8-2008

Virtue Under Fire: Leadership Attributes Required in 21st Century Combat

Robert D. Gibson
Indiana University of Pennsylvania

VIRTUE UNDER FIRE:

LEADERSHIP ATTRIBUTES REQUIRED IN 21ST CENTURY COMBAT

A Dissertation

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies and Research

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Education

Robert D. Gibson

Indiana University of Pennsylvania

August 2008

Indiana University of Pennsylvania
The School of Graduate Studies and Research
Department of Professional Studies in Education

We hereby approve the dissertation of

Robert D. Gibson

Candidate for the degree of Doctor of Education

_____ _____
Robert Millward, D. Ed.
Professor of Education, Advisor

_____ _____
George Bieger, Ph.D.
Professor of Education

_____ _____
Wenfan Yan, Ph.D.
Professor of Education

ACCEPTED

_____ _____
Michele S. Schwietz, Ph.D.
Assistant Dean for Research
The School of Graduate Studies and Research

Title: Virtue Under Fire: Leadership Attributes Required in 21st Century Combat

Author: Robert D. Gibson

Dissertation Chair: Dr. Robert Millward

Dissertation Committee Members: Dr. George Bieger
                                          Dr. Wenfan Yan

The purpose of this study is to examine sources of leader attributes and values of U. S. Army officers and to ascertain which attributes and values commissioned officers find most applicable to modern combat. The study compares the theoretical attributes taught in Army officer education programs with the attributes and values practiced by four commissioned officers in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Afghanistan. In narrative case study form, it presents a phenomenological exploration of the philosophies, beliefs, and conclusions of those four commissioned officers.

The study identified four sources of the values that the participants consider important to their performance as leaders: commissioning sources; military role models, including family members; self-study and reflection; and values defined by the requirements of service to legitimate civilian authority.

Regarding individual values, the study concluded that selflessness creates the foundation for all other leader behaviors in combat, and that personal integrity, confidence, courage, empathy, humanity, and proportionality were five other critical values required in combat. A commissioned officer who manifests those six values in his behaviors will be a successful combat leader.

The study revealed that combat leaders believe that leadership behaviors cannot be learned in a classroom environment; they must be acquired by habitual confrontation

by challenges pertinent to a specific virtue. The study found that combat leadership corroborates theories of action-based leadership by leaders who personify important core values, first articulated in Aristotle's theory of virtue ethics and promoted by Army leadership doctrine.

Finally, this study concluded that the most valuable attributes in combat are those that compel subordinates to overcome the cognitive dissonance between self-preservation and action, between risk and duty. Often, the leader must overcome his cognitive dissonance first.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM

Prologue

The good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity
with excellence or virtues, and if there are several virtues,
in conformity with the best and most complete.

--Aristotle (p.17)

In the winter of 2004, I was assigned to the staff and faculty at the U. S. Military

Academy at West Point, New York. My good friend and colleague, Lieutenant Colonel

Theodore S. Westhusing, the foremost expert on military ethics at West Point—and

perhaps the most up-to-date expert on that topic in the entire Army—was getting ready to

deploy to Iraq to train the Iraqi police force.

"Keep your eyes open over there, Ted," I remember saying to Colonel

Westhusing just before he left, referring to the already tenuous security situation. But I

knew that if anyone could import a sense of honor and purpose to the Iraqi security

forces, it was Ted Westhusing. He was the consummate soldier, an expert on virtue

ethics, and the best choice to teach the idea of honor in combat to an Iraqi security force

that desperately needed it.

Six months later, Ted Westhusing had given his life in service to his country, and

the Iraqi police force was practicing nothing that resembled a professional military ethic.

This study hopes to ensure that Colonel Westhusing's death was not in vain.

*   *   *

Introduction

Like the counterpart domains of business, education, and politics, the U. S. military embraces the idea that its educated leaders—its commissioned officer corps— must acquire a specific set of attributes to be successful in their profession. All three primary services—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—teach these attributes in their officer education programs, whether they be the national military academies (Annapolis or West Point, for example), the Reserve Officer Training Corps program, or at their Officer Candidate Schools. No matter the commissioning source, the services claim that they instill values and attributes that their graduates can employ throughout a lifetime of service.

The U. S. Army is the largest of the four military services and thus requires the most junior officers to fill its ranks. For example, the Army invests several hundred million dollars at 270 colleges and universities in the United States, where Reserve Officers Training Corps programs advertise themselves as "the best college course you can take." Colin Powell stands as perhaps the most famous graduate of the Army ROTC program. In addition to ROTC, the Army produces officers at the U. S. Military Academy at West Point, where posters on the walls claim that "the history we teach is made by the people we taught," replete with pictures of Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. Whether they graduate from ROTC or from West Point, new Army officers complete an officer education program install specific values, skills, and attributes that guide them after they graduate and earn commissions in the Army.

Given what happened to Ted Westhusing, we must ask some hard questions.

The Army teaches specific leadership attributes, but do military officers practice them in combat? Or do leaders in combat fall back on other elements of character to guide their behavior—values and attributes that they learned from some other source?

If so, the Army's officer education curriculum must change to emphasize attributes that are more relevant in combat. This study will reach some conclusions about such a change.

The Need for the Study and the Theoretical Frameworks That Inform It

Virtue Ethics

Academic philosophers study three main branches of their discipline: metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. The third branch, axiology, is pertinent the study of virtue ethics. Axiology is the study of the worth or value of actions, laws, object, or anything else that requires a moral judgment by the observer.

Ethics, the study of good or bad or right and wrong in human behavior, is a subset of axiology. Thus any study of ethics aims to define whether a specific behavior is a good act and how we know that the acts we judge to be good <u>are</u> good. Any such judgment demands a well-reasoned principle or set of principles against which the observed judges acts of similar kinds.

The term "virtue ethics" refers to the theory that if the person taking action personifies a specific set of virtues, personifying behaviors that define his attributes, that person must perform good acts—his virtues make bad actions impossible.

Any study of virtue ethics begins with the work of Aristotle, particularly Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle taught his students to focus on living a

comprehensive virtuous life—often referred to as "the unity of the virtues"—rather than an individual decision or act. In virtue ethics, goodness or badness depends on developing the character of the agent over an entire life; individual actions count less.

This study will focus on the attributes that the Army finds valuable for its officer corps, so to triangulate the source of virtue ethics with the Army's practical application of it, we must identify the attributes from *Nicomachean Ethics* that Aristotle found virtuous: the "cardinal virtues" of temperance, justice, courage, and wisdom. As history progressed from the time of Aristotle and Plato to the time of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Christian thinkers add the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. To remain objective in this study, we will exclude Aquinas's addition of the theological virtues.

The most important theoretical point from *Nicomachean Ethics* is Aristotle's concept of the unity of the virtues. Whether the culture privileges temperance, justice, courage, and wisdom—Aristotle's Big Four—or the seven Army Values integral to the Army's leadership doctrine, Aristotle's theory of the unity of the virtues applies to situations where leader attributes are being practiced and assessed. A virtuous leader is sensitive to collisions of specific virtues in the execution of a specific act. For example, a combat leader may have to ignore courage in order to apply the correct amount of temperance or wisdom.

According to Aristotle, a person possessing one virtue must necessarily possess them all if he hopes to live a good life.

According to the Army, an officer must personify the Seven Army Values in order to lead effectively.

This study will examine whether the similarity of those two statements rings true.

Trait Theory

> They were the leaders . . . these great [men]; the modellers,
> patterns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general
> mass of men contrived to do or to attain.

> --Thomas Carlyle, 1840, p. 1

Trait theory contends that there is a connection between [internal] values, [external] attributes, and success as a leader.   It emerged early in the 20th century in the social sciences and led to perhaps the earliest theory of leadership, the Great Man Theory (Stodgill, 1974).

Trait theory investigates the idea that the success or failure of a leader depends on his or her personality traits, physical attributes, measurable intelligence, or personal values. Stogdill (1948) was the first leadership researcher to summarize the findings. Stogdill concluded that having certain traits did not guarantee that those who had them would rise to a leadership position. But once in that position, people who had these characteristics were moderately more likely to succeed than people who were lazy, grumpy, jittery, or less intelligent.

Mann (1959) later reached the same conclusion, and Stogdill later concluded that the field of leadership study had erroneously dismissed traits in favor of studying the situation that would predict a leader's success. His 1974 study caused the academic community to revisit trait theory and eventually divide it into sub-categories, encouraging a new genre of study that focused on personality and intelligence in a wide variety of leadership domains—a genre that evolved to the point that its practitioners became famous, such as Daniel Goleman's measurement theory of Emotional Intelligence (1995 & 1998) and Stephen Covey's (1991) mercurial rise in the domain of business leadership.

Hogan (1991) defined personality as a measurable social reputation whereby the leader manifests traits and behaviors in public in ways that others can see and judge, and also as the unseen beliefs and processes that cause the leader to behave the way he does. These traits of personality may not be observable, like the traits that define social reputation, but they create the leader's perception of self and affect his behavior. Hogan's study complemented earlier studies by psychologists, most notably Sigmund Freud (1913), who believed that the tensions created by three components of the self, the id, ego, and super-ego, caused a person to behave in a characteristic way even if that person was not conscious of the cause of those behaviors.

Trait theory becomes useful in predicting how people will react from one situation to the next. Trait theory applies best in fast paced, rapidly changing organizations that have no clear policies or direction. Certainly combat meets those criteria, making trait theory an important framework for this study.

Army Leadership Doctrine

Army *Field Manual 22-100: Army Leadership* (1999) specifies three leader dimensions, each of them always capitalized:

- BE

- KNOW

- DO

These three leader dimensions symbolize character, competence, and leader actions. FM 22-100 specifies that leaders at every level—direct, organizational, and strategic—must personify the Seven Army Values. Then, with those values at the top of

the ethical pyramid, the Army publishes complementary manuals, publications, and directives that guide leader development.

The most pertinent of those directives are *Army Regulation 600-100: Army Leadership* (1993), which establishes the basis for leader development doctrine and training; *Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58: Leader Development for America's Army* (1994), which describes the Army's leader development model; and *Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3: Commissioned Officer Development* (1998), which discusses qualification criteria and outlines development and career management programs for commissioned officers.

Clearly the intent of Army doctrine is to establish a curriculum that develops leader attributes using the Army Values as the foundation for character development. Such a curriculum clearly connects the BE component of the Army's doctrine to Aristotle's virtue ethics: what virtues that must exist <u>inside</u> the leader, in the truest sense? Did the leader rely on the Seven Army Values acquired in the Army's curriculum, or did the leader fall back on other, more intrinsic values—a BE component that existed before the leader completed the Army's curriculum—to develop his leadership attributes? This study will investigate those questions.

The idea that specific leadership contexts require different leadership attributes has been discussed by many authorities. For example, the 'big fish" in business leadership agree that leaders must personify certain qualities or establish certain conditions in order to be successful. Warren Bennis (1989), Max DePree (1989), and Stephen Covey (1991) identify desirable attributes for leaders. Kotter (1990) explains the vision that the leader creates by his or her personal example. And Covey (1991) endorses

this idea of a leader who shapes the organization's climate by personifying a principled vision.

Combat is arguably the most dangerous leadership context. Thus Army leadership doctrine specifies requirements in the domain of military leadership. That domain depends on officer education curriculums at West Point and ROTC programs across the United States to teach Army leadership doctrine its students. Inherent in those curricula are several theories of social development that apply across more than one professional domain:

- *Social exchange theory and leader-member exchange theory* (LMX) explain how leaders develop separate exchange relationships with each subordinates.

- French and Raven's (1959) *taxonomy of power* classifies sources of power, three of which are prominent in any officer education curriculum: *legitimate* power, *coercive* power, and *expert* power.

- Chickering's *Student Development Theory* explains the factors that contribute to the mental and socialization changes that affect students as they progress through a curriculum.

- *Constructive-developmental theory* explains that leaders build understanding of themselves from their experiences.

Officership

Like its comparable theories for business leadership, the Theory of the Military Professional Ethic (2003) articulates the unique requirements of the military profession. Don Snider frames those requirements in the term "Officership." Officership defines the attributes necessary for success as a commissioned officer, not simply as an enlisted leader of soldiers, such as a non-commissioned officer (sergeant). Snider's theory establishes a rubric to assess whether commissioned officers master each of the four components of Officership.

Statement of the Problem

This study explores the connections between ethical philosophy, leadership curricula, and real-world reality. We know which leader attributes the Army privileges in its officer education programs, but we have not verified their value through the eyes of its modern practitioners.

An educated observer might ask, "Why must we verify that value? What is it about virtue that is important? And why should we worry about the virtue of an officer?"

Our explanation weaves its way from the moral philosophy of virtue to the mortal consequences of combat leadership:

- from virtue come values

- from values come moral judgment (personal ethics)

- from moral judgments come behaviors

- behaviors define attributes, since when a person is place in <u>any</u> leadership position, behaviors are interpreted by and affect the performance of followers

- when placed in a <u>specific</u> leadership context, the leader must apply specific behaviors for success, i.e., specific leader attributes

- in dangerous leadership situations, the absence of the required leader attributes may result in disastrous consequences

- in the case of the specific dangerous context of leadership in combat, the disastrous consequence may be death for the leader and his subordinates

Thus, failing to understand these connections might result in death or cause the death of others—clear reason to believe that that the virtue of a combat leader matters.

Purpose of the Study and Research Questions

The purpose of this study is to examine the attributes that Army officer education programs claim to be vital for success when their graduates lead soldiers in combat. What is the source of these attributes? Do they ensure success in combat, or do the realities of modern combat compromise them? The study compared the theoretical attributes taught in military education programs with the examined the key attributes of

combat leadership practiced by commissioned officers in Iraq and Afghanistan. This study will present a phenomenological exploration of the pre-commissioning and combat experiences of four commissioned combat leaders. In narrative case study form, it will examine the philosophies, beliefs, and conclusions of the subjects.

Specifically, this study will illuminate and clarify these research questions:

1. What sources of individual values or leader attributes did these subjects consider to be more influential to their performance as a leader?

2. What individual values or leader attributes are most important to success as an Army officer, from their perspectives?

3. What personal values or leader attributes did these leaders find valuable in combat?

4. How did the subjects apply these values or demonstrate these attributes in combat?

5. What differences exist between the values attributes taught in formal curricula and the values and attributes these subjects required in combat?

I will ask these interview questions to discover the answers to the research questions:

Interview Questions

I. Questions that develop a condensed pre-Army biography of the participant

1. Tell me a little about yourself: age; hometown; family life growing up; current family

2. Describe the source of values early in your life (role models; vignettes, formative mentors)

3. What values did you come to embrace, and why did you embrace them? (formation of pre-Army personal values system)

4. Did you reach any conclusions about officer values before you entered the Army, and if so, what were the sources of those values.

II. Questions that develop a condensed military biography of the participant

    1. Did you internalize the Army values that you were taught during your officer education program, whether USMA, ROTC, or OCS?

    2. Tell me about your source of commissioning (West Point; ROTC; Officer Candidate School; direct commission

    3. Please describe your education, both civilian and military (undergrad; grad; Military Education Level)

    4. Describe your Army career to date (branch of service; assignment history; units)

III. Questions that frame the participant's perception of the relevance of the Army Values, pre-combat

    1. Did you apply the *Army Values* you learned in your officer education system in your career before you deployed to the combat theater? When and how?

    2. Did you apply or privilege other values not taught in your officer education system before you deployed to the combat theater? What values, and why?

IV. Questions that develop a picture of the participant's combat experience

    1. Where were you assigned in combat, and what was your assigned duty?

    2. Did you infer that your duty assignment affected the relevance or applicability of the *Army Value* you described in the questions from Part III, above?

    3. Have you had more than one combat assignment? If so, did your perspectives differ from assignment to assignment? How or in what way?

    4. If you have served in combat in different ranks (e.g., lieutenant in First Gulf War, lieutenant colonel in the second), would you say that you emphasized different Army Values at one level of command than at the other?

V. Questions that frame the participant's perception of the relevance of the Army Values, during combat

    1. Did you apply the values you learned in your officer education system in combat? When and how?

2. Did you come to apply or privilege other values—values <u>not</u> taught in your officer education system--in combat? What values and why?

3. What tasks that you performed in combat caused you to revise, reconsider, or change your perception of the values critical in combat?

4. What events that you witnessed in combat caused you to revise, reconsider, or change your perception of the values critical in combat?

5. What personal symbols, documents, or other artifacts capture your perception of the values critical to success in combat?

VI. Questions that frame the participant's perception of the relevance of the Army Values <u>after some reflection about his experiences</u> in combat (several months later)

1. Since you have returned from theater, how has your perception of the values critical in combat changed?

2. Since you have returned from theater, what new behaviors have you employed or considered that manifest your new attitude about values education?

3. What personal symbols, documents, or other artifacts capture changes in your perception of the values critical to success in combat?
4. What recommendations would you make for the future teaching of leader values and attributes in the officer education system?

VII. Questions for family members, colleagues, and friends close to the participant that corroborate the participant's statements

1. What is the source of the values that [the participant] believes in most?

2. Since [the participant] has returned from theater, have you noticed changes in his behavior or attitude about his Army service or the values he was taught in the officer education system?

3. Since [the participant has returned from theater, what new behaviors have you noticed that manifest his new attitude about the values he was taught in the officer education system?

4. What personal symbols, documents, or other artifacts capture the changes you have noticed in [the participant's] behavior or attitudes toward the values he was taught in the officer education system?

For the last 50 years, the Army's leadership and ethical training curricula have been constructed using data gathered from Cold War or Vietnam-era users. This study expands the reach for data about the relevance of officer education curricula to a valuable source: commissioned Army officers who have served recently in combat. The findings may compel new perceptions of which military skills, attributes, and values translate best to combat leadership roles. Which attributes matter most in combat? How so?

Most important, should the Army's officer education curriculum change to emphasize attributes that are more relevant in combat? This study will reach some conclusions about such a change.

Definition of Terms

Axiology – a branch of academic philosophy that focuses on the worth or value of actions, laws, objects, or anything else that requires a moral judgment by the observer.

values – values are "constructs representing generalized behaviors or states of affairs that are considered *by the individual* to be important" (emphasis mine; Gordon, 1975, p. 2). In other words, values are defined by the leader and held internally.

Army Values – values that the Army, as an institution, requires its members to embrace. They might be attitudes about the worth of people or the institution as a whole (Shinseki 1999). The Army insists that its leaders must manifest these values in their behaviors if they are to be morally aligned with the values of the institution and implies that, if the leader is not aligned, he or she cannot be a successful leader.

attributes – attributes are the outward manifestation of values by the leader, observed and acknowledged from two different points of view:

- the point of view of the leader who intentionally performs an action (thus displaying the attribute) to demonstrate a particular value

- the point of view of an external audience (superiors, peers, and subordinates) who witness an action and conclude that it demonstrates an admirable attribute. Leader attributes affect leader actions, and they also affect how the leader is perceived by his or her followers (Hogan 1991).

Army leader attributes – According to Army leadership doctrine, attributes are mental, physical, and emotional and can be learned and changed (U. S. Army Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership*, 1999).

CLDS – The acronym for the Cadet Leader Development System, the organizing framework that coordinates and integrates developmental activities during the course of tthe four-year officer education curriculum at the U. S. Military Academy at West Point

commissioned officer – An officer in the rank of second lieutenant through colonel, appointed by the President of the United States by the authority of Congress, vested with the responsibility to lead subordinates and issue legal orders (U.S. Code 10.A. II.32)

consequentialism – also called *utilitarianism*; the theory of ethics that emphasizes the value of the consequences of actions

deontology – A theory of ethics that emphasizes the value of adhering to duties or rules

ethical objectivism – an ethical perspective that believes that moral judgment is made completely outside the bounds of a culture

ethical relativism – an ethical perspective that believes that moral judgment is derived from the culture surrounding the person making the judgment

officer education program – A program of instruction by which a student concurrently earns a bachelor's degree and a commission as an officer in the Army, either through the Reserve Officers Training Corps Program (ROTC) or the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY

ROTC – The Reserve Officers' Training Program, an academic program which has been approved by the Secretary of the Army and requires completion of the baccalaureate degree in order to receive a commission as an officer in that military department (U. S. Code 10.A.III.102.2101)

USMA – a four-year baccalaureate institution at West Point, New York that educates its students and simultaneously commissions them as officers in the Army as prescribed by the Secretary of the Army (U. S. Code 10.B.III.403)

virtues – dispositions or traits of character, not learned skills or capacities, that are to be admired because they contribute to living a good life

Virtue Ethics – The ethical theory derived from the teachings of Aristotle that claims that a person's character, personified in his unified application of key virtues, is the focal point of moral judgment about the goodness or badness of that person's actions

Conclusion

As we cleaned out Colonel Westhusing's office after his death, we came upon a dog-eared copy of Shakespeare's *Henry V*, perhaps the most famous war drama in western literature. I picked up the book, and my eyes stopped on these lines, which were highlighted and circled:

> [W]e / know enough if we know we are the King's subjects: /
> if his cause be wrong, our obedience to the King wipes / the
> crime of it out of us.

> --*Henry V* (p. 787, ll. 4.1.130-133).

These lines, spoken by the English soldier John Bates to his disguised leader, King Henry, demonstrate the grave responsibility the Army officer accepts when he takes the field on behalf of his country. Bates suspects that Henry's motives for invading France may be flawed, but he remains loyal and obedient. His only solace is that his innate goodness, his virtue, protects him from moral blame in case King Henry's cause is not just.

If every subordinate understands this logic, the moral obligation for virtue on the leader's part increases exponentially. And whether the actions occur at Agincourt, in our imagination of Shakespeare's drama, or in Iraq, witnessed by the world on the evening news, the gravity of the event illustrates the burden of leadership, which so completely depends on the leader's confidence in the integrity of his actions. If those actions stem from pure virtues, the leader is at ease with his conscience and can act with conviction. More important, the leader's subordinates will sense the purity of the act, the value of the attribute, and respond accordingly. And once the battle is over, both can lay down their arms with a clear conscience.

Just as John Bates interviewed King Henry more than six hundred years ago, this study will interview four combat leaders to understand the relevance of the officer education they completed and assess the true source of their leadership attributes. In that way, it hopes to answer the questions that Colonel Ted Westhusing raised, completing his mission . . . and mine.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

Every art or applied science and every systematic
investigation, and similarly every action and choice,
seem to aim at some good; the good, therefore, has
been well defined as that at which all things aim.

--Aristotle (p. 3)

This study traces the journey of four military leaders through their formative

experiences before, during, and after combat, examining the concepts of leadership,

character, and virtue by applying three theoretical frameworks to their experiences.

First, it will examine the leader's personal development, his sense of being, from

a virtue ethics perspective.   The concept of virtue ethics began with the Greeks, most

notably Aristotle. So to begin, this study will examine Aristotle's notion of personal

virtue and then discuss contemporary academic perspectives of Aristotle's claims. Then

it will consider the case of virtue ethics among contemporary philosophers, who still

wrestle with the place of virtue ethics theory compared with the two other dominant

ethical theories of the last 200 years: deontology and consequentialism.

The work of these contemporary philosophers has caused virtue ethics to float on

a groundswell of popular sentiment, most famously demonstrated by *The Book of Virtues*

(1993), a collection of virtue parables by the former U. S. Secretary of Education,

William J. Bennett. Bennett's book may never have reached best-seller status had it not

been for a sudden increase in the study of virtue ethics in academic curricula in colleges

and universities across several continents. This renewed interest in virtue ethics

stemmed, in part, from the academic work of Alasdair MacIntyre, Rosalind Hursthouse,

and Michael Slote. Their work pushed the concept of virtue back into fashion in the last 30 years. More important, their work illuminates the paradox of virtue in combat and the importance of the leader's assessment of self. Ethical philosophy helps the leader understand what he <u>must be</u>.

Next, this study will examine trait theory, which holds that there is a connection between the values and attributes of a leader and the success that the leader will achieve. Trait theory emerged early in the 20th century in the social sciences; it includes the Great Man Theory of leadership (Stodgill, 1974). Trait theory considers the leader's personality traits, physical attributes, measurable intelligence, or personal values. While Stogdill (1948) was the first leadership researcher to reach conclusions about the effects of those qualities on leadership.

Mann (1959) later reinforced Stogdill's study with one of his own, and Stodgill himself extended the theory by applying not only to the leader's traits, but also to the leadership situation as a predictor of a leader's success. As a result, subsequent researchers divided the field into sub-categories, focusing on personality and intelligence in a wide variety of leadership domains. Some examples are Daniel Goleman's measurement theory of Emotional Intelligence (1995 & 1998) and Stephen Covey's (1991) mercurial rise in the domain of business leadership.

As trait theory developed, it focused on the social element of leadership, both how the leader perceived himself and how his subordinates perceived the leader's actions. The leader acquires a social reputation that defines the leader's behavior and his status as an effective leader. In short, trait theory predicts how people will react from one situation to the next, particularly in fast paced organizations that have no clear policies or

direction. Trait theory helps the leader understand what he <u>might do</u> in such a situation, making trait theory an important framework for this study.

Finally, this chapter will examine Army leadership doctrine, captured in *Field Manual 22-100: Leadership*. By looking at Army leadership doctrine, we understand the tension between virtue ethics, behaviors based on sound moral character, and deontology, behavior based on a rigid belief in duty or observance of a strict set of rules. On a base level, every connotation of the word *doctrine* implies an emphasis on deontology in Army leadership theory, since it seems to demand a specific set of behaviors from its practitioners. Yet the Army also claims that its leaders should rely on the power of their character. The careful student of leadership would ask, "How can these two ethical perspectives co-exist in the profession of arms?"

To complete the journey from what the student officer <u>must be</u> (virtue ethics) to what he <u>might do</u> (trait theory), to what he <u>must do</u> (Army doctrine), this chapter will include a short review of the student development theory espoused by Arthur Chickering and his subsequent colleagues; since the Army's leadership curricula apply to officers-in-training ranging in age from 18-27, Chickering's theory is applicable. Chickering's theory applies to students in the general population, so after we examine his ideas, this section will sharpen Chickering's broad focus of individual development to pinpoint its application in officer education curricula, culminating with Snider's theory of officership—the last stage before the officer leaves the nest of academic study and walks down a very short plank toward combat.

Finally, this third part will briefly review discussions of leader virtue in other professional domains to find connections between theory, practice, and lessons learned.

The Theoretical Frameworks That Inform the Study

Virtue Ethics

> Of those virtues which entitle a man to be called good
> in an unqualified sense . . . as soon as he possesses [the]
> single virtue of practical wisdom, he will also possess
> all the rest.
> --Aristotle (p. 172)

Academic philosophers study three main branches of their discipline: metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. The third branch, axiology, is pertinent to the study of virtue ethics. Axiology is the study of the worth or value of actions, laws, objects, or anything else that requires a moral judgment by the observer.

Ethics, the study of good or bad or right and wrong in human behavior, is a subset of axiology. Thus any study of ethics aims to define whether a behavior is a good act and how we know that the acts we judge to be good <u>are</u> good. Any such judgment demands a well-reasoned principle or set of principles against which the observer judges acts of similar kinds.

The term "virtue ethics" refers to the theory that if the person taking action personifies a specific set of virtues, personifying behaviors that define his attributes, that person must perform good acts—his virtues make bad actions impossible. As Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) points out, virtue ethics contrasts with deontology, the ethical approach that emphasizes duties or rules, and utilitarianism, which emphasizes the consequence of actions (p. 1).

Any study of virtue ethics begins with the work of Aristotle, particularly Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (Ostwald, 1986). Aristotle taught his students to focus on living a comprehensive virtuous life—often referred to as "the unity of the virtues"—

rather than an individual decision or act. In virtue ethics, goodness or badness depends on developing the character of the agent over an entire life; individual actions count less.

This study will focus on the attributes that the Army finds valuable for its officer corps, so to triangulate the source of virtue ethics with the Army's practical application of it, we must begin with the attributes from *Nicomachean Ethics* that Aristotle found virtuous: the "cardinal virtues" of temperance, justice, courage, and wisdom. As history progressed from the time of Aristotle and Plato to the time of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Christian thinkers added the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. To remain objective in this study, we will exclude Aquinas's addition of the theological virtues.

Aristotle's most important theoretical point is his concept of the unity of the virtues. Whether the culture privileges temperance, justice, courage, and wisdom—Aristotle's Big Four—or the Seven Army Values, integral to the Army's leadership doctrine, Aristotle's theory of the unity of the virtues applies whenever a professional culture demands the practice of specific leader virtues. A virtuous leader is sensitive to collisions of specific virtues in the execution of a specific act. For example, a combat leader may have to ignore courage in order to apply the correct amount of temperance or wisdom. Conversely, that same leader may have to test the extremes of courage in order to fulfill his obligations, both to himself and his soldiers. Which course of action is best, or most virtuous? In the end, contended Aristotle, a person possessing one virtue must necessarily possess them all if he hopes to achieve a state of well-being or a flourishing life.

Accelerating Aristotle's theory into the 20th century, we arrive at the contemporary experts on virtue ethics: Alisdair MacIntyre, Stephen Hudson, Rosalind

Hursthouse, and Michael Slote. Each of these experts agrees that virtue ethics is a reasonable alternative to deontological (rule-based) ethics and consequentialist (results-based) ethics. Let's look at their contributions to the dialogue.

Beginning in the late 1950s, virtue ethics enjoyed a revival that grew until Alasdair MacIntyre published *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (1981). MacIntyre called for a rejection of moral theory driven on ethical relativism (the idea that moral judgments derive from the culture surrounding them). A moral relativist believes that a leader's actions are governed by the social moors of a geographic time and place; just as a child learns the grammar of her native language, so does she learn the morality of her native culture. MacIntyre called for a return to ethical objectivism (moral judgment made completely outside the bounds of a culture). He was particularly dissatisfied with the effects Marxism brought to moral thinking, so he attacked 19th and 20th century social effects on moral reasoning, insisting that "nothing less than a rejection of a large part of that ethos [the ethos of cultural relativism] will provide us with a rationally and morally defensible standpoint from which to judge and act" (p. *x*).

This study focuses on a military leader's actions in combat, and as it discusses later, the U. S. military considers honor to be a critical attribute for leadership success. MacIntyre reminds us of Aristotle's point regarding the concepts of virtue and honor. In short, honor exists only as a means to acknowledge the value of the leader's virtue: "we honor others . . . in virtue of something that they are or have done to merit the honor; honor *cannot therefore be at best more than a secondary good*" (emphasis mine, p. 116). In short, the leader's virtue creates a requirement for honor, so honor is not a stand-alone virtue. Honor is a reaction to virtue.

This point also brings traction to the slippery slope of judging a leader's role in a heroic culture. MacIntyre acknowledges that, in many cultures, heroism was tied to social status; for example, to imply that a member of aristocracy was not heroic would be an insult, even if the aristocrat did nothing to earn honor. Less important than being an heir to the throne, says, MacIntyre, are leaders' actions in similar situations. A person who confronts danger and responds virtuously deserves praise, regardless of his social status. "To be courageous is to be someone on whom reliance can be placed," writes MacIntyre (p. 123). If we apply virtue ethics, respect and honor are earned, not inherited. And by extension to the military domain, they cannot be conferred by an officer's commission, either. The combat leader must earn his soldiers' respect. In short, subordinates recognize the value of the leadership attribute and honor it; the person performing it is simply the delivery vehicle.

MacIntyre's book ended with an ominous tone. He worried in print that the virtues only narrowly managed to survive the Dark Ages, and he considered the early 1980s as a new turning point for virtue. "This time," MacIntyre cautioned, "the barbarians are not waiting beyond our frontiers; they have already been governing us for quite some time. And it is our lack of consciousness of this that constitutes part of our predicament" (p. 263).

MacIntyre's warning worked. It compelled other academic philosophers to reconsider virtue ethics as a legitimate theory for action, and it inspired a revolution of moral thinking in the mainstream media, as well. For example, MacIntyre's work probably inspired William J. Bennett's best-selling edition of moral stories, *The Book of Virtues: A Treasury of Great Moral Stories* (1993). Bennett collected stories, parables,

and fables from literature, myth, and history and organized them according to ten universal virtues:

- Self-discipline
- Compassion
- Responsibility
- Friendship
- Work
- Courage
- Perseverance
- Honesty
- Loyalty
- Faith

MacIntyre's work was a catalyst for scholars, but more important, it spawned a renewed interest that allowed Bennett to sell virtue to the masses.

Stephen Hudson, a professor of philosophy at Rutgers, published a complementary theoretical framework for morality. In *Human Character and Morality: Reflections From the History of Ideas* (1986), Hudson explained a simple way to consider the two possible conceptions of morality. The first conception, which he termed the "Direct View" (p. 2), holds that actions are the primary phenomena of morality, so moralists should weigh the value of actions, not the actor, when they make a moral judgment; this perspective is essentially a consequentialist view. In his second chapter, Hudson points to English philosopher Henry Sidgwick as the best example of the Direct View camp.

Conversely, the "Indirect View" (p. 4) believes that the character of the actor, called the moral agent, is the primary phenomenon; this is clearly a virtue ethics perspective, and Hudson points to Aristotle as its principal theorist.

Thus Hudson casts moral theory as a chicken-or-egg argument: do good acts create virtue when they occur, causing us to privilege the actor's traits, capacities, or motives, or does virtue exist primarily, with good acts as their inevitable by-product?

Hudson champions the Indirect View perspective, but he acknowledges the complex connection between an agent and his actions. He states that every person brings some mental baggage to moral judgment; some of that baggage comes from first-order effects: religious faith, perceptions of human perfection or frailty, and intellection reason. From this moral beginning, Hudson says, we [later] make decisions based on the relative value of virtues like gratitude, kindness, charity, or friendship that stem from these first-order effects, and they guide the leader's actions in the same way—maybe even a more accurate way—than the leader's obligations to duty or laws do: "Virtues provide action guidance . . . in the same sense in which, say, the [consequentialist] principles of beneficence or . . . equal treatment provide action guidance" (p. 38). In the end, Hudson reaches a simple conclusion: if the goal of morality is to make life better for those to whom it applies, then the best moral theory must help us "discover what practices and conventions improve, enlighten and ennoble our lives" (107). Anyone who aspires to lead others would agree with Hudson's conclusion, which compels us to agree with his view of virtue and character as the cause of virtuous actions.

Rosalind Hursthouse accepted the theoretical baton from MacIntyre and Hudson. In her book *On Virtue Ethics* (2001), Hursthouse dismisses the claim that virtue ethics cannot provide guidance for a leader's actions, like deontology and consequentialism do. Because virtue ethics requires a right action, what a virtuous agent would do in a given

circumstance in accordance with a particular virtue, each virtue "generates an instruction . . . and each vice a prohibition" (p. 17) regarding the leader's actions.

More important to this study, Hursthouse argues that a specific virtue need not contradict another. In fact, the virtuous leader is best equipped to recognize conflict between the virtues and reason out the correct moral reaction to the situation at hand. Hursthouse contends that virtue ethics is not a mathematical approach to moral reasoning, and it certainly is not the source of a codified procedure that, if properly applied, will ensure a moral decision or act.

Perhaps most important, Hursthouse attempts to resolve the collision between duty-based ethics and virtue ethics by pointing out that performing a duty well is tangent to, and perhaps synonymous with, with making a virtuous decision, so doing either one benefits the possessor of the virtue. Thus a virtue agent can obey a duty and live a flourishing life.

Gardiner (2005) expands Hursthouse's discussion of virtue ethics, contending that virtue ethics has gained favor because of the deficiencies in deontology and consequentialism. By default, scholars who reconsider virtue ethics as an ethical option must rethink the work of Aristotle and Plato; Gardiner applauds that revision. Gardiner also collects important new ideas about virtue from several scholars, most notably Julia Annas and Jennifer Welchman.

In her essay "Virtue Ethics: What Kind of Naturalism?" (2005), Annas discusses the effects of nature on the Aristotelian position that virtue is necessary for a good life (versus, for example, the Stoic notion that virtue is simply sufficient) but achieving material wealth or professional success are not necessarily indicative of virtue. Not to

worry, says Annas: nature might intervene to prevent the agent from achieving wealth, but he still may flourish in an ethical sense: "It is open to anyone to live virtuously given the circumstances of life which they have, and so the poor and ill can flourish as well as the rich and healthy" (p. 27).

Jennifer Welchman (2005) proposes two distinct types of virtues: first, the "major" virtues proposed by Aristotle and universally accepted by virtue ethicists (justice, temperance, honesty, and courage); Welchman considers these virtues to be over-valued because they are restricted to a relatively short middle part of life, when the agent is a full-grown adult and the major virtues are less co-dependent on mentors, education, and other variables. Then Welchman considers the "minor" virtues of curiosity, confidence, sympathy, gratitude, and loyalty, claiming that they may be more important, since are formed in early adulthood and become the "primary constituents of personal character through the whole of our lives" (p. 155). Her position is pertinent to this study because she acknowledges the difference between an 18-year-old's concept of virtue versus that of a person who has benefited from a lifetime of experience. We must assume that a leader in a particularly tight moment of crisis is making decisions from an adult perspective, which makes our judgment of the leader's actions reasonable. In other words, assessing a leader's attributes in combat is an appropriate ethical judgment on the part of a subordinate.

Michael Slote's book *From Morality to Virtue* (1992) explores virtue ethics systematically and at length. Slote points out that deontology and utilitarianism depend on a moral intuition of right versus wrong, which implies a finality to our judgment of a leader's actions. Instead, Slote argues, applying virtue ethics might reveal to leaders the

correct *dispositions* (emphasis mine) toward the right or the good—dispositions that are essential to moral leadership. In this way, the leader concentrates on concepts of goodness and excellence rather than on what he or she "ought" to do. More important, the leader can apply virtue ethics in a common-sense way. We infer, then, that Slote's ideas benefit leaders who face very tough decisions (in the case of this study, perhaps even facing the consequence of death) and must reconcile their actions with their concept of themselves as virtue agents.

Finally, Slote points out the main difference between moral judgment based on utility and those based on virtue: "common-sense virtue ethics allows for factors of individual excellence that are largely independent of an individual's (likely) contribution to the larger whole" (p. 237). In Slote's mind, a leader who shows a small kindness to the newest employee on the loading dock is the moral equivalent of Mother Teresa or Florence Nightingale. A point is that virtue is an <u>internal</u> judgment; the leader knows what he thinks most truthfully, and is able to judge himself far more accurately than someone who might be watching what he does.

But all studies of leadership require outsiders to make a reasoned judgment about the leader's actions. If each person is an equal contributor to the world, by extension, observers should consider leaders from an identical and equal starting point way when they judge the leaders' value to the organization. Virtue, manifest in action, is the key criterion for that judgment, and if virtuous, by must be a <u>positive</u> leader attribute.

Aristotelian virtue ethics, then, establishes the concept that each person begins on the same moral plane regardless of his or her position and each action that results in an effect on some other living being warrants a value judgment by outsiders, no matter the

context. For example, consider two decisions. First, the decision to move an injured animal from the middle of the road, weighing the risk of injuring it further versus leaving it exposed to oncoming traffic; second, the decision to order a frontal assault of a machine gun position, weighing the exposure to direct fire for a few seconds against the risk of enduring sustained fire for several minutes. Each situation compels an internal decision by the virtue agent, and after the fact, each invites judgment from outside observers.

Trait Theory

> They were the leaders . . . these great [men]; the modellers,
> patterns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general
> mass of men contrived to do or to attain.

> --Thomas Carlyle, 1840, p. 1

Now let's use those two decisions to compare virtue ethics to trait theory, which emerged early in the 20th century in the social sciences and led to perhaps the earliest theory of leadership, the Great Man Theory (Stodgill, 1974).

Trait theory investigates the idea that the success or failure of a leader depends on his or her personality traits, physical attributes, measurable intelligence, or personal values. Beginning in the 1900s, hundreds of research studies looked at this idea, but Stogdill (1948) was the first leadership researcher to summarize the findings. Stogdill reached two major conclusions:

1. Leaders were not qualitatively different than followers—a follower was just as likely to be tall, short, outgoing, or ambitious as the leader.

2.   Some characteristics, such as intelligence, initiative, stress tolerance, friendliness, and responsibility, were modestly related to leadership success.

In other words, having these traits did not guarantee that those who had them would rise to a leadership position. But once in that position, people who had these characteristics were moderately more likely to success than people who were lazy, grumpy, jittery, or less intelligent.

Mann (1959) later reached the same conclusion, and Stogdill's review of 163 trait studies (1974) reinforced these same two conclusions. But Stogdill emphasized that earlier researchers had focused too much on the first point (any random follower could have the same traits as the leader) and dismissed the value of the second point (when the leader does have the "right stuff," success is more likely to follow for the group). Stogdill concluded that the field of leadership study had erroneously dismissed traits in favor of studying the situation that would predict a leader's success. In some way, the 1974 study corrected the 1948 study, which had caused the academic community to veer away from traits and instead focus on situational factors.

Stogdill's 1974 study caused the academic community to revisit trait theory and eventually divide it into sub-categories of study. Later articles by Lord, DeVader, and Allinger (1986) and Hogan, Curphy, and Hogan (1994) focused attention on the specific traits of intelligence and personality. They encouraged a new genre of study that focused on personality and intelligence in a wide variety of leadership domains—a genre that evolved to the point that its practitioners became famous, such as Daniel Goleman's measurement theory of Emotional Intelligence (1995 & 1998) and Stephen Covey's (1991) mercurial rise in the domain of business leadership.

Let's focus on the two most popular components of trait theory, personality and intelligence, and explain their application to virtue ethics.

Personality. We most often invoke the word *personality* in a social context, using it to define how a person is perceived by others. In effect, our judgment of personality becomes a measure of acceptance by peers. Hogan (1991) explained this measurement of personality as a social reputation. If the leader's peers perceived the leader as someone they would like to work for or be associated with, that leader's personality became an influential trait—a condition that compelled other people to accept followership. Thus a confident, friendly, conventional person was more likely to inspire others than a pushy, impulsive, and brooding person. Hogan's point about social reputation is that the leader manifests those traits and behaviors in public, in ways that others can see and judge.

The second part of Hogan's study of a leader's personality describes the unseen beliefs and processes that cause the leader to behave the way he does. These traits of personality may not be observable, like the traits that define social reputation, but they are

- consistent across a range of situations

- different from other people's behavior

Hogan's study complemented earlier studies by psychologists, most notably Sigmund Freud (1913), who believed that the tensions created by three components of the self, the id, ego, and supego, caused a person to behave in a characteristic way even if that person was not conscious of the cause of those behaviors.

Thus between Freud and Aristotle we see an important distinction regarding personality, trait theory, and leadership. While Freud concluded that the leader may not comprehend the motives for his behavior, even though it is characteristic and uniform

across all situations, Aristotle concluded that the leader must be <u>conscious</u> of his choice to live correctly, adopting virtuous traits.

Those virtuous traits will inspire others to model them, which brings us right back to Hogan, who defined traits as "recurring regularities or trends in a person's behavior" (p. 875). The traits themselves are not tangible; we cannot touch *honesty*. Nor can they be quantified; how would we measure *compassion*? But collected in one person, manifest by that person's actions and consciously defining that person's being, traits become a means to discriminate between people. An effective leader comes to work on time every day and is committed to the welfare of her employees; an ineffective leader comes to work late and ignores his employees' advice and requirements. Over the course of time, the probability is that employees will follow the committed leader and abandon the lazy one. And one level removed, discerning senior leaders will promote the committed leader and remove the lazy one.

Moreover, trait theory becomes useful in predicting how people will react from one situation to the next. Later studies by Hogan, Hogan, & Roberts (1996) and Roberts (1996) examined this cross-situational consistency, likening it to seasonal weather patterns in different cities. We expect it to be very cold in Wisconsin in winter and hot and humid in Georgia in summer. Thus we can make a fairly accurate prediction of the temperatures in Green Bay in January and Atlanta in July, respectively. Hughes, Ginnett, & Curphy (2002) applied that metaphor by categorizing leadership situations as either weak situations or strong situations. A weak situation is one in which the leader is thrust into an ambiguous, unfamiliar situation or role. A strong situation is one marked by clearly specified rules, demands, or policies. Curphy (1996 and 1997) found that

strong situations, governed by already-known rules, minimize the effect traits have on leadership. Turning those findings around, traits may play a more important role in weak situations, making the leader's positive traits even more valuable in fast paced, rapidly changing organizations that have no clear policies or direction. Certainly combat meets those criteria, making Curphy's finding relevant to this study.

Earlier we concluded that virtue manifest in action is the key criterion for an outsider's judgment of a person's actions, leading to a conclusion about that person's values.

Then we examined Trait Theory, which contends that there is a connection between [internal] values, [external] attributes, and success as a leader.

Now we will consider leadership in a specific context—Army officer education programs—to examine the values and attributes that those programs consider as imperative for successful leadership in combat and understand the doctrine that instills them.

Army Leadership Doctrine

The office of authority provides a position
about which peoples' expectations cluster.

--Heifeitz (1997, p. 62)

The principal document for Army leadership doctrine is *Field Manual 22-100: Leadership* (1999), which defines the Army's theoretical framework for leadership and leader development. Through the practice of nested concepts, whereby practices at the most basic level acknowledge and incorporate the theoretical concepts from each next higher level, the Army builds its leadership doctrine from the ground up. Below FM 22-

100 in the spectrum of Army literature are more specific Army regulations and manuals that Army officers use to put the doctrine of FM 22-100 into practice.

The domain of Army leadership development begins with a capstone leadership manual, FM 22-100. Moving downward from FM 22-100, each successive level establishes the fundamental principles that guide the actions of Army leaders. Pertinent to this study, at each successive level the doctrine emphasizes an absolute requirement: leaders must internalize and practice seven specific values. To emphasize that requirement, those values are valorized by capitalization (i.e., the Seven Army Values) in every field manual, regulation, and letter of instruction. The acronym "LDRSHIP" captures those values:

- LEADERSHIP
- DUTY
- RESPECT
- SELFLESS SERVICE
- HONOR
- INTEGRITY
- PERSONAL COURAGE

FM 22-100 describes three leader dimensions, articulated in single words, each of them always capitalized—BE, KNOW, and DO—that symbolize character, competence, and leader actions. The Seven Army Values are part of the BE leader dimension, and FM 22-100 emphasizes the role of the moral development in the BE dimension:

> "The Army is a values-based institution. FM 22-100 establishes and clarifies those values. Army leaders must set high standards, lead by example, do what is legally and morally right, and influence other people to do the same. They must establish and sustain a climate that ensures people are treated with dignity and respect and create an environment in which people are challenged and motivated to be all they can be" (p. *x*).

FM 22-100 specifies that leaders at every level—direct, organizational, and strategic—must personify the Seven Army Values. Then, with FM 22-100 as the point at the top of the [theoretical] pyramid, the Army publishes increasingly more specific manuals, publications, and directives that compose the doctrinal library for Army leadership development. The most pertinent of those directives are *Army Regulation 600-100: Army Leadership* (1993), which establishes the basis for leader development doctrine and training; *Department of the Army Pamphlet 350-58: Leader Development for America's Army* (1994), which describes the Army's leader development model; and *Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3: Commissioned Officer Development* (1998), which discusses qualification criteria and outlines development and career management programs for commissioned officers.

At first glance, the Army's exhaustive effort to "nest" each successive manual, regulation, or directive with the one just above it implies an effort to establish a framework that resolves absolutely the collision between virtue ethics (behaviors based on sound moral character) and deontology (behavior based on a rigid belief in duty or observance of a strict set of rules).   Sometimes even the institutional terminology seems to prevent this resolution, since by definition, the word "doctrine" implies a heavy leaning toward deontology, while clearly the intent of Army doctrine is to establish a virtue ethics curriculum for leaders using the Army values as the foundation for character development.

The litmus test for that curriculum is the leader's actions in combat, which brings us back to the BE component of leadership: virtues that must exist inside the leader, in the truest sense. This introspective component of leadership begs some questions: What

does the litmus paper of combat reveal after the leader takes the test?   Did the leader rely

on the Seven Army Values acquired in the Army's curriculum, or did the leader fall back

on other, more intrinsic values—a BE component that existed before the leader

completed the Army's curriculum to develop his leadership attributes? This study will

investigate those questions.

Student Development and the Sources of Power

> Rules are <u>bureaucratic</u> things; roles and visions
> are <u>moral</u> things that obligate people morally.
>
> --Robert Sergiovanni
> Address to Cohorts 5 and 6, September 2004

A close review of the for-credit classroom component of the Army's leader

development curricula, whether at West Point or at the 270 colleges and universities that

host ROTC programs, identifies several common theories of leadership and the values

and attributes required by each. Future officers first learn <u>social exchange theory</u>,

beginning with <u>leader-member exchange theory</u> (LMX), which theorizes that leaders

develop separate exchange relationships with each subordinate (Graen & Cashman,

1975). This theory establishes the military students' view of loyalty, duty, and obligation

and ultimately evolved into the "life cycle model" proposed by Graen & Uhl-Bien

(1991), which proposed three distinct stages of the leader-member relationship. In its

third stage, their extension of LMX theory corresponds to transformational leadership.

Later researchers, most notably Green, Anderson, and Shivers (1996), investigated how

leader-member exchange relationships were affected by demographic and organizational

variables—an idea that applies to the Army, since its rank structure imposes clear

organizational pressure on individual relationships. Most pertinent to my study is the effect of individual attributes, particularly on the part of the leader, on the leader-member relationship (Schriesheim, Castro, & Cogliser, 1999).

Army officer education curricula, both at West Point and in ROTC, include the study of the sources of power, focusing on French and Raven's (1959) taxonomy that classifies sources of power.

The first of those is *legitimate* power—power that stems from a source of authority recognized by every member of the organization.

The second is *coercive* power, power that depends on punishment to establish authority. Though students may associate coercive power with military authority (and military law), modern officer education programs strive to reverse that perception because coercive power produces undesirable side effects. The ROTC curriculum (Visconti, 2002), for example, teaches the theory of coercive power but emphasizes strict guidelines for its application—an idea first proposed by Arvey & Ivancevich (1980). More pertinent, the ROTC curriculum identifies four specific values and attributes on the part of the leader:

- fairness
- patience
- credibility
- sincerity

The third and most important is *expert* power, whereby the leader's demonstration of knowledge and skills creates influence over peers, superiors, and subordinates, earning personal power in the organization.

The ROTC curriculum admits that, in the study of leader-subordinate roles, "there has been too much reliance on static field studies with questionnaires . . . research is needed to discover how exchange relationships evolve over time" (Visconti, 2002). This includes how the leader perceives his or her own evolution over time, a phenomenon that the next section will address.

Chickering's Student Development Theory

As early as 1969 and later with Linda Reisser in 1993, Arthur Chickering applied Erickson's ideas in a developmental theory of student development, meant to empirically explain the factors that contribute to the mental and socialization changes that affect students as they progress through a curriculum. At West Point, the military curriculum is a practical application of Chickering's research, since it aims to compel and guide cadets to higher mastery of the military profession.

Chickering's *Education and Identity* (1969) focused on the developmental concerns of students during the time they progress through a university setting, which in the context of this study is the 47-month West Point Experience or the four-year ROTC curriculum, though for some college students it may expand to five, six, or seven years.

Rather than proposing a list of tasks to master or stages to achieve like Erickson, Chickering proposes seven dimensions of development, which he calls "vectors." Vectors 1-3 occur most commonly in the freshman year. Vector 4 is the transition point between 1-3 and between 5-7, which develop most frequently during sophomore, junior, and senior years. Chickering's seven vectors:

      1. Achieving competency
      2. Managing emotions
      3. Developing autonomy

4. Establishing identity
5. Freeing of interpersonal relationships
6. Developing purpose
7. Developing integrity

Cadets achieve most of the sub-tasks for Vectors 1-3 during their first summer at West Point, called Cadet Basic Training. Simply put, new cadets who fail to master those vectors cannot continue at the Academy. But as they progress through their four years in the curriculum, they master the physical, intellectual, and moral dimensions of officership and earn their place in the profession by excellence in performance and ethical standing—in other words, though their virtue. As they do, the move from Chickering's fourth vector to his sixth: "developing [professional] purpose." These final four vectors are vital to officer professional development since they promote what Massey described as "value programming" (1979), whereby a generation becomes like-minded because of the outside influences that shape what they value as a cohort.

The Army Version of Chickering: Constructive-Development Theory

Harvard psychologist Robert Kegan's constructive-developmental theory (*The Evolving Self,* 1982) explained that leaders build understanding of themselves from their experiences. More important, by progressing first through a finite series of universal experiences and then succeeding at progressively more complex stages, they understand how they construct their understanding. His two-stage theory of identity development creates a system leaders can use to explain where they stand in terms of professional development.

Certainly Kegan's idea applies to the military. Within this framework, officer development involves qualitative shifts in how officers make sense of themselves and their experiences. Each shift leads to a progressively broader perspective toward oneself

as a professional and one's relationships to others within and outside the profession.

Over a period of ten years, Scott Snook, an associate professor at the Harvard Business School and a former faculty member at West Point, conducted a study of officer identity development using Kegan's framework by interviewing hundreds of Army officers, both before commissioning and long after they graduated (2002). These interviews were used to determine officers' stage of development and to make recommendations about how the Army selects and assign officers to positions that demand increasing levels of psychological maturity.

In many ways, Kegan and Snook explain how leaders-in-training acquire the traits that are critical to organizational success. Northouse (1997) summarizes this "trait approach," which applies in realms other than the military, too. Kirkpatrick and Locke (1991) found that leaders in business acquired six important traits, and the process of acquiring these traits was essential to effective end-state leadership—perhaps even more so that applying the traits after the fact. This "trait acquisition process" is a key component of officer education programs.

West Point's Framework for Student-Leader Development

> Officers not only do things right, they do the right
> things. Guided by a strong set of professional principles
> and institutional values, Army officers seek to discover
> the truth, decide what is right, and demonstrate the courage
> to act accordingly.

--USMA Circular 1-101 (p. 17)

The United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, publishes its vision of what a leader must be and the process that produces that end state in *USMA Circular 1-101, [The] Cadet Leader Development System* (2002).

40

USMA Circular 1-101 echoes the BE-KNOW-DO dimensions of Army leadership doctrine found in FM 22-100. But West Point believes that the sum of those three components is greater than each part taken individually. The Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS) is an organizing framework that coordinates and integrates developmental activities throughout each cadet's four years at West Point. In short, CLDS "provides the structure, process, and content for cadets' 47-month journey from `new cadet' to `commissioned leader of character" (p. 1).

To create those commissioned leaders of character, CLDS teaches eight principles of officer development:

● DUTY—Officers subordinate personal interests, accept responsibility for their actions, and show allegiance to the commissioning oath.

● HONOR—Officers embrace the virtues of integrity and honesty.

● LOYALTY—Officers confer loyalty to seniors and subordinates alike, creating trust in the officer as a public servant.

● SERVICE TO COUNTRY—Officers have an obligation to use their authority and expertise for the benefit of their fellow citizens.

● COMPETENCE—The serious consequences of professional failure make competence an imperative, which means the officer accepts a moral obligation to continually study their profession.

● TEAMWORK—Officers model civility by subordinating personal interests to the mission.

● SUBORDINATION—Officers accept and observe the principle of civilian control of the military

● LEADERSHIP—Officers set the example by personifying the attributes of spiritual, physical, and intellectual fitness.

Of course, the term "professional development" begs the question: What does the program develop? CLDS explains better than nearly any other leadership program exactly what its graduates will experience.

Most pertinent to this study, CLDS aims to develop a *sense of professional self*—how cadets construct an understanding of themselves in relation to their roles as officers and to the world at large. As they make sense of that relationship, cadets acquire character, professional identity, and competence. Again, this idea supports the BE component of leadership from FM 22-100. Thus the curriculum relies heavily on the rhetoric of self-concept: words like commitment, inspiration, curiosity, imagination, honor, creativity, selflessness, critical thinking, decisiveness, motivation, values, courage, character, and duty.

The key goal of CLDS is to compel cadets to reconcile what they believed about themselves before they arrived at West Point with the ethical standards for officership. The curriculum acknowledges that those two sets of values may not be aligned when a new cadet arrives at West Point. But the demands of CLDS are clear: by the time the cadet graduates and receives a commission as an Army officer, what once was an evolving set of personal values, akin to wet cement, must have hardened into concrete. West Point defines that process of mixing moral ingredients to make the cement that becomes an officer's bedrock values as *integrity*. If cadets cannot align their individual and professional values, CLDS will reveal that problem to them. And if that problem cannot be resolved, the cadet should not be conferred the privilege of officership lest his moral dilemma put the cadet and his soldiers at risk.

The Profession of Officership

> The responsibility entrusted to officers requires them
> to be exceptionally effective leaders who embody the
> highest standards of moral-ethical behavior so as to lead
> the profession effectively, and to set a personal example
> for their peers, their units, and society. Both dimensions
> of this role—leadership and character—are critical
> and inseparable.

--USMA Circular 1-101 (p. 15).

Our previous discussion ended with a warning about the consequence of accepting military leadership without fully embracing the principles of leadership defined by CLDS. Despite that warning, do not conclude that future officers educate themselves in a vacuum or that decisions about fitness for leadership are reached lightly. Quite the opposite; Army officer curricula provide a comprehensive combination of theory and practice so that cadets reach a clear point of self-assessment.

For example, throughout the 47-month USMA experience, West Point valorizes the seven Army values defined in Army leadership doctrine, encouraging cadets to embrace them fully, even to the point of abandoning [earlier] loyalties that they may have brought with them to West Point, be they personal or cultural. In this way, West Point's developmental process promotes what Massey described as "value programming" (1979), whereby a generation becomes like-minded because of the outside influences that shape what they value as a cohort. Think of your grandfather or great-grandmother's respect for hard work and financial thrift; they were "value programmed" to cherish those qualities because of their common experience in the Great Depression. When a new cadet arrives at West Point, he or she may privilege values that stand at a polar opposite to the Army Values; imagine the children of the Depression celebrating their "right" to

collect the bling-bling rather than pinching pennies. Can we fault an eighteen-year-old

child of privilege who admires money more than abstract terms like honor and integrity?

By the last year of that 47-month experience, each cadet fully understands the

obligation of Don Snider's Theory of the Military Professional Ethic (2003). This

framework of officership as a defined profession is summarized in *The Future of the*

Army as a Profession, a research project directed by Don Snider and Gayle L. Watkins

(2002) and later expanded and refined by Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (2005).

Snider's theory draws upon Massey's theory of value programming, Erickson's human

development theory, and Chickering's student development theory to define a

commissioned officer's unique profession, which Snider titles simply "Officership."

Officership becomes the unique professional identity that cadets [ultimately] share, and it

demands mastery of four clusters of expert knowledge:

- Military-technical knowledge (leadership theory, military doctrine and tactics)

- Knowledge of military ethics (legal and moral context of the professional ethic)

- Knowledge of human development (emphasis on character development and moral decision making)

- Political-social knowledge (senior leaders employ it to resource and manage the institution)

Before he or she can master these clusters of knowledge, a cadet must internalize

the individual values captured in the acronym LDRSHIP. In short, if Massey's theory of

Value Programming is valid, then the military curriculum at West Point must selectively

replace the values they accrued over their first eighteen years with values that they'll

need to succeed for the next nine (four years at West Point plus five in the Army) or

more, if they continue to serve past their military obligation.

The connection between these theories is interesting. Erickson explains when the

student is old enough to understand the abstract concept of ethics; Massey's theory

explains how students come to believe what they believe before and after they arrive at

West Point; Kegan and Snook's behavioral theory of leadership first demonstrates "what

right looks like" and then mentors the student as he or she mimics the new values that

West Point demands; Chickering, Kegan, and Snook apply that learning to a college

environment; and Snider's theory of Officership requires the student to apply individual

principles of character, newly shaped at USMA, to the profession that cadets swear to

practice after they leave West Point.

Theories of Leader Attributes from Other Professional Domains

> The difference that exists between military and
> civilian leadership are differences in degree, not
> kind . . . one notices the emphasis on subordination—
> not only to the will of the leaders, but frequently of
> an individual's desires and goals.
>
> --Colonel Larry Donnithorne (1994, p. 9).

The Army's top leaders wholly endorse a leadership curriculum based on key

leader attributes. In a forum with General Eric Shinseki, the 34th Chief of Staff of the

Army, I gathered his thoughts on West Point's student development program, the

requirements of officership, and the qualities that officers bring to their service to the

nation.

In response to the question, "How do you know that West Point graduates return

value on the nation's investment?," General Shinseki replied:

> As Chief of Staff, I would meet often with CEOs of
> major companies. Invariably those CEOs—different ones,

not the same ones—would tell me that they want captains and majors and lieutenant colonels. And I would ask, 'Why? What is it about the captains and majors in the Army attracts your attention at a time when you have lots of opportunities to find people?'

Their unanimous response was leadership. Technology we can teach in 60 days . . . but we can't get leadership the way you teach it in the Army—not just out of West Point, but in the Army. That's what they tell me. That personal confidence, the ability to build teams, that sense of focusing on the objective past five o'clock at the end of the day, getting the tough job done at two o'clock in the morning. . . . CEOs tell me flat out: `We come after your captain before we go after a Harvard Business School graduate.' [Their responses tell me that] Army leadership only improves with time.

Experts from a wide range of professional domains concur that leaders acquire attributes that compel proper behavior. More important, the moral development implied by putting these leader attributes on display is a critical component of a successful cultural fabric. In her book *Building Moral Intelligence* (2001), educator Michelle Borba contends that such learning must begin very early in a student's development, claiming that moral intelligence, the "capacity to understand right from wrong (p. 4), is the core component of ethical citizenship. She contends that moral intelligence consists of several essential virtues:

- Empathy
- Compassion
- Self-control
- Respect
- Tolerance
- Fairness

Borba's most important point is that moral intelligence can be learned, and the best moral curriculum will be certain to explain the value and meaning of the virtue. She explains, "the key is to make sure that the [student] knows exact ways that she can

display the virtue," (p. 66), either by listing its characteristics, summarizing its qualities, or role-playing actions that demonstrate the virtue. Her point about learning virtue is valuable, but we also must note Aristotle's point that a child is excluded from the ability to reason well enough to accept the responsibility for leadership. A child cannot apply *phronesis*, the practical wisdom that allows a person to reason well enough to apply a correct amount of a specific virtue in a given situation. Gardiner (2005) echoes that same point in the introduction to *Virtue Ethics, Old and New*.

Experts in business leadership agree that leaders must personify certain qualities or establish certain conditions in order to be successful. Stephen Covey (1991) identified seven desirable attributes for leaders:

- Continuous Learning through self education
- Service--facilitating other people's work
- Stay Positive; don't criticize, complain, or compare
- Affirming others proactive individuals with great potential
- Balance individual roles and maintain appropriate focus in each
- Spontaneity and Serenity--a sense of adventure
- Consistent improvement of the physical, emotional, and mental dimensions

Warren Bennis (1989) describes leader actions that stem from leader attributes: open communication up and down the chain of command; building consensus; recognizing the value of compromise; and expressing emotions even though the leader makes decisions based on objective facts.

Max DePree (1989) acknowledges, however, that many leaders talk the talk, but too few walk the walk when it comes to putting values and attributes into practice. Kuczmarski and Kuczmarski (1995) agree, contending that America suffers from an erosion of values caused by our preoccupation with policies and procedures; employees

know what to <u>say</u>, but don't understand the leadership philosophy that makes it possible to think without a script.

Conversely, by modeling appropriate values and attributes, the leader creates a culture that inspires subordinates to follow their lead and do the right thing—even if the leader is absent. The Army refers to this phenomenon as "command climate," and as Kotter (1990) explains, effective leaders compel the organization to embrace the vision that the leader creates by his or her personal example. And Covey (1991) endorses this idea of a leader who shapes the organization's climate by personifying a principled vision.

Peter F. Drucker's Leader to Leader Institute (http://www.pfdf.org/) is literally selling the idea of military values in the corporate world by arranging speaking engagements for retired Army generals, who will lend their thoughts on leadership to executives and managers—for a fee.

The idea of virtue ethics appears in the domain of sports, as well. In his book *On Leadership* (2005), John Wooden defines character. Character isn't something that you memorize or recite; it's something that you <u>are</u>, which makes character the paramount virtue. In Coach Wooden's view too many education programs teach values as the means for acquiring a reputation—something students can mimic, place on display for others to see, and then discard when it has outlived its usefulness.

Coach Wooden's point clearly connects to Aristotelian virtue, which Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) describes as "excellences of character" (p. 12) dependent on the ability to reason correctly. The truly virtuous agent acts from a rock-solid state of

character, unconcerned with the consequences of his action or how he will be perceived by others.

In *Good to Great* (2001), Jim Collins describes a leadership framework dependent on specific leader qualities:

> ● DISCIPLINED PEOPLE, which means leaders getting the right people on the bus and in the right seats: "People are *not* your most important asset. The *right* people are" (p. 13).
>
> ● DISCIPLINED THOUGHT, which contends that leaders must maintain faith in what you are doing but still have the discipline to confront the facts about brutal reality.
>
> ● DISCIPLINED ACTION, which implies the same BE component described in FM 22-100: a culture of discipline that begins at the personal level

Collins contends that great leaders create an ethos of faith for anyone who is confronted by dishonorable actions. Disciplined leaders both personify the discipline of the organization and become accelerators for its success.

Howard Gardner's framework in *Leading Minds* (1995) examines the factors of human development that make possible the phenomenon of leadership. Then he aligns those human factors with the "frame stories" of influential leaders. By examining the narrative of these lives, he finds common threads of leadership. Finally, Gardner aligns those two components—human development with frame stories—to identify general considerations of leadership in specific domains: academic scholarship; the arts; institutions; business; the military; the church; women and minorities; and the leadership of a nation. Like CLDS, Gardner understands the human factors of leadership, particularly in what he calls "the attainment of expertise in domains" (29). *Leading*

Minds lists the military specifically as a domain, and clearly for future Army officers, mastery of the officership is "mandated by an individual's culture or subculture" (30). Thus, West Point's leadership curriculum meshes perfectly with Gardner's antecedents for leading and following.

Most important, Gardner's thesis aligns nicely with Chickering's student development theory. Gardner concludes that a developed leader must reach an end state (recall Chickering's idea of escalating "vectors" that students reach as they development in a learning community). Chickering proposed seven such vectors; Gardner proposes four that students must achieve to reach full development, i.e., attainment of leadership:

- a tie to the community—common values
- a rhythm for life—becoming immersed in the culture they hope to lead
- a clear relation between stories and embodiments—actions match character
- the centrality of choice—the idea of earning leadership through virtue, not brutality

Rationale of Research Method Selection

Qualitative research as a method of interpreting data springs from the evolution of social science—more specifically, the opportunity to reach reasonable conclusions based on an ordered examination of the human experience. Throughout the early part of the 20th century, sociologists relied on research methods borrowed from the natural or physical sciences, but they found that strictly scientific methods could not adequately explore the huge body of knowledge implied by the human mind and experience. Thus sociologists rightly concluded that scientific methods were not adequate to unlock the huge, untapped reservoir of information that they witnessed in human experience but could not measure using strictly scientific research methods.

By the end of the 20th century, a more naturalistic approach began to emerge within the social sciences. It moved beyond a positivist, quantitative approach toward a naturalistic view of data-gathering and epistemology. Modern academe accepts that acquiring and communicating personal stories, and the outcomes they compel, as sources of data appropriate to qualitative studies.

Several researchers have concluded that inductive analysis is a legitimate method for interpreting data in qualitative research. The researcher constructs a methodology to gather data, and he anticipates themes, patterns, and categories of meaning that will come from the participants' words. Then, while recording the raw data, the researcher codes and categorizes it in a uniform fashion, true to the original thoughts and feelings of the study participants (Janesick, 1996). Patton (2002) defines this process as "discovering" emerging themes and patterns in the raw data of qualitative research methods:

> Qualitative inquiry is particularly oriented toward exploration, *discovery* [emphasis mine], and inductive logic. Inductive analysis begins with specific observations and builds toward general patterns. Categories or dimensions of analysis emerge from open-ended observations as the inquirer comes to understand patterns that exist in the phenomenon being investigated (p. 455).

Patton's definition of inductive analysis matches the open-form interviews that will comprise my study. After establishing Don Snider's definition of officership and the Army Values as general themes and points of departure for the initial interviews, I will direct the dialogue toward the context of officership in combat, focusing on the individual experiences of the participants. Questions concerning each participant's officer education program, his assessment of the values and attributes he acquired before commissioning, and the effects those two sources had on combat experience that occurred later will serve as the framework

for the interview process. Finally, I will ask the participants to recount examples

of incidents in combat that corroborated or refuted their assumptions about

officership. A copy of the interview questions in the order I intend to ask them

appears in Chapter 1.

Conclusion

In *The Dance of Change* (1999), Peter Senge tells the story of the CEO of a large

corporation who announced a new vision for the company. The CEO assembled

hundreds of managers and salespeople to announce his new vision, which demanded

teamwork between all the divisions of the organization, from sales to production to

management. The CEO beamed with pride over his new vision, but when he asked for

questions, one salesman questioned the gap between his leaders' claim of commitment

and their behaviors . . . and he included the CEO among those who were "talking the

talk" but not "walking the talk."

Senge's story ended with success. The CEO promised to align his actions with

the personal principles captured in the new company vision—and he encouraged

everyone below him to correct him if he wavered from that commitment. By promising

sincerely to change himself and to listen to others when they reminded him of that

promise, he won the respect of his employees and the trust of his shareholders.

The Senge story demonstrates the difference between values and attributes.

Values are "constructs representing generalized behaviors or states of affairs that are

considered *by the individual* to be important" (emphasis mine; Gordon, 1975, p. 2). In

other words, values are defined by the leader and held internally.

Attributes are the outward manifestation of values by the leader, observed and acknowledged from two different points of view:

- the point of view of the leader who intentionally performs an action (thus displaying the attribute) to demonstrate a particular value

- the point of view of an external audience (superiors, peers, and subordinates) who witness an action and conclude that it demonstrates an admirable attribute.

In other words, attributes are "walking the walk" so that people see them.

Tony Pfaff describes a similar dilemma with a much more serious context in his essay "The Officer as Leader of Character: Leadership, Character, and Ethical Decision-Making" (2005). Pfaff describes the actions of an infantry battalion commander in Iraq who fired a pistol close to the head of an enemy prisoner in an effort to get information about upcoming enemy operations. In the investigation that followed, some critics demanded that the battalion commander be court-martialed; others, including members of Congress, suggested that he receive a medal for valor.

Each of these cases illustrates the burden of leadership, which so completely depends on the leader's confidence in the integrity of his actions. If those actions stem from pure virtues, the leader is at ease with his conscious and can act with conviction. More important, the leader's subordinates will sense the purity of the act and respond accordingly.

Thus the two cases demonstrate a point of alignment between leaders of different domains: all leaders must seal the gap between what they promise and what they deliver. Notice that I did not say *close* the gap. Coming close is not good enough. On the topic of promises, of virtuous actions, by leaders, subordinates expect AIRTIGHT competence and commitment. Competence results when appropriate behaviors intersect with bedrock

53

values, and the more dangerous or specialized the profession, the greater the requirement for all three: values, behaviors, and the competence that results.

What profession is more dangerous or demanding than leading American soldiers in combat? Very few, which explains the relevance of this study. Whatever their source of commission, Army officers must be prepared for ethical leadership from the minute they toss their hats into the air on graduation day. As the old adage at West Point goes, "the good news is that there is no need for a job fair at West Point; the bad news is that on-the-job training is not an option."

Professional officership requires the application of values when making moral decisions, with outcomes manifest in actions that personify the combat leader's being. We call that application of being *character*, a quality that serves future officers as they learn to talk the talk and walk the walk. In taking that walk, leaders demonstrate the attributes that they believe to be important demonstrations of moral reasoning, and by demonstrating them, leaders inspire confidence in their subordinates.

This study will examine the self-concept of values and character gained by four leaders who were tested in combat, triangulating their experiences to identify the virtues they found to be most important and the attributes they displayed, hoping to lead themselves and others the highest moral ground.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Research Perspective

The past, which [cannot] know the future, [acts] in
ways that ask to be imagined before they are condemned.

--Paul Fussell (p. 736)

Paul Fussell's words defended America's decision to drop the bomb on

Hiroshima, but Frankel and Devers (2000a) echo his idea in their theoretical defense of

qualitative research as a practice that bring the researcher to an "understanding [of] lived

experiences" and a "focus on the natural history of events or relationships" (p. 114). In

my study, understanding the lived experiences of combat soldiers clarified the values

those soldiers found important in combat, the sources of their beliefs, and the ideological

changes that informed those values. Their narrative histories revealed changes in their

knowledge of themselves and others and their understanding of the combat they survived.

This social construction of knowledge served as the theoretical grounding for this study,

examining the past before reaching any judgment of it.

My study meshed two broad strands of constructivist thought: radical

constructivism and social constructionism. Radical constructivism, derived ultimately

from Plato and other Greek philosophers, contends that knowledge is the result of an

interior dialogue composed by a mind examining its environment; thinkers constantly

redefine what they know. In other words, knowledge comes from the self.

The social construction of knowledge, defined by Schwandt (2001), contends that

people recognize, produce, and *re*produce social actions and so invent knowledge by

interacting with other humans and with the environment in which they live. In other

words, knowledge develops in a social context, informed by the words, actions, obligations, reactions, and expectations of others.

Both theories of meaning-making, individual and social, applied to this study. In their formative studies as officers-in-training, my participants gathered knowledge through both individual and social constructs. After serving in combat, their understanding of what they knew became less focused, and more conditional. Longino (2002) describes this phenomenon as a provisional process by which knowledge creates "the conditions of its own transformation" (p. 208).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to investigate the claim that military officer education programs instill values and attributes that help their graduates lead soldiers. Does the theoretical framework of Army leadership doctrine apply in combat, where Army officers practice leadership skills? Or do the realities of modern combat compromise that doctrine and the values it promotes? This study examined the theoretical beginning of virtue ethics and the attributes taught in military education programs, then compared them to the literal attributes of combat leadership practiced by commissioned officers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The vehicle for the study was a phenomenological exploration of the pre-commissioning and combat experiences of four commissioned combat leaders. In narrative case study form, the study examined the philosophies, beliefs, and conclusions of the participants.

Specifically, this study illuminated and clarified these questions:

1. What were the sources of the leader attributes these officers considered important?
2. What attributes were most important to "officership" from their perspectives?

3. What were the common elements of officership these leaders required in combat?
4. How did the officers apply these attributes in a combat theater?
5. What differences exist between the attributes taught in formal curricula and the attributes these officers required in combat?

In large part, revisions to those curricula have evolved from theory and data gathered from Cold War or Vietnam-era users. This study expanded the reach for data about the relevance of officer education curricula to a valuable source: military officers who have served recently in combat. The findings revealed fresh perceptions of the military skills, attributes, and values that translate best to combat leadership in the 21st century. It described the attributes that mattered most in combat for four commissioned combat leaders. By examining the experiences, perceptions, and attitudes of those leaders, this study provides information that can improve future officer education curricula.

Research Methods

This study compared the theoretical intent of officer education programs with the experiences of its practitioners in stressful environments where the theory would be most severely tested. It employed a qualitative, interpretive approach to explore the outer limits of that stress. Originally, I intended to limit participants to officers who served in Special Forces, Infantry, or Armor branches, thinking that they were most likely to have endured stressful combat. But after composing my research and interview questions and explaining them to colleagues with recent combat experience, I concluded that the nature of warfare has changed; an officer in any branch of the Army could serve as a participant. Many recent combat veterans have experienced catharsis or emotional transformation as a result of their experiences, so qualitative methods worked best to examine people who

experience substantial behavioral, philosophical, and ideological changes. This chapter describes my open-inductive design for data collection. It also explains my authority as an interpreter of the data to establish my position in the research process.

Research Procedures

In Chapter 2, I discussed Patton's (2002) process of inductively discovering themes and patterns in raw data gathered from open-form interviews. I applied that process in my data collection. For example, after establishing Army leadership doctrine, including the seven Army Values, as a general point of departure for the initial interviews, the interview questions directed the dialogue toward the context of officer-leader behaviors in combat, focusing on the individual experiences of the participants. Questions concerning each participant's officer education program, his assessment of the values and attributes he acquired before commissioning, and the effects those two sources had on combat experience that occurred later served as the framework for the interview process. Finally, I asked the participants to recount examples of incidents in combat that corroborated or refuted their assumptions about officership. A copy of the interview questions in the order I asked them appears in Chapter 1.

Because of the sensitive nature of the data I gathered, I had to apply procedures to assure to the participants that their privacy would be protected, both during the interview process and after the study was complete. Patton (2002) outlines several ethical considerations that may arise in the process of collecting qualitative data during interviews, and I applied them. For example:

1. I thoroughly summarized, in writing, the purpose of the study to each participant
2. Before the initial face-to-face interview, I explained to each participant my intent
3. Throughout the process, I safeguarded whatever changes in attitudes the participants reached about themselves, their experiences, and the Army in general
4. I made clear that these changes were normal, pertinent products of the study.

I employed a purposeful sampling selection process, using an *intensity-sampling* regimen coupled with *snowball sampling* to achieve the desired number of participants. Patton (2002) explains that intensity sampling selects "information-rich" participants who clearly exhibit the topic to be studied. Snowball sampling implies the process of finding participants through "well-situated" sources whose expertise or connections increase the likelihood of finding participants with the appropriate prospective.

To apply Patton's practices, I interviewed former officers who were identified through a set of criteria that emphasized the key components of my research topic. The well-situated sources I employed for snowball sampling were professional military contacts on the staff and faculty at West Point and veterans' groups that make contact with officers with combat experience, such as the USMA Association of Graduates or the U. S. Army Human Resources Command.

Patton (2002) suggests that purposeful sampling requires that the researcher determines the nature of the participant prior to the research interview process, so I asked my professional contacts to apply these five criteria to identify potential participants:

1) Participants could be identified through referrals from individuals, news agencies, or veterans affairs organizations familiar with combat veterans' experiences.

2) Participants could reside anywhere in the United States. This criterion allowed a broad geographic area, increasing the chances of obtaining an adequate sample size.

3) Participants had to be combat veterans of the Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, or other relevant theaters since the first Persian Gulf War.

4) Since combat experience "on the ground" normally involves operations at the battalion level and below, participants must have held the rank of captain through lieutenant colonel.

5) Participants must have returned to the United States before they participated in the study.

6) Participants must have stated their willingness to discuss personal or ideological perceptions of officer education or the values required in combat.

After I gather a list of candidates using the sample selection procedures I described earlier, I winnowed the sample down to four primary participants.

I inferred that the process of finding participants for this study would be problematic for several reasons. Because of the "need to know" constraints of classified military operations, identifying potential participants could have been a challenge, and compelling them to relate experiences that occurred in the course of classified combat operations could have been additional constraint. The application of a robust referral network of professional contacts made these concerns moot. I found that many combat veterans were willing to assist me by contacting officers who they believed meet my criteria. Identifying those potential participants was the first step. The second step in this networking was literally locating the potential participants. I found that even when the participant was willing to be interviewed, operational requirements (for those still on active duty) or the sheer distance between my location and theirs made dialogue a challenge. I was required by the institutional review board to contact potential

participants through an intermediary, so that process also took time. Choreographing that contact was the third and final step of participant identification.

I identified several potential participants through snowball sampling. I contacted the graduate support cell of the Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point and other professional contacts to identify candidates who meet my inclusion criteria.

After those intermediaries made contact with potential participants for the study, I mailed each one a letter describing the purpose and methods of the study and a consent form outlining the interview process and the rights of the participant. Thereafter, I explained the purpose of the study and answered any questions, delivered the initial questions to which the participants would respond, and arranged a time, date, and location for a face-to-face interview when those were possible.

The face-to-face interviews took place at locations convenient for the participants. In the case of Michael Halo, I met him at a public library halfway between his location and mine. In the case of Malcolm Evers, I flew to his home and interviewed him there, then followed up by email. In the case of Andrew Barber, I conducted all interviews by email. In the case of Zarius Kolter, I conducted one face-to-face interview and then corresponded by email, since is still on active duty and could not reliably be reached at this home.

I conducted all of the follow-up interviews via email or telephone. I encouraged the participants to share any prose narratives, creative writing, photographs, or artifacts that they produced that illuminate their combat experiences.

Semi-structured interviews. I used semi-structured, in-depth interviews to encourage the

participants to relate their experiences in a manner that is not rushed or regimented. The

interview questions were open-ended, allowing flexibility to explore individual

recollections of combat as they arise, but I kept the interviews "on topic" by invoking a

uniform list of interview questions that standardized and directed the interview process.

In short, the process closely resembles Patton's (2002) "interview guide" approach to

interviewing, whereby the interviewer follows a pre-published set of questions to ensure

a systematic, consistent cataloguing of data, yet allows the interview to remain

conversational.

I explained to each participant the general topics the questions will address, but I

did not discuss the list of questions before they responded the first time to them. When

possible, I audiotaped the interview sessions and asked the participants to bring with

them written or artistic work that they may have created that related to their combat

experiences.

The interview guide. The interview questions created a focus for the participants'

narratives. I asked additional questions at the end of each interview to clarify vignettes

and to encourage additional details that amplified the participants' reports. Patton (2002)

advises using interview questions that elicit a broad range of feelings and experiences, so

I composed questions that created a comprehensive chronology of events before, during,

and after combat. More important, the questions explored the participants' perceptions

about the values they considered important before they deployed to a combat theater and

the changes to those perceptions, however slight, that occurred during combat or

afterward.

The setting. The interviews took place in a variety of settings, each one dictated by convenience and the preference of the participant. I contacted each participant vial email or telephone to establish a date, time, and location. I met in a private setting that precludes any interruption, including cell phones. The settings were private enough to allow for personal conversation that could be overheard by third parties, including the spouses of the participants, when present. I preferred to meet in academic places, such as a professional office, public library, or similar setting, but I also met one participant (Malcolm Evers) in his private home because it was the most comfortable setting for the participant. In that one case, I ensured that the presence of the participant's family members did not stifle his candor.

The initial one-on-one interviews lasted between 90 and 150 minutes.

Journals, diaries, prose, poetry, photos, and personal artifacts provided by the participants. During my initial contact with the participants, I encouraged them to gather written, photographic, literary, or other materials they had produced that captured their experiences in combat or demonstrated their perception of commissioned combat leadership. Of course, the choice to share such artifacts was strictly voluntary. In each case, I was surprised by the willingness of the participants to offer journal entries, photos, poems, short essays, battlefield artifacts, videos, and other non-verbal data.

Recording the data. At the completion of each interview, I recorded my initial impressions of the participant and my perceptions of his experience and his reporting of those experiences. Patton (2002) stresses the importance of writing field notes soon after the completion of any interview. These notes should include the researcher's observations, his feelings and reactions to the interview process, and whatever inferences

the researcher makes about the data that came out of the interview. These initial field notes were vital to capturing themes and patterns in the interview data. I do not want to lose the vivid impressions that I inferred from the participants' words, so I recorded my thoughts each time on a hand-held digital recording device. After each contact with a participant, I recorded my thoughts on that device or directly into a prose document on my laptop computer.

I took other steps to accurately capture the data. For example, I employed active listening during the interviews, requested clarification of key points, and immediately captured each impression to illuminate the participants' words and collect a rich, meaning-making story.

Follow-up interviews. After I completed the initial interviews, I transcribed them and married them with a biography of each participant. Then I constructed tables in which I made a preliminary list of themes prevalent in each narrative. I organized these three documents—biography, transcript, and initial themes—into a single coherent narrative of each participant and then added to it during each subsequent interview or email clarification and comment. Over the course of several weeks, I scheduled follow-up interviews to expand on the narratives. These interviews, either face-to-face or via telephone, took approximately 20-30 minutes to collect and transcribe. As the process moved forward, I verified that each participant had been portrayed accurately in the data.

Analysis of the data. I applied interpretative analysis of the participants' narratives to identify themes or patterns that emerged and to compare actual behavior to what they had learned in their classroom training before combat. Since Army combat operations often employ standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures—how to clear a building or

envelop an objective, for example—I anticipated that the participants would relate experiences in common in their narratives. But I found significant differences between their individual reactions to those experiences, and those differences informed the participants' assessment of the value of pre-commissioning training. My focused questions compelled memories and thoughts about changes to their ideological perspective of officership, which I summarized in tables at the end of Chapter 4.

Interpretative analysis. Interpretive analysis begs the question, "Who defines the final meaning of any experience? The person who tells the story, or the audience who hears it?" Patton (2002) contends that the speaker and the audience combine to make meaning; meaning depends on the cultural context of both the participant and the researcher. Interpretive analysis, then, is the practice of constructing a reasonable conclusion, a truth based on a meaning stated by the participant, then filtered through the perspective of the researcher. In short, conclusions are never absolute, according to Patton. This theory is supported by Gergen (1999), who concluded that all claims to "the real" are traced to processes of relationship—a lone researcher listens and reacts to the personal experiences and perspectives of each participant. That single researcher becomes a uniform sieve through which the researcher sifts each participant's story, with same-size nuggets of data appearing throughout the process. Then the researcher catalogs, compares, or contrasts the 'nuggets" from each story.

Techniques Important to Interpretive Analysis. The effectiveness of my qualitative study relied on the quality, breadth, and scope of my interpretative analysis of the data— qualities that depended on several components or techniques:

- the researcher's credibility;
- using multiple methods of data collection;
- triangulation of the data;
- "member checking" the data by the participants;
- effective narrative analysis that compels "thick, rich description" of the findings;
- and establishing an effective audit trail of the data.

Below is a short description of each of those components or techniques.

Credibility of the researcher. The value of the study depends on the credibility of the researcher, according to several theorists. Denzin & Lincoln (1998); Patton (2002); Rossman & Rallis (1998); Tutty, Rothery and Grinnell (1996); Frankel & Devers (2000b); Gerdes & Conn (2001) all agree that the researcher must demonstrate a true respect for the participants, their culture, or the phenomena that focus the study.

Patton (2002) and other authorities point to the trustworthiness of the researcher as an important characteristic of qualitative research. Specifically, Patton (2002) considers voice, perspective, and reflexivity as critical components' of the researcher's trustworthiness. To be believable and authentic, the researcher must be aware of the complexity of the data and open to the direction it takes. The researcher must balance subjective interpretation with objectivity, allowing the data to speak for itself without applying a preconceived notion about what his or her conclusions should be.

Given these concepts, my goal as the researcher was to remain objective. To do that, I had to set aside my own experience as an Army officer, remain open to the stories of the participants, and listen carefully for similarities and differences that became apparent in their narratives. Conversely, my experience as an officer could not be ignored; my goal was to use my experience selectively, recognizing what effects my own

perspective had on the information while acknowledging my common ground with the subjects.

My qualifications as a researcher stem from my role as a recently retired Army officer, the product of Vietnam-era enlistment practices and the recipient of a West Point education. My view of the Army's pre-commissioning curricula evolved from my West Point experience, but they changed during my three years as the commander of the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) program at a large state university, an assignment that ended before I conducted this study [and thus involved no competing interest with the dissertation process]. Because I had never deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, or Africa, I had no pre-conceived conclusions about combat operations in any of those theaters of operations. Thus I was entirely objective regarding the practical context of the study, with the advantage of a shared experience with my participants regarding the theoretical premises that pre-dated their combat experiences.

Multiple data sources. By applying multiple methods of data gathering in the study, I extracted a deeper meaning from the data. Patton (2002) concurs that multiple methods can reveal causal factors that are incongruent or, conversely, construct common themes and patterns. For example, a short interview of family members, colleagues, and friends close to the participant will corroborate the accuracy and trustworthiness of the participants' statements. First and foremost, I compared actual behaviors and evidence from the data with the theoretical concepts I described in Chapter 2. Afterward, my in-depth interview with the participant, guided by a semi-structured format, allowed individual stories to emerge, revealing the incidents that may have served as catalysts for ideological change about commissioned combat leadership. Concurrently, the artifacts,

67

documents, and pictures I collected from the participants illuminated the causes or the

chronology of their perceptions. Finally, my follow-up questions clarified the data and

elicited reactions to and explanations for emerging themes.

Triangulating those multiple data sources. I will employ multiple data sources and

different methods of data gathering—oral, written, and symbolic "texts" —to achieve

triangulation. Methodological triangulation includes recording the data in the interview

as well as the researcher's record of the mannerisms, actions, and non-verbal

communication that occurs while the interview takes place. In every case, the researcher

develops logical ways to catalog the data by type, theme, or inference. In this way, the

researcher creates different perspectives of a single point of inquiry. Denzin (in Patton,

2002, p. 247) promotes the idea of organized, methodological triangulation, and Patton

(2002) considers triangulation as an essential ideal for any study.

Member checks. "Member checking" is a method of triangulation that increases the

trustworthiness of the research data. Member checking clarifies and explains the

meaning of the data. According to Gerdes and Conn (2001), member checks reveal

whether the findings represent truth as it occurred for the participants and in their context.

I employed member checking by advising the participants of the findings of the study as

it evolved from the information they provided and from my observations during the

interviews.

Narrative analysis. Narrative analysis is the process of sifting through data (to continue

the metaphor of the sieve) written or spoken directly by the participant, gathered either

during an interview or included in the participants' written responses. In my study, these

personal narratives shed light on the meanings of events and experiences that informed

the concept of officership before combat and affected it after their combat experience had ended. Patton (2002) states that narrative analysis offers "translucent windows into [the participants'] cultural and social meanings" (p. 116). I analyzed the participants' narratives to identify themes, similarities, and differences among the stories.

My interview questions guided the direction of the interview, and after the initial interviews, I composed additional questions that illuminated pertinent points during each interview. After considering the data, I forwarded those follow-up questions to expand my understanding of the participants' narratives. Potter (1996) asserts that fact implies a truth based on real events, while simple description may not. By extension, the researcher becomes the catalyst that connected descriptions into a *reasonable* picture of the truth, interpreting what the participant reports in a logical way until the description comes into focus. Finding a reasonable picture of the truth was my goal.

To reach that goal, I transcribed each interview onto paper, combined it with the participants' written responses, and collated everything into tables that I placed at the end of Chapter 4. Then I read each transcript several times, making notes in the margins to identify and catalog meanings in the prose. I color coded each narrative to align them with the theoretical frameworks that inform this study and with specific themes that emerged from the narratives.

After I color coded and edited each narrative, I compared them with each other and cataloged each similarity, difference, theme, or pattern. This comparison served as the framework for my Chapter 4. I wove the stories of the four participants together into a coherent narrative that met at the nexus of several emerging themes. Those themes became the basis for my findings in Chapter 5.

Creating thick, rich descriptions of the findings. One key premise of narrative analysis is that the findings must be applicable or transferable between participants and the setting of the study; the researcher affirms those conditions by composing detailed and thorough narratives that accurately describe the context for and the setting of the study (Frankel & Devers, 2000). Lincoln & Guba (1985) provide a similar term for such detailed, thorough narratives: they contend that the researcher must provide a "thick description" of the data that may interest someone in replicating the study. Patton (2002) concurs, stating that thick, rich description is critical to qualitative study since it allows the reader to experience the setting and infer the importance of the data.

These premises begged a question: how would I compose "thick, rich" descriptions of the combat experience of my participants? First, I accurately captured the sounds, emotions, and tactical chaos of combat operations, bringing as many vivid details as possible into my description of the geographic, cultural, and operational context of each participant's experience. More important, I used the words of the participants themselves, preserving dialogue as often as possible to capture the emotional nature of their experiences. Merriam (2002) contends that thick, rich description of the participants stories in the participants, *told in the participants' own words* (emphasis mine) increases the trustworthiness of the findings. Thus I retained as much storytelling dialogue as possible in Chapter 4.

Dependability. An effective audit trail makes any qualitative study more dependable because the data and its sources are more confirmable; the research process becomes a "self-critical" account (Searle, 1999). Merriam & Associates (2002) describe an audit trail as "dependent upon the researcher keeping a research journal or recording memos

70

throughout the conduct of the study" (p. 27). Journal entries include the researcher's thoughts, questions, and reflections about the data as it is obtained. I recorded each significant revision of each participant's narrative so that I could look back at what I had composed and restart the process at critical points along the way. In this way, I cataloged interpretive decisions I make along the way and the history of my data collection method and applied these two principles—self critical and disciplined recording—as I conducted my research process.

Limitations. Marshall and Rossman (1999) state that all research is limited in some manner; the researcher must identify and discuss a study's limitations and the constraints placed upon its conclusions. The design of this study included the use of a semi-structured interview process to determine the participant's experiences in combat and to relate those experiences to their earlier officer education. My primary method of gathering data was interviews, and Patton (2002) suggests that many possible limitations occur in interviews. Most prevalent are "distorted responses due to personal bias, anger, anxiety, politics and simple lack of awareness" (p. 306). The interviewee may also make errors in recall, react too positively or negatively to the interviewer, or give evasive or self-serving responses to certain questions. Given the very personal and often secretive nature of combat experiences, the occurrence of any of these was possible, but I did not see it happening. The participants felt comfortable with me as a former officer and researcher, and I felt that they shared their stories honestly and thoughtfully.

Chapter 4 describes the findings I obtained from this process.

Summary

In this chapter, I presented the methodology and research perspective I used in this study, I explained my data collection and analysis methods, I discussed the importance of the credibility of the researcher, and I presented the limitations I anticipated for the study.

CHAPTER 4

COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

Introduction to the Interview Process and Snapshot of the Participants

In my effort to identify potential subjects for my study, I queried dozens of former colleagues in the military and asked them to recommend commissioned officers who had served in combat and who could offer insight into the attributes required for combat leadership. It was important that the subjects must also have the ability to look inward for self-assessment and have the courage to publish their thoughts to me.

Moreover, each subject had to be willing to allow friends, family members, and colleagues to be part of the study. Thus, an effective subject had to be brave, articulate, and frank, both in his assessment of himself, in his assessment of his actions, and in his willingness to accept the perceptions of others who might also contribute to the study.

After several months of sorting through leads and recommendations from others and balancing them against my own perceptions of the subjects, I invited four principal subjects to explain how their experiences define the values and attributes required of a 21st century combat leader.

My research protocol required that I keep the identities of the participants a secret, but to bring their narratives to life, I created pseudonyms for each participant and for the proper names of others who amplify their experiences.

Thus the names of the participants and the names of soldiers they recall in their narratives are fictional, but their stories are real.

```
Name: Michael Halo
Rank while in combat: Second Lieutenant
Branch: Armor
Operational Theatre: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
```

On a cold, rainy December morning not far from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, I met Michael Halo, the youngest combat veteran my study. In October 2003, less than two months after he arrived in Iraq, he was injured by a roadside bomb. Shrapnel tore through his right side underneath his armpit and came out the top left half side of his chest; it was a miracle he survived the ride to the aid station. But Michael Halo did survive his wounds and returned to the world that sent him into combat.

What do you say to an officer who nearly lost his life in combat? "Hello, Michael. Would you like to discuss how you were almost killed in Iraq?" The interview represented a sobering juxtaposition of two worlds: the gaiety of the holiday season versus Michael Halo's memory of Iraq—Santa Claus and candy canes versus the fighting and the fear.

Exactly ten minutes before the interview was scheduled to start, I saw an SUV with out-of-state plates pull into the lot. Michael Halo stepped into the rain and walked toward the front door. He looked like a healthy young man; he smiled tentatively as he saw me through the window, raising his right hand in a silent hello. Only then did I see that the last three fingers on his right hand were permanently curled toward his palm, and his right arm was noticeably smaller than his left. He winced as he opened the library door.

We shook hands and affirmed common acquaintances. Despite Michael's

apparent nonchalance about participating in the study, I wondered if answering my

questions may have been too much, too soon. Surprisingly, the answer was "No."

Participant #2

```
Name: Zarius Kolter
Rank while in combat: Major
Branch: Special Forces
Operational Theatre: Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
```

Zarius Kolter is still on active duty as a Special Forces officer. Special Forces

branch is more commonly called the "Green Berets" in deference to the distinctive

headgear Special Forces soldiers wear.

Many Americans may not realize this, but for many years there existed only three

noteworthy pieces of headgear in the U. S. Army: the green beret, worn by Special Forces

soldiers; the black beret, worn by members of the Army's Ranger battalions; and the

burgundy beret, worn by members of the 82nd Airborne Division. By regulation, soldiers

wore the Ranger beret with its distinctive "flash" insignia or the burgundy beret only

when they were assigned to a Ranger battalion or the 82nd Airborne, respectively. When

they left those units for another assignment, such as instructor duty, they had to wear the

baseball-style camouflage patrol cap worn by all soldiers.

Not so for Special Forces soldiers. Once a Green Beret, always a Green Beret, no

matter where you are assigned. Once you have completed the grueling Special Forces

Qualification Course (called the "Q Course") and have been assigned somewhere with a

Special Forces unit, you are officially "SF." You pronounce your branch using those two

letters, "ESS EFF," and you wear your green beret wherever you go. The hat speaks for its wearer:

"I am SF. You are not. Deal with it."

As the reader might imagine, earning the right to wear the green beret requires a very specific set of skills, but it also breeds a very predictable set of stereotypes. Think of the strong, silent type portrayed by John Wayne in the film *The Green Berets*. A Green Beret was lean, tall, fit, mean, clinical, deadly . . . and largely silent.

Zarius Kolter is a Green Beret. Yet he is none of these things, and he had succeeded as a leader in combat. That combination made him an intriguing subject for my study.

The word "special" in Special Forces is a practical application of the word. When Special Forces soldiers are away from their home station, nobody knows their exact location. During the course of my research, Major Kolter was assigned in a remote location, so I emailed the interview questions to him. I had no idea where Major Kolter was physically located as I gathered data, but I am certain that he was out of the United States at least part of the time. Even his wife did not know his location.

Participant #3

```
Name: Malcolm Evers
Rank while in combat: Captain and Major
Branch: Armor
Operational Theatre: Operation DESERT STORM, Iraq;
Operation RESTORE HOPE, Somalia; Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM, Djibouti
```

I flew into Spokane, Washington, landing in the middle of the night and waking up to a landscape of pine trees and fog. I picked up my rental car and drove west from Spokane, looking for a house at the end of a muddy gravel road in the middle of nowhere.

76

I found my participant's hometown, but all I had was an address written on a scrap of paper, and none of the streets had signs. I pulled into the town's police station, showed the officer at the desk in the address, and asked where it was. He looked at the paper for a full minute, consulted the town map, and handed the paper back to me.

"I have no idea where that is," he said.

That exchange served as a metaphor for my search for Malcolm Evers, an officer who served 20 years in the Army, saw action in three theaters, and walked away abruptly to spend the rest of his days looking into the canyon.

Participant #4

```
Name: Andrew Barber
Rank while in combat: Lieutenant Colonel
Branch: Infantry
Operational Theatre: Rwanda, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,
Afghanistan
```

After serving nearly 30 years in uniform, all of them in the infantry, Andrew Barber retired to the very dead center of the United States. He bought 800 acres in Nebraska, where he knew absolutely no one and had no prospect of a job or a vocation outside of the lonely task of self reflection.

After arriving in Nebraska, Barber had to build a new home from the ground up; his 800 acres had nothing except a livestock watering trough, a few tumbleweeds, and a tool shed he had built during a holiday break about a year before he retired. He planned to raise cattle, or maybe grow corn, or possibly come to understand what the Army had given to him . . . and what the Army had done to him.

To those who knew him, it seemed that Andrew Barber did not want to be understood; he didn't spew forth advice, and some who knew him advised me that he would "not want to be bothered" with answering questions about the Army.

Despite those warnings and the sheer distance he lived from the populated edges of the country, he was not a difficult man to approach. On the contrary, he seemed very willing to talk, as if after the passage of a few years he had discovered a clarity of purpose that required an audience. It would be easy to suspect that because he had gone to such great pains to put himself at a distance from the world, Barber was a curmudgeon who felt that he had been used by a system that overpowered those who enlisted in it. But that would be misreading Barber's voice and misunderstanding his vision of an institution that is incomprehensible to the young and impenetrable to the naïve.

Instead, Barber spoke freely from practical experience, offering the voice of a man at odds with something he pledged to love and at uneasy peace with something he loves to hate.

The Research Questions

1. What sources of individual values or leader attributes did these subjects consider to be most influential to their performance as a leader?

2. What individual values or leader attributes are most important to success as an Army officer, from the perspectives of the participants?

3. What personal values or leader attributes did these leaders find valuable in combat?

4. How did the subjects apply these values or demonstrate these attributes in combat?

5. What differences exist between the values attributes taught in formal curricula and the values and attributes these subjects required in combat?

The first research question was designed to identify the sources of the values that the participants considered important. These sources could be the Army officer education program from which they earned their commission, such as ROTC or the U. S. Military Academy at West Point; friends or family members; churches or other formal organizations; or other sources. The responses from the participants are generally organized here according to each source.

Commissioning Sources

The Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) and the U. S. Military Academy at West Point both teach leader attributes and values, but the participants did not consider them to be the primary source of leader attributes and values. In Michael Halo's opinion, ROTC was a final polishing process that turned a young man with very solid family values into a commissioned officer with clearly defined professional values.

Halo's ROTC curriculum taught him the basics about values and the principles behind them. He also studied situations in which he could apply the values and subsequently assess their effect on subordinates. But Halo felt that the campus setting was a limiting factor in his quest to become a values-based leader. The classroom represented a theoretical application of values; combat would become the place for practical application.

Complicating matters was the fact that the ROTC curriculum is literally a classroom setting, populated by peers. In the spirit of unit cohesion, ROTC cadets are encouraged to become friends with all the other cadets in the program. So when the

program teaches the value of loyalty, the cadet assumes that he is supposed to be loyal to his friends, i.e. his fellow cadets. Unfortunately, that causes the cadets to allow one another to cut corners—exactly the behavior the Army does not want. For example, Halo described the simple procedure of assigning duties to other cadets in the program:

If you have to assign a crappy job to another cadet, you give it to someone you don't like. You didn't give it to your buddy. But that's not a good Army value— not the kind of loyal to the Army is looking for.

To illustrate his point, Halo pointed to the word *Loyalty* on the Army Values dogtag card: "Like I said, practicing that kind of loyalty [favoring a friend] isn't the kind of outcome that the Army is looking for. But it's hard to teach and practice the correct kind of loyalty in an educational setting."

Figure 1. The Army Values card.

However, Halo found more value in the social nature of his ROTC training, where he practiced and learned basic values like trust and a sense of duty, than he found in his Armor Officer Basic Course (AOBC), which he attended after he had been commissioned. The Army creates branch-specific schools like AOBC to make standard the training that all new lieutenants in that branch receive, no matter their source of commissioning. For example, ROTC graduates, Officer Candidate School graduates, and

West Point graduates learn together in a cohort, so AOBC is designed to teach the final lessons those new officers will need before they report to their first unit.

But Halo's experience proves just the opposite. Halo recalled a vignette from his AOBC, where a cadre member, only a private, was yelling at an officer. This incident caused a great amount of self reflection; Halo recoiled from the example of the private, reinforcing in his own mind what behaviors and attributes he did not want to demonstrate when he took command of his first platoon.

Halo's recognition of correct versus incorrect loyalty shows he had embraced the Army values and applied moral judgment in his application of them before he left his ROTC program. More important, through that moral judgment, he gained respect for himself as a leader and no doubt earned the respect of his instructors and fellow cadets. Then he took that lesson with him into combat. "[In ROTC], you learn respect not just for yourself but also for your instructors and for your fellow cadets, which is like your respect for your fellow soldiers [later in your career]."

In hindsight, years later, Zarius Kolter recognized his ROTC program was somewhat important to his development as an officer, but that his time as an enlisted soldier could have been valuable to his cadet peers—an asset that Kolter squandered for them. He feels a great sense of failure as a result. Kolter came to ROTC from a Special Forces unit, but by his own admission he was cocky. The impressive qualification badges on his uniform may have intimidated some of his fellow cadets, but Kolter recognizes that those badges would mean very little once he began his service as an officer: "I allowed hubris to overcome common sense . . . I should have offered what I

knew instead of relying on the fact that I was an older cadet who knew more about the Army than my peers. Looking back, I was simply a foolish young man."

Andrew Barber was even less inclined to credit his ROTC program. Barber felt as though ROTC was simply a continuation of the "brainwashing" he had endured from the preachers and elders of his Mississippi church. He came to ROTC wary of any authority, so although his ROTC program was effective enough, it simply reminded him of his time in church "at the cynic's well."

Nonetheless, more than 30 years after he had been commissioned, Barber could quote from Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-2, *The Armed Forces Officer* (1950): "That little book rang right with me. One of the most eloquent things it said was this, `About matters of rank, senior will never remember while junior will never forget.'"

Three of the four participants concur that the Army education system in the classroom is less effective and less important to the formation of values or attributes than practical application outside the classroom. Michael Halo called the ROTC program "bookwork" and emphasized that he had to create a separation between himself and his peers in order to become an effective leader. Kolter and Barber agreed. Evers did learn something from his ROTC program, but most of his conclusions were based on role-modeling the action of one ROTC faculty member, rather than absorbed from ROTC curriculum. Their conclusions connect to trait theory (Stodgill, 1974), whereby in specific situations, a leader must apply different behaviors in order to be successful.

From the data, we see that their commissioning programs taught the participants the importance of trust. We can conclude that formal curricula are important because they force the student into a social situation, which is part of social exchange theory and

leader member exchange theory, where the leader develops separate exchange relationships with each peer or subordinate and learns through those relationships who is trustworthy and who is not. Thus it is essential that there be some kind of collective classroom training where these social exchanges can take place and where a leader can develop a sense of the character and judgment of his peers and of himself.

Family Members

Family members who have served previously in the military are influential sources for individual values and leader attributes.

Michael Halo's immediate family consists of a father who served in uniform in Vietnam and continues to serve as a volunteer fireman; a mother who works today in local municipal government; and two sons (Halo and his brother), both of whom have served in uniform in combat in Iraq. This is a family completely vested in service to others.

Michael Halo acquired a desire to serve in uniform from the influence of his maternal grandfather, who spent 37 years in the Navy and retired as a Senior chief Petty Officer. Halo's mother described the influence her father had on the future combat lieutenant:

> My dad spent hours with the boys, telling them stories from when he was in the Navy, talking about doing things for the country. He was in the Pacific theater, on the USS *Cannon*, a destroyer escort. He always emphasized honesty; to help people; to be there for other people. When the boys were little, they would play Army all the time with the other kids. But my kids never had their guns; they

always gave them to the other kids that didn't have one. So my boys ran around

with tree branches, playing Army. They were always very giving, always went to

take care of people, always very protective.

Figure 2. Michael Halo's grandfather.

Halo also cited his brother, a sergeant in the Army, as the source for leadership

lessons both good and bad. Halo's brother had been in the Army for five years before

Halo came on active duty as an officer. The brother had described bad things that leaders

had done and the good qualities people look for in a leader. For example:

- Don't act like you know everything

- Trust your soldiers until you have a reason <u>not</u> to trust them

- Listen to your NCOs and your soldiers

Listening to NCOs and soldiers alludes to the Army value of respect; because

NCOs are the technical experts in the Army, they generally know more than a new officer

will know. By listening to what the NCOs suggest, the officer demonstrates respect for

his subordinates.

Halo emphasized that trust is a two-way street—a lesson he learned from his brother's poor leadership modeling. For example, he saw his brother torment his subordinates by hazing them or giving them foolish tasks like looking for something that doesn't exist, like grid squares (the lines on a military map). Halo instantly recognized that those actions were wrong: "I saw my brother do some things that didn't fit the officer persona because they violated the value of integrity."

Comparing his experience in ROTC to his experience with his brother, Halo "saw the book way of doing things versus way things are really done." What we learn from Halo's testimony is that the future officer's conclusions about appropriate values do not require him to learn only from commissioned officer role models. Halo observed behaviors and recognized the presence or absence of important values manifest in his brother's actions; his brother's status as a non-commissioned officer was less important than the [high] level of regard Halo conferred to him. The powers of observation do not know rank, and the most effective leader can interact with soldiers of all ranks and assess leadership skills on display from the bottom up and from the top down.

But the difference between commissioned and non-commissioned leadership is relevant to Halo's conclusion about his own future behaviors. The most important distinction here is the moral judgment reached by two Army leaders, one not commissioned, the other commissioned. Halo's brother was a noncommissioned officer, sworn to the same Army values that a commissioned officer is. Yet these two brothers, raised in the same town, in the same house, by the same parents, disagreed on several leadership behaviors. The noncommissioned (older) brother found them to be appropriate leader behaviors. The commissioned (younger) brother found them to be

inappropriate hazing. This difference of opinion implies that the process of becoming a commissioned officer taught Halo something that his brother had never learned.

The data from Zarius Kolter echoes the value of family members in uniform. Both sides of Kolter's family had a history of service, including service in the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II. This family legacy creates a powerful influence for the future officer. As Kolter explained, "I never want to shame those who went before me."

These influential people in uniform need not only be immediate family members. For example, Kolter and his father were estranged for many years, but his uncles were still a part of his moral-ethical upbringing, and his best friend's father, Roger, became like a father to him. Not surprisingly, this surrogate father also had worn his nation's uniform: "He worked on the assembly line at International Harvester, and he had served in the Army—hated it, but was still proud that he served. He embodies most of what I want to be."   Interesting to note the virtue that Kolter recognized in Roger's behavior: Roger hated the Army, but was still proud to have served in it. Kolter learned from Roger that a virtue agent does things that they don't want to do, maybe even things that they hate doing, but they still do them to the best of their ability. And later, they're proud that they have served nobly. This is a recurring theme in the data.

One single positive role model—even one single event—can be the catalyst that compels appropriate leader behavior by a future officer.

Not every American grows up in a story-book home, complete with two parents, siblings, and a strong nuclear family. Army officers are no exception. For example, Zarius Kolter is the son of an immigrant. Kolter's father was born in Hungary, raised in

Venezuela, and came to the States with nothing, barely able to speak English. His mother was one of the first in her family to attend college, but Kolter's family life was marked by relative poverty, his mother's several marriages, and the effects of alcoholism on both sides of his family. They moved constantly, and Kolter resented his mother for it.

Nonetheless, Kolter learned from his mother the value of caring for other people and standing up for what is right, regardless of what others might think. He recalled picketing the local A & P because it was selling Gallo grapes, showing support for Caesar Chavez and all other farm workers.

Kolter learned to respect other people's self-dignity in other ways. He told this story:

When I was in second grade, we were living on Long Island. My friend Anthony came to spend the night. He was poorer than we were. The next day we went to the beach. There was a sandcastle-building contest, so we teamed up with another family, and we won first place. First Place! Can you imagine? That meant a trophy! Or so I thought.

The judges had two only first-place trophies, but our team was made up of three families, if you counted Anthony. My mom, despite my vociferous objections, declined the trophies because only two kids could have taken one home. Instead, she treated us all to candy. I was seven, and I have never forgotten that lesson.

Like Kolter, Andrew Barber was inspired by a female family member to live a life of virtue. Grandma Minnie was a simple woman with only a fifth grade education, but she taught Barber the values of humanity and self-respect. Somehow, despite her limited

education, she figured out that all people—even black people, not an easy thing to do in 1960s Mississippi—were equally valuable. Barber credits Grandma Minnie for sowing in him the seeds of learning, forgiveness, humility, and common humanity.

Barber tells the story of the day Grandma Minnie revealed to him the ethics of virtue, which contradicted everything he had learned in his peer environment up to that point:

She smelled smoke on me at the tender age of ten.

"Why have you been smoking?" she asked. I shifted my weight from one bare foot to the other, looked down and away, wiggled my toes, and placed the blame on my friend Glen.

She said simply, "You don't have to do as other people do." This suggested to me that there ought to be reasons for what you do—that I was responsible for both the reasons and the choices that followed from them.

Grandma Minnie's lesson became the foundation for Barber's practice of leadership as a junior officer several years later. He had enlisted in the Army, but he had no conception of what being an officer was about. He simply knew that it paid more money than being a private. And once he found himself standing in front of his platoon, finally in charge of people and equipment, he relied on one simple rule: "I knew that people mattered, that I was there to serve my soldiers and not the people who outranked me."

Other Positive Role Models

Halo, Kolter, and Barber learned several important lessons from family members, but Malcolm Evers wasn't so lucky. He found no role models among his coaches,

88

teachers, or relatives and recalled few memorable life lessons from the day-to-day contacts of his early life. Evers could not even define his hometown, since his early life was spread across the states of Kentucky, Ohio, Georgia, and Florida. This was not whimsical travel made slightly romantic in the way that Kolter described his youth. Instead, Evers's time on the road was the result of his parents having to keep one step ahead of the debt collector.

ROTC eventually provided a single positive role model for Evers: his ROTC detachment commander, Major Gary R. Cole. A short, gruff man who seemed to appear out of nowhere everywhere his cadets would meet, Major Cole was an infantry officer who had combat experience in Vietnam as a Marine, where he had served as a reconnaissance officer. He disciplined Evers—always with a smile on his face—and helped him with academics. Most important, he explained why doing things right mattered, using crass humor to argue for virtue in action.

Cole's effect on Evers was profound, and it had less to do with Cole's rank as an officer than it did with Cole's role as a mentor. Evers explained:

Gary Cole is why I decided to sign the enlistment contract with the ROTC detachment, but my commitment was not to the Army. It was an extension of my search for leadership within me, [which I saw] in people like Major Cole.

In Gary Cole, Malcolm Evers finally saw what right looked like. It was wearing the uniform of a United States Army officer.

Antithetical Leadership: Negative Role Models as a Barometer of Values

Today, looking across the Nebraska plains, Andrew Barber laments his naive understanding of the means and sources of power. He feels that his ignorance of power made him practically useless to the soldiers he led. Had he understood power, he might have made a difference for them. He worries now that he missed an opportunity to do whatever good he might have done.

Barber's testimony demonstrates a common stalemate that develops between leaders who use lofty, idealistic language to inspire others, yet fail to personify those lofty ideals in their own actions. For example, Army officers must inspire soldiers to kill for supposedly high human causes, such as the abstract American values of liberty and decency. Yet Americans neither own virtue nor deserve to define it for the rest of the world. In fact, to be most virtuous, each person should contribute to worldwide, common humanity. So what should be a thinking soldier's logical reaction to leaders who use high-toned language to inspire them to kill?

They react exactly like Barber has: they mistrust their leaders' lofty rhetoric because too often it is manipulated by people in power to serve their own ambition. Barber described the stalemate and compared it to his grandmother's example:

> People in power learn to cloak private purpose in public language. They pay for war with checks cashed by lieutenants, sergeants, and privates who are told not to think but to do. But if people matter, then they *matter*.
>
> Grandma knew. Our generals generally don't.
>
> So Grandma Minnie was the only thing I carried into adult life that I believed in.

Negative role models serve a valuable purpose: demonstrating which behaviors to avoid. Another common thread in the data was the importance of avoiding the behaviors demonstrated by poor leaders from the participants' past. These demonstrations of poor leadership remain in the memory banks for years; they are often more memorable and examples of positive leadership. Aspiring leaders enter a leadership program expecting to see correct behavior demonstrated for them. When that does not happen, the new leader is confused about the purpose of the instruction.

Consider Michael Halo and his brother. They are products of a family environment focused on service; we can assume that when they left that family environment, they were very much like items. Their leadership experiences diverged, however, based on their military education level. Michael Halo became an officer, where he learned the values of attributes that made him understand hazing soldiers was wrong; he reprimanded his brother for that behavior. Michael's brother, on the other hand, became a noncommissioned officer after coming up through the enlisted ranks. That military education process is much less formal, much more dependent on rituals. It is less genteel and less structured. Thus, Michael's brother has no problem with hazing soldiers or giving them challenges that seem petty and childish. After Michael witnessed this leadership style, he concluded that it was inappropriate because of what he learned in his officer education program.

Malcolm Evers recalled his effort to find an organization that would demonstrate positive leadership. He thought he might find it in his ROTC program. Instead, he was shocked by the performance of his first detachment commander—a nameless aviation

officer who Evers rarely saw and who seemed uninterested in leaving his office. From Evers's point of view, this officer was not a commander; he was a manager.

Evers intuitively recognized the difference between someone who could teach cadets combat leadership and someone who could teach them how to be an efficient supply clerk. Evers was looking for someone to inspire virtue in him. Instead, he found a faux leader whose "method of leadership was nothing more than the effective management of the detachment, keeping budgets in balance, and meeting mission in a time when the Army wasn't in desperate need of additional officers." Evers correctly concluded that this nameless aviation officer was the antithesis of what an officer should be. As a result, whatever the aviator did, Evers did the opposite.

Self-Generated Virtues

Negative role models can also be observed in hindsight. For example, a leader may look back on an arbitrary choice he made early in his life—a choice any person in his peer group could have made—and recognize the value of that choice. Or the leader might consider a judgment made by someone in a position of authority, like a guidance counselor, teacher, or coach, and instead of accepting their poor judgment as absolute truth, decide to improve himself as much as possible and see just what positive outcome may result.

We have all heard the success stories of people who have been told they were not college material, who later win the Nobel Prize, or the Jordanesque story of being cut from the junior varsity team, then later winning the NBA championship. The individual concludes that they will achieve in spite of the flawed advice of those in authority.

Failure or success by combat leaders represents a tenfold increase in relative consequence—far greater than the consequence of failure in science or sports. That is why earning an officer's commission cannot be a matter of self-selection. As Don Snider articulates in his theory of Officership (2003), commissioned service is a profession that requires qualifications that have been confirmed by people who understand the requirements of the profession. Once an officer is conferred a commission by ROTC or West Point, under the authority of the President of the United States of America, the commission is rarely recalled.

Nonetheless, a diamond in the rough like Zarius Kolter can make choices that make it possible for him to qualify for a commission. One method is the process of elimination: the future officer confirms what he does <u>not</u> want to be and gradually learns what he wants to become. G.I. Bill benefits, ROTC scholarships, and appointments to West Point offer a rope with which to climb to the qualification. At a critical decision point in his life, Kolter looked around him and realized he should grab the rope:

> I still remember working construction on a bitterly cold day during an Ohio winter. I had just gotten out of the Army, and I was digging a ditch for $5 an hour.

> Beside me in the ditch was a guy who had attended the same high school I did. He had graduated only ten years before me, but he looked sixty, and his life existed from paycheck to paycheck, beer to beer, joint to joint.

> I looked across the street. A woman in a fancy car was looking at us with pity and disdain. That was my epiphany. Then and there I decided to go to college using the G.I. Bill.

Kolter knew that he had talent as a soldier. He couldn't stay in that ditch. He made the choice to test himself in ROTC to see if he could meet the requirements for Officership.

Kolter's negative role model was standing right beside him and was largely passive. Other participants faced more aggressive negative role models, some of whom stood in positions of authority, and therefore in positions from which they could judge and influence the participant. Resisting these more influential (and so more dangerous) examples of negative behavior was a critical requirement if the participant hoped to avoid following their bad examples—but might be inspired to achieve because of them.

For example, Andrew Barber saw around him negative role models among the elders of his church, among the adults and his family, and among the pillars of his community. Imagine the depth of character required to overcome those influencers and become a virtue agent. Ironically, because these bad examples held positions of influence, they had many opportunities to demonstrate to Barber their glaring flaws.

From the pulpit, his preacher hurled hellfire and brimstone at the congregation, young Barber included, then went home to whip his daughter before sending her to school in long skirts to hide the marks. In church boards and conferences, the elders argued over petty differences, each holding his own place of pride, impervious to either reason or compassion. The town's leaders gave speeches in which they made public their preference for prejudice over compassion.

All these things, Andrew Barber saw.

All these things, Andrew Barber cataloged.

And all these things, Andrew Barber eventually knew to be wrong.

To their credit, some of Barber's teachers operated under this local radar of unethical behavior and made an effort to educate for the best. Some people in places of low rank chose kindness over meanness, right in the face of persistent meanness. But overwhelmingly, Barber's memory of the village that was supposed to raise him conjures a picture of an uninformed, unreflective, and unforgiving group. Barber summarized his hometown peers this way:

> Largely, they were witless piss-ants passing themselves off as decent and godly folk. If you were in their circle, then kindness and charity flowed like water. But if you were outside, they would kick your ass if you crossed them or their kin.

Not surprisingly, Barber couldn't imagine that a federal institution like the Army could be as morally bankrupt as the hometown that taught him what right did <u>not</u> look like. But he made no assumptions about the values and attributes that would be required in an officer. As a brand-new second lieutenant, he took the Army at its word; in fact, he interpreted "military service" as a literal command:

> I figured that military service was about service, since otherwise it wouldn't be called *service*, that generals really did have the best *general* idea of how things ought to be, and that everyone was committed to the decency and spirit of the private fighting soldier.

Barber came to the Army naïve, innocent, and idealistic in the extreme, and he struggled from the beginning to reconcile the noble concept of service—his first assumption about the organization had joined—with the observation that he would be in competition with other officers. Competition for promotion. Competition for assignments. Competition for free graduate education paid for by the government. And

most important, competition for power. Because he came from a world of poverty and illiteracy, he didn't comprehend that power was a prize to be won among officers.

Barber believed that officers were required to be virtuous leaders, so their words carried exact meaning, and that other officers using the same words he was using meant the same things he meant. He was wrong. He used words to inspire his soldiers. Other officers use the same words to advance their own careers or obscure their own failures.

Once Barber realized that words spoken by different officers meant different things, he became wary. He felt the senior officers were treating him the same way car dealerships treat their sales force: "Keep them young and dumb." In that way, junior leaders are more easily manipulated, more easily brought to kill or die trying for causes that seem good but are not. Now knowing that his superiors compelled him to risk his life for an unjust cause is the most serious blow to Barber's conception of virtue. He still cannot forgive:

> Just how, exactly, was killing Saddam Hussein a blow for freedom and democracy, a blow we had the right to make, a blow made in the right way and for the right reasons tending toward the permanent interests of man as a progressive being?

> I may have no idea of how things really work.   But I require [of myself] that people know and understand the words they use and then mean what they say, right up to and including the point of action. I know now that my senior leadership did not intend to meet that standard.

Imagine Barber's dilemma. He learned from Grandma Minnie that people mattered, and the ROTC program had taught him that it was his job to create the

impression that people mattered. Then he concluded that the Army's senior leadership

really didn't believe the words that it was telling Barber to speak. When Barber spoke up

in defense of people, he felt shouted down by the system—a system that he found flawed

and complicit at every level from battalion command to Capitol Hill:

> I was meant to be a puppet, a mere puppet, strung up and played mostly by the
>
> battalion commander and sometimes by the brigade commander.
>
> It was a long time before I figured out that they were puppets in their turn
>
> strung up by the generals, just as the generals were strung up by the politicians—
>
> including the Congress of some several hundred having some thousand or so
>
> children, with just a handful ever donning a uniform and shouldering a rifle. We
>
> don't even have a draft. Who's in the ranks? Where are the elite? Why do
>
> mostly poor folk bear the burdens of liberty? These things don't square with what
>
> I thought we were about.

Values Informed by Roles and Jurisdictions Assigned by Civilian Authority

Barber's dissonance with what he felt was correct conduct and what he was

ordered to do comes from the duality of the Army as a profession. On one hand, the

Army is a profession requiring experts in land warfare, trained in the management of

violence; on another, the Army is a federal bureaucracy controlled by elected officials

and political appointees in Washington. As part of his theory of Officership (2003), Don

Snider has studied this duality at length and describes it perfectly:

> Professions [like the Army] also have a hidden, more self-serving side.
>
> Rather than being static producing organizations, they are engaged in spirited

competitions for control over the arenas, or jurisdictions, in which they seek to apply their expertise. . . . The Army is embroiled in such competitions today in several jurisdictions. These are "negotiated" competitions in which the Army's senior leaders represent [their] profession before the nation's civilian leaders. . . . These rivalries are not trivial. Competitive failure by a profession, including the Army, may well result in its demise (Snider, 2005, p. 141).

Snider notes an irony about the political competition for professional jurisdiction: the Army may want to decline a role in some jurisdictions, but our elected leadership will not allow it. He cites as an example the "Homeland Security jurisdiction (e.g., counter-drug operations), where the Army has often sought, unsuccessfully, to opt out" (Snider, 2005, p. 141). Later in this chapter you will read the vignette "Humanity in the Somali Desert," which describes how Malcolm Evers struggled to reconcile his virtue as a combat leader with an unwelcome opportunity to intervene in the counter-drug jurisdiction.

Unfortunately for virtuous leaders who wish to do only what is right, the bureaucratic battle over roles and missions in Washington too often affects rules of engagement on the battlefield in Rwanda or Iraq, clouding the vision of junior officers who serve at the tip of the nation's spear. Like the Army they serve, these officers become unwilling owners of a jurisdiction that conflicts with their own values.

A common principle in the Army is to "train as you will fight," meaning that whatever the commander plans to do in combat, he should emphasize during training beforehand. Barber's experience highlights another theme in the data: effective officer educations programs must apply the "train as you will fight" principle to values, too, helping the officers reconcile their personal values with the role or mission they are

sworn to perform. "Train as you will fight" applies to equipment tactics, techniques, and procedures. It also includes moral-ethical components of training like the rules of engagement or cultural awareness of the region in which the unit will operate. Adherence to the correct leader values and attributes is implicit in that moral-ethical component of training.

Imagine the effect on an infantry unit that had trained for months for dismounted infantry operations, and then at the penultimate moment, was told to leave their rifles behind. Soldiers would be confused if what their leadership had emphasized as important during months of training was suddenly dismissed as unnecessary baggage. Morale would suffer because soldiers would wonder what new changes were just around the next corner.

When leaders jettison something that soldiers believe to be valuable to the completion of the mission, they imply a willingness to compromise anything that has been identified as valuable during pre-combat training—including values themselves. Effective leaders train values, just as they train on pieces of equipment. Changing on-the-fly sets a terrible precedent for soldiers.

This is exactly what happened to Michael Halo's platoon. Halo went to Iraq with the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, as a tank platoon leader. He loved his job—until the chain of command took his tanks away from him. During the training events conducted before his deployment to Iraq, Halo had prepared his platoon to establish a presence in the southwest part of the Sunni Triangle, between Fallujah and Ramadi. The mission was to tame the Iraqi Wild West and to keep the roads clear of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Halo's unit left Fort Riley, Kansas, and arrived in Kuwait two days later. Then the announcement came: they would not be using tanks. Instead, they drew up-armored Humvees [High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles] that were "less imposing to the local populace." Someone forgot to mention that the local populace included many members of al Qaeda who were eager to kill Americans.   Halo knew better:

> We were told that the mission was a "hearts and minds" thing, and that we would not see much action when we got there. It came down from higher headquarters that we would be outside playing volleyball and soccer from the minute we got there. That turned out to be nowhere near the truth.

Instead of fighting as he had trained, Michael Halo had to train a tank platoon to be an infantry platoon in the combat zone, on-the-fly. Nobody could help him. His platoon sergeant, who had trained on tanks for 16 years and was supposed to be Halo's tactical and technical advisor, knew nothing about infantry tactics. Halo went from being the most inexperienced tanker in his company to being the most experienced infantryman, all because of what he had learned in ROTC. The sum total of his expertise about infantry tactics came from U. S. Army Field Manual 7-8, *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad,* which he had studied in theory, but never applied in practice. Needless to say, FM 7-8 did not include a chapter on "reorganizing a tank platoon into an infantry platoon while the insurgents are trying to kill you." Yet because Halo had read one manual, he was declared the expert on clearing a house. All he knew was to kick the door in and look at all the corners.

Abandoning the "train as you will fight" principle led Halo to understand a new critical leader attribute in combat: managing the social effects of combat stress. This was

not a leadership behavior he had been taught in ROTC. But learning to handle grown

men who were whining and crying about losing their tanks was a skill he had to master

quickly. Within 24 hours of their arrival in Iraq, Halo's platoon took over for a unit that

still had their tanks because they had been part of the initial invasion of Iraq. On the last

"right seat ride" with the outgoing unit, Halo's platoon found their first IED. It detonated

without injuring anybody. But the explosion crystallized in Halo's mind all the things he

did not know about leadership in combat:

> Not researching IEDs was a failure on my part as a leader. The chain of
>
> command passed on what information they had, but in hindsight, I wish I had
>
> done more. By the time we landed on the ground, we knew IEDs were serious;
>
> we heard some rumors, and on our convoy north, we saw tanks that have been
>
> disabled by IEDs. That really demoralized my guys—seeing tanks that had been
>
> destroyed by a roadside bomb.

Halo may have been a brand-new platoon leader, but he was wise enough to realize that

he would have to learn new leadership skills and attributes if he was going to be

successful in combat. He had to establish a social reputation as a leader in order to

inspire his soldiers to succeed without their tanks. Selflessness was the foundation of that

reputation.

Values or Leader Attributes Important to Success as an Army Officer
(Research Question #2)

> Three years ago died the old colonel of my regiment, the 20th
> Massachusetts. He gave our regiment its soul. I went to his funeral. The
> doors opened at the front, and up the main aisle advanced his coffin,
> followed by the few gray heads who stood for the men of the Twentieth.
> The church was empty. No one remembered the old man whom we were
> burying, no one save those next to him, and us. And then I thought: "It is
> right. It is as the colonel would have had it." This is also part of the
> soldier's faith: Having known great things, to be content with silence.

> **--**Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
> Memorial Day, 1895 (p. 93)

Selflessness

Selflessness is a critical value for leaders, and they learn it best by observing it in

others, practicing it in training, and demanding it of themselves and subordinates in tough

conditions, including combat. The participants were attracted to the Army because of its

esprit de corps, and the opportunity to do "man things in a manly manner with other

men," according to Zarius Kolter. The participants consider their service to be both a

higher calling and a challenge. They enjoy the opportunity to do the thankless for the

ungrateful. They trust their comrades with their lives, and knowing that they share this

trust is something that merits worth. Their shared trust becomes a value for everybody in

the organization. Shared trust creates an ethos that binds members of the unit together

until each becomes a member of a community of leaders who share values. More

important, it creates a sense of obligation and accountability that transforms into action at

every level of leadership. From a five-man fire team to a 4,000-soldier brigade, the

participants agree that the fear of breaking the bond of trust motivated them to perform

their duties to the best of their ability. They were ashamed if apathy crept into their

decision-making, even if nobody got killed or the apathy went unnoticed by the chain a command.

The participants warned that somebody is always watching for selfishness on the part of the leader, so the harshest critic must be the leader's own conscience. Zarius Kolter told the story of his Platoon Sergeant at the Special Forces Qualification Course. This NCO, a short, thin black man, had been featured on cover of *Soldier of Fortune* the same month Kolter reported for duty, though Kolter didn't know it at the time.

Kolter and his Q-Course classmates were sprawled out on the grass after completing a grueling physical training session, and they were complaining that they still had 24 more hours of training ahead of them. Out of nowhere came the platoon sergeant. "Never bitch while you're sitting on your ass!" Kolter and his fellow students were commissioned officers, so they outranked the platoon sergeant. Yet nobody challenged the sergeant: "We were wrong. We didn't say a word. That was 17 years ago, but the lesson stays with me today."

One leader behavior that complements selflessness is the desire to be a self-starter. An effective leader takes control of the situation and compels his subordinates to follow his example. Kolter related a Special Forces proverb: "People join us not because we're different, but because they are." This phrase captures the idea that officers must compel their soldiers to follow the officer's example. An effective Army officer education program installs training and classroom instruction that causes the student to examine what they stand for, how they will define their "BE" component, and how they will transmit that message to others. The best programs expose those who are selfish, or

who are not self-starters, leaving only those who accept the responsibilities of leadership and are willing to master the behaviors that qualify them to lead.

Selflessness need not be some grand demonstration, like throwing yourself on a grenade or single-handedly saving a village from massacre. It is a series of simple actions that accumulate to form the leader's reputation in the eyes of his peers and subordinates. Eating a meal only after every other soldier has eaten, or being the first man out of bed or the last one in bed every day—these actions convey much about what the leader finds valuable and what he will deny himself to make sure that his soldiers have it.

Figure 3. Zarius Kolter in Iraq.

Michael Halo realized quickly in Iraq that selflessness on his part would keep his soldiers alive. Soon after his platoon began to conduct combat patrols, Halo noticed a pattern in the insurgents' tactics. If the convoy had five vehicles, the insurgents never fired at the first truck; they always shot at the number two, three, or four truck. From that point forward, Halo never rode in the first truck.

Halo's chain of command questioned his decision. After all, officers were supposed to lead from the front. And in a practical sense, the guy with the map and the

radio was supposed to lead the patrol in the right direction. Nonetheless, Halo valued

selflessness more than he valued of the opinions of those who outranked him. His virtue

nearly proved fatal.

On October 13, 2003, Halo assembled a force of five Humvees for a mission to

patrol Route MICHIGAN, the most dangerous road in Iraq. Halo planned to be in Truck

3. But at the last minute, the gunner of Truck 5 asked if the two vehicles could switch

spots. (The gunner of the last vehicle in a patrol must ride standing up, facing

backwards, so that he can watch for an attack from behind.) The soldier had a bad

feeling about riding backwards that day, and he felt comfortable enough with his platoon

leader to be honest about his fears.

Halo switched places, and the IED hit Truck 5, sending shrapnel through Halo's

chest and right arm. Had Halo been too selfish to switch places, he would not have been

injured. And he would have lived with that decision the rest of his life.

Malcolm Evers agrees that being approachable and accessible to soldiers is

important leader behavior. He believes that Army Field Manual 22-100, *Army

Leadership* (1999), accurately describes the skills that a leader needs; the manual directs

future leaders to those aspects of the "self" that they need to understand service for the

greater good of the organization. Contributing to that greater good are conceptual and

interpersonal skills. If the leader cannot relate to soldiers, no amount of technical and

tactical proficiency will inspire those soldiers to follow the leader. Evers stated this point

more brutally: "No one wants to follow an idiot, except perhaps out of idle curiosity."

The participants also felt that a leader must embrace and convey some degree of

stoicism, a value that isn't quite fully captured in the Army's definition of its collective

values or attributes, although FM 22-100 touches on the idea of stoicism in its explanation of selfless service. Two of the four participants mentioned the old saying that "a soldier who isn't bitching isn't happy," but all agreed that leaders must avoid the corrosive impact of expressing personal frustrations out loud. Halo, Evers, and Barber all connected the requirement for stoic acceptance of American foreign policy that uses its military forces for nation building and winning the hearts and minds of Islamic peoples. A leader in uniform, they believe, must stand apart from political debate. Evers summarized their conclusions:

> The Army leadership model, which centers on the values and attributes of honor, integrity, personal courage, and a sense of duty, is effective. Those are values I hoped to find in myself as I matured. Finding a means to truly test and study them was the driving force in my decision to seek a commission. The notion of committing myself to a cause for the common good was a very strong factor in bringing me into the ROTC department at the local university.

In keeping with trait theory, selflessness is an important prerequisite for a future officer; the trait is vital to success in that particular domain.

The participants agreed that this virtue was also vital in the practical sense on the battlefield; selflessness creates a foundation for all other leader behaviors in combat. All four participants reached similar conclusions about the necessity for selflessness in combat. For example, all four claimed that when bullets began to fly all around, their first concern was for the safety of noncombatants. This behavior is emphasized in all training: that the safety of noncombatants comes before the safety of trained soldiers. Had the participants been more loyal to their soldiers than to their duty, their first reaction

may have been to protect their American comrades, not the noncombatants in the streets who just yesterday may have been trying to kill them.

This selfless reaction amplifies the participants' comments about values learned in the classroom and values practiced in combat, which really becomes a comparison of theory versus practice. In combat, the participants were even more willing to sacrifice themselves if that meant saving their men. Michael Halo's story of the day he was nearly killed sheds an immense amount of light on leadership attributes and behaviors in combat. Halo nearly died, but he was happy that he had switched places so that his truck was hit rather than his gunner's; nearly giving his own life was a "little thing" in terms of selfless service. Later we will learn how Kolter preferred to risk death by volunteering for a mission than shirk his obligation to non-SF soldiers who asked for his leadership. In each case, the participants were concerned about people first, mission next. This fact supports to theoretical perspectives that inform my study. First, it personifies the "BE" component described in Army Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership* (1999). The virtue of each officer's being was created before he was commissioned, encouraged during the commissioning process, and solidified by the test of combat. It endures today. The genesis of this "BE" component comes from Aristotle's virtue ethics, whereby the officer personifies a specific set of virtues and behaviors that make bad actions impossible and selflessness automatic.

A leader creates a climate in which "choosing the harder right over the easier wrong" is a rare dilemma. He makes selflessness contagious. For example, the leader makes certain that "getting ahead" is less important than getting the mission done. In short, he makes moral success easy for his subordinates, rather than have them constantly

tested by ethical dilemmas. This kind of climate can reverse the negative energy that short-term violations of the "train as you will fight" principle might create. Sometimes those changes are dictated by political forces, which is not a problem as long as the political leadership explains the new rules of engagement to the military chain of command. For example, if the mission changes from combat operations to peace enforcement to peace keeping, the leader must transition from conqueror to cop, which requires a mental adjustment. The leader must abandon the behaviors of the conqueror and embrace those values required of the cop.

Left to military management, operational changes—such as modifying the Rules of Engagement or changing weapons readiness—are doctrinally sound and so understandable to leaders at every level of the chain of command. Replacing military doctrine with the policies of an outside agency—such as the United Nations—is the sure way to replace predictability with chaos. Extending unpredictability over months and years of a deployment is a sure-fire way to breed contempt for the decision-making at every level of the chain of command.

A selfless leader applies virtue by ignoring temporary effects on morale and applying sound behaviors—called the "mechanics of soldiering"—based on the tactical situation, not the politics at echelons far above the tactical level. They create success by installing rules at their level that allow subordinates no other option than to be agents of virtue.

Despite the efforts of the most virtuous leaders, they cannot ignore the selfish, immoral, or incompetent behaviors by higher ranking officers. Such actions have a serious negative effect on an officer's motivation to lead. This phenomenon appears to

increase as time goes forward and the officer reflects on his experience. Several of the

participants have become quite jaded about their experiences in combat. They feel as

though they have been pawns, not virtue agents.

Malcolm Evers recalled his squadron commander during Operation Restore Hope

in Somalia, LTC Kelly. LTC Kelly was an aviator who had married an attractive blonde

UH-60 pilot assigned as the personnel officer in the brigade headquarters, which was

located on the same compound as the commander's squadron. Kelly ignored the negative

perception his soldiers developed of him as he paraded around the compound with his

wife while his soldiers were thousands of miles away from theirs. His ignorance became

even more absurd as opportunities for rest and relaxation came up. LTC Kelly had his

wife in the combat zone with him, yet rather than allow his subordinates to go to on R&R

to get a brief respite from the desert, he sent himself on vacation, leaving his subordinates

back in Somalia in charge of the airstrip and aviation operation.

Needless to say, LTC Kelly's soldiers didn't think too much of his leadership. So

shortly after LTC Kelly left with his wife for R&R on the Kenyan coast, one of the

soldiers he left behind deliberately threw his rifle out the window of his 5-ton truck and

into a crowd of Somalis during a convoy into Mogadishu. LTC Kelly had recently

punished the soldier for unruly behavior, which was caused when his girlfriend—the only

woman assigned to the entire unit—started sleeping with other soldiers in the unit.

When a soldier loses a weapon, the commander is held accountable, so the rifle

tossed out the window cut short LTC Kelly's vacation.

You see the moral of the story: If LTC Kelly saw no problem with abandoning his

soldiers in the combat zone to go on vacation with his wife, why would this soldier not be

willing to interrupt LTC Kelly's vacation by throwing his weapon out the window?

Kelly used his rank to gain a personal pleasure, yet he punished this soldier for seeking

that same pleasure.

Incompetence by senior leaders in combat is another demoralizing behavior. Not

every officer is Lee, Bradley, or MacArthur, but soldiers expect their leaders to exhibit

basic technical competence, like reading a map, using a compass, or firing their personal

weapon. Unfortunately, the participants saw plenty of examples to the contrary.

Consider this story:

On one of our first days in combat, my unit was located in a tactical assembly

area. Suddenly we began to receive sporadic sniper fire. We took cover and

began to return fire.

As I searched in the distance for a target, I felt a tap on my shoulder. It

was my battalion commander.

"Can you help me load this?" he asked, holding out his pistol and some

bullets. I was shocked; I actually thought he was joking. As I stood there,

dumbfounded, his driver rushed over and began loading the weapon for him. I

looked at both men, and instantly I felt sorry for one and began to despise the

other.

Selfish motives driven by pleasure and technical incompetence are just two examples of

negative behaviors on the part of senior leaders. But at least they can be explained away

by the emotions of the moment. More calculated moral failures, however, are even more

debilitating to a junior officer's eagerness to lead.

Andrew Barber recalled the dark early days in Kigali, Rwanda, during the genocide of 1994. Barber deployed there with the Southern European Task Force; their mission was to secure the airfield there and attempt to restore order as massacres occurred at all points around the city.

The most critical order of business was to restore fresh water to the city, and Barber suggested that they take the only large generator available to the central pumping station. If they could get water flowing into the city, the tensions that were fueling the crisis might decrease. That generator might save lives.

The U. S. Department of State was in charge, and its civilian leader on the ground would decide where to deploy the generator. He decided that the generator ought to power the heart of the downtown electrical grid, not the water pumping station:

In the downtown grid were the hotels where the Department of State contingent and most of the other civilian relief workers were living. My impression was that we didn't really give a damn about the Rwandans. What we really wanted was for [the media] to turn off their TV camera. When they did, when nobody could watch the dying refugees on Lake Kivu, we bugged out. . . . We had the immediate ability to help people, and we did not. We *expressly* did not.

Barber's bitterness is clear. He went to Rwanda to help people, and he assumed that his senior leadership was equally decent and morally motivated. Instead, he saw personal ambition, selfishness, and political maneuvering. He realized that his military idealism was powerless in the presence of real power, and he left Rwanda skeptical of the chain of command that should have motivated him, not disillusioned him.

Before they entered the Army, the participants had learned the value of selflessness from commissioning sources, friends, family, and other formal organizations. They embraced that virtue as they trained to be officers, and they applied it in combat. Malcolm Evers and Andrew Barber reported that their strong belief in selflessless contradicted the orders and the behaviors they saw from their chains of command. Yet they never allowed those negative influences to compromise their virtue in combat.

The participants concluded that selflessness was an important virtue for a leader in training, and its value was reinforced by their experiences in combat. But other values were also important. As a result of their combat experiences, they identified six other virtues that were important to leading soldiers in combat.

Values and Leader Attributes Important in Combat (Research Questions 3 and 4)

> The test of character is not "hanging in there" when you expect a light at
> the end of the tunnel, but performance of duty and persistence of example
> *when you know that no light is coming.* Believe me, I've been there.
>
> > --Admiral James B. Stockdale
> > Medal of Honor recipient
> > Prisoner of war in Vietnam for 7 years
> > Address to the West Point Class of 1983
> > July 13, 1979 (p. 266, italics mine)

Personal Integrity

The officer must exhibit behaviors that establish his personal integrity and make it irrefutable in the eyes of his subordinates and peers.

Michael Halo's response to the first research question connects personal integrity to trait theory. "The three most important values in my mind are duty, integrity, and

112

respect. You're responsible to the people above you, and you are responsible to the people below you no matter what you're doing. I think a leader's attributes change depending on whether [the leader] is in garrison or in a combat situation," he said.

So Halo believes that leadership is situational, and leader behaviors may have to change based on that situation. "The respect for your superiors, and the guys beneath you, you do during your everyday job," he told me. "But once you are in combat, you change your whole role." Yet Halo refused to compromise his position on personal integrity. He mentioned it as a bedrock value in his relationship with his subordinates; he recalled its importance in combat, when he had to decide whether to fire at insurgents who were near civilians (he didn't shoot); he even mentioned its importance on the day he was wounded, explaining that he would rather have died that day than compromise his integrity (by refusing a request by another soldier to switch the order of march of the vehicles in the convoy that day).

Much like Michael Halo, the single most important value to Zarius Kolter was honor. He lived in fear of letting down his comrades or tarnishing the memory of colleagues who had died by performing in an un-honorable way himself. Fighting is an honorable profession. Kolter explained:

> I recently volunteered to go back to the war. Am I scared of never seeing my family again? Yes. Do I relish the fact of operating under intense pressure? No. Do I feel obligated to serve with my Special Forces brethren and to honor my friends who have already been there—especially those who gave their lives? Most definitely. Our society is largely disaffected by the war and the heroics of the common soldier, but I am not. So I will speak with deeds, not words.

These words make very clear that the Army value of honor is not a slogan to Zarius Kolter. It is a creed, and it is important that others know that Kolter embraces it. Successful officers share the desire to protect and serve people less fortunate or at greater risk than themselves.

Zarius Kolter supported the idea that the seven Army values offer a good starting point for the attributes and values that an officer must personify. But he described a few subtle departures from the standard definition of those values.

For example, regarding loyalty, the first value on the Army's list, he said, "Of course I was loyal to America, but I was more loyal to the men I served with in combat." In Kolter's mind, his obligation to his subordinates superseded his obligation to the nation. This attitude extended to his perception of the Army value of duty. To him, duty meant improving on his mistakes and accepting responsibility for his actions so that his soldiers stayed alive. "Serving others in the face of adversity, especially those who were more scared or younger than us, brings out the best in us." Thus Kolter applied his personal integrity to become more selfless, almost as a means to self-improvement, not just a way to serve others.

Kolter also offered an interesting perspective on the value of respect, describing it as "the Golden Rule." This analogy shows that his concept of respect grew from a perception from childhood were certainly from his teenage years, where he learned the parable of the Golden Rule in church. Incredibly, he recognized that this practice of "doing unto others" must necessarily extend to the insurgents who were trying to kill him. Kolter's application of that difficult moral responsibility was his greatest test in combat: "Respect for the insurgents was a real test. Some of those trying to kill us will

never lay down their arms. Still, we treated them far more humanely than they would ever treat any of us."

Zarius Kolter's perspective is hopeful and positive about the existing leadership curriculum for Army officers. At the opposite end of that spectrum is the experience of Malcolm Evers. When asked to name the most important values or attributes of Army officer must possess, Evers named none of the standard seven Army values. Instead, he listed humanist attributes that implied a tremendous amount of self reflection on his part, and possibly a resistance to the attributes that were pushed upon him by the Army, but also possibly a defensive reaction to what happened to him in Somalia.

The data from Evers also implied a difference between leaders who are assigned in strict combat missions, such as fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq, and leaders who succeed during very demanding peace enforcement or peacekeeping missions, such as Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. Many Somalis were members of warlord gangs and were eager to kill American soldiers, but the rules of engagement were very strict. American soldiers could not unilaterally shoot back.

Those rules of engagement created great stress for leaders on the ground. The restraint required by strict rules of engagement changed the attributes that Evers found valuable, not only in combat, but also in officers' day-to-day performance of their duties. Evers explained, "Empathy, patience, humanity, humility, and proportionality are particularly valuable, especially as the United States conducts more and more nation building, which forces military officers to perform roles that State Department personnel should [but do not]. The [civilian leadership] decides to rebuild and pacify lawless Islamic regions."

In many recent military operations, American foreign policy has created immense stress on the values of its officer corps. In Evers's case, they cracked: "In my personal case, during Operation Restore Hope, I failed to practice the value of humanity. I came to loathe the Somali people."

Andrew Barber argues that the U. S. officers incur an obligation for integrity when they swear to represent the nation. He saw the effects of brutal nationalism, first in Rwanda during the 1994 crisis and then in Afghanistan in 2005. In each case, his conclusion was the same: "I've been around enough to see that being an American is the equivalent of winning the lottery." Left unspoken is the obligation: American "lottery winners" bear an obligation to share the ethical wealth.

Barber compared his life of the American lottery winner to the life of the people in the combat zone. In Rwanda, he saw people massacre their neighbors with machetes. In some cases, refugee males were ambushed and had their Achilles tendons severed so they could never fight. Ethnic prejudice, driven by the unreasoned preference for my tribe at the group's expense, combined with fear-driven pettiness to create the constant rule the day.

According to Barber, an effective officer recognizes these prejudices and takes action to stop them before they become deadly. In other words, an officer must become the agent who moves events away from violence toward justice and respect for others. But Barber is not hopeful that even the best military officer education system can produce graduates who can succeed in a world that is becoming increasingly more violent in too many spots, among too many peoples.

In short, moral ethical reasoning depends on a common goodness of human nature. But in cultures where irrational extremists dictate regional and national policy, what difference can one commissioned leader make? A U. S. Army officer assumes human nature to be based in virtue and goodness, because that is the expectation he demands of himself. Personal integrity is the core of an officer's "BE" component, drummed into that officer on the day he reports to West Point or begins his ROTC program. Barber applauds that virtue, but wonders whether it is achievable:

Human beings are never more than hair's breadth from the fang and the claw. If our history involves a move toward justice and respect for others, the move is painstakingly slow, halting, sometimes reversed, and always fragile. High ideals generally give place to today's food, tomorrow's comfort, and small applause of the [idealists] around us.

According to Barber, the best way to succeed in a polarized world, with virtue agents on one end of the spectrum and the disciples of "the fang and the claw" on the other, is to live by this escalating list of simple rules:

- People matter

- All people matter

- All people matter all the time

- All people matter all the time everywhere

- Leaders respect other people more than they privilege themselves

The important leader behavior is clear: to overcome the numbing effects of brutality, officers must adhere to the highest standards of personal integrity, humanity, and selflessness, always at the expense of their own comfort.

Figure 4. Michael Halo before and after his last patrol.

Confidence

Leadership theory applies in garrison, but you're in your own world when
you're in combat.   I'm not thinking about my brigade commander that
day; I'm taking care of my own. You're not there to impress people.
You're there to get the job done.

--Michael Halo

All four participants sought a commission as an Army officer because of their

idealism and their patriotism—but they agreed that combat contradicts idealism and

patriotism. As Malcolm Evers summarized: "Let's face it—Lee Greenwood can only

take you so far," referring to Greenwood's patriotic anthem, "Proud to Be an American."

Three of the four participants concluded that their patriotism and idealism shifted

over time in combat to the point that their confidence in the mission and the purpose of

their service were assailed and nearly overcome. As a given deployment stretched from

days to weeks to months, the participants agreed that displays of individual confidence on

the part of combat officers became more and more important. Not just in giving specific

orders to soldiers or completing specific tasks each day; and not just the confidence

118

needed in the split-second decisions requiring combat; but also confidence in the chain of command from platoon to battalion to division all the way up to elected civilian decision-makers who committed the troops in the first place.

Any wavering in this confidence has a serious negative effect on the morale of the individual officer and on the overall morale of the unit. Effective combat leaders cannot allow that to happen. Confidence in the face of adversity is the single most important attribute for an officer in combat. The participants concurred that confidence is manifest in actions, so confidence an attribute, not a value. Confidence is manifest in a number of ways: first, by trusting your own judgment to make the correct decision when you have only a few seconds to make it. Second, having the courage to believe in the prudence of what you just decided to do without second-guessing yourself. The requirement for these decisions appear daily in combat, and many of them seem quite mundane. But any one of them could result in injury or death.

Michael Halo gave one example. His patrol came to the end of its assigned route, so they had to turn around. There was one reasonable turnaround spot along the route, but it was on the far side of a tight spot in the road, with room for only one vehicle to squeeze through at a time. This greatly increased the probability that the insurgents had targeted that one spot for an IED. Halo had to decide whether to give the order for his patrol to proceed through the choke point or to develop some other course of action.

Unfortunately, no second easy course of action existed, so Halo had to decide how much risk he was willing to accept. His soldiers waited for the order:

> I gave the word that we were going through that danger zone knowing full well it
> was probably mined. I also had to have the courage to pick which truck was

going to go through first, possibly picking which guys were going to be killed.

That's not easy, but I had to have the confidence to follow through.

Officers must personify confidence when they make split-second decisions in combat. Confidence is also necessary during the many months of a year-long or more deployment. It becomes increasingly difficult to display confidence when the mission becomes much more poorly defined by senior leaders. It is easy to understand why an infantry platoon must confidently attack the enemy who is firing at them from the top of the hill. But it is much more difficult to be confident as a leader when your understanding of the larger purpose of the operation begins to waver.

For example, when Malcolm Evers first arrived in Somalia, he had the full complement of combat power at his disposal: more than a dozen tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles to use to protect its troops and to project combat power against militiamen and bandits who were plundering the land and terrorizing the population.

But only two months after he arrived in country, the commander of 10th Mountain Division, his parent organization, decided to reduce the number of combat vehicles in order to project a "kinder and gentler" image of U.S. troops working for stability in region. Evers was in charge of security for every convoy moving to resupply the airstrip airstrip in Baledogle, 70 nautical miles north of Mogadishu, and also securing convoys traveling between Baidoa, where many of the "death camps" were located, and Kismayo, Somalia's other deep-water seaport. He needed combat power to complete those missions. Yet the commanding general in charge of the region was telling Evers that he couldn't have combat power. Not surprisingly, Evers lost confidence in the mission:

After conducting 44 separate convoy security missions, my opinion of our

mission's efficacy, the worth of the UN forces who were supposed to be

"supporting" us, and my understanding of the value of human life deteriorated

significantly.

That last point is particularly chilling: the mission was to ensure that Somali civilians

could live without fear. Yet over the course of several months, Malcolm Evers valued

human life less and less, not more and more. His confidence in the mission was

destroyed by a chain command that did not understand the stress felt by junior officers

who were fighting the battle on the ground.

Figure 5. Zarius Kolter jumps off the ramp of a Chinook helicopter.

Officers expect their subordinates to serve faithfully and obediently in combat. In

return, the officer swears to employ a soldier in a justifiable way and expose him to

minimal risk. The prospect of increasing the risk that soldiers must endure for vague

political reasons is not acceptable to an ethical leader. Ultimately, no such ethical leader

will corrupt his own values to achieve political objectives or operational outcomes not

consistent with the officer's understanding of the Army's leadership model or its collective values. Once an officer loses confidence in his chain of command, and thus in the purpose of his commission, he rarely gets it back. The baggage left over from earlier experiences cause the officer to be cautious and skeptical of each subsequent deployment.

This kind of wary skepticism haunted Evers 10 years later when he returned to the Horn of Africa, this time in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. His Army and Marine Corps joint task force was hunting terrorists in East Africa, and Evers found themselves once again working with Somalis throughout the region. The mental baggage left over from his experiences during Operation RESTORE HOPE caused a tremendous crisis in confidence:

> I was always uneasy while posted at Camp Lemonier. The prospect of losing one of my Marines in an effort to shore up a thug's control of his own people or the possible loss of a soldier just to cover a school's grand opening always troubled me. In short, I struggled between two diametrically opposed concepts—accepting that the ends justify the means [by supporting a flawed mission] versus preserving my ideals in order to avoid becoming exactly what we were hunting: amoral terrorists.

Courage

> By becoming habituated to despise and endure terrors, we become courageous, and once we have become courageous, we will best be able to endure terror.

> --Aristotle (*Nichomachean Ethics*, p. 36)

The participants agreed that courage meant having the ability or willingness to make the tough call in front of soldiers, often when confronting the enemy. For example,

a platoon on patrol in Iraq receives fire from a cemetery. What should the platoon leader do? In general, he cannot order his soldiers to fire into the cemetery, but he must weigh the rules of engagement with tactical necessity: his soldiers will be left defenseless if he doesn't give the order to fire. This decision would require courage on the part of the leader, particularly when there is no absolutely correct answer.

The leader must also understand the effect of courage on future operations. In the case of receiving fire from the cemetery, if he did not give the order to fire back, his soldiers would lose confidence in him, and the enemy would gain confidence that his unit would do nothing if they were attacked. Perhaps more important, how would his decision to fire or not fire affect the local civilians' perception of an American presence in the community? And how would it affect the officer's ability keep those civilians safe the next time his unit passed the cemetery?

Each of those questions had to be answered correctly in the split-second between the crack of the rifle and the strike of the first bullet.

Outward displays of moral courage demonstrate to subordinates what "right looks like." Courage is closely connected to confidence, because sometimes a leader must exhibit personal courage in order to inspire subordinates. The most effective leaders have one thing in mind: accomplishing the mission while minimizing the risk. The participants agreed: combat leaders need not be glory seekers. There is no sense in taking a risk just to get your name in the newspapers. A leader must entertain multiple scenarios and courses of action before deciding on how to accomplish a specific mission. That's what soldiers expect.

But a leader of virtue understands that character is demonstrated by actions, not words. Aristotle articulated the value of action in *Nicomachean Ethics*, and Army Leadership Doctrine (BE-KNOW-DO) requires that leaders take action, part of the "DO" component of leadership. The concept of leader-in-action extends backward in history to Thomas Carlyle's Great Man Theory (1840). In Carlyle's theory, a hero is sincere in what he thinks, what he says, and what he does. He strives to find the deep truth of the world and, once found, live by it in every aspect of his life—in other words, he looks into a mirror and sees a reflection of Aristotle's virtuous leader. The combination of those two qualities, sincerity and virtue, makes the hero great enough to warrant our veneration: "They were the leaders of men, these great ones; the modellers, patterns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain" (Carlyle, p. 1).

Carlyle published his theory two centuries ago, but the participants described heroic acts that validated Carlyle's conclusions. Zarius Kolter told the story of his friend Dave, a Special Forces soldier who faced a decision. While conducting convoy security outside of Mosul, Dave recognized that a car speeding toward the convoy was a suicide bombing attack. The attacker's car was traveling at a high rate of speed toward the convoy that Dave was guarding. Dave was at the wheel of the security patrol's vehicle; three other Americans were in the car with him. Without hesitating, Dave decided to ram the attacker's car before it reached the main body of a convoy.

Dave stopped the attack, but he died in the process. His death had a profound effect on Kolter:

I try to imagine what I would have done in the same situation. I have three small children who I want to watch grow. That said, I don't think that I could rest at night if I dodged the bullet. I would have rammed the car, too. Next to my Catholic faith, being a Special Forces soldier is the most defining moment of my life. I could never shame those who wear the beret.

Kolter got his chance a short while later. He had been in Iraq only a short time when a call came over the radio—if they moved *now*, they could intercept some very bad actors. Soldiers scrambled for their weapons and rushed outside.

Kolter's first reaction was to pass out ammo to the others—until one of his subordinates brought him to his senses. "What are you doing, sir? You're going too." Kolter grabbed his weapon and his Rosary and ran for the vehicles.

The mission would take the team up Route IRISH, the most ambushed route in all Iraq, which traced its way from Baghdad airport to the Green Zone. Earlier that day, the mission had been postponed because of an ambush that left several men dead or wounded. Now the mission was on.

The soldiers piled into two vehicles. One was a thin-skinned Opel that offered little protection to its passengers. The other was an armored SUV. Kolter chose the Opel. Its driver was a medical doctor who had served in Special Forces for years. He had volunteered to return to Iraq because he missed the camaraderie of the Special Forces.

The vehicles careened through tight and winding streets. Muzzles flashed in the darkness as the SF solders raced to intercept the target.

This is the real thing, thought Kolter. *There's no backing out now.*

Courage displayed in the face of the enemy is one thing, but there are other types of courage that officers need in combat. The courage to accept advice and indulge the ideas of subordinates is also a critical leader behavior. Imagine a senior leader, perhaps an aviation officer, who is placed in command of armor or infantry assets during combat operations. Quite possibly, the lieutenants and captains assigned to those armor and infantry units know more about how they should be deployed than the aviator who is in command. If the aviator in command remains open to suggestion and accepts the advice of officers and NCOs who have a better understanding of their specialty, he will earn the respect of those officers and NCOs. Conversely, a commander and refuses to admit the gaps in his own experience is doomed to operate in the blind when confronted by tactics, techniques, and procedures he does not understand. Leaders who embrace the intelligence of their subordinates will earn their subordinates respect, inspire them to do their best, and therefore be successful in combat.

Malcolm Evers remembers his commander during the first Gulf War, a lieutenant colonel who had very little understanding of how to use the cavalry platoon that Evers commanded. Yet one quotation from that lieutenant colonel still resonates with Evers: "A true soldier is one who is both courageous in defeat as well as humble in victory." That statement showed the colonel's virtuous nature to his officers and NCOs at a time when many American officers were "sporting a Rambo attitude when they confronted Iraqi troops, complete with the Stallone sneer, sporty bandanas, and modified desert camouflage uniforms." It took courage for the colonel to renounce the renegade mentality that some of his subordinates thought was appropriate.

Evers recalled one incident in particular that demonstrated humble courage. A Republican Guard tank company was putting up stiff resistance against Evers's task force, but the Americans quickly gained control of the battle. Many Iraqi soldiers were coming forward to surrender, but as they did, their own comrades were firing into them, killing them for surrendering. Simultaneously, American soldiers were firing at the advancing Iraqis, too, not yet certain that they intended to surrender. The battlefield was lit by bullets flying from each side toward a single point in the center.

Evers was amazed to see the scout platoon leader, a young second lieutenant, risk his life by rushing into that crossfire to evacuate the surrendering Iraqis rather than killing them, as the "Rambo" officer might have. That act of bravery and moral clarity by the scout platoon leader was intuitive, but the task force commander recognized it as an act of extraordinary courage. He recommended the lieutenant for the Silver Star, the second highest award for valor in the United States military.

Table 1. *Vignette on Personal Courage*

Personal Courage: Two Leaders in Iraq

Michael Halo

It was a typical rock clearance mission: a five-truck patrol up Route MICHIGAN. Then just before we left, we were tasked to take a military intelligence captain back to brigade headquarters at Ramadi.

The captain made us two hours late. This was only his second time going outside the wire, and I could tell that he was not a very happy man. He wouldn't get on the radio. I sent my driver over. He came back and said, "His radio is working—I can hear you calling him." So I walked over to the captain's vehicle. He was still trying to get into his body armor, which was really easy to put on—just some Velcro and a couple of snaps.

"Look, if you don't get on the radio, we are leaving without you," I said. Finally he came up on the net.

There were five vehicles in the patrol. The captain was in the middle vehicle; I was in the last vehicle. I gave the order to roll, and we left.

We had just crossed through Khalidiyah, one of the most dangerous places in the country at the time. We had been through plenty of other IED attacks, so when I saw a water bottle on the side of the road, I said "Watch out for that water bottle . . . Go left! Left! LEFT! . . ."

BOOM! It was a 155 mm artillery shell, remotely detonated. They were watching us.

The entry wound is right underneath my right shoulder, and the exit wound is right above my heart on my left chest.

My gunner was out the hatch. He got hit in the neck with a couple pieces of shrapnel that just missed his jugular vein. Two months later, he got hit in the exact same spot, but on the other side of his neck. They sent him home after that one.

I barely remember the ride back to the aid station, trying to ask what was wrong with me. They say that I complained about my right arm. I couldn't breathe.

When we got back to the aid station, I called my platoon sergeant over, grabbed his hand, and said, "Tell my wife I love her." I figured I was dead.

He looked at me, and I remember what he said, exactly: "Bullshit! You tell her yourself."

Those words got me through the rest of the day.

Empathy

> The people I met in Rwanda, Panama, and Afghanistan exhibit the same desires, affections, needs, and abilities we do. Our conditions vary; our resources vary; our education varies; and our imaginations become what they become from these influences. But underneath that, we're all the same.
>
> --Andrew Barber

Applying the virtue of empathy represents many challenges for a combat leader. A commissioned officer's first priority is to take care of his soldiers and to be empathetic to their needs and emotions in the face of danger. But there are other constituents who also require an officer's empathy. The civilian population in the area of operations also deserves the officer's empathy. For example, American officers on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan must understand the culture to gauge how their actions might influence the locals' perception of what an American officer stands for and the American ideals he represents. At times the officer may have to subordinate the wishes and needs of his soldiers in order to meet the needs of the civilian population that would be defenseless without the presence of American forces.

American officers must also be empathetic to the enemy. Although this seems like an illogical statement, the Law of Land Warfare requires US officers to treat enemy combatants with dignity and respect, particularly if they are taken prisoner by U.S. units. In a world where the identity of combatants versus common civilians is increasingly blurred, U.S. officers must weigh their application of empathy with a healthy amount of prudence. Too much empathy could be fatal.

Finally, a commissioned officer must be empathetic to the American people. In the digital age, the actions of one officer on a difficult and remote battlefield thousands of miles away from the continental United States could very well be broadcast on the

evening news minutes later. For those who suspect the motives of men in uniform, the broadcast could corroborate or refute their preconceived notions of the virtue of military service. Simply put, an important leader behavior in today's media climate is to confirm for the television audience that America's armed forces are ethical, noble, and absolutely in step with American values. Being effectively lethal is secondary.

All four of my participants confirmed the requirement to be empathetic to foreign civilians and enemy combatants. All four have had multiple interactions with enemy soldiers, and they agreed that for the most part, enemy soldiers who wore a uniform, such as Iraqi soldiers in the first Gulf War, were noble combatants who deserved respect.

It became more difficult for the participants to respect combatants who were fighting an unconventional war, such as the one we are experiencing now in Afghanistan and Iraq. American military law—and for that matter, US constitutional law—is still struggling with the question of whether Al Qaeda insurgents deserve the protections afforded to enemy combatants in accordance with the Law of Land Warfare. This begs a logical question: if the United States Supreme Court cannot decide whether the insurgents deserve the protections afforded a legal combatant, how was a 22-year-old second lieutenant supposed to answer the question in the tense seconds before he orders his soldiers to pull the trigger?

Table 2. *Vignette on Empathy*

Empathy: Day One in Afghanistan

Andrew Barber

My overwhelming first impression is one of grinding poverty. I had no idea the people were so poor. They are. The place is filthy. Life expectancy is age 43. Twenty percent of children die before their fifth birthday.

There are over 8,000 soldiers from more than twenty countries securing the city of Kabul. One sees every kind of military vehicle, every kind of uniform, and every kind of weapon. The insurgents place IEDs but haven't yet gotten good enough at building them. Two were found last week, another reason for the extreme security: wire, thick barriers, gates, guards, guns, armored vehicles, checkpoints, and procedures for coming and going.

The air in Kabul is so thick that you can only see three telephone poles ahead at ten in the morning. Smoke billows from every kind of fuel you can imagine—tires, wood, plastic, petroleum, coal, and exhaust from vehicles.

I've never seen such a filthy place. Nothing is clean. Butchers slaughter animals in the unmucked lots just outside and then hang the meat from poles by the street. The roads are horrible, and no one follows any hint of rules. If your side of the road has potholes, you just move to the other side, drive fast, honk your horn, flash your lights and refuse to yield a single millimeter. I've seen exactly one woman driving a car.

Most of the older women wear Burkhas; blue is the most popular color. Women are always behind. Even girls in groups of youngsters walk behind. Even in the orphanages, the women and girls are pushed to the back of the room. One would not want to be a woman in Afghanistan. You can own nothing. You almost don't exist in the eyes of officialdom.

The Afghans are very tribal, and those allegiances far outweigh any loyalty to the unclear and abstract thing called the country of Afghanistan. The government exerts virtually no control over the countryside, and vast regions of the country have no road network whatever.

These people are survivors. They survived the Soviets, who trained all the senior officers in the country, and then they survived the Taliban. We are next. The first thing our interpreter told us was "Never trust an Afghan, including me."

The participants emphasized that a combat leader must understand the source of soldiers' fears and plan daily operations accordingly. Zarius Kolter recalled a recent experience in Iraq. He was working with a Special Forces detachment whose mission was to locate and capture some of the most dangerous terrorists in Iraq. After the SF unit captured them, the terrorists were handed over to conventional forces who transported them via helicopter from the forward edge of the battle area to a holding area in the rear.

Transporting these captured terrorists was an additional duty for the conventional US forces, and the unit that was formed to transport them was made up of soldiers from a variety of military specialties: cooks, radio operators, and clerks, for the most part. They were somewhat nervous about the cargo they were carrying. And to compound matters, the flights often received small arms fire, with tracers coming up at the aircraft.

One night, the transport mission was assigned to a squad led by a young female sergeant. She approached Kolter and asked to speak to him in private. She explained that the flight mission had just been assigned to her and her soldiers. Normally, an SF soldier accompanied each flight mission, but on this particular night no order had come down assigning an SF escort to accompany her soldiers.

The young sergeant explained that her soldiers were nervous about flying without an SF soldier in the bird with them, and by the hitch in her voice, Kolter could tell that she was nervous, too. Kolter had flown another mission the night before, and it had received enemy fire. He was not particularly eager to volunteer to escort this new flight. He could have declined; certainly his presence alone would not stop the enemy fire.

But Kolter remembered the tracers streaming up at the bird the night before, and he realized that the sergeant was imagining them streaming toward her and her soldiers.

He grabbed his weapon and led the way to the helicopter.

Michael Halo assigned empathy another name: "being a mind reader." By that he meant the officer's ability to look his soldiers in the eye and decipher which ones were truly scared to go outside the wire that day and which ones were merely trying to gain a few more hours of rest. Once the officer is on the ground, walking the battlefield, it's called "situational awareness"—the intuitive comprehension of what just happened and what may be about to happen based on those recent events. On the human level, situational awareness is another name for empathy; the officer comprehends what his soldiers just said or did, and based on his ability to empathize with their emotions, he anticipates how they will react in the next situation.

Halo remembered how critical that skill was in leading his soldiers in combat, and also how critical that skill was in understanding the Iraqi people, and the risks that the bad actors among them represented:

> Empathy was also looking at the Iraqi civilians—looking into their eyes and knowing if they're *really* ready to kill you that day, or if they're going to be nice that day. Some days, that's the difference between life and death.

Finally, the participants suggested that senior leaders who dismiss empathy as weakness or claim that it puts soldiers at risk send the wrong message about values to their officer subordinates.

For example, in 1994, the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) deployed to Rwanda to secure the Kigali airfield so private volunteer and nongovernmental agencies

could conduct relief efforts. Once they secured the airfield, they realized that they had

the only working generator, and therefore the only clean water supply in the entire city.

The Rwandan authorities had neither the means nor the ability to repair the city's

electrical grid, which would power the lifting station pumps and return clean water to the

city. Meanwhile, the Rwandan people were bathing in and drinking water from a

sewage-filled river that doubled as a livestock watering hole.

Andrew Barber empathized with the Rwandan people and wanted to help them, so

he approached the chain of command and asked if he could use the task force's tanker

trucks to deliver water downtown or deploy their Air Force engineer team to repair

enough the grid to get the water flowing. He was shocked by the answer: "No, you may

not leave the airfield. Your mission is to secure the airfield so that relief supplies can

flow and others can do the assistance work. If the people of Kigali become dependent on

you, it will be hard to keep the deployment short, and the people, the government, will

never stand on its own."

Barber hoped that this lack of empathy was a one-time decision, but he was

wrong. Ten years later, he deployed to Afghanistan, where he noticed a similar lack of

empathy. The Americans occupied the best buildings in town and paid much higher than

usual rents. They drove new SUVs rented from an oil emirate at a very high rate, and

they drove fast because "speed is security." Meanwhile, Afghan children begged just

outside the gates of the American compound, and the General Commanding forbade

"interaction" with Afghan civilians, including the kids. The Afghans never saw an

American face up close. Americans did not buy in their shops. Americans did not speak

to them on the street. Americans did not eat in their restaurants because of security

concerns. Americans did not give candy to children. In short, Americans were ordered

to act in a way that contradicted how they would have acted anywhere else. Americans

were not nice.

Instead, the Americans raised the Afghans' already-too-high rent in the housing

market and ran right over any Afghan who got in the way of a Humvee. Andrew Barber

was ashamed of how he was required to conduct himself in Afghanistan. The behaviors

demanded by his chain of command contradicted what Grandma Minnie had taught him:

"We generally showed the Afghans that their lives were less important, less valuable,

than our lives." Barber resented that lesson.

Humanity

> I always kept in mind that I was not an individual; I represented
> the American people. As such, I made it a point to carry myself
> as an officer.
> --Zarius Kolter

Combat is an immensely dangerous environment, and soldiers who operate in it

can easily forget their moral obligations as members of a civilized international

community that believes in basic the common values of decency, justice, and respect for

human life. Philosophically, it might be difficult to reconcile the requirement to kill

others, even in self-defense, yet still embrace these basic human values.

Military ethicists have studied this dilemma in detail, and the body of knowledge

that results, called Just War Theory, is a topic separate from this study. Both

international and common laws have been enacted to enforce Just War Theory. When we

think of international laws that govern the actions of leaders in combat, we most often

recall the Geneva and Hague Conventions, but Just War Theory did not begin with those

135

two forms of international law; it began centuries ago, in the middle ages, when both secular and religious leaders sought to diminish the increasing misery and damage caused by war.

The purpose of more formal international law is to limit both the reasons for fighting in the first place and the means employed by the combatants after the fighting begins. International law works fine when all the combatants agree to comply with them, i.e., when two nations at war have signed documents that specify the rules under which they will fight. The Hague Conventions (1907) and the Geneva Conventions (1949) and are examples of such international law (both are summarized in FM 27-10: *The Law of Land Warfare*, 1976, p. A-vi). But U. S. soldiers are also bound by common law—the customs of international warfare that, although not written down, are assumed to be binding on both warring states and soldiers. The U.S. Army follows both international law (the Hague and Geneva Conventions) and common law, and has organized both in Field Manual 27-10: *The Law of Land Warfare* (1976). United States Army officers must obey the tenets contained in that regulation and risk punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice if they fail to enforce them.

Beyond these legal requirements for officer leadership in combat, Army initial entry training reminds soldiers of their obligation for compassion for other human beings and attempts to include that obligation into its value system. By extension, this obligation creates an even greater responsibility for commissioned officers. Officers are responsible for operating the Army's formal programs that intend to teach the Army values in a formal environment. The Consideration for Others Program, the Values and

Sensitivity Program, and the Equal Opportunity Training Program are just three examples.

The participants concurred that these forced programs are simply institutional eyewash that wastes precious training time, so their conclusions represent a source of tension. As commissioned officers, they are obliged to support those formal programs. But the participants agreed that the Army's classroom model for teaching values is a defensive measure meant only to record attendance and placate possible critics. Just because a soldier reports to a classroom, discusses the importance of being "kinder and gentler," and signs an attendance sheet does not mean that he left the room more enlightened than when he first entered it.

Instead, the participants conclude from their experiences that leaders learn values by witnessing role models putting values into action on a daily basis. Virtuous leaders are considerate of others and mindful of equal opportunity in their daily interactions with subordinates and peers. They earn a reputation for thoughtful, effective leadership by their deeds, not by virtue of rank. Each of the participants recalled leaders who demonstrated good deeds, and so were admired. But they also recalled sycophants who "led" by intimidation and derision.

Simply stated, an effective combat leader lets others see that he is human and allows his subordinates to be human, too. Many soldiers in Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia, and Afghanistan were away from family and loved ones for the first time, so the participants had to be attuned to the emotions caused by separation. More important, the participants noted that many of soldiers were entering harm's way and witnessing things that might

haunt them for hours, weeks, or months into the future. Failure to recognize natural

human frailty might compromise future missions and the safety of others.

Two of the participants cited the effects of Abu Ghraib, the scandal in which U. S.

soldiers were accused of mistreating prisoners in Iraq. Clearly that event shook these

officers' perception of values and compelled them to make emphatic demonstrations of

virtue to their soldiers after the Abu Ghraib incident became public. All four participants

cited the difficulty of reminding subordinates that they could not retaliate against local

civilians after their American members of their unit had been killed or wounded.

Captured insurgents, even those who had been caught in the act of firing on Americans or

placing explosives, could not become the target of frustration and hatred.

The overriding conclusion of the participants was that an effective combat officer

must stay human and honest in combat and must work to demonstrate those behaviors to

their subordinates. Combat requires discipline, not retribution.

Balancing humanity with the mission is a critical leader skill. The participants

cited many examples where humanity almost necessarily clashed with the chaos of

combat. An officer often must choose whether he should maintain a civilized level of

humanity for others, and so accept more risk, or become less attuned to another person's

feelings but have a better opportunity to complete the mission without the risk of

casualties or the chance of moral failure on the part of the leader.

Officers who embrace humanity as an important virtue demonstrate

corresponding leader behaviors to show their soldiers how humanity can be an important

barometer of moral conduct in combat. For example, Malcolm Evers recalled how LTC

Critz, his battalion commander during the Gulf War, demonstrated humanity in combat and used it to teach his junior officers effective ways to lead soldiers in combat.

LTC Critz's battalion had among its officers an armor captain who was quite a dandy—full of bravado and swagger. One night during the opening stages of the war, Captain Dandy called in a situation report over the command net; he had engaged a BRDM [an Iraqi combat vehicle] and destroyed it. Dandy's excitement over his "first kill" was so extreme that his spot report over the command net was largely incoherent and astonishingly offensive, and most of the officers in the battalion heard it.

LTC Critz immediately halted the entire task force and called all the commanders to his location. Stopping an entire task force in the middle of a battle in the middle of the desert was an extremely difficult task, nearly unheard of in the first Gulf War. LTC Critz risked his own career by taking such extraordinary measures. But his commanders, all captains, were leading soldiers in combat for the first time, and LTC Critz wanted to drive his point home.

Once all the captains had arrived, LTC Critz calmly removed his headgear. When he did, Evers noticed that inside the webbing of LTC Critz's Kevlar helmet was an image of the Virgin Mary. That seemed out of character, because LTC Critz was not an overly religious man.

LTC Critz explained to the assembled captains that CPT Dandy's pleasure about his first kill, broadcast live over the radio net, was not only in poor taste, but also counter to good order and discipline. It was not the message that a professional officer would send, and it would not be tolerated.

Nobody spoke. Evers realized that Captain Dandy stood within an eyelash of being relieved from command—an action that would have ended Dandy's career on the spot, created enormous stress in his unit, and threatened the success of the synchronized battalion attack that LTC Critz was leading. Was the virtue of humanity, assaulted by Dandy's crude and unprofessional outburst over the radio, important enough to risk those outcomes?

To LTC Critz, it was. And any officer who had not embraced humanity as an important value for every leader in that task force before that meeting clearly understood its place in LTC Critz's organization after that day in the desert.

As the most senior captain not in command, Evers would have replaced Dandy as company commander. From LTC Critz's demonstration in Iraq, he gained an understanding an officer's obligation to be human, even in combat.

Several years later in Somalia, that lesson prevented Evers from killing an unarmed civilian.

Table 3. *Vignette on Humanity*

Humanity in the Somali Desert

Malcolm Evers

I was leading a small convoy from Kismayo to Baledogle after delivering vehicles, repair parts, and fuel to our aviators when suddenly we were caught in a large surge of Somalis who had gathered by a remote airstrip. They gathered there to receive and distribute a mildly narcotic plant called *quat*, which when chewed releases dopamine from its freshly cut green leaves.

My convoy slowed. I had seen this side of the black market before, and it pissed me off. These drug users stole relief grain and then sold it in Addis Ababa in order to feed their addiction to *quat*. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of their own people were starving.

We inched through the mass of four to five hundred men, many armed with AK-47s, but eventually we were forced to stop to avoid running over them. I had dropped off the bulk of my combat force in Kismayo, so I had only 12 men spread among five trucks, with a single .50 caliber machine gun mounted on one 5-ton truck and one M60 machine gun on the armored Humvee in the rear of the formation. That was all the firepower I had to in case the crowd decided to loot the convoy or take our vehicles from us.

Yet for reasons I can't explain, at that point I decided to get out of my Humvee and physically push my way through the Somalis. The potential of being taken hostage by the crowd came to mind, so I grabbed a GP medium tent stake wrapped with nylon cord at one end to secure my grip—I called it my "Somali Whacker"—took my M9 pistol out of its holster, and began to lead the convoy on foot.

Most of the Somalis began to disperse enough to allow us to pass, but I yelled and swung my Somali Whacker at the others. Suddenly, a man with a large amount of *quat* bundled under his arm approached me.

"Stop!" he commanded, in a firm but calm voice. I could see that he was unarmed.

My jaw tightened. I raised my M9, took the weapon off safe, and grinned. I might have killed him right there.

To my surprise, he showed neither emotion nor alarm. Then he spoke in perfect English, "Why are you so angry, American? Why not just wait for the people to move?"

I dropped my arm. The Somalis slowly parted, and I led my five trucks through the human press.

After months of constant misery and dealing with the frustration of understanding a culture that survived only because of American intervention, yet resented the presence of every American, Evers was losing his own humanity. He began to despise the Somalis, to the point that he nearly killed an unarmed man simply because he had the opportunity to do it. Evers lost 40 pounds during his time in Somalia and came home with reservations about American intervention in Africa. Yet during that deployment, he led 44 convoy security missions without the loss of one soldier and survived that tense moral test in the Somali desert.

The other participants also reported a clash of cultures and values that made it very difficult for them to confer empathy or humanity to enemy soldiers, insurgents, or civilians who rejected American values at every turn. This phenomenon—human beings refusing to accept good acts by American soldiers—tested officer leadership at every level.

Zarius Kolter remembered how difficult it was the practice humanity with captured insurgents who spit on U. S. soldiers and threatened them even as they were handed food, water, and medical treatment. Soldiers wear their last names on their uniforms, but Kolter and his soldiers routinely placed tape over their nametags to hide their identities from the insurgents, because the insurgents have "friends" in America who might try to harm the families of American soldiers.

Yet Kolter pledged to keep his personal feelings in check; respect for others and selflessness, two qualities inherent in the virtue of humanity, drove him to enforce what he described as "the values that transcend jobs." Officers and soldiers, regardless of

rank, specialty, or branch must hang together and live those values in order to accomplish the mission and return to their loved ones.

Officers in combat struggle to maintain their humanity, not just with the enemy, but also with their own subordinates. An officer must be loyal to his soldiers and must display empathy for the hardship caused by the profession, but the officer also has an obligation to do whatever he must do to keep his soldiers alive. Sometimes that means being very callous to complaints, homesickness, or fear in the face of combat. The officer may be experiencing those emotions himself, but he can't empathize with his soldiers to the point that his emotions translate into decisions that place soldiers at risk.

The participants reported that they had to separate human emotion from military necessity, which created a climate of social detachment for the officers. They had to put themselves at a social distance from their soldiers. Sometimes this distance was driven by tactical necessity. Sometimes it was driven by the need for military discipline. In combat, it was necessary because an officer cannot be too friendly with soldiers he must order to take the next hill or clear the next building. The emotional baggage that might have resulted when an officer's orders caused the death of his friends was too great a burden for the officers to risk.

Consequently, when the participants deployed and move closer to combat, they became less friendly and more strict with their soldiers because they knew that the first casualty might be right around the corner. They would have to maintain their own self-control in order to prevent the second casualty.

Minimizing casualties was a constant theme among all four participants. Even in training leading up to combat, the number of injuries became an informal scorecard by

which the officer rated his performance as a leader. A twisted knee here or a small cut there was one thing; a KIA [Killed in Action] was something entirely different. Without exception, the participants preferred that they become a casualty before their soldiers. The participants who redeployed from theater without incurring a casualty among their subordinates felt like they had done the best job they could.

Michael Halo measured himself in terms of the "casualty scorecard," describing how his transition from a personable lieutenant to a callous leader kept his soldiers safe:

Shortly after we arrived in Iraq, our battalion had one guy shot in the arm and another shot in the head. It was a large caliber round; the bullet entered his Kevlar and only grazed his head, but it still knocked him unconscious. At that point, I stopped joking around with my guys and started yelling about small mistakes.

I was very fortunate—we only suffered one casualty, and that was from a rock that came down after an IED exploded. It flew up in the air, then came down and broke the guy's wrist. Inventorying that soldier's equipment to go back to the rear made everything more real.

After that, I became even more serious on the missions. No idle chatter on the radio. At first, we would have that, because you would get bored. But after the casualties, I cracked down on that.

An outside observer would struggle to find a connection between a soldier being wounded and idle chatter between soldiers on the radio as their vehicles rolled down the highway. But Halo considered even the most minor breakdowns in discipline as the potential cause for a casualty. Casualties were what he feared most, and if it meant being

144

a tyrant to eliminate what caused them, so be it. He was not willing to risk nightmares in the future for friendship in the present, even in the loneliest place on Earth.

Proportionality

> They teach you that an officer must have courage and must do the right thing. But remember this: it's all right to take cover. You can't stay behind cover the whole time and hide. But don't be afraid to take cover. Otherwise, you're dead.
>
> --Michael Halo

Proportionality is an abstract term that can apply to operational efforts and personal conduct on the part of the officer. It means that the unit practices restraint in terms of its use of force, a restraint that is manifest in the rules of engagement. For example, there is no need to destroy the entire city block to capture one insurgent who is hiding in the house on the corner.

Proportionality also applies in the personal level to individual leaders and their actions in combat. Officers who practice proportionality calculate the means needed to reach justifiable ends, and issue orders accordingly. In this way, proportionality is closely akin to prudence and objectivity in the officer's decision-making process.

Proportionality is a virtue; officers who practice it are moral agents in combat. Yet in American military history, proportionality most often comes up in discussing failures on the part of individual leaders or collective leadership. The participants agreed that any discussion of proportionality typically leans toward its most negative context: eliminating the possibility of inappropriate behaviors by leaders, in its most mild form, and war crimes in its most extreme form.

In discussing proportionality, Andrew Barber recalled an old proverb from the social sciences: "Give me a child up through the age of seven, and I will give you the man." Barber meant that values are something a person establishes in his youth. By extension, Arthur Chickering (1993) said the same thing when he explained his student development theory, which held that a young person develops his own identity through a series of tests until he reaches a point of adulthood where he can be fully accountable for his actions. Chickering's theory applies to the Army's formal efforts to teach values to enlisted soldiers and to officer education programs that teach future leaders what right looks like. If Chickering is right, what a brand-new lieutenant learns in Army schools simply reinforces what is already a part of his being. In that way, proportionality points directly back to Aristotle and the theory of virtue ethics, where goodness is defined by the good acts knowingly performed by the virtue agent.

The participants worried that Army officer education emphasizes too often the negative consequences that can result when officers failed to live up to expectations of the profession. Rather than encourage new officers to seek the highest moral road, the system instead warns officers that failure to comply, failure to behave, in one fashion or another may endanger or end their careers.

The danger in creating such a negative climate is that people who exist in it feel compelled to adapt, and the smartest people are the most able to navigate the system. The Army tells officers that proportionality matters, then emphasizes the negative effects on the officer's career that will result of the officer does not practice proportionality. If the Army subsequently places the officer in a situation where proportionality is impossible, the Army compels the officer to simply sharpen his calculus about what

might or might not be gotten away with. In short, the Army risks creating a generation of officers who will be less inclined to do the right thing than they will be to avoid punishment or cover up the facts of their failures afterward.

In that extreme place called combat, the virtue of proportionality faces its greatest test. The United States Army has seen already what happens when the veneer of civilization is peeled away and junior officers are left to fashion a defense for what they did—or more likely, what they were ordered to do. My Lai springs to mind.

At My Lai, a U.S. Army officer personally directed the killing of over 400 persons, mostly women, children, and old men. The U.S. troops were never fired on, never threatened; nevertheless, they committed war crimes by murdering civilians. Had Lieutenant William Calley fully understood the principle of proportionality, those crimes would not have happened.

Proportionality cannot be learned in training; it requires practical experience to understand when and how to apply appropriate force. The leadership situation requires that the officer apply force in reasonable proportion to the task at hand. Proportionality requires discipline and judgment, and officers who practice it commonly choose a harder right over the easier wrong. Combat places an officer in a position where he has to make that choice, often in a surreal or chaotic setting. But a clear vision of the values that guide the organization makes applying proportionality in combat easier for an officer.

A leader's personal reaction in combat must be proportional to the situation at hand; above all, it must be controlled.   Michael Halo recalled the second mission his battalion conducted after they arrived in Iraq. A lieutenant from another company in the

battalion led his platoon outside the wire, and Halo listened to the situation on the battalion command net.

The platoon was attacked by insurgents. Within seconds, Halo could hear the lieutenant screaming and yelling on the net. Halo couldn't understand a word the lieutenant was saying. Nobody in the battalion tactical operations center could understand him, either. They did not tell where the platoon was, what size unit it was facing, or what support it needed to extricate itself from the firefight. Because he could not keep himself in control, the platoon leader lost critical seconds of support from his higher headquarters. Halo learned that day the value of staying calm, cool and collected.

Malcolm Evers echoed the value of self-control as a leader behavior, particularly when logistics support didn't match the threat is unit faced. During the first Gulf War, Evers led his soldiers on a three-day push across the Iraqi desert. Several times, he came under heavy machinegun fire from Iraqi armored vehicles as he moved about the battlefield in a canvas Humvee. At the end of those three days, his unit had defeated the Iraqi forces and taken 245 Iraqi captives. Yet for that entire operation, the only weapon Evers was issued was a .45 caliber pistol and a grand total of 21 rounds of ammunition. Clearly, his combat load of ammunition was not proportional to the amount of enemy resistance he faced.

During a later deployment as commander of a cavalry troop in Somalia, Evers witnessed a more serious example of proportionality. After relative peace had been established in and around Mogadishu as part of the UNITAF mission, the chain of command decided to expand the area of operations that Evers would have to secure. He

was given responsibility for convoy security from Mogadishu to Kismayo, yet his battalion *decreased* its combat strength.

This decision violated the principle of proportionality. Evers and his soldiers faced more risk with less firepower. The reasons were political. Citing doctrine published in manuals rather than listening to leaders on the ground, the chain of command declared that the task force had officially transitioned from *combat* operations to *peace enforcement* operations and finally to *peacekeeping* operations. They ordered Evers to send most of his combat power back to Fort Drum, ignoring the fact that the rebels were still shooting at American soldiers.

The decision violated the principle of proportionality and left Evers in a very dangerous situation. He felt that the decision to declare an end to combat operations was dictated by the media, which forced U.S. policy makers to deploy a less lethal, more media-friendly peacekeeping presence in Somalia. As a result, the most effective firepower Evers could wield during security operations was a .50 caliber machine gun. No tanks. No Bradleys. Not surprisingly, the security situation eroded over the next four months as the original rules of engagement were replaced by new ones that limited the use of force.

About that time, Evers was also given the mission to defend the perimeter of the task force's compound, so he was simultaneously commanding the Quick Reaction Force to defend the task force compound as well as controlling ground convoy operations from Baledogle. More important, the security perimeter was rather porous, with only wire and a few earth revetments to keep the Somalis outside of the task force area. Evers assumed more responsibility with less firepower and absolutely no creature comforts—no air

conditioning, no hot meals, and only the most primitive hygiene facilities (three 5-gallon water jugs and a bucket). The situation placed an escalating physical strain on Evers and his soldiers, and he found it increasingly difficult to enforce proportionality among his soldiers. They started to crack.

In such a situation, the officer's understanding of his moral responsibility is the only thing that can maintain a sense of balance when things are clearly veering out of balance. But that is easier said than done. No amount of leadership can prevent irrational acts by subordinates who, placed under extreme stress, lose their sense of proportionality. Evers told the story:

> One day in Somalia, a convoy was passing through the K4 traffic circle. A Somali boy, perhaps 10 or 11 years old, snatched the sunglasses off a staff sergeant's face. In retaliation, the sergeant grabbed an M79 grenade launcher and fired a 40mm grenade into the boy, vaporizing him instantly.

Did the act of stealing the sunglasses warrant killing the boy? Absolutely not. But after enduring months in the field in tough conditions, the sergeant's perspective had warped so much that it compelled his irrational response. In his mind, Somalia was a land peopled by thieves and thugs, and it was impossible to maintain any sense of balance while dealing with them.

This vignette demonstrates why combat officers must make every effort to enforce the principal of proportionality and resist the downward spiral into lawlessness that extended deployments to lawless places make possible in any soldier, no matter how well trained they might be.

Andrew Barber witnessed that lawlessness in Afghanistan, where the civilian population was systematically exploited by those who had guns or clerics or both on their side. Peasants grew poppies not because they wished to addict Americans, but because they wished to feed their children. Girls could not go to school; if they tried, either the girls or their teachers or both were killed and the schools burned. Making the landscape more incredible to Barber was the Taliban's claim that the violence was carried out in the name of justice. To a reasonable person, there was no justice, not even the hint of justice:

> Killing to achieve even the smallest comfort was, apparently, a deep but readily accepted part of the culture. If those in power could have gained food, shelter, and convenience through intelligence, they might have built schools. But they gained comforts more easily through violence, so they employed violence. And if they could have better and more comforts by employing more and better violence, that's what they did.

Andrew Barber realized that proportionality was entirely absent in Afghanistan. By removing it, the Taliban replaced reason with violence.

Officers also apply proportionality to their management of friendly forces in combat; in that way, proportionality has practical use in the profession of arms. For example, an armor battalion on the attack moves along an axis of advance; on its left and right are friendly units moving in the same direction, so that their axes of advance are parallel. A tank that beats the enemy to the punch by firing first has the best chance to survive. But when friendly units are moving parallel to each other, each tank must be careful not to fire across the adjacent unit's boundary. The tank commander must clearly identify his target as an enemy vehicle before he fires. If he doesn't, he risks fratricide.

151

This concept of identifying each enemy vehicle before engaging it is easy to imagine in theory, but difficult to execute combat, especially at night. During the first Gulf War, when American tanks were fighting enemy tanks for the first time since the Korean War, American officers struggled to minimize fratricide. Every vehicle that appeared on the horizon was assumed to be the [Iraqi] Republican Guard, and the tendency was to shoot first and ask questions later. The rate of unnecessary fire increased exponentially, and principle of proportionality suffered.

When faced with unique circumstances, effective combat leaders invent new doctrine on the fly. Malcolm Evers found himself in that role during the first Gulf War. Evers commandeered his battalion commander's Humvee, which had four radios in it, and used it to monitor the communications nets of adjacent units as his battalion attacked. As a flank unit came into contact with the enemy, or when his battalion met resistance, Evers stayed in constant contact with all unit commanders, trying to keep unnecessary friendly fire to a minimum.

Sure enough, a mechanized infantry company team operating on extreme edge of the battalion's formation came under fire from a friendly unit. Within seconds, an American Bradley fighting vehicle pumped seven 25mm rounds into one of Evers's Bradley fighting vehicles. The adjacent friendly force was firing across the unit boundary!

Evers quickly called the adjacent task force commander: "Check fire!" Immediately, the firing stopped. By inventing new leader behaviors to fit the situation, Evers made his unit more combat effective, enforced the principle of proportionality, and reduced the risk of fratricide.

Differences between Formal Curricula and the Values and Attributes Required in Combat (Research Question #5)

The participants noted several differences between formal curricula and the values and attributes required in combat. As a result of their experiences in combat, they have changed their perceptions of leadership in several ways.

First, the participants recognized that different environments require very similar leader behaviors. For example, staying calm and collected inspired followers to listen to a leader no matter if it's a dirty street in Ramadi or Kigali or a business office in Philadelphia or Akron. If the leader personifies self-discipline and confidence, people will listen and follow. Michael Halo identified three important behaviors that have a calming effect in combat and in business:

- Remain calm

- Speak clearly

- Get your point across in a minimum of words

I would add to this list the virtue of selflessness, which the participants identified as a critical value earlier in this study. Halo personified it when he described his reaction to being wounded. Rather than becoming jaded or bitter about his injuries, Halo saw it as the source of learning: his injury taught him that "life isn't all about getting everything done, work, work, work all the time."

More incredibly, Halo concluded that his injuries prevented two deaths that day and his own death several months later:

It was lucky it was me [who got wounded], because if [the IED had hit] the Humvee that we were escorting, we would have had two body bags that day. They were riding in un-armored Humvee, so they would have been destroyed.

Overall, outside from the fact that being wounded was a physically negative thing, it has probably been positive on my life.

The weird thing is that my getting wounded saved my life. A couple of months after I was wounded, my replacement and my driver were on dismounted patrol when they got hit. Both were killed in the same instant. If I hadn't been hurt, I would've been there instead. It's weird to think about: getting wounded actually saved my life.

The tasks that the participants performed in combat reinforced their faith in their perception of the values critical in combat, but caused them to question the values of the senior leaders they followed. Two of the four participants emphasized that high ranking military officers and elected civilian leaders must model values through their conduct. For practical examples, future values education should summarize appropriate leader behaviors at every level, from the lowest ranking soldier to relatively famous officers who demonstrate them on the battlefield.

The Army values of personal courage, selfless service, and honor will always be applicable in combat. But they can be compromised by senior leaders who contradict those values with their own improper behaviors. Zarius Kolter recalled several officers who abandoned selflessness by putting themselves in for awards or making a brief foray into a combat zone to "earn" a combat patch and ribbon.

One was a colonel who recommended himself for the Combat Action Badge, a new qualification badge meant to identify those who were engaged in combat or on the receiving end of enemy fire. This colonel started wearing the badge just because he had been in a guard tower when some mortar fired came into his camp—even though every camp in Iraq received mortar fire at one time or another, and most of the camps spanned tremendous amounts of land.

Another officer bumped an enlisted soldier from a scheduled flight to Afghanistan, then after landing on the return flight, pinned on the Combat Action Badge. Kolter considered those actions "sickening and shameful" immoral actions that contradicted the spirit of commissioned service and tarnished the valor of soldiers who honestly earned the awards.

Elite units like the Special Forces and Ranger battalions have developed very strict, though unwritten, rules for officer behavior, and those higher standards of conduct inspire officers to want to join those units even though their missions are often more dangerous. For example, Special Forces officers attend the same leadership development schools as their peers from other branches, such as the Infantry Officer Basic Course. But attending them is considered an understood formality, less pertinent to real combat leadership than the unspoken standard of the Special Forces. Everything SF soldiers do reinforces and requires leadership that tests the human psyche. Who would volunteer to carry a telephone pole for miles, while wearing a rucksack, just to be selected to join the unit? That's what SF officers must do just to join the club, but it teaches them that every mission has a purpose.

The purpose of tough training is to sift out the weak of heart and spirit, like those officers who submitted themselves for awards. The best leaders take the lessons learned in training and apply them to leader behaviors in combat. Zarius Kolter described his transition from training to combat:

Combat was surreal until I actually engaged in it. I remembered very little of the "book stuff" while in combat, but that was where the true test of leadership came into play. The books can prepare you and discuss how to react, but the real test comes on the inside of every leader.

After interviewing Kolter, I was struck by the absence of any reference to the officer education system as a source of values. Instead, he relied on the personal example of family members and fellow soldiers; they personified values he cherished. This is a common thread in the data: the participants dismiss formal "book learning" of values education in favor of behavior modeling.

Since he is now retired from the Army, Malcolm Evers's quest to understand leadership attributes and values is mostly reflective in nature. The more time he spent musing over this topic, the more he recognized the importance of values and behaviors that teach cultural tolerance and values training for commanders and leaders.

One constant theme in my dialogue with Evers was his fear that our elected leaders lack the moral clarity to side only with foreign governments or entities that will wholeheartedly adopt and accept our American value system, or one very similar to it. As a result, even though our elected leaders may have the best intentions, they commit soldiers to conflicts that are clearly unjust. By disregarding the theory of just and unjust war, they force military leaders to make a decision: should they collectively disobey

direct orders when the officers feel that their senior leadership is serving a political agenda instead of adhering to the precepts that define American democracy or the American sense of justice?

Andrew Barber echoed those same fears. He feels that the Army's values education program may actually corrode the ideals it purports to serve. The difference between what we say and what we do creates cynicism and isolates the human qualities we're supposed to be about. For example, how can military officers train, coach, or mentor the Iraqi Army when the rules of engagement demand that American officers refuse all social contact—an order that exists only because the chain of command can't afford to have an incident that the press can claim, after the fact, could have been prevented?

Barber concluded that our support to our allies overseas is too often tempered by political risk to the generals in charge, not physical risk to the soldiers on the ground. Our leadership is paralyzed by the "CNN effect"—a fear of what the media will say about our actions, rather than trusting the virtue of those actions themselves. Combat officers end up restraining their subordinates' more democratic impulses when democracy is exactly what we are trying to impart.

The participants recommended several changes to the values education curricula in the officer education system. First, reduce dramatically the number and frequency of mandatory classes. Teach one class, but then assign a multi-month project which captures some or all of the values. All the participants considered formal values training to be ineffective at best and a farce at worst because the clarity of purpose for the training has been lost.

The oldest of the participants, Barber and Evers, were taught the meaning of military right and wrong against the backdrop of the Cold War. The Soviets were going to invade Europe, so they were the bad guys. The Americans were defending freedom; they were the good guys. That logic is a virtual re-run of the ethical justification for World War II.

But their personal experiences in Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Rwanda were not so clear. Moral justification for each successive operation decreased, until today, moral clarity is only a hope, not a certainty. Officers in combat today must make a moral judgment for each action—in some case, each shot fired—if they hope to prevent a war crime or the claim of one on the evening news. Twenty years ago, it was easy to be an ethical leader: shoot the guys in the other uniform. Today, each day of combat is an ethical dilemma.

Adding to this problem is the fact that real combat leadership is increasingly rare. Even though today's continuous pace of operations has caused more officers than ever to be deployed to a combat theater, fewer officers than ever have been required to display combat leadership. Many officers are often confined to Forward Operating Bases (FOB) and may never test themselves in a real combat situation.

And as soon as an officer passes the first few tests of combat, he is promoted into assignments or tasks that require less leadership and more management. Just when an officer becomes proficient at leading soldiers in combat, he is moved to a staff or management role, where he cannot influence and improve the leader behaviors in others. For the great majority of modern officers, combat experience is measured in days and minutes, not months and years. The burden is less visceral, more cerebral.

To prepare for those cerebral challenges, the participants recommended that future officers read books that examine the officer's understanding of commitment and cultivate the habits and powers of imagination. These books might come from a wide range of topics: art; literature; military history; philosophy. Reading these books over the course of time, the officer will develop the intellectual courage that will translate into acts of decency. Until the officer understands the human condition—its history, its tendencies, its capacities for inhumanity, and the fragility of civilization's veneer—he cannot personify the values that define American democracy.

Connections to Theoretical Frameworks

> War is hell, but that's not the half of it, because war is also mystery and terror and adventure and courage and discovery and holiness and pity and despair and longing and love. War is nasty; war is fun. War is thrilling; war is drudgery. War makes you a man; war makes you dead.

> --*The Things They Carried* (O'Brien, p. 80)

Leadership behaviors cannot be learned in a classroom environment; they must be acquired by habitual confrontation by challenges pertinent to that specific virtue. This theme connects perfectly to Virtue Ethics. Aristotle believed that virtue was achieved by practice, not by static display. A leader must take <u>action</u> to define for others his attributes. By performing good acts, he develops virtues that make bad future actions impossible:

> In our transactions with other men, it is by action that some become just and others unjust, and it is by acting in the face of danger and developing the habit of feeling fear or confidence that some become brave men and some become cowards. . . . Hence it is no small matter whether one habit or another is

159

inculcated in us from early childhood; on the contrary, it makes a considerable difference, or rather, *all* the difference (Aristotle, 1986, pp. 34-35, emphasis mine).

In *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle defined the "cardinal virtues":

- temperance

- justice

- courage

- wisdom

In this study, the participants identified seven virtues required in combat:

- selflessness

- personal integrity

- confidence

- courage

- empathy

- humanity

- proportionality

Artistotle's theory of the unity of the virtues applies to situations where combat leaders practice and display attributes that promote those virtues in themselves and others. Each action becomes a building block in the leader's self-assessment. A virtuous leader is sensitive to collisions of specific virtues in the execution of a specific act. For example, a combat leader may have to ignore courage in order to apply the correct amount of empathy or proportionality.

According to Aristotle, a person possessing one virtue must necessarily possess them all if he hopes to live a good life. Likewise, the participants concurred that these six virtues are important to the officer's ability to succeed in combat and that the officer's success could be judged by his application of those virtues.

Trait theory clearly informed the combat leadership experiences of the four participants in this study. Trait theory contends that there is a connection between internal virtues, (which Stodgill calls "values"), external behaviors, and ultimate success as a leader (Stodgill, 1974). All four of the participants related vignettes in which the situation dictated appropriate leader behaviors. In one context, humanity may have been appropriate. In the very next context, courage may have been paramount, up to and including the application of lethal force. If a combat officer does not possess the correct traits for combat leadership, he will fail. Trait theory is useful in predicting how people will react from one situation to the next, such as the chaos of combat. Alistaire MacIntyre articulates the close connection between virtue ethics and trait theory in a specific situation:

> To judge a man therefore is to judge his actions. By performing actions of a particular kind in a particular situation a man gives warrant for judgment upon his virtues and vices; for the virtues are just those qualities which sustain a free man in his role and which manifest themselves in those actions which his role requires. (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 122).

MacIntyre's concept is articulated in Army leadership doctrine, the second theoretical concept that informs this study. U. S. Army Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership*, describes the values that sustain a leader as what a leader must "BE" (p. 2-2).

The leader's values make up his "BE" component. But developing these qualities is only the first step of action-based leadership.

A leader is judged by what he *does*, not what he *should do*. In *Fields of Fire* (1978), James Webb's riveting and realistic fictional account of combat in Vietnam, Webb described the moral dilemma of Lieutenant Robert Hodges. Hodges had been seriously wounded by a grenade while leading his platoon in combat and had been evacuated to Okinawa, Japan, to recover from his wounds. While on Okinawa, he fell in love with and pledged to marry a beautiful Japanese woman. Hodge's senior officer on the base, a Major, tried to help Hodges by offering him the job of the base recreation officer. If Hodges accepted, he would spend the rest of his Vietnam tour on Okinawa, marry his sweetheart, and return to the United States a healthy man. Hodges mentally considered his options:

> A simple "Yes," and the war would be over. . . . What does a man do when his war is over, wondered Hodges, except keep fighting it? . . . He suddenly felt superior to the Major, a creature apart, capable of absorbing combat's horror without asking for quarter. Down south, his men were on patrol, or digging new perimeters, or dying, and he was nothing if he did not share in that misery.
>
> He stared deep into the Major's face, enjoying the one moment of nobility that his months of terror had allowed. "Thanks, Major. But I didn't come halfway around the world to referee basketball games" (pp. 257-58).

Lieutenant Hodges wrestled with his "BE" component, questioning whether he could live with himself if he abandoned his platoon in favor of a beautiful woman and a lifetime of personal safety. His decision to return to his platoon personified the "DO"

162

component of Army leadership, which requires that an officer develop the right values to lead others, then display those values in their actions.   In James Webb's fiction, Lieutenant Robert Hodges paid the ultimate sacrifice for his moral integrity: he died after calling an artillery strike on his platoon's position after it was overrun by a North Vietnamese regiment.

According to Don Snider (2005), a commissioned leader of character lives a life that reflects eight "time tested principles that have proven best able to prompt decisions reflecting discretion and judgment and . . . provide for consistent and professionally virtuous behavior in the daily lives of members of the Army officer corps" (Snider, 2005, p. 145):

- Duty—subordinating personal interests to the requirements of the profession

- Honor—includes the virtues of integrity and moral courage

- Loyalty—both upward to the President and downward to the last soldier in the unit

- Service—defined by the quality of an officer's years of service to the nation

- Competence—a moral imperative made possible by continuous self-improvement

- Teamwork—subordinating the will of the individual to the task of the group

- Subordination—accept the principle of civilian control of the military

- Leadership—personifying the attributes of spiritual, physical, and intellectual fitness (Snider, 2005, pp. 145-146)

Snider's theory of Officership extends Aristotle's idea of virtue to what an officer must "BE" to succeed in the profession of arms. Thereafter, according to FM 22-100, *Army*

Leadership (1999), the officer demonstrates the virtuous base of his "BE" component by demonstrating four important categories of knowledge—his "KNOW" component:

- Interpersonal Skills

- Conceptual Skills

- Technical Skills

- Tactical Skills

By creating a virtuous base of values, then mastering these four categories of knowledge, the leader is ready to DO the influencing, operating, and improving tasks that will lead his unit and his subordinates to success.

In summary, the participants concurred with Aristotle's theory of an action-based leader who personifies important core values, and the same conclusion is articulated in Don Snider's theory of Officership and in Army leadership doctrine, articulated by FM 22-100: *Army Leadership* (1999).

In this study, three caveats to those three theoretical frameworks appeared in the data:

- Officers must learn their craft in the field, not in the classroom

- Mere presence in the combat theater is not equivalent to combat experience

- As an officer's career progresses, he *manages* more but *leads by action* less

Malcolm Evers described how his role as a combat officer changed greatly between two tours in combat even though his age, rank, and level combat experience changed only slightly: "I served as a very junior captain in the Gulf War and rose [only] to the rank of

major for my tour in Somalia.   It seems to me, however, that as a leader's position or rank in combat increases, he is usually forced into a situation where his sphere of influence expands in such a way that he becomes less of a combat leader and more of a manager."

Evers's testimony was echoed by Barber and endorsed by Kolter, both of whom had to fight with their chain of command to return to combat once they passed the rank of captain. Thus the data indicates that the theoretical frameworks indeed apply to combat leadership, but their experiences belie a trend in professional practice, encouraged by officer education programs and personnel management procedures, that hinders an officer's ability to be a leader of action. Instead, as officers progress up the career ladder, they become managers, not leaders.

Each of the seven virtues found valuable by the participants can be measured by Aristotle's virtue ethics theory of the Golden Mean. Aristotle believed that a leader must take action in order to hone his virtue. The laws of physics demand that actions create energy, and energy compels a consequence. In the case of a leader in combat, those consequences can be quite serious. So a leader must make decisions based on the action that might result. Success depends on action that falls between the extremes of the possible results of those actions—Aristotle's theory of the Golden Mean:

> The median characteristic [of action] is in all fields the one that deserves praise. . . . it is sometimes necessary to incline toward the excess and sometimes toward the deficiency (the opposite extreme).   For it is in this way that we will most easily hit upon the median, which is the point of excellence (*Nicomachean Ethics*, p. 51).

165

Consider again the example in *Fields of Fire* (1978). Lieutenant Hodges

mastered a "golden mean" of personal conduct, flying between cowardice—taking the

easy way out of Vietnam via Okinawa—and extreme courage (refusing to consider the

option at all) before returning to his platoon in the An Hoa Basin. For the four

participants in this study, it meant trying to increase their probability of success and

survival by weighing the extremes of each virtue against the risks required by the mission

at hand.

Applying the theory of the Golden Mean to the seven virtues identified by the

participants might yield these polarized extremes of action:

Table 4. *Extremes of Action for the Seven Combat Virtues*

VIRTUE	Example of EXCESS	Example of DEFICIENCY
Selflessness	Volunteering for every mission without regard to knowledge, skills, or abilities	Shirking duty to the point of malingering or desertion
Integrity	So brutally honest as to insult others, even in social settings	Lying under oath to the chain of command or Congress
Confidence	Becoming a braggart about the most trivial achievement, even if the facts are true	Knowing the correct action, but being fearful to the extreme in executing it
Courage	Walking unarmed directly into machine gun fire	Missing movement to avoid combat
Empathy	Bringing an armed insurgent into the perimeter just because he is homeless	Killing a homeless person to put him out of his misery
Humanity	Giving all of the unit's money, food, water, and supplies to the locals, leaving solders to fend for themselves	Refusing to render first aid to a child injured by the unit's actions
Proportionality	Destroying an entire village because a soldier was injured there	Failing to engage enemy combatants firing at the unit because they "might not understand the Law of Land Warfare"

For example, recall the confrontation between Malcolm Evers and the *quat* dealers at the airstrip deep in the Somali desert. Evers was leading a convoy from the coast to the interior of the country, so his confrontation with the drug dealers had nothing to do with accomplishing his mission. But he had a cognitive reaction to drug dealers who were stealing the food that the United States was providing for hunger relief, then selling it on the black market to buy drugs. Evers very nearly killed one of the drug dealers "just because [he] had the opportunity," but he avoided an extreme reaction to lawlessness that might have haunted him the rest of his life. His actions mirror the virtue that Aristotle described more than a thousand years ago:

> Virtue is a mean in the sense that it aims at the median. . . . There are many ways of going wrong, but only one way which is right—for evil belongs to the indeterminate, as the Pythagoreans imagined, but good to the determinate. . . . Excess and deficiency characterize vice, while the mean characterizes virtue: for bad men have many ways, good men but one. (Aristotle, p. 43)

Evers's moral compass found Aristotle's "one good way," settling on the correct azimuth just before he pulled the trigger. He demonstrated an officer's prudent, reasoned response to a dangerous situation—the military virtue of proportionality—and applied Aristotle's vision of virtue to it.

The most valuable attributes in combat are those that compel subordinates to overcome the cognitive dissonance between self-preservation and action, between risk and duty, between ethical combat leadership and cover-your-back bureaucracy. Often, the leader must overcome his own cognitive dissonance first.

Leon Festinger described a new theory of social psychology in *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (1957). Cognitive dissonance is defined as a collision between what a person believes and values and other persuasive indicators, e.g. cognitions, that calls that person's belief into question. This collision might be manifest in self-doubt, psychological discomfort, or even altered physical behaviors as the person adjusts to or compensates for the disparity between the belief and their immediate circumstances.

Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance is relevant to virtue ethics and leadership in several ways. Cognitive dissonance may compel both the leader and the follower to alter their values. For example, if a leader behaves in a way that his or her followers reject, the followers experience dissonance: they cannot simultaneously respect the leader and accept the unacceptable behavior unless they alter their own values. The followers might accept the leader's behavior. They might resist the behavior but rationalize why the behavior is acceptable in the short term. Or they might reject the leader altogether to resolve the collision with their personal values. In each case, the followers' cognitive dissonance requires an ethical decision.

The leader may also experience cognitive dissonance because of his behavior. The leader may refute claims that the behavior damages his ethos as a leader, but once that possibility is raised, the leader is aware that the behavior is a problem and so cannot pretend that dissonance does not exist. The leader may rationalize the relative merit of the behavior, recalling the quotation of an American officer speaking about the 1968 "liberation" of the Vietnamese village of Ben Tre: "It was necessary to destroy the village in order to save it." Destroying the town was the only way to keep the communists from

controlling it, so the officer rationalized the immoral outcome of destroying a civilian village in exchange for the [perceived] benefit of scorched-earth democracy.

Harman-Jones and Mills (1999, p.7) would describe this logic as the Effort-Justification Paradigm of dissonance. Their research concludes that when a person engages in an unpleasant activity (destroying the village) with intentions to gain a desirable result (saving the village), dissonance is aroused. The actor understands that the activity is unpleasant, so to justify it, he exaggerates the desirability of the outcome. In the case of Ben Tre, cognitive dissonance occurs when the officer doesn't really believe those benefits exists, yet he destroys the village anyway.

The same rationalization exists for those who make the unethical decision to make large sums of money by illegal means, but wouldn't do the same thing for less money; the larger sum overcomes ethical objections that might exist for smaller amounts. Festinger's theory explains people who would not steal a pack of gum at the grocery store but will rationalize cheating on their income taxes or destroying a Vietnamese village. They claim that the outcome warrants the behavior.

Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999, p. 4) identified four basic ways that dissonance can be reduced:

1) removing the dissonant cognitions

2) adding new consonant cognitions outweighing the dissonant ones

3) lessening the importance of dissonant cognitions

4) increasing the importance of consonant cognitions

We can also consider two other concepts pertinent to cognitive dissonance and their relationship to combat leadership.

Harmon Jones and Mills (1999) described the Free-Choice Paradigm of cognitive dissonance. Under that paradigm, an officer makes a decision, but the negative possible outcomes of the decision conflict with the most likely outcome, or an alternate decision that was rejected has a more likely positive outcome than the decision that was enforced. In either scenario, cognitive dissonance occurs as the result of a decision being made. The dissonance increases with the difficulty of the circumstances, because a greater number of [possibly better] outcomes are likely.

Aronson (1997) defined the Self-Consistency interpretation of cognitive dissonance. His theory assumed that dissonance can be created in situations that create inconsistency between the actor's self-concept and his behavior. Since virtue ethics depends on developing a positive self-concept, a virtuous leader is very likely to experience dissonance when he experiences behaviors that are immoral, irrational, or imprudent. The subjects in this study, for example, displayed extreme dissonance when describing the incompetent or immoral actions of officers senior to them because they viewed those actions as incorrect.

For example, when Andrew Barber requested permission to provide water to the citizens of Kigali, Rwanda, during the genocidal civil war there in 1994, he was instructed to stay at his location and let the locals fend for themselves. Those orders violated the values of humanity and empathy, both of which were important to Barber. As a result, Barber experienced dissonance on two levels. First, he struggled to reconcile why his chain of command, which supposedly had assembled in Rwanda expressly to help the Rwandan people, would refuse his request to do just that. Second, after he had been ordered to do nothing, Barber experienced what Aronson (1997) described as Self-

Consistency dissonance. Barber knew that the right thing to do was to repair the water pumping station, but his military discipline required him to obey orders that contradicted what was right.

In *War, Morality, and the Military Profession* (1979), Malham M. Wakin argues that even though Barber may have sworn an oath to obey his chain of command, he had no moral obligation to be loyal to his superiors from the moment he received the first immoral order:

> The emphasis on instant obedience to military superiors and civilian leaders is critical and appropriate. . . . But the military professional, the officer leader, ought in fact to seek after the justice of the cause. Obedience to orders is not in itself either a legal or moral claim of right action although it is certainly a mitigating circumstance. Military leaders cannot be merely an instrument to the state. They are instrumental, yes; but they must at the same time accept a portion of the responsibility for the use of the military instrument (Wakin, p. 205).

Barber might have used Wakin's argument to counteract his reaction to an immoral order. In that way, he would have better understood how to morally rationalize the Self-Affirmation theory proposed by Claude Steele (1988). Steele's idea was that cognitive dissonance results from behaving in a manner that goes against the actor's sense of moral integrity. It is a self-defensive reaction to failures of virtue on the part of the leader. In short, the leader is disappointed with his own moral failure, recognizes it, and must reconcile it. Had Andrew Barber understood Steele's argument, he may have left the Army much less troubled by his experiences in Rwanda and Afghanistan.

Combat leaders often carry reminders of their personal and professional responsibilities with them on the battlefield and treasure those symbols long after the have returned to safety. Officers in combat must overcome the mental strain of self-doubt and fear that increases as the stakes in combat get higher. One of the participants relayed a vignette that demonstrated the unpredictably swift consequences of combat:

> During a relatively quiet evening in Baledogle, Somalia, an infantry unit from the 10th Mountain Division manning a checkpoint just outside our compound opened fire on a bus containing civilians. The captain in command said that he thought he saw an armed man among those riding the Somali bus. After several dozen rifle bullets passed through the bus and the smoke cleared, they found only dead and wounded unarmed civilians on that bus.

> One woman, critically injured, was brought into our compound as my medics and our physician's assistant worked on her. She died in our aid station.

> No doubt the infantry captain responsible for those deaths will bear the burden of his rash actions for the rest of his life.

How do officers avoid acquiring those burdens when they are in the combat zone or carrying them home after the war is over? Artifacts from home help officers cope with the social isolation of leadership. To resolve the cognitive dissonance between what the officers saw in combat and what they remember from home, they carried personal symbols, documents, or other artifacts that reinforced their values. The participants who fought in more than one war carried the same things both times. Anything special, even a pillow or stuffed animal, helped the participants maintain their sense of self during the stress of combat.

We have all heard the old leadership cliché, "It's lonely at the top." That phrase applies to officers leading men in combat. The artifacts the officers carried helped reduce the strain of their social anonymity, necessary when leading soldiers in combat, while providing a cognitive relevance for the tremendous strain on the psyche they had to endure as leaders. The leader cannot be best friends with his subordinates, yet he cannot go home to his family at the end of the day. A commissioned officer has no peer, no confidant, at the platoon or company level. Leadership is indeed lonely for commissioned officers in combat.

Michael Halo described the social distance he established in his platoon once they arrived in Iraq and the reasons for it:

> I [became] totally callous to my guys. [Before the unit left for Kuwait], they were whining and complaining and wanted to go home to their families, and I wanted to go home and see my wife. But I had to exhibit the stubborn, callous part of myself, which I had never had to apply [back in Kansas].

Why would an officer purposefully establish a social distance between himself and his soldiers? Because he wants to demonstrate to them the mental discipline that will help them survive in combat. Combat is no place to allow the mind to wander, or tell jokes, or discuss a pending divorce. It is the workplace of the no-nonsense professional soldier in confrontation with an enemy who is eager to kill the American jokester or soon-to-be-divorcé.

In short, the officer must adjust his actions toward a *deficiency* of humanity, modeling a behavior that his soldiers will accept and mimic. That process represents the

ideals of virtue-based living described by Stephen Hudson in *Human Character and Morality* (1986):

> Our evaluative conceptions about the nature and ideals of right-living are drawn
> from vast networks of social activities that have transpired over enormous reaches
> of time: models of conduct and character have been established, assayed, rejected,
> confirmed, revised, redrawn, shown unfit. The process continues. We *identify*
> with such [leader] models, taking them to be what we should be like, what we
> want to *be*. Our admiration and esteem for those whose character and conduct we
> approve and respect causes us to desire to become like them, to become the
> objects of such approval and respect. Such identifications are integral to the
> continuing process, for they connect the standards to the various patterns of
> behavior characteristic of the process, making us the sort of rational creatures we
> are (p. 121; all italics appear as they were in the original text).

The key terms here are "connecting the standards" to "patterns of behavior." The combat leader's soldiers see what right looks like and then connect it to behaviors that succeed in combat. The leader compels his soldiers toward actions that will keep them alive, but, as I explained earlier in this chapter, in the process denies himself the social interaction that any human being requires. That's what Michael Halo did in combat, and what other commissioned leaders must do if they hope to succeed as combat leaders.

Beyond the practice of establishing social anonymity, the participants were no different from the soldiers they led; the participants corroborated that finding when they inspected their soldiers and their living quarters. All soldiers, regardless of rank, carry private symbols of the world they left behind. The artifacts varied depending on each

soldier's personal situation—pictures in a wallet of children, wives, friends, or significant others. Many leaders carried a prayer or other symbol of their religious faith. Next to a soldier's cot, the officers might find a compilation CD made by a loved one, a coffee cup from the hometown diner, a letter from children at the soldier's elementary school back home. Zarius Kolter described artifacts that few would imagine:

> When a soldier went to the shower, his towel was probably something from the linen closet at home. I personally tried to ration the shampoo and shaving cream I brought from home. I used them sparingly, only during times when I was in a funk. They were talismans that reminded me of who I was and where I came from. I saw on many dogtags a Crucifix or Saint Michael medallion. A soldier might even wear a Scapular or carry a Crucifix. All of these were reminders of home. I wore it all.

After Kolter told me this story, I asked him if he had any other artifacts, photos, or other documents that might clarify his experiences in combat. Later he emailed me this photo and this poem. He told me that poetry served as his primary method of dealing with his combat experience.

My Son's Hands
by Zarius Kolter
U. S. Army Major, Special Forces
two months after his return from combat in Iraq

I watch my son, six-month-old Jack,
inspect his hands, precious toys
that never need batteries.

He turns them
clockwise, then counter-clockwise,
smiling as I reach out to him.

Small fingers
clench my pinky. My mind coasts and
accelerates as the son holds the hand of the
father and the fathers before him.

I wonder
will those hands experience the
indescribable joy of holding a new child?

Will they feel the satisfying sting of a boy's
first double (ignore the error) after striking
out time and time again?

Will they hold a little girl's hand
on that first long walk
across the playground, suffering the jeers of
playmates but gaining the thrill of first love?

When my son is sixteen, will he feel the
satisfaction of cleaning these fingers after
changing the oil or gripping the wheel of a
beat-up Ford

as it careens down a country road with the
windows down to hear

the whizzing cornstalks laugh at the night?

One day, will they tremble as he slides
an unbroken circle on his lover's finger,
whispering those solemn words, "I do"?

Jack squeezes my finger, and I imagine
calluses on his hands from baling hay,

remember the grip of the earth
as it resists my shovel, the campaign
ribbons of the working man.

I wonder

will these fingers manipulate
the strings of a guitar or the buttons
of a keyboard, giving voice to music or
prose?

If these fingers will ever grip a drink
so hard that life itself depends on a bottle
and the "good times" that go along with it?

Will they curl into a tight, knotty
fist, clenched and swung drunkenly
over and over again, connecting
with another man's face,
waking up torn and ashamed?

Most of all
I pray Jack's hands never
wrap around the receiver of his weapon
as Jack buries the stock against his shoulder,
never
place one finger on the trigger during
that fleeting moment where life compresses
like a coil unsure what to do next,
never
hesitate, then pay for all eternity;
never
squeeze, then live forever with the
consequences.

Jack lets go, and I wonder

whether my son will squeeze

my hand when I am the unsure one

and he is the father.

I watch my son inspect his hands.

And I wonder.

Figure 6. Kolter's poem about his son.

176

We recognize in Kolter's poem a summary of ways a young man might demonstrate values acquired from his upbringing, such as fixing his car himself or treating his high school girlfriend with chivalry.   Clearly, the speaker/father sees himself in his son. But we recognize the tone of the speaker's voice; he has seen the terror of combat, and he worries whether its effects will ever reach his innocent son.   The speaker in the poem is tormented because he cannot see the future. He understands that the only thing that will protect the son are the values he learns as he grows up, and the father hopes that he has modeled those values well enough to keep the boy safe.

The participants also keep symbols of their time in combat. Ten years after his last combat, Malcolm Evers cherishes the guidon from the first unit he commanded in combat: Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3rd Battalion, 17th Cavalry Regiment. A guidon is a common keepsake for outgoing commanders, but most of the time, it's a replica that was purchased from a retail store.

Not this guidon. It was the actual guidon that had been issued to the 10th Mountain Division when it was re-activated in the late 1980's, and the one that Evers had followed in combat.   When Evers changed command, his First Sergeant and other NCOs had filed a statement of charges with the supply clerk for the troop guidon; they paid for it out of their own pockets to give to their commander.

The First Sergeant had a replacement made at a local shop, so Evers's replacement took command of the troop with a duplicate guidon. I could tell that Evers was touched by the thoughtfulness and selflessness of his soldiers.   The combat guidon hangs on the wall of his home.

Evers also showed me an engraved K-BAR combat knife given to him by the marines and soldiers who worked for him while at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti. It was presented to him well after he had redeployed from East Africa. The marines and soldiers surprised him with it; they called him at Fort Monroe, Virginia, then met him at a local campsite in Virginia to celebrate his return from theater.

Although the Marine non-commissioned officer Evers supervised did not initially agree with him about his cautious employment of the marines and soldiers, the NCO grew to trust Evers's judgment about operations in Somalia. Because of the leader behaviors he displayed in combat, Evers, an Army officer, won the trust of a Marine sergeant. The knife served as a symbol of that trust.

Personal artifacts helped the officers reconcile the dissonance of combat by reminding them of home, and in some cases, inspiring the participants during combat. For example, keeping a small picture of a spouse in a breast pocket—literally close to the heart during combat—reminded the officer to do his job well so he could get back home. Michael Halo described the motivating aspect of the artifacts:

> Doing the job well meant demonstrating the right attributes and the values to my soldiers, hoping to make them as responsible for me as I was responsible for them.

> I didn't know it, but my wife made a picture album for me. She stuck it in the bottom of my rucksack before I deployed. I cried like a baby when I saw it for the first time. It reminded me that it was not just me I was looking out for, not just my wife, but all the other people in that photo album. It made me think of how much harder I had to work because I promised each and every one of my

guys I would bring them home to their families. It instilled a sense of duty and made me work that much harder to get them all home.

His wife left him shortly after he was retired from the Army, but Halo still has that picture album. He keeps it in a fireproof safe.

Even a funeral can bring some comfort to officers who have borne the weight of leadership in combat. Consider the end of Michael Halo's military career. Halo was wounded in October. A few weeks later, his friend Tim, another lieutenant in his unit, was killed. From his hospital bed at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Halo wrote a goodbye speech to his fallen friend. On the day of the funeral, he limped out of the hospital and went to Arlington National Cemetery, but he was too overcome with emotion and too weak to read his eulogy.

Yet that day represented the beginning of the rest of Michael Halo's life. An observation from Halo's wife says it best: "That funeral was the first time I've seen him happy, talking, and smiling since he had returned from Iraq." Ironically, the only thing that made Halo happy and feel human again was to be around his comrades in arms— even if it was at their funerals. Halo's loyalty to his comrades was intact even after he had been wounded and retired from the Army. The Army was his life. His fellow officers personified everything that Halo had aspired to be, and all that he swore to defend. Then an IED had stolen away his sense of self and his purpose for being: to serve in uniform.

The fraternity of arms had created Lieutenant Michael Halo, and as he stood once more among his peers at Arlington, Halo felt again the gravity of what made his sacrifice noble: his own virtue, manifest by his actions. The weight was heavy, and it felt good.

Conclusion

> No other environment [than military service] is more conducive to leading
> of a full life by the individual who is ready to accept the word of the
> philosopher [who says] that the only security on earth is the willingness to
> accept insecurity as an inevitable part of living. Once an officer has made
> this passage into maturity, and is at peace with himself because his service
> means more to him than all else, he will find kinship with the great body
> of his brothers-in-arms.

> --*The Armed Forces Officer* (1950, p. 7)

S. L. A. Marshall wrote the words above in the first chapter of *The Armed Forces Officer*, published more than 50 years ago. That chapter was titled "The Meaning of Your Commission," and Marshall wrote it to explain the immense obligation that is an integral part of accepting a commission as a U. S. Army officer. To research his position, Marshall cited a survey of World War II veterans: 60% of them claimed that they had been morally strengthened by their experiences in uniform (Marshall, 1950, p. 11). Millions of Americans in Marshall's time passed into maturity and gained the kinship of their brothers-in-arms.

This study investigated the values and behaviors an officer needs to make that passage. Using the experiences of four commissioned officers who have served in combat, this study captured the source of their values and described the behaviors that resulted in combat. Like Marshall's study more than 50 years ago, it hoped to answer the question, "What must an officer "BE" and "DO" in order to personify the ideals that inspire other men to give their best effort in the face of danger?"

Marshall considered the four qualities named on every officer's commissioning certificate—Patriotism, Valor, Fidelity, and Ability. After addressing the merits of each quality in turn, Marshall dismissed all but one:

> There is a one-word key to the answer [of which is the most important] among the four lofty qualities which are cited on every man's commission. . . . That word is *Fidelity*. Fidelity is the derivative of personal decision. It is the jewel within reach of every man who has the will to possess it (p. 3).

After studying the narratives of Michael Halo, Zarius Kolter, Malcolm Evers, and Andrew Barber, I recognize that all four were men of action, serving the nation before they served themselves. They have been true to their soldiers, honest in their virtuous actions, and free with the truth without reservation.

I hope that this record of their actions and deeds will match the quality of their service to the nation, valorizing the fidelity that Marshall described and honoring the achievements of four American combat leaders and the soldiers they inspired to action.

Table 5. *Common Themes and Artifacts that Came from the Initial Interview*

Participant Name	Context: Duty and Location of Combat Experience	Pre-Combat sources of values	Artifacts provided by the participant
Halo	▪ Iraq 2003, platoon leader	▪ ROTC ▪ Brother (soldier) ▪ Armor OBC	▪ Values card ▪ Picture of wife ▪ Picture album made by wife
Halo (data from his parents)	▪ N/A	▪ Grandfather (naval officer) ▪ Uncle (naval officer) ▪ Father (drafted during Vietnam war, served in Georgia and Germany)	▪ Photo of grandfather in uniform ▪ Funeral prayer card ▪ Grandfather's business card ▪ Grandfather's bible
Kolter	▪ Iraq 2001, company commander ▪ Iraq, 2004: Special Operations	▪ Books by military leaders (*Long Gray Line*) ▪ Catholic faith ▪ Mother's personal example ▪ Surrogate father (vet who hated the Army) ▪ construction work and contempt from affluent people ▪ SF training school (versus commissioning source)	▪ Photo of self in combat theater ▪ Poem "My Son's Hands" ▪ "Gave sand castle trophy to Anthony, not me" ▪ Sent base camp flag to his ROTC program
Evers	▪ Gulf War 1991, S3 TAC OIC ▪ Somalia 1992-3, Troop Cdr ▪ AAFES, 2003, PAO ▪ Djibouti, E. Africa 2004, PAO	▪ Literature (*Iliad, Beowulf, Heart of Darkness, Lord Jim*) ▪ MAJ Cole, ROTC Cdr	▪ 10th Mountain Division guidon ▪ K-Bar combat knife
Barber	▪ Rwanda 1994, Opns Officer ▪ Afghanistan 2005, Faculty Advisor	▪ Negative example from townspeople ▪ Grandma Minnie ▪ *The Armed Forces Officer* book	▪ Values card (but thinks it's unoriginal and largely ignored)

Table 6. *Themes Embedded in Each Participant's Narrative or Artifacts*

Participant Name	Themes from published materials that the participant read	Themes from stories or dialogues with combat colleagues	Behaviors that manifest these themes
Halo	▪ Infantry Guide	▪ Selfless service (ROTC) ▪ Integrity (brother) ▪ Courage to make decisions	▪ First to wake up/last to bed ▪ Never rode in first (safe) truck ▪ Switched places with other truck to relieve soldier
Halo (data from his parents)	▪ Honesty ▪ Helpfulness ▪ Patriotism		
Kolter	▪ "higher calling" ▪ Performing the "thankless for the ungrateful"	▪ Loyalty to fellow SOF "brothers" ▪ Rank means less than common experiences ▪ Trust; a common ethos ▪ "You can't fake it" ▪ Beware hubris	▪ Leadership by example ▪ humble professionalism; no vanity ▪ Recall roots (pays for ROTC cadets at his ROTC alma mater)
Evers	▪ Understand human condition ▪ Interested in failing protagonist	▪ Disillusionment ▪ Learned distrust ▪ Humility and humanity (LTC Critz)	▪ Retreat to remote area ▪ Studying for new career that does not involve managing people
Barber	▪ Mankind matters/people matter	▪ Indignant that he can't help people in need ▪ Army isn't showing that it cares for other peoples	▪ Trying to avoid bitterness/cynicism ▪ A retreat from people (lives in remote area)

Table 7. *Behaviors that Imply a Change in Perspective on Values*

Participant Name	Actions in combat that placed values in conflict	Reaction of participant to that "values conflict"	Changes in behaviors that resulted
Halo	▪ IEDs disabling tanks—wanted to go home ▪ Higher-ranking officer jeopardizing mission	▪ Broke military rank ▪ (He was gravely injured)	▪ Calmer/less intense when communicating ▪ Less aggressive
Halo (data from his parents)	▪ Experienced loss—his career and the deaths of others around him	▪ Temporarily abandoned patriotism	▪ Turned off TV when national anthem was played
Kolter	▪ Friend who died by ramming insurgent vehicle with his car ▪ Ambush on Route Irish ▪ Night mission with female NCO	▪ Shame for thinking of family first ▪ Reconsider SF qualification vs. purpose ▪ Inspired by volunteer SF doctor ▪ Obligation overcame fear	▪ Contempt for pop culture craze about "brotherhood" (though few understand it) ▪ Places SF bond <u>above</u> Catholic faith ▪ Became more stoic
Evers	▪ Encounter with Somali man on airstrip	▪ Fear of his own loathing for Somali people	▪ Retains contempt/loathing for Somali
Barber	▪ Wanted to deliver water to Rwandans—told no ▪ Wanted to place new generator where it could power water-pumping station—told no ▪ Forced to live apart from and limit contact with Afghan people	▪ Bitterness and disbelief that American soldiers must resist impulse to help. ▪ Belief that power corrupts ▪ Belief that higher-ranking officers act in their own best interests only (promotion)	▪ Retirement to remote location. ▪ Distrust of government and Army ▪ Trying to avoid bitterness/cynicism

Table 8. *Conclusions and Recommendations from the Participants*

Participant Name	Recommendations for future Army Values education curricula
Halo	▪ Teach/develop confidence ▪ Teach officers to recognize when they need help
Kolter	▪ Fewer "values" class hours ▪ Require an active volunteer project (i.e. with homeless or disabled veterans)
Evers	▪ Teach a good understanding of just/unjust wars (read more Joseph Conrad)
Barber	▪ Read more real books and encourage imagination ▪ Promote ways an officer can act on decency (even/especially in uniform) ▪ Emphasize that all people matter.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION

Summary of the Study's Purpose and Research Method

The Spartans excuse without penalty the warrior who loses his helmet
or his breastplate in battle, but punish with loss of all citizenship the man
who discards his shield . . . because a warrior carries his helmet and
breastplate for his own protection, but his shield for the safety of the
whole line.
--Pressfield (p. 36)

The purpose of this study was to examine the attributes, values, and leader

behaviors that commissioned Army officers must apply when they lead soldiers in

combat. What is the source of these attributes? Which values and attributes promote

success in combat? How does modern combat affect leader behaviors?

This study applied three main theoretical frameworks to the topic. First, it

examined Aristotle's theory of "virtue ethics," articulated in *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Aristotle taught his students to focus on living a comprehensive virtuous life—often

referred to as "the unity of the virtues"—rather than an individual decision or act. In

virtue ethics, goodness or badness depends on developing the character of the agent over

an entire life; individual actions count less. This study identified the attributes from

Nicomachean Ethics that Aristotle found virtuous: the "cardinal virtues" of temperance,

justice, courage, and wisdom.

Aristotle's theory of leadership virtue is pertinent to Army leadership doctrine, the

second theoretical framework in this study. A virtuous leader is sensitive to collisions of

specific virtues in the execution of a specific act. For example, a combat leader may have

186

to ignore courage in order to apply the correct amount of temperance or wisdom. According to Aristotle, a person possessing one virtue must necessarily possess them all if he hopes to live a good life. In that way, the leader personifies the "unity of the virtues." According to the Army, an officer must personify the Seven Army Values in order to lead effectively. Army *Field Manual 22-100: Army Leadership* (1999) specifies three leader dimensions, each of them always capitalized:

- BE

- KNOW

- DO

These three leader dimensions symbolize character, competence, and leader actions. FM 22-100 specifies that leaders at every level—direct, organizational, and strategic—must personify the "BE" component of the Army's doctrine, and the "BE" component mirrors Aristotle's vision of a virtue agent in action. Don Snider narrows the "BE" focus even further in his theory of Officership. Officership defines the attributes necessary for success as a *commissioned* officer, not simply as an enlisted leader of soldiers, such as a non-commissioned officer (sergeant). Snider's theory of Officership is an extension of Army leadership doctrine, the second of three theories that informed this study.

Finally, trait theory was applicable to this study because the study focused on leadership taught for a specific cohort of leaders (commissioned officers) for a specific professional domain (military operations in combat). Trait theory investigates the idea that the success or failure of a leader depends on his or her personality traits, physical attributes, measurable intelligence, or personal values. Stogdill (1948) was the first

leadership researcher to summarize the findings, and he concluded that having certain traits did not guarantee that those who had them would rise to a leadership position. But if people with those traits were placed in a leadership position, they were moderately more likely to succeed than people who did not have the traits. Trait theory applies best in fast paced, rapidly changing organizations that have no clear policies or direction. Certainly combat meets those criteria, which made trait theory an important framework for this study.

The study compared the theoretical attributes acquired by four commissioned officers who served in combat in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, and Afghanistan. This study presented a phenomenological exploration of the pre-commissioning and combat experiences of those four commissioned combat leaders. In narrative case study form, it examined the philosophies, beliefs, and conclusions of these participants:

- Michael Halo

- Zarius Kolter

- Malcolm Evers

- Andrew Barber

These four participants were tested in combat, the most dangerous leadership context in history, requiring unique requirements of the military profession.

What were the sources of the virtues <u>inside</u> these leaders? Did they rely on the Seven Army Values acquired in the Army's curriculum, or did they fall back on other, more intrinsic values—a BE component that existed before they completed the Army's curriculum—to develop their leadership attributes? What are the most important

leadership attributes, values, and behaviors in modern combat? This study investigated those questions.

Summary of the Findings According to Each Research Question

1. What sources of individual values or leader attributes did these subjects consider to be most influential to their performance as a leader?

2. What individual values or leader attributes are most important to success as an Army officer, from the perspectives of the participants?

3. What personal values or leader attributes did these leaders find valuable in combat?

4. How did the subjects apply these values or demonstrate these attributes in combat?

5. What differences exist between the values attributes taught in formal curricula and the values and attributes these subjects required in combat?

Sources of Values (Research Question #1)

The participants identified four sources of the values that they considered important to their performance as leaders:

Commissioning Sources

The narratives suggested that although Army officer commission sources—most notably, the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC)—teach leader attributes and values, the participants did not consider them to be the primary source of leader attributes and values. Specifically, the participants identified five reasons why the campus setting was a limiting factor:

- it is a theoretical environment for combat leadership, not a practical one

- it is too much a social setting, populated by peers

- it too often demonstrates ineffective leader behaviors

- it is redundant for cadets who have prior enlisted experience

- it is less specific than each branch's officer basic course

Three of the four participants concur that the Army education system in the classroom is less effective and less important to the formation of values or attributes than practical application outside the classroom. Nonetheless, all four participants saw value in the social aspect of their officer education program at their commissioning source. This finding reinforced trait theory (Stodgill, 1974), whereby in specific situations, a leader must apply different behaviors in order to be successful.

Formal curricula are important because they force the student into a social situation, which is part of social exchange theory and leader member exchange theory, where the leader develops separate exchange relationships with each peer or subordinate and learns through those relationships who is trustworthy and who is not. Social exchanges allow a cadet to develop a sense of the character and judgment of his peers and of himself.

Former Military Members, Including Family Members

Family members who have served previously in the military are influential sources for individual values and leader attributes. Leader behaviors they transmitted to the participants:

- Don't act like you know everything

- Trust your soldiers until you have a reason <u>not</u> to trust them

- Listen to your NCOs and your soldiers

- Observe other military leaders to assess their leadership skills

- Complete every task to the best of your ability.

A recurring theme in the data was that one single positive role model—even one single event—can be the catalyst that compels appropriate leader behavior.

The inverse was also true: negative role models demonstrated behaviors to avoid. In those cases, a successful combat leader observes those incorrect behaviors and decides to do the opposite.

Self-Generated Virtues

In his theory of Officership (2003), Don Snider argues that commissioned service is a profession that requires qualifications that have been confirmed by experts who understand the requirements of the profession. But the participants contended that an individual can nominate himself as a candidate for a commission. Zarius Kolter, Malcolm Evers, and Andrew Barber explained how they made choices that made it possible for them to qualify for a commission. They achieved a commission via a process of elimination: they confirmed what they did not want to become and eliminated alternatives until they pinned on a second lieutenant's insignia.

Values Informed by Roles and Jurisdictions Assigned by Civilian Authority

The Army is a profession requiring experts in land warfare, trained in the management of violence, but it is also a federal bureaucracy controlled by elected officials and political appointees in Washington, so it is sometimes assigned roles and missions that it would rather not accept. When that happens, commissioned officers can become unwilling owners of a jurisdiction that conflicts with their own values, which causes them to experience dissonance. When that happens, it becomes even more important that combat leaders apply the "train as you will fight" principle to values, too.

When they do, they help subordinates reconcile personal values with the role or mission they are sworn to perform. "Train as you will fight" applies to equipment tactics, techniques, and procedures. It also includes moral-ethical components of training like the rules of engagement or cultural awareness of the region in which the unit will operate. Effective leaders purposefully train to learn and demonstrate values just as they train on pieces of equipment.

Values or Leader Attributes Important to Success as an Army Officer
(Research Question #2)

Selflessness

The participants agreed that selflessness creates the foundation for all other leader behaviors in combat. Leaders learn selflessness by observing it in others, practicing it in training, and demanding it of themselves and their subordinates in tough conditions, including combat. The narratives suggested that effective combat leaders personify these selfless traits:

- the feeling that combat leaders are answering a higher calling

- shared trust between leaders and their soldiers

- obligation and accountability on the part of the leader

- self-criticism manifest in the leader's own conscience

- the desire to be a self-starter

- being approachable and accessible to soldiers

By demonstrating these selfless traits in a daily display of actions, the leader establishes his reputation in the eyes of his peers and subordinates. Examples of these habitual leader behaviors include:

- standing apart from political debate

- making selflessness contagious

- making moral success easy for subordinates

- minimizing changes, such as to the Rules of Engagement

- being predictable in word and deed

- resolving selfish or incompetent behaviors by higher ranking officers

Trait theory requires that a value must be applicable to specific professional domains. The participants identified selflessness as the most important virtue for a leader in training. Its value was corroborated by their experiences in combat, where they identified six more virtues important to leadership success in combat.

Values and Leader Attributes Important in Combat (Research Questions 3 and 4)

Personal Integrity

Effective combat leaders exhibit behaviors that make their personal integrity irrefutable in the eyes of their subordinates and peers. Personal integrity comprised several virtues manifest in a leader's actions:

- personal and professional honor

- the desire to serve people less fortunate or at greater risk than themselves

- loyalty to comrades in arms

- an obligation to personify America's democratic values

- a belief in intrinsic goodness, part of the officer's "BE" component

- respecting other people more than privileging themselves

The importance of personal integrity was clear: officers must adhere to the highest standards of personal integrity, always at the expense of their own comfort.

Confidence

All four participants agreed that displays of individual confidence on the part of combat officers are critical to success in modern combat. Confidence is manifest in several different contexts:

- confidence in the face of adversity is a critical attribute in combat

- trusting your own judgment to make the correct decision

- believing in the prudence of your confidence (remaining wary of hubris)

- confidence in the chain of command both above and below the officer

The participants emphasized that wavering confidence has a serious negative effect on the morale of the individual officer and on the overall morale of the unit.

Courage

Courage is closely connected to confidence, because a leader must exhibit personal courage in order to inspire subordinates. The concept of leader-in-action extends backward in history to Thomas Carlyle's Great Man Theory (1840) and also to Aristotle. Courage is one of Aristotle's cardinal virtues, and in Aristotle's theory of virtue ethics, each virtue requires action on the part of the leader. Courage is rarely static.

The narratives revealed these themes regarding courage:

- Physical courage is not a grand demonstration—true courage is modest.

- Courage requires prudence—accomplish the mission, but minimize risk.

- Outward displays of moral courage demonstrate what "right looks like."

Recall the quotation from Malcolm Evers: "A true soldier is one who is both courageous in defeat as well as humble in victory."

Empathy

Demonstrating empathy represents many challenges for a combat leader. There are several constituencies that require a combat officer's empathy in combat:

- his soldiers

- the civilian population

- enemy combatants

- family members of the soldiers under his command

- the American people

The participants emphasized that a combat leader must understand the source of soldiers' fears and plan daily operations accordingly. Michael Halo called this task: "being a mind reader." By that he meant the officer's ability to comprehend what his soldier just said or did, and based on his ability to empathize with their emotions, anticipate how the soldier will react in the next situation. The other participants called it "situational awareness"—the intuitive comprehension of what just happened and what may be about to happen based on those recent events.

Finally, the participants suggested that senior leaders who dismiss empathy as weakness or claim that it puts soldiers at risk send the wrong message about values to their officer subordinates.

Humanity

Combat leaders must reconcile the requirement to kill others, even in self-defense, while upholding the basic human values of justice and respect for human life.

The body of knowledge that explains that dilemma is called Just War Theory. International and common laws have been enacted to enforce Just War Theory. The two most prevalent international laws are the Hague Conventions (1907) and the Geneva Conventions (1949). The U.S. Army follows the Hague and Geneva Conventions and common law, and has organized both in Field Manual 27-10: *The Law of Land Warfare* (1976).

The participants fully supported the tenets of Field Manual 27-10, but they felt that obeying the letter of the law was not enough. To uphold the spirit of the humanity in combat, an effective combat leader must stay human and honest in combat and must work to demonstrate those behaviors to their subordinates.

Combat requires discipline, and balancing humanity with the mission is a critical leader skill. Officers who embrace humanity as an important virtue demonstrate corresponding leader behaviors to show their soldiers how humanity can be an important barometer of moral conduct in combat. The participants also reported a clash of cultures and values that made it very difficult for them to confer empathy or humanity to enemy soldiers, insurgents, or civilians who rejected American values at every turn. This phenomenon—human beings refusing to accept good acts by American soldiers—tested

officer leadership at every level, and revealed another finding in the data: officers in

combat struggle to maintain their humanity, not just with the enemy, but also with their

own subordinates. An officer must be loyal to his soldiers and must display empathy for

the hardship caused by the profession, but the officer also has an obligation to do

whatever he must do to keep his soldiers alive. The participants reported that they had to

separate human emotion from military necessity, which created a climate of social

detachment for the officers. They had to put themselves at a social distance from their

soldiers, ironically, to be human, yet professional and objective.

Why was professional detachment so important? Because minimizing casualties

was the scorecard by which the participants scored their performance as a leader. This

was a constant theme among all four participants. Even in training leading up to combat,

the number of injuries became an informal scorecard by which the officer rated his

performance as a leader. The participants who redeployed from theater without incurring

a casualty among their subordinates felt like they had done the best job they could. They

were not willing to risk nightmares in the future for friendship in the present, even in the

loneliest place on Earth.

Proportionality

Proportionality means practicing restraint in terms of the use of force. It also

applies to the personal level. Officers who practice proportionality calculate the means

needed to reach justifiable ends, and issue orders accordingly. In this way,

proportionality is closely akin to prudence and objectivity, and it is critical to every

officer's decision-making process. Proportionality points directly back to Aristotle and

the theory of virtue ethics, where goodness is defined by the good acts knowingly performed by the virtue agent. It also connects to student development theory. Arthur Chickering (1993) explained that a young person develops his own identity through a series of tests until he can be fully accountable for his actions. Chickering's theory applies to an officer's evolving understanding of what proportionality is and why it matters in combat.

Proportionality is a virtue; officers who practice it are moral agents in combat. The participants agreed that any discussion of proportionality typically leans toward its negative outcomes: in its most mild form, that might mean eliminating the possibility of inappropriate behaviors by leaders; in its most extreme, form it might mean a war crime.

In that extreme place called combat, the virtue of proportionality faces its greatest test. Proportionality cannot be learned in training; it requires practical experience to understand when and how to apply appropriate force. The leadership situation requires that the officer apply force in reasonable proportion to the task at hand, requiring controlled discipline and judgment, and officers who practice proportionality commonly choose a harder right over the easier wrong.

Changes to roles and missions require a new assessment of appropriate proportionality. For example, if the political reality causes a renaming of the mission from *combat* operations to *peace enforcement* operations and finally to *peacekeeping* operations, the original rules of engagement must be replaced by new ones that limited the use of force. In such a situation, the officer's understanding of his moral responsibility is the only thing that can maintain a sense of balance. Otherwise, subordinates may lose their sense of proportionality. Combat officers must make every

effort to enforce the principal of proportionality and resist the downward spiral into lawlessness that extended deployments to lawless places make possible in any soldier, no matter how well trained that soldier might be.

Other Findings Pertinent to Research Questions 3 and 4

All soldiers, regardless of rank, carry private symbols of the world they left behind. In that way, the participants were no different from the soldiers they led. But for officers, carrying artifacts from home helped the officers cope with the social isolation of leadership. To resolve the cognitive dissonance between what the officers saw in combat and what they remember from home, they carried personal symbols, documents, or other artifacts that reinforced their values. The artifacts the officers carried helped reduce the strain of their social anonymity, necessary when leading soldiers in combat, while providing a cognitive relevance for the tremendous strain on the psyche they had to endure as leaders. Personal artifacts helped the officers reconcile the dissonance of combat by reminding them of home, and in some cases, inspiring the participants during combat. For example, keeping a small picture of a spouse in a breast pocket—literally close to the heart during combat—reminded the officer to do his job well so he could get back home.

The successful combat leader demonstrates to his soldiers high standards of leader behavior and inspires them to match those behaviors. By doing that, the leader compels his soldiers toward actions that will keep them alive, but in the process denies himself the social interaction that any human being requires.

Officers in combat must overcome the mental strain of self-doubt and fear that increases as the stakes in combat get higher. Combat leaders often carry reminders of their personal and professional responsibilities with them on the battlefield and treasure those symbols long after the have returned to safety. Examples:

- unit guidons

- personal weapons carried in combat

- poems

- pictures

- religious medals or crucifixes

- eulogies or funeral announcements

Differences between Formal Curricula and the Values and Attributes Required in Combat (Research Question #5)

The participants noted several differences between formal curricula and the values and attributes required in combat. As a result of their experiences in combat, they have changed their perceptions of leadership in several ways. First, the participants recognized that different environments require very similar leader behaviors. For example:

- Remain calm

- Speak clearly

- Get your point across in a minimum of words

The tasks that the participants performed in combat reinforced their faith in their perception of the values critical in combat, but caused them to question the values of the senior leaders they followed. Two of the four participants emphasized that high ranking

military officers and elected civilian leaders must model values through their conduct. For practical examples, future values education should summarize appropriate leader behaviors at every level, from the lowest ranking soldier to relatively famous officers who demonstrate them on the battlefield.

An officer's values can be compromised by senior leaders who contradict those values with their own improper behaviors. Examples witnessed by the participants:

- putting themselves in for awards

- making a brief foray into a combat zone to "earn" a combat patch or ribbon

- displaying differences between what they say and what they do

Elite units like the Special Forces and Ranger battalions have developed very strict, though unwritten, rules for officer behavior, and those higher standards of conduct inspire officers to want to join those units even though their missions are often more dangerous. In every case, the standards of conduct depend on modeling behavior, not learning it in a classroom environment. This is a common thread in the data: the participants dismiss formal "book learning" of values education in favor of behavior modeling. They recommended four changes to current practices in the officer education and officer assignment systems:

- For the great majority of modern officers, combat experience is measured in days and minutes, not months and years. The burden is less visceral, more cerebral. To prepare for those cerebral challenges, the participants recommended that future officers read books that examine the officer's

understanding of commitment and cultivate the habits and powers of imagination. These books might come from a wide range of topics: art; literature; military history; philosophy.   Reading these books over the course of time, the officer will develop the ability to personify the values that define American democracy.

- Reduce dramatically the number and frequency of mandatory classes. Teach one class, but then assign a multi-month project that forces officer candidates to model their values and record the behaviors that do that.

- Simplify all values training to focus on one reality: in modern combat, each day brings a new ethical dilemma.

- Rotate officers in the combat zone so that all officers are exposed in equal measure to the rigors of combat leadership

Connections to Theoretical Frameworks

In Aristotle's conception of virtue ethics, virtue is achieved by practice. A leader must take <u>action</u> to define for others his attributes. By performing good acts, he develops the four cardinal virtues described in *Nicomachean Ethics*:

- temperance
- justice
- courage

- wisdom

In this study, the participants concurred with Aristotle: leadership behaviors cannot be learned in a classroom environment; they must be acquired by habitual confrontation by challenges pertinent to that specific virtue. The participants identified seven virtues required in combat:

- selflessness

- personal integrity

- confidence

- courage

- empathy

- humanity

- proportionality

According to Aristotle, a person possessing one virtue must necessarily possess them all if he hopes to live a good life. Likewise, the participants concurred that these seven virtues must be applied by leaders in combat.

Stodgill's trait theory (1974) connects Aristotle's theory of virtue to the combat leadership experiences of the four participants in this study. Trait theory contends that there is a connection between internal virtues, (which Stodgill calls "values"), external behaviors, and ultimate success as a leader. Trait theory is useful in predicting how people will react in uncertain situations. Combat certainly applies.

Army leadership doctrine, articulated in U. S. Army Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership*, describes what a leader must "BE" (p. 2-2); the leader's values make up his "BE" component. Developing these qualities is the first step of action-based leadership.

From that point, a leader is judged by what he *does*, not what he *should do*.

Don Snider combines virtue ethics, trait theory, and Army leadership doctrine in his theory of Officership (2003). According to Snider, a commissioned leader lives a life that reflects eight "time tested principles" (Snider, 2005, p. 145):

- Duty—subordinating personal interests to the requirements of the profession

- Honor—includes the virtues of integrity and moral courage

- Loyalty—both upward to the President and downward to the last soldier in the   unit

- Service—defined by the quality of an officer's years of service to the nation

- Competence—a moral imperative made possible by continuous self- improvement

- Teamwork—subordinating the will of the individual to the task of the group

- Subordination—accept the principle of civilian control of the military

- Leadership—personifying the attributes of spiritual, physical, and intellectual fitness (Snider, 2005, pp. 145-146)

Snider's theory of Officership extends Aristotle's idea of virtue to what an officer must "BE" to succeed in the profession of arms. Thereafter, according to FM 22-100, *Army Leadership* (1999), the officer demonstrates the virtuous base of his "BE" component by demonstrating four important categories of knowledge—his "KNOW" component:

- Interpersonal Skills

- Conceptual Skills

- Technical Skills

- Tactical Skills

By creating a virtuous base of values, then mastering these four categories of knowledge, the leader is ready to DO the influencing, operating, and improving tasks that will lead his unit and his subordinates to success.

In summary, the participants concurred with Aristotle's theory of an action-based leader who personifies important core values, and Aristotle's mandate for leadership in action is reflected in Army leadership doctrine, articulated by FM 22-100: *Army Leadership* (1999) and in Don Snider's theory of Officership (2003).

In this study, three caveats to those three theoretical frameworks appeared in the data:

- Officers must learn their craft in the field, not in the classroom

- Mere presence in the combat theater is not equivalent to combat experience

- As an officer's career progresses, he *manages* more but *leads by action* less

Each of the seven virtues found valuable by the participants can be measured by Aristotle's virtue ethics theory of the Golden Mean. Aristotle believed that a leader must take action in order to hone his virtue. Success depends on action that falls between the extremes of an excess of virtue or a deficiency of virtue. See Chapter 4, Table 4, for examples.

Leon Festinger's *Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (1957) was demonstrated in the narrative of the participants. Cognitive dissonance is relevant to virtue ethics and leadership in several ways. Cognitive dissonance is defined as a collision between what a person believes and cognitions that calls that person's belief into question. This collision might be manifest in self-doubt, psychological discomfort, or even altered physical behaviors as the person adjusts to or compensates for the disparity between the belief and their immediate circumstances.

Since virtue ethics depends on developing a positive self-concept, a virtuous leader is very likely to experience dissonance when he experiences behaviors that are immoral, irrational, or imprudent. The subjects in this study, for example, displayed extreme dissonance when describing the incompetent or immoral actions of officers senior to them because they viewed those actions as incorrect.

This study concluded that the most valuable attributes in combat are those that compel subordinates to overcome the cognitive dissonance between self-preservation and action, between risk and duty, between ethical combat leadership and cover-your-back bureaucracy. Often, the leader must overcome his cognitive dissonance first.

Recommendations for Future Study

Michael was wounded. A few weeks later, his friend Tim, another lieutenant in his unit, was killed. Then four months later, Michael's replacement was killed. Then Ned, another lieutenant friend of Michael's, was killed.
Four lieutenants went over to Iraq, and only Michael came back alive. And Michael very nearly died.
Those kids didn't deserve what happened to them. None of them do.

--Michael Halo's mother

This study uncovered several possibilities for future study. One interesting phenomenon was the change in each participant's perception of virtue over the course of their experiences. The two oldest participants, Evers and Barber, were career officers who retired after more than 20 years of active duty service, which implies that their careers were fulfilling and relevant. Yet those two participants were the most bitter of the four officers in the study. Conversely, Halo was the most idealistic voice in this dissertation, yet he is the youngest participant, served the shortest time on active duty, and was the only one seriously wounded. Why this disconnect?

A second possible topic for study is Aristotle's theory of the golden mean. Who defines the golden mean of each virtue? More important, who defines the limits of excess and deficiency for each virtue. Does the leader define his own limits, or does the culture in which he operates—his profession—define it?

Future inquiry about the limits of each virtue could apply that concept to other professional domains. First, the researcher could define virtues required in other professional domains; thereafter, the researcher could investigate limits of the golden mean, the excess and deficiencies, for virtues in those domains. For example:

- Virtue in K-12 education

- Virtue in static organizations (think vision statements)

- Virtue in governance (think school board members)

Another topic for inquiry might be based in the social science of human development. A researcher might seek to answer the question, "When does a person become liable for his own behavior, and hence his own virtue?" In many states, a teenager is permitted to drive a car when he or she is 16. Certainly anyone driving a car

must be able to perceive right from wrong, if only to avoid the liability of hurting others with the car. Yet a 16-year-old is not permitted to vote in the general election. Which is more dangerous: a 16-year-old behind the wheel of an SUV, or a 16-year-old at the ballot box? Our laws imply that the teenage *voter* cannot reach a prudent adult judgment, but the teenage *driver* can. This paradox represents the starting point for future study, and virtue ethics would be a useful theoretical framework for that study, which might eventually compare a leader's legal obligation to his moral obligation.

Finally, current world events beg a troubling question: do the escalating extremes of terrorism and religious zealotry around the world today make virtue too altruistic to be feasible in the future? In this study, we saw Evers and Barber struggle with the effects of politics at the tactical level—a place where diplomacy is far less effective than the capacity for violence. Future combat leaders may eventually reach a point where their virtue cannot overcome the malevolence it confronts. When we reach that point, we will have arrived at Barber's world of the fang and the claw. The researcher might ask, "Are we there yet? And how will we know when virtue has become obsolete?"

Conclusion

From the experiences of these four officers and the theories that frame them, we see the overwhelming responsibility that commissioned combat leaders assume. The American people send these young officers into combat with an obligation to demonstrate to the citizens of other nations that America's ideals are so dear to its citizens that its citizen-soldiers will risk their own deaths before they would see those ideals perish.

In places where these ideals are obscured by years of social ignorance and governmental brutality, the officers' task is even more difficult, because they must compel their soldiers to see the virtue of resisting ignorance and brutality, even when they themselves may be more motivated by vengeance than virtue.

In my last exchange with Andrew Barber, the most cynical of my four participants, I asked, "So much of what you have said implies that a U. S. Army officer has an impossible job in combat. What is virtuous about an impossible job?"

There was a long pause as Barber weighed his answer. "The British say, `The officer's duty is to teach the enlisted men how to die.' They are right. Nobody wants to die, but accepting the possibility of death to assure freedom for others is the personification of selflessness." His point was left unspoken: selflessness, perhaps the most democratic of all ideals, is a virtue to which every American should all aspire.

Combat is a whirlwind of chaos, polarized into absolutes: freedom or subjugation; hope or despair; life or death. By leading others in combat, an officer faces revolving sets of those possibilities. Failure is not an option, because it includes the risk of his own military death. Taking that risk willingly reveals the officer's deepest commitments, and succeeding in the endeavor represents a soldier's greatest achievement, delivered to the nation on a warrior's shield.

REFERENCES

Annas, J. (2005). Virtue ethics: What kind of naturalism? In S. Gardiner (Ed.) *Virtue ethics old and new*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 11-29.

Aristotle. (1986). *Nicomachean ethics*. (Martin Ostwald, Trans.). New York: MacMillan. (Original work published in 350 BC)

Aronson, E. (1997). Back to the future: Retrospective review of Leon Festinger's *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. In *American Journal of Psychology,* 110, Spring, 127-137.

Arvey, R. D. & Ivancevich, J. M. (1980). Punishment in organizations: A review, propositions, and research suggestions. *Academy of Management Review, 5*(l), 123-131.

Augoustinos, M. & Walker, I. (1995). *Social cognition*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Beauvois, J. & Joule, R. (1996). *A radical dissonance theory*. Bristol, PA: Taylor & Francis Inc.

Bennett, W. J. (Ed.) (1993). *The book of virtues: A treasury of great moral stories*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Bennis, W. G. (1989). *On becoming a leader*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing.

Borba, M. (2001). *Building moral intelligence: The seven essential virtues that teach kids to do the right thing*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Brehm, J. & Cohen, A. (1962). *Explorations in cognitive dissonance*. New York and London: John Wiley & Sons.

Brehm, J. & Wicklund, R. (1976). *Perspectives on cognitive dissonance*. Hillsdale, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons.

Carlyle, T. (1840). *On Heroes, hero-worship and the heroic in history*. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.

Chickering, A. W. and Reisser, L. (1993). *Education and identity* (2nd ed.). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Collins, J. (2001). *Good to great: Why some companies make the leap . . . and others don't*. New York: HarperCollins.

Cooper, J. & Fazio, R. (1984). A new look at dissonance theory. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*. Vol. 17 (pp. 229-264). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

Covey, S. R. (1991). *Principle-centered leadership*. New York: Summit Books.

Curphy, G. J. (1996). "New directions in personality." In R. T. Hogan (chair). *Personality and Organizational Behavior*. Symposium presented at the 104th Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, Canada, 1996.

Curphy, G. J. (1997). "Personality, intelligence, and leadership." Presentation given to the Pioneer Leadership Program at Denver University, Denver, CO.

Denzin, N. & Lincoln, Y. (1998). *The landscape of qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks, CA; Sage publications.

De Pree, M. (1989). *Leadership is an art*. New York: Doubleday.

Donnithorne, L. R. (1994). *The West Point way of leadership: From learning principled leadership to practicing it*. New York: Currency Doubleday.

Drucker, P. F. (1999). *Management challenges for the 21ˢᵗ century*. New York: HarperBusiness.

Festinger, L. (1957). *A theory of cognitive dissonance*. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson & Company.

Frankel, R. & Devers, K. (2000a). Qualitative research: A consumer's guide. *Education for Health: Change in Learning & Practice*, 13(1) 113-124.

Frankel, R. & Devers, K. (2000b). Study design in qualitative research: Developing questions and assessing resource needs. *Education for Health: Change in Learning & Practice*, 13(1), 251-262.

French, J. and B. H. Raven. (1959). The bases of social power. In D. Cartwright (Ed.). *Studies of social power* (pp. 150-167). Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research.

Freud, S. (1913). *Group psychology and the analysis of the ego*. Trans. J. Strachey. 2ⁿᵈ ed. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, Vol. 2. London: Hogarth Institute for Psychoanalysis.

Fussell, P. (2002). Thank God for the atom bomb. In *The Norton reader* (p. 736). New York: Norton.

Gardiner, S. M. (2005). (Ed.) *Virtue ethics old and new*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Gardner, H. (1995). *Leading minds*. New York: HarperCollins.

Gerdes, D. & Conn, J. (2001). A user-friendly look at qualitative research methods. *Physical Educator* 58 (4), 183-191.

Gergen, K. (1999). *Social construction in context*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Goleman, D. (1995). *Emotional intelligence*. New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell.

Goleman, D. (1998). *Working with emotional intelligence*. New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell.

Gordon, L. V. (1975). *Measurement of interpersonal values*. Chicago: Science Research Associates.

Graen, G. B., & J. F. Cashman. (1975). A role-making model of leadership in formal organizations: A developmental approach. In J. G. Hunt & L. L. Larson (Eds.), *Leadership frontiers* (pp. 143-165). Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.

Graen, G. B., & Uhl-Bien, M. (1995). Relationship-based approach to leadership: Development of leader-member exchange (LMX) theory. *Leadership Quarterly*, 6: 219-247.

Green, S.G., Anderson, S.A., & Shivers, S.L. Shivers (1996). Demographic and organizational influences on leader-member exchange and related work attitudes. *Organizational behavior and human decision processes*, 66(2), 203-214.

Harmon-Jones, E. & Mills, J. (1999). *Cognitive dissonance: Progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology*. Washington, D.C.: Braun Brumfield, Inc.

Heifetz, R. A. (1994). *Leadership without easy answers*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hogan, R. T. (1991). "Personality and personality measurement." In M. D. Dunnette and L. M. Hough (Eds.). *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, Vol 2 (pp. 873-919). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Hogan, R. T., G. J. Curphy, and J. Hogan. (1994). What do we know about personality: leadership and effectiveness?" *American Psychologist* 49 (1994), pp. 493-504.

Hogan, R. T., J. Hogan, & B. W. Roberts. (1996). "Personality measurement and employment decisions: Questions and answers." *American Psychologist* 51 (5), 469-77.

Holmes, O. W. Jr. (1992). The soldier's faith. In R. Posner (Ed.). *The essential Holmes: Selections from the letters, speeches,judicial opinions, and other writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.* (pp. 87-93). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hudson, S. D. (1986). *Human character and morality: Reflections from the history of ideas*. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hughes, R. L., R. C. Ginnett & G. J. Curphy (2002). *Leadership: Enhancing the lessons of experience*. 4th Ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Hursthouse, R. (1999). *On virtue ethics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hutchins, P. (2005). Building pedagogical intelligence. *The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching*. Retrieved 1 December 2005, from http://www.carnegiefoundation.org/perspectives/sub.asp?key=245&subkey=571.

Janesick, V. (1996). The dance of qualitative research design: Metaphor, methodolatry, and meaning. In Denzin, N. & Lincoln, Y. (Eds.). *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 209-219). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Kaufman, D. (2002). *Educating future Army officers for a changing world: the operational concept for the academic program of the United States Military Academy*. West Point, NY: Office of the Dean, U. S. Military Academy.

Kegan, R. (1982). *The Evolving self: Problem and process in human development.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kegan, R. (1994). *In over our heads: The mental demands of modern life*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kirkpatrick, S. A., & Locke, E. A. (1991). Leadership: Do traits matter? *The executive, 5*, 48-60.

Kotter, J. (1990). *A force for change: How leadership differs from management*. New York: Free Press.

Kuczmarski, S., & Kuczmarski, T. (1995). *Values-based leadership*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Lemme, B. (1995). *Development in adulthood*. Boston: Simon and Schuster.

Lincoln, Y. & Guba, E. (1985). *Naturalistic inquiry*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Longino, H. (2002). *The fate of knowledge*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lord, R. G., C. L. DeVader, G. M. Allinger. "A meta-analysis of the relationship between personality traits and leadership perceptions: An application of validity generalization procedures." *Journal of Applied Psychology* 71 (1986), pp. 402-10.

MacIntyre, A. (1984). *After virtue: A study in moral theory* (2nd ed.). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Makin, M. (1979). The ethics of leadership. In Makin, M. (Ed.). *War, morality, and the military profession* (pp. 197-217). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Mann, F. C. (1959). "Toward an understanding of the leadership role in a formal organization." In R. Dubin (Ed.). *Leadership and productivity* (pp. 68-103). San Francisco: Chandler.

Marshall, C. & Rossman, G. (1999). *Designing qualitative research, 3rd edition*.

 Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Marshall, S. L. A. (1950). *The armed forces officer*: *Department of the Army pamphlet*

 600-2. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office.

Massey, M. (1979). *The people puzzle: Understanding yourself and others*. Reston,

 VA: Reston Publishing.

McMasters, R. (1951). *West Point's contribution to education: 1802 – 1952*. El Paso:

 McMath Publishing Co.

Merriam, S. & Associates. (2002). *Qualitative research in practice: Examples for*

 discussion and analysis. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Northouse, P. G. (1997). *Leadership: Theory and practice*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

 Publications.

O'Brien, T. (1990). *The things they carried*. New York: Broadway Books.

Patton, M. (2002). *Qualitative research & evaluation methods, 3rd edition*. Thousand

 Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Pfaff, T. (2005). The officer as leader of character: Leadership, character, and ethical

 decision-making. In L. J. Mathews (Ed.). *The future of the Army profession*. (2nd

 ed.). (pp. 153-161).   Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Potter, J. (1996). *Representing reality: Discourse, rhetoric and social construction*.

 Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Pressfield, S. (1998). *Gates of fire*. New York: Doubleday.

Roberts, B. W. (1996). An alternative perspective on the relation between work and

 psychological functioning: The reciprocal model of person-environment interaction.

In R. T. Hogan (chair). *Personality and Organizational Behavior*. Symposium presented at the 104th Annual Meeting of the American Psychological Association, Toronto, Canada, 1996.

Rossman, G. & Rallis, S. (1998). *Learning in the field: An introduction to qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Schriesheim, C., Castro, S., & Cogliser, C. (1999). Leader-member exchange (LMX) research: A comprehensive review of theory, measurement, and data-analytic procedures. *Leadership Quarterly*, 10, 63-113.

Schwandt, T. (2001). *Dictionary of qualitative inquiry*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Searle, C. (1999). Quality in qualitative research. *Qualitative inquiry*, 5 (4) 465-479.

Senge, P. (1990). *The fifth discipline: The art & practice of the learning organization*. New York: Currency Doubleday.

Senge, P., et al. (1999). *The dance of change: The challenges to sustaining momentum in learning organizations*. New York: Random House.

Shakespeare, W. (1972). *The life of Henry V*. In J. R. Brown (Ed.). *The complete signet classic Shakespeare* (pp. 758-801). San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. (Original work published in 1600)

Slote, M. (1992). *From morality to virtue*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Snider, D. (2003). Officership: The professional practice. *Military review*, LXXXIII, January-February 2003, No. 1, 3-8.

Snider, D., & Watkins, G. L. (2002). Introduction to L. J. Mathews (Ed.). *The future of the Army profession* (pp. 3-18). Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Snider, D. (2005). The multiple identities of the professional Army officer. In L. Mathews (Ed.). *The future of the Army profession*. (2nd ed.). (pp. 139-146). Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Snook, S., & Forsythe, G., et. al. (2002). Making sense of officership: Developing a professional identity for 21st century Army officers. In L. J. Matthews (Ed.). *The Future of the Army Profession* (pp. 357-78). Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Steele, C. M. (1988). "The psychology of self-affirmation: sustaining the integrity of the self." In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 21, pp. 261-302). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Stockdale, J. (1979). A Vietnam experience, duty. In A. Arkush (Ed.). *West Point's perspectives on Officership* (pp. 261-266). West Point, NY: United States Military Academy. Stodgill, R. M. (1974). *Handbook of leadership*. New York, Free Press.

Stodgill, R. M. (1948). Personal factors associated with leadership: A review of the literature. *Journal of Psychology* 25 (1948), pp. 35-71.

Tutty, L., Rothery, M. & Grinnell, R. (1996). *Qualitative research for social workers*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

United States Code. (2003). Title 10, Subtitle A.2.33.§ 531. Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office. Accessed from the U.S. Code Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

U. S. Department of the Army. (1976). *Field manual 27-10: The law of land warfare*. Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office.

U. S. Department of the Army. (1993). *Army regulation 600-100: Army leadership*. Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office.

U. S. Department of the Army. (1993). *Department of the Army pamphlet 350-58: Leader development for America's army.* Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office.

U. S. Department of the Army. (1998). *Department of the Army pamphlet 600-3:Commissioned officer development.* Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office.

U. S. Department of the Army. (1999). *Field manual 22-100: Army leadership*. Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office.

Visconti, S. (Ed.). (2002). *Leadership & management: Instructor's manual for military science and leadership*. New York: McGraw-Hill Custom Publishing.

Webb, J. (1978). *Fields of fire*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Welchman, J. (2005). Virtue ethics and human development. In S. Gardiner (Ed.) *Virtue ethics old and new* (pp. 142-155). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Wooden, J., & Jamison, S. (2005). *Wooden on leadership*. New York: McGraw-Hill.