.3	15	25.4	34	27.9
16-17	63	19.7	7	9.1	7	11.9	13	10.7
18-19	24	7.5	7	9.1	7	11.9	10	8.2
20-24	24	7.5	10	13.0	4	6.8	8	6.6
25-32	17	5.3	6	7.8	2	3.4	6	4.9
33-41	16	5.0	9	11.7	8	13.6	5	4.1
42 and older	3	0.9	2	2.6	1	1.7	0	0.0

The child versus adult status for victim was next dichotomized to determine whether any associations with offense categories are statistically significant in the census. There is a statistically significant strong association in the census between officers arrested for offenses coded in cases as sex-related police crime in the typology of police crime, where $\chi^2(1, N = 1{,}401) = .027$, $p < .001$, $V = .441$, with a higher than expected cell count for child victims (i.e., victim under 18 years old at time of the offense) (expected count is 132.8). Moving to specific sex-related criminal offenses, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between officers arrested for forcible rape and victim age, where $\chi^2(1, N = 1{,}401) = 9.459$, $p < .01$, $V = .082$, with a

higher than expected cell count for child victims (expected count is 30.1). Similarly, there is also a statistically significant, but weak, association in the census between arrests of officers for forcible sodomy offenses and victim age, where χ^2 (1, N = 1,401) = 10.732, p < .01, V = .088, with a higher than expected cell count for child victims (expected count is 23.7). There is also a statistically significant moderate association in the census between officers arrested for forcible fondling offenses and victim age, where χ^2 (1, N = 1,401) = 75.121, p < .001, V = .232, with a higher than expected cell count for child victims (expected count is 47.1) (see Table 170).

Table 170

Adult and Child Victims: Sex-related Police Crime, Forcible Rape, Sodomy, and Fondling

	Sex-related Police Crime (n = 521)		Forcible Rape (n = 118)		Forcible Sodomy (n = 93)		Forcible Fondling (n = 185)	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Adult Victim	258	49.5	74	62.7	56	60.2	90	48.6
Child Victim	260	50.5	44	37.3	37	39.8	95	51.4

V*iolence-related crime*. There is a statistically significant moderate association in the census between officers arrested for criminal offenses coded as violence-related police crime in the typology of police crime and victim age, where χ^2 (8, N = 679) = 82.761, p < .001, V = .349, with higher than expected cell counts in the following victim age categories: ages 18-19 (expected count is 40.7), ages 20-24 (expected count is 49.6), ages 25-32 (expected count is 56.5), ages 33-41 (expected count is 55.1), and ages 42 and older (expected count is 47.6). There is also a statistically significant moderate association in the census between officers arrested for criminal offenses that are acts of

police sexual violence and victim age, where $\chi^2(8, N = 679) = 37.501, p < .001, V = .235$, with higher than expected cell counts in the following victim age categories: ages 14-15 (expected cell count is 19.5), ages 16-17 (expected count is 17.6), ages 18-19 (expected count is 10.9), and ages 20-24 (expected count is 13.4). As to specific violent offenses, there is a statistically significant moderate association in the census between arrests for aggravated assault and victim age, where $\chi^2(8, N = 679) = 55.401, p < .001, V = .286$, with higher than expected cell counts in the following victim age categories: ages birth to 11 (expected count is 10.7), ages 18-19 (expected count is 9.6), ages 20-24 (expected count is 11.7), ages 25-32 (expected count is 13.3), and ages 42 and older (expected count is 11.2). There is also a statistically significant moderate association in the census between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for simple assault and victim age, where $\chi^2(8, N = 679) = 31.892, p < .001, V = .217$, with higher than expected cell counts in the following victim age categories: ages 18-19 (expected count is 9.5), ages 20-24 (expected count is 11.6), ages 25-32 (expected count is 13.2), ages 33-41 (expected count is 12.8), and ages 42 and older (expected count is 11.1) (see Table 171).

Table 171

Victim Age: Violence-related Police Crime, Police Sexual Violence, Aggravated Assault, and Simple Assault

Victim's Age	Viol.-related Police Crime (n = 468)		Police Sexual Violence (n = 126)		Aggravated Assault (n = 110)		Simple Assault (n = 109)	
	n	%	*n*	%	*n*	%	*n*	%
Birth - 11	45	9.6	1	0.8	12	10.9	4	3.7
12-13	30	6.4	9	7.1	2	1.8	6	5.5
14-15	48	10.3	26	20.6	3	2.7	3	2.8
16-17	46	9.8	22	17.5	7	6.4	14	12.8
18-19	48	10.3	20	15.9	10	9.1	15	13.8
20-24	58	12.4	18	14.3	17	15.5	14	12.8
25-32	73	15.6	14	11.1	26	23.6	19	17.4
33-41	68	14.5	13	10.3	11	10.0	18	16.5
42 and older	52	11.1	3	2.4	22	20.0	16	14.7

Victim Gender

Women are more likely to be the victims of crime for which sworn law enforcement officers are arrested for offenses that are sex crimes, whereas men are more likely to be the victims of crime for which officers are arrested are violent in nature. The only exception to this in the census is that women are more likely to be the victims of crimes that are coded as police sexual violence (see Table 172). There is a statistically significant association in the census between victim gender and arrests in each of the following sex-related offense categories: sex-related police crime, $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}247) =$

.030, $p < .001$, $V = .496$; police sexual violence, $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}247) = .014$, $p < .001$, $V = .341$; forcible rape, $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}247) = 58.282$, $p < .001$, $V = .216$; forcible sodomy, $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}247) = 17.061$, $p < .001$, $V = .117$; forcible fondling, $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}247) = 91.266$, $p < .001$, $V = .271$; statutory rape, $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}247) = 30.058$, $p < .001$, $V = .155$; indecent exposure, $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}247) = 16.098$, $p < .001$, $V = .114$; and, child pornography, $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}247) = 5.590$, $p < .05$, $V = .067$. As to violent crimes for which officers were arrested, there is a statistically significant, but weak, association between officer arrest and the following violence-related offense categories: robbery, $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}247) = 35.121$, $p < .001$, $V = .168$, and aggravated assault, $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}247) = 47.475$, $p < .001$, $V = .195$. There is also a statistically significant, but weak, association, in the census between officer arrests for alcohol-related police crime and victim gender, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}247) = 4.218$, $p < .05$, $V = .058$, with a higher than expected cell count for victims who are men (expected count is 48.3). Likewise, there is a statistically significant moderate association in the census between officer arrests for profit-motivated police crime offenses and victim gender, where $\chi^2 (1, N = 1{,}247) = 89.279$, $p < .001$, $V = .268$, with a higher than expected cell count for victims who are men (expected count is 36.0).

Table 172

Victim Sex, by Offender Category

	Female		Male	
	n	%	*n*	%
Sex-related Police Crime (*n* = 495)	456	92.1	39	7.9
Police Sexual Violence (*n* = 253)	241	95.3	12	4.7
Forcible Rape (*n* = 118)	112	94.9	6	5.1
Forcible Sodomy (*n* = 92)	76	82.6	16	17.4
Forcible Fondling (*n* = 184)	173	94.0	11	6.0
Statutory Rape (*n* = 80)	73	91.2	7	8.8
Indecent Exposure (*n* = 36)	34	94.4	2	5.6
Child Pornography (*n* = 37)	30	81.1	7	18.9
Robbery (*n* = 32)	4	12.5	28	87.5
Aggravated Assault (*n* = 226)	96	42.5	130	57.5
Alcohol-related Police Crime (*n* = 129)	70	54.3	59	45.7
Profit-motivated Police Crime (*n* = 96)	17	17.7	79	82.3

Logistic Regression

This section of the analysis relates to the second and third research questions posed in this study, and their respective related hypotheses. The logistic regression models built and analyzed in the pages directly below ponder the research question as to whether Ross's (2001) taxonomy of police crime provides a useful conceptualization to reliably predict factors relating to arrests of sworn law enforcement officers. Later, the pages that follow below address the research question as to whether the typology of police crime reliably predicts factors relating to arrests of sworn law enforcement officers.[33] The model building process for each of the logistic regression analyses on the pages that follow all include a three-step analytic process to build the various final models. The first step of each model built is to assess the fitness of the model. This is assessed by analyzing the goodness of fit, pseudo R^2 values, and classification tables. The second step in evaluating and building each logistic regression model is to assess the importance of each independent variable through analysis of the coefficients, Wald statistics, significance scores, odd ratios, and related confidence intervals (at 95% CI). The third and final step is to assess whether the assumptions of the logistic regression model are satisfied for each model. The greatest concern in assessment of the model assumptions is to assure a lack of perfect or severe multicollinearity in the independent variables. Collinearity diagnostics were performed on an initial model that included all independent variables available (and, again, for each backward stepwise model built) with specific attention to assessment of the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance values for each independent variable. In instances where tolerance scores were < .25 and/or variance inflation factor (VIF) scores were > 4.0 for an individual independent

variable in a model, the offending independent variables were eliminated from the model in order to eliminate any multicollinear relationships. In such instances, the models were then rerun for further assessment.

Logistic Regression Models for Ross' Taxonomy of Police Crime

Ross (2001) presented a taxonomy of police crime, which states that "police crime is multi-dimensional and directional, representing ranges that can differ in opportunity-ratios, necessary conditions, potency, stability, values, and other basic demands" (p. 184). The taxonomy offers five nonmutually-exclusive bipolar distinctions of police crime. Each are conceptualized here as dichotomous variables. They are economically-motivated versus noneconomic crime, violent versus nonviolent crime, organizational police crime versus crime against the citizenry, internal crime against the organization versus crime by the organization against the officer, and official capacity crime versus individual capacity crime.

Economically-motivated vs. Noneconomic Crime

The dichotomous variable on the coding sheet for this study where "1 = this crime is economically-motivated" and "0 = this crime is not economically-motivated" (V88) was coded for all cases the same as another variable on the coding sheet relating to the typology of police crime (discussed below) where "1 = this crime is profit-motivated" and "0 = this crime is not profit-motivated" (V97) (see Appendix C). For the sake of brevity, the resulting logistic regression model for both variables will be treated as the dependent variable (i.e., it is the same logistic regression model) and primarily discussed here. Enter method logistic regression, with manual stepwise backward elimination, was conducted to determine which independent variables are predictors of a sworn law

enforcement officer being arrested for an economic crime versus arrest for a noneconomic crime (and, for analysis of profit-motivated crime in the typology of police crime: to determine which independent variables are predictors of a sworn law enforcement officer being arrested for a profit-motivated crime versus arrest for a crime that is not profit-motivated). An initial regression model was built with all independent variables included that are potential (i.e., might be) statistically relevant (see Table 173).

Table 173

Logistic Regression Results for Economically-motivated versus Noneconomic Crime: Initial Model (n = 476)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Full-time Sworn Personnel	1.279	.776	2.713	.100	3.592
Victim Age	.068	.024	7.811	.005	1.070
Violence-related	-2.877	1.229	5.480	.019	.056
Officer was Suspended	1.249	1.223	1.043	.307	3.487
Years of Service	-.026	.062	.169	.681	.975
Agency Type – Municipal	.490	1.170	.176	.675	1.633
-2 Log Likelihood	39.916				
Model Chi-Square	24.492			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.050				
Nagelkerke R^2	.396				

Using manual observation of the SPSS output for each model, independent variables were eliminated and removed from the model at each backward step in a sequential fashion with each decision for inclusion or exclusion in the model based solely on statistical criteria (i.e., manually observed *p*-values for each independent variable in the model, -2 log likelihood at the last iteration performed by SPSS, model Chi-Square, model pseudo R^2 values for the Cox and Snell R^2 and Nagelkerke R^2, and correlation tables). This process of backward elimination of independent variables at each step was continued until a best final model was selected (see Table 174). The independent variables included in the final, last step, model are victim age (a continuous variable in years) and violence-related crime (a dichotomous variable where 0 = the crime is not violence-related and 1 = the crime is violence-related).

Table 174

Logistic Regression Results for Economically-motivated versus Noneconomic Crime: Final Model (n = 679)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Victim Age	.053	.013	15.314	.000	1.054
Violence-related Crime	-2.200	.714	9.499	.002	.111
-2 Log Likelihood	91.544				
Model χ^2	20.977			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.030				
Nagelkerke R^2	.199				

The pseudo R^2 values for the final model indicate that the independent variables in the model account for between 3% and 19.9% of the "variation" in the dependent variable. Although it is preferable to obtain a pseudo $R^2 > .30$ (30%) in a final model, scores that are > .10 (10%), while low, are acceptable for the purposes of this research as it is exploratory in nature. Here, the Cox and Snell R^2 score falls below the minimum threshold, but the Nagelkerke R^2 score is within the acceptable range. The classification table for the final model indicates that it correctly classified 98.4% of the cases. Wald statistics indicate that the relationship between each independent variable in the model is significant. Collinearity diagnostics for the final model indicate no problems with multicollinearity. The tolerance scores for both independent variables in the model are .973, and both VIF score are 1.028. There is no perfect or severe multicollinearity in the independent variables for this model. The odds ratio for victim age is Exp(B) = 1.054, 95% CI [1.027, 1.082], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an economic crime go up by 5.4% with a one year increase in the age of the victim. The odds ratio for violence-related crime is Exp(B) = .111, 95% CI [.027, .449], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an economic crime go down by 89% when the crime is also a violent crime as opposed to a nonviolent crime.

Violent Crime vs. Nonviolent Crime

Here, again, there is overlap in the coding sheet with variables relating to the taxonomy of police crime that measure that same thing as another variable on the coding sheet related to the typology of police crime. The dichotomous variable on the coding sheet for this study where "1 = this crime is violent" and "0 = this crime is not violent" (V89) was coded for all cases the same as another variable on the coding sheet relating to the typology of police crime (discussed below) where "1 = this crime is violence-related" and "0 = this crime is not violence-related" (V96) (see Appendix C). The resulting logistic regression model for both dependent variables will be consolidated for this analysis and treated as one (i.e., it is the same logistic regression model) and discussed here in lieu of duplicative analysis below.

A logistic regression model was built using all potentially relevant independent variables in the model based on preliminary diagnostics (see Table 175). The final, last step, regression model (with manual elimination of one independent variable at a time) includes the following independent variables: full-time sworn employees, arresting agency, victim is an officer, child victim, drug-related crime, alcohol-related crime, sex-related crime, profit-motivated crime, chief under scrutiny, agency scandal, citizen complaint, and victim relationship (dichotomous) (see Table 176).

Table 175

Logistic Regression Results for Violent Crime versus Nonviolent Crime: Initial Model (n = 472)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Gender	2.299	1.168	3.877	.049	9.969
Duty Status	-.018	.321	.003	.954	.982
Full-time Sworn Personnel	.076	.071	1.130	.288	1.078
Part-time Sworn Personnel	-.121	.100	1.473	.225	.886
County	.032	.116	.074	.785	.969
Arresting Agency	-.118	.307	.149	.700	.888
Victim Gender	.159	.360	.196	.658	1.173
Victim is Officer	1.986	1.445	1.890	.169	7.286
Victim Age	-.002	.015	.018	.893	.998
Child Victim	-1.729	.422	16.781	.000	.177
Drug-related	4.617	1.053	19.209	.000	101.186
Alcohol-related	-2.569	.447	32.997	.000	.077
Sex-related	-1.529	.453	11.397	.001	.217
Profit-motivated	-4.323	.994	18.905	.000	.013
Driving While Female	1.147	.885	1.680	.195	3.150
Officer Suspended	.281	.285	.972	.324	1.325
Supervisor Disciplined	-.419	1.152	.132	.716	.658
Chief Under Scrutiny	2.099	.896	5.489	.019	8.161
Agency Scandal	.964	.850	1.287	.257	2.621
Citizen Complaint	2.376	.407	34.000	.000	10.761
Years Service	.020	.019	1.083	.298	1.020
Rank by Org. Function	.038	.304	.016	.901	1.039
Victim Relationship (Dichot)	-.823	.395	4.340	.037	.439
-2 Log Likelihood	393.759				
Model Chi-Square	194.890			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.338				
Nagelkerke R^2	.475				

Table 176

Logistic Regression Results for Violent Crime versus Nonviolent Crime: Final Model (n = 1,379)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Full-Time Sworn Employees	.090	.031	8.260	.004	1.094
Arresting Agency	-.394	.175	5.091	.024	.674
Victim is an Officer	1.669	.507	10.824	.001	5.308
Child Victim	-1.551	.182	72.629	.000	.212
Drug-related	2.869	.460	38.849	.000	17.626
Alcohol-related	-1.605	.234	47.018	.000	.201
Sex-related	-.920	.204	20.336	.000	.398
Profit-motivated	-3.665	.277	174.443	.000	.026
Chief Under Scrutiny	1.253	.415	9.128	.003	3.500
Agency Scandal	.975	.318	9.392	.002	2.652
Citizen Complaint	1.300	.204	40.592	.000	3.669
Victim Relationship Dichot.	-1.311	.241	29.538	.000	.269
-2 Log Likelihood	1104.594				
Model χ^2	554.508			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.331				
Nagelkerke R^2	.473				

The pseudo R^2 values for the final model indicate that the independent variables in the model account for between 33.1% and 47.3% of the "variation" in the dependent variable. The classification table for the final model indicates that it correctly classified 82.2% of the cases. Wald statistics for the final model indicate that the relationship between each independent variable in the model and the dependent variable is significant. Collinearity diagnostics for the final model indicate no perfect or severe multicollinearity. The lowest tolerance score for an independent variable in the model is .549 and the highest VIF score is 1.821.

The odds ratio for the number of full-time sworn employees in the agency is Exp(B) = 1.094, 95% CI [1.029, 1.163], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violent crime go up by 9.4% as the size of the law enforcement agency goes up one level on the categorical scale (where 1 = 1 employee, 2 = 2-4 employees, 3 = 5-9 employees, 4 = 10-24 employees, 5 = 25-49 employees, 6 = 50-99 employees, 7 = 100-249 employees, 8 = 250-499 employees, 9 = 500-999 employees, and 10 = 1,000 or more employees). The odds ratio for arresting agency is Exp(B) = .674, 95% CI [.479, .950], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violent crime go down by 32.6% if the arresting agency is a law enforcement agency other than the agency employing the arrested officer as opposed to officers who are arrested by their own agencies.

The odds ratio for victim is also an officer is Exp(B) = 5.308, 95% CI [1.964, 14.350], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violent crime is over five times greater if the victim is also a sworn law enforcement officer as opposed to cases where the victim is not an officer. The odds ratio for child victim is Exp(B) = .212, 95% CI [

.148, .303], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violent crime go down by 78.8% when the victim is not a child, as opposed to those cases where the victim is a child.

The odds ratio for drug-related crime is Exp(B) = 17.626, 95% CI [7.150, 43.453], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violent crime is over 17 times greater if the crime is also drug-related, as opposed to police crime that is not also drug-related. The odds ratio for alcohol-related crime is Exp(B) = .201, 95% CI [.127, .318], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violent crime go down by 79.9% if the crime is also alcohol-related, as opposed to police crime that is not also alcohol-related. The odds ratio for sex-related crime is Exp(B) = .398, 95% CI [.267, .594], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violent crime go down by 60.2% if the crime is also sex-related, as opposed to police crime that is not also sex-related. The odds ratio for profit-motivated crime is Exp(B) = .026, 95% CI [.015, .044], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violent crime go down by 97.4% if the crime is also profit-motivated, as opposed to police crime that is not also profit-motivated.

The odds ratio for chief under scrutiny is Exp(B) = 3.500, 95% CI [1.553, 7.888], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violent crime are three and a half times greater if the arrested officer's chief is under media scrutiny, as opposed to those officers' arrests where the police chief is not under media scrutiny. The odds ratio for agency scandal is Exp(B) = 2.652, 95% CI [1.421, 4.948], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violent crime is over two and a half times greater when the media reports that there is an agency scandal or cover-up related to the officer's arrest, as opposed to those arrests for police crime where there is not media report of an agency scandal or cover-up. The odds ratio for citizen complaint as the method of crime detection is Exp(B) = 3.669, 95%

CI [2.460, 5.473], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violent crime are over three and a half times greater when the crime is detected by virtue of a citizen complaint, as opposed to those arrests where there was no citizen complaint. The odds ratio for victim relationship (dichotomous) is Exp(B) = .269, 95% CI [.168, .432], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violent crime go down by 73.1% if the victim is a stranger (or unrelated/nonintimate acquaintance), as opposed to those arrests for police crime where the victim is a relative or intimate partner of the officer.

Organizational Police Crime vs. Crime Against The Citizenry

The dependent variable in this model is coded as "1 = this crime is against the citizenry" and "0 = this crime is organizational police crime" (V90) (see Appendix C). An initial logistic regression model was built with all of the independent variables included that might potentially be relevant and statistically significant (see Table 177). The independent variables in the final, last step, model are victim gender, victim age, agency scandal, and citizen complaint (see Table 178). The pseudo R^2 values for the final model indicate that the independent variables in the model account for between 12.5% and 33.5% of the "variation" in the dependent variable. Although it is preferable to obtain a pseudo $R^2 > .30$ (30%) in a final model, scores that are > .10 (10%), while low, are acceptable for the purposes of this research as it is exploratory in nature. In this instance the Cox and Snell R^2 falls below the desired range, whereas the less-conservative Nagelkerke R^2 is above the > .30 threshold. The classification table for the final model indicates that it correctly classified 94.5% of the cases, and the Wald statistics for the final model indicate that the relationship between each independent variable in the model and the dependent variable is significant. Collinearity diagnostics for the final model

indicate no severe or perfect collinearity in the final model. The lowest tolerance score for an independent variable in the model is .886 and the highest VIF score is 1.128. There is no perfect or severe multicollinearity in the independent variables for this model.

Table 177

Logistic Regression Results for Organizational Police Crime versus Crime Against the Citizenry: Initial Model (n = 472)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Years Service	.074	.043	2.928	.087	1.076
Full-time Sworn Personnel	.153	.139	1.223	.269	1.166
County	.539	.407	1.754	.185	1.714
Arresting Agency	.463	.677	.468	.494	1.589
Victim Gender	-3.339	.920	13.161	.000	.035
Victim Age	-.060	.020	9.236	.002	.942
Child Victim	-1.400	.915	2.342	.126	.246
Violence-related	.574	.713	.648	.421	1.775
Profit-motivated	-1.083	1.391	.606	.436	.339
Officer Suspended	.360	.620	.336	.562	1.433
Supervisor Disciplined	.390	1.295	.090	.764	1.476
Chief Under Scrutiny	1.248	1.067	1.368	.242	3.484
Agency Scandal	-4.307	.838	26.398	.000	.013
Citizen Complaint	1.012	.644	2.469	.116	2.750
-2 Log Likelihood	102.158				
Model Chi-Square	87.588			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.169				
Nagelkerke R^2	.512				

Table 178

Logistic Regression Results for Organizational Police Crime versus Crime Against the Citizenry: Final Model (n = 672)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Victim Gender	-1.299	.438	8.799	.003	.273
Victim Age	-.021	.010	4.197	.040	.980
Agency Scandal	-2.096	.411	26.007	.000	.123
Citizen Complaint	2.055	.404	25.938	.000	7.807
-2 Log Likelihood	224.435				
Model χ^2	89.781			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.125				
Nagelkerke R^2	.335				

The odds ratio for victim gender is Exp(B) = .273, 95% CI [116, .644], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a crime against the citizenry go down by 72.7% when the victim is a male, as opposed to officers arrested for crimes where the victim is a female. The odds ratio for victim age is Exp(B) = .980, 95% CI [.961, .999], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a crime against the citizenry go down by 2% for every one year increase in the age of the victim. The odds ratio for agency scandal is Exp(B) = .123, 95% CI [.055, .275], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a crime against the citizenry go down by 87.7% when there is a report in the media of an agency scandal or cover-up, as opposed to those arrests when there is no report in the media of an agency scandal or cover-up. The odds ratio for citizen complaint is Exp(B) = 7.807, 95% CI [3.540, 17.218], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a crime against the citizenry are almost eight times greater when the crime is detected through a citizen complaint, as opposed to those arrests where there is no citizen complaint filed with a law enforcement agency.

Internal Crime Against the Organization vs. Crime by the Organization Against the Officer

In this model the dependent variable is coded as "1 = this crime is an internal crime against the organization" and "0 = this crime is by the organization against the officer" (V91) (see Appendix C). The initial model built includes all potentially relevant independent variables (see Table 179). The independent variables included in the final model are duty status, arresting agency, victim gender, alcohol-related crime, sex-related crime, police sexual violence, agency scandal, citizen complaint, and victim relationship dichotomous (see Table 180).

Table 179

Logistic Regression Results for Internal Crime Against the Organization versus Crime by the Organization Against the Officer: Initial Model (n = 452)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Age	.032	.042	.561	.454	1.032
Years Service	-.015	.047	.106	.745	.985
Duty Status	-3.526	.526	44.864	.000	.029
Rank	-.109	.111	.966	.326	.897
Full-time Sworn Personnel	-.043	.105	.165	.685	.958
Part-time Sworn Personnel	.165	.152	1.185	.276	1.180
County	-.096	.189	.255	.613	.909
Arresting Agency	.772	.439	3.092	.079	2.163
Victim Gender	-.448	.459	.952	.329	.639
Victim is Officer	-.502	1.181	.181	.671	.605
Victim Age	-.003	.020	.018	.892	.997
Child Victim	-.475	.585	.660	.417	.622
Drug-related	.875	1.544	.321	.571	2.399
Alcohol-related	1.737	.650	7.143	.008	5.682
Sex-related	2.136	.701	9.276	.002	8.461
Violence-related	-.809	.582	1.932	.165	.445
Profit-motivated	1.439	1.192	1.458	.227	4.218
Police Sexual Violence	-2.527	.777	10.582	.001	.080
Driving While Female	-.008	.965	.000	.993	.992
Officer Suspended	-.043	.406	.011	.916	.958
Supervisor Disciplined	-.286	1.712	.028	.868	.752
Chief Under Scrutiny	-.076	.810	.009	.925	.927
Agency Scandal	-2.735	1.212	5.091	.024	.065
Citizen Complaint	1.122	.474	5.616	.018	3.072
Victim Relationship Dichot.	-1.559	2.059	.754	.385	5.972
-2 Log Likelihood	225.440				
Model Chi-Square	387.637			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.576				
Nagelkerke R^2	.776				

Table 180

Logistic Regression Results for Internal Crime Against the Organization versus Crime by the Organization Against the Officer: Final Model (n = 1,247)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Duty Status	-3.410	.251	184.258	.000	.033
Arresting Agency	.713	.226	9.999	.002	2.041
Victim Gender	-.711	.282	6.337	.012	.491
Alcohol-related	1.627	.388	17.587	.000	5.090
Sex-related	1.584	.343	21.386	.000	4.875
Police Sexual Violence	-3.037	.449	45.662	.000	.048
Agency Scandal	-2.521	.433	33.834	.000	.080
Citizen Complaint	.632	.273	5.362	.021	1.881
Victim Relationship Dichot.	-1.056	.326	10.477	.001	.348
-2 Log Likelihood	607.937				
Model χ^2	1120.483			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.593				
Nagelkerke R^2	.791				

The pseudo R^2 values for the final model indicate that the independent variables in the model account for between 59.3% and 79.1% of the "variation" in the dependent variable. The classification table for the final model indicates that it correctly classified 91.8% of the cases. Wald statistics indicate that the relationship between each independent variable in the model and the dependent variable is significant. Collinearity statistics show that there is no perfect or severe multicollinearity in the independent variables for this model. The lowest tolerance score for an independent variable in the model is .379 and the highest VIF score is 2.640.

The odds ratio for duty status is Exp(B) = .033, 95% CI [.020, .054], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization go down by 96.7% for officers who were on duty at the time the crime for which they were arrested was committed, as opposed to those who were off-duty when their crime was committed. The odds ratio for arresting agency is Exp(B) = 2.041, 95% CI [1.312, 3.175], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization are two times greater for officers who were arrested by an agency other than their employer, as opposed to those officers who were arrested by their employing law enforcement agency.

The odds ratio for victim gender is Exp(B) = .491, 95% CI [.282, .854], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization go down by 50.9% when the victim is male, as opposed to those cases in which the victim is a female. The odds ratio for citizen complaint is Exp(B) = 1.881, 95% CI [1.102, 3.211], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization go up by 88.1% when the crime is detected by a citizen complaint, as opposed to those cases where there is no citizen complaint filed with the agency. The odds ratio for victim relationship

(dichotomous) is Exp(B) = .348, 95% CI [.183, .659], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization go down by 65.2% when the victim of the crime is a stranger or nonintimate acquaintance of the arrested officer, as opposed to those cases where the victim is a relative or intimate partner of the arrested officer.

The odds ratio for alcohol-related crime is Exp(B) = 5.090, 95% CI [2.379, 10.889], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization are five times greater when the crime is an alcohol-related offense, as opposed to those cases that are not alcohol-related. The odds ratio for sex-related crime is Exp(B) = 4.875, 95% CI [2.491, 9.541], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization are almost five times greater when the crime is a sex-related offense, as opposed to those cases that are not sex-related. The odds ratio for police sexual violence is Exp(B) = .048, 95% CI [.020, .116], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization go down by 95.2% when the crime is an act of police sexual violence, as opposed to those cases that do not involve acts of police sexual violence. The odds ratio for agency scandal is Exp(B) = .080, 95% CI [.034, .188], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization go down by 92% when there is a media report of an agency scandal or cover-up relating to the incident giving rise to the arrest, as opposed to those cases where there is no report in the media of a related agency scandal or cover-up.

Official Capacity Crime vs. Individual Capacity Crime

The dependent variable in this model is coded as "1 = this crime was committed by officer in their official capacity" and "0 = this crime was committed by officer in their individual capacity" (V92) (see Appendix C). The initial model built includes all independent variables that might be potentially relevant (see Table 181). The independent variables included in the final logistic regression model are number of full-time sworn employees (categorical variable), arresting agency, child victim, alcohol-related crime, chief under scrutiny, agency scandal, and victim relationship (dichotomous) (see Table 182). The pseudo R^2 values for the final model indicate that the independent variables in the model account for between 42.4% and 56.6% of the "variation" in the dependent variable. The classification table for the final model indicates that it correctly classified 80.8% of the cases. Wald statistics indicate that the relationship between each independent variable in the model and the dependent variable is significant. Collinearity statistics for this model show that there is no perfect or severe multicollinearity in the independent variables. The lowest tolerance score for an independent variable in the final model is .592 and the highest VIF score is 1.690.

Table 181

Logistic Regression Results for Official Capacity Crime versus Individual Capacity Crime: Initial Model (n = 452)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Age	-.026	.027	.961	.327	.974
Years Service	.018	.029	.383	.536	1.018
Full-time Sworn Personnel	-.158	.069	5.200	.023	.854
Part-time Sworn Personnel	-.013	.093	.019	.891	.987
County	-.220	.129	2.902	.088	.803
Arresting Agency	-1.054	.296	12.651	.000	.349
Victim Gender	.457	.355	1.657	.198	1.579
Victim Age	.011	.014	.610	.435	1.011
Child Victim	-1.079	.388	7.736	.005	.340
Drug-related	-.576	1.135	.257	.612	.562
Alcohol-related	-2.3502	.500	22.074	.000	.095
Sex-related	.746	.414	3.257	.071	2.110
Violence-related	.611	.311	3.847	.050	1.842
Officer Suspended	.081	.277	.085	.771	1.084
Supervisor Disciplined	1.697	1.289	1.732	.188	5.456
Chief Under Scrutiny	1.026	.695	2.180	.140	2.789
Agency Scandal	2.482	.759	10.695	.001	11.961
Citizen Complaint	-.474	.336	1.991	.158	.623
Rank by Org. Function	.392	.298	1.731	.188	1.479
Victim Relationship Dichot.	3.398	.559	37.018	.000	29.919
-2 Log Likelihood	390.207				
Model Chi-Square	227.866			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.396				
Nagelkerke R^2	.531				

Table 182

Logistic Regression Results for Official Capacity Crime versus Individual Capacity Crime: Final Model (n = 1,384)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Full-time Sworn Employees	-.117	.031	14.589	.000	.890
Arresting Agency	-1.202	.172	48.733	.000	.301
Child Victim	-1.289	.165	61.150	.000	.275
Alcohol-related	-2.662	.285	87.102	.000	.070
Chief Under Scrutiny	1.342	.399	11.305	.001	3.826
Agency Scandal	2.258	.334	45.648	.000	9.562
Victim Relationship Dichot.	3.7982	.282	181.513	.000	44.629
-2 Log Likelihood	1154.467				
Model χ^2	763.815			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.424				
Nagelkerke R^2	.566				

The odds ratio for the number of full-time sworn employees (a categorical variable) is Exp(B) = .890, 95% CI [.838, .945], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a crime committed in an officer's official capacity go down by 11% as the size of the officer's agency increases one unit on the categorical scale of number of full-time sworn officers employed. The odds ratio for arresting agency is Exp(B) = .301, 95% CI [.215, .421], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a crime committed in an officer's official capacity go down by 69.9% for cases in which the officer was arrested by an agency other than their employing agency, as opposed to cases where the officer was arrested by their own agency.

The odds ratio for child victim is Exp(B) = .275, 95% CI [.199, .381], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a crime committed in an officer's official capacity go down by 72.5% when the victim is a child, as opposed to when the victim is an adult. The odds ratio for victim relationship (dichotomous) is Exp(B) = 44.629, 95% CI [25.682, 77.553], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a crime committed in an officer's official capacity are 44 times greater when the victim is a stranger or nonintimate acquaintance, as opposed to a relative or intimate partner.

The odds ratio for alcohol-related crime is Exp(B) = .070, 95% CI [.040, .122], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a crime committed in an officer's official capacity go down by 93% when the offense is an alcohol-related crime, as opposed to those cases that are not alcohol-related. The odds ratio for chief under scrutiny is Exp(B) = 3.826, 95% CI [1.750, 8.366], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a crime committed in an officer's official capacity are almost four times greater when the officer's chief is under scrutiny about the incident in the press, as opposed to when there

is no such media scrutiny of the chief. The odds ratio for agency scandal is Exp(B) = 9.562, 95% CI [4.967, 18.407], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a crime committed in an officer's official capacity are nine and a half times greater when there is a media report of an agenda scandal or cover-up related to the officer's arrest, as opposed to those cases where there are no reports in the media of an agency scandal or cover-up related to the case.

Logistic Regression Models for the Typology of Police Crime

A second conceptual perspective for this research is a typology of police crime, where virtually all crime for which sworn law enforcement officers are arrested falls into at least one of five categories: drug-related police crime, alcohol-related police crime, sex-related police crime, violence-related police crime, and profit-motivated police crime. As with Ross' taxonomy, the categories in this typology of police crime are not mutually exclusive of each other.

Drug-related Crime vs. Other Crime

As with the logistic regression models relating to Ross' taxonomy of police crime, each of the models conceptualized pursuant to the typology of police crime include a dichotomous dependent variable relating to one tenet of the typology. The dependent variable in this model is coded as "1 = this crime is drug-related" and "0 = this crime is not drug-related" (V93 (see Appendix C). The initial model includes all potentially relevant independent variables (see Table 183). The independent variables in the final model are arresting agency and alcohol-related crime (see Table 184). The pseudo R^2 values for the final model indicate that the independent variables in the model account for between 2.2% and 4.4% of the "variation" in the dependent variable. This model is a

weak predictor of drug-related police crime. The classification table for the final model indicates that it correctly classified 89.5% of the cases. Wald statistics indicate that the relationship between each independent variable in the model and the dependent variable is significant. Model diagnostic collinearity statistics show that there is no perfect or severe multicollinearity in the independent variables in the final model. The tolerance scores for both independent variables in the final model are .995 and both VIF scores are 1.005.

Table 183

Logistic Regression Results for Drug-related Crime versus Other Crime: Initial Model (n = 602)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Age	.035	.055	.399	.528	1.036
Duty Status	.894	.981	.831	.362	2.445
Full-time Sworn Personnel	.048	.197	.060	.806	1.050
Part-time Sworn Personnel	.496	.223	4.932	.026	1.641
Arresting Agency	-.329	1.025	.103	.748	.720
Victim Gender	-1.160	1.251	.859	.354	.314
Victim Age	-.102	.079	1.662	.197	.903
Child Victim	-1.137	1.272	.798	.372	.321
Alcohol-related	3.338	.857	15.152	.000	28.150
County (Dichot)	2.548	.963	7.004	.008	12.776
-2 Log Likelihood	61.018				
Model Chi-Square	48.832			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.078				
Nagelkerke R^2	.467				

Table 184

Logistic Regression Results for Drug-related Crime versus Other Crime: Final Model (n = 2,119)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Arresting Agency	.787	.172	20.977	.000	2.197
Alcohol-related	-1.173	.267	19.315	.000	.309
-2 Log Likelihood	1375.141				
Model χ^2	46.417			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.022				
Nagelkerke R^2	.044				

The odds ratio for arresting agency is Exp(B) = 2.197, 95% CI [1.569, 3.078], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a drug-related crime are more than two times greater when an officer is arrested by a law enforcement agency other than their employing agency, as opposed to those cases where an officer is arrested by their own agency. The odds ratio for alcohol-related crime is Exp(B) = .309, 95% CI [.183, .522], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a drug-related crime go down by 69.1% when the crime is also alcohol-related, as opposed to those cases that are not alcohol-related.

Given the weak model for drug-related crime resulting from stepwise regression using manual deletion of one independent variable at each step (as evidenced by the -2LL score of 1375.141, which is much higher in the final model than in the starting/full model), an alternate model was run using the backward stepwise LR operation for binary logistic regression in SPSS to explore whether a more robust model could be developed.

In the alternate final model the independent variables are number of full-time sworn employees (a scaled categorical variable from one to ten), alcohol-related crime, and county size (a dichotomous variables where 0 = metropolitan county and 1 = nonmetropolitan county). The pseudo R^2 values indicate that the independent variables in the model account for between 7% and 41.7% of the "variation" in the dependent variable. This model is a stronger predictor of drug-related police crime than the model built using the manual step deletion process (see above) (see Table 185). The classification table for the final model indicates that it correctly classified 99.3% of the cases. Wald statistics indicate that the relationship between each independent variable in the model and the dependent variable is significant. Model diagnostic collinearity statistics for this alternate model indicate that there is no perfect of severe multicollinearity in the independent variables in the final model. The tolerance scores for two of the independent variables (number of full-time sworn employees and county size dichotomous) are .851 and VIF scores for both variables are 1.176. The tolerance score and the VIF score for the independent variable alcohol-related crime are 1.000. In this alternate model, the odds ratio for number of full-time sworn officers is Exp(B) = 1.657, 95% CI [1.126, 2.436], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a drug-related crime go up by 65.7% with a one unit increase in the size of the officer's employing agency on the scale of agency size by number of full-time sworn officers employed. The odds ratio for alcohol-related crime is Exp(B) = 19.543, 95% CI [4.475, 83.511], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a drug-related crime are nineteen times higher when the crime is also alcohol-related. The odds ratio for the third independent variable in the alternate model, county (dichotomous), is Exp(B) = 13.223, 95% CI [3.240, 53.963], showing that

the simple odds of arrest for a drug-related crime are thirteen times greater as you move one unit from metropolitan (i.e., typically urban and suburban) counties to nonmetropolitan (i.e., typically rural) counties on the nine level rurality scale.

Table 185

Logistic Regression Results for Drug-related Crime versus Other Crime: Alternate Final Model (n = 602)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Full-time Sworn Personnel	.505	.197	6.580	.010	1.657
Alcohol-related	2.973	.741	16.092	.000	19.543
County Dichotomous	2.582	.718	12.947	.000	13.223
-2 Log Likelihood	66.478				
Model χ^2	43.371			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.070				
Nagelkerke R^2	.417				

Alcohol-related Crime vs. Other Crime

The model for the alcohol-related logistic regression equation includes a dependent variable where "1 = this crime is alcohol-related" and "0 = this crime is not alcohol-related" (V94) (see Appendix C). The initial model built includes all potentially relevant independent variables (see Table 186). The independent variables in the final model are duty status, drug-related crime, sex-related crime, violence-related crime, police sexual violence, supervisor disciplined and/or reassigned, rank by organizational function, and victim relationship (dichotomous) (see Table 187). The pseudo R^2 values for the final model indicate that the independent variables in the model account for between 14.1% and 28.8% of the "variation" in the dependent variable. The classification table for the final model indicates that it correctly classified 89.5% of the cases. Wald statistics indicate that the relationship between each independent variable in the model and the dependent variable is significant. Collinearity statistics for this model show that there is no perfect or severe multicollinearity in the independent variables. The lowest tolerance score for an independent variable in the final model (police sexual violence) is .376 and the highest VIF score is 2.659.

Table 186

Logistic Regression Results for Alcohol-related Crime versus Other Crime: Initial Model (n = 452)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Duty Status	-4.000	.880	20.663	.000	.018
Full-time Sworn Personnel	.042	.099	.180	.672	1.043
Part-time Sworn Personnel	-.012	.145	.007	.934	.988
Arresting Agency	.092	.431	.045	.832	1.096
Victim Gender	-.205	.489	.175	.675	.815
Victim is Officer	.962	1.268	.575	.448	2.617
Victim Age	-.017	.017	.974	.324	.984
Drug-related	5.091	1.107	21.173	.000	162.633
Sex-related	-3.173	.620	26.221	.000	.042
Violence-related	-2.206	.464	22.550	.000	.110
Police Sexual Violence	1.692	1.178	2.064	.151	5.432
Driving While Female	1.972	1.685	1.370	.242	7.186
Officer Suspended	-.637	.398	2.556	.110	.529
Supervisor Disciplined	3.616	1.355	7.126	.008	37.205
Chief Under Scrutiny	.901	.823	1.199	.273	2.462
Agency Scandal	.627	.882	.505	.477	1.871
Citizen Complaint	.906	.498	3.314	.069	2.474
Rank by Org. Function	-.878	.570	2.369	.124	.416
Victim Relationship Dichot.	2.334	.662	12.451	.000	10.323
County Dichotomous	.471	.680	.480	.489	1.601
-2 Log Likelihood	219.837				
Model Chi-Square	159.505			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.297				
Nagelkerke R^2	.524				

Table 187

Logistic Regression Results for Alcohol-related Crime versus Other Crime: Final Model (n = 1,403)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Duty Status	-3.926	.426	85.051	.000	.020
Drug-related	1.845	.435	18.015	.000	6.327
Sex-related	-1.828	.287	40.527	.000	.161
Violence-related	-1.067	.229	21.663	.000	.344
Police Sexual Violence	2.332	.535	19.006	.000	10.296
Supervisor Disciplined	2.124	.470	20.393	.000	8.361
Rank by Org. Function	-.517	.266	3.788	.052	.596
Victim Relationship Dichot.	1.103	.249	19.593	.000	3.012
-2 Log Likelihood	732.064				
Model χ^2	213.494			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.141				
Nagelkerke R^2	.288				

The odds ratio for duty status is Exp(B) = .020, 95% CI [.009, .045], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an alcohol-related crime go down by 98% when an officer is on duty, as opposed to those cases where the officers are off duty. The odds ratio for drug-related crime is Exp(B) = 6.327, 95% CI [2.699. 14.831], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an alcohol-related crime are over six times greater when the crime is also a drug-related crime, as opposed to those cases that are not drug-related. The odds ratio for sex-related crime is Exp(B) = .161, 95% CI [.092, .282], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an alcohol-related crime go down by 83.9% when the crime is also sex-related, as opposed to those cases that are not sex-related. The odds ratio for violence-related crime is Exp(B) = .344, 95% CI [.220, .539], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an alcohol-related crime go down by 65.6% when the crime is also violence-related, as opposed to those cases that are not violence-related. The odds ratio for police sexual violence is Exp(B) = 10.296, 95% CI [3.609, 29.373], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an alcohol-related crime are more than ten times greater when the crime involves an act of police sexual violence, as opposed to those cases that do not involve acts of police sexual violence.

The odds ratio for supervisor disciplined is Exp(B) = 8.361, 95% CI [3.326, 21.016], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an alcohol-related crime are over eight times greater when the arrested officer's supervisor is disciplined and/or reassigned as a result of the incident giving rise to the arrest, as opposed to those cases where the officer's supervisor is neither disciplined nor reassigned. The odds ratio for rank by organizational function is Exp(B) = .596, 95% CI [.354, 1.004], and is disregarded for violating the null hypothesis that the odds ratio is equal to one. The odds ratio for victim

relationship (dichotomous) is Exp(B) = 3.012, 95% CI [1.848, 4.908], showing that the simple odds of arrest for an alcohol-related crime are three times greater when the victim of the crime is a stranger or nonintimate acquaintance of the officer, as opposed to those cases where the victim is a relative and/or intimate partner of the arrested officer.

Sex-related Crime vs. Other Crime

The dichotomous independent variable for the next model is coded as "1 = this crime is sex-related" and "0 = this crime is not sex-related" (V95) (see Appendix C). The initial model includes all independent variables that might be potentially relevant to the model (see Table 188). The independent variables in the final model are age, rank, victim gender, victim age, child victim, victim relationship (dichotomous), alcohol-related crime, violence-related crime, and citizen complaint (see Table 189). The pseudo R^2 values for the final model indicate that the independent variables in the model account for between 56.6% and 75.5% of the "variation" in the dependent variable. The classification table for the final model indicates that it correctly classified 88.9% of the cases. Wald statistics indicate that the relationship between each independent variable in the model and the dependent variable is significant. Collinearity statistics for this model show that there is no perfect or severe multicollinearity in the independent variables. The lowest tolerance score for an independent variable in the final model is .489 and the highest VIF score is 2.047.

Table 188

Logistic Regression Results for Sex-related Crime versus Other Crime: Initial Model (n = 452)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Age	.094	.035	7.015	.008	1.098
Years Service	-.039	.038	1.034	.309	.962
Duty Status	1.336	.436	9.379	.002	3.802
Rank	.275	.103	7.120	.008	1.316
Full-time Sworn Personnel	-.025	.089	.080	.777	.975
Part-time Sworn Personnel	.108	.134	.650	.420	1.114
County	-.034	.144	.055	.815	.967
Arresting Agency	-.107	.395	.073	.787	.899
Victim Gender	-3.887	.438	78.597	.000	.021
Victim Age	-.062	.020	9.113	.003	.940
Child Victim	1.903	.481	15.665	.000	6.707
Victim Relationship Dichot.	2.586	.473	29.904	.000	13.270
Alcohol-related	-2.218	.562	15.594	.000	.109
Violence-related	-1.226	.463	7.007	.008	.294
Agency Scandal	-.464	.654	.505	.477	.629
Citizen Complaint	2.133	.586	13.247	.000	8.438
-2 Log Likelihood	251.479				
Model Chi-Square	372.567			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.561				
Nagelkerke R^2	.750				

Table 189

Logistic Regression Results for Sex-related Crime versus Other Crime: Final Model (n = 615)

	B	*SE*	Wald	*p*	Exp(B)
Age	.052	.018	8.015	.005	1.054
Rank	.285	.085	11.231	.002	1.330
Duty Status	.899	.339	7.038	.008	2.456
Victim Gender	-3.754	.360	108.758	.000	.023
Victim Age	-.069	.017	16.648	.000	.933
Child Victim	1.775	.409	18.799	.000	5.900
Victim Relationship Dichot.	2.728	.410	44.310	.000	15.305
Alcohol-related	-2.078	.486	18.259	.000	.125
Violence-related	-.795	.373	4.534	.033	.452
Citizen Complaint	2.053	.468	19.229	.000	7.794
-2 Log Likelihood	339.325				
Model χ^2	513.244			.000	
Cox & Snell R^2	.566				
Nagelkerke R^2	.755				

The odds ratio for age at time of arrest is Exp(B) = 1.054, 95% CI [1.016, 1.092], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a sex-related crime go up by 5.4% with a one year increase in officer age at the time of their arrest. The odds ratio for rank is Exp(B) = 1.330, 95% CI [1.126, 1.572], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a sex-related crime go up by 33% with a one grade increase in officer rank. The odds ratio for duty status is Exp(B) = 2.456, 95% CI [1.265, 4.771], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a sex-related crime are almost two and a half times greater for an officer on-duty at time of the offense charged, as opposed to those who are off-duty.

The odds ratio for victim gender is Exp(B) = .023, 95% CI [.012, .047], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a sex-related crime go down by 97.7% when the victim is a male, as opposed to when the victim is a female. The odds ratio for victim age is Exp(B) = .933, 95% CI [.903, .965], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a sex-related crime go down by 6.7% with a one year increase in age of the victim. The odds ratio for child victim is Exp(B) = 5.900, 95% CI [2.645, 13.162], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a sex-related crime are almost six times greater when the victim of the crime charged is a child (under the age of 18 years), as opposed to when the victim is an adult. The odds ratio for victim relationship is Exp(B) = 15.305, 95% CI [6.855, 34.175], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a sex-related crime are more than 15 times greater when the victim is a stranger or nonintimate acquaintance, as opposed to when the victim is a relative and/or intimate partner of the officer.

The odds ratio for alcohol-related crime is Exp(B) = .125, 95% CI [.048, .325], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a sex-related crime go down by 87.5% when the crime charged is also an alcohol-related offense, as opposed to when the offense is

not also alcohol-related. The odds ratio for violence-related crime is Exp(B) = .452, 95% CI [.217, .939], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a sex-related crime go down by 54.8% when the crime charge is also violence-related, as opposed to when the offense is not also violence-related. The odds ratio for citizen complaint is Exp(B) = 7.794, 95% CI [3.113, 19.514], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a sex-related crime are almost eight times greater when the crime is detected through a citizen complaint, as opposed to when there is no citizen complaint made to law enforcement.

Violence-related Crime vs. Other Crime

The logistic regression model for violence-related crime in the typology of police crime measures the same thing as the model built for the violent crime model, *supra*, pursuant to Ross' taxonomy of police crime. For the sake of brevity, the full discussion is not repeated verbatim here.

The odds ratio for the number of full-time sworn employees in the agency is Exp(B) = 1.094, 95% CI [1.029, 1.163], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violence-related crime go up by 9.4% as the size of the law enforcement agency goes up one level on the categorical scale. The odds ratio for arresting agency is Exp(B) = .674, 95% CI [.479, .950], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violence-related crime go down by 32.6% if the arresting agency is a law enforcement agency other than the agency employing the arrested officer as opposed to officers who are arrested by their own agencies.

The odds ratio for victim is also an officer is Exp(B) = 5.308, 95% CI [1.964, 14.350], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violence-related crime is over five times greater if the victim is also a sworn law enforcement officer as opposed to cases

where the victim is not an officer. The odds ratio for child victim is Exp(B) = .212, 95% CI [.148, .303], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violence-related crime go down by 78.8% when the victim is not a child, as opposed to those cases where the victim is a child.

The odds ratio for drug-related crime is Exp(B) = 17.626, 95% CI [7.150, 43.453], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violence-related crime is over 17 times greater if the crime is also drug-related, as opposed to police crime that is not also drug-related. The odds ratio for alcohol-related crime is Exp(B) = .201, 95% CI [.127, .318], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violence-related crime go down by 79.9% if the crime is also alcohol-related, as opposed to police crime that is not also alcohol-related. The odds ratio for sex-related crime is Exp(B) = .398, 95% CI [.267, .594], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violence-related crime go down by 60.2% if the crime is also sex-related, as opposed to police crime that is not also sex-related. The odds ratio for profit-motivated crime is Exp(B) = .026, 95% CI [.015, .044], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violence-related crime go down by 97.4% if the crime is also profit-motivated, as opposed to police crime that is not also profit-motivated.

The odds ratio for chief under scrutiny is Exp(B) = 3.500, 95% CI [1.553, 7.888], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violence-related crime are three and a half times greater if the arrested officer's chief is under media scrutiny, as opposed to those officers' arrests where the police chief is not under media scrutiny. The odds ratio for agency scandal is Exp(B) = 2.652, 95% CI [1.421, 4.948], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violence-related crime is over two and a half times greater when the media

reports that there is an agency scandal or cover-up related to the officer's arrest, as opposed to those arrests for police crime where there is not media report of an agency scandal or cover-up. The odds ratio for citizen complaint as the method of crime detection is Exp(B) = 3.669, 95% CI [2.460, 5.473], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violence-related crime are over three and a half times greater when the crime is detected by virtue of a citizen complaint, as opposed to those arrests where there was no citizen complaint. The odds ratio for victim relationship (dichotomous) is Exp(B) = .269, 95% CI [.168, .432], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a violence-related crime go down by 73.1% if the victim is a stranger (or unrelated/nonintimate acquaintance), as opposed to those arrests for police crime where the victim is a relative or intimate partner of the officer.

Profit-motivated Crime vs. Other Crime

Here, again, the logistic regression model for profit-motivated crime in the typology of police crime is the same as the model built earlier for the economic versus noneconomic crime category in Ross' taxonomy of police crime. As such, analysis of the model is incorporated by reference, although the odds ratios are restated here using the terminology of the typology the discussion.

The odds ratio for victim age is Exp(B) = 1.054, 95% CI [1.027, 1.082], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a profit-motivate crime go up by 5.4% with a one year increase in the age of the victim. The odds ratio for violence-related crime is Exp(B) = .010, 95% CI [.027, .449], showing that the simple odds of arrest for a profit-motivated crime go down by 99% when the crime is also a violent crime as opposed to a nonviolent crime.

Summary of Results

The findings of this study show that police crime occurs in nonmetropolitan, urban, suburban, and rural communities, and effects officers employed by primary state police agencies, sheriff's departments, county police departments, municipal police departments, and special police departments (e.g., university/college police departments, park police departments, etc.). It involves officers at all ages and years of service levels (from entry level rookies to those officers in the sunset of their careers, and at all periods in between), at all ranks within law enforcement agencies, off duty and on duty, and against victims known and unknown to the arrested officers, and against victims of all ages. Both the typology of police crime and Ross' taxonomy of police crime provide useful conceptualizations to examine and reliably predict factors relating to arrests of sworn law enforcement officers. Police crime is multidimensional and involves crimes against the citizenry, internal crimes against the organization, official capacity and individual capacity crime, economically-motivated crime, violent crime, sex-related crime, drug-related crime, and alcohol-related crime. This study is more exploratory than explanatory in nature; the findings should be viewed with caution regarding any generalizations to any population outside the scope of those cases analyzed herein. The coefficients reported describe relationships between variables in the census; they are the exact calculations of the relationships that actually exist in the population considered, assuming there is no measurement error. These coefficients have no random component based on variability introduced by a chance draw of a sample from the greater population of all officers who were arrested in those years.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This final chapter starts with an assessment of the research questions and hypotheses relating to the four major components of this study: exploration of the nature and prevalence of police crime in the United States during the years 2005 through 2007;[34] an assessment of whether Ross' (2001) taxonomy of police crime provides a useful conceptualization to reliably predict factors relating to arrests of sworn law enforcement officers; an assessment of whether the typology of police crime (conceptualized for and introduced in this study) provides a useful conceptualization to reliably predict factors relating to arrests of sworn law enforcement officers; and, whether the Google News search engine is a useful tool for criminological research. That is followed by a discussion of the findings of this research study, limitations of the study, the relationship between this study and in the context of the body of literature, policy implications of the findings, and future research agenda.

Police crime, as measured by arrests of sworn law enforcement officers with general powers of arrests and employed by nonfederal law enforcement agencies across the United States, occurs in agencies large and small, throughout the country in metropolitan, nonmetropolitan, urban, suburban, and rural communities, and effects officers employed by primary state police agencies, sheriff's departments, county police departments, municipal police departments, special police departments (e.g., university/college police departments, park police departments, etc.). It involves officers at all ages and years of service levels (from entry level rookies to those officers in the sunset of their careers, and at all periods in between), at all ranks within law enforcement

agencies, off duty and on duty, and against victims known and unknown to the arrested officers, and against victims of all ages. Police crime is multidimensional and involves crimes against the citizenry, internal crimes against the organizational, official capacity and individual capacity crime, economically-motivated crime, violent crime, sex-related crime, drug-related crime, and alcohol-related crime.

Key Findings Related to the Research Hypotheses

First Research Question

What descriptive information and associations can be learned about the nature and prevalence of police crime in the United States during the years 2005-2007?

First Hypothesis

H_a1: There is a statistically significant relationship between years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer and arrest for a crime in all offense categories. The findings support the hypothesis in some, but not all, offense categories. At both the bivariate and multivariate levels, there is a statistically significant relationship between years of service as a sworn law enforcement and arrest for some violence-related crimes, sex-related crimes, and profit-motivated crime. In each instance, however, the violence-related, sex-related, and profit-motivated independent variables of interest washed out and were eliminated in the multivariate analyses from final logistic regression models. Potential reasons include perfect or severe collinearity (likely related to age and rank variables), complete separation, and/or zero cell counts. Collapsing the years of service variable into a categorical variable (in three-year scaled categories for years of service) did not improve the multivariate results, likely due to missing data (keeping in mind that the sole sources of data were news articles that often did not include this information).

For sex-related crimes, generally, there is a statistically significant relationship in the census at the bivariate level between years of service and arrest at 3 to 5 years of service, 12 to 14 years of service, and 18 to 20 years of service. There is also a statistically significant relationship for arrests relating to acts of police sexual violence at 27 and more years of service. As to violence-related crimes, generally, there is a statistically significant relationship in the census at the bivariate level between years of service and arrest at 3 to 5 years of service and at 12 to 14 years of service. For the profit-motivated crime of bribery, there is a statistically significant relationship in the census at the bivariate level between years of service and arrest at 3 to 5 years of service, 9 to 11 years of service, and at 27 and more years of service. These findings indicate that sworn law enforcement officers are, in the context of a red flag in an early intervention/warning system, at risk for criminality and arrest at the early (post-rookie), mid-career (journeymen), and late career (pre-retirement) stages of their law enforcement careers.

Second Hypothesis

H_a2: There is a statistically significant relationship between agency-type (employer of officer arrested) and some offense categories. There is some support for the hypothesis in the findings of this study. Low cell counts, however, plagued results at the bivariate level. Additional research is needed at the multivariate level.

Several interesting patterns emerged at the bivariate level. For alcohol-related arrests, there is a statistically significant relationship with agency type with higher than expected counts for primary state police agencies, sheriff's departments, and tribal police departments. The same holds true for officers arrested for driving under the influence, with statistically significant higher than expected cell counts for primary state police

agencies, sheriff's departments, and tribal police departments. As to sex-related crime, there is a statistically significant relationship between arrests for sex-related crimes and agency type with higher than expected cell counts for primary state police agencies, sheriff's departments, and special police departments. There is a statistically significant relationship between arrests for violence-related crimes and higher than expected count for municipal police departments. As to specific violent offenses, there is a statistically significant relationship between arrests for intimidation offenses (i.e., intimidation, harassment, threats, and stalking) and primary state police agencies. For both aggravated assault and simple assault, there is a statistically significant relationship with municipal police departments. Lastly, as to profit-motivated/economic-motivated crimes, there is a statistically significant relationship at the bivariate level between arrests and the following agency types: sheriff's departments, county police departments, and special police departments. For bribery, there is a statistically significant relationship between arrests and employment with primary state police agencies and sheriff's departments. There is also a statistically significant relationship between arrests for extortion/bribery and agency type, with higher than expected cell counts for sheriff's departments, county police departments, and special police departments.

Third Hypothesis

H_a3: There is a statistically significant relationship between officer duty status (i.e., on-duty or off-duty) at time of offense and some offense categories. The findings of this study support the hypothesis that there is a statistically significant relationship between duty status at time of commission of the crime(s) charged and various criminal offenses at both the bivariate and multivariate analysis levels.

There are numerous statistically significant associations between duty status and other variables of interest at the bivariate level in the census. Nonsupervisory officers (i.e., officers, troopers, and deputies) are more likely to be arrested for crimes committed while off duty, whereas chiefs are more likely to be charged with a crime that was committed while they were on duty. In other words chiefs of police and sheriffs are less likely than nonsupervisory officers to be arrested for crimes committed while off duty. Similarly, when collapsing ranks into a scale variable with fewer categories by organizational function within the law enforcement agency, street-level and line- and field-supervisors are more likely to be arrested for crimes occurring while off duty, whereas management-level (i.e., highest ranking law enforcement administrators) are more often arrested for crimes that occurred while they were on duty.

Looking at arrests for types of police and crime specific criminal offenses and statistically significant associations, arrests for drug-related crime and drug/narcotic offenses are more likely to result from crimes committed while on duty. Arrests for alcohol-related crime, including driving under the influence arrests, are more likely to result from off duty incidents. Arrests for some categories of sex crimes are more likely to result from crimes committed while on duty, with statistically significant relationships between arrest and being on duty at time of the crime(s) charged for forcible sodomy and forcible fondling offenses. Alternatively, there are some categories of sex crimes – those that are, by definition, limited to child victims – where arrests are more likely to result from off duty incidents, including crimes relating to online solicitation of a child, child pornography offenses, and statutory rape.

Arrests for some violent types of crime are more likely than others to result from incidents that occurred while on duty, in terms of statistically significant associations at the bivariate level. Officers are more likely to be arrested for crimes alleged to have been committed while they were on duty when the charges are robbery and abduction offenses (including kidnapping, abduction, and false imprisonment). Arrests for the violence-related offenses of aggravated and simple assault are more likely to result from off duty conduct. The majority of profit-motivated criminal offenses for which officers in the census were arrested resulting from crimes alleged to have occurred while they were on duty, with statistically significant associations between duty status and several profit-motivated police crimes that are almost always alleged to have occurred while on duty: bribery, extortion/blackmail, embezzlement, theft from buildings, "other" unclassified larceny offenses, and stolen property offenses (e.g., receiving stolen property). These specific profit-motivated crimes are, clearly, police occupational crimes.

Duty status is also statistically significant at the multivariate level in several of the logistic regression models developed in this study. In the final model of the logistic regression results for internal crime against the organization versus crime by the organization against the officer, the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization go down by 96.7% for officers who were on duty at the time the crime for which they were arrested was committed, as opposed to those officers who were off duty when their crime charged was committed. For alcohol-related crime versus other crime, in the final model logistic regression results indicate that the simple odds of arrest for alcohol-related crime go down by 98% when an officer is on duty. Similarly, in the final model for the logistic regression results for sex-related crime versus other crime, the

simple odds of arrest for a sex-related crime are almost two and a half times greater for an officer on duty at time of the offense charged, as opposed to those officers arrested who are off duty.

Fourth Hypothesis

H_a4: There is a statistically significant relationship between some offense categories for which sworn law enforcement officers are arrested and victim age. There is strong support for this hypothesis in this study at the bivariate level of analysis for sex-related crime and violence-related crime, and at the multivariate level of analysis for sex-related crime, violence-related crime, profit-motivated crime, organizational police crime versus crime against the citizenry, and official capacity crime versus individual capacity crime.

There are numerous statistically significant associations in the census at the bivariate level between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for sex-related offenses age of their victims. For cases coded as acts of sex-related police crime, there are higher than expected counts for the following victim age categories: age birth to 11 years, ages 12-13 years, ages 14-15 years, and ages 16-17 years. There are higher than expected victim age cell counts for forcible rape arrests in the following victim age categories: age birth to 11 years, ages 12-13 years, ages 18-19 years, and ages 20-24 years. As to forcible sodomy arrests, there are higher than expected cell counts for the following victim age categories: ages birth to 11 years, ages 12-13 years, ages 14-15 years, ages 18-19 years, and ages 33-41 years. Lastly, as to arrests of officers for forcible fondling offenses, there are higher than expected cell counts for the following victim age categories: age birth to 11 years, ages 12-13 years, and ages 14-15 years. There are statistically significant

associations in the census between arrests and child victims for the offenses of forcible rape, forcible sodomy, and forcible fondling when the victim age variable is dichotomized into child (under age 18) and adult (age 18 or older) categories.

There are also several statistically significant associations at the bivariate level between arrests of sworn law enforcement officers for violence-related offenses age of their victims. For cases coded as acts of violence-related crime, there are higher than expected cell counts for the following victim age categories: ages 18-19 years, ages 20-24 years, ages 25-32 years, ages 33-41 years, and ages 42 and older. For cases coded as acts of police sexual violence, there are higher than expected cell counts for the following victim age categories: ages 14-15 years, ages 16-17 years, ages 18-19 years, and ages 20-24 years. As to specific violence-related assault offenses, there higher than expected counts for aggravated assault and the following victim age categories: age birth to 11 years, ages 18-19 years, ages 20-24 years, ages 25-32 years, and age 42 years and older. There are also higher than expected counts for simple assault arrests and victim age in the following victim age categories: ages 18-19 years, ages 20-24 years, ages 25-32 years, ages 33-41 years, and age 42 years and older.

In analyzing the logistic regression results, there are numerous statistically significant relationships at the multivariate level between various offense categories and victim age. The final model of logistic regression results for arrests for sex-related crime versus other crime show that the simple odds of arrest for a sex-related crime go down by 6.7% with a one year increase in age of the victim. Similarly, the simple odds of arrest for a sex-related crime are almost six times greater when the victim of the crime charged against the officer is a child. As to violent crimes, the simple odds of arrest for a violent

crime go down by 78.8% when the victim is not a child, as opposed to those cases where the victim is a child. But, the simple odds of arrest for a crime committed in an officer's official capacity go down by 72.5% when the victim is a child, as opposed to when the victim is an adult. When examining profit-motivated crime arrests, the final model logistic regression results indicate that the simple odds of arrest for a profit-motivate crime go up by 5.4% with a one year increase in the age of the victim. Conversely, the simple odds of arrest for a crime against the citizenry go down by 2% for every one year increase in the age of the victim.

Second Research Question

Does Ross' (2001) taxonomy of police crime provide a useful conceptualization to reliably predict factors relating to arrests of sworn law enforcement officers?

Fifth Hypothesis

$H_0$5: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for an economically-motivated crime versus a crime that is not economically-motivated. The null hypothesis is rejected, as a set of factors was calculated through the use of logistic regression models that provide a useful conceptualization to reliably predict between 3% and 19.9% of the factors (i.e., "variation" in the dependent variable as measured by pseudo R^2 scores) relating to arrest of sworn law enforcement officers for economically-motivated crime as opposed to noneconomic crime. The final model of prediction is a weak model, and additional research is needed to further develop it. The factors identified as predictors of officer arrest for economically-motivated crime are age of the victim and economically-motivated crimes that are also violent crimes. The simple odds of arrest for an

economically-motivated crime go up with a one year increase in the age of the victim, and go down by 89% when the crime is also a violent crime.

Sixth Hypothesis

$H_0$6: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for committing a violent crime versus a nonviolent crime. The null hypothesis is rejected, as a strong logistic regression model was calculated that provides a useful conceptualization to reliably predict between 33.1% and 47.3% of the factors relating to arrest of sworn law enforcement officers for a violent crime as opposed to a nonviolent crime. The simple odds of arrest go up by 9.4% as the size of the employing law enforcement agency increases one step on a categorical scale grouping by the number of full-time sworn officers employed by the agency. The simple odds of arrest for a violent crime do down by 32.6% if the investigating law enforcement agency is an outside agency other than the one employing the officer. The odds are about three times greater that an officer will be arrested for a violent crime if there is media scrutiny about the incident directed at the officer's chief or agency head, if there are media reports of an agency scandal or cover up related to the incident, and if the crime is detected through a citizen complaint to a law enforcement agency. As to the victims of violent crimes of officers, the simple odds of arrest are five times greater if the victim of the crime is also a sworn law enforcement officer, go down by 78.8% when the victim is an adult (and not a child under 18 years old), and go down by 73.1% when the victim is a stranger or unrelated/nonintimate acquaintance. In terms of types of crime, an officer is more likely to be arrested for a violent crime if the crime is also a drug-related crime, but

less likely to be arrested if the violent crime is also alcohol-related, sex-related, and/or profit-related.

Seventh Hypothesis

$H_0$7: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for an organizational police crime versus a crime that is against the citizenry. The null hypothesis is rejected. This study provides a useful conceptualization to reliably predict between 12.5% and 33.5% of the factors relating to arrest of an officer for organizational police crime versus crime against the citizenry. The final logistic regression model generated is a weak to moderate model of prediction. The simple odds of arrest go down by 72.7% when the victim of an officer's crime against the citizenry is a male, and regardless of whether the victim is a male or female, the odds of arrest go down slightly as the age of the victim increases. An officer is eight times more likely to be arrested for a crime against the citizenry when the crime is detected through the filing a complaint by a citizen. An unanticipated finding of this study, however, is that the simple odds of arrest for a crime against the citizenry go down by 87.7% when there is a report in the media of an agency scandal or cover-up related to the underlying incident, as opposed to those cases in the census when there is no news report in the media of an agency scandal and/or cover-up. One possible explanation is that law enforcement agencies may be reluctant to file criminal charges against one of their own officers when there is an internal perception of outside pressures being placed on the agency to take such action. In other words, agency decision-makers might have a tendency to "dig in" in an effort to escape liability or acknowledgement of criminal behavior within their ranks.

Eighth Hypothesis

$H_0$8: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for an internal crime against the organization versus a crime committed by the organization against a law enforcement officer. This null hypothesis is rejected because this study provides a very strong model and useful conceptualization to reliably predict between 59.3% and 79.1% of the factors relating to arrest of a sworn law enforcement officer for internal crimes against the organization (i.e., their employing nonfederal law enforcement agency) versus crime by the organization against the officer. An officer is twice as likely to be arrested for an internal crime against the organization when the allegations were investigated by an outside law enforcement agency (i.e., an agency other than the one employing the officer in question), although the odds of arrest go down by 96.7% for officers who were on duty at the time of the crime for which they were arrested was alleged to have been committed. Here, again, the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization go down by 92% when there is a media report of an agency scandal and/or cover-up relating to the underlying incident, as opposed to those cases where there is no news report in the media of a related agency scandal and/or cover-up. Additional research is warranted to see if law enforcement agencies resist media scrutiny to the utmost in efforts to maintain a veil of secrecy over the alleged criminal activities of its members. Contrary to the apparent resistance to media scrutiny, the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization go up by 88.1% when the crime is detected by a citizen complaint but go down by 65.2% when the victim of the crime is a stranger or nonintimate acquaintance of the officer and down by 50.9% when the victim is a male.

Turning next to types of crime, the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime against the organization are five times greater when the crime is an alcohol-related offense and almost five times greater when the crime is also sex-related. Conversely, the simple odds of arrest for an internal crime go down 95.2% when the crime involves an act of police sexual violence, and – similar to the findings above for crimes against the citizenry and internal crimes by officers against the organization but contrary to the findings for violent crime by sworn officers – down by 92% when there is media report of an agency scandal and/or cover-up related to the underlying incident.

Ninth Hypothesis

$H_0$9: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for an official-capacity crime versus a crime committed by an officer in their individual capacity. This null hypothesis is rejected. This study provides a useful conceptualization and strong model to reliably predict between 42.4% and 56.6 of the factors to predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for an official capacity crime versus a crime committed by an officer in their individual capacity. The simple odds of arrest for a crime committed by a sworn law enforcement officer in their official capacity do down as the size of the agency (as measured by the number of full-time sworn officers employed) goes up and when the criminal allegations are investigated by an outside law enforcement agency. As to the victims of crimes alleged to have been committed by officers in their official capacity as sworn law enforcement officers, the simple odds of arrest go down 72.5% when the victim is a child, and are 44 times greater when the victim of an official capacity crime is a stranger or nonintimate acquaintance of the officer. Consistent with the findings for

officers arrested for violent crimes, the simple odds of arrest for an official capacity crime are almost four times greater when the agency head (e.g., the police chief) is under media scrutiny in published news reports about the underlying incident, and nine and a half times greater when there is a published news report in the media of an agenda scandal and/or cover-up relating to the incident. There is a clear delineation in the findings as to how law enforcement agencies (and, specifically, their agency heads) react to published media reports of allegations relating to criminal misconduct of officers within the agency; publicity about crimes against persons often result in the filing of criminal charges against offending officers, whereas publicity about internal crimes and crimes against property are less likely to result in initiation of criminal proceedings against an officer as a result of outside scrutiny on the agency.

Third Research Question

Does the typology of police crime provide a useful conceptualization to reliably predict factors relating to arrests of sworn law enforcement officers?

Tenth Hypothesis

$H_0$10: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for a drug-related crime versus other crime types. It is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that no set of factors can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for a drug-related crime versus another type of crime based solely on the results of the final model developed for this dependent variable using stepwise logistic regression with manual backward elimination of independent variables. The pseudo R^2 values for the final model indicate that the independent variables in the model only account for between 2.2% and

4.4% of the "variation" in the dependent variable (i.e., drug-related crime). The null hypothesis is rejected, however, based on an alternate final model calculated using the backward stepwise logistic regression with automated computer algorithms in SPSS. The alternate final model provides a useful conceptualization to reliably predict between 7% and 41.7% of the factors to predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for a drug-related crime versus some other type of crime. This model, although of weak to moderate strength, is a substantial improvement, in terms of its prediction ability, over the first final model with drug-related crime as the dependent variable built in SPSS using logistic regression with manual elimination of one independent variable at each step. The odds of arrest for a drug-related crime go up (by 65.7% with a one step up the scale of number of full-time sworn officers employed) as the size of the employing agency increases, and are thirteen times greater moving from metropolitan to nonmetropolitan counties (with each one unit move on the rurality scale continuum in the direction from large metropolitan to small nonmetropolitan counties). The odds ratio for alcohol-related crime shows that the simple odds of an officer being arrested for a drug-related crime are 19 times greater when the crime is also alcohol-related. Although the model diagnostics do not indicate any problem with severe or perfect colliniearity between these two variables, is does seem to reason that there is a correlation between alcohol- and drug-related substance use/abuse.

Eleventh Hypothesis

$H_0$11: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for an alcohol-related crime versus other crime types. This null hypothesis is rejected. This study provides a useful conceptualization and

strong model to reliably predict between 14.1% and 28.8% of the factors to predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for an alcohol-related crime versus some other type of crime. The simple odds of arrest for an alcohol-related crime go down by 98% when an officer is on duty. Arguably, most sworn law enforcement officers imbibe in the consumption of alcoholic beverages while they are off duty, although the bivariate results in this study show that over 13% of arrests for alcohol-related crimes (including arrests for driving under the influence) result from offenses committed by officers on duty (see Table 80 and Table 81, *supra*). As above with the findings for arrests of officers for drug-related crimes, the simple odds of arrest for an alcohol-related crime are over six times greater when the crime is also a drug-related crime. The simple odds of arrest for an alcohol-related offense go down by 83.9% when the crime is also sex-related, and down by 65.6% when the crime is also violence-related (as opposed to those crimes that are not, respectively, sex- or violence-related). When the incident involves an act of police sexual violence, however, the simple odds of arrest for an alcohol-related crime are ten times greater than those cases in the census that do not involve acts of police sexual violence. It is eight times more likely that an officer will be arrested for an alcohol-related crime when that officer's supervisor is disciplined and/or reassigned for reasons relating to the underlying arrest giving rise to the alcohol-related arrest of the subordinate officer. Finally, the simple odds of arrest of a sworn law enforcement officer for an alcohol-related crime are three times greater when their victim is a stranger or nonintimate acquaintance of the officer, as opposed to when the victim is a relative or past/present intimate partner of the arrested officer.

Twelfth Hypothesis

$H_0$12: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for a sex-related crime versus other crime types. The null hypothesis is rejected because this study provides a useful conceptualization and very strong model to reliably predict between 56.6% and 75.5% of the factors to predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for a sex-related crime versus some other type of crime. This is the first time in this study where a final regression model finds that officer rank (at time of arrest) and officer age (at time of arrest) are statistically significant predictors of arrest as independent variables. The simple odds of arrest of a sworn law enforcement officer for a sex-related crime go up by 5.4% with a one year increase in officer age, go up by 33% with a one grade increase in officer rank, are two and a half times greater for an officer who was on duty at the time of commission of the offense(s) charged, and eight times greater when the crime is detected through the filing a citizen complaint to a law enforcement agency. Regarding the victims of sex-crimes for which officers were arrested in the census, the simple odds of arrest go down by 97.7% when the victim is a male, go down by 6.7% with a one year increase in the age of the victim, are almost six times greater when the sex crime victim is a child (under 18 years of age), and are more than 15 times greater when the victim is a stranger or nonintimate acquaintance of the officer. When examining the relationship between sex-related crimes and other types of crime in the typology of police crime, the simple odds of an officer being arrested for a sex-related crime go down by 87.5% when the incident is also alcohol-related, go down by 54.8% when the incident is also violence-related. These findings support the notion that even when an officer is subject to criminal

arrest, there is favorable discretion exercised – to wit, the behavior of law – lessening or downgrading the seriousness of a criminal charge.

Thirteenth Hypothesis

$H_0$13: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for a violence-related crime versus other crime types. The null hypothesis is rejected for the same reasons as discussed above for factors that can reliably predict the odds of arrest for a violent crime versus a nonviolent crime under Ross' taxonomy of police crime. The conceptual definition of violent crime is the same as that of violence-related crime.

Fourteenth Hypothesis

$H_0$14: There are no set of factors that can reliably predict the odds that a sworn law enforcement officer will be arrested for a profit-motivated crime versus other crime types. Here, again, the null hypothesis is rejected for the same reasons as those discussed above for the dichotomous distinction between economically-motivated and noneconomic crime pursuant to Ross' taxonomy of police crime. The conceptual definition of economically-motivated crime is the same as that of profit-motivated crime.

Fourth Research Question

Is Google News a useful tool for criminological research?

The Google News search engine is largely ignored by social scientists, including criminologists as a source of information/data for research studies, as evidenced by a dearth of published refereed articles in social science journals that mention using Google News as a part of a study's methodology and/or data collection. This study offers evidence, as concluded preliminarily in the pilot study, *supra*, that Google News is a

useful tool for criminological research. The Google News search engine provides access to a rich and largely untapped wealth of raw data appropriate for quantitative content analyses within the context of newspapers published on-line by the mass media that would, otherwise, be unmanageable and not available as a source of news information data. There are no official data maintained on criminal arrests of sworn nonfederal law enforcement officers in the United States (with the limited exception on certain civil rights-related and use of force reporting requirements that are now mandated by federal law). Retroactive longitudinal data collection is not possible using the no cost Google News search engine and the application only lends itself to lengthy real-time data collection contemporaneous with event publication. It is not a searchable archival database. The Google News search function, and related Google News Alerts, extends back 30 days from the date the search is conducted, although there is a fee-based archival news database, Google News Archives, recently launched by Google. As a result, this research study started with the real-time collection of news articles on January 1, 2005 (almost five years prior to completion of the study). The Google News Alerts tool within the Google News application search engine provides an automated data collection that is orderly and efficient to collect news content on a scale otherwise not possible. The knowledge base of information about nature and extent of police crime can be expanded through the content analysis of news articles. There is no known readily available source of data to determine whether use of Google News, as applied here, captures the full incidence and prevalence of police crime within the United States. It is clear, however, that the findings of this study – using data primarily collected through the use of the Google News search engine with several dozen designated automated search terms setup

in Google Alerts – makes a meaningful contribution to the literature by expanding knowledge related to the social phenomena of police crime within the United States during the calendar years 2005 through 2007.

Limitations

This study analyzed the population of all of the documentary accounts (of sworn law enforcement officers who were arrested during the calendar years 2005 through 2007) available and located primarily through the use of Google News and its Google Alerts tool. As such, it is a census. The coefficients reported herein describe relationships between variables in the census; they are the exact calculations of the relationships that actually exist in the population considered, assuming there is no measurement error. These coefficients have no random component based on variability introduced by a chance draw of a sample from the greater population of all officers who were arrested in those years. For this reason, tests of statistical significance – at least, in the ordinary and usual context – are "neither necessary nor appropriate" (Hodson, 1999, p. 44).

The statistical relationships uncovered here represent the phenomenon of police crime as it is reported in the available accounts (i.e., the census of cases reported in news articles studied). To the extent that the findings are supported by other research in the future, in some instances it might later be possible to argue that the findings of this study are representative of the broader population of law enforcement officers in this country. That is not the situation at this juncture, and it is appropriate to thus err on the side of caution as to any claims of generalizability. That is not to suggest, however, that tests of statistical significance are of no value here. Inferential statistics and tests of statistical significance are reported in this research study because they help to provide standards of

comparison by which it was possible to assess which effects and relationships are of greater magnitude than others within the census (see Hodson, 1999, p. 45).

One problem with using published news articles as the data source for a quantitative content analysis is that there is a lack of uniformity from article to article and across the census of articles collected on information about each case and arrest. There was journalistic consistency whereby information in articles typically included some or all of the following facts: name of the officer arrested, officer's employer, officer's age and years of service as a sworn law enforcement officer, and type of criminal offense(s) charged. Often times the information regarding victims of the crimes were vague, typically to protect the identity of a victim of domestic abuse and/or sexual assault, and when the victim was a child. Not all of the information, however, was included in each article, leading to missing data, zero cell counts, and low cell counts during subsequent quantitative analyses. News articles as a primary source of arrest data is merely a substitute (albeit, a legitimate data collection method in the context of newsmaking criminology research) for better data sources that either do not exist or are not readily available to researchers. There are no official data collected, tabulated, archived, and/or published that would provide the same level of information as this study. In an effort to ensure reliability of the data sources, triangulation methods were used whereby all articles located on a specific case/arrest were collected and coded, and supplemental "spot" checks on data reliability were conducted periodically through additional Google searches on arrests/cases already identified.

Another limitation of this study is that the data collection was real-time, and not retrospective searches of archival data/news sources. As such, replication of the same

time period would be difficult, if not impossible, given the current state of internet-based searchable news archives. Replication of this study for prospective time period data collection is easily accomplished, although would be time consuming and would take years to complete (in the absence of the development of archival news sources for content previously searchable through the Google News search engine). A final limitation worth noting is the information about police crime that this study was unable to gather. Namely, absent from this study is conviction data on each arrest in the census, as well as data on the educational level of each officer included in the census).

Relation of this Study to the Body of Literature

Van Maanen (1973a, 1973b, 1975) identified four sequential stages of a police officer's socialization as each new recruit/officer is initiated into the organizational setting of a municipal police department: choice (the preentry stage of police socialization), introduction (the admittance stage of police socialization), encounter (the change stage of police socialization), and metamorphosis (the continuance stage of police socialization). The current research study identifies a fifth stage of police socialization at preretirement: the exit strategy. It also lends support to Van Maanen's conceptualization of sequential steps in the organizational process of police socialization. The findings relating to the bivariate relationship between arrest (for various categories of offenses and types of crime) and years of service of the arrested officers show that there are certain stages where officers are seemingly at risk for being arrested for committing a crime. They are: 3 to 5 years of service (at the end of the encounter stage of police socialization); 9 to 11 and 12 to 14 years of service (well into the continuance stage of

police socialization); and, 18 to 20 and 27 and more years of service (at the exit strategy stage of police socialization).

Numerous scholars, including Sherman (1978), Kappeler and his colleagues (1998), and Ross (2001), have argued that those crimes committed by police officers while they were off duty are not to be included in the definition of offenses that are police crime. This notion was challenged by Fyfe and Kane (2006), as well as the Mollen Commission (1994), who argued that it is a mistake to draw a bright line distinction asserting that the off duty individual crimes committed by police officers does not constitute police crime. In this study, 7.5% of crimes charged against officers were for off-duty criminal offenses alleged to have been committed by an officer in their official capacity.[35] Similarly, 11% of the arrests for internal crimes by an officer against the organization (i.e., against the law enforcement agency employing them as a sworn law enforcement officer with general powers of arrest) were for off-duty crimes, and 3.5% of the arrests involving acts of police sexual violence were alleged to have been committed while the arrested officer was off-duty. It would, indeed, be a mistake a draw a bright line distinction; some police crime is committed by sworn law enforcement officers while they are off-duty.

Black (1976) formulated a theory of the behavior law positing that law is a quantitative variable, and that predictions can be made as to how the law is going to behave in any situation, including within the context of criminal arrests and charging decisions. Black (1971) referred to the process of citizen-initiated interactions with the police whereby a citizen complained to them of a crime as “mobilization,” whereby citizen involvement with the police mobilizes the law. How the police react, however,

when mobilization occurs is largely a matter of their lawful discretion within the law. In this study, crime detection that came to the knowledge of the police through the filing of a citizen complaint tended to greatly increase the likelihood of a police officer being arrested (as opposed to the arrests when there is no citizen complaint). Further, in this study, media reports of scandal, cover-up, and/or scrutiny on the chief (as a result of the underlying incident of alleged officer criminality) had different effects on how the law behaves.

Black's theory offers several explanations for these findings. First, the likelihood of an arrest is more likely in serious, felonious, situations where there is a victim. As such, the theory predicts that an arrest is more likely when the crime is a violent crime against a person (as opposed to a nonviolent misdemeanor or a crime against property). Second, there is a greater likelihood of arrest when there is a greater relational distance between a suspect and a complainant; the police are more likely to make an arrest when the victim is a stranger. This certainly is true as to the findings in this study. The problem, however, is that the police are the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system and are, largely, exempt from arrest (Black & Reiss, 1967; Reiss, 1971a). Black (1976) referred to this relational aspect of distance between people as morphology. According to Black, as an element of morphology, relational distance predicts and explains the quantity of law, as well as the outcome of criminal cases. To this end, rational distance also explains why police officers who commit crimes themselves are often not arrest (or arrested for a downgraded criminal charge). In many respects, police officers are only arrested when they have expended all of their political capital and other officials are left with no choice but to publicly resolve the problem through the formal mechanisms of the criminal justice

system. Another variable of behavior of law is organization (i.e., the corporate aspect of social life). Some aspects of organization are specifically relevant to the study of police crime. Black argued that organization provides immunity from the law, whereby the more organized the offender, the more aspects of immunity will be enjoyed by the offender. Black's theory predicts that law will vary inversely with an offender's organization and/or organizational membership, and that law will vary directly with a victim's organization and/or organizational membership (Black, 1976, p. 93). The findings of this study are generally consistent with Black's theory of the behavior or law.

Policy Implications

The literature often disguises police crime in the context of police corruption and police misconduct, without ever using the word "crime" in the context of the criminal behavior of sworn law enforcement officers. The findings of this study, especially when taken together with those of Fyfe and Kane (2006), substantiate that police crime is a unique phenomena separate from police misconduct and police corruption, and should not be recognized solely under the auspices of misconduct and/or corruption. As a matter of public policy, the definition and conceptualization of police crime must include off-duty crimes of sworn law enforcement officers. It would be a mistake to continue the past practice, at least in terms of those scholars who have written on the subject, of limiting conceptualization of police crime to include only those crimes committed by police officers who were on duty when offending; it only serves to deny the existence of job-related off-duty criminality of some police officers.

The findings of this study offer considerable knowledge that could be useful in developing, implementing, and/or improving early intervention (i.e., early warning)

systems to identify those law enforcement officers at risk for engaging in acts of police crime. In this study, numerous officers were arrested more than once (some, repeatedly) during the census years of 2005 through 2007, and not fired from their law enforcement jobs. This is consistent with earlier research suggesting that law enforcement agencies are aware of problem behaviors by a small group of officers in their agency, and yet there is no effort to maintain such information as part of a meaningful early intervention/warning system. The predictors of arrest identified in this study should potentially be incorporated into those systems, especially as the findings relate to risk management decision points for officers already identified by early warning/intervention to assess the likelihood of future offending during the course of continued employment as a sworn law enforcement officer.

Future Research

There are a number of areas related to the findings that should be pursued in future research. Several independent commissions, as well as at least two prior research studies, have identified regional correlates of police crime within the United States (see, e.g., Christopher Commission, 1991; Fyfe & Kane, 2006; Knapp Commission, 1972; Lopez & Thomas, 2004). Although this was largely outside the scope of the current study and its research hypotheses, there are considerable data (currently analyzed at the bivariate level only) in this dataset to pursue research on the geographic correlates of police crime within this country. The process of police socialization should be explored in future research, especially as related to the exit strategy that was identified in this study as a fifth stage of police socialization, at and during preretirement years of service, building on Van Maanen's theory. Additional research should also examine the reliable

predictors of officer arrest identified in this study and how they could be incorporated into proactive use as part of the early intervention/warning systems used by many law enforcement agencies to identify potential problem officers before they get in trouble. Both of these areas as part of a research agenda – the exit strategy as a fifth and final stage of police socialization and reliable predictors of police officer arrest as a component of early intervention/warning systems – have real-world applications that could potentially serve to reduce, among other things, agency exposure and liability for the criminal behavior of officers in their employ.

Future research stemming directly from this study and its findings could include continued consideration of the findings in the context of Black's behavior of law theory, and further research to empirically test the theory using the dataset developed for this study. Supplemental data, some from outside secondary sources, relating to conviction data and educational levels of those officers included in this census would provide additional opportunities to build on the instant findings so as to increase knowledge of police crime. Lastly, researchers should develop and embrace extensive application of the Google News search engine, and its Google Alerts tool, as a data source for social science research.

Conclusion

This study is more exploratory than explanatory in nature. The findings should be viewed with caution regarding any generalizations to any population outside the scope of those cases analyzed herein. The findings of this study show that police crime occurs in nonmetropolitan, urban, suburban, and rural communities, and effects officers employed by primary state police agencies, sheriff's departments, county police departments,

municipal police departments, and special police departments (e.g., university/college police departments, park police departments, etc.). It involves officers at all ages and years of service levels (from entry level rookies to those officers in the sunset of their careers, and at all periods in between), at all ranks within law enforcement agencies, off duty and on duty, and against victims known and unknown to the arrested officers, and against victims of all ages. Both the typology of police crime and Ross' taxonomy of police crime provide useful conceptualizations to examine and reliably predict factors relating to arrests of sworn law enforcement officers. Police crime is multidimensional and involves crimes against the citizenry, internal crimes against the organization, official capacity and individual capacity crime, economically-motivated crime, violent crime, sex-related crime, drug-related crime, and alcohol-related crime. That being said, the findings of this study contribute to the body of knowledge on police crime within the United States. There simply is a dearth of empirical research directly on point, although there is a plethora of theoretical articles and research on the related police deviance areas of police corruption and, to a lesser degree, police misconduct. In closing, it would be a mistake to not recognize that not all cops are bad cops. Many law enforcement officers serve without ever engaging in criminal activities during the course of their employment. Most officers do not get arrested, and there are indications (albeit, outside the scope of this study) that many of those officers who are arrested are ultimately cleared of any criminal wrongdoing. This study offers a step in the direction of better understanding the phenomenon of police crime.

ENDNOTES

[1] The categories in this typology of police crime are, in retrospect, loosely grounded in a warning that was given to the members of the 76th session of the New Hampshire State Police Academy in the Fall of 1986: "there are three things that can mess up a police officer's career: women, booze, and money."

[2] In *Garrity v. New Jersey* (1967), the Supreme Court discussed the difference between adverse employment actions, in the nature of disciplinary investigations against police officers for police misconduct, and initiation of criminal proceedings against a police officer for the same event. The Court held that a police officer is required to answer questions truthfully in internal disciplinary investigations where the officer would be subject to termination for failing to answer the questions, but that any statements made in that context by a police officer cannot then be used in any criminal proceeding against the officer because the statements were coerced (under the threat of employment termination). Thus, many investigations into police misconduct that potentially involve police crime are stymied because a decision must be made by police administrators is whether to (a) elect to gather information by questioning an officer in a disciplinary matter, or (b) forego any questioning of an officer administratively and proceed, alternatively, with a criminal investigation against the officer (see *Garrity v. New Jersey*, 1967). If the latter option is elected, than the officer would be entitled to the right against self-incrimination that is afforded to any suspect or defendant in a criminal investigation (see *Miranda v. Arizona*, 1966).

[3] Wilson also identified a fourth police problem: police incompetence (Wilson, 1963, p. 190).

[4] Mystification is a process recognized in Marxist theory whereby specific social dynamics are obscured – or mystified – from public consciousness (see, e.g., Box, 1983, pp. 12-15; Matza, 1969, p. 196).

[5] Victor Felix is actually Victor Felix Ramos, and he was a member of the Los Angeles Police Department, not the Glendale Police Department ("News from across the USA," 1992).

[6] The Broward County deputy was Jeffrey Willets, although his name was not provided by Kappeler et al. (1998). The Willets case gained considerable notoriety, primarily due to the Prozac-induced-nymphomania defense proffered by Kathy Willets' attorney, Ellis Rubin (Bragg, 1991). Jeffrey Willets' bad acts here were a pattern of police crime well-known to his employer, the Broward County Sheriff's Department, long before the prostitution arrests (Kane, 1991).

[7] As argued throughout, it is a mistake to draw a bright line distinction asserting that off-duty individual crimes committed by police officers does not constitute police crime (see, e.g., Fyfe & Kane, 2006; Mollen Commission, 1994). The off-duty element negating certain offenses from police crime – as argued by Sherman (1978), Kappeler and his colleagues (1998), and Ross (2001) – is challenged in this research study.

[8] The scenarios and response options in the survey were adopted from the Klockars, Kutnjak Ivkovic, Harver, and Haberfield (1997) study (as a product of Klockars' Measuring Police Integrity study at the University of Delaware) (see Greene et al., 2004, pp. 66, 94).

[9] The observed police officers, however, "were told that the research was not concerned with police behavior but only with citizen behavior toward the police and the kinds of problems citizens make for the police" (Black, 1971, p. 1089). Although deception of this nature was common in sociological field experiments conducted in the 1960s and early 1970s, discipline-specific ethical canons (e.g., Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, 2000; American Psychological Association, 2002; American Sociological Association, 1999) and institutional review board (IRB) procedures now often constrain the formerly-routine practice of deceiving research participants as to the purpose of research studies (Patton, 2002, pp. 269-273) (see also National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1979).

[10] This is best summed up by Walker (2005) who commented, "The dirty little secret in policing is not just that some officers repeatedly engage in misconduct but that other officers know who they are. Historically, police departments always had their 'problem' officers but failed to take effective action toward them" (Walker, 2005, p. 100).

[11] Fyfe and Kane (2006) included an acknowledgement that "Paul McCauley of Indiana University of Pennsylvania planted the seed that grew into this study" (p. xxxi).

[12] The New York City Housing Authority Police Department and the New York City Transit Police Department merged into the NYPD in 1995 (Henry, 2002).

[13] Fyfe and Kane's (2006) extensive race-based findings regarding police officers who were involuntarily separated from their employment with the NYPD are not discussed at length herein, because the data in the instant research do not include race/ethnicity of police officers arrested for criminal offenses. As such, while important to the study of

police crime, discussion of race and/or ethnicity of offenders is outside the scope of this research.

[14] In fairness to Kraska and Kappeler (1988), however, it is noted that the stated intent in their research was not to make broad generalizations of their findings, but, rather, to present a "theoretical context for understanding police on-duty drug use and an exploratory descriptive account of on-duty drug use in a southern police department" within the United States (Kraska & Kappeler, 1988, p. 19).

[15] For the purposes of this study and tabulation of DUI arrests of police officers, an on-duty DUI includes all arrests of police officers for DUI offenses while driving a police vehicle, without consideration for whether the respective officer was actually on-duty at time of the arrest. This is because, generally, (1) any police officer driving a police vehicle, even if off-duty at that moment, is required to respond to emergency calls for service if driving a police vehicle, and (2) the perception of the public is that any police officer driving a police vehicle is "on-duty" and available to assist any members of the public who may encounter that officer and reasonably expect that the officer will be sober.

[16] Law Enforcement Exploring Programs are career-oriented programs for youth, male and female, age 15 (or age 14, if completed 8th grade) to age 20 and are one of the youth programs of Learning for Life, a non-scouting subsidiary of the Boy Scouts of America (Boy Scouts of America, 1990, p. 627). Local chapters, known as Explorer Posts, are organized, operated, and affiliated with local law enforcement agencies, primarily police departments, across the country (Boy Scouts of America, 2008; Learning for Life, 2007).

[17] Hawaii does not have a primary state police agency with general law enforcement authority.

[18] The second behavioral motivation behind drug-related police corruption that was identified by Carter (1990a), a "user-driven cycle," was discussed earlier.

[19] Westley (1956) maintained confidentiality of the police department where he conducted his police research in the early 1950s by referring to it as "a municipal police department in a Midwestern industrial city" (Westley, 1956, p. 254). In his book on police violence, he identified the police department as "Police Department X" and defined it as a department serving "an industrial community with a population of approximately 140,000 persons … within commuting distance of a major metropolis" (Westley, 1970, p. 20). A recent article in *Criminology*, however, mentioned "Westley's study of policing in Gary, Indiana, in the 1950s" (Terrill, Paoline, & Manning, 2003, p. 1003).

[20] In an amazing display of academic chutzpah, Joshi, Anand, and Henderson (2007) list and discuss all of the techniques of neutralization formulated by Sykes and Matza (1957), but provide no credit, citation, or reference to the source of their material. Instead, they proffer the various techniques of neutralization under the guise of "rationalization of corruption" as if the conceptualization (i.e., denying responsibility, denying injury, denying the victim, and appeal to higher loyalties) was their own original idea and/or theoretical formulation (see Joshi et al., 2007, pp. 237-238). Perhaps their boldfaced act of plagiarism can best be explained, ironically, through application of one or more technique of neutralization.

[21] An example of a situational lie that was tolerated, given the circumstances, was the case of the "Christian burial speech" where police officers agreed not to question or interrogate a prisoner who was a suspect in the abduction of a ten year-old girl in Des Moines, Iowa. The police officers then drove the prisoner around in the backseat of a police car for several hours – lying about the purpose of the road trip and talking among themselves about how the little girl deserved a Christian burial and how they wished they could find her body so that they could give her an appropriate funeral and burial – in an effort to elicit a supposedly spontaneous confession from the shackled backseat prisoner (*Brewer v. Williams*, 1977).

[22] A companion bad act to the practice of police testilying is that of prosecutorial misconduct in the form of failing to provide counsel for the defense with any and all exculpable evidence by the Supreme Court pursuant to *Brady v. Maryland* (1963). Under *Brady*, all evidence that tends to be favorable to the defendant must be turned over to defense counsel by the prosecuting attorney prior to trial (see *Brady v. Maryland*, 1963). Although *Brady* violations by prosecutors occur frequently, it is a rare occurrence that a prosecutor is disciplined (and criminal charges against prosecutors are even rarer) for prosecutorial misconduct in this form, quite likely in many instances because (a) the courts passively condone the official misconduct pursuant to the harmless error doctrine, and (b) meaningful disciplinary oversight by state bar authorities, especially as to the official conduct of prosecutors, is scant (Davis, 2007, p. 141).

[23] As Black noted, however, in most jurisdictions within the United States, a police officer with general powers of arrest is typically authorized by law to effectuate an arrest

for felonies upon probable cause and without a warrant (Black, 1971, p. 1093). As to misdemeanors, police officers are usually only statutorily authorized to make arrests without an arrest warrant for those misdemeanors committed in their presence. In order to make an arrest for a misdemeanor that was not committed in the presence of the arresting officer, many jurisdictions require that the officer sign a criminal complaint under oath and obtain an arrest warrant from a judicial officer of competent jurisdiction, such as a magistrate judge.

[24] Fyfe and Kane's (2006) seminal study of career-ending misconduct, including acts of police crime, within the NYPD has not been formally published. Perhaps this is related to Fyfe's death in 2005. Nevertheless, when the research for the instant project commenced, only a preliminary draft of their report was on file in the library at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City. It was not until Paul McCauley filed a request with the U.S. Department of Justice in 2006 that the Fyfe and Kane report was made available by the Justice Department by way of an electronic copy in the format of a PDF file being posted on the NCJRS web-site. Similarly, Walker and Irlbeck's (2002, 2003) research into the police crime phenomenon they called "driving while female," and other aspects of sex crimes committed by police officers against teenagers, has never been published. Walker self-promulgated the two reports on a now-defunct web-site previously maintained by the Police Professionalism Initiative in the Department of Criminal Justice at the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

[25] But see Lopez and Thomas (2004) and their study of geographic patterns of official misconduct in the nature of police malpractice across the United States by analyzing case

summaries obtained from the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Justice Department; cf. Sherman and Langworthy (1979) and their research measuring homicides by police officers using data that were obtained from death certificates, police internal affairs records, and newspaper articles.

[26] The NIBRS criminal offense definitions are based on the common law as defined in *Black's Law Dictionary* (Garner, 2004), the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), and National Crime Information Center (NCIC) offense classifications.

[27] These cases were cataloged in the content analysis for the pilot study as Case No. 191 and No. 386-392.

[28] Although since 1978 arson has been indexed in the UCR as a property crime, at common law arson is construed to be a crime of violence.

[29] Web crawling is first of three applications of the Google search engine architecture (the others being indexing and searching). In this context, crawling is the "downloading of web pages" to Google servers from millions of servers on the internet (Brin & Page, 1998, Sec. 4.1).

[30] One reported disadvantage to the use of forward inclusion in stepwise regression is that it is possible that the computer will exclude relevant variables from the model as it is built due to suppressor effects that occur when statistical significance of a variable changes while another variable is controlled or held constant. There is less possibility of failing to find a relationship when one exists because both variables will already be in the model (Menard, 2002, p. 64).

[31] The current dissertation research could be treated by the university as exempt from IRB review pursuant to the provisions of IRB Exempt Category #4 and 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) because (a) this research study does not involve human subjects, and (b) this research involves the study of existing data, documents, and records that are publicly available.

[32] Full contingency tables displaying the second column counts (for nonarrests in a variable of interest) are not presented, as the primary purpose of this lengthy bivariate analysis section is to serve as part of preliminary diagnostic assessment of the nominal level categorical variables prior to running logistic regression models of interest.

[33] The methodology (discussed *supra*) calls for the analysis to invoke backward stepwise logistic regression whereby decisions are made by computer algorithms in SPSS, instead of choices manually made by a researcher. Pursuant to direction of two committee members, however, a manual process of removing independent variables from each model, one at a time, is employed herein to select a set of predictors to test the various research hypotheses. With manual step elimination, each step is a new enter method logistic regression operation where all relevant cases are included in the SPSS analysis at the first iteration. The logistic regression models that result, for some of the models, appear more robust than some test models that were run using the automated backward stepwise logistic regression functions in SPSS with stepwise elimination decided by computer algorithm, as the automated process in SPSS builds its models using the least number of cases from each backward step without adding cases back into the model when a variable is removed where missing cases had previously reduced the *N* for continued

additional backward stepwise elimination in model building. That is not the case, however, for the final drug-related crime model. In that instance, an alternate final model was run using the automated backward stepwise logistic regression operation as described earlier in the methods chapter.

[34] The research prospectus approved in November, 2008, called for this study to analyze the content of relevant news articles collected for arrests of nonfederal sworn law enforcement officers in the United States that occurred during the calendar years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, a four year period. At that time, the number of cases in the census was not known. When the committee was subsequently advised that there were over 2,000 cases without coding the collected articles for arrests during the year 2008, it was agreed to limit this study to a census of articles/cases from arrests in the three year period of 2005, 2006, and 2007.

[35] The Chi-Square calculation is statistically significant and very strong association in the census between duty status and arrests for official capacity crime, where $\chi^2(1, N = 2{,}119) = .017$, $p < .001$, $V = .904$, with a higher than expected cell count (twice as high: expected count is 495.8, and the actual count is 974) for on-duty status and arrest for a crime committed by an officer in their official capacity. Quite obviously, however, there is a correlation between on-duty status and acts committed in an officer's official capacity.

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APPENDIX A

Google News Alerts automated daily search terms:

“agent was arrested”

“agent was charged”

“agent was convicted”

“agent was indicted”

“deputy was arrested”

“deputy was charged”

“deputy was convicted”

“detective was arrested”

“detective was charged”

“detective was convicted”

“detective was indicted”

“detectives were arrested”

“detectives were charged”

“detectives were convicted”

“detectives were indicted”

“officer charged”

“officer was charged”

“police chief was arrested”

“police chief was charged”

“police chief was convicted”

“police officer was arrested”

“police officer was charged”

“police officer was convicted”

“police officers were indicted”

“police officers were charged”

“police officers were convicted”

“sheriff was arrested”

“sheriff was charged”

“sheriff was convicted”

“trooper was convicted”

“trooper was arrested”

“trooper was charged”

“trooper was convicted”

police “captain was arrested”

police “captain was charged”

police “captain was convicted”

police “captain was indicted”

police “lieutenant was arrested”

police “lieutenant was charged”

police “lieutenant was convicted”

police “lieutenant was indicted”

police “officer is charged”

police “sergeant was arrested”

police “sergeant was charged”

police “sergeant was convicted”

police “sergeant was indicted”

Offender Name (Last, First)

Offender's Employer / Agency

City & State

Case # _____ Year _____

ASSESSING POLICE CRIMINALITY: NEWSPAPER CONTENT ANALYSIS
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: PHILIP M. STINSON, SR., J.D.
INDIANA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA - CRIMINOLOGY DEPARTMENT

Case # _____ **V01** _____ **V02** Year

_____ **V03** Age _____ **V04** Years of service

_____ **V05** Gender _____ **V06** Duty Status

1	MALE	1	ON-DUTY AT TIME OF OFFENSE
2	FEMALE	2	OFF-DUTY AT TIME OF OFFENSE

_____ **V07** Employment status at time of offense

1	ACTIVE POLICE OFFICER AT TIME OF OFFENSE
2	FORMER POLICE OFFICER AT TIME OF OFFENSE

_____ **V08** Date of Arrest (mm/dd/yyyy)

_____ **V09** Type of Agency

1	FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
2	PRIMARY STATE POLICE AGENCY
3	SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
4	GENERAL PURPOSE COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT
5	GENERAL PURPOSE MUNICIPAL POLICE DEPARTMENT (CITY, TOWN, TOWNSHIP)
6	SPECIAL POLICE DEPARTMENT
7	CONSTABLE
8	TRIBAL POLICE DEPARTMENT
9	REGIONAL POLICE DEPARTMENT

_____ **V10** State _____ **V11** # of sworn personnel

01	ALABAMA	18	KENTUCKY	35	NORTH DAKOTA
02	ALASKA	19	LOUISIANA	36	OHIO
03	ARIZONA	20	MAINE	37	OKLAHOMA
04	ARKANSAS	21	MARYLAND	38	OREGON
05	CALIFORNIA	22	MASSACHUSETTS	39	PENNSYLVANIA
06	COLORADO	23	MICHIGAN	40	RHODE ISLAND
07	CONNECTICUT	24	MINNESOTA	41	SOUTH CAROLINA
08	DELAWARE	25	MISSISSIPPI	42	SOUTH DAKOTA
09	DIST OF COLUMBIA	26	MISSOURI	43	TENNESSEE
10	FLORIDA	27	MONTANA	44	TEXAS
11	GEORGIA	28	NEBRASKA	45	UTAH
12	HAWAII	29	NEVADA	46	VERMONT
13	IDAHO	30	NEW HAMPSHIRE	47	VIRGINIA
14	ILLINOIS	31	NEW JERSEY	48	WASHINGTON
15	INDIANA	32	NEW MEXICO	49	WEST VIRGINIA
16	IOWA	33	NEW YORK	50	WISCONSIN
17	KANSAS	34	NORTH CAROLINA	51	WYOMING

_____ **V12** Gender of victim _____ **V13** Is victim a police officer?

1	VICTIM IS MALE	1	YES, VICTIM IS A POLICE OFFICER
2	VICTIM IS FEMALE	2	NO

_____ **V14** Age of victim

_____ **V15** Victim's relationship to the offender

1	VICTIM IS **CURRENT** SPOUSE OF OFFENDER
2	VICTIM IS **FORMER** SPOUSE OF OFFENDER
3	VICTIM IS **CURRENT** BOYFRIEND/GIRLFRIEND OF OFFENDER
4	VICTIM IS **FORMER** BOYFRIEND/GIRLFRIEND OF OFFENDER
5	VICTIM IS CHILD OR STEP-CHILD OF OFFENDER
6	VICTIM IS OTHER RELATIVE OF OFFENDER
7	VICTIM IS A STRANGER

_____ **V16** #1 _____ **V17** #2 _____ **V18** #3 _____ **V19** #4

1	ARSON (200)
	ASSAULT OFFENSES:
2	AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (13A)
3	SIMPLE ASSAULT (13B)
4	INTIMIDATION (13C)
5	BRIBERY (510)
6	BURGLARY / BREAKING & ENTERING (220)
7	COUNTERFEITING / FORGERY (250)
8	DESTRUCTION / DAMAGE / VANDALISM OF PROPERTY (290)
	DRUG OFFENSES:
9	DRUG/NARCOTIC VIOLATIONS (35A)
10	DRUG EQUIPMENT VIOLATIONS (35B)
11	EMBEZZLEMENT (270)
12	EXTORTION / BLACKMAIL (210)
	FRAUD OFFENSES:
13	FALSE PRETENSES / SWINDLE / CONFIDENCE GAME (26A)
14	CREDIT CARD / AUTOMATED TELLER MACHINE FRAUD (26B)
15	IMPERSONATION (26C)
16	WELFARE FRAUD (26D)
17	WIRE FRAUD (26E)
	GAMBLING OFFENSES:
18	BETTING / WAGERING (39A)
19	OPERATING / PROMOTING / ASSISTING GAMBLING 39B)
20	GAMBLING EQUIPMENT VIOLATIONS (39C)
21	SPORTS TAMPERING (39D)
	HOMICIDE OFFENSES:
22	MURDER AND NONNEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER (09A)
23	NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER (09B)
24	JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE (09C)
25	KIDNAPPING / ABDUCTION (100)
	LARCENY / THEFT OFFENSES:
26	POCKET-PICKING (23A)
27	PURSE-SNATCHING (23B)
28	SHOPLIFTING (23C)
29	THEFT FROM BUILDING (23D)
30	THEFT FROM COIN-OPERATED MACHINE OR DEVICE (23E)
31	THEFT FROM MOTOR VEHICLE (23F)
32	THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLE PARTS OR ACCESSORIES (23G)
33	ALL OTHER LARCENY (23H)
34	MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT (240)
35	PORNOGRAPHY / OBSCENE MATERIAL (370)
	PROSTITUTION OFFENSES:
36	PROSTITUTION (40A)
37	ASSISTING OR PROMOTING PROSTITUTION (40B)
38	ROBBERY (120)
	SEX OFFENSES, FORCIBLE:
39	FORCIBLE RAPE (11A)
40	FORCIBLE SODOMY (11B)
41	SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH AN OBJECT (11C)
42	FORCIBLE FONDLING (11D)
	SEX OFFENSES, NONFORCIBLE:
43	INCEST (36A)
44	STATUTORY RAPE (36B)
45	INDECENT EXPOSURE
46	ON-LINE SOLICITATION OF A CHILD
47	OTHER SEX CRIME
48	STOLEN PROPERTY OFFENSES (RECEIVING, ETC.) (280)
49	WEAPONS LAW VIOLATIONS (520)
50	BAD CHECKS (90A)
51	CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
52	DISORDERLY CONDUCT (90C)
53	DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE (90D)
54	DRUNKENNESS (90E)
55	EVIDENCE: DESTROYING / TAMPERING
56	FALSE REPORT / STATEMENT
57	FAMILY OFFENSES, NONVIOLENT (90F)
58	LIQUOR LAW VIOLATIONS (90G)
59	OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE
60	PEEPING TOM (90H)
61	RESTRAINING ORDER VIOLATIONS
62	TRESPASS OF REAL PROPERTY (90J)
63	WIRETAPPING, ILLEGAL
64	ALL OTHER OFFENSES (90Z)

_____ **V20** If pornography, was it child pornography?

1 YES
2 NO

Case # _____

_____
Offender Name (Last, First)

_____
Offender's Employer / Agency

_____
City (County) & State

V1 Case # _____ **V2** Year _____

_____ **V3** Age _____ **V4** Years of service

_____ **V5** Gender _____ **V6** Duty Status

1	MALE	1	ON-DUTY AT TIME OF OFFENSE
0	FEMALE	0	OFF-DUTY AT TIME OF OFFENSE

_____ **V7** Rank _____ **V8** Date of Arrest (mm/dd/yyyy)

1	OFFICER / DEPUTY / TROOPER	6	CAPTAIN
2	DETECTIVE / INVESTIGATOR	7	MAJOR
3	CORPORAL	8	COLONEL
4	SERGEANT	9	DEPUTY CHIEF / CHIEF DEUPTY
5	LIEUTENANT	10	CHIEF / SUPERINTENDENT / SHERIFF

_____ **V9** Type of Agency _____ **V10** # of F-T sworn personnel

		FT:		PT:	
1	FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY	1	"1"	1	
2	PRIMARY STATE POLICE AGENCY	2	"2-4"	2	
3	SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT	3	"5-9"	3	
4	COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT	4	"10-24"	4	
5	MUNICIPAL POLICE DEPARTMENT	5	"25-49"	5	
6	SPECIAL POLICE DEPARTMENT	6	"50-99"	6	
7	CONSTABLE	7	"100-249"	7	
8	TRIBAL POLICE DEPARTMENT	8	"250-499"	8	
9	REGIONAL POLICE DEPARTMENT	9	"500-999"	9	
		10	"1,000 or more"	10	

_____ **V11** State _____ **V12** # of P-T sworn personnel

1	ALABAMA	18	KENTUCKY	35	NORTH DAKOTA
2	ALASKA	19	LOUISIANA	36	OHIO
3	ARIZONA	20	MAINE	37	OKLAHOMA
4	ARKANSAS	21	MARYLAND	38	OREGON
5	CALIFORNIA	22	MASSACHUSETTS	39	PENNSYLVANIA
6	COLORADO	23	MICHIGAN	40	RHODE ISLAND
7	CONNECTICUT	24	MINNESOTA	41	SOUTH CAROLINA
8	DELAWARE	25	MISSISSIPPI	42	SOUTH DAKOTA
9	DIST OF COLUMBIA	26	MISSOURI	43	TENNESSEE
10	FLORIDA	27	MONTANA	44	TEXAS
11	GEORGIA	28	NEBRASKA	45	UTAH
12	HAWAII	29	NEVADA	46	VERMONT
13	IDAHO	30	NEW HAMPSHIRE	47	VIRGINIA
14	ILLINOIS	31	NEW JERSEY	48	WASHINGTON
15	INDIANA	32	NEW MEXICO	49	WEST VIRGINIA
16	IOWA	33	NEW YORK	50	WISCONSIN
17	KANSAS	34	NORTH CAROLINA	51	WYOMING

_____ **V13** County _____ **V14** Arresting Agency

URBAN → RURAL

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

0	ARRESTING AGENCY IS OFFICER'S EMPLOYER
1	ARRESTING AGENCY IS NOT OFFICER'S EMPLOYER

V15 ARSON (200)
ASSAULT OFFENSES:
V16 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (13A)
V17 SIMPLE ASSAULT (13B)
V18 INTIMIDATION (13C)
V19 BRIBERY (510)
V20 BURGLARY / BREAKING & ENTERING (220)
V21 COUNTERFEITING / FORGERY (250)
V22 DESTRUCTION / DAMAGE / VANDALISM OF PROPERTY (290)
DRUG OFFENSES:
V23 DRUG/NARCOTIC VIOLATIONS (35A)
V24 DRUG EQUIPMENT VIOLATIONS (35B)
V25 EMBEZZLEMENT (270)
V26 EXTORTION / BLACKMAIL (210)
FRAUD OFFENSES:
V27 FALSE PRETENSES / SWINDLE / CONFIDENCE GAME (26A)
V28 CREDIT CARD / AUTOMATED TELLER MACHINE FRAUD (26B)
V29 IMPERSONATION (26C)
V30 WELFARE FRAUD (26D)
V31 WIRE FRAUD (26E)
GAMBLING OFFENSES:
V32 BETTING / WAGERING (39A)
V33 OPERATING / PROMOTING / ASSISTING GAMBLING 39B)
V34 GAMBLING EQUIPMENT VIOLATIONS (39C)
V35 SPORTS TAMPERING (39D)
HOMICIDE OFFENSES:
V36 MURDER AND NONNEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER (09A)
V37 NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER (09B)
V38 JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE (09C)
V39 KIDNAPPING / ABDUCTION (100)
LARCENY / THEFT OFFENSES:
V40 POCKET-PICKING (23A)
V41 PURSE-SNATCHING (23B)
V42 SHOPLIFTING (23C)
V43 THEFT FROM BUILDING (23D)
V44 THEFT FROM COIN-OPERATED MACHINE OR DEVICE (23E)
V45 THEFT FROM MOTOR VEHICLE (23F)
V46 THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLE PARTS OR ACCESSORIES (23G)
V47 ALL OTHER LARCENY (23H)
V48 MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT (240)
V49 PORNOGRAPHY / OBSCENE MATERIAL (370)
PROSTITUTION OFFENSES:
V50 PROSTITUTION (40A)
V51 ASSISTING OR PROMOTING PROSTITUTION (40B)
V52 ROBBERY (120)
SEX OFFENSES, FORCIBLE:
V53 FORCIBLE RAPE (11A)
V54 FORCIBLE SODOMY (11B)
V55 SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH AN OBJECT (11C)
V56 FORCIBLE FONDLING (11D)
SEX OFFENSES, NONFORCIBLE:
V57 INCEST (36A)
V58 STATUTORY RAPE (36B)
V59 INDECENT EXPOSURE
V60 ON-LINE SOLICITATION OF A CHILD
V61 OTHER SEX CRIME
V62 STOLEN PROPERTY OFFENSES (RECEIVING, ETC.) (280)
V63 WEAPONS LAW VIOLATIONS (520)

V64 BAD CHECKS (90A)
V65 CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
V66 DISORDERLY CONDUCT (90C)
V67 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE (90D)
V68 DRUNKENNESS (90E)
V69 EVIDENCE: DESTROYING / TAMPERING
V70 FALSE REPORT / STATEMENT
V71 FAMILY OFFENSES, NONVIOLENT (90F)
V72 HIT & RUN
V73 LIQUOR LAW VIOLATIONS (90G)
V74 OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE
V75 OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT / OFFICIAL OPRESSION / VIOLATION OF OATH
V76 PEEPING TOM (90H)
V77 RESTRAINING ORDER VIOLATIONS
V78 TRESPASS OF REAL PROPERTY (90J)
V79 WIRETAPPING, ILLEGAL
V80 ALL OTHER OFFENSES (90Z)

_____ **V81** Gender of victim

1 VICTIM IS MALE
0 VICTIM IS FEMALE

_____ **V82** Is victim a police officer?

1 YES, VICTIM IS A POLICE OFFICER
0 NO

_____ **V83** Age of victim

_____ **V84** Is victim a child?

1 YES, VICTIM IS A CHILD
0 NO

_____ **V85** Victim's relationship to the offender

1 VICTIM IS **CURRENT** SPOUSE OF OFFENDER
2 VICTIM IS **FORMER** SPOUSE OF OFFENDER
3 VICTIM IS **CURRENT** BOYFRIEND/GIRLFRIEND OF OFFENDER
4 VICTIM IS **FORMER** BOYFRIEND/GIRLFRIEND OF OFFENDER
5 VICTIM IS CHILD OR STEP-CHILD OF OFFENDER
6 VICTIM IS OTHER RELATIVE OF OFFENDER
7 VICTIM IS AN UNRELATED CHILD
8 VICTIM IS A STRANGER

_____ **V86** News Source

1 LOCAL NEWSPAPER
2 NATIONAL NEWSPAPER
3 LOCAL / NETWORK AFFILIATE TV NEWS WEB-SITE
4 NATIONAL / NETWORK TV NEWS WEB-SITE
5 NEWS BLOG
6 NEWS MAGAZINE WEB-SITE
7 NEWS PORTAL

_____ **V87** Article Byline

1 REPORTER FOR THAT PUBLICATION
2 REPORTER FOR ANOTHER PUBLICATION
3 WIRE SERVICE AUTHOR
4 WIRE SERVICE NO AUTHOR
5 NO BYLINE

_____ **V88** Taxonomy $H_0$5 – Economic vs. Noneconomic Crime

1 THIS CRIME IS ECONOMICALLY-MOTIVATED
0 THIS CRIME IS NOT ECONOMICALLY-MOTIVATED

_____ **V89** Taxonomy $H_0$6 – Violent vs. Nonviolent rime

1 THIS CRIME IS VIOLENT
0 THIS CRIME IS NOT VIOLENT

_____ **V90** Taxonomy $H_0$7 – Organizational vs. Against Citizenry

1 THIS CRIME IS AGAINST THE CITIZENRY
0 THIS CRIME IS ORGANIZATIONAL POLICE CRIME

_____ **V91** Taxonomy $H_0$8 – Internal vs. Organizational

1 THIS CRIME IS AN INTERNAL CRIME AGAINST THE ORGANIZATION
0 THIS CRIME IS BY THE ORGANIZATION AGAINST THE OFFICER
9 DOES NOT APPLY

_____ **V92** Taxonomy $H_0$9 – Official Capacity vs. Individual Capacity

1 THIS CRIME WAS COMMITTED BY OFFICER IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY
0 THIS CRIME WAS COMITTED BY OFFICER IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

_____ **V93** Typology $H_0$10 – Drug-Related Crime vs. Other Crime Type

1 THIS CRIME IS DRUG-RELATED
0 THIS CRIME IS NOT DRUG-RELATED

_____ **V94** Typology $H_0$11 – Alcohol-Related Crime vs. Other Crime Type

1 THIS CRIME IS ALCOHOL-RELATED
0 THIS CRIME IS NOT ALCOHOL-RELATED

_____ **V95** Typology $H_0$12 – Sex-Related Crime vs. Other Crime Type

1 THIS CRIME IS SEX-RELATED
0 THIS CRIME IS NOT SEX-RELATED

_____ **V96** Typology $H_0$13 – Violence-Related Crime vs. Other Crime Type

1 THIS CRIME IS VIOLENCE-RELATED
0 THIS CRIME IS NOT VIOLENCE-RELATED

_____ **V97** Typology $H_0$14 – Profit-Motivated Crime vs. Other Crime Type

1 THIS CRIME IS PROFIT-MOTIVIATED
0 THIS CRIME IS NOT PROFIT-MOTIVATED

_____ **V98** Police Sexual Violence vs. Other Crime Type

1 THIS CRIME IS POLICE SEXUAL VIOLENCE
0 THIS CRIME IS NOT POLICE SEXUAL VIOLENCE

_____ **V99** Driving-While-Female Encounter

1 THIS CRIME STEMS FROM A DRIVING-WHILE-FEMALE ENCOUNTER
0 THIS CRIME DOES NOT STEM FROM A DRIVING-WHILE-FEMALE ENCOUNTER

_____ **V100** Officer's employment was terminated

1 YES, ARTICLE MENTIONS THAT THE OFFICER WAS TERMINATED
0 NO

_____ **V101** Officer resigned from employment

1 YES, ARTICLE MENTIONS THAT THE OFFICER RESIGNED FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT JOB
0 NO

_____ **V102** Officer was reassigned to another position in the agency

1 YES, ARTICLE MENTIONS THAT THE OFFICER WAS REASSIGNED WITHIN THE AGENCY
0 NO

_____ **V103** Officer was demoted in rank

1 YES, ARTICLE MENTIONS THAT THE OFFICER WAS DEMOTED IN RANK
0 NO

_____ **V104** Officer was suspended for a period of time

1 YES, ARTICLE MENTIONS THAT THE OFFICER WAS SUSPENDED FROM JOB
0 NO

_____ **V105** Officer's supervisor was disciplined and/or reassigned

1 YES, ARTICLE MENTIONS THAT A SUPERVISOR WAS DISCIPLINED AND/OR REASSIGNED
0 NO

_____ **V106** Officer's chief is under scrutiny as a result of the officer's arrest

1 YES, ARTICLE MENTIONS THAT AGENCY CHIEF IS UNDER SCRUTINY
0 NO

_____ **V107** Discussion of Agency Scandal / Cover-Up

1 YES, ARTICLE MENTIONS AGENCY SCANDAL AND/OR COVER-UP
0 NO

_____ **V108** Method of Crime Detection: Citizen Complaint

1 YES, ARTICLE MENTIONS CRIME WAS DETECTED BECAUSE OF A CITIZEN COMPLAINT
0 NO

_____ **V109** Case Disposition: Officer was convicted of a crime

1 YES, THE OFFICER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME
0 NO

NOTES:

APPENDIX D

Randomly Selected Cases for Coder Reliability Testing

35	740	1448
36	748	1485
56	761	1494
66	855	1553
78	859	1562
83	864	1578
89	876	1584
90	903	1585
176	910	1614
206	911	1618
233	991	1633
250	1005	1649
254	1029	1700
266	1030	1721
271	1109	1733
296	1115	1759
338	1125	1792
343	1156	1841
351	1167	1854
377	1188	1874
390	1214	1881
395	1216	1898
427	1217	1913
448	1223	1921
482	1230	2006
509	1232	2032
527	1266	2038
559	1289	2054
560	1307	2071
567	1312	2074
590	1321	2077
615	1338	2082
643	1354	2103
678	1359	2149
686	1364	
711	1418	

APPENDIX E

Coder Reliability – Percentage of Agreement by Variable

V1	100	V41	100	V77	100
V2	91.5	V42	100	V78	100
V3	90.56	V43	98.11	V79	100
V4	86.79	V44	100	V80	99.05
V5	100	V45	100	V81	97.16
V6	94.33	V46	100	V82	100
V7	98.11	V47	100	V83	94.33
V9	99.05	V48	100	V84	95.28
V11	97.16	V49	97.16	V85	91.5
V14	96.22	V50	97.16	V86	99.05
V15	99.05	V51	96.22	V87	91.5
V16	99.05	V52	98.11	V88	99.05
V17	92.45	V53	97.16	V89	99.05
V18	95.28	V54	98.11	V90	93.39
V19	99.05	V55	100	V91	63.2
V20	100	V56	97.16	V92	95.28
V21	100	V57	100	V93	100
V22	99.05	V58	97.16	V94	100
V23	96.22	V59	98.11	V95	99.05
V24	100	V60	99.05	V96	99.05
V25	97.16	V61	97.16	V97	100
V26	99.05	V62	99.05	V98	87.73
V27	99.05	V63	98.11	V99	100
V28	100	V64	100	V100	97.16
V29	100	V65	100	V101	92.45
V30	100	V66	98.11	V102	98.11
V31	99.05	V67	99.05	V103	100
V32	100	V68	100	V104	97.16
V33	100	V69	96.22	V105	92.45
V34	100	V70	97.16	V106	88.67
V35	100	V71	99.05	V107	88.67
V36	99.05	V72	99.05	V108	80.18
V37	99.05	V73	100	V109	100
V38	100	V74	98.11	SUM	10210
V39	98.11	V75	92.45	MEAN	97.24
V40	100	V76	100		

APPENDIX F

List of Law Enforcement Agencies Represented in Census

Anchorage PD	Anchorage	AK
AL State PD	Perry Co.	AL
Athens PD	Limestone Co.	AL
Birmingham PD	Jefferson Co.	AL
Butler Co. Sheriff	Butler Co.	AL
Chickasaw PD	Mobile Co.	AL
Columbia PD	Richland Co.	AL
Columbiana PD	Shelby Co.	AL
Dale Co. Sheriff	Dale Co.	AL
Demopolis PD	Marengo Co.	AL
Dora PD	Walker Co.	AL
Dothan PD	Houston Co.	AL
Fayette PD	Fayette Co.	AL
Florala PD	Covington Co.	AL
Florence PD	Lauderdale Co.	AL
Hanceville PD	Cullman Co.	AL
Hobson City PD	Calhoun Co.	AL
Huntsville PD	Madison Co.	AL
Level Plains PD	Dale Co.	AL
Millbrook PD	Elmore Co.	AL
Mobile PD	Mobile Co.	AL
Montevallo PD	Shelby Co.	AL
Montgomery PD	Montgomery Co.	AL
Moulton PD	Lawrence Co.	AL
Opelika PD	Lee Co.	AL
Owens Crossroads PD	Madison Co.	AL
Rainsville PD	Dekalb Co.	AL
Tuscumbia PD	Colbert Co.	AL
Tuskegee PD	Macon Co.	AL
Alexander PD	Pulaski Co.	AR
AR Highway Patrol	Crittenden Co.	AR
Baxter Co. Sheriff	Baxter Co.	AR
Benton Co. Sheriff	Benton Co.	AR
Benton PD	Saline Co.	AR
Elm Springs PD	Washington Co.	AR
Fort Smith PD	Sebastian Co.	AR
Gentry PD	Benton Co.	AR
Pine Bluff PD	Jefferson Co.	AR
Sedgwick PD	Sedgwick Co.	AR
AZ State DPS	n/a	AZ
Chandler PD	Maricopa Co.	AZ
Graham Co. Sheriff	Graham Co.	AZ
Maricopa Co. Sheriff	Maricopa Co.	AZ

Navajo Nation PD	Apache Co.	AZ
Oro Valley PD	Pima Co.	AZ
Phoenix PD	Maricopa Co.	AZ
Pima Co. Sheriff	Pima Co.	AZ
Scottsdale PD	Maricopa Co.	AZ
Tohono O'Odham Tribal PD	Pima Co.	AZ
Tucson PD	Pima Co.	AZ
Alameda Co. Sheriff	Alameda Co.	CA
Alhambra PD	Los Angeles Co.	CA
Anaheim PD	Orange Co.	CA
Bakersfield PD	Kern Co.	CA
Beaumont PD	Riverside Co.	CA
Bell PD	Los Angeles Co.	CA
Berkeley PD	Alameda Co.	CA
CA BNE	n/a	CA
CA Highway Patrol	n/a	CA
Cathedral City PD	Riverside Co.	CA
Contra Costa Co. Sheriff	Contra Costa Co.	CA
Daly City PD	San Meteo Co.	CA
Desert Hot Springs PD	Riverside Co.	CA
El Cajon PD	San Diego Co.	CA
Fresno PD	Fresno Co.	CA
Hayward PD	Alameda Co.	CA
Kern Co. Sheriff	Kern Co.	CA
Lake Co. Sheriff	Lake Co.	CA
Lakeport PD	Lake Co.	CA
Long Beach PD	Los Angeles Co.	CA
Los Angeles Co. Sheriff	Los Angeles Co.	CA
Los Angeles PD	Los Angeles Co.	CA
Los Angeles USD PD	Los Angeles Co.	CA
Maywood PD	Los Angeles Co.	CA
Modesto PD	Stanislaus Co.	CA
Oakland PD	Alameda Co.	CA
Oceanside PD	San Diego Co.	CA
Orange Co. Sheriff	Orange Co.	CA
Placer Co. Sheriff	Placer Co.	CA
Pleasanton PD	Alameda Co.	CA
Riverside Co. Sheriff	Riverside Co.	CA
Riverside PD	Riverside Co.	CA
Sacramento Co. Sheriff	Sacramento Co.	CA
Sacramento PD	Sacramento Co.	CA
Salinas PD	Monteray Co.	CA
San Bernardino Co. Sheriff	San Bernardino Co.	CA
San Diego Co. Sheriff	San Diego Co.	CA
San Diego PD	San Diego Co.	CA
San Francisco PD	San Francisco Co.	CA
San Jose PD	Santa Clara Co.	CA
San Leandro PD	Alameda Co.	CA

Santa Ana USD PD	Orange Co.	CA
Santa Barbara Co. Sheriff	Santa Barbara Co.	CA
Santa Clara PD	Santa Clara Co.	CA
Seaside PD	Monterey Co.	CA
Shafter PD	Kern Co.	CA
Sutter Co. Sheriff	Sutter Co.	CA
Tulare Co. Sheriff	Tulare Co.	CA
Venture Co. Comm. College Dist. PD	Ventura Co.	CA
Visalia PD	Tulare Co.	CA
Walnut Creek PD	Contra Costa Co.	CA
Adams Co. Sheriff	Adams Co.	CO
Arapahoe Co. Sheriff	Arapahoe Co.	CO
Aurora PD	Arapahoe Co.	CO
Broomfield PD	Broomfield Co.	CO
Colorado Springs PD	El Paso Co.	CO
Denver Co. Sheriff	Denver Co.	CO
Denver PD	Denver Co.	CO
Fort Collins PD	Larimer Co.	CO
Pueblo PD	Pueblo Co.	CO
Westminster PD	Adams Co.	CO
Cheshire PD	New Haven Co.	CT
CT State PD	n/a	CT
East Windsor PD	Hartford Co.	CT
Enfield PD	Hartford Co.	CT
Hamden PD	New Haven Co.	CT
Hartford PD	Hartford Co.	CT
Madison PD	New Haven Co.	CT
Manchester PD	Hartford Co.	CT
New Britain PD	Hartford Co.	CT
New Haven PD	New Haven Co.	CT
Norwalk PD	Fairfield Co.	CT
Norwich PD	New London Co.	CT
Oxford PD	New Haven Co.	CT
Seymour PD	New Haven Co.	CT
Stamford PD	Fairfield Co.	CT
Wallingford PD	New Haven Co.	CT
Willimantic PD	Windham Co.	CT
Winsted PD	Litchfield Co.	CT
Metro Transit PD	District of Columbia	DC
Metropolitan PD	City of Washington	DC
DE River & Bay Authority PD	n/a	DE
Georgetown PD	Sussex Co.	DE
Laurel PD	Sussex Co.	DE
Millsboro PD	Sussex Co.	DE
New Castle Co. PD	New Castle Co.	DE
Newark PD	New Castle Co.	DE
Ocean View PD	Sussex Co.	DE
Smyrna PD	Kent Co.	DE

Wilmington PD	New Castle Co.	DE
Apopka PD	Orange Co.	FL
Auburndale PD	Polk Co.	FL
Bartow PD	Polk Co.	FL
Blountstown PD	Calhoun Co.	FL
Boynton Beach PD	Palm Beach Co.	FL
Brevard Co. Sheriff	Brevard Co.	FL
Broward Co. Sheriff	Broward Co.	FL
Calhoun Co. Sheriff	Calhoun Co.	FL
Cape Coral PD	Lee Co.	FL
Charlotte Co. Sheriff	Charlotte Co.	FL
Clay Co. Sheriff	Clay Co.	FL
Clearwater PD	Pinellas Co.	FL
Clewiston PD	Henry Co.	FL
Coconut Creek PD	Broward Co.	FL
Collier Co. Sheriff	Collier Co.	FL
Coral Gables PD	Miami-Dade Co.	FL
Crescent City PD	Putnam Co.	FL
Daytona Beach PD	Volusia Co.	FL
Defuniak Springs PD	Walton Co.	FL
Dunnellon PD	Marion Co.	FL
Escambia Co. Sheriff	Escambia Co.	FL
Fernandina Beach PD	Nassau Co.	FL
FL FWCC	n/a	FL
FL Hwy Patrol	n/a	FL
FL Intl. Univ. PD	Miami-Dade Co.	FL
Flagler Beach PD	Flagler Co.	FL
Fort Lauderdale PD	Broward Co.	FL
Fort Meade PD	Polk Co.	FL
Fort Pierce PD	St. Lucie Co	FL
Gainesville PD	Alachua Co.	FL
Haines City PD	Polk Co.	FL
Hillsborough Co. Sheriff	Hillsborough Co.	FL
Hollywood PD	Broward Co.	FL
Indian River Co. Sheriff	Indian River Co.	FL
Jackson Co. Sheriff	Jackson Co.	FL
Jacksonville Beach PD	Duval Co.	FL
Jacksonville Sheriff	Duval Co.	FL
Kissimmee PD	Osceola Co.	FL
Lake Co. Sheriff	Lake Co.	FL
Lake Wales PD	Polk Co.	FL
Lakeland PD	Polk Co.	FL
Largo PD	Pinellas Co.	FL
Lee Co. Sheriff	Lee Co.	FL
Leon Co. Sheriff	Leon Co.	FL
Longwood PD	Seminole Co.	FL
Manatee Co. Sheriff	Manatee Co.	FL
Marion Co. Sheriff	Marion Co.	FL

Martin Co. Sheriff	Martin Co.	FL
Melbourne Beach PD	Brevard Co.	FL
Miami Beach PD	Miami-Dade Co.	FL
Miami PD	Miami-Dade Co.	FL
Miami-Dade PD	Miami-Dade Co.	FL
Monroe Co. Sheriff	Monroe Co.	FL
Nassau Co. Sheriff	Nassau Co.	FL
Ocala PD	Marion Co.	FL
Opa-Locka PD	Miami-Dade Co.	FL
Orange Co. Sheriff	Orange Co.	FL
Orlando PD	Orange Co.	FL
Osceola Co. Sheriff	Osceola Co.	FL
Palm Beach Co. Sch. PD	Palm Beach Co.	FL
Palm Beach Co. Sheriff	Palm Beach Co.	FL
Pensacola PD	Escambia Co.	FL
Pinellas Co. Sheriff	Pinellas Co.	FL
Pinellas Park PD	Pinellas Co.	FL
Polk Co. Sheriff	Polk Co.	FL
Port Orange PD	Volusia Co.	FL
Riviera Beach PD	Palm Beach Co.	FL
Rockledge PD	Brevard Co.	FL
Seminole Co. Sheriff	Seminole Co.	FL
Seminole Tribal PD	Hillsborough Co.	FL
St. Petersburg PD	Pinellas Co.	FL
Tampa PD	Hillsborough Co.	FL
Tarpon Springs PD	Pinellas Co.	FL
Volusia Co. Sheriff	Volusia Co.	FL
West Palm Beach PD	Palm Beach Co.	FL
Zolfo Springs PD	Hardee Co.	FL
Arcade PD	Jackson Co.	GA
Athens-Clarke PD	Clarke Co.	GA
Atlanta PD	Fulton Co.	GA
Barrow Co. Sheriff	Barrow Co.	GA
Bibb Co. Sheriff	Bibb Co.	GA
Clayton Co. PD	Clayton Co.	GA
Cobb Co. PD	Cobb Co.	GA
Columbia Co. Sheriff	Columbia Co.	GA
Columbus PD	Muscogee Co.	GA
Dekalb Co. PD	Dekalb Co.	GA
Dougherty Co. PD	Dougherty Co.	GA
East Point PD	Fulton Co.	GA
Eatonton PD	Putnam Co.	GA
Forsyth Co. Sheriff	Forsyth Co.	GA
Fort Oglethorpe PD	Catoosa Co.	GA
Fulton Co. Sheriff	Fulton Co.	GA
GA State Patrol	n/a	GA
Gwinnett Co. PD	Gwinnett Co.	GA
Helen PD	White Co.	GA

Henry Co. PD	Henry Co.	GA
Kingsland PD	Camden Co.	GA
Lafayette PD	Walker Co.	GA
Macon PD	Bibb Co.	GA
Marietta PD	Cobb Co.	GA
McDonough PD	Henry Co.	GA
Oglethorpe Co. Sheriff	Oglethorpe Co.	GA
Polk Co. PD	Polk Co.	GA
Sandy Springs PD	Fulton Co.	GA
Savannah-Chatham Metro PD	Chatham Co.	GA
Senoia PD	Coweta Co.	GA
Shelby Twp. PD	Macomb Co.	GA
Smithville PD	Lee Co.	GA
Towns Co. Sheriff	Towns Co.	GA
Walker Co. Sheriff	Walker Co.	GA
Waynesboro PD	Burke Co.	GA
Honolulu PD	Honolulu Co.	HI
Kauai Co. PD	Kauai Co.	HI
Carlisle PD	Warren Co.	IA
Coal Valley PD	Rock Island Co.	IA
Dallas Co. Sheriff	Dallas Co.	IA
Des Moines PD	Polk Co.	IA
Floyd Co. Sheriff	Floyd Co.	IA
Fremont Co. Sheriff	Fremont Co.	IA
Hamburg PD	Fremont Co.	IA
IA State Patrol	n/a	IA
Mason City PD	Cerro Gordo Co.	IA
Missouri Valley PD	Harrison Co.	IA
Osceola PD	Clarke Co.	IA
Stuart PD	Guthrie Co.	IA
Waterloo PD	Black Hawk. Co	IA
BYU-Idaho PD	Madison Co.	ID
Montpelier PD	Bear Lake Co.	ID
Belgium PD	Vermillion Co.	IL
Berwyn PD	Cook Co.	IL
Bloomington PD	McLean Co.	IL
Bradley PD	Kankakee Co.	IL
Burnham PD	Cook. Co.	IL
Calumet City PD	Cook Co.	IL
Chicago PD	Cook Co.	IL
Cicero PD	Cook Co.	IL
College of Lake Co. PD	Lake Co.	IL
East St. Louis PD	St. Clair Co.	IL
El Paso PD	Woodford Co.	IL
Evansville PD	Randolph Co.	IL
Forest Park PD	Cook Co.	IL
Gurnee PD	Lake Co.	IL
Harvey PD	Cook Co.	IL

IL State PD	n/a	IL
Kane Co. Sheriff	Kane Co.	IL
La Salle Co. Sheriff	La Salle Co.	IL
Lemont PD	Cook Co.	IL
Maywood PD	Cook Co.	IL
McHenry Co. Sheriff	McHenry Co.	IL
Moline PD	Rock Island Co.	IL
Naperville PD	Dupage Co.	IL
North Pekin PD	Tazewell Co.	IL
Oak Lawn PD	Cook Co.	IL
Oglesby PD	La Salle Co.	IL
Randolph Co. Sheriff	Randolph Co.	IL
Richmond PD	McHenry Co.	IL
Rockford PD	Winnebago Co.	IL
Spring Grove PD	McHenry Co.	IL
Springfield PD	Sangamon Co.	IL
Steger PD	Cook Co.	IL
Tinley Park PD	Cook Co.	IL
Washington Park PD	St. Clair Co.	IL
Waukegan PD	Lake Co.	IL
Westchester PD	Cook Co.	IL
Winnebago Co. Sheriff	Winnebago Co.	IL
Alexandria PD	Madison Co.	IN
Anderson PD	Madison Co.	IN
Blackford Co. Sherff	Blackford Co.	IN
Carmel PD	Hamilton Co.	IN
Clarksville PD	Clark Co.	IN
Clay Co. Sheriff	Clay Co.	IN
Clinton PD	Vermillion Co.	IN
Danville PD	Hendricks Co.	IN
Dearborn Co. Sheriff	Dearborn Co.	IN
East Chicago PD	Lake Co.	IN
Evansville PD	Vanderburgh Co.	IN
Fort Wayne PD	Allen Co.	IN
Gary PD	Lake Co.	IN
Hamilton Co. Sheriff	Hamilton Co.	IN
IN State PD	n/a	IN
Indianapolis Metro PD	Marion Co.	IN
Indianapolis PD	Marion Co.	IN
Kendallville PD	Noble Co.	IN
Lafayette PD	Tippecanoe Co.	IN
Lake Co. Sheriff	Lake Co.	IN
Marion Co. Sheriff	Marion Co.	IN
Michigan City PD	LaPorte Co.	IN
Middletown PD	Henry Co.	IN
Monticello PD	White Co.	IN
Morgan Co. Sheriff	Morgan Co.	IN
Muncie PD	Delaware Co.	IN

Nashville PD	Brown Co.	IN
New Albany PD	Floyd Co.	IN
Porter Co. Sheriff	Porter Co.	IN
Roseland PD	St. Joseph Co.	IN
Sellersburg PD	Clark Co.	IN
South Bend PD	St. Joseph Co.	IN
St. Joseph Co. Sheriff	St. Joseph Co.	IN
Union Co. Sheriff	Union Co.	IN
Westfield PD	Hamilton Co.	IN
Dodge City PD	Ford Co.	KS
Edwardsville PD	Wyandotte Co.	KS
Jackson Co. Sheriff	Jackson Co.	KS
Kansas City PD	Wyandotte Co.	KS
Kingman PD	Kingman Co.	KS
Olathe PD	Johnson Co.	KS
Topeka PD	Shawnee Co.	KS
Berea PD	Madison Co.	KY
Carlisle PD	Nicholas Co.	KY
Covington PD	Kenton Co.	KY
Estill Co. Sheriff	Estill Co.	KY
KY State PD	n/a	KY
Lebanon Junction PD	Bullitt Co.	KY
Louisville Metro DILS	Jefferson Co.	KY
Louisville Metro PD	Jefferson Co.	KY
Louisville PD	Jefferson Co.	KY
Newport PD	Campbell Co.	KY
Oldham Co. PD	Oldham Co.	KY
Perryville PD	Boyle Co.	KY
Providence PD	Webster Co.	KY
Richmond PD	Madison Co.	KY
Warsaw PD	Gallatin Co.	KY
West Point PD	Hardin Co.	KY
Williamsburg PD	Whitley Co.	KY
Worthington PD	Greenup Co.	KY
Golden Meadow PD	Lafourche Parish	LA
Southern Univ. PD	East Baton Rouge Parish	LA
Acadia Parish Sheriff	Acadia Parish	LA
Baton Rouge PD	East Baton Rouge Parish	LA
Bossier City PD	Bossier Parish	LA
Bossier Parish Sheriff	Bossier Parish	LA
Bunkie PD	Avoyelles Parish	LA
Crowley PD	Acadia Parish	LA
Denham Springs PD	Livingston Parish	LA
Ferriday PD	Concordia Parish	LA
Grambling State Univ. PD	Lincoln Parish	LA
Haynesville PD	Claiborne Parish	LA
Iberia Parish Sheriff	Iberia Parish	LA
Jefferson Parish Sheriff	Jefferson Parish	LA

Kenner PD	Jefferson Parish	LA
Lafayette PD	Lafayette Parish	LA
Livingston Parish Sheriff	Livingston Parish	LA
LSU Health Sciences Ctr PD	Caddo Parish	LA
New Orleans PD	Orleans Parish	LA
Opelousas PD	St. Landry Parish	LA
Orleans Parish Sheriff	Orleans Parish	LA
Port Barre PD	St. Landry Parish	LA
Shreveport PD	Caddo Parish	LA
Slidell PD	St. Bernard Parish	LA
St. Landry Parish Sheriff	St. Landry Parish	LA
St. Tammany Parish Sheriff	St. Tammany Parish	LA
Winnsboro PD	Franklin Parish	LA
Barnstable Co. Sheriff	Barnstable Co.	MA
Barnstable PD	Barnstable Co.	MA
Beverly PD	Essex Co.	MA
Boston PD	Suffolk Co.	MA
Boston Publ. Sch. PD	Suffolk Co.	MA
Brockton PD	Plymouth Co.	MA
Cambridge PD	Middlesex Co.	MA
Chicopee PD	Hampden Co.	MA
Danvers PD	Essex Co.	MA
Duxbury PD	Plymouth Co.	MA
Falls River PD	Bristol Co.	MA
Hanover PD	Plymouth Co.	MA
Lawrence PD	Essex Co.	MA
Littleton PD	Middlesex Co.	MA
Lowell PD	Middlesex Co.	MA
Lynn PD	Essex Co.	MA
MA Bay Transit Auth. PD	Suffolk Co.	MA
MA State PD	n/a	MA
Mansfield PD	Bristol Co.	MA
Needham PD	Norfolk Co.	MA
New Bedford PD	Bristol Co.	MA
Newton PD	Middlesex Co.	MA
Quincy PD	Norfolk Co.	MA
Rockport PD	Essex Co.	MA
Salem PD	Essex Co.	MA
Sandwich PD	Barnstable Co.	MA
Somerville PD	Middlesex Co.	MA
Springfield PD	Hampden Co.	MA
Warren PD	Worcester Co.	MA
Worcester PD	Worcester Co.	MA
Anne Arundel Co. PD	Anne Arundel Co.	MD
Baltimore Co. PD	Baltimore Co.	MD
Baltimore PD	Baltimore Co.	MD
Boonsboro PD	Washington Co.	MD
Brunswick PD	Frederick Co.	MD

Denton PD	Caroline Co.	MD
Howard Co. PD	Howard Co.	MD
MD GSA PD	n/a	MD
MD Park PD	n/a	MD
MD State PD	n/a	MD
MD Transportation Auth. PD	n/a	MD
Montgomery Co. PD	Montgomery Co.	MD
Ocean City PD	Worcester Co.	MD
Prince George's Co. PD	Prince George's Co.	MD
Rockville PD	Montgomery Co.	MD
Salisbury PD	Wicomico Co.	MD
Bangor PD	Penobscot Co.	ME
Caribou PD	Aroostook Co.	ME
ME State PD	n/a	ME
Portland PD	Cumberland Co.	ME
Ann Arbor PD	Washtenaw Co.	MI
Brady Twp PD	Saginaw Co.	MI
Dearborn PD	Wayne Co.	MI
Detroit PD	Wayne Co.	MI
Eaton Co. Sheriff	Eaton Co.	MI
Flat Rock PD	Wayne Co.	MI
Flint PD	Genesee Co.	MI
Grand Traverse Co. Sheriff	Grand Traverse Co.	MI
Hamtramck PD	Wayne Co.	MI
Jackson PD	Jackson Co.	MI
Lake Angelus PD	Oakland Co.	MI
Lansing PD	Ingham Co.	MI
Livingston Co. Sheriff	Livingston Co.	MI
Lowell PD	Kent Co.	MI
Luna Pier PD	Monroe Co.	MI
Madison Heights PD	Oakland Co.	MI
MI State PD	n/a	MI
Muskegon Heights PD	Muskegon Co.	MI
Osceola Co. Sheriff	Osceola Co.	MI
Pontiac PD	Oakland Co.	MI
Port Huron PD	St. Clair Co.	MI
River Rouge PD	Wayne Co.	MI
Saginaw PD	Saginaw Co.	MI
Southgate PD	Wayne Co.	MI
White Cloud PD	Newaygo Co.	MI
Atwater PD	Kandiyohi Co.	MN
Austin PD	Mower Co.	MN
Cottage Grobe PD	Ramsey Co.	MN
Crookston PD	Polk Co.	MN
Maplewood PD	Ramsey Co.	MN
Minneapolis PD	Hennepin Co.	MN
MN State PD	n/a	MN
Ramsey Co. Sheriff	Ramsey Co.	MN

Richfield PD	Hennepin Co.	MN
Robbinsdale PD	Hennepin Co.	MN
St. Paul PD	Ramsey Co.	MN
West Concord PD	Dodge Co.	MN
Battlefield PD	Greene Co.	MO
Bismarck PD	St. Francois Co.	MO
Chaffee PD	Scott Co.	MO
Charlack PD	St. Louis Co.	MO
Columbia PD	Boone Co.	MO
Dixon PD	Pulaski Co.	MO
Kahoka PD	Livingston Co.	MO
Kansas City PD	Jackson Co.	MO
Lebanon PD	Laclede Co.	MO
Madison Co. Sheriff	Madison Co.	MO
Miller Co. Sheriff	Miller Co.	MO
Northwoods PD	St. Louis Co.	MO
Pauls Valley PD	Garvin Co.	MO
Pine Lawn PD	St. Louis Co.	MO
Pleasant Valley PD	Clay Co.	MO
Poplar Bluff PD	Butler Co.	MO
Randolph PD	Clay Co.	MO
Richland PD	Pulaski Co.	MO
Richmond PD	Ray Co.	MO
Springfield PD	Greene Co.	MO
St. Charles PD	St. Charles Co.	MO
St. Louis Co. Sheriff	St. Louis Co.	MO
University of MO-Rolla PD	Phelps Co.	MO
Biloxi PD	Harrison Co.	MS
Bolivar Co. Sheriff	Bolivar Co.	MS
Columbus PD	Lowndes Co.	MS
Frederick Co. Sheriff	Frederick Co.	MS
Greenville PD	Washington Co.	MS
Jackson PD	Hinds Co.	MS
Leland PD	Washington Co.	MS
Meridian PD	Lauderdale Co.	MS
Moss Point PD	Jackson Co.	MS
Pearl PD	Simpson Co.	MS
Petal PD	Forrest Co.	MS
Kalispell PD	Flathead Co.	MT
Petroleum Co. Sheriff	Petroleum Co.	MT
Powell Co. Sheriff	Powell Co.	MT
West Yellowstone PD	Gallatin Co.	MT
Appalachian State Univ. PD	Watauga Co.	NC
Boiling Spring Lakes PD	Brunswick Co.	NC
Charlotte-Mecklenburg PD	Mecklenburg Co.	NC
Columbus PD	Polk Co.	NC
Concord PD	Cabarrus Co.	NC
Davie Co. Sheriff	Davie Co.	NC

Dunn PD	Harnett Co.	NC
Durham PD	Durham Co.	NC
Eden PD	Rockingham Co.	NC
Edenton PD	Chowan Co.	NC
Fayetteville PD	Cumberland Co.	NC
Gastonia PD	Gaston Co.	NC
Graham PD	Alamance Co.	NC
Greensboro PD	Guilford Co.	NC
Hoke Co. Sheriff	Hoke Co.	NC
Kenly PD	Johnston Co.	NC
Kings Mountain PD	Cleveland Co.	NC
Kitty Hawk PD	Dare Co.	NC
Lee Co. Sheriff	Lee Co.	NC
Lincoln Co. Sheriff	Lincoln Co.	NC
McDowell Co. Sheriff	McDowell Co.	NC
Middlesex PD	Nash Co.	NC
Mint Hill PD	Mecklenburg Co.	NC
Mount Airy PD	Surry Co.	NC
NC Highway Patrol	n/a	NC
North Topsail Beach PD	Onslow Co.	NC
Orange Co. Sheriff	Orange Co.	NC
Raleigh PD	Wake Co.	NC
Robeson Co. Sheriff	Robeson Co.	NC
Rocky Mount PD	Edgecombe Co.	NC
Roseboro PD	Sampson Co.	NC
Salisbury PD	Rowan Co.	NC
Smithfield PD	Johnston Co.	NC
Stoneville PD	Rockingham Co.	NC
Tabor City PD	Columbus Co.	NC
Wake Co. Sheriff	Wake Co.	NC
Wallace PD	Duplin Co.	NC
Washington PD	Beaufort Co.	NC
Waxhaw PD	Union Co.	NC
Wayne Co. Sheriff	Wayne Co.	NC
Waynesville PD	Haywood Co.	NC
Wilkesboro PD	Wilkes Co.	NC
Wilson PD	Wilson Co.	NC
Winterville PD	Pitt Co.	NC
Burleigh Co. Sheriff	Burleigh Co.	ND
Griggs Co. Sheriff	Griggs Co.	ND
Franklin PD	Franklin Co.	NE
Holt Co. Sheriff	Holt Co.	NE
Omaha PD	Douglas Co.	NE
Ravenna PD	Buffalo Co.	NE
Allenstown PD	Merrimack Co.	NH
Brentwood PD	Rockingham Co.	NH
Hudson PD	Hillsborough Co.	NH
Litchfield PD	Hillsborough Co.	NH

NH State PD	n/a	NH
Sandown PD	Rockingham Co.	NH
Woodstock PD	Grafton Co.	NH
Atlantic Co. Sheriff	Atlantic Co.	NJ
Bridgeton PD	Cumberland Co.	NJ
Camden PD	Camden Co.	NJ
Clifton PD	Passaic Co.	NJ
Clinton Twp. PD	Hunterdon Co.	NJ
Collingswood PD	Camden Co.	NJ
Denville Twp PD	Morris Co.	NJ
Deptford PD	Gloucester Co.	NJ
East Orange PD	Essex Co.	NJ
Edison PD	Middlesex Co.	NJ
Egg Harbor Twp PD	Atlantic Co.	NJ
Fair Haven PD	Monmouth Co.	NJ
Far Hills PD	Somerset Co.	NJ
Gloucester Twp PD	Camden Co.	NJ
Greenwich Twp. PD	Gloucester Co.	NJ
Hackensack PD	Bergen Co.	NJ
Hackettstown PD	Warren Co.	NJ
Hammonton PD	Atlantic Co.	NJ
Hillside PD	Union Co.	NJ
Hillside PD	Union Co.	NJ
Hunterdon Co. Sheriff	Hunterdon Co.	NJ
Irvington PD	Essex Co.	NJ
Jersey City PD	Hudson Co.	NJ
Little Egg Harbor Twp. PD	Ocean Co.	NJ
Lumberton PD	Burlington Co.	NJ
Mantua Twp. PD	Gloucester Co.	NJ
Maple Shade PD	Burlington Co.	NJ
Milltown PD	Middlesex Co.	NJ
Millville PD	Cumberland Co.	NJ
NJ DEP	n/a	NJ
NJ State PD	n/a.	NJ
NJ Transit PD	Hudson Co.	NJ
North Bergen PD	Hudson Co.	NJ
Passaic Co. Sheriff	Passaic Co.	NJ
Paterson PD	Passiac Co.	NJ
Plainfield PD	Union Co.	NJ
Point Pleasant PD	Ocean Co.	NJ
Red Bank PD	Monmouth Co.	NJ
Ringwood PD	Passaic Co.	NJ
Riverton PD	Burlington Co.	NJ
Roselle PD	Union Co.	NJ
Roxbury PD	Morris Co.	NJ
Salem Co. Sheriff	Salem Co.	NJ
Salem PD	Salem Co.	NJ

Sea Isle City PD	Cape May Co.	NJ
South Plainfield PD	Middlesex Co.	NJ
Trenton PD	Mercer Co.	NJ
Vineland PD	Cumberland Co.	NJ
Wall Twp. PD	Monmouth Co.	NJ
Waterford Twp. PD	Camden Co.	NJ
Wayne PD	Passiac Co.	NJ
West New York PD	Hudson Co.	NJ
Woodbridge PD	Middlesex Co.	NJ
Albuquerque PD	Bernalillo Co.	NM
Aztec PD	San Juan Co.	NM
Bernalillo Co. Sheriff	Bernalillo Co.	NM
Boswell PD	Chaves Co.	NM
Clovis PD	Curry Co.	NM
Farmington PD	San Juan Co.	NM
Gallup PD	McKinley Co.	NM
Las Cruces PD	Dona Ana Co.	NM
Las Vegas PD	San Miguel Co.	NM
Luna Co. Sheriff	Luna Co.	NM
NM State PD	n/a	NM
Sandoval Co. Sheriff	Sandoval Co.	NM
Santa Clara PD	Grant Co.	NM
Santa Clara Pueblo Tribal PD	Santa Fe Co.	NM
Santa Fe PD	Sante Fe Co.	NM
Sante Fe Co. Sheriff	Santa Fe. Co.	NM
Douglas Co. Sheriff	Douglas Co.	NV
Elko Co. Sheriff	Elko Co.	NV
Las Vegas PD	Clark Co.	NV
Metro Las Vegas PD	Clark Co.	NV
NV State PD	n/a	NV
Reno PD	Washoe Co.	NV
Winnemuca PD	Humboldt Co.	NV
Albany PD	Albany Co.	NY
Buffalo PD	Erie Co.	NY
Canton PD	St. Lawrence Co.	NY
Colonie PD	Albany Co.	NY
Cortland PD	Cortland Co.	NY
Delphi PD	Delaware Co.	NY
Glen Falls PD	Warren Co.	NY
Johnson City PD	Broome Co.	NY
Kingston PD	Ulster Co.	NY

Monroe Co. Sheriff	Monroe Co.	NY
Mount Kisco Village PD	Westchester Co.	NY
Nassau Co. PD	Nassau Co.	NY
North Syracuse PD	Onondaga Co.	NY
Norwich PD	Chenango Co.	NY
NY DEP	n/a.	NY
NY State PD	n/a	NY
NYPD	New York City (5 boroughs)	NY
Ocean Beach PD	Suffolk Co.	NY
Ogdensburg PD	St. Lawrence Co.	NY
Orange Co. Sheriff	Orange Co.	NY
Oswego PD	Oswego Co.	NY
Rochester PD	Monroe Co.	NY
Schenectady PD	Schenectady Co.	NY
Scotia Village PD	Schenectady Co.	NY
Skaneateles PD	Onondaga Co.	NY
Southampton PD	Suffolk Co.	NY
Spring Valley Vlg PD	Rockland Co.	NY
Suffolk Co. PD	Suffolk Co.	NY
Sullivan Co. Sheriff	Sullivan Co.	NY
Syracuse PD	Onondaga Co.	NY
Tarrytown PD	Westchester Co.	NY
Uttica PD	Oneida Co.	NY
Village of Saugerties PD	Ulster Co.	NY
Westchester Co. DPS	Westchester Co.	NY
Akron PD	Summit Co.	OH
Bay Village PD	Cuyahoga Co.	OH
Canton PD	Stark Co.	OH
Cincinnati PD	Hamilton Co.	OH
Circleville PD	Pickaway Co.	OH
Cleveland PD	Cuyahoga Co.	OH
Columbiana Co. Sheriff	Columbiana Co.	OH
Columbus PD	Franklin Co.	OH
Cuyahoga Co. Sheriff	Cuyahoga Co.	OH
Cuyahoga Falls PD	Summit Co.	OH
Delaware Co. Sheriff	Delaware Co.	OH
Euclid PD	Cuyahoga Co.	OH
Fayette Co. Sheriff	Fayette Co.	OH
Forest Park PD	Hamilton Co.	OH
Franklin Co. Sheriff	Franklin Co.	OH
Gahanna PD	Franklin Co.	OH

Holmes Co. Sheriff	Holmes Co.	OH
Hudson PD	Summit Co.	OH
Jackson Twp PD	Stark Co.	OH
Lorain PD	Lorain Co.	OH
Mason PD	Warren Co.	OH
McArthur PD	Vinton Co.	OH
Middletown PD	Butler Co.	OH
Montgomery Co. Sheriff	Montgomery Co.	OH
Mt. Healthy PD	Hamilton Co.	OH
New Athens PD	Harrison Co.	OH
Newtown PD	Hamilton Co.	OH
North Kingsville PD	Ashtabula Co.	OH
Oxford PD	Butler Co.	OH
Parma PD	Cuyahoga Co.	OH
Perrysburg PD	Wood Co.	OH
Portage Co. Sheriff	Portage Co.	OH
Sandusky PD	Erie Co.	OH
South Charleston PD	Clark Co.	OH
Springfield PD	Clark Co.	OH
Sugarcreek PD	Tuscarawas Co.	OH
Toledo PD	Lucas Co.	OH
Trotwood PD	Montgomery Co.	OH
West Milton PD	Miami Co.	OH
Yorkville PD	Jefferson Co.	OH
Zanesville PD	Muskingum Co.	OH
Bartlesville PD	Washington Co.	OK
Broken Arrow PD	Tulsa Co.	OK
Chickasha PD	Grady Co.	OK
Crescent PD	Logan Co.	OK
Edmond PD	Oklahoma Co.	OK
Fairland PD	Ottawa Co.	OK
Fort Gibson PD	Muscogee Co.	OK
Grant Co. Sheriff	Grant Co.	OK
Guthrie PD	Logan Co.	OK
Harrah PD	Oklahoma Co.	OK
Haskell PD	Muskogee Co.	OK
Kaw Nation PD	Kay Co.	OK
Lawton PD	Comanche Co.	OK
Madill PD	Marshall Co.	OK
Miami PD	Ottawa Co.	OK
Muskogee PD	Muskogee Co.	OK

Nicoma Park PD	Oklahoma Co.	OK
Noble PD	Cleveland Co.	OK
Oklahoma City PD	Oklahoma Co.	OK
Sallisaw PD	Sequoyah Co.	OK
Tulsa PD	Tulsa Co.	OK
Vinita PD	Craig Co.	OK
Waukomis PD	Garfield Co.	OK
Bend PD	Deschutes Co.	OR
Clackamas Co. Sheriff	Clackamas Co.	OR
Dallas PD	Polk Co.	OR
Gold Beach PD	Curry Co.	OR
King City PD	Washington Co.	OR
Medford PD	Jackson Co.	OR
Portland PB	Multnomash Co.	OR
Redmond PD	Deschutes Co.	OR
Salem PD	Marion Co.	OR
Seaside PD	Clatsop Co.	OR
Sherwood PD	Washington Co.	OR
Woodburn PD	Marion Co.	OR
Allegheny Co. PD	Allegheny Co.	PA
Allegheny Co. Sheriff	Allegheny Co.	PA
Allentown PD	Lehigh Co.	PA
Avalon PD	Allegheny Co.	PA
Avoca PD	Luzurne Co.	PA
Berlin PD	Somerset Co.	PA
Bernville PD	Berks Co.	PA
Bethlehem PD	Northampton Co.	PA
Blakely PD	Lackawanna Co.	PA
Bucks Co. Sheriff	Bucks Co.	PA
Caraoplis PD	Allegheny Co.	PA
Centre Co. Sheriff	Centre Co.	PA
Chalfont PD	Bucks Co.	PA
Chambersburg PD	Franklin Co.	PA
Chippewa Twp PD	Beaver Co.	PA
Coopersburg PD	Lehigh Co.	PA
Cranberry Twp. PD	Butler Co.	PA
Dallas Twp. PD	Luzerne Co.	PA
Dauphin Co. Sheriff	Dauphin Co.	PA
Delaware Co. Sheriff	Delaware Co.	PA
Easton PD	Northampton Co.	PA
Edgewood PD	Allegheny Co.	PA

Fairchance Borough PD	Fayette Co.	PA
Fallowfield Twp. PD	Washington Co.	PA
Falls Twp PD	Bucks Co.	PA
Forks Twp PD	Northampton Co.	PA
Foster Twp PD	McKean Co.	PA
Freeland PD	Luzerne Co.	PA
Hanover Twp. PD	Washington Co.	PA
Hegins Twp. PD	Schuylkill Co.	PA
Hilltown Twp. PD	Bucks Co.	PA
Horsham PD	Montgomery Co.	PA
Indiana Borough PD	Indiana Co.	PA
Kingston PD	Luzerne Co.	PA
Lancaster PD	Lancaster Co.	PA
Lansford PD	Carbon Co.	PA
Lawrence Twp PD	Clearfield Co.	PA
Lehigh Valley Int. Airport PD	Lehigh Co.	PA
Lower Paxton Twp. PD	Dauphin Co.	PA
Mahanoy City PD	Schuylkill Co.	PA
Manheim Twp. PD	Lancaster Co.	PA
Marcus Hook PD	Delaware Co.	PA
Marlborough Twp PD	Montgomery Co.	PA
Marysville PD	Perry Co.	PA
McCandless PD	Allegheny Co.	PA
Meyersdale PD	Somerset Co.	PA
Moore Twp. PD	Northampton Co.	PA
Moosic PD	Lackawanna Co.	PA
New Britian PD	Bucks Co.	PA
Newport Twp PD	Luzerne Co.	PA
North Catasauqua PD	Northampton Co.	PA
PA DCNR	n/a	PA
PA State PD	n/a	PA
Palmer Twp. PD	Northampton Co.	PA
Philadelphia PD	Philadelphia Co.	PA
Philadelphia Sch. Dist. PD	Philadelphia Co.	PA
Pittsburgh PD	Allegheny Co.	PA
Plainfield Twp. PD	Northampton Co.	PA
Plum PD	Allegheny Co.	PA
Scranton PD	Lackawanna Co.	PA
Shippensburg Univ. PD	Cumberland Co.	PA
South Fayette PD	Allegheny Co.	PA
South Londonderry Twp. PD	Lebanon Co.	PA

State College PD	Centre Co.	PA
Summerfill Twp. PD	Cambria Co.	PA
Uniontown PD	Fayette Co.	PA
University of Pittsburgh PD	Allegheny Co.	PA
Vandergrift PD	Westmoreland Co.	PA
Waynesburg PD	Greene Co.	PA
West Chester PD	Chester Co.	PA
West Mifflin PD.	Allegheny Co.	PA
Westmoreland Co. Sheriff	Westmoreland Co.	PA
Wilkes-Barre PD	Luzerne Co.	PA
Wilkinsburg PD	Allegheny Co.	PA
Wyoming Borough PD	Luzerne Co.	PA
Cranston PD	Kent Co.	RI
East Greenwich PD	Kent Co.	RI
East Providence PD	Providence Co.	RI
Johnston PD	Providence Co.	RI
North Providence PD	Providence Co.	RI
Providence PD	Providence Co.	RI
Westerly PD	Washington Co.	RI
Woonsocket PD	Providence Co.	RI
Allendale PD	Allendale Co.	SC
Anderson Co. Sheriff	Anderson Co.	SC
Anderson PD	Anderson Co.	SC
Atlantic Beach PD	Horry Co.	SC
Bowman PD	Orangeburg Co.	SC
Camden PD	Richland Co.	SC
Charleston Co. Sheriff	Charleston Co.	SC
Charleston PD	Putnam Co.	SC
Columbia PD	Richland Co.	SC
Columbia PD	Richland Co.	SC
Darlington Co. Sheriff	Darlington Co.	SC
Dillon PD	Dillon Co.	SC
Ellenton PD	Aiken Co.	SC
Florence PD	Florence Co.	SC
Goose Creek PD	Berkeley Co.	SC
Greenville PD	Greenville Co.	SC
Hampton Co. Sheriff	Hampton Co.	SC
Holly Hill PD	Orangeburg Co.	SC
Horry Co. PD	Horry Co.	SC
Lake City PD	Florence Co.	SC
Lexington PD	Lexington Co.	SC

Marion PD	Marion Co.	SC
Marlboro Co. Sheriff	Marlboro Co.	SC
Medical Ctr SC PD	Charleston Co.	SC
Moncks Corner PD	Berkeley Co.	SC
Mount Pleasant PD	Charleston Co.	SC
Orangeburg PSD	Orangeburg Co.	SC
Richland Co. Sheriff	Richland Co.	SC
Ridgeville PD	Colleton Co.	SC
Rock Hill PD	York Co.	SC
SC Highway Patrol	n/a	SC
SC SLED	n/a	SC
Spartanburg Co. Sheriff	Spartanburg Co.	SC
St. George PD	Colleton Co.	SC
Sumter PD	Sumter Co.	SC
Surfside Beach PD	Horry Co.	SC
Union DPS	Union Co.	SC
Alcester PD	Union Co.	SD
Canton PD	Lincoln Co.	SD
Garretson PD	Lincoln Co.	SD
Lake Co. Sheriff	Lake Co.	SD
Sioux Falls PD	Minnehaha Co.	SD
Algood PD	Putnam Co.	TN
Caryville PD	Campbell Co.	TN
Chattanooga PD	Hamilton Co.	TN
Clarksville PD	Robertson Co.	TN
Clarksville PD	Montgomery Co.	TN
Cleveland PD	Bradley Co.	TN
Cookeville PD	Putnam Co.	TN
Gallatin PD	Sumner Co.	TN
Gordonsville PD	Smith Co.	TN
Hardeman Co. Sheriff	Hardeman Co.	TN
Jackson Co. Sheriff	Jackson Co.	TN
Jackson PD	Madison Co.	TN
Kenton PD	Obion Co.	TN
Kingsport PD	Sullivan Co.	TN
Loudon PD	Loudon Co.	TN
Memphis PD	Shelby Co.	TN
Metro Nashville PD	Davidson Co.	TN
Murfreesboro PD	Rutherford Co.	TN
Rutherford Co. Sheriff	Rutherford Co.	TN
Shelby Co. Sheriff	Shelby Co.	TN

Smyrna PD	Rutherford Co.	TN
TN Highway Patrol	n/a	TN
TN State Univ. PD	Davidson Co.	TN
Washington Co. Sheriff	Washington Co.	TN
White Co. Sheriff	White Co.	TN
Williamson Co. Sheriff	Williamson Co.	TN
Alamo PD	Hidalgo Co.	TX
Alton PD	Hidalgo Co.	TX
Arlington PD	Dallas Co.	TX
Aubrey PD	Denton Co.	TX
Austin ISD PD	Travis Co.	TX
Austin PD	Travis Co.	TX
Bexar Co. Sheriff	Bexar Co.	TX
Brownwood PD	Brown Co.	TX
Cameron Co. PCT4 Constable	Cameron Co.	TX
Cameron Co. Sheriff	Cameron Co.	TX
Cockrell Hill PD	Dallas Co.	TX
Connally ISD PD	McLennan Co.	TX
Dallas PD	Dallas Co.	TX
Del Rio PD	Val Verde Co.	TX
Edinburg PD	Hidalgo Co.	TX
El Paso Co. Sheriff	El Paso Co.	TX
El Paso PD	El Paso Co.	TX
Elsa PD	Hidalgo Co.	TX
Ennis ISD PD	Ellis Co.	TX
Fort Worth PD	Tarrant Co.	TX
Galveston PD	Galveston Co.	TX
Gatesville PD	Coryell Co.	TX
Georgetown PD	Williamson Co.	TX
Greenville PD	Hunt Co.	TX
Harlingen PD	Cameron Co.	TX
Harris Co. Constable - PCT 6	Harris Co.	TX
Harris Co. Sheriff	Harris Co.	TX
Hidalgo Co. Sheriff	Hidalgo Co.	TX
Hitchcock PD	Galveston Co.	TX
Hondo PD	Medina Co.	TX
Houston Comm. Coll. PD	Harris Co.	TX
Houston PD	Harris Co.	TX
Hutto PD	Williamson Co.	TX
Irving PD	Dallas Co.	TX
Kilgore PD	Gregg Co.	TX

Killeen PD	Bell Co.	TX
La Salle Co. Sheriff	La Salle Co.	TX
Lakeway PD	Travis Co.	TX
Liberty Co. Sheriff	Liberty Co.	TX
Lindale PD	Smith Co.	TX
Lubbock PD	Lubbock Co.	TX
Malakoff PD	Henderson Co.	TX
McAllen PD	Hidalgo Co.	TX
Mineral Wells PD	Palo Pinto Co.	TX
Mission PD	Hidalgo Co.	TX
New Braunfels PD	Comal Co.	TX
Pasadena PD	Harris Co.	TX
Pharr PD	Hidalgo Co.	TX
Pilot Point PD	Denton Co.	TX
Robinson PD	McLennan Co.	TX
San Antonio Park PD	Bexar Co.	TX
San Antonio PD	Bexar Co.	TX
San Marcos PD	Hays Co.	TX
Santa Rosa PD	Cameron Co.	TX
Shenandoah PD	Montgomery Co.	TX
St. Mary's Univ. PD	Bexar Co.	TX
Sugar Land PD	Fort Bend Co.	TX
Surfside Beach PD	Brazoria Co.	TX
Texarkana PD	Bowie Co.	TX
Texas City PD	Galveston Co.	TX
TX DPS	n/a	TX
University of Texas-Austin PD	Travis Co.	TX
Victoria PD	Victoria Co.	TX
Vidor PD	Orange Co.	TX
Wichita Falls PD	Wichita Co.	TX
Centerville PD	Davis Co.	UT
Orem PD	Utah Co.	UT
Salt Lake City PD	Salt Lake Co.	UT
Taylorsville PD	Salt Lake Co.	UT
UT Highway Patrol	n/a	UT
Arlington Co. PD	Arlington Co.	VA
Caroline Co. Sheriff	Caroline Co.	VA
Chilhowie PD	Smyth Co.	VA
Coeburn PD	Wise Co.	VA
Damascus PD	Washington Co.	VA
Danville PD	City of Danville	VA
Fairfax Co. PD	Fairfax Co.	VA
Fairfax Co. Sheriff	Fairfax Co.	VA

George Mason Univ. PD	Fairfax Co.	VA
Hampton PD	City of Hampton	VA
Henry Co. Sheriff	Henry Co.	VA
Loudoun Co. Sheriff	Loudoun Co.	VA
Newport News PD	City of Newport News	VA
Norfolk City Sheriff	City of Norfolk	VA
Norfolk PD	City of Norfolk	VA
Petersburg PD	City of Petersburg	VA
Portsmouth PD	City of Portsmouth	VA
Prince William Co. PD	Prince William Co.	VA
Richmond City Sheriff	City of Richmond	VA
Richmond PD	City of Richmond	VA
Rockingham Co. Sheriff	Rockingham Co.	VA
St. Paul PD	Wise Co.	VA
VA Marine PD	Accomack Co.	VA
VA State PD	n/a	VA
Virginia Beach PD	City of Virginia Beach	VA
Chesapeake PD	City of Chesapeake	VA
Springfield PD	Windsor Co.	VT
Des Moines PD	King Co.	WA
Federal Way PD	King Co.	WA
Kennewick PD	Benton Co.	WA
King Co. Sheriff	King Co.	WA
Ocean Shores PD	Grays Harbor Co.	WA
Okanogan Co. Sheriff	Okanogan Co.	WA
Seattle PD	King Co.	WA
Spokane PD	Spokane Co.	WA
Tacoma PD	Pierce Co.	WA
WA State Patrol	n/a	WA
Walla Walla PD	Walla Walla Co.	WA
Yakima Co. Sheriff	Yakima Co.	WA
Beloit PD	Rock Co.	WI
Bloomer PD	Chippewa Co.	WI
Dane Co. Sheriff	Dane Co.	WI
Eau Claire PD	Eau Claire Co.	WI
Franklin PD	Milwaukee Co.	WI
Freedom PD	Outagamie Co.	WI
Greenfield PD	Milwaukee Co.	WI
Kenosha Co. Sheriff	Kenosha Co.	WI
Lisbon PD	Waukesha Co.	WI
Marathon Co. Sheriff	Marathon Co.	WI
Milwaukee Co. Sheriff	Milwaukee Co.	WI
Milwaukee PD	Milwaukee Co.	WI
Minoqua PD	Oneida Co.	WI
Monroe Co. Sheriff	Monroe Co.	WI
New Lisbon PD	Juneau Co.	WI
Prescott PD	Pierce Co.	WI
Sheboygan Falls PD	Sheboygan Co.	WI

South Milwaukee PD	Milwaukee Co.	WI
Wausau PD	Marathon Co.	WI
Belle PD	Kanawha Co.	WV
Charleston PD	Kanawha Co.	WV
Greenbrier Co. Sheriff	Greenbrier Co.	WV
Marion Co. Sheriff	Marion Co.	WV
McMechen PD	Marshall Co.	WV
Mount Hope PD	Fayette Co.	WV
Weirton PD	Brooke Co.	WV
Campbell Co. Sheriff	Campbell Co.	WY