

AN EXAMINATION OF SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN ASIA: COMPARING THE
UYGHUR IN CHINA WITH THE KASHMIRI IN INDIA

By

Martha Pezzino, M.A.
University of Scranton

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Political Science
to the Office of Graduate and Extended Studies
of East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania

December 19, 2020

SIGNATURE/APPROVAL PAGE

The signed approval page for this thesis was intentionally removed from the online copy by an authorized administrator at Kemp Library.

The final approved signature page for this thesis is on file with the Office of Graduate and Extended Studies. Please contact Theses@esu.edu with any questions.

ABSTRACT

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Political Science to the Office of Graduate and Extended
Studies of East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania.

Student's Name: Martha Pezzino

Title: An Examination of Separatist Movements in Asia: Comparing the Uyghur in China
with the Kashmiri in India

Date of Graduation: December 19, 2020

Thesis Chair: Ko Mishima, Ph.D.

Thesis Member: Samuel Quainoo, Ph.D.

Thesis Member: Adam McGlynn, Ph.D.

Abstract

This thesis will examine the separatist movement and ethnic conflict in Xinjiang, China with the Uyghur population, and contrast that against the separatist movement and ethnic conflict in Kashmir between India and Pakistan. The research will show that while the culture and geography are vastly different between the two, there many similarities. The significance of this research is that it will show that at the heart of both conflicts is a fight over resources. In China the resource is oil, and in Kashmir the resource is water. In order to come to this conclusion, much was taken into consideration, including the origins of the conflicts, the resources in each of the regions, as well as the reasons for continued fighting. The larger implications of this research will show that the fight for resources can be found to be at the heart of many conflicts.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is with extreme thanks and appreciation that I must acknowledge the help and assistance I received from a multitude of people, all of whom made the completion of both this thesis and this degree possible. To my husband, Chuck Rowles, your eternal support and encouragement throughout this process has been valued more than you know, especially because you have seen me through this process before. You were selfless and encouraging to see me through this yet again. The combination of frequently reminding me that I needed to finally finish this, coupled with leaving me in solitude so that I actually could, is exactly the combination that I needed. Thank you, I love you. To my best friend and colleague Richelle Smith, your unending encouragement and inspiration have been invaluable. Driving to classes together made the long rides fun, and helping me with the formatting and page numbers was positively invaluable, but letting me bounce ideas off of you, and being the kind of person that gets things done was inspirational. Thank you, I love you.

Dr. Ko Mishima, your patience and direction was instrumental, and I thank you for it. Having faith that I would finally get this done and helping me to do so was invaluable. Beginning with my first semester at East Stroudsburg University, your encouragement made me feel welcome. From advising me with my classes and degree, to helping me with my thesis and reading through it multiple times, your guidance, your help, and your presence has not only made it possible for me to successfully finish, but to enjoy doing it along the way. Thank you for the advice, the guidance, and for being a brilliant professor as well.

Dr. Samuel Quainoo and Dr Adam McGlynn, thank you for taking the time not only to read through this thesis and to be members of this thesis committee, but for being wonderful professors as well. I enjoyed all of your classes and learned a tremendous amount from both of you. Thank you for helping me not only to get through this thesis, but to get through and enjoy my time at ESU.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements.....	i
Chapter1: Introduction.....	1
Chapter 2: Literature Review.....	7
Chapter 3: Uyghur Separatism in Xinjiang.....	22
Chapter 4: Hydropolitics in Kashmir.....	47
Chapter 5: Conclusion.....	73
Bibliography.....	79

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the separatist movements in two different parts of Asia, and to compare some of the similarities between them. On the surface, the issues facing the Uyghur population of China and the conflict between India, Pakistan, and Kashmir may seem different, but these conflicts have major issues in common. The separatist movements not only have comparable religious and ethnic similarities, but the ethnic conflicts at the heart of them are fights for the land, and the resources on that land. While the conflicts in both of these places are decades old, in recent years they have both escalated. In both Xinjiang, China, where the Uyghur live, and in Kashmir, India, the Chinese and Indian governments respectively have increased their suppression of the people, using brutal and harsh techniques to silence any opposition.

The research question at hand, then, is not only whether or not these issues are about natural resources, and what natural resources are being fought over, but also the ways in which the people are being suppressed in these regions, and the separatist movements that originated there.

In Xinjiang, the Uyghur are experiencing suppression at the hands of the Chinese government. Many are being held against their will in what the Chinese call “reeducation

camps”, and the mass surveillance of the population means that the Uyghur have no privacy from the government and cannot escape their oppression. The Uyghur are historically, religiously, and culturally very different from the rest of China, and the suppression of the Uyghur clearly has a very strong nationalist streak to it. While their separatist movement challenges Chinese authority in the northwest part of the nation, it also threatens some of China’s resources, as Xinjiang contains very large coal deposits, as well as some of China’s largest oil reserves.

In Kashmir, traditional argument has it that the fight is strictly over religion, and that the Muslims and Hindus are fighting based on religious loyalty, with Kashmir and Pakistan having a largely Muslim population, and India being largely Hindu. The policies and pronouncements of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi would seem to bear that out, as his anti-Muslim nationalism led to India recently removing the autonomy of Kashmir and instituting harsh, oppressive policies against the Kashmiri people. However, a closer look at the situation will demonstrate that while Modi’s Hindu nationalist decrees and declarations appear to be strictly cultural and religious in nature, by taking control of Kashmir and removing its autonomy, he also gained a great deal of control over much of the Indus River and some of its tributaries. India has been experiencing extreme water shortages over the last few decades and the situation becomes increasingly more dire every day. But by taking control of Kashmir, Modi also helped to alleviate the water scarcity in India.

This study is significant, in that it makes a noteworthy argument regarding the causes of the separatist movements and resultant violence and fighting in two large regions of Asia. By looking at the natural resources, and the ways in which they affect the

cultures, this study poses an alternative to the traditional arguments concerning religion, ethnicity, and culture. By concentrating on our similar dependence on natural resources, and not the differences in various cultures, this study presents another viewpoint to the problem.

There were several different approaches taken in this study. First, an examination of the problems in northwestern China will highlight the problems among the Uyghur, and an examination of the problems in India and Pakistan will highlight the issues in Kashmir. The background and the origins of the fighting needed to be examined, as well as the reasons for their continuance. In order to counter the argument that these issues are solely based in ethnic or religious differences, the cultures of all of the warring parties, as well as the leadership, needed to be taken into consideration. For example, studying the religious and cultural differences in China will show that China contains many different ethnicities, and has Muslim populations in several provinces. However, it is the Muslim Uyghur who have suffered more at the hands of the Chinese government. Likewise, in order to establish that the religious differences are not solely at the heart of the issues in Kashmir, the religions of those involved needed to be considered. While Kashmir is largely Muslim, it is not solely Muslim, and many Muslims live in many other parts of India.

In addition, consideration needed to be given to the types of natural resources that are in the regions being studied. A look at the natural resources in the Xinjiang region of China, home of the Uyghur, shows that there is coal, as well as very large deposits of oil. The Chinese government sees these resources as necessary to not only enrich the country, but also to position itself in a more powerful way on the world stage. Similarly, a look at

the flow of the Indus River, as well as its tributaries, will show that lack of water is the source of the problems in Kashmir. The people of Kashmir, as well as Pakistan and India all rely on the water from the Indus to sustain their economies and their lives. As India has been experiencing extreme water scarcity, the water that flows from the Indus is necessary to maintain Indian lives and Indian power.

Finally, an examination of the culture, biases, and methods used by the leadership in China, as well as India, is necessary in order to demonstrate that their concern is more about the natural resources in the land, than about the people living on the land. They are concerned about getting the natural resources – their behavior toward the people living in Xinjiang and Kashmir will bear this out.

The methodology used, was to examine the cultural and political atmosphere in both China and India, as well as to look at the necessity or desperation both states had in obtaining the natural resources. For example, in order to understand the oppression of the Uyghur, an examination of the laws and the ways in which they are applied differently to the Uyghur as compared to other Chinese ethnic groups had to be made. The resources in Xinjiang also needed to be studied. Similarly, the political atmosphere in India needed to be studied, as did the extreme water scarcity. Only by looking at both of these issues can a connection be made between the two. The extreme Hindu nationalism of Prime Minister Modi suitably allowed him to remove the autonomy of Kashmir, take control of their water thus helping to alleviate their extreme water shortage, all while playing to his base of supporters.

The literature review will examine various causes of separatist movements. Nationalism, which necessarily runs through all separatist movements, will be looked at

more closely, as will the geographic reasons for separatist movements. The historic causes of separatism will contain a brief examination of separatist movements in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia from the 1990s that resulted from redrawing the map of Europe after World War I. This was done in order to demonstrate that separatist movements have long histories and do not suddenly occur without provocation. When examining protection from oppression or genocide as a cause of separatist movements, a closer examination will be given to the Kurdish separatist movements in several countries throughout the Middle East.

In addition to looking at some of the major causes of separatist movements, the literature review will also examine the three major theories of ethnic conflict. This was necessary because separatist movements largely coincide with ethnic conflict, and an examination of the separatist movements of the Uyghur in China and the Kashmiri of India will certainly bear that out. Instrumentalism assumes that those in power cause ethnic conflict so that they can gain wealth or power from it, implying that ethnic conflict is a manipulation by those in power for personal gain. Primordialism argues that ethnicity is fixed at birth, and that ethnic bonds are emotional and visceral. As a result, ethnic conflict grows from that kinship one feels with others of the same ethnicity. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Constructivism contends that ethnicity is a construct and does not even exist biologically. It argues that what is often deemed to be ethnic, is largely cultural, and so ethnic conflict is based in cultural differences, and not biological differences.

This study will examine the separatist movements in two vastly different parts of Asia but will highlight the similarities between the two of them. From the origins of

separatism, to the oppression of the people, and the harsh brutalities endured by the separatists, the patterns and problems of both the Uyghur of China and the Kashmiri of India will become apparent.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Separatist movements and ethnic conflict are major parts of the study of international politics, and very often they go together. While ethnic conflict is more prevalent, it can sometimes result in a separatist movement. Though each movement and conflict is very different, there are major themes that run through them.

A separatist movement is “the advocacy of a state of cultural, ethnic, tribal, religious, racial, governmental, or gender separation from the larger group. Separatist movements are often accompanied by violation of human rights and international law.”¹ Very often, these groups look to establish their own independent government, though some only look for more autonomy. Currently, there are dozens of separatist movements going on around the world and on every continent with the exception of Antarctica.²

While most are small or marginal and may not reflect the opinions of the majority, such

¹ Matúš Petrovský, United States General Assembly: International Intervention in Separatist Movements, The Bratislava Model United Nations Conference, 7-9 November 2014, accessed October 29, 2020, <http://www.fn-rollspel.se/dokument-till-rollspelet/seperatistrolelser.pdf>.

² Andrew Lisa, “Brexit and other active separatist movements around the world”, 22 April 2019, accessed October 29, 2020, <https://stacker.com/stories/2868/brexit-and-other-active-separatist-movements-around-world>.

as those in Texas, Alaska, Hawaii, or California, many are much more significant. Puerto Rico has a somewhat larger, albeit thus far unsuccessful separatist movement, as does Quebec in Canada and the Zapatistas in Mexico. Brexit, also in the UK, represents the separation of Great Britain from the European Union, and while the British people voted for the separation, the world waits to determine the success or failure of their venture. Two larger, though unsuccessful separatist movements that will be examined in greater detail in later chapters are the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China, and the Kashmiri in Kashmir, India.

Some political scientists have argued for what is called the “contagion theory” regarding separatist movements. Dartmouth University Political Scientist Jason Sorens claims that “There is some evidence that secessionism in one part of a country tends to spread to other parts of the same country... And there is also evidence that when a central government fails to put down one armed self-determination conflict, another one is more likely to emerge in the same country.”³ The multiple secession movements in China, such as those currently taking place in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang would seem to provide evidence for this theory. In addition, Spain is experiencing fairly significant secessionist movements in the Basque Country as well as in Catalonia. While Great Britain is looking to leave the European Union, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales all have active separatist movements. In addition, France has multiple separatist movements within its borders, as does Russia.

³ Brennan Weiss, “Experts can’t figure out why independence movements are suddenly sweeping the world”, Business Insider, 10 October 2017, accessed October 29, 2020, <https://www.businessinsider.com/why-catalan-kurds-voting-independence-movements-secession-2017-10>.

In spite of the fact that multiple separatist movements can often be found within the same countries, they do not seem to spread across international borders. Steve Saideman, a Political Scientist from Carleton University in Canada, and author of multiple books on ethnic conflict, claims that separatist movements do not cut across borders. He claims that “there really doesn’t seem to be any hard evidence behind the concern that allowing independence to occur in one place will encourage similar movements elsewhere around the world.”⁴ When separatist movements spread, they spread within national boundaries.

While each separatist movement will have its own character and purpose, there tend to be specific reasons that they each begin. According to the United Nations, “Motivations for separatism originate from the oppression which stimulates their desire to secede.”⁵ The implication here is that separatist movements are begun in order to escape domination and subjection by the ruling class. The varied causes of separatist movements to be examined here include nationalism, geographic or historical reasons, protection from oppression or genocide, as well as religious or ethnic identity and ethnic conflict. Most separatist movements will be caused by a combination of these different factors.

Nationalism is a strong motivating factor and is common in all separatist movements. Separatist movements “are fed by the identity factor that in its turn is based on nationalism... nationalism could be only negative and aggressive as it can be the

⁴ Weiss, “Experts can’t figure out why independence movements are suddenly sweeping the world”.

⁵ Petrovský, United States General Assembly: International Intervention in Separatist Movements, The Bratislava Model United Nations Conference.

reason for conflict between different groups of people.”⁶ Nationalism imposes an identity, but also excludes those who are deemed to not belong. For example, the Uyghurs are not considered to be Chinese by the greater Chinese population, but the Uyghurs also largely do not identify as Chinese. They are Uyghur. Similarly, India does not consider the Kashmiri people to be Indian, but the Kashmiri people do not consider themselves Indian either. They are Kashmiri. They identify with their culture and tradition, which is not the same culture and tradition of the larger Chinese or Indian populations. As such, it is far more likely that a group who feels isolated from the larger culture or nation will seek its independence.

Additionally, there are frequently geographic reasons for separatist movements. The larger a country is, the more opportunities there are for separatist movements to take place.⁷ Nations like Russia and China with their multitude of separatist movements can provide perfect examples for this. Enormous geographic regions make it very difficult not only to maintain authority over a region, but more importantly, to maintain hegemony over the population. Various ethnic groups, with their diverse histories, languages, religions, and cultures will find it difficult to identify with each other. This difficulty can translate to a sense of isolation in a state and result in a separatist movement.

There are a multitude of historical reasons for separatist movements as well. There is evidence to show that younger countries are more likely to experience separatist movements than older ones. A new nation is unlikely to have a strong central government

⁶ Yevgeny Ryabinin, “The Basic Causes of the Contemporary Separatism”, *Journal of Geography, Politics and Society*, 2017, 7(1), 5–9, accessed October 29, 2020, [file:///C:/Users/Martha/Downloads/01%20ryabinin%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/Martha/Downloads/01%20ryabinin%20(1).pdf).

⁷ Ryabinin, “The Basic Causes of the Contemporary Separatism”.

to suppress any movements, or to have an established economic policy that might strengthen the government.⁸ Additionally, a new nation is more likely to have ethnic clashes, as the boundaries of newly formed nations are often established without consideration for the ethnic history of its population. In many ways, World War I proved to be a catalyst for separatist movements throughout the 20th Century.

World War I, which lasted from 1914 to 1918, was not only largely the result of separatist movements in the now nonexistent Ottoman Empire, but would prove to be the cause of many separatist movements in Europe at the end of the century. Immediately following World War I, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania established their independence from Russian and created their own independent states. Additionally, following World War I many new European states emerged as a result of boundaries that were redrawn, including Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. As a result of the creation of these states along boundaries that ignored ethnic and cultural heritage, both Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia experienced separatist movements in the 1990s. These happened soon after the fall of the Soviet Union, which, in itself, consisted largely of a lot of separatist movements.

Yugoslavia was created in 1918 immediately after World War I. Ignoring the ethnic and cultural history of the region, the allied powers created this state out of many different ethnic groups, including several separate Slavic cultures, some Hungarians from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, parts of the former Ottoman Empire, the independent states of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.⁹

⁸ Ryabinin, “The Basic Causes of the Contemporary Separatism”.

⁹ Brian Beary, “WWI Transformed the Map of Europe – Could it Change Again?”, European Institute at the University of Maryland, 18 June 2014, accessed

Following the end of World War II, Yugoslavia came under the influence of the now powerful Soviet Union, with Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito exerting a strong grip on power, and keeping all of the different ethnic groups in check. When Tito died in 1980, ethnic differences began to rise. But it was not until the Soviet Union's power was starting to dissipate that Yugoslavian separatist movements began to emerge. With the fall of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, these emerging separatist movements broke out into full scale declarations of independence with the accompanying fighting and violence.¹⁰

In June of 1991 Slovenia and Croatia each declared their independence from Yugoslavia. This was followed in January of 1992 with Macedonia declaring its independence. Three months later, in April, Bosnia and Herzegovina followed suit, as well as Serbia and Montenegro.¹¹ These declarations of independence essentially fell along ethnic lines. Separatist movements had largely been established by groups that were artificially thrown together to create Yugoslavia after World War 1. Also, in 1992, ethnic tensions erupted into a war which lasted for three years, and saw the deaths of thousands, and the displacement of more than one million people. At the end of the war, the country was “partitioned into three areas, with each region governed by one of the three ethnic groups. Each enclave is now made up of roughly 90% of its own ethnic

October 31, 2020, <https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/233-european-affairs/ea-june-2014/1909-wwi-transformed-the-map-of-europe-could-it-change-again>.

¹⁰ Borgna Brunner and David Johnson, “Timeline: The Former Yugoslavia. From WW1 to the splintering of the country”, Infoplease, 28 February 2017, accessed October 31, 2020, <https://www.infoplease.com/history/world/timeline-the-former-yugoslavia>.

¹¹ Brunner and Johnson, “Timeline: The Former Yugoslavia”.

group.”¹² From the middle to the late 1990s in Serbia, President Slobodan Milošević engaged in the extermination of thousands of mostly ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo. What began as a multitude of independent ethnic groups and states being thrown together to start a new nation at the beginning of the century, ended with many separatist movements declaring their independence with resultant violence and even genocide.

While Yugoslavia stands out because of the violence and genocide associated with its separatist movements and eventual dissolution, other states were created because of separatist movements that were largely peaceful. Czechoslovakia experienced its Velvet Revolution in November 1989, which was a largely peaceful protest to gain independence from the communist Soviet regime. While Czechoslovakia had seen hints of rebellion for decades, the Velvet Revolution was marked by enormous demonstrations sparked by playwright and future president of the Czech Republic, Václav Havel. What ostensibly began as a celebration of the anniversary of demonstrations that took place in 1968 to protest the killing of a student by the Nazis and its subsequent repression, evolved into protests against the communist government. While the students who participated “were met with police tear gas and water cannons... the students nonetheless created more protest events. Marches and mass demonstrations paralleled grassroots organizing by actors and students around the country.”¹³ In a country with a population of less than 16 million people, more than a million people took to the streets in mass demonstrations. In just over a month, the protests “forced the resignation of the Politburo,

¹² Brunner and Johnson, “Timeline: The Former Yugoslavia”.

¹³ Lester Kurtz, “Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution (1989)”, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, March 2008, accessed October 31, 2020, <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/czechoslovakias-velvet-revolution-1989/>.

and the creation of a new government dominated by non-communists.”¹⁴ This would pave the way for the subsequent division of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which also occurred peacefully and along ethnic lines in January of 1993.

Frequently referred to as the “Velvet Divorce”, the split of Czechoslovakia largely occurred along ethnic lines. When Czechoslovakia gained its autonomy and began to establish its own government with its own constitution, there were many issues which divided the Czechs, who dominated the western part of the nation, from the Slovaks, which dominated the eastern part of the nation. The two groups had difficulties coming together over issues such as the economy and general governance, and their differences proved to be too large to overcome. There were a greater number of Czechs in Czechoslovakia than there were Slovaks, and therefore dividing power equally between the two ethnic groups seemed unfair to the Czechs, as “many Czechs felt the Slovaks had too much power for their respective numbers.”¹⁵ While there were some difficulties along the way, with discussions on whether to separate coming from both sides, in the end the dissolution was diplomatic and nonviolent, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia peacefully replaced a unified Czechoslovakia on 1 January 1993.¹⁶

While some separatist movements are largely the result of historical events, such as those that took place in Yugoslavia as well as in Czechoslovakia, others occur mainly because of a need to avoid persecution or even genocide. Several separatist movements

¹⁴ Kurtz, “Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution (1989)”.

¹⁵ Robert Wilde, “The Velvet Divorce: The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia”, 21 February 2019, accessed October 31, 2020, <https://www.thoughtco.com/the-velvet-divorce-1221617>.

¹⁶ Wilde, “The Velvet Divorce: The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia”.

around the world and throughout history are evidence of this, including the Uyghur in China. As we shall see, the separatist movement there is born from nationalism, historical events, but also from a need to avoid persecution by the Chinese government. The Kurds are engaging in separatist movements in several nations. Their ethnic identity, coupled with persecution and oppression from several states, has driven the Kurds to form their own separatist movement and to try to create their own state.

The Kurds are an ethnic group consisting of approximately 25 to 35 million people spread across the borders of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Armenia. While they constitute “the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East... they have never obtained a permanent nation state.”¹⁷ There was consideration for the creation of a Kurdish state called Kurdistan following World War I, but when Turkey and other Middle Eastern states were carved out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, consideration for a Kurdish state evaporated. The Kurds would be spread across five different nations and find themselves a minority ethnic group in each of them.¹⁸

In Turkey, where the Kurds make up approximately 15 to 20 percent of the population, they have been treated harshly by the government for decades. Many Kurds were forced off their land, their traditional names and clothing were banned, the language was forbidden, and their ethnic identity was forcibly changed from being called Kurds, to ‘Mountain Turks’. While Turkey attempts to eliminate Kurdish identity, the separatists fight the Turkish government. Thousands of people have been killed over the last few

¹⁷ BBC News, “Who are the Kurds?”, 15 October 2019, accessed October 31, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440>.

¹⁸ BBC News, “Who are the Kurds?”.

decades, sowing the seeds for future violent clashes, and increasing the calls for separatist movements. The Kurdish population in Iraq suffered chemical attacks at the hands of Saddam Hussein in the 1980s in retaliation for the Kurds supporting Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. In Syria, where the Kurds constitute 7 to 10 percent of the population, they have suffered oppression there as well.¹⁹ Approximately “300,000 have been denied citizenship since the 1960s, and Kurdish land has been confiscated and redistributed to Arabs in an attempt to ‘Arabize’ Kurdish regions.”²⁰ The Kurdish population, while it is one of the largest ethnic groups in the Middle East, is spread out between five different countries. This means that they are minority ethnic group within any national boundary and suffer as a result. Their separatist movement crosses those boundaries, only because the Kurds were there for millennia before the political boundaries were established in the years after World War I. Therefore, in order to avoid oppression and extermination, they persist with their separatist movement.

Religion is certainly a common cause of separatist movements as well.

Overlapping with other cultural differences such as food, rituals, and language, religion can point to differences between varied groups within the same state. The Kashmiri people of India are a Muslim minority in a largely Hindu state. They demand their autonomy while they suffer the oppression of India. The same can be said of the Uyghur of Xinjiang in China. They are a Muslim minority in a Chinese state without a dominant religion. But the religion of both the Kashmiri and the Uyghur points to additional cultural differences between them and the states from which they wish to separate.

¹⁹ BBC News, “Who are the Kurds?”.

²⁰ BBC News, “Who are the Kurds?”.

Religion determines beliefs, practices, rituals, and sometimes even language, setting apart those who practice the minority religion from the larger population.

While all of these separatist movements are driven largely by one cause or another, nationalism and ethnic identity are more common factors. Nationalism by its very definition must exist in order for a group to demand its independence or autonomy, and ethnic identity is very often a common factor as well. Simply put, an ethnic conflict is one in which two or more ethnic groups fight for power, and ethnic conflicts are common factors in separatist movements. Ethnic conflict exists in various forms, and there are multiple reasons for them. However, political scientists have proposed three major theories behind the cause of ethnic conflicts. They are instrumentalism, primordialism, and constructivism. Each of these theories proposes different ideas and causes of ethnic conflict, and each starts with different assumptions.

Instrumentalism as a theory for the cause of ethnic conflict presumes that those involved in the ethnic conflict “hope to derive some material benefit from the conflict, such as jobs, wealth, or power” and that “ethnic conflict is conflict among rational agents over scant resources”.²¹ With this, political, cultural, or religious leaders use their power to manipulate ethnic groups for their own personal, economic, or political advancement. Ethnic differences are exploited for personal gain. The assumption inherent in Instrumentalism is that organization by ethnicity is beneficial and reasonable, but that it is also an intentional attempt to grab power and control resources by manipulating various

²¹ Francesco Caselli and Wilbur John Coleman II, “On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict”, September 2011, accessed November 1, 2020, <https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~coleman/web/ethnic.pdf>.

ethnic groups and creating allegiances along ethnic lines. The efficacy of Instrumentalism “lies also in explaining why some ethnically fragmented societies choose to fight or chose to cooperate rather than fight. This decision, it is argued, depends on the cost and benefit calculations that groups make and so when the cost of cooperation is more than the perceived benefits, ethnic conflicts tend to be unavoidable.”²² According to this theory, people participate in ethnic conflict not because they necessarily believe in the reasons for the fight, but because the fight will benefit them materially.

While Instrumentalism may be used to explain some ethnic conflicts, this theory does not address the violence that often accompanies such conflicts. Torture, rape, and genocide have been associated with many ethnic conflicts, but this explanation does not account for such brutality. While leaders may appeal to ethnic sentiment in order to mobilize people, the atrocities that have been witnessed in ethnic conflicts that can be found in Rwanda in the 1990s, and currently in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and among the Uyghurs in China, cannot be explained simply by saying that it was manipulation by the highest powers that made it happen.²³

Primordialism is another theory of ethnic conflict. It presupposes passion and sentimental causes, as it focuses “on the visceral dimension of conflict”.²⁴ According to primordialism, ethnic groups have a connection and a mutual bond which unites them. This bond is not only emotive, but it is fixed and exists at birth. Ethnic identity in

²² Dodeye Uduak Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories of Ethnic Conflict”, *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol 4 (1) March 2015, p.148.

²³ Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.148.

²⁴ Caselli and Coleman, “On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict”.

inevitable and unchangeable, but it also comes with deep-seated rivalry or even hatred of other ethnic groups.²⁵

There are problems with the Primordialist theory as well. While it explains the emotional brutality that comes with some ethnic conflicts, it also implies that there is an inevitability to the violence. By ignoring “the structural, economic and political processes within which these conflicts erupt”,²⁶ it assumes there is a certainty and predictability to ethnic conflict. However, there are many places around the world and throughout history where different ethnic groups have lived together without conflict, which would seem to negate this theory.²⁷

The final theory of ethnic conflict is Constructivism. This theory offers an alternative approach, and views ethnic identity as something that changes with cultural association. This holds that ethnicity is an artificial construct and it is not immutable and fixed at birth, as Primordialism would maintain. It is a product of cultural assimilation and “can be formed through various means including conquest, colonization or immigration”.²⁸ Your ethnic identity is tied up in your language, customs, and religion, none of which are absolute. Ethnicity is contrived and subjective, and its goal is to reinforce the differences between different groups of people.

This theory also has problems. It ignores instances of ethnic conflict that cross borders, such as the Kurds. Spanning five different countries, there are certainly cultural

²⁵ Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.147-148.

²⁶ Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.147.

²⁷ Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.148.

²⁸ Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.149.

differences between different Kurdish groups that live in different nations. Additionally, some groups identify themselves on some aspect of their physicality, such as hair or skin color, and this theory would seem to minimize or ignore that altogether.

It is clear that neither Instrumentalism, Primordialism, nor Constructivism is applicable to all ethnic conflicts, as there are ethnic conflicts that would disprove each of these theories. The problem lies in their definition of ethnic identity, and the fact that the theories do not start with a firm definition on which all can agree. Where Primordialism defines ethnicity as natural and unchanging, Constructivism does just the opposite and defines ethnicity as a construct determined more by culture than by genes. For the Instrumentalists, it is irrelevant if ethnicity is natural or artificial, so long as it can be used for power or material gain.²⁹ Knowing the cause of ethnic conflict is integral to finding a solution to it, as our definition and understanding frames “our response and informs the course of action taken to prevent or resolve these conflicts. A narrow focus on a single dimension will continue to produce ineffective intervention or post conflict peace building strategies that are insensitive to other significant factors.”³⁰ Unless we can understand the cause of ethnic conflict, we cannot hope to find a solution to it.

Separatist movements are caused by a multitude of factors, many of which overlap. There are countless geographic and historical reasons for many separatist movements, but many others are the result of oppression and genocide, and the need to escape the torture and death that goes along with it. Others have ethnic conflict at their foundation, though political scientists cannot come to an agreement as to the causes of

²⁹ Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.149-150.

³⁰ Williams, “How Useful are the Main Existing Theories”, p.150

ethnic conflict. Nationalism seems to run through most as well. The reality is that most separatist movements are caused by a combination of factors. To simplify the causes of ethnic conflict, or the causes of separatist movements into lists, is to ignore the complex nature of politics, culture, identity, as well as human nature.

CHAPTER 3: UYGHUR SEPARATISM IN XINJIANG

Introduction

China, like many other nations, is one filled with religious and political turmoil. Through thousands of years of existence, the Chinese government, whether imperial or communist, has attempted to maintain itself in spite of multiple revolts from within. Most recently, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China has experienced many problems. It has been fighting for independence for much of the twentieth century, and this fight has spilled over into the twenty first century in the form of acts of defiance, both violent and peaceful, that are met with acts of aggression from the Chinese government. The Uyghur are the dominant ethnic minority in Xinjiang. They are the people that are in opposition with the Chinese government, and the ones that are being repressed by the Chinese government. Predominantly Muslim, they are ethnically and culturally part of the Turkic people, and not the majority Han of traditional China. Additionally, they live in an area that is rich in oil and mineral reserves. While at first glance it appears that the uprisings in Xinjiang and resultant reasons for the repression of the Uyghur people are religious in nature, the cultural and economic issues should be considered as well.

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, usually referred to simply as Xinjiang, dominates the northeast part of China. An incredibly large land mass, it borders eight nations and accounts for one-sixth of the entirety of Chinese territory. As of 2000, its population was 19.25 million. While just over eight million of these constitute the Han Chinese, the remaining eleven million are made up of forty seven other minority ethnic groups, the most prevalent of which is the largely Islamic Uyghur. In large part because of its location, its history, and its ethnic diversity, Xinjiang has been home to a variety of religions, including Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Taoism, among others. Islam was introduced into the region in the tenth century and became the dominant religion in the sixteenth century.³¹

Over the centuries, many other religions continued to exist, albeit not always peacefully, alongside Islam, which is now by far the dominant religion in the region. According to the Chinese government, Xinjiang contains more than 24,000 religious sites, 23,753 of which are mosques. In addition, there are approximately 26,800 clerics, including 26,500 which are Muslim. The Chinese government also contends that Xinjiang has many Islamic leaders active in the regional government, and that China has spent a lot of money to build and fix mosques in Xinjiang. While many assert that the atheistic Chinese government is anti-Islamic, the government claims that all are given freedom to practice their religion, as is stated in the Chinese constitution and the law.³²

³¹ Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Beijing, May 2003, accessed November 27, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-06/12/content_916306.htm.

³² Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China.

Culturally, many issues in Xinjiang should be considered. Problems began for this region in the middle ages, when ethnic and national identities were questioned, and parts of this region were briefly referred to as Turkistan. The fact that it bordered Russia and Kazakhstan to the north, and had much in common with the Russian culture, led many in Xinjiang to identify more with Russian culture than with the traditional Han Chinese culture.³³ Additionally, Xinjiang has enjoyed sporadic autonomy and independence since coming under Chinese authority in the eighteenth century. The Turkish Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan was briefly declared in 1933,³⁴ and after the Chinese Revolution in 1949, a short lived East Turkestan state was declared, after which the region officially and formally became part of China. As such, the Chinese government now had to suppress any revolutionary activity in order to maintain their authority.³⁵ However, the methods used to relate with the Uyghur population varied through the decades. In the 1950s, the Uyghurs and their language, beliefs, and customs, were to be treated with respect. This changed quickly in the 1960s with the Cultural Revolution, when violence again was used against the Uyghurs.”³⁶ With nationalist movements gaining momentum in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union, the call for an independent East Turkestan

³³ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

³⁴ Enze Han, “Boundaries, Discrimination, and Interethnic Conflict in Xinjiang, China”, *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, Vol 4 (2) 2010, p.247.

³⁵ BBC News, “Why is there Tension between China and the Uighurs?” 26 September 2014, accessed November 28, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014>.

³⁶ Gardner Bovington. "The not-so-silent majority: Uyghur resistance to Han rule in Xinjiang." *Modern China* (2002): p 45.

was revived.³⁷ Although quickly suppressed by the Chinese government, some separatists continue to refer to the region as East Turkestan.

Economically, there are several issues which also complicate the situation in Xinjiang. Situated along the Great Silk Road, Its geographical position has been important for trade between the east and the west for many centuries.³⁸ While agriculture has competed with trade in the region for a very long time, recent industrial and developmental projects have brought more jobs and opportunities to the larger cities in Xinjiang. This, in turn, has brought in more Han Chinese from the east into the region. In addition to the cultural, linguistic, and religious differences, the native Uyghur argue that the best jobs are given to the new Han. This is cause for additional animosity among the Uyghurs toward the Han, and therefore toward the Chinese government.³⁹

The issues in Xinjiang are multifaceted and complex. The Uyghur feel discrimination and the Chinese government discriminates against them, even going so far as creating concentration camps, or “re-education” centers to house countless numbers of them. Their desire for an independent state emanates not from one event or a single issue, but from many issues that work together. In turn, the Chinese government looks to suppress any revolutionary activity, which is seen as anything that is not in line with traditional Chinese culture. Therefore, the issues of religion, culture, and economy all play a role in the revolutionary activity in Xinjiang.

³⁷ BBC News, “Why is there Tension between China and the Uighurs?”.

³⁸ Han, “Boundaries, Discrimination, and Interethnic Conflict”, p.246.

³⁹ BBC News, “Why is there Tension between China and the Uighurs?”.

Xinjiang has a rather problematic history. Situated in Central Asia, the indigenous people have more in common with other Central Asian ethnicities than with traditional China. As such, the Uyghur have been fighting a secessionist movement for many decades. This movement has manifested itself in many ways, though the most apparent to an outside observer is through violent acts against the Chinese people, and the Chinese government. As such, the attacks by the Uyghur against the Han and others has been at the forefront of the discussion of the Uyghur and their treatment by the Chinese. While it may be asserted that the violence of the Uyghur toward China is the result of the violent, unequal, and unfair treatment given to them by the Chinese government, it can also be claimed that the Chinese government is defending itself, albeit violently, against the aggressions of the Uyghur people.

The Uyghur people are culturally and physically different from other minority ethnicities in China and are therefore treated differently by the Chinese government than other minority ethnic groups. The assertion that the Chinese government treats the Uyghur differently than other minorities, including other Muslim groups, within China, is affirmed by Liang Zheng in his doctoral dissertation. After analyzing “four state newspapers” and conducting thirty-eight interviews, he concludes that “Uyghurs are represented in China’s state media in a partial and biased way.”⁴⁰ This bias has come through in several ways. For example, in the northwest part of Xinjiang, where the vast resources have brought investment and immigrant Han, the local government imposed a

⁴⁰ Liang Zheng, “Media and Minkaohan Uyghurs: Representation, reaction and resistance”, (Doctoral Dissertation Abstract, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2011), accessed November 27, 2015, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/915643879>.

ban on people sporting Islamic dress or long beards from using public transportation.

While the government claims that this was done to prevent terrorist attacks, the Uyghur population claim that they are being unfairly targeted.⁴¹

In April 2017, the Chinese government began to implement an even more repressive policy, when they instituted a program of mass surveillance, and built and established a system of camps and prisons across Xinjiang to house the Uyghur population extrajudicially. While the Chinese government refers to them as “political education” camps or “boarding schools”, it is estimated that there are more than 1,000 of these prisons in Xinjiang, and that approximately 1.5 million people have been held there against their will. That is roughly one out of six adult Muslims in Xinjiang.⁴²

Additionally, since 2018, the Chinese government has begun to move from internment to forced labor. Uyghurs and other Muslims are kept in the prisons and “forced to work in the production of textiles, food, and light manufacturing.”⁴³

According to Human Rights Watch, the Uyghur population, with their differing language, religion, and heritage “are deemed evidence of disloyalty to the Chinese

⁴¹ Joshua Lipes, “Xinjiang City Bans Beards, Islamic Dress from Public Buses” *Radio Free Asia*, 6 August 2014, accessed November 29, 2015, <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/karamay-08062014182306.html>.

⁴² Radio Free Asia, “Expert Estimates China has more than 1,000 Internment Camps for Xinjiang Uyghurs” 12 November 2019, accessed October 4, 2020, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/zenz-11122019161147.html>.

⁴³ Radio Free Asia, “Expert Estimates China has more than 1,000 Internment Camps for Xinjiang Uyghurs”.

Communist Party.”⁴⁴ Therefore, the Chinese government is attempting to create a more homogenous society, one where the Uyghurs will not attempt to separate from the Chinese government, because they see themselves as Chinese, not as Muslims, or Turks, or even as Uyghurs. Referred to as “cultural genocide”, the purpose is to forcibly assimilate them, and eradicate their heritage. Those detained in the camps are “subjected to political indoctrination, routinely face rough treatment at the hands of their overseers, and endure poor diets and unhygienic conditions”.⁴⁵

Additionally, even those Uyghur not detained in the camps are under constant scrutiny by the Chinese government. China is spending billions of dollars to create a surveillance system in Xinjiang to monitor and control the Uyghurs, while ignoring the Han Chinese that live in Xinjiang. They have created a computerized system which “taps into networks of neighborhood informants; tracks individuals and analyzes their behavior; tries to anticipate potential crime, protest or violence” and deploys what they see as the appropriate security forces.⁴⁶

However, Chinese government contends that the problems in Xinjiang stem from external, foreign interference. The issues initially began in the first part of the twentieth century, when, according to the Chinese government, “a small number of separatists and

⁴⁴ Maya Wang, “More Evidence of China’s Abuses in Xinjiang” Human Rights Watch, 20 February 2020, accessed October 4, 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/20/more-evidence-chinas-horrific-abuses-xinjiang#>.

⁴⁵ Radio Free Asia, “Expert Estimates China has more than 1,000 Internment Camps for Xinjiang Uyghurs”.

⁴⁶ Chris Buckley and Paul Moser, “How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance to Subdue Minorities”, *The New York Times*, May 22, 2019, accessed October 4, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/china-surveillance-xinjiang.html>.

religious extremists in Xinjiang, influenced by the international trend of religious extremism and national chauvinism, politicized the unstandardized geographic term ‘East Turkistan’ and fabricated an ‘ideological and theoretical system’⁴⁷ Furthermore, the Chinese government argues that these foreigners interfered with a previously peaceful state when they encouraged and provoked Islamic ethnic groups which spoke Turkic, to form a theocracy together. According to the Chinese government, these groups, including the foreigners who interfered as well as the native Uyghurs, “denied the history of the great motherland jointly built by all the ethnic groups of China” and that “separatists of all shades raised the banner of ‘East Turkestan’ to carry out activities aimed at materializing their vain wish of establishing an ‘East Turkestan State.’⁴⁸ These groups “created many disturbances with the connivance and support of hostile foreign forces.”⁴⁹

China further argues that there was a disturbance in 1933 with the founding of the “East Turkestan Republic”, but these forces were put down “thanks to the opposition of all the people of all ethnic groups of Xinjiang.”⁵⁰ “Since the peaceful liberation of Xinjiang, the ‘East Turkestan’ forces have never resigned themselves to their defeat.”⁵¹ Interestingly, the Chinese government perceives this to be a danger and menace from outside forces, threatening the peace of China and the people of Xinjiang, as opposed to a

⁴⁷ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

⁴⁸ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

⁴⁹ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

⁵⁰ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

⁵¹ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

revolution from within, by the people of Xinjiang. They clearly wish to convey the notion that had it not been for foreign interference, the Uyghur people would not have any difficulty with the Chinese government, and certainly would not be advocating for any form of secession.

The secessionist movement takes its official form with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), presumably formed sometime around 2000. Founded, organized, and joined by the most militant of Uyghurs, the United States Treasury Department, in 2002, listed the ETIM as a terrorist organization. This happened at a time of increased cooperation between the United States and China in fighting terrorism following the September 11 attacks. A nationalist, Islamist organization, they have taken credit for much of the violence done in the name of the Uyghur separatist movement. It should be noted however, that most Uyghur do not belong to the ETIM, and that the ETIM, while based in Xinjiang, has support in several other nations.⁵²

The Chinese government, then, argues that the war on terror which resulted from the September 11 attacks, have given the East Turkestan forces an argument against the Chinese government, in that they now “have raised the banner of ‘human rights,’ freedom of religion’ and ‘interests of ethnic minorities,’ and fabricated claims that ‘the Chinese government is using every opportunity to oppress ethnic minorities,’ to mislead the public and deceive world opinion in order to escape blows dealt by the international

⁵² Beina Xu, Holly Fletcher, and Jayshree Bajoria, “The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)”, Council on Foreign Relations, updated 4 September 2014, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://www.cfr.org/china/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim/p9179>.

struggle against terrorism.”⁵³ The Chinese government is arguing that since the September 11 attacks, the Islamic separatists are hiding behind the banner of government repression to justify their separatist ideology. Interestingly, Liang Zheng contends that the overt bias against the Uyghurs began after the September 11 attacks and the War on Terror, which led to “an increase in negative depictions of Uyghurs as more related to terrorism and a greater threat to China.”⁵⁴ Gardner Bovingdon argues that since the September 11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror declared by the United States, the Chinese government has used this opportunity to increase its control and impose more restrictions on the people of Xinjiang under the guise of fighting terrorists. As a result, many others in Xinjiang besides the Muslims and separatist Uyghurs are increasingly angry at the Chinese government.⁵⁵

The animosity that the Uyghur have toward China, and the desire for secession, might be the fault of China itself. Gardner Bovingdon contends that inconsistent policies in that region have exacerbated the problems. The frequent shift back and forth between tolerant and repressive policies from the 1950s through the 1980s, as China went through many changes, meant that policies toward the Uyghur fluctuated between acceptance and forced assimilation. By the end of the Cultural Revolution with the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, “pressures to assimilate linguistically and culturally, the persecution of religious practices and personnel, and attacks on respected authorities had profoundly alienated

⁵³ Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

⁵⁴ Zheng, “Media and Minkaohan Uyghurs”.

⁵⁵ Bovingdon, "Autonomy in Xinjiang", page 9.

most Uyghurs.” Bovingdon further asserts that “this was soon followed by somewhat more tolerant cultural and economic policies in Xinjiang, though signally without relaxation of political controls” which further resulted in violent rebellions. The result of these rebellions was that “Xinjiang was accompanied by new restrictions on culture and religion that have remained in place up to the present.”⁵⁶ The repressive stance taken by China toward Xinjiang has increased the animosity of the Uyghur, and their desire for secession. Bovingdon argues that it is the repression of Islam in Xinjiang by the Chinese government, which has caused the Uyghur to dig in their heels to revolt. He contends that if China had taken a step back and allowed for more autonomy and less control, “Xinjiang would have seen less conflict” and that “rigid policies and crackdowns on dissent have precipitated the protests and violent episodes of recent years.”⁵⁷ In other words, as the Chinese government became harsher in their treatment of the Uyghur, the Uyghur increased their revolutionary behavior.

Are the Difficulties Based in Religious Issues?

The Islamic Uyghur are very different from the largely Confucian Chinese society. Confucianism is the dominant Chinese philosophy which teaches respect for authority, and the established social and political order.⁵⁸ It can therefore be argued that it

⁵⁶ Bovingdon, "Autonomy in Xinjiang", page 8.

⁵⁷ Bovingdon, "Autonomy in Xinjiang", page 9.

⁵⁸ Judith A Berling, “Confucianism”, *Focus on Asian Studies*, Vol 2, No 1, Asian Religions, pp 5-7, Fall 1982, copyright 1996, accessed November 30, 2015, <http://www2.kenyon.edu/Depts/Religion/Fac/Adler/Reln270/Berling-Confucianism.htm>.

is the religious differences that have been triggering the revolutionary movement, as well as the harsh reaction from the Chinese government. The politicization of religion has become a regular occurrence in Xinjiang. The Chinese government can close mosques, dismiss clerics, and many people are otherwise prevented from practicing their religion.⁵⁹ They also determine who can be a religious leader, which form of the Koran is to be used, what can and cannot be said in religious gatherings, and where these gatherings may or may not be held.⁶⁰ This has necessarily made religion a political issue, and therefore the possible source of the separatist movement.

Human Rights Watch, an NGO which advocates on behalf of human rights internationally, asserts in a 2005 report that the repression of the Uyghurs is religious in nature, and that they are being discriminated against because of their Islamic faith and practice, “in the name of anti-separatism and counter-terrorism”.⁶¹ The report argues that the subjugation of the Uyghurs is based in their Islamic religion, and that the Chinese government uses the separatism and dissent of the people as an excuse for religious persecution. It further states that Chinese policy toward them disallows the Uyghurs “religious freedom, and by extension freedom of association, assembly, and

⁵⁹ Bovingdon, "Autonomy in Xinjiang", page 8.

⁶⁰ Joshua Philipp, “China Security: How China is using the Paris Attacks to Promote the Persecution of Uyghurs”, Uyghur Human Rights Project, published 25 November 2015, accessed November 28, 2015, <http://uhrp.org/news/china-security-how-china-using-paris-attacks-promote-persecution-uyghurs>.

⁶¹ Human Rights Watch, “China: Religious Repression of Uighur Muslims” 12 April 2005, accessed November 28, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/04/12/china-religious-repression-uighur-muslims>.

expression.”⁶² Another, more recent report from Human Rights Watch upholds the assertion that “the government maintains a pervasive system of ethnic discrimination against Uighurs and other ethnic minorities...and sharply curbs religious and cultural expression.”⁶³ While Human Rights Watch maintains that the religion is the source of the discontent, others argue that when the Chinese government goes after the religion, it is being used as a tool to curb the activities, religious or otherwise, of a population that China is looking to silence. Interestingly, neither of these reports makes mention of the Hui.

According to the 2000 Chinese census report, there are roughly 20.3 million Muslims in China. The two largest groups are the Uyghurs, which constitute 8,399,393 people, and the Hui, which is the largest at 9,816,805.⁶⁴ As established, the largely separatist Uyghur can be found predominantly in Xinjiang. The Hui can be found throughout China, but predominantly in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. Usually referred to simply as Ningxia, it is located in the north-central part of China. The Hui have more in common with the Han Chinese than either the Uyghur, or other Muslim groups “in terms of demographic proximity and cultural assimilation.”⁶⁵

⁶² Human Rights Watch, “China: Religious Repression of Uighur Muslims”.

⁶³ Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2013: China”, accessed November 27, 2015, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/china-and-tibet?page=3>.

⁶⁴ Dru C. Gladney, “Islam in China: Beijing’s Hui and Uighur Challenge”, *Global Dialogue*, volume 9, Number 12, 2007, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=403>.

⁶⁵ Gladney, “Islam in China: Beijing’s Hui and Uighur Challenge”.

While their religion is the same, it is only the Uyghur that have formed a separatist movement, and it is only the Uyghur that are feeling the wrath of the Chinese government. The Uyghur and the Hui have different experiences when it comes to their treatment by the Chinese government. For example, Yining, which is one of the larger cities in northwest Xinjiang, was the first in that region to prohibit wearing veils which cover the face in public.⁶⁶ The Hui experience no such restriction.

The Hui are an ethnic minority that is in large part defined by their Islamic religion but does not attract the same amount of ire from the government as does the Uyghur. According to Brent Crane, the explanations for this are multifaceted. First, territoriality is a reason for the disparate treatment of the Hui and the Uyghur. While the Hui are not arguing for a separate state, the Uyghur declared independence from China twice in the twentieth century, and many continue to refer to Xinjiang as East Turkestan.⁶⁷ This is perhaps the most important reason, as the Hui are not looking to separate from China. It should also be noted that the Hui, in general, do not support the separatist movement of the Uyghurs, or an independent Xinjiang, and neither do China's other Muslim minorities.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ *The Economist*, "Remote Control: The Government in Xinjiang is trying to limit Muslim births", 7 November 2015, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21678007-government-xinjiang-trying-limit-muslim-births-remote-control>.

⁶⁷ Brent Crane, "A Tale of Two Muslim Minorities", *The Diplomat*, published 22 August 2014, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/a-tale-of-two-chinese-muslim-minorities/>.

⁶⁸ Gladney, "Islam in China: Beijing's Hui and Uighur Challenge".

The second reason for the unequal treatment, according to Crane, is cultural, and includes their language and their race. Unlike the Hui, the Uyghurs “have a strong attachment to their cultural practices and are deeply prideful of their culture’s long history” with “little desire to assimilate into Han society.” The Hui, on the other hand, have converged Islam with traditional Chinese culture. Hui mosques, argues Crane, are “a harmonious blend of traditional Chinese dynastic architecture with Islamic motifs” and “are the perfect manifestation of the Hui’s fluid assimilation.”⁶⁹

In addition, the physical characteristics of the Uyghur force them to stand apart from the Han and the Hui. While the Hui “mingle freely” as they speak Mandarin, and look like the Han, the Uyghur’s physical characteristics are quite different. Appearing more like “Turkic minority groups”, Crane argues that when a crime is committed by any Turkic minority, including “Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks or Tatars, Han will likely describe the wrongdoers to authorities as Uyghurs; suddenly nearly every non-Han crime taking place in China is committed by Uyghurs.” Because of this animosity toward the Uyghur, the Chinese state-run media portrays all acts of violence or crime committed by the Uyghur as an Act of Terrorism.⁷⁰

Bill Savadove agrees that the hostility toward the Uyghur is political in nature, not because of their religion, when he states that the “Muslim sect in Ningxia accepts Beijing’s authority and is allowed to build a virtual religious state.”⁷¹ This article tells the

⁶⁹ Crane, “A Tale of Two Muslim Minorities”.

⁷⁰ Crane, “A Tale of Two Muslim Minorities”.

⁷¹ Bill Savadove, “Faith Flourishes in an Arid Wasteland” *South China Morning Post*, 17 August 2005, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/article/512501/faith-flourishes-arid-wasteland>.

story of Hong Yan, an Islamic Hui leader in the Ningxia region, who “has created a virtual religious state by building mosques, schools and libraries throughout the region.” In return for state-sanctioned approval and the ability to practice his religion that comes with it, he “toes the government line” and “praises state policies.” Different from the Uyghurs, this group “preaches co-operation with the government” and “has sought compromise with the government.”⁷² Where the Hui are working with the Chinese government, the Uyghur are looking to break from the Chinese government. As a result, the Hui are permitted to practice their religion, the Uyghur are not. It is therefore difficult to argue that it is strictly a religious issue.

Are the Difficulties Based in Cultural Issues?

The Uyghur are culturally very different from other ethnic groups in China, and it can therefore be argued that it is the cultural differences that have been triggering the revolutionary movement, as well as the reaction from the Chinese government. While China has more than 50 ethnicities, the largest and dominant are the Han, which constitute more than ninety percent of the Chinese population.⁷³ The Uyghur are Turkic. With the creation of the Soviet Union in the early part of the twentieth century, and the subsequent emphasis on regional nationality, the Soviets influenced Chinese policy with a creation of a divide-and-rule strategy. The result of that was Chinese acceptance and

⁷² Savadove, “Faith Flourishes in an Arid Wasteland”.

⁷³ Frank Dikotter, “Nationalist Myth-Making: The Construction of the Chinese Race” *Human Rights in China*, posted 27 April 2001, accessed November 20, 2015, <http://www.hrichina.org/en/content/4573>.

recognition of different ethnic groups in different regions, including the Uyghur. This led to the “widespread acceptance today of the idea of a continuity with the ancient Uighur kingdom and that they constitute a *bona fide* nationality.”⁷⁴ This acceptance of their group as a nationality, in spite of concealing the vast differences among the Uyghur themselves, has given rise to the notion among the Uyghur that because they constitute their own nationality, they should rule their own nation.⁷⁵ Thus, the creation of a separatist movement.

Sporadic violent insurgences occur among the Uyghur, directed toward the Chinese government, and the majority Han. These insurgences are met with violence by the Chinese government, and according to Gardner Bovingdon, the violence, met with violence, produces more violence.⁷⁶ Some of the violent episodes in the past year include the deaths of seven Uyghurs after they were accused of hacking at least three people in March 2015; the deaths of four Uyghurs as they tried to knife and kill Han outside a casino in March 2015; the deaths of six people as a result of two consecutive suicide bombs at a checkpoint in Hotan in May 2015; the deaths of eighteen people after a knife and bomb attack by Uyghurs after strict limits were placed on them concerning their observance of Ramadan in June 2015; and the deaths of eight Uyghurs after someone claimed to see suspicious strangers by a river.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Gladney, “Islam in China: Beijing’s Hui and Uighur Challenge”.

⁷⁵ Gladney, “Islam in China: Beijing’s Hui and Uighur Challenge”.

⁷⁶ Bovingdon, “Autonomy in Xinjiang”, page 9.

⁷⁷ Radio Free Asia, “Xinjiang Unrest Timeline”, accessed November 29, 2015, <http://www.rfa.org/english/multimedia/timeline/UyghurUnrest.html>.

However, Gardner Bovingdon asserts that as the Uyghurs might sometimes use violence to make their voices heard, the biggest threat to China does not come from the violence, but rather the “quiet resistance of ordinary Uyghurs all over the province”.⁷⁸ The Uyghur are culturally very different from the rest of China, especially the majority Han. The fact that the Uyghur defiantly maintain cultural differences, represented by their religion, their language, their literature and poetry, as well as their lifestyles, is evidence that the Chinese government has not been successful in winning over the Uyghur. China has been unable to create a homogenous culture, and the Uyghur have been intentional participants in this cultural resistance. According to Bovingdon, “this resistance exposes the gap between the state’s vision of Uyghurs as PRC citizens and the Uyghurs’ understanding of themselves as first and foremost Uyghur.”⁷⁹ Because actual secession, in all likelihood, is impossible to attain, and because violence is not the legitimate and useful method of obtaining political goals, cultural differences are all the Uyghur have, and so that is what they use. According to Bovingdon, “Uyghurs challenge their political representation through defiant cultural representation.”⁸⁰ Further, he states that “Where collective action is too risky and open expression of criticism or dissent is not allowed, grumbling, songs, jokes, satire, and political fantasy do not just substitute for politics – they are politics. Through these various modes of self-expression and resistance, Uyghurs claim a different reality.”⁸¹

⁷⁸ Bovingdon, "The not-so-silent majority", page 42.

⁷⁹ Bovingdon, "The not-so-silent majority", page 44.

⁸⁰ Bovingdon, "The not-so-silent majority", page 46.

⁸¹ Bovingdon, "The not-so-silent majority", page 47.

The Uyghurs have created their own distinct culture in order to prove that they are not Chinese, and this has apparently been effective, as the Han view themselves as different from the Uyghur. Bovingdon's research indicates that the Han, as a group, tend to believe the official stories put forth by the Chinese government, which means they believe the Uyghurs are receiving preferential treatment, and that the Uyghurs do not have a claim to Xinjiang or secession from China.⁸² However, this lack of cultural assimilation is something the Chinese government is fighting. Hoten, in the northwestern region of Xinjiang, has recently instituted a ban on twenty two Muslim names, "in an apparent bid to discourage extremism among the region's Uyghur residents" and threatened to prevent students with Muslim names "from attending school unless their parents change them."⁸³

There are vast cultural differences between the Han and the Uyghur, with religion certainly being one of them. And while the Uyghur have cultural differences among themselves, including but not limited to issues of class, language, politics, and location, these differences do not seem to be insurmountable to the Uyghur themselves. The overarching Uyghur culture, the one defined by their place as a minority ethnicity, appears to be able to counteract the differences between them.

⁸² Bovingdon, "The not-so-silent majority", pages 44 and 45.

⁸³ Radio Free Asia, "Chinese Authorities Ban Muslim Names Among Uyghurs in Hoten" 24 September 2015, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/chinese-authorities-ban-muslim-names-among-uyghurs-in-hotan-09242015120656.html>.

Are the Difficulties Based in Economic Issues?

The Chinese government has an economic stake in the retention of Xinjiang for various reasons. The northwestern part of Xinjiang contains a vast amount of oil, coal, and gas, and is also a transport center to ship the resources not only to other parts of China, but also to other nations looking to purchase the resources. As such, China has built several pipelines to move the resources not only throughout China, but to bordering nations as well. In addition, Xinjiang distributes any resources China imports from Central Asia through the rest of the country.⁸⁴ China's increasing industrialization, as well as its role on the world stage, means that these resources are integral not only to China's economy, but to its international political power as well. The Chinese government has an economic stake in maintaining control over Xinjiang and quelling the secessionist movement and related uprisings. However, the increased attention given to Xinjiang has had a detrimental effect on the native Uyghur, giving impetus to the secessionist movement there.

It is estimated that when it comes to oil reserves, Xinjiang itself contains approximately twenty one billion tons, which is roughly one fifth of the nation's total, and new large deposits are being discovered. Additionally, Xinjiang contains China's largest natural gas and coal reserves, with the coal reserves totaling approximately forty percent of China's total. The result is increased interest and investment in the area.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Edward Wong, "China Invests in Region Rich in Oil, Coal and also Strife", *The New York Times*, 20 December 2014, accessed November 27, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/china-invests-in-xinjiang-region-rich-in-oil-coal-and-also-strife.html? r=0>.

⁸⁵ Wong, "China Invests in Region Rich in Oil, Coal and also Strife".

This also means that China has a major economic stake not only in making certain that Xinjiang remains part of China, but also in suppressing any rebellious activity there.

In spite of the production of natural resources, and the increased capital being made by the Chinese government, the indigenous Uyghur are worse for it. As a result of this boom in natural resources, there have been consequences to both the land and the Uyghurs. The increased water usage has led to drought conditions, and the processes by which the resources are produced has resulted in the production of heavy smog conditions. In addition, the Uyghurs have not benefitted economically either. Immigrant Han are given most of the jobs, resulting in ethnic strife between the immigrant Han and the native Uyghur, many of whom claim that “they resent Han rule and the reaping of their homeland’s resources.”⁸⁶

While the Chinese government may contend that they are attempting to suppress the influence of outside forces on an otherwise peaceful people, and that the Uyghurs are treated equally as all others in China, the evidence seems to counteract that assertion. The one-child policy has never been prescribed equally for all in China, and now that the requirements have been relaxed, they are disbursed unequally again, with the Uyghur being treated differently than others.

The one-child policy that was imposed in 1983 was largely focused on the Han Chinese, which is the dominant ethnic group throughout China. Ethnic minorities, especially those in the rural areas, were permitted to have sometimes up to three or four children. While the Chinese government have begun to relax the rules concerning family-

⁸⁶ Wong, “China Invests in Region Rich in Oil, Coal and also Strife”.

planning in much of the country, the regulations are being tightened in Xinjiang. Since 2012, the Han living in the southern part of Xinjiang, where the separatist movement is the strongest, have had permission to have two children. At the same time, the Chinese government is attempting to restrict Uyghur births. The government has doubled payments to 6,000 yuan (\$950) to Uyghur couples with fewer children than their government would normally allow. In addition, both parents receive an annual payment of 1,800 yuan for life. The Chinese government has created an economic incentive for the Uyghur to have fewer children.⁸⁷

This was done, according Xinjiang's communist party chief, in order to combat terrorism. If the government can lower birth rates among the Uyghur, then eventually the Uyghur will be outnumbered, thus ending, or at least minimizing, the separatist movement. Thus far, it is somewhat successful in that among the Uyghur in Yining, one of the larger cities in northwest Xinjiang, birth rates have been declining over the course of the last three years that the policy has been in place. The government sees this as its attempt to "battle against 'extremism'."⁸⁸

The Han living in Xinjiang are growing concerned that they are becoming outnumbered by the Uyghur, and the "rising separatist militancy".⁸⁹ As a result, the Chinese government is attempting to ensure that the Uyghur are, and will continue to remain, a minority group in Xinjiang by both attempting to decrease the birthrate of the Uyghur, as well as encouraging more Han to settle in the region. The Chinese

⁸⁷ *The Economist*, "Remote Control".

⁸⁸ *The Economist*, "Remote Control".

⁸⁹ *The Economist*, "Remote Control".

government has reduced restrictions on residency requirements in hopes of bringing in new Han immigrants. Han have been encouraged to move into Xinjiang for the last few decades, and that encouragement has shown results. Since the 1940s, the Han population has gone from approximately two hundred thousand, to roughly six and a half million, which indicates a growth from five percent of the population, to thirty eight percent of the population.⁹⁰

There are many economic issues at stake in Xinjiang. The discovery and excavation of so many natural resources, as well as the distribution of resources and goods into and out of China, have made Xinjiang an especially important region for the Chinese government. At the same time, the Uyghur have not benefitted economically from the developments. They have been witness to the destruction and pollution of their land, and the Chinese government has instituted restrictive family planning policies to ensure that the Uyghur population is reduced in size, while encouraging Han to move to the region. There are many economic incentives for the dissatisfaction of both the Uyghur and the Chinese government.

There are many complicated and varied issues affecting Xinjiang, and the people living there, especially the Uyghur. The violence being imposed on the Uyghur by the Chinese government, and the violence being imposed by the Uyghur on the people of China as well as the government, has led to many problems. Branded terrorists by both the Chinese government as well as by the United States government, the separatist movement has gained international notoriety since the September 11 attacks. The Uyghur claim that the Chinese government has used the September 11 attacks to brand them

⁹⁰ Bovingdon, "The not-so-silent majority", page 45.

terrorists, and therefore to exact harsher punishments and more restrictions against their behavior. The Chinese government claim that the separatist movements, and the Uyghur have used the September 11 attacks to become more violent and revolutionary.

In December 2003, the Chinese government named four groups as terrorist organizations within China. They are the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement, the Eastern Turkestan Liberation Organization, the World Youth Uyghur Congress, and the Eastern Turkestan Information Center,⁹¹ all centered in Xinjiang, and all Islamic Uyghur. In addition, the Chinese government used the recent November 13 attacks in Paris to bring attention to what they deem to be their own domestic terrorists. They “called on the world to support its own brand of ‘counterterrorism’” in fighting the terrorist forces in Xinjiang.⁹² In turn, however, the Uyghur have suffered at the hands of the Chinese. Discriminatory practices by the Chinese government have resulted in limits on their behavior, restrictions in their movement and religious practices, as well as impoverishment. The fight is on both sides.

There are many underlying causes to the problems in Xinjiang and the Uyghur people. At first glance, it appears that the primary, fundamental problem is the difference in religion, and it is easy to say that the Uyghurs are persecuted simply for their religious beliefs and practices. However, the Hui, which are the largest Muslim group, encounter no such hostility from the Chinese government. Blending in virtually seamlessly, they acquiesce to the larger Chinese culture, and appear no different from the majority Han. They have blended Islam with traditional Chinese culture, and are certainly not

⁹¹ Gladney, “Islam in China: Beijing’s Hui and Uighur Challenge”.

⁹² Philipp, “China Security”.

advocating secession, ensuring that they are not a threat to the government, or the culture. In turn, the Chinese government permits them to practice without persecution or discrimination. Culturally, there are many differences between the Uyghur and the Han, and the Uyghur have made no attempt at assimilation. Taking pride in their religious, linguistic, cultural, and physical differences, they flaunt the notion that sub-cultures that refuse to assimilate into the broader culture are a threat to the powers that be. Economically, the Uyghur have seen their land taken over, and the Chinese government is essentially trying to weed them out with a discriminatory family planning policy.

While it by no means can be claimed that secession is the predominant preference of the Uyghur people, this vocal minority is certainly making its voice heard. However, the people of Xinjiang, Uyghur or not, are becoming increasingly disgruntled at their treatment by the Chinese government. The restrictions on religious freedom, the environmental destruction, and the prejudicial and discriminatory branding of all Uyghur Muslims as terrorists, has angered and concerned many people who are not advocating separatism.⁹³ Clearly, the actions taken by the Chinese government have proven counter-productive, assuming their goal is peace and security in the region, as their policies are ensuring them more adversaries instead.

There is clearly no single cause of the problems in Xinjiang, but it is the culmination of issues that are hundreds of years in the making. Problems so old, however, are being exacerbated by an increase in violence and discrimination on both sides. The differences in religion, culture, and ethnicity are difficult to overcome in a nation where cultural assimilation is mandatory.

⁹³ Gladney, "Islam in China: Beijing's Hui and Uighur Challenge".

CHAPTER 4: HYDROPOLITICS IN KASHMIR

Kashmir is a region of the Indian subcontinent that lies to the north of India and the northeast of Pakistan, bordering both nations. Both India and Pakistan have been fighting over this region for many decades. Considered one of the more volatile regions in the world, and exacerbated by the fact that both India and Pakistan are nuclear states, many of the difficulties between these two nations originate in a fight for the water that comes from the Indus River, on which both states rely for their existence. The issues stem from Britain's partition of India in the middle of the 20th century, and they continue to persist to this day.

Britain took control of the Indian subcontinent in the middle of the 19th century and lost it in the middle of the 20th century. When Britain partitioned its holdings on the Indian sub-continent into India and Pakistan in 1947, it was intended to divide the region into Hindu and Muslim states, with the stated purpose of maintaining peace by giving each religion its own home. However, India and Pakistan have been in conflict with each other since the partition. They have fought several wars and continue to have fights and skirmishes along the border in the Kashmir region. The historical roots of this conflict began when the British government intentionally and deliberately alienated both groups from each other after the 1857 War of Independence. However, the issue was made more

difficult because the partition itself was rather vague when it came to the control of Kashmir. As with so many conflicts around the globe, the fight over Kashmir comes down to a fight over resources, and in this case, that resource is the water that flows from the Indus River and its tributaries. No nation can survive without access to clean, adequate sources of water. It affects everything from a nation's economy, its ability to feed itself, and its citizens' health. A multitude of problems arise when there is a scarcity of water.

Pakistan became its own state on 14 August 1947, as a result of the conflict between Muslims and Hindus on the sub-continent of India.⁹⁴ While Islam traces its origins to the 7th century, and started to foment and grow into the region that is now Pakistan in the 8th century and beyond, by the 18th century, Sharia law had come to dominate the region, and Islamic culture and tradition were well established.⁹⁵ This is in large part due to the influence and power of the Mughal Empire, which controlled the land which is now India and Pakistan, and actively sought to consolidate Islam within its borders during the 16th and 17th centuries. However, by the 19th century, Britain was increasing and expanding its control in the region. It was in 1837, when the British government made Urdu the official language in the Muslim dominated regions of northern India, that Muslim nationalism started to gain more of a foothold there. Urdu, a combination of six different languages from the region, including Persian and Hindi, had

⁹⁴ Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and National Heritage, "History in Chronological Order," accessed March 20, 2015, <http://infopak.gov.pk/History.aspx>.

⁹⁵ Government of Pakistan, "History in Chronological Order".

become the preferred language of administration, where it previously had only been used among the urban elite. The new, ennobled position given to Urdu made this language a status symbol, and seemingly elevated those who used it. Now that it was the official language, it started to be used in the courts, among the elite, and it became the vernacular among the Islamic population, creating a sense of nationalism among the Muslims.⁹⁶

It was, however, the 1857 War of Independence that cemented the division between the Muslims and the Hindus in the region, as the beginning of Indian Nationalism and the growth of Muslim separatism began with the War of Independence.⁹⁷ During the war, Muslims and Hindus worked together against the British. However, after the war, the British blamed the war on the Muslims, and deliberately began not only a tyrannical rule over the Muslims,⁹⁸ but also intentionally tried to pit the Muslims against the Hindus, thus hoping to prevent any collusion against the British in the future. British rulers came up with a two-nation theory, and proposed to the people of the region that they cannot peacefully live together because of their different religions. Muslims and Hindus, suggested the British, are far too different to be able to work together.

There is much evidence to support this assertion. In a letter from British Secretary of State Sir Charles Wood to Lord Elgin, the Governor General of Canada from 1847 to

⁹⁶ R. Upadhyay, "Urdu Controversy – Is Dividing the Nation Further," South Asia Analysis Group, last modified January 5, 2003, accessed March 29, 2015, <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper675>.

⁹⁷ R.A. Geaves, "India 1857: A Mutiny or a War of Independence? The Muslim Perspective," *Islamic Studies* 35, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 25.

⁹⁸ Government of Pakistan, "History in Chronological Order".

1854, and Governor General of India from 1862 to 1863, Elgin states “We have maintained our power in India by playing off one part against the other and we must continue to do so. Do all you can, therefore to prevent all having a common feeling.”⁹⁹ In addition, in a letter dated 26 March 1886 from George Francis Hamilton, Secretary of State of India, to Lord George Curzon, Viceroy of India, Hamilton states:

I think the real danger to our rule in India not now, but say 50 years hence is the gradual adoption and extension of Western ideas of agitation organisation [*sic*] and if we could break educated Indians into two sections holding widely different views, we should, by such a division, strengthen our position against the subtle and continuous attack which the spread of education must make upon our system of government. We should so plan educational text-books that the differences between community and community are further strengthened.¹⁰⁰

The British government planned to foment hostility and bitterness between the Muslims and the Hindus who once worked together, and they were successful.

This premeditated and deliberately instigated animosity continued to grow through the 19th century and into the 20th century. When various nationalist movements were growing around the world in the 1920s and 1930s, the sub-continent would not be immune. Several decades of intentionally fostered hostility, coupled with an increasing sense of nationalism, resulted in the movement for the creation of a separate Muslim state. The preeminent spokesperson for this separation was the philosopher, writer, and politician, Allam Muhammad Iqbal. He claimed that “for the healthy development of Islam in South-Asia, it was essential to have a separate Muslim state.”¹⁰¹ This movement

⁹⁹ B.N. Pande, “History in the Service of Imperialism,” accessed March 29, 2015, <http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic/pande.htm>.

¹⁰⁰ Pande, “History in the Service of Imperialism”.

¹⁰¹ Government of Pakistan, “History in Chronological Order”.

would gain momentum over the course of the next ten years, so that in 1940, the All-India Muslim League, an Indian political party devoted to the creation of a Muslim state, demanded an independent homeland for Muslims living in the Muslim dominated, northern regions of India. This Pakistan Resolution, as it would come to be known, became popular among the Muslims living in the region immediately, and the movement continued to grow during World War II.¹⁰² Those who supported the creation of Pakistan, cut away from the northern part of India, and became the vocal majority over those who opposed it.

Following World War II, the movement to separate Pakistan and thus to create a Muslim homeland continued to gain support. With the aid of Britain, an interim government was formed in October 1946, under the direction of the Muslim League.¹⁰³ Because Britain was about to lose control over all of India, it was in Britain's best interest to assist with the division of the state, which it did. India gained its independence in 1947. As a result of the British subjugation of India, and the intentional and calculated effort at causing a conflict between the Muslims and the Hindus in the region, Pakistan was created on 14 August 1947. It was geographically divided into West Pakistan, which bordered India on the northwest, and East Pakistan, which bordered India on the northeast. The Eastern and Western halves were divided not only by India, but by political and economic differences which made political agreement difficult. The Muslim League, therefore, was unprepared to establish and create a workable governing system.

¹⁰² Government of Pakistan, "History in Chronological Order".

¹⁰³ Government of Pakistan, "History in Chronological Order".

They argued over political power, and who should have it. As a result, the first constitution was not drafted until 1954, and it would be two additional years before it was adopted.¹⁰⁴ Even though it now had a constitution, Pakistan would continue to experience political upheavals over the next few decades in the form of military coups, as well as a civil war in 1971, which would result in the secession of Eastern Pakistan, and the creation of Bangladesh from this region.

The partition itself caused a multitude of problems in both India and Pakistan. While the goal behind the division was to create separate Muslim and Hindu states, nearly half of the Muslims remained in India, while many Hindus remained in what would become Pakistan.¹⁰⁵ The partition also resulted in many riots and fights, most of them taking place in Punjab, which was now physically divided. These riots caused the deaths of nearly one million people. In addition, the partition resulted in the “largest mass migration in human history of some 10 million.”¹⁰⁶ Muslims along the border had to head west to the freshly created Pakistan, and as the new residents, they had to compete with established residents for land, resources, and jobs. This caused additional conflict.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Sumit Ganguly, "Pakistan's never-ending story: Why the October coup was no surprise," *Foreign Affairs* (March 2000): 3.

¹⁰⁵ Robert L. Hardgrave, "India: The dilemmas of diversity." *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4 (1993): 54.

¹⁰⁶ Crispin Bates, "The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies," last modified March 3, 2011, accessed April 1, 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/partition1947_01.shtml.

¹⁰⁷ Bates, "The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies".

To further complicate matters, the boundary between India and Pakistan was drawn up and announced on 17 August 1947, two days after India's independence, and three days after Pakistan's independence. Furthermore, the border itself was fashioned by British lawyer Cyril Radcliffe, who was inexperienced in Indian affairs, and utilized outdated maps and census information. As a result of the haphazard method of partitioning, the Kashmir region was left in an ambiguous position. It was not fully given to either state, but it was claimed by both. This is the region that India and Pakistan have been fighting over ever since. The conflict over Kashmir began almost immediately after the partition.¹⁰⁸

Only months after the division in 1947, India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir, which is something they would do several times again over the course of the next few decades. Kashmir is a region which borders both India and Pakistan to their north, and China to its south. While it was believed that the partition would result in the Muslim population of Kashmir being controlled by Pakistan, and the Hindu population being controlled by India, the end result was conflict over the entire region, as both India and Pakistan claimed jurisdiction. The Kashmiri people, however, have historically viewed things quite differently. As a population consisting of Muslims, Hindus, as well as Buddhists, traditionally, they have lived peacefully with each other. And since the decades long fight over the region, there have been a small but growing minority of

¹⁰⁸ Bates, "The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies".

Kashmiris that have been advocating autonomy, and freedom from India as well as Pakistan.¹⁰⁹

The separatist movement among Muslims in the Indian-administered part of Kashmir largely began in the 1980s, spurred on by the massive demonstration held by orthodox Muslim students in Kashmir in June of 1976. This was followed in the 1980s by bomb and arson attacks by Muslim separatist organizations against the Indian government, who responded with increased military action, which led to increased protests and violence against Indian rule. India responded in July 1990 by suspending the Kashmiri state assembly and imposing “direct federal rule over Kashmir”.¹¹⁰ The next decades saw increasing clashes between Kashmiri Muslim separatists and the Indian military. According to the US State Department, Pakistan showed support for the Islamic separatists.¹¹¹

For India and Pakistan, however, it is not about what the people of Kashmir want. There are many reasons why these two states fight over this region, including nationalism and religion, but one of the main causes of the fighting is over one of the most important of resources, water. The Indus River begins in the Tibetan Plateau, which sits on the far northeast border of India, but the basin is split between India and Pakistan. It then runs through the length of Pakistan and empties into the Arabian Sea. India and Pakistan, being the two major beneficiaries of this waterway, have both created dams along the

¹⁰⁹ Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, "India and the Crisis in Kashmir." *Asian Survey* (1994): 402.

¹¹⁰ Minorities at Risk Project, “Chronology for Kashmiris in India”, accessed October 12, 2020, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38961e.html>.

¹¹¹ Minorities at Risk Project, “Chronology for Kashmiris in India”.

river's pathway to use for irrigation as well as hydro-electricity. Of the five main tributaries, the largest begins in Kashmir. Therefore, if the line of control that they are fighting over becomes a permanent border, India would control the upper part of the Indus River, and Pakistan would control the lower part as well as all of its tributaries.¹¹²

This would be detrimental for Pakistan to lose control of the upper part. Pakistan relies on the Indus River, as it is the sole river system supplying this state "where more than 92 percent of the land is arid or semi-arid."¹¹³ If India retained control of the upper part of the river, they could cut the supply whenever they wanted or needed to, paralyzing Pakistan. To make matters worse for Pakistan, "90% of the subcontinent's industry, and taxable income base remained in India, including the largest cities of Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta. The economy of Pakistan was chiefly agricultural and controlled by feudal elites."¹¹⁴ For India, control of the Indus River is essential as well. The Indus, in the northwest of the country, is only one of two river systems which support this region, which includes Punjab. Punjab, known as the 'bread basket' of India, "produces more than 20 percent of India's wheat."¹¹⁵ The Indus River is extremely important to both states, and the loss of Kashmir, and control of the Indus River, would be detrimental to both.

¹¹² Ayesha Siddiqi, "Kashmir and the Politics of Water," accessed March 30, 2015, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgottenconflict/2011/07/20117812154478992.html>

¹¹³ Siddiqi, "Kashmir and the Politics of Water,"

¹¹⁴ Bates, "The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies".

¹¹⁵ Siddiqi, "Kashmir and the Politics of Water".

When the partition was made official in 1947, the British government understood the importance of the Indus River to both states, but when the British had control of the entire region, they established an irrigation system in Punjab, the region in India where the Indus flows. In 1947, it was agreed that both India and Pakistan would share the system until 1948, putting off making the final decision in the region for a year. The first day that they were no longer legally obligated to share the system, on 1 April 1948, India cut off the flow of water to Pakistan. While India could never completely stop the flow of the Indus, it reduced the amount of water that flowed into Pakistan. This was enough to cause major problems for Pakistan's crops, and it also highlighted the problems the partition was to bring. Pakistan, therefore, cannot give up rights to Kashmir, because if they did, India would be able to virtually destroy Pakistan. India clearly is in the more advantageous situation, and Pakistani political leaders know this. For this reason, they have not given up their claims to the region. They know they would always have to rely on the magnanimity of India for their water, and thus their survival.¹¹⁶

It should be noted that India has always categorically denied that it has ever interfered with Pakistan's water supply. India maintains that any cutting off of the water supply was either accidental, short term, or both, and there is no way to either prove or disprove Pakistan's allegations.¹¹⁷ What is known, however, is that whether or not India has ever actually tampered with the water supply, they have the strategic advantage. They therefore can, if they choose, tamper with, and manipulate the water supply flowing into

¹¹⁶ Siddiqi, "Kashmir and the Politics of Water".

¹¹⁷ Siddiqi, "Kashmir and the Politics of Water".

Pakistan. This is a dangerous enough situation for Pakistan. With partition, India now controls their water supply.¹¹⁸

Since control of the water supply had been a difficult problem in the region for a very long time, negotiations were started in order to attempt to alleviate the crisis. In September 1960, the Indus Water Treaty was signed by both India and Pakistan. Following more than eight years of negotiations through the World Bank,¹¹⁹ the treaty was intended to ease the tensions in the region. Initially, India wanted control over all of the eastern tributaries, as well as part of the western tributaries. Pakistan wanted all of the western tributaries, as well as part of the eastern tributaries. Part of the problem involved the system of canals and engineering structures which were intended to regulate the flow of water from the Indus. These were built by the British when they controlled the entire region, and now that two separate states wanted to divide the water, they needed to restructure the canals and engineering structures so that both states would have an ample supply of water, unimpeded by the other. Because of the impasse between India and Pakistan, it took several years for the World Bank's solution to be accepted. In 1954, the World Bank proposed a complete separation of the tributaries, with Pakistan being given all of the western tributaries, and India being given all of the eastern tributaries except for a small portion of one river, which would be given to Pakistan. The proposal allowed for

¹¹⁸ Neda A. Zawahri, "India, Pakistan and cooperation along the Indus River system." *Water Policy* 11, no. 1 (2009): page 4.

¹¹⁹ Zawahri, "India, Pakistan and cooperation along the Indus River system."

a period of transition, so that the canals and dams could be adjusted according to the plan.¹²⁰

India accepted the proposal, but Pakistan was hesitant, as they believed that the plan would not provide them with a sufficient supply of water. In an attempt to appease Pakistan and come to an agreement, an additional proposal was made which called for increased storage facilities and greater canals along the western rivers. While India agreed to the concessions, a new controversy arose over who would pay for these new amenities, and exactly where they would be placed. The new projects would cost approximately \$1.12 billion, and neither state was willing or able to pay this, especially because both saw themselves as being the rightful heir to the Indus River in the first place. To settle the dispute, the World Bank suggested that the cost be divided. India would pay \$174 million, Pakistan would pay \$46 million, and the remaining \$900 million would be raised in the international community through a consortium of donors. Both sides agreed to the new terms and were put on a payment plan so that construction would begin. On 19 September 1960, the Indus Water Treaty was signed in Karachi, Pakistan.¹²¹

With the Indus River system divided, the crisis was temporarily alleviated. However, over the course of the next few decades, both India and Pakistan saw population increases, which accentuated and revived the old problem.¹²² While the treaty

¹²⁰ Aaron T. Wolf and Joshua T. Newton. "Case study of transboundary dispute resolution: The Indus water treaty," accessed April 17, 2015, www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Documents/indus . Ddf.

¹²¹ Wolf and Newton. "Case study of transboundary dispute resolution: The Indus water treaty". The authors do not state why it was that India was asked to shoulder a larger share of the financial burden.

¹²² Siddiqi, "Kashmir and the Politics of Water".

allows for cooperation in the building of industrial works affecting the river that both sides agree to, it also permits India to construct anything it needs in its area, in terms of hydrological features such as dams or methods of irrigation. The run-off would be Pakistan's problem. Additionally, anything India does to the water flow can change the quality and condition of the water, as well as the amount of water that flows into Pakistan. And the quality of water has certainly been affected. Polluted water has made its way into Pakistan's aquifers, corrupting their fresh water supply. Because all of Pakistan's water comes from the Indus and its tributaries, and because they are dependent on the water flowing down from India, farmers in Pakistan have used this polluted water to irrigate their farms, resulting in increased disease and decreased soil fertility. Children in these regions have developed previously unexperienced health problems, and people living close to the drainage point show high levels of lead in their blood. While India modified the construction of its structures as necessary to reduce the pollution,¹²³ it again shows how dependent Pakistan is on India.

In addition, while the Indus Water Treaty has settled some issues, dispute over water continues to plague the region. This has become especially heated since the 1980s. Since then, Pakistan has challenged several Indian hydroelectric water projects. More recently it has taken umbrage with the Baghilar Hydropower Project (BHP), which began construction in 1999. India proposed to create a dam for power generation on the Chenab River in the disputed region of Kashmir. Pakistan argued that this project ran contrary to the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty. Pakistan asserted that this might inhibit the

¹²³ Zawahri, "India, Pakistan and cooperation along the Indus River system" page 6.

flow of water in the region, which could be especially detrimental during the low season, and insisted that India stop production immediately. Since it was the World Bank which brokered the original Indus Water Treaty, the World Bank was again called upon for a solution. They, in turn, assigned a neutral party to come to an unbiased resolution.¹²⁴ While it was determined that the project could continue, and has in fact since been completed, this matter points to the continuing problem that exists between India and Pakistan over control of the Kashmir region, and the water that stems from it.

The problems do not look to be ending any time soon. Due to climate change, water scarcity is fast becoming an issue in many areas around the world, including the Indian subcontinent. It is believed that climate change is causing the glaciers in the Himalayans, which feed the Indus River, to melt at an alarming rate. Over the last two decades, these glaciers have melted two times as quickly as they did in the two decades prior, and additionally, it is predicted that over the course of the next eighty years, “up to two-thirds of the Himalayan glaciers are projected to melt because of climate change.”¹²⁵ The glaciers play an important role in regulating the flow of the Indus River, as it freezes the snow in the winter and releases it as water in the summer. As a result, the Indus River depends on regular, seasonal melting to regulate its flow. In the short term, this means

¹²⁴ Rajesh Sinha, "Two Neighbours and a Treaty: Baglihar Project in Hot Waters," *Economic and Political Weekly* (2006): 606-607.

¹²⁵ Pien Huang, "I Spy, Via Spy Satellite: Melting Himalayan Glaciers," NPR, accessed October 10, 2020, <https://www.npr.org/2019/06/19/733739909/i-spy-via-spy-satellite-melting-himalayan-glaciers>.

there will be more flooding, but in the long term, as the glaciers disappear, there will be less water in the Indus River.¹²⁶

Couple the melting glaciers and resultant decrease in water with the increasing population of both India and Pakistan, and this problem will become much worse. It is predicted that by 2025, the population of India will be three times what it was when the Indus Water Treaty was signed in 1960, and the population of Pakistan will grow to be six times what it was. More people means there will be more crops requiring irrigation, more water necessary for industry, and larger cities that will need to be supplied.¹²⁷ This means that very soon, a dwindling water supply will need to be shared by millions more people in an already contentious region.

This will have not only enormous humanitarian consequences, but political and economic ones as well for both India and Pakistan. Pakistan's economy is driven partly by the sugar and wheat industries, but largely by the textile industry, which forms a large part of India's economy as well. It is estimated that almost India and Pakistan provide approximately "thirty percent of the world's cotton supply ... much of that from the Indus River Valley. On average, about 737 billion gallons are withdrawn from the Indus River annually to grow cotton – enough to provide Delhi residents with household water for more than two years."¹²⁸

¹²⁶ William Wheeler, "India and Pakistan at Odds Over Shrinking Indus River," National Geographic, accessed October 10, 2020, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/10/111012-india-pakistan-indus-river-water/#close>.

¹²⁷ Wheeler, "India and Pakistan at Odds Over Shrinking Indus River".

¹²⁸ Wheeler, "India and Pakistan at Odds Over Shrinking Indus River".

The dwindling water supply is already having an effect not only on the Pakistani farming industry but on their fishing industry as well. Fishermen are abandoning regions that at one point had sufficient water supplies, but now rivers have turned to streams, leaving them unable to make a living. Farmers and fishermen are leaving rural regions that once had adequate water and moving to the cities, where the water supply is still a problem.¹²⁹

The loss of water results in corruption as well. In Karachi, the largest city in Pakistan, water theft is common, and is a \$500 million annual industry. People take public water from the pipes and sell it from tankers throughout the city and the slums, where water is difficult to get. In other cities, the water crisis has resulted in food and energy shortages that have sparked riots and protests.¹³⁰

In India, the situation is just as dire. With a population of approximately 1.3 billion, about half of them are currently facing severe water shortages, and roughly “200,000 die every year from inadequate or unsafe water supplies”.¹³¹ This will continue to result in food shortages, sanitation problems and increased susceptibility to disease, as well as conflict over the supplies of water. Infrastructure is struggling, with hospitals and schools short of water. Hundreds of thousands of people “wait in line each day to fill

¹²⁹ Wheeler, “India and Pakistan at Odds Over Shrinking Indus River”.

¹³⁰ Wheeler, “India and Pakistan at Odds Over Shrinking Indus River”.

¹³¹ Jessie Yeung, Swati Gupta, and Michael Guy, “India Has Just Five Years to Solve its Water Crisis, Experts Fear. Otherwise Hundreds of Millions of Lives Will Be in Danger”, CNN, accessed October 11, 2020, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/27/india/india-water-crisis-intl-hnk/index.html>.

their pots at government water tankers ... People are forced to wash utensils in the same dirty water, saving a few bottles of clean water to cook food.”¹³²

Several sectors of the economy are suffering as a result. Chennai is one of the largest cities of southern India and is often referred to as the banking capital of India. With a growing population that has tripled in the last thirty years to approximately 10 million, it has one of the fastest growing economies in the world. However, water scarcity will likely slow that growth. Its recent rapid development has largely contributed to the problem of dwindling water supplies, not just because of the increase in population, but also because of way the city grew. To accommodate the physical growth of this city, the municipal government changed zoning regulations to allow builders to fill in water supplies such as ponds, canals, and flood plains, and then build on top of them. As a result, water that is normally supplied during the monsoon season is not absorbed by the land and therefore cannot refill groundwater supplies.¹³³

With its recent rapid development, coupled with its high population and high tourism rate, its water supply is being overtaxed. Consequently, the government has had to spend a lot of money to desalinate sea water, and to import water by using both trains and water trucks, which is not a long term solution. In a city that is the business center of southern India, this water shortage is disrupting the flow of business. Most industries in Chennai have been affected by the dwindling water supply, as it has “caused disruptions in production schedules, higher operation costs and a reluctance to invest in expansion

¹³² Yeung, Gupta, and Guy, “India Has Just Five Years to Solve its Water Crisis”.

¹³³ “Rapid growth of India’s Chennai threatened by water shortages”, CNBC, accessed October 11, 2020, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/06/rapid-growth-of-indias-chennai-threatened-by-water-shortages.html>.

because of the uncertainty about future water supplies.”¹³⁴ Additionally, many businesses have had to hire people whose sole job is to manage the importation of water tankers to their companies, and they pay upwards of 30% more for the water supplied this way.¹³⁵ Water scarcity is having a detrimental effect on the development and growth of Chennai and its economy, and as one of the largest cities in India, and as the financial center of southern India, it will have a detrimental effect on India as a whole.

The farming industry is suffering as well, as it uses a tremendous amount of water. These water problems have and will continue to have, detrimental effects on India’s economy. The World Bank predicts that unless India can manage its water supply, it will be unable to achieve its next level of economic growth because it will be unable to protect its farmers, as well as the agricultural sector as a whole.¹³⁶

Because water is often difficult to get in the quantities needed, many farmers in India have resorted to using untreated sewage wastewater to irrigate their crops. But while it can reduce costs to the farmers, it also puts them at risk of disease from exposure to harmful microorganisms found in the wastewater. The wastewater also contains heavy metals, which, when it builds up in the soil, “results in toxicity to plants and food contamination.”¹³⁷ As a result, scientists have discovered dangerous levels of toxic

¹³⁴ “Rapid growth of India’s Chennai threatened by water shortages”, CNBC.

¹³⁵ “Rapid growth of India’s Chennai threatened by water shortages”, CNBC.

¹³⁶ “Without Water Management, India’s 8% GDP growth is a distant dream: World Bank”, Financial Express, accessed October 11, 2020, <https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/world-water-day-2018-without-water-management-indian-economy-cant-growth-at-8-world-bank/1107717/>.

¹³⁷ Jennifer Moller-Gulland, J. Carl Ganter, and Cody T. Pope, “Toxic Water, Toxic Crops: India’s Public Health Time Bomb”, Circle of Blue, accessed October 11,

substances in the crops themselves, which can cause cancer, malnutrition, as well as genetic mutation, posing a threat to public health when the crops are consumed.¹³⁸

The toxic levels of microorganisms and heavy metals in their agricultural products is making it more difficult for India to trade those products internationally, as their agricultural exports are no longer deemed safe by many countries. While “the United States is India’s top export market”, India is listed by the United States as one of three countries that “most consistently violate America’s import safety limits. Food grown in India accounts for 60 percent of the items that United States Customs inspectors refuse to allow into U.S. markets.”¹³⁹ And the United States is not alone in restricting the importation of food grown in India. The United Arab Emirates has banned many Indian agricultural products unless they also contained official residue analysis reports. As nations around the world restrict Indian imports for not meeting international quality standards, Indian farmers are still left with little choice. They do not have the water supply to irrigate their farms without the use of wastewater, and they cannot afford to give up farming.¹⁴⁰

A few farmers have changed the crops that they grow in an attempt to decrease their water usage. Farming is a huge industry, and farmers use upwards of 90% of the available groundwater, with rice being not only one of India’s most important staple

2020, <https://www.circleofblue.org/2018/india/toxic-water-toxic-crops-indias-public-health-time-bomb/>.

¹³⁸ Moller-Gulland, Ganter, and Pope, “Toxic Water, Toxic Crops”.

¹³⁹ Moller-Gulland, Ganter, and Pope, “Toxic Water, Toxic Crops”.

¹⁴⁰ Moller-Gulland, Ganter, and Pope, “Toxic Water, Toxic Crops”.

crops, but also one that uses a tremendous amount of water. In India's rice growing district, "the water table has been declining by 0.7 meters every year".¹⁴¹ Crops such as wheat and sugar cane also use a lot of water, but many farmers are hesitant to switch crops. The government purchases rice at a set price, so they know they will always have a market, and they are guaranteed an income. While crops such as millet, legumes, and corn use up to 80% less water than rice, there is no guaranteed market for them, and therefore no incentive for the farmers to change. Additionally, since the government subsidizes the cost of water, power, and fertilizer, it can be difficult to convince the farmers to make the switch to a different crop especially where there is no guaranteed income.¹⁴²

As a result, the government has started to enact change, albeit slowly. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is facing the difficult problem of trying to convince farmers to switch to a crop that does not have a guaranteed income, such as corn or legumes. But farmers are the largest voting bloc in India. If he ends the policies of subsidized farming and guaranteed income for rice, Modi will lose a lot of support. Politically, forcing farmers to switch their crops is risky. At the beginning of 2020, the north Indian state of Haryana attempted to limit rice cultivation to half of its farming region. But the farmers argued that the government cannot prohibit them from growing something which gave them a guaranteed income.¹⁴³ In other places, attempts are being made as well. In

¹⁴¹ Bibhudatta Pradhan and Pratik Parija, "India's Water Crisis is Becoming a Problem for Modi", Bloomberg, accessed October 12, 2020, <https://www.bloombergquint.com/economy-finance/india-water-crisis-forces-farmers-to-rethink-their-crops>.

¹⁴² Pradhan and Parija, "India's Water Crisis is Becoming a Problem for Modi".

¹⁴³ Pradhan and Parija, "India's Water Crisis is Becoming a Problem for Modi".

Northern Punjab, cash incentives are being offered “to farmers who use less electricity to extract ground water. In Maharashtra... farmers are encouraged to use drip irrigation for sugarcane cultivation.”¹⁴⁴ If the farmers do not change, and if Modi does nothing, then the water situation will continue to get more dire.

Varied other solutions are being offered to the problem as well. Niti Aayog is an Indian government policy think tank, and Prime Minister Modi is the Chair. Its CEO Amitabh Kant recently argued that “Water needs to be priced well. If not, then people won’t understand the value of water.”¹⁴⁵ Parameswaran Iyer, the Secretary of the Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation agrees with Kant. He maintains that “India should learn water management from Singapore and Israel” and that “Water is almost free in India. People are willing to pay for good services including water, but there is unwillingness on part of state to charge for water usage”.¹⁴⁶ But these views do not take into consideration the plight of the farmer. Rajinder Singh is a farmer and an activist who would like to see the government guarantee the purchase of not just rice, but other crops such as corn, millet, and legumes, which would use much less water to produce. This would change the attitude of farmers and make the transition to less wasteful crops much

¹⁴⁴ Pradhan and Parija, “India’s Water Crisis is Becoming a Problem for Modi”.

¹⁴⁵ “Water management to play key role in India’s economic growth: Amitabh Kant”, The Economic Times, accessed October 12, 2020, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/water-management-to-play-key-role-in-indias-economic-growth-amitabh-kant/articleshow/66808688.cms?from=mdr>.

¹⁴⁶ “Water management to play key role in India’s economic growth”.

easier. He contends that the “government should give assurance to procure these crops, more access to market and set up infrastructural facilities like cold storage.”¹⁴⁷

India’s water problems are exacerbated by its political problems. Politicians disagree on solutions and at the same time they try to please their voting constituents. Additionally, competition between different factions within the government makes communication among government agencies difficult, which inhibits finding and working together on a solution. “Policies of data secrecy inhibit the effectiveness of agencies responsible for planning, resource allocation and disaster preparedness and add to the atmosphere of mistrust.”¹⁴⁸ It is very difficult to find solutions to these problems in such an environment.

Finding a solution to the water problems experienced by both India and Pakistan has become increasingly difficult in recent years. The growth of Hindu nationalism signified by the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party initially in 2014 and again in 2019, has further complicated the issues. By adding Hindu nationalism into the already complex relationship between the Kashmiri people and the Indian people, and with the revocation of Article 370 of India’s Constitution, the region has become more volatile.

Article 370 gave the India-controlled part of Kashmir a certain degree of autonomy. While foreign affairs and defense remained the purview of the central Indian government, Kashmir was able to make its own laws and maintain its own constitution.

¹⁴⁷ Pradhan and Parija, “India’s Water Crisis is Becoming a Problem for Modi”.

¹⁴⁸ The World Bank, “Water Sector in India”, accessed October 11, 2020, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2011/09/29/india-water>.

They could govern themselves in such areas as property ownership and they oversaw their own basic, fundamental rights. This is the way it had been for approximately seventy years.¹⁴⁹ But Modi made it a central theme of his reelection campaign, arguing that Kashmir needed to be put “on the same footing as the rest of India”.¹⁵⁰ The reality, however, is that since the revocation of Article 370, the Kashmiri people have been suppressed, not made equal.

While many debate whether or not the cancellation of Article 370 on 5 August 2019 by presidential decree was legal, the Indian government has moved forward with the changes that come from its revocation. This removes Kashmir’s ability to rule itself, but it also allows other people from India to move to Kashmir and to purchase property, something Article 370 expressly prohibited. It also suddenly puts the people of Kashmir under India’s laws. Many Kashmiris feel that the end result is not only the end to political autonomy, but also the integration of Hindu Indians into the Muslim-dominated region, which may eventually reduce their majority.¹⁵¹

As India-controlled Kashmir is largely Muslim, the Hindu nationalism of Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party are central to the treatment of the Kashmiri people. Modi’s animosity toward the Muslim population within India have been well known for many years, as has his vision of a homogenous Hindu population throughout India. When he was the chief minister of the state of Gujarat, “he presided over the worst communal

¹⁴⁹ Geeta Pandey, “Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters”, BBC News, accessed October 13, 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49234708>.

¹⁵⁰ Pandey, “Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters”.

¹⁵¹ Pandey, “Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters”.

bloodletting in India's recent history in 2002, when 1,000 Muslims, by a conservative estimate, were slaughtered by sword-wielding Hindus in his state over several weeks. Some accused Modi of abetting the mobs; other said he turned a blind eye to them."¹⁵² He frequently portrayed himself and other Hindus as the victims of Muslims, erroneously claiming "that there were forces out to kill him", and mocked the sufferings of Muslims at his many rallies attended by his base, as the "crowd roared back: 'Kill them! Kill them!'"¹⁵³

When Kashmir lost its autonomy and was under the full authority of Modi and the Indian government, steps were immediately taken to cut off the Kashmiri people not only from the rest of the world, but from each other as well. India sent in 10,000 troops and arrested many Kashmiri political leaders.¹⁵⁴ The internet was immediately shut down and all cellular networks and landlines were disabled. A curfew was instituted, and all public assembly was prohibited. In some villages, a soldier from the Indian army was stationed outside of every home. Stores and homes ran out of food, and pharmacies ran out of medicine.¹⁵⁵ Protests by the Kashmiri people continue, resulting in frequent clashes with the Indian soldiers.

¹⁵² Kapil Komireddi, "The Kashmir crisis isn't about territory. It's about a Hindu victory over Islam", The Washington Post, accessed October 13, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-kashmir-crisis-isnt-about-territory-its-about-a-hindu-victory-over-islam/2019/08/16/ab84ffe2-bf79-11e9-a5c6-1e74f7ec4a93_story.html.

¹⁵³ Komireddi, "The Kashmir crisis isn't about territory".

¹⁵⁴ Harjot Kaur, "Weaponizing Water in Kashmir", Legal Planet, accessed October 13, 2020, <https://legal-planet.org/2019/09/10/weaponizing-water-in-kashmir/>.

¹⁵⁵ Komireddi, "The Kashmir crisis isn't about territory".

By formally taking all political control over Kashmir, the Indian government also took control of Kashmir's waterways, allowing Modi not only to dominate the Muslim population there, but also to potentially solve India's water crisis. India now had power over the rivers that flow through Kashmir, and there is evidence that they intend to use that power. In August of 2019, the same month that India revoked Article 370, India announced that they would not renew an agreement with Pakistan from 1989 in which both India and Pakistan agreed to share hydrological information of the shared rivers with each other. This agreement has been renewed every year by both parties up until last year. That India has backed out of a thirty year agreement, coupled with the fact that India now physically and legally controls most of the tributaries' headwaters, has made many in Pakistan wonder if India plans on meeting its obligations under the Indus Water Treat of 1960.¹⁵⁶

However, India could technically reduce the water flowing into Pakistan and increase their own supply of water, and still hold to the terms of the IWT. Currently, India allows some water to flow into Pakistan from the Sutlej and Beas Rivers. Now that India no longer agrees to share hydrological information of the shared rivers with Pakistan, India could reduce the water flow, and Pakistan would have little to no notice that they were about to have a severe water shortage. Therefore, by taking full control of Kashmir, India now has the upper hand not only in Kashmir, but also in Muslim Pakistan, and may also have at least a partial solution to their water problem.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ Kaur, "Weaponizing Water in Kashmir".

¹⁵⁷ Kaur, "Weaponizing Water in Kashmir".

The problems in Kashmir, as in so many places around the world, comes down to resources, complicated by ethnic strife. Without the water that flows from the Indus River and its tributaries, neither India nor Pakistan can adequately sustain its people. Whether India can provide enough wheat for a swelling population, or whether Pakistan can provide clean water for its farmers in a dry, dusty climate, determines the future of both of these states. Furthermore, Pakistan's dependence upon India for its water supply, as an unfortunate issue of geography, is crucial to Pakistan's development and sustainability. No country can survive without an adequate supply of water. The interdependence on the Indus River and its tributaries, and the fight for the resources might be the point of contention, but the inability to adequately cooperate to share the resources points to other problems between India and Pakistan.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Separatist movements are complicated. They occur frequently throughout the world and throughout history, though their success, comparatively speaking, is something that is not often seen. This study examined two separate movements in two distinct parts of Asia. While there were some shared factors between them, the most glaring commonality between the plight of the Uyghurs and that of the Kashmiri, is that thus far they have both failed. But it is not their failure that defines these movements; in many ways it is their struggles. By looking at their struggles, and the reasons for their separatist movements, we can understand their history and their culture. We can also understand how separatist movements originate, and why and when they will occur again throughout the world.

Separatist movements have a multitude of causes. Among them are nationalism, geographic or historic reasons, protection from oppression or genocide, religious identity and ethnic conflict, as well as control of natural resources. We see all these issues in the separatist movements both in Xinjiang and in Kashmir.

The Uyghur have their own identity outside of being Chinese. With a strong nationalist sentiment, they resist assimilation into the larger Chinese culture, and retain

their own language and customs. Similarly, the Kashmiri have their own sense of nationalism that excludes incorporation into Indian culture. However, the nationalist sentiments are never one sided. While the Uyghur and the Kashmiri struggle to create their autonomy and retain their cultural independence, the nationalism comes through equally powerfully on the part of the Chinese and Indian governments. As both China and India look to become global powers, there is an increased need to create strong state structures and unified, homogenous national identities.¹⁵⁸

In China, President Xi Jinping is looking to develop not only a unified society, but a prosperous and powerful nation, and these two cannot be mutually exclusive. China feels a need to end its inconsistent policies in Macao and Hong Kong, as well as to restore sovereignty over Taiwan. This would create one unified, politically and culturally homogenous China. In order to successfully create this consistent culture and build a national identity, the Uyghurs must be brought into line. Similarly, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has used strong Hindu nationalism to suppress the largely Muslim Kashmiri people. Creating a strong, nationalist Hindu identity is seen by Modi as being integral to the creation of a homogenous society in India. While it is difficult to conceive the brutality that results from such nationalism, it should be pointed out that history is on their side, as many western nations did very similar things when they were developing politically and economically, and preparing to become world powers. In the United

¹⁵⁸ James Crabtree, “India and China push a new age of Asian nationalism”, Nikkei Asia, 23 October 2019, accessed November 3, 2020, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/India-and-China-push-a-new-age-of-Asian-nationalism>.

States, the Native American population was treated in much the same way as the Uyghur in China and the Kashmiri in India.¹⁵⁹

Separatist movements frequently have historic roots as well. In China, the Xinjiang region and the Uyghur were traditionally Turkic, and their geographic location led them to more closely identify with Russian culture than with Chinese culture. Additionally, they enjoyed sporadic periods of independence throughout the centuries, and only became absorbed into China in the last century. This makes it difficult for both the Uyghurs as well as the larger Chinese population to see the Uyghurs as one of them. Historically, they did not belong to China, so accepting Chinese sovereignty would understandably be difficult for the Uyghurs. Similarly, the conflict in Kashmir started with the partition of India in 1947. This move by Great Britain not only created the state of Pakistan, but also created the conflict over Kashmir. In 2019, India revoked Article 370 of its constitution and with it they also removed all autonomy that the Indian controlled part of Kashmir had previously enjoyed. Just as the Uyghurs were not traditionally part of China until relatively recently, the Kashmiri were not part of India until relatively recently. Because they did not choose to become part of their respective nations, separatist movements grew in both places.

Protection from oppression or genocide is another common cause of separatist movements, and it is apparent in both China and India. The Uyghur have frequently felt the oppressive hand of the Chinese government, and it became much worse following the Cultural Revolution. The political, legal, and economic policies of the Chinese government have frequently shown animosity and disfavor to the Uyghur people. For

¹⁵⁹ James Crabtree, “India and China push a new age of Asian nationalism”.

example, China's one child policy, as it was enforced among the Uyghur, was intended to drastically shrink their population much more than the Han Chinese. In recent years, the use of surveillance in Xinjiang in order to keep track of everyone's movements, as well as the creation of concentration camps in order to 're-educate' them are examples of the severe oppression and tyranny being suffered by the Uyghur at the hands of the Chinese government.

Likewise, the people of Kashmir have also felt the oppressive hand of the Indian government. While persecution and repression have existed since the establishment of the Indian constitution in 1950, it saw an increase in the 1980s with the increasingly vocal and powerful separatist movement. But with the revocation of Article 370 came not only the loss of political autonomy by the Kashmiri people, but also the harsh policies of the Indian government. The Indian military moved in, a curfew was instituted, and all communication both in Kashmir, and to the outside world, was cut off. These repressive acts have increased the calls for independence.

Religious identity and ethnic conflict are also relevant to both separatist movements, as religion is an aspect of the Uyghur and Kashmiri people that differentiates them from the rest of China and India. Both the Uyghur and the Kashmiri are Muslim and are frequently referred to as 'Muslim terrorists' by their respective governments, with little to no actual evidence to support their claims. As such, both groups suffer because not only are they religiously and culturally different, but also because both the Chinese and Indian governments use that difference to intentionally set apart the Uyghur and the Kashmiri from the rest of China and India. Modi has made it a central part of his political

strategy to culturally isolate Muslims. His Hindu nationalism has given him the pretext necessary to revoke Article 370 and remove the autonomy of the Kashmiri people.

In addition to nationalism, history, protection from oppression, and religious identity, the separatist movements in China and India are complicated by the natural resources that lie in the disputed areas. Xinjiang contains large coal deposits, as well as some of the largest oil reserves in China. Because China is working to become a global power, they need the energy reserves. If the Uyghur are successful in their separatist movement, then they take the land with them and China loses a great deal of coal and oil, and therefore the wealth and power that goes with it. China cannot let the Uyghur go because they cannot let the land go. Likewise, Kashmir is the source of much of the water that comes from the Indus River and its tributaries. India is experiencing extreme water scarcity, and this problem will only get worse as the months and years wear on. When Modi revoked Article 370, India gained control of the water in Kashmir, and can now redirect it to India if and when he chooses. If India were to let the Kashmiri separatist movement succeed, they lose a significant source of water as well. India's water scarcity problems could potentially slow their economy and end their ability to become a global power.

Separatist movements, whether in China, India, or elsewhere in the world, are not likely to end any time soon, as the issues which spark these movements continue to exist in many places around the globe. And it certainly looks as though China and India will be having problems for many years to come. The Uyghur surveillance and concentration camps have only just begun, but they are only part of the issues in China, as the Chinese government has been experiencing civil and political unrest in Hong Kong, and issues

with Taiwan and Tibet loom large as well. In India, Modi's reelection might signify a growing consensus regarding Hindu nationalism, as well as the role Kashmir should be playing in Indian politics. As the world watches both China and India, and as China and India both look to become global powers, the separatist movements, and how they handle them, will become increasingly relevant not only to those immediately involved, but to the rest of the world as well.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bates, Crispin. "The Hidden Story of Partition and its Legacies," last modified March 3, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/partition1947_01.shtml accessed 4/1/15.

BBC News. "Who are the Kurds?" 15 October 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29702440> accessed 10/31/2020.

BBC News. "Why is there Tension between China and the Uighurs?" 26 September 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-26414014> accessed 11/28/15.

Beary, Brian. "WWI Transformed the Map of Europe – Could it Change Again?", European Institute at the University of Maryland, 18 June 2014, <https://www.europeaninstitute.org/index.php/233-european-affairs/ea-june-2014/1909-wwi-transformed-the-map-of-europe-could-it-change-again> accessed 10/31/2020.

Berling, Judith A. "Confucianism", Focus on Asian Studies, Vol 2, No 1, Asian Religions, pp5-7, Fall 1982, copyright 1996, <http://www2.kenyon.edu/Depts/Religion/Fac/Adler/Reln270/Berling-Confucianism.htm>, accessed 11/30/15.

Bovingdon, Gardner. "Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han nationalist imperatives and Uyghur discontent." *East-West Center Washington* (2004).

Bovingdon, Gardner. "The not-so-silent majority: Uyghur resistance to Han rule in Xinjiang." *Modern China* (2002): 39-78.

Brunner, Borgna and David Johnson. "Timeline: The Former Yugoslavia. From WW1 to the splintering of the country", Infoplease, 28 February 2017, <https://www.infoplease.com/history/world/timeline-the-former-yugoslavia> accessed 10/31/2020.

Buckley, Chris, and Paul Moser. "How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance to Subdue Minorities", *The New York Times*, 22 May 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/china-surveillance-xinjiang.html>, accessed 10/4/20.

Caselli, Francesco and Wilbur John Coleman II "On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict", September 2011, <https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~coleman/web/ethnic.pdf> accessed 11/1/2020.

CNBC. "Rapid growth of India's Chennai threatened by water shortages", 6 August 2019, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/06/rapid-growth-of-indias-chennai-threatened-by-water-shortages.html>, accessed 10/11/20.

Crabtree, James. "India and China push a new age of Asian nationalism", *Nikkei Asia*, 23 October 2019, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/India-and-China-push-a-new-age-of-Asian-nationalism>, accessed 11/3/20.

Crane, Brent. "A Tale of Two Muslim Minorities", *The Diplomat*, 22 August 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/a-tale-of-two-chinese-muslim-minorities/>, accessed 11/27/15.

Dikotter, Frank. "Nationalist Myth-Making: The Construction of the Chinese Race" *Human Rights in China*, 27 April 2001, <http://www.hrichina.org/en/content/4573> accessed 11/20/15.

The Economic Times. "Water management to play key role in India's economic growth: Amitabh Kant" 26 November 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/water-management-to-play-key-role-in-indias-economic-growth-amitabh-kant/articleshow/66808688.cms?from=mdr> accessed 10/12/20.

The Economist. "Remote Control: The Government in Xinjiang is trying to limit Muslim births" 7 November 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/china/21678007-government-xinjiang-trying-limit-muslim-births-remote-control>, accessed 11/27/15.

Financial Express. "Without Water Management, India's 8% GDP growth is a distant dream: World Bank", 22 March 2018, <https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/world-water-day-2018-without-water-management-indian-economy-cant-growth-at-8-world-bank/1107717/> accessed 10/11/20.

Ganguly, Sumit. "Pakistan's never-ending story: Why the October coup was no surprise." *Foreign Affairs* (March 2000): 2-7.

Ganguly, Sumit, and Kanti Bajpai. "India and the Crisis in Kashmir." *Asian Survey* (1994): 401-416.

Geaves, R.A. "India 1857: A Mutiny or a War of Independence? The Muslim Perspective," *Islamic Studies* 35, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 25-44.

Gladney, Dru C. "Islam in China: accommodation or separatism?" *The China Quarterly* 174 (2003): 451-467.

Gladney, Dru C. "Islam in China: Beijing's Hui and Uighur Challenge", *Global Dialogue*, volume 9, Number 12, 2007, <http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=403> accessed 11/27/15.

Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and National Heritage, "History in Chronological Order", <http://infopak.gov.pk/History.aspx> accessed 3/20/15.

Han, Enze. "Boundaries, Discrimination, and Interethnic Conflict in Xinjiang, China", *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, Vol 4 (2) 2010, pages 244-256.

Hardgrave, Robert L. "India: The dilemmas of diversity." *Journal of Democracy* 4, no. 4 (1993): 54-68.

Huang, Pien. "I Spy, Via Spy Satellite: Melting Himalayan Glaciers", NPR, 19 June 2019, <https://www.npr.org/2019/06/19/733739909/i-spy-via-spy-satellite-melting-himalayan-glaciers> accessed 10/10/2020.

Human Rights Watch. "China: Religious Repression of Uighur Muslims" 12 April 2005, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2005/04/12/china-religious-repression-uighur-muslims>, accessed 11/27/15.

Human Rights Watch. "World Report 2013: China", <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/china-and-tibet?page=3>, accessed 11/27/15.

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Beijing, May 2003, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-06/12/content_916306.htm, accessed 11/27/15.

Kaur, Harjot. "Weaponizing Water in Kashmir", Legal Planet, 10 September 2019, <https://legal-planet.org/2019/09/10/weaponizing-water-in-kashmir/> accessed 10/13/20.

Komireddi, Kapil. "The Kashmir crisis isn't about territory. It's about a Hindu victory over Islam", The Washington Post, 16 August 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/the-kashmir-crisis-isnt-about-territory-its-about-a-hindu-victory-over-islam/2019/08/16/ab84ffe2-bf79-11e9-a5c6-1e74f7ec4a93_story.html accessed 10/13/20.

Kurtz, Lester. "Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution (1989)", International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, March 2008, <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/czechoslovakias-velvet-revolution-1989/> accessed 10/31/2020.

Lipes, Joshua. "Xinjiang City Bans Beards, Islamic Dress from Public Buses" Radio Free Asia, 6 August 2014, <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/karamay-08062014182306.html> accessed 11/29/15.

Lisa, Andrew. "Brexit and other active separatist movements around the world", 22 April 2019, <https://stacker.com/stories/2868/brexit-and-other-active-separatist-movements-around-world> accessed 10/29/2020.

Minorities at Risk Project, “Chronology for Kashmiris in India”, 2004, <https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38961e.html> accessed 10/12/20.

Moller-Gulland, Jennifer, J. Carl Ganter, and Cody T. Pope, “Toxic Water, Toxic Crops: India’s Public Health Time Bomb”, Circle of Blue, <https://www.circleofblue.org/2018/india/toxic-water-toxic-crops-indias-public-health-time-bomb/> accessed 10/11/20.

Pande, B.N. “History in the Service of Imperialism”, <http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic/pande.htm> accessed 3/29/15.

Pandey, Geeta. “Article 370: What happened with Kashmir and why it matters”, BBC News, 5 August 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49234708> accessed 10/13/20.

Petrovský, Matúš. United States General Assembly: International Intervention in Separatist Movements, The Bratislava Model United Nations Conference, 7-9 November 2014, <http://www.fn-rollspel.se/dokument-till-rollspelet/seperatistorelser.pdf> accessed 10/29/2020.

Philipp, Joshua. “China Security: How China is using the Paris Attacks to Promote the Persecution of Uyghurs”, Uyghur Human Rights Project, 25 November 2015, <http://uhrp.org/news/china-security-how-china-using-paris-attacks-promote-persecution-uyghurs>, accessed 11/28/15.

Pradhan, Bibhudatta and Pratik Parija, “India’s Water Crisis is Becoming a Problem for Modi”, Bloomberg, 23 July 2020, <https://www.bloombergquint.com/economy-finance/india-water-crisis-forces-farmers-to-rethink-their-crops> accessed 10/12/20.

Radio Free Asia. “Chinese Authorities Ban Muslim Names Among Uyghurs in Hoten” 24 September 2015, <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/chinese-authorities-ban-muslim-names-among-uyghurs-in-hotan-09242015120656.html>, accessed 11/27/15.

Radio Free Asia. “Expert Estimates China has more than 1,000 Internment Camps for Xinjiang Uyghurs” 12 November 2019, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/zenz-11122019161147.html> accessed 10/4/2020.

Radio Free Asia. “Xinjiang Unrest Timeline”, <http://www.rfa.org/english/multimedia/timeline/UyghurUnrest.html>, accessed 11/29/15.

Ryabinin, Yevgeny. “The Basic Causes of the Contemporary Separatism”, Journal of Geography, Politics and Society, 2017, 7(1), 5–9, [file:///C:/Users/Martha/Downloads/01%20ryabinin%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/Martha/Downloads/01%20ryabinin%20(1).pdf) accessed 10/29/2020.

Savadove, Bill. "Faith Flourishes in an Arid Wasteland" *South China Morning Post*, 17 August 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/article/512501/faith-flourishes-arid-wasteland> accessed 11/27/15.

Siddiqi, Ayesha. "Kashmir and the Politics of Water," <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgottenconflict/2011/07/20117812154478992.html> accessed 3/30/15.

Sinha, Rajesh. "Two Neighbours and a Treaty: Baglihar Project in Hot Waters." *Economic and Political Weekly* (2006): 606-608.

The World Bank. "Water Sector in India", 29 September 2011, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2011/09/29/india-water> accessed 10/11/20.

Upadhyay, R. "Urdu Controversys – Is Dividing the Nation Further," South Asia Analysis Group, last modified January 5, 2003, <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper675> accessed 3/29/15.

Wang, Maya. "More Evidence of China's Abuses in Xinjiang", Human Rights Watch, 20 February 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/20/more-evidence-chinas-horrific-abuses-xinjiang#> accessed 10/4/20.

Weiss, Brennan. "Experts can't figure out why independence movements are suddenly sweeping the world", Business Insider, 20 February 2017, <https://www.businessinsider.com/why-catalan-kurds-voting-independence-movements-secession-2017-10> accessed 10/29/2020.

Wheeler, William. "India and Pakistan at Odds Over Shrinking Indus River." *National Geographic*, 13 October 2011, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/10/111012-india-pakistan-indus-river-water/#close> accessed 10/10/20.

Wilde, Robert. "The Velvet Divorce: The Dissolution of Czechoslovakia", 21 February 2019, <https://www.thoughtco.com/the-velvet-divorce-1221617> accessed 10/31/2020.

Williams, Dodeye Uduak. "How Useful are the Main Existing Theories of Ethnic Conflict", *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, Vol 4 (1) March 2015, pages 147-151.

Wolf, Aaron T. and Joshua T. Newton. "Case study of transboundary dispute resolution: The Indus water treaty," www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Documents/indus.Ddf accessed 4/17/15.

Wong, Edward. "China Invests in Region Rich in Oil, Coal and also Strife", *New York Times*, 20 December 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/china-invests-in-xinjiang-region-rich-in-oil-coal-and-also-strife.html?_r=0 accessed 11/27/15.

Xu, Beina, Holly Fletcher, and Jayshree Bajoria. "The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)", Council on Foreign Relations, updated 4 September 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/china/east-turkestan-islamic-movement-etim/p9179>, accessed 11/27/15.

Yeung, Jessie, Swati Gupta, and Michael Guy. "India Has Just Five Years to Solve its Water Crisis, Experts Fear. Otherwise Hundreds of Millions of Lives Will Be in Danger", CNN, 3 July 2019, <https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/27/india/india-water-crisis-intl-hnk/index.html> accessed 10/11/20.

Zawahri, Neda A. "India, Pakistan and cooperation along the Indus River system." *Water Policy* 11, no. 1 (2009): 1-20.

Zheng, Liang. "Media and Minkaohan Uyghurs: Representation, reaction and resistance" (Doctoral Dissertation Abstract, University of Colorado at Boulder, 2011), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/915643879>, accessed 11/27/15.