

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Political Science
to the Office of Graduate and Extended Studies
of East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania

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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

Corruption exists in all countries. The thesis attempts to determine the relationship between political corruption and development by hypothesizing that political corruption impedes development. Initially, the independent variable (political corruption), dependent variable (development), as well as a control variable (state of democracy) are defined. Additionally, statistics pertaining to the variables within one hundred and fifty-six polities are employed through linear regression analyses. Findings of which conclude a statistically significant relationship between political corruption and development exists, however, the control variable is not found to be significant to the first measurement of the dependent variable. Subsequently, a comparative analysis of the respective countries perceived to be least and most politically corrupt and anti-corruption proposals are presented. Implications of the research are that political corruption festers due to a lack of political will to combat corruption, a lack of or inadequate corruption laws, unjust legal protections for certain public officials, and political instability.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

Corruption is a momentous pandemic. While it may be true that corruption is more prevalent within some countries than within other countries, corruption can be found to exist within all countries throughout the world. Furthermore, many theorize that when a country is infected with the disease known as corruption, corruption may have a multitude of detrimental consequences which relate to politics and governance, health, education, economics, the environment, as well as to society as a whole. As stated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice and discouraging foreign aid and investment (United Nations, 2004).”

SIGNIFICANCE AND PURPOSE

Political corruption, corruption which is prevalent within the political institutions and within the bureaucracies of countries, is especially problematic and may hinder the development of countries throughout the world. According to the World Bank, an international financial institution which issues loans to national entities to help facilitate

development, political corruption, “leads governments to intervene where they need not, and it undermines their ability to enact and implement policies in areas in which government intervention is clearly needed – whether environmental regulation, health and safety regulation, social safety nets, macroeconomic stabilization, or contract enforcement (World Bank, n.d.)” This phenomenon, known as political corruption, is a complex issue and far too habitually goes undetected. Therefore, it is essential for further research to be conducted in order to determine the impacts political corruption has on the development of countries throughout the world. If the pandemic known as political corruption is further researched, thereby becoming more adequately comprehended, political corruption may become less prevalent in all countries throughout the world and a cure to the pandemic may even be found.

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

What is the relationship between political corruption and the development of countries throughout the world? A plethora of literature already exists which strives to answer the aforementioned question. More specifically, a plethora of literature exists contemporarily which strives to ascertain the relationship between political corruption and the development of countries throughout the world in general and a plethora of literature also exists which strives to ascertain the relationship between political corruption and the development of countries throughout individual geographical regions of the world. Therefore, the reviewing of such existing literature pertaining to the relationship between political corruption and the development of countries is crucial to forming the basis of the research of the thesis.

Such literature which studies the relationship between political corruption and the development of countries in general is entitled “Corruption and Development: Explaining the Evidence,” authored Keith Blackburn and published in *The Manchester School*. Throughout this particular body of literature, the study develops theories pertaining to the relationship between corruption occurring in the public sectors of countries and development based on empirical evidence. Additionally, the study reviews existing literature related to the topic of the research to aid with the presentation of a

comprehensive analysis of corruption and its possible impacts on development.

Altogether, much of the focus of the article pertains not only to corruption and its relationship to development but also to what the author asserts to be, “the persistence of corruption and poverty, the diversity of corruption across countries and the differential impact of corruption in different economies (Blackburn, 2012, p. 401).”

Another body of literature which also focuses on the relationship between corruption and the development of countries throughout the world is entitled “Corruption and Development,” authored by Leslie Palmer and published in *IDS Bulletin*.

Interestingly, this particular article does not find a strong correlation between corruption and the development of countries to exist. More specifically, the author of the literature asserts that corruption is neither obstructive to development nor does it help to facilitate development (Palmer, 2009). However, it is significantly notable that the author of the literature also asserts that when the economic development of a country is substantially being pursued by means of immense state control of the country’s economy corruption appears to bolster. Furthermore, concerning corruption which manifests as a result of considerable state control of a country’s economy, “developers, local and foreign, should view corruption as an unavoidable cost (Palmer, 2009, p. 32).” Yet, the article additionally asserts that “energetic measures” should be made in order to lessen the existence of corruption (Palmer, 2009, p. 32).

“Public Expenditures, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development,” authored by Keith Blackburn, M. Emranul, and Niloy Bose and published in *The Manchester School*, also focuses on the relationship between corruption and the development of countries by analyzing corruption occurring in the public sector, and

thereby attempts to determine its possible impacts on the economic growth of countries. In order reach a conclusion, the authors of the literature first highlight that when there is considerable state control of an economy, public sector bureaucracies are tasked with the procurement of many public sector goods that are intended to aid with economic productivity. Subsequently, the authors of the literature go on to assert that corruption comes into fruition as a result of “an opportunity for bureaucrats to appropriate public funds by misinforming the government about the cost and quality of public goods provisions (Blackburn et al., 2011, p. 405).” Additionally, the article implies that the motivation behind individual government bureaucrats tasked with the procurement of many public sector goods to partake in such corrupt dealings is the result of numerous economic factors, all of which are dependent upon the actions and motivations of individual government bureaucrats (Blackburn et al., 2011).

“How Bad is Corruption? Cross-country Evidence of the Impact of Corruption on Economic Prosperity,” authored by Jeanet Sinding Bentzen and published in *Review of Development Economics*, attempts to determine whether or not corruption is as detrimental to the development of countries as countless seem to perceive. In order to determine whether or not corruption is truly detrimental to the development of countries, the literature devises a definitive empirical estimate of corruption’s impacts on development. More specifically, the article supplies “an estimate of the causal impact of corruption” pertaining to gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Bentzen, 2012). It is notable that this particular article uses additional factors pertaining to the cultures of countries as tools of corruption. Such tools remain constant while alternative measures of the economic development of countries such as the geography of countries, the residual

factors of a country's institutions, as well as a country's cultural factors are controlled. It is also important to note that the article's complete variable set is sourced from the Quality of Governance (QOG) database which encompasses the literature's crucial variables pertaining to institutional factors and cultural factors as well. In summation, the findings of the literature assert, "corruption does exert a significant and negative impact on countries' productivity levels (Bentzen, 2012, p. 167)."

An article that studies the relationship between corruption and human development is entitled "Growth in Human Development: The Role of Corruption," authored by Bienvenido Ortega, Antonio Casquero, and Jesús Sanjuán and is published in the *Journal of International Development*. In order to determine whether or not a relationship between corruption and the human development of countries exists, cross-country growth models are presented in the literature. The models are comprised using growth rates of human development measurements which were used to compose the Human Development Index (HDI) from the year 2000 until the year 2009 (Ortega et al., 2013). Additionally, the human development measurements are regressed within the literature based upon the corruption perceptions of a country and also based upon the amount of income inequality which is determined to exist within a country. The findings of the research imply that a country's income inequality significantly impacts the human development index's (HDI) education measurements, as well as increases of human development in general (Ortega et al., 2013). Yet, in regard to corruption, the findings of the research imply that only the human development index's (HDI) health measurements are impacted negatively by the prevalence of corruption (Ortega et al., 2013).

“Contextualizing Corruption in the Health Sector in Developing Countries: Reflections on Policy to Manage the Risks,” authored by Kempe Ronald Hope Sr. and published in *World Medical Health Policy*, argues that the prevalence of corruption within the health sectors of countries is problematic. Additionally, it is notable that the article stresses that the prevalence of corruption within the health sectors of countries throughout the developing world is especially problematic. More specifically, the article asserts that the prevalence of corruption within the health sectors of countries throughout the developing world is especially problematic because, “public resources are severely constrained (Hope, 2015, p. 383).” Moreover, the article goes on to argue in favor of the governments of countries considered to be less developed taking initiative to eradicate corruption within their health sectors and also to take initiative to ensure that corruption cannot arise within their health sectors. In order to reach these conclusions, the literature, “contextualizes, examines, and analyzes the corruption risks in the health sector in developing countries based on research observation and some interviews with key personnel in that sector (Hope, 2015, p.383).” It is also important to note that the article proposes policies which are intended to be employed by governments of less developed countries (LDCs) relating to corruption within health sectors and policies which are intended to enhance the administration of health-related goods and services (Hope, 2015).

Specifically pertaining to corruption throughout East Asia, “Government Performance, Corruption, and Political Trust in East Asia,” authored by Ching-Hsing Wang and published in *Social Science Quarterly*, focuses on the relationship between government performance and corruption to political trust within the polities of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In order to study the relationship between government

performance and political trust within the polities of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the article employs empirical implications of theoretical models (EITM) (Wang, 2015). In doing so, the author of the article presents an empirical analysis and asserts that, “political trust is a function of evaluation of government performance, perception of corruption, and their interaction (Wang, 2015, p. 211).” The results of the analysis imply that government performance has a positive relationship to political trust, perceived corruption has a negative relationship to political trust, and that government performance’s interactions with perceived corruption has a negative relationship to political trust (Wang, 2015). In summation, the results of the study imply that, “in a democracy, the public expects its government to be not only competent but also ethical, and put more weight on ethics than on competence (Wang, 2015, p. 211).”

“State Power and Private Profit: The Political Economy of Corruption in Southeast Asia,” authored by Linda Y.C. Lim and Aaron Stern and published in *Asian-Pacific Economic Literature*, initially examines existing literature related to corruption in the Southeastern Asian countries of the Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Following the examination of existing literature pertaining to corruption in the Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, the article relies on a comparative analysis of the existence of corruption within these five respective Southeast Asian countries in order to determine corruption’s relationship to the governments, private industries, democratization, and decentralization (Lim & Stern, 2002). Additionally, the article attempts to make a determination as to the relationship between corruption and development within each of the five respective Southeast Asian countries focused on throughout the literature. In summation, the findings of the literature

assert that “while economic liberalisation, democratisation and centralisation of state power influence the forms of corruption and its impact on national economic performance, they are neither necessary nor sufficient for its decline (Lim & Stern, 2002, p. 18).”

Pertaining to corruption and the human development of countries throughout the world, an article which specifically focuses on human development in Asia is entitled “Human Development and Service Delivery in Asia,” authored by Nazmul Chaudhury and Shantayanan Devarajan and published in *Development Policy Review*. Overall, the authors of the article attempt to provide insight into obstacles to human development throughout Asia. As asserted by the article, obstacles to further human development throughout Asia are the result of “systematic failures” related to the administration of services (Chaudhury & Devarajan, 2006). The authors of the literature go on to further assert that inefficiencies involved with the administering of services is the consequence of a lack of accountability within institutions which are tasked with administering services throughout certain countries which are geographically located throughout the Asian continent. Additionally, the article focuses on some attempts which certain Asian countries have made in order to try to solve issues related to the administering of services. Such obstacles to human development and service delivery in Asia, as implicated by the authors of the literature, are related to the political practices of countries throughout Asia and are also related to “decentralisation and the role of learning from impact evaluation (Chaudhury & Devarajan, 2006, p. 81).”

“A Critical Assessment of Anti-corruption Strategies for Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” authored by Oluwafemi Senu and published in *Development*

Policy Review, makes note of Sub-Saharan Africa's struggles to develop alongside widespread political corruption. As a result of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) striving to aid with the creation of anti-corruption mechanism throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, the author of the literature forms the basis of the research by arguing that, "there is a need to examine the causes of the setbacks affecting these mechanism, looking at the current trends of corruption and their impact on socio-economic development (Senu, 2019)." Moreover, the literature concentrates on analyzing certain obstacles to anti-corruption efforts in order to facilitate economic development throughout Sub-Saharan Africa by largely reviewing the means by which the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) strives to combat corruption throughout the region. Furthermore, the author of the literature relies on case studies of the Sub-Saharan African countries of the Republic of Kenya and the Federal Republic of Nigeria in order to demonstrate anti-corruption strategies pertaining to these two respective countries and to analyze obstacles or failures with anti-corruption efforts. Overall, the author of the literature asserts that economic development throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, "is hard to separate from maladministration and large-scale corruption (Senu, 2019)." The author of the literature goes on to assert that sources of the inability to combat corruption throughout Sub-Saharan Africa must be resolved for Sub-Saharan Africa to experience longstanding economic development (Senu, 2019).

"Genuine Wealth Per Capita as a Measure of Sustainability and the Negative Impact of Corruption on Sustainable Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa," authored by Joseph Ato Forson, Ponlapat Buracom, Guojin Chen, and Theresa Yaaba Baah-Ennumh and published in the *South African Journal of Economics*, also focuses on corruption and its

relationship to development throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Throughout the article, the authors assert that the impacts corruption has on economic development throughout Sub-Saharan Africa is not uniform. The aforementioned assertion made by the authors is a result of the ways in which the term corruption is defined. For example, the authors argue that when corruption is associated with, “a narrow measure in economic-wise” that does not consider many significant problems, the results of corruption may be constructive (Forson et al., 2017). Yet, when corruption is defined by a, “broad-based approach such as sustainable development,” the results of corruption on economic development may be that corruption is obstructive to economic development throughout countries located in Sub-Saharan Africa (Forson et al., 2017). In order to develop these assertions, the authors of the article analyze twenty-two Sub-Saharan African economies from the year 1996 until the year 2013. As stated by the authors of the literature, the findings of analyses, “holds in pooled OLS, Fixed effects and GMM within IV settings; and it also holds for different measures of institutions and different measures of development using growth per capita GDP and genuine wealth per capita, respectively (Forson et al., 2017. P. 178).” In summation, the article implies that institutions are central to protecting the populous from the negative impacts of corruption pertaining to economic well-being and the article also implies that, in general, corruption may have longstanding negative impacts when economies are attempting to achieve growth which is sustainable.

“The Effects of Corruption on Investment Growth: Evidence from Firms in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Transition Countries,” authored by Elizabeth Asiedu and James Freeman and published in *Review of Development Economics*, analyzes the relationship between corruption and the development of countries throughout Latin

America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and also transition countries. The article makes note that a multitude of analyses which research the relationship between corruption and development and attempt to determine the effects corruption has in relation to investment “employ country-level data on investment, corruption is measured at the country level, and data for countries from several regions are pooled together (Asiedu & Freeman, 2009, p. 200).” Therefore, the authors of the article instead employ “firm-level data” pertaining to investment and estimates corruption based upon “firm and country” levels (Asiedu & Freeman, 2009). In addition, the article permits for the impacts of corruption to differ from each region which is analyzed throughout the literature. Furthermore, the article employs “firms’ investment growth” as the dependent variable of the research and the article also employs a total of six different measurements of corruption (Asiedu & Freeman, 2009). More specifically concerning the six measurements of corruption, the six different measurements entail “two firm-level measures and four country-level measures (Asiedu & Freeman, 2009).” The results of the research conclude that the impacts of corruption to investments is heterogeneous. For example, the research finds that “corruption has a negative impact and significant effect on investment growth in firms in Transition countries but has no significant impact for firms in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa (Asiedu & Freeman, 2009, p. 200).”

CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

Specifically, the thesis focuses on the relationship between political corruption and development within one hundred and fifty-six individual polities throughout the world. By doing so, the thesis attempts to determine whether or not a significant relationship between political corruption and development exists. Moreover, the thesis hypothesizes that a significant relationship between political corruption and development exists and that political corruption hinders the development of countries throughout the world. First, concepts pertinent to the research are conceptualized. The two most significant concepts defined throughout the research to be used as measurable variables and thereby operationalized are *political corruption* and *development*. Hence, as a result of the topic and the hypothesis of the thesis, the independent variable of the thesis is termed *political corruption* and the dependent variable of the research is termed *development*. Additionally, a control variable termed *state of democracy* is also included within the research to aid with the alleviation of bias.

After the conceptualization of the aforementioned variables, relevant statistics are gathered. Statistics gathered pertain to measurements of the independent variable (political corruption), the dependent variable (development), and the control variable (state of democracy) within the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed throughout the

thesis. It is important to note that the dependent variable (development) is measured in two ways, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at nominal values and in terms of human development. Statistics are then analyzed through linear regression analyses. More specifically, two linear regression analyses and two multiple linear regression analyses are employed. The findings of which determine whether or not a statistically significant relationship exists between the independent variable (political corruption), both measures the dependent variable (development), and the control variable (state of democracy).

Additionally, a comparative analysis is employed. The comparative analysis pertains to the respective polity perceived to be the least politically corrupt of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed and the respective polity perceived to be the most politically corrupt of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed. Furthermore, the comparative analysis of the respective polity perceived to be the most politically corrupt and the respective polity perceived to be the least politically corrupt provides insight into why the respective polity perceived to be least politically corrupt is largely successful with preventing, combating, and eradicating political corruption and why the respective polity perceived to be most politically corrupt is largely unsuccessful with the prevention, combating, and eradication of political corruption. Lastly, proposals intended to be employed for the prevention, combating, and eradication of political corruption, especially by countries in which political corruption is perceived to be highly endemic, are presented.

CHAPTER 4 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (POLITICAL CORRUPTION)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (POLITICAL CORRUPTION) DEFINED

Concerning the independent variable (political corruption), political corruption is defined by Transparency International as, “a manipulation of policies, institutions, and rules of procedures in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status, and wealth (Transparency International e.V., 2018).” Transparency International even makes note of and differentiates between what the organization terms to be “grand corruption” and “petty corruption.” For example, Transparency International asserts that “grand corruption” refers to corrupt dealings occurring within the uppermost levels of government. Transparency International further asserts that grand corruption may result in the manipulation of government policies and may also results in the manipulation of how governments function, both of which result in public officials profiting while public interests are thwarted (Transparency International e.V., 2018). As for “petty corruption,” according to Transparency International, “petty corruption” can be inferred to consist of corrupt actions by public officials at lower levels of government through deals with the general public who are attempting to use common public goods and public services (Transparency International e.V., 2018).

Unlike Transparency International, the World Bank defines the independent variable (political corruption) more generally. According to the World Bank, corruption is defined as, “the abuse of public office for private gain (World Bank, n.d.)” The reasoning for the World Bank defining corruption in such general terms is to ensure that the provided definition of the phenomenon known as corruption is adequate enough to guarantee that the World Bank’s definition is able to “cover most of the corruption that the Bank encounters (World Bank, n.d.)” Therefore, non-academics or those unfamiliar with the phenomenon known as political corruption should comprehend that the independent variable (political corruption) involves unethical, immoral, or unlawful undertakings by individuals employed within government service for their own private interests over the interests of the general population. Many actions or activities taken by public officials may constitute distinct forms of the independent variable (political corruption). Some of the most common forms of political corruption are known as bribery, trading in influence, patronage, nepotism, cronyism, parochialism, electoral fraud, and embezzlement.

CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (CPI)

Each year, Transparency International issues an index entitled the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which measures the public sectors of one hundred and eighty polities throughout the world by each country’s “perceived levels of corruption (Transparency International e.V., 2018).” More specifically, concerning the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International, one hundred and eighty polities are measured from zero to one hundred; zero being “highly corrupt” and one hundred being “very clean (Transparency International e.V., 2018).” Therefore,

polities which are ranked least corrupt have measurements which are closer to the number one and polities which are ranked most corrupt have measurements which are closer to the number one hundred. It is important to note, however, that no country has received a perfect measurement of one hundred on the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index which provides credence to the claim that corruption is present in all countries throughout the world.

In review of the 2018 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the respective country of the Kingdom of Denmark, commonly referred to as Denmark, is perceived to be the least politically corrupt of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed throughout the thesis. According to the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International, the Kingdom of Denmark has a perceived corruption measurement of eighty-eight (Transparency International e.V., 2018). Additionally, in review of the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the respective country of the Republic of Yemen, commonly referred to as Yemen, is perceived to be the most politically corrupt country of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed throughout the thesis. According to the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International, the Republic of Yemen has a perceived corruption measurement of fourteen (Transparency International e.V., 2018). Therefore, the respective countries of the Kingdom of Denmark and Republic of Yemen are the focus of comparative analysis.

With further review of the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) issued by Transparency International, it is important to note that the majority of polities measured to compose the index (i.e., approximately two thirds) have perceived corruption

measurements of fifty or below (Transparency International e.V., 2018). Additionally, the average measurement of the respective one hundred and eighty polities measured by Transparency International to compose the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is just forty three (Transparency International e.V., 2018). Shockingly, only twenty polities of the one hundred and eighty polities measured by Transparency International to comprise the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) have notably increased their measurements on the index throughout the past seven years (Transparency International e.V., 2018). Even more shockingly is that many polities (i.e., sixteen countries most notably) are experiencing declining scores on the index (Transparency International e.V., 2018). Based upon the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Transparency International asserts that, “most countries are failing to make serious inroads against corruption (Transparency International e.V., 2018).”

LIMITATIONS/CRITICISM OF THE CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (CPI)

Even though analyses pertaining to corruption which entail comparing other indicators of corruption to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) have determined that the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is one of the “most valid measures of the magnitude of overall corruption in many country contexts (Hamilton & Hammer, 2018),” it is important to note that the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International is not without criticism. Some critics of the index direct criticism toward the methodology used to compose the index. For example, literature which is critical of the methodology of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International is entitled “Transparency International’s Corruption

Perceptions Index: Who's Perceptions Are They Anyway?," authored by Theresa Thompson and Anwar Shah. Overall, the literature elaborates on what the authors assert to be limitations pertaining to the methodology used to comprise the index and the literature also provides recommendations for further research pertaining to corruption. More specifically, concerning limitations asserted by the authors of the literature pertaining the methodology employed by Transparency International to compose the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the authors' criticisms are directed towards aggregation, source reliability, and criticism is also directed toward definitions employed by Transparency International to define the phenomenon known as corruption (Thompson & Shah, 2005).

An article entitled "The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of Transparency International's Approach to Measure Corruption," authored by British academics Staffan Anderson and Paul Heywood and published in *Political Studies*, also expresses criticism of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). More specifically, the authors of the article argue that the index, "has been used for political ends which may not always turn out to be supportive of anti-corruption efforts (Andersson & Heywood, 2009). In order to validate the argument asserted by the authors of the literature, the authors first critique the definition employed by Transparency International to define corruption by making note of what they claim to be conceptual problems and also making note of what the authors argue are limitations with the definition's relation to the combating of corruption. In addition, the article is critical of the methodology used to comprise the index as well. Subsequently, the article assert that the index can play a role in the formation of what the authors term to be a "corruption trap" within certain countries throughout the world in

which corruption is perceived to be highly endemic since the receiving of aid intended to facilitate development is often given conditionally upon the implementing of certain anti-corruption reforms which are often not able to be implemented, or are difficult to implement, if such aid is not able to be received (Andersson & Heywood, 2009).

Additionally, Dan Hough, a political science professor at the University of Sussex, is also critical of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International. While Hough praises the index as, “a great tool for ensuring that corruption and anti-corruption measures remain on the public policy agenda (Hough, 2016),” Hough contends that there are three significant limitations. The first limitation of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) asserted by Hough is that the phenomenon known as corruption is “complex” and therefore a single score cannot accurately measure it. The second limitation of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) asserted by Hough is that the index measures, “not corruption itself, but perceptions of it (Hough, 2016).” Thirdly, Hough asserts another limitation of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) to be that the index measures, “perceptions only of public-sector corruption, not that in private business (Hough, 2016).” In summation, the limitations of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) asserted by Hough imply that the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International may not necessarily be the preeminent tool for measuring the phenomenon known as corruption.

CHAPTER 5 DEPENDENT VARIABLE (DEVELOPMENT)

1st MEASURE OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE (DEVELOPMENT) DEFINED

Concerning the dependent variable (development), the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of a country in comparison to other countries throughout the world is commonly used as an indicator of the dependent variable (development). Additionally, gross national income (GNI) and per capita income (PCI) levels are also frequently used as indicators of development. Some even assert that the dependent variable (development) of a country can be measured based upon industrialization levels.

However, the aforementioned definitions of less developed countries (LDCs) are not completely recognized. For instance, the United Nations has declared that it employs, “no established convention for the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries or areas in the United Nations system (United Nations Statistics Division, 2010).” Still, the United Nations has also declared that, “in common practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States in northern America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania, and Europe are considered "developed" regions or areas. In international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs Union is also treated as a developed region and Israel as a developed country; countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia are treated as developing countries; and countries of Eastern Europe and of the Commonwealth of

Independent States (code 172) in Europe are not included under either developed or developing regions (United Nations Statistics Division, 2010).”

In order to measure the dependent variable (development) throughout the world, the World Bank compiles statistics pertaining to development to create the World Development Indicators (WDI). The World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), “contains 1,600 time series indicators for 217 economies and more than 40 country groups, with data for many indicators going back more than 50 years (World Bank, 2020).” With the issuing of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2016 (WDI), the World Bank declared that it would cease to differentiate between countries which previous World Development Indicator Reports declared to be either “developed” or “developing (Fantom et al., 2016).” Alternatively, the World Bank henceforth distinguishes between development statuses of countries on the basis of each country’s gross national income (GNI). Therefore, the World Bank currently distinguishes between countries throughout the world by four categories of gross national income. The four categories that are employed by the World Bank are low income countries (gross national income (GNI) of \$995 or lower), lower middle income countries (gross national income (GNI) between \$996 and \$3,895), upper middle income countries (gross national income (GNI) between \$3,895 and \$12,055), and high income countries (gross national income (GNI) of \$12,056 or greater) (World Bank, n.d.).

Furthermore, pertaining to the dependent variable (development), World Economic Outlook (WEO), a survey issued by the International Monetary Fund which provides analyses pertaining to economic developments globally, differentiates between developed countries, developing countries, and less developing countries (LDCs), or as

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) calls them, “advanced economies, emerging market and developing economies,” based upon three criteria (World Economic Outlook, 2020). The first criterion, per capita income levels, is measured by average per capita income levels throughout multiple years since volatility may have significant impacts on income levels between each year. Data pertaining to the per capita income levels of countries throughout the world employed by the World Economic Outlook (WEO) is sourced from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database (World Economic Outlook, 2020). The second criterion employed by the World Economic Outlook (WEO) to differentiate between developed countries, developing countries, and less developed countries is export diversification. Export diversification is employed “so oil exporters that have high per capita GDP would not make the advanced classification because around 70% of its exports are oil (World Economic Outlook, 2020).” Data employed by the World Economic Outlook (WEO) pertaining to the second criterion, export diversification, is sourced from the United Nations International Trade Statistics Database (UN COMTRADE) (World Economic Outlook, 2020). Lastly, the third criterion is measured as a country’s “degree of integration into the global financial system (World Economic Outlook, 2020).” As for data pertaining to the third criterion, data used by the World Economic Outlook (WEO) is sourced from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics Database (World Economic Outlook, 2020).

2nd MEASURE OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE (DEVELOPMENT) DEFINED

Furthermore, concerning the dependent variable (development), some assert that the development status of a country can be indicated based upon measurements of human

development. Therefore, the second measurement of the dependent variable (development) is a concept developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) termed “human development.” According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “human development – or the human development approach - is about expanding the richness of human life, rather than simply the richness of the economy in which human beings live (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.).” The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) declares that human development involves the achievement of good health and long lifespans, a well-educated population, and the ability of populations to be able to access basic goods and basic services. Therefore, it should be comprehended by non-scholars or those unfamiliar with the concept of human development that human development does not simply use economic indicators (e.g., GDP growth or GDP per capita) to measure the human development of countries throughout the world.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (HDI)

The Human Development Index (HDI), a statistical composite index initially issued in 1990, is employed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in order to measure the human development of countries throughout the world. More specifically, concerning the Human Development Index (HDI), the index ranks and measures countries into four measures of human development based on life expectancy, education levels, and per capita income (United Nations Development Programme, n.d.). The four measures of human development, as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI), are “very high human development, high human development, medium human development, and low human development (United Nations Development

Programme, 2019).” Furthermore, concerning the Human Development Index (HDI), polities are measured from zero to one; one being, “very high human development” and zero being “low human development (United Nations Development Programme, 2019).” Therefore, countries with longer expectancies, higher levels of education, and higher GNI (PPP) per capita income, have higher scores on the Human Development Index (HDI). It is important to note that information used to compose the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI) was gathered in 2018. Therefore, the human development measures of the 2019 Human Development Report reflex human development in the year 2018.

In review of the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI), of the one hundred and fifty-six polities measured throughout the thesis, the respective country of the Kingdom of Norway, commonly referred to as Norway, is found to be ranked highest in terms of human development. According to the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI), the Kingdom of Norway has a human development measurement of 0.954 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019). Therefore, Norway is considered to have “very high human development (United Nations Development Programme, 2019).” As for the respective polity with the lowest measurement of human development of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed throughout the thesis, the respective polity with the lowest measurement of human development is the Republic of Niger, commonly referred to as Niger. The respective country of the Republic of Niger is found to have a human development measurement of 0.337 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019). Therefore, the Republic of Niger is measured to have “low human development (United Nations Development Programme, 2019).”

LIMITATIONS/CRITICISM OF THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (HDI)

Similarly, to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International, the Human Development Index (HDI) published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report Office has not been without criticism. An article which is critical of the Human Development Index (HDI) is entitled “Classification, Detection and Consequences of Data Error: Evidence from the Human Development Index,” published in *Economic Journal* and authored by economists Hendrik Wolff of the University of Washington, Howard Chong of Cornell University, and Maximilian Auffhammer of the University of California – Berkley. The literature first highlights what the authors assert to be methodological errors pertaining to the human development indicators used to be compose the Human Development Index (HDI). Specifically, the authors highlight three errors which they assert are “due to data updating; formula revision, and thresholds to classify a country’s development status (Wolff et al., 2010).” Subsequently, the authors suggest the employment of a statistical framework to be used for the calculations of measures of data which are specific to individual countries measured by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report Office in order to compose the Human Development Index (HDI). Furthermore, the authors suggest that the employment of the aforementioned statistical framework be used with investigations of bias pertaining to data error since the authors assert that data error biases may play a role in the composition of the index. In conclusion, the authors of the article determine that a significant percentage of countries (i.e., approximately 34%) are found to be misclassified and the authors of the article also

assert, “key estimated parameters vary by up to 100% due to data error (Wolff et al., 2010).”

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report Office even went as far as to respond to the criticism rendered by Wolff et al. and decided to update the methodology used to compose the index. In response to the article authored by Wolff et. al., the Human Development Report Office decided to reform their thresholds which categorize countries measured in order to compose the Human Development Index (HDI) as high human development, medium human development, and low human development. In addition, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report Office (HDRO) also responded to an article in *The Economist* which highlights the article written by Wolff et al. Comments in response to the criticism rendered by Wolff et al. by the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Report Office state, “the Human Development Report Office undertook a systematic revision of the methods used for the calculation of the HDI, carefully considering criticisms leveled at the Index in the past. The new methodology directly addresses the critique by Wolff and his colleagues in that it generates a system for continuous updating of the human development categories whenever formula or data revisions take place (The Economist, 2011).”

CHAPTER 6 LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSES

LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 1 OVERVIEW

After the conceptualizing of both the independent variable (political corruption) and the dependent variable (development), in order to analyze the statistics gathered to determine whether or not a statistically significant relationship between the aforementioned variables exists, linear regression analyses are presented within the thesis. The first linear regression analysis pertains to the independent variable (political corruption) and the first measurement of the dependent variable (development). All data employed for the first linear regression analysis pertaining to the independent variable (political corruption) of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed is sourced from the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International and presented in the appendices, appendix A, as Table 1 (Transparency International e.V., 2018). As for the first measurement of the dependent variable (development), estimates of the gross domestic products (GDP) per capita at nominal values sourced from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are employed for the first linear regression analysis. Estimates of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at nominal values, of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed is presented in the appendices, appendix B, as Table 2 (International Monetary Fund, 2018).

LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 1 FINDINGS

Findings of the first regression analysis between the independent variable (political corruption) and the first measurement of the dependent variable (development) yield a p-value of 0.000 for the independent variable (political corruption). Therefore, the independent variable (political corruption) of the study is found to be statistically significant since its p-value is found to be less than 0.05. As for the value of the Pearson's r measurement of the first regression analysis, the value of the Pearson's r measurement is found to be 0.814. Since Pearson's r measurement is measured between the values of 1.00 and -1.00, 1.00 indicating a perfect positive relationship and -1.00 indicating a perfect negative relationship, the results yield a positive statistical relationship to exist between the independent variable (political corruption) and the first measurement of the dependent variable (development). In addition, the r squared value is found to be 0.662. Therefore, 66.2 percent of the variance in the first measurement of the dependent variable (development) is able to be predicted by the independent variable (political corruption). In summation, due to the findings of the first linear regression analysis yielding statistical significance, the null hypothesis pertaining to the independent variable (political corruption) and the first measurement of the dependent variable (development), gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, is rejected.

LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 2 OVERVIEW

The second linear regression analysis pertains to the independent variable (political corruption) and the second measurement of the dependent variable (development). All data employed for the second linear regression analysis pertaining to the independent variable (political corruption) of the one hundred and fifty-six polities

analyzed is sourced from the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International and presented in the appendices, appendix A, as Table 1 (Transparency International e.V., 2018). As for the second measurement of the dependent variable (development), values of human development of the one hundred and fifty-six polities are employed. Furthermore, concerning the second measurement of the dependent variable (development), all data employed for the second regression analysis of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed is sourced from the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI) published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report Office and presented in the appendices, appendix C, as Table 3 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019).

LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 2 FINDINGS

Findings of the second linear regression analysis between the independent variable (political corruption) and the second measurement of the dependent variable (development) yield a p-value of 0.000 for the independent variable (political corruption). Therefore, the independent variable (political corruption) of the study is determined to be statistically significant since its p-value is found to be less than 0.05. As for the value of the Pearson's r measurement, the value of the Pearson's r measurement is found to be 0.756. Since Pearson's r measurement is measured between the values of 1.00 and -1.00, 1.00 indicating a perfect positive relationship and -1.00 indicating a perfect negative relationship, the results yield a positive statistical relationship to exist between the independent variable (political corruption) and the second measurement of the dependent variable (development). In addition, the r squared value is found to be 0.565. Therefore, 56.5 percent of the variance in the second measurement of the dependent variable

(development) is able to be predicted by the independent variable (political corruption). Additionally, due to the findings of the second regression analysis yielding statistical significance, the null hypothesis pertaining to the independent variable (political corruption) and the second measurement of the dependent variable (development), human development, is rejected.

CHAPTER 7 CONTROL VARIABLE (STATE OF DEMOCRACY)

CONTROL VARIABLE (STATE OF DEMOCRACY) LITERATURE REVIEW

It is important to note that much literature currently exists pertaining to the relationship between the control variable (state of democracy), the independent variable (political corruption), and the dependent variable (development). For example, the article “Does the Effects of Corruption upon Growth Differ Between Democracies and Autocracies,” authored by Andreas Assiotis and Kevin Sylwester and published in *Review of Development Economics*, attempts to determine whether or not corruption has similar impacts in all countries or whether or not the impacts of corruption are unique to the features of some countries. In order to reach a conclusion, the authors of the literature study the relationship between both corruption and economic growth. It is important to note that throughout the research, “the marginal impact of corruption is allowed to differ across democratic and nondemocratic regimes (Assiotis & Sylwester, 2014, p. 581).” Furthermore, concerning the methodology of the research, the authors employ “cross-country, annual data” spanning from the year 1984 until the year 2007 in order to “regress growth on corruption, democracy and their interaction (Assiotis & Sylwester, 2014, p.581).” In summation, the authors of the literature find that declines in corruption does result in increases in economic growth, overall. However, it is important to note that

the authors of the literature also find that declines in corruption are more significant to the increase of economic growth in authoritarian states than in democratic states (Assiotis & Sylwester, 2014).

The article “Compound Democracy and the Control of Corruption: A Cross-Country Investigation,” authored by Alok K. Bohara, Neil J. Mitchell, and Carl F. Mittendorf and published in *Policy Studies Journal*, studies the relationship between democracy and the perception of corruption. Throughout the literature, the authors assert that restraining corruption is determined by public officials’, “compensation and accountability (Bohara et al., 2004).” Additionally, the authors of the literature go on to assert that restraining corruption is further determined by both the openness of an economy as well as the competitiveness of an economy. In order to support this assertion, the authors of the literature provide an analysis of the relationship between democracy and the perception of corruption through “controlling for the influence of other political and economic factors including federalism, economic development, and economic competition (Bohara et al., 2004, p. 481).” As for the findings of the research, the authors of the literature conclude, “the findings of the importance of economic factors are consistent (Bohara et al., 2004, p. 481).” However, the research does not conclude that corruption escalates due to federalism. Furthermore, it is important to note that when it comes to democracy, findings which are related to democracy are greatly dependent upon measurements of democracy. In addition, the authors of the literature find that “citizens’ repetitive participation in competitive elections increases the control of corruption (Bohara et al., 2004, p.481).”

“Perceptions of Political Corruption in Latin American Democracies,” authored by Damarys Canache and Michael E. Allison and published in *Latin American Politics and Society*, asserts that mere perceptions of political corruption is detrimental to democracies, particularly to democracies which are considered to be developing countries or less developed countries (LDCs), because the perception of political corruption abrades the bond and trust between the people and the government. In order to construct this assertion rendered by the authors of the literature, the research relies on data sourced from Transparency International’s 1997 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and individual opinions which are sourced from the 1995-97 World Values Survey (Canache & Allison, 2005). According to the authors, the results of the research indicate, “Latin Americans are quite aware of the seriousness of corruption in their countries (Canache & Allison, 2005).” Subsequently, after concluding that a significant number of Latin Americans have high perceptions of political corruption throughout their countries, the authors attempt to determine as to whether or not Latin Americans apply their perceptions of corruption to their perceptions of their governments and their perceptions of democracy overall. Furthermore, concerning the application of perceptions of political corruption to perceptions of democracy, the authors conclude that Latin Americans “can” apply their perceptions of political corruption to their perceptions of democracy and that, “the possible dark side of mass opinion on corruption is that pervasive misconduct may poison public sentiment toward democratic politics (Canache & Allison, 2005).”

“Economic Development and Democracy: An Electoral Connection,” authored by Karl Henrik Knutsen et al. and published in the *European Journal of Political Research*, attempts to determine whether or not economic development has an impact on

the form of government employed by a country. Furthermore, the authors of the literature assert that a relationship is present between economic development and a democracy's "electoral components (Knutsen et al., 2015)." However, the authors of the literature also assert that there is no relationship, or not a significant relationship, between economic development and additional measurements of democracies. The authors of the literature go on to justify their assertions by arguing their assertions are true, "because development enhances the power resources of citizens and elections provide a focal point for collective action (Knutsen et al., 2015, p. 292)." In addition, the authors of the literature use datasets known as Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), as well as the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy in order to test their theory. As stated by the authors of the literature the datasets employed for analysis result in the ability, "to disaggregate the concept of democracy into meso- and micro-level indicators (Knutsen et al., 2015, p.292)." Findings of the research imply that indicators which pertain to elections are the only indicators which impact economic development (Knutsen et al., 2015).

Furthermore, "Does Political Democracy Enhance Human Development in Developing Countries?," authored by Ming-Chang Tsai and published in the *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, attempts to determine as to why such distinctions continue to exist relating to the human development of developing countries. In order to make a determination, the author of the literature study the relationship between democracy and human development. More specifically, the literature employs measurements of democracy such as "majority rule and political contention to estimate their correlation with three physical well-being indicators as well as with three school enrollment indicators (Tsai, 2006, p. 233)." In addition, following the controlling of

specific political characteristics as well as the controlling of specific economic characteristics, the regression analysis of the literature finds that democratic countries attain “higher levels on the HD indicators used (Tsai, 2006).” Yet, it is important to note that the findings of the literature do not find democracy to be significantly to alterations of human development values throughout the period of time which is analyzed within the literature. Additionally, the authors of the literature assert that findings of the research provide, “a plausible explanation of why democracy in DCs failed to sustain its momentum in improving HD (Tsai, 2006, p. 233).”

DEMOCRACY INDEX

Control variables are often important factors to consider during the conducting of research. Making note of and including control variables during the conducting of research can help to alleviate bias and can help to add depth to the research. One such control variable that is analyzed throughout the thesis is termed *state of democracy*. In order to measure the control variable (state of democracy) to be employed for linear regression analyses, the thesis employs the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is a British company which strives “to produce the highest quality data, research and analysis on everything from national elections and international trade, to food security and sustainable cities (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019).”

More specifically, concerning the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index, the index reviews a total of one hundred and sixty-seven polities in an attempt to determine the intervening variable (state of democracy) within each of the respective polities. As stated within a report by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU),

the index, “is based on five categories: *electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture* (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016).” Furthermore, on the index polities are classified into four individual regime types. The four regime types are known as full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, as well as authoritarian regimes. In order to classify each polity into one of the four regime types, each polity receives both a ranking and also a score between the numbers ten and zero. Polities which receive scores on the Democracy Index between the numbers 10 and 8.01 are classified as full democracies, polities which receive scores between the numbers 8 and 6.01 are classified as flawed democracies, polities which receive scores between the numbers 6 and 4.01 are classified as hybrid regimes, and polities which receive scores between the numbers 4 and 0 are classified as authoritarian regimes (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). Overall, concerning the methodology of the democracy index, the index can be described as a weighted arithmetic mean, also known as a weighted average, which is composed through the use of a total of sixty distinct questions (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013).

CHAPTER 8 MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSES

MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 1 OVERVIEW

The first multiple linear regression analysis pertains to the independent variable (political corruption), first measurement of the dependent variable (development), and the control variable (state of democracy). It is important to note that the first multiple linear regression analysis employs the independent variable (political corruption) and the control variable (state of democracy) both as independent variables. All data which is employed for the first multiple linear regression analysis pertaining to the independent variable (political corruption) of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed is sourced from the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International and is presented in the appendices, appendix A, as Table 1 (Transparency International e.V., 2018). Data pertaining to the control variable (state of democracy) of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed is sourced from the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Democracy Index 2018 and is presented in the appendices, appendix D, as Table 4 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). Furthermore, all data employed for the first multiple linear regression analysis pertaining to the first measurement of dependent variable (development), gross domestic product (GDP) per capita nominal values, of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed is sourced from

the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and is presented in the appendices, appendix B, as Table 2 (International Monetary Fund, 2018).

MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 1 FINDINGS

Findings of the first multiple regression analysis between the independent variable (political corruption), the control variable (state of democracy), and the first measurement of the dependent variable (development) yield a p-value of 0.000 for the independent variable (political corruption) and yield a p-value of 0.170 for the control variable (state of democracy). Therefore, the independent variable (political corruption) is found to be statistically significant since its p-value is found to be less than 0.05. However, the control variable (state of democracy) is not found to be statistically significant since its p-value is found to be greater than 0.05. Additionally, as for the value of the Pearson's r measurement, the value of the Pearson's r measurement is found to be 0.816. Since Pearson's r measurement is measured between the values of 1.00 and -1.00, 1.00 indicating a perfect positive relationship and -1.00 indicating a perfect negative relationship, the results yield a positive statistical relationship to exist between the variables. Furthermore, the r squared value is found to be 0.666. Therefore, 66.6 percent of the variance in the first measurement of the dependent variable (development) is able to be predicted by the other variables of the analysis.

MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 2 OVERVIEW

As for the second multiple linear regression analysis, the second multiple linear regression analysis also pertains to all three variables, the independent variable (political corruption), second measurement of the dependent variable (development), and the control variable (state of democracy). It is important to note that the second multiple

linear regression analysis presented also employs the independent variable (political corruption) and the control variable (state of democracy) both as independent variables. All data which is employed for the second multiple linear regression analysis pertaining to the independent variable (political corruption) of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed is sourced from the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International and is presented in the appendices, appendix A, as Table 1 (Transparency International e.V., 2018). Data pertaining to the control variable (state of democracy) of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed is sourced from the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Democracy Index 2018 and is presented in the appendices, appendix D, Table 4 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019). Furthermore, all data employed for the second multiple linear regression analysis pertaining to the second measurement of the dependent variable (development), human development, of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed is sourced from the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI) published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report Office and presented in the appendices, appendix C, as Table 3 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019).

MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 2 FINDINGS

Findings of the second multiple linear regression analysis between the independent variable (political corruption), the control variable (state of democracy), and the second measurement of the dependent variable (development) yield a p-value of 0.000 for the independent variable (political corruption) and yield a p-value of 0.013 for the control variable (state of democracy). Therefore, the independent variable (political corruption) is found to be statistically significant since its p-value is found to be less than

0.05. Additionally, the control variable (state of democracy) is also found to be statistically significant since its p-value is found to be greater than 0.05. As for the value of the Pearson's r measurement, the value of the Pearson's r measurement is found to be 0.763. Since Pearson's r measurement is measured between the values of 1.00 and -1.00, 1.00 indicating a perfect positive relationship and -1.00 indicating a perfect negative relationship, the results yield a positive statistical relationship to exist between the variables of the second multiple linear regression analysis. Furthermore, the r squared value is found to be 0.583. Therefore, 58.3 percent of the variance in the second measurement of the dependent variable (development) is able to be predicted by the other variables of the second multiple linear regression analysis.

CHAPTER 9 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

DENMARK OVERVIEW

The Kingdom of Denmark, commonly referred to simply as Denmark, is a country which is located in Northwestern Europe. European Denmark, also known as Denmark proper, is comprised of a total of four hundred and forty-three islands as well as a peninsula which is a part of continental Europe and named Jutland (Danmarks Statistik, 2010). As one of the Nordic countries, Denmark is the southernmost country located in Scandinavia. The only country to share a physical border with Denmark is Germany. Furthermore, apart from Denmark proper, Denmark claims sovereignty over Greenland as well as the Faroe Islands. Therefore, Denmark proper has an approximate land area of 16,573 square miles (42,924 square kilometers), making Denmark the one hundred and thirtieth largest country in the world. However, the Kingdom of Denmark has an approximate land area of 853,509 square miles (2,210,579 square kilometers) with the territories of both Greenland and the Faroe Islands included within the approximate total land area of the country (Statistikbanken, 2019). As of 2019, the population of Denmark proper was estimated to be 5,827,463 (Statistics Denmark, 2019). Furthermore, as a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy, the current Prime Minister of Denmark is Mette Frederiksen and the current monarch is Queen Margrethe II. According to the

Democracy Index, the kingdom ranks seventh of all polities measured with a value of 9.22. Therefore, Denmark is categorized as a “full democracy (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019).”

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (POLITICAL CORRUPTION) IN DENMARK

Pertaining to the independent variable (political corruption) in the Kingdom of Denmark, the country is perceived to be among the most corrupt free countries in the entire world. As previously stated, the Kingdom of Denmark is perceived to be the least corrupt country out of the one hundred and eighty polities measured by Transparency International in order to compose the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index with a perceived corruption measurement of eighty-eight (Transparency International e.V., 2018). Furthermore, according to Transparency International, the Kingdom of Denmark, “performs very strongly in international measures of corruption, and most experts agree that its public sector exhibits a high level of integrity (Transparency International e.V., n.d.).” When it comes to perceptions of corruption of Danish citizens, the Global Corruption Barometer 2013, also published by Transparency International, finds that most Danes do not perceive corruption to be a serious issue facing the country (Transparency International e.V., 2013). Overall, within the Kingdom of Denmark a comprehensive system exists that is intended to prevent, discover, and also penalize the independent variable (political corruption) throughout the country.

Laws which are intended to deter corruption from transpiring and laws which are intended to penalize government officials who have engaged in corrupt dealings do exist within the Danish Criminal Code. For example, the Danish Criminal Code contains laws which outlaw active bribery as well as passive bribery and the Danish Criminal Code

outlaws a multitude of corrupt acts which are included within international conventions that are devoted to anti-corruption efforts (Danish Criminal Code, n.d.). Furthermore, the Danish Criminal Code contains laws which outlaw the bribing of foreign officials and companies within Denmark may even be found criminally liable if corrupt dealings are undertaken by persons who are employed by Danish companies (Danish Criminal Code, n.d.). It is important to note that the Danish Criminal Code does not distinguish bribery from facilitation payments, as well as from gifts and hospitality (Danish Criminal Code, n.d.). However, gifts and hospitality deemed to be corrupt offenses or not corrupt offenses is dependent upon the intentions of the parties involved and the benefits which may result (GAN Integrity, 2016). Yet, it is argued that there is scarce regulations pertaining to conflict of interests as well as pertaining to the disclosing of assets which may arise within the public sector of Denmark (GAN Integrity, 2016). Furthermore, even though Denmark is considered to be highly corruption free, international institutions which monitor corruption have been critical of Denmark for a lack of transparency relating to regulations pertaining to political party finances and some international institutions which monitor corruption have also been critical of Denmark for inadequacy pertaining to the enforcing of bribery laws which are foreign to Denmark (GAN Integrity, 2016).

Specifically pertaining to the independent variable (political corruption) in the Danish judicial system, political corruption within the judicial system is perceived to be rare. According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018 published by the World Economic Forum, companies operating within Denmark are highly confident in the adequacy of the legal framework of Denmark's judicial system to justly settle legal

disputes which may arise. However, the Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018 also finds that companies operating within Denmark have concerns relating to the adequacy of the judicial system of Denmark's legal framework pertaining to suits attempting to challenge Danish regulations (World Economic Forum, n.d.). Also, the Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016 published by the World Economic Forum finds that the perception of bribery, as well as irregular payments intended to influence judicial decisions to be low (World Economic Forum, n.d.). According to the EU Justice Scoreboard 2017, approximately eighty percent of Danish companies as well as Danish citizens have the perception that the courts are indeed independent (European Commission, 2017). Moreover, according to the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), in 2017 most Danish judges are confident that the majority of appointments made within the judicial system of Denmark and the majority of promotions made within the judicial system of Denmark are occurring due to merit and not a result of corrupt influence (European Networks of Councils for the Judiciary, 2017).

Overall, the Sustainable Governance Indicators 2016 Denmark Report finds that corruption within the police forces of the Kingdom of Denmark to be scarce (Sustainable Governance Indicators, 2016). Also, according to World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018, Danish police forces are considered to be highly reliable pertaining to efficiency in protecting Danish companies from corrupt influences and other illegal activities which may arise (World Economic Forum, n.d.). Furthermore, the Human Rights Report 2016 asserts that the Danish government is largely sufficient and possesses the tools necessary for both the investigation of corruption within Danish police forces, as well as the prosecution of corruption within Danish police forces (U.S.

Department of State, 2016). Even public opinions polls, Eurobarometer Special Surveys conducted by the European Commission, find no evidence of payment of bribes by citizens to the Danish police and also find that Danish police forces are perceived to be one of the most corrupt free public services (European Commission, 2014).

Concerning the independent variable (political corruption) in relation to public services within the Kingdom of Denmark, according to the United State Department of State' Investment Climate Statements, in 2017 Danish accounting, legal, as well as regulatory systems relating to public services are both transparent and also adhere to international standards (U.S. Department of State, 2017). The United State Department of State's Investment Climate Statements 2017, also asserts that procedures within Danish bureaucracies dedicated to public services are transparent and operate efficiently (U.S. Department of State, 2017). It is important to note that twice a year within the Kingdom of Denmark, laws as well as regulations are enacted to govern the Danish private sector's involvement with public services (U.S. Department of State, 2017). It is also important to note that a great deal of the administration of public services within the Kingdom of Denmark is decentralized. Furthermore, the interpreting of laws governing public services by municipalities and other regions may differ by individual municipalities or by individual regions throughout the country (Sustainable Governance Indicators, 2016).

However, according to the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018, some companies within Denmark have expressed that inadequacies within bureaucracies dedicated to public services can obstruct business dealings (World Economic Forum, n.d.). Yet, both the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016 and the European Commission in 2014 have found that corrupt acts

such as bribery and also irregular payments are rare pertaining to public services such as public utilities, the issuing of or the rejecting of business permits, and the issuing of or the rejecting of licenses (World Economic Forum, n.d. & European Commission, 2014). Nevertheless, the mismanaging of quotas pertaining to fishing within Denmark spanning for more than a dozen years within the Fisheries Ministry of Denmark has been alleged. The allegations, featured in Eurotopics allege, “a group of so called “quota kings” had procured fishing licenses using fake papers and sold them to fishermen (Eurotopics, 2017).” Allegations pertaining to the matter go on to claim, “as many as eight ministers are potentially involved in the illegal trading (Eurotopics, 2017).”

In regard to the independent variable (political corruption) pertaining to land administration within the Kingdom of Denmark, corruption is perceived to be low (GAN Integrity, 2016). According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018, most Danish companies are confident that property rights within Denmark have adequate protection (World Economic Forum, n.d.) Furthermore, the European Commission found that it is rare for companies within Denmark to confront corruption during dealings with Denmark’s land administration (European Commission, 2014). It is important to note that the expropriation of land within Denmark intended to be used for public purposes must involve just compensation and the expropriation of land within Denmark does adhere to international law, however, no major expropriation of lands within the Kingdom of Denmark has occurred in recent years (U.S. Department of State, 2017).

Tax administration within the Kingdom of Denmark is also perceived to be largely corruption free. According to the World Economic Forum’s Global

Competitiveness Report 2015-2016, companies within Denmark have disclosed that corrupt acts such as bribery and also the making of irregular payments during yearly tax payments are largely infrequent (World Economic Forum, n.d.). However, according to the European Commission, in 2014 nearly fifty percent of Danish companies that participated in surveys expressed the belief that tax fraud is the foremost common form of corruption taking place within the Kingdom of Denmark (European Commission, 2014). Also, according to the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018, Danish companies expressed that both the tax rates within Denmark, as well as other regulations within Denmark to be the biggest obstacles relating to business operations within the country (World Economic Forum, n.d.). Concerning corporate tax payments, in order to ensure transparency the Danish Ministry of Taxation makes corporate tax records available to the public (U.S. Department of State, 2017).

As for the independent variable (political corruption) pertaining to the Kingdom of Denmark's customs administration, perceptions of the existence of corruption are largely non-existent. According to the World Economic Forum's Global Enabling Trade Report 2016, bribery and the use of irregular payments are infrequent throughout customs transactions (World Economic Forum, 2016). The Global Enabling Report 2016 also asserts that the "time-predictability of import procedures are seen as satisfactory" within Denmark's customs administration (World Economic Forum, 2016). Even polls conducted by the European Commission in 2014 suggest that the Kingdom of Denmark's customs administration is perceived to be largely void of corruption and that corrupt acts such as bribes rarely take place throughout dealings with Danish services related to the Kingdom of Denmark's customs administration (European Commission, 2014).

Concerning the independent variable (political corruption) relating to public procurement within the Kingdom of Denmark, the existence of corruption is perceived to be low (GAN Integrity, 2016). According to the European Commission, in 2014 only a small number of Danish businesses that participated in surveys expressed the assumption that corruption within Denmark's public procurement process obstructs Danish companies from being awarded public tenders (European Commission, 2014). Furthermore, according to the Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018, the report asserts that most Danish businesses believe that Danish officials who are involved with public procurement do not engage in favoritism during contract decisions (World Economic Forum, n.d.). However, the European Commission found that in 2014 approximately one out of seven Danish companies perceive corruption to be highly prevalent within tenders that are under the management of Danish national officials and the European Commission also found that one out of five Danish companies perceive corruption to be prevalent within tenders under the management of local officials within Denmark (European Commission, 2014). It is important to note that any Danish company which is convicted of engaging in corrupt acts may be required to pay fines and any Danish company which is convicted of engaging in corrupt acts may be prohibited from engaging in several types of commercial dealings, all of which are dependent upon the severity of the corrupt dealings (United Nations, 2016).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE (DEVELOPMENT) IN DENMARK

The Kingdom of Denmark is significant to the studying of the dependent variable (development), because Denmark is considered to be a highly developed. Moreover, Denmark is perceived to be among the most developed countries throughout the entire

world, and even one of the most developed countries on the European continent.

According to the World Bank, the Danish economy is classified as “high income (World Bank, n.d.)” Furthermore, Denmark is perceived to be highly advanced in many regards. Such regards pertain to human rights, the country’s education system, the country’s healthcare system, the country’s legal system, and the country’s overall economy. In addition, the majority of Danish citizens have standards of living which are considered to be among the highest in the world, and even have standards of living which are considered to be some of the highest of the entire European continent.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that in the year 2019 the total GDP (PPP) of Denmark to be \$312.842 billion (International Monetary Fund, 2019) and in 2020 Denmark’s GDP (PPP) per capita to be \$55,674.672 (International Monetary Fund, 2020). As for the total nominal GDP of Denmark, the country’s nominal GDP is estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to be \$347.176 billion (International Monetary Fund, 2019) and the GDP (nominal) per capita of Denmark is estimated to be \$61,226.9766 (International Monetary Fund, 2019). Concerning the human development of the Kingdom of Denmark, the country is reported to be the eleventh most human developed country in the world according to the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI) issued by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2019 Human Development Index (HDI), the Kingdom of Denmark has a human development measurement of 0.930 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019). Additionally, according to the 2019 Human Development Index Rankings, Denmark has a gross

national income (GNI) per capita (PPP) of \$48,836 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019).

Furthermore, concerning the overall economy of the Kingdom of Denmark, apart from being described as a developed or industrialized economy, the Danish economy can also be described as a mixed economy. Similarly, to other countries located in Scandinavia, Denmark employs the Nordic Model. The Nordic Model can be conceptualized as the fusing of free market capitalism alongside an array of social welfare provisions and an immense amount of social protections for Danish workers (Sanandaji, 2012). According to the 2019 Index of Economic Freedom, the index classifies the Danish economy as “mostly free” with an overall measurement of 76.7, making the Kingdom of Denmark’s economy the fourteenth most free economy of the polities measured to compose the index (Heritage Foundation, 2020). Additionally, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2018 asserts the Danish economy to be the world’s tenth most competitive economy of the countries measured and also asserts that the Danish economy is the sixth most competitive economy of the entire European continent (World Economic Forum, 2018).

It is important to note that for the majority of Danish history, prior to World War II, Denmark’s economy was heavily agrarian. However, post-World War II, the Danish economy has largely been transformed by large-scale industrialization. The country’s service sector has grown exponentially as well. For example, the manufacturing sector of the Kingdom of Denmark accounted for approximately fifteen percent of Denmark’s GDP and Denmark’s service sector accounted for approximately three-fourths of its GDP in 2017 (Statistikbanken, 2018). Denmark’s agricultural sector accounted for not even

two percent of the country's total gross domestic product (GDP) that same year (Statistikbanken, 2018). Some of the industries within Denmark which are currently predominant throughout the Danish economy include such industries as the production of renewable energy devices such as wind turbines, the production of pharmaceutical medicines, and the productions of medical related devices. Other industries which are currently predominant throughout the Danish economy include industries such as the production of equipment which are used for transportation related purposes and even food processing is a predominant industry within the Danish economy (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018).

Furthermore, Denmark is a major exporter of goods and services. The approximate percentage of Denmark's total export value attributed to the export of goods is sixty percent and the approximate percentage of Denmark's total export value attributed to services is forty percent. Moreover, in regard to food and energy, the kingdom is a net exporter. The kingdom's net international investment position equaled 64.6% of Denmark's total gross domestic product (GDP) in the year 2018 (European Commission, 2018). The countries which Denmark exports to most include the bordering country Germany and nearby Sweden, as well as other fellow European Union (UN) member states. Additionally, countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States of America are heavily involved in trade with Denmark as well (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). Polls which have been conducted involving Danish citizens suggest that free trade is perceived well in Denmark (Nielsen, 2016). It is important to note, concerning commerce, Denmark is a member of the European Single Market of the European Union (EU). Therefore, many of Denmark's domestic policies relating to

commerce exist as a result of agreements which had been made alongside fellow member states of the European Union (EU) and many of Denmark's domestic policies relating to commerce came into existence as a result of European Union (EU) law.

As for social welfare programs within the Kingdom of Denmark, according to Society at a Glance 2014 Highlights: Denmark OECD Social Indicators, government expenditures on social welfare provisions equaled 30.8% of Denmark's total gross domestic product (GDP), which is higher than the average of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2014). Also, according to Society at a Glance 2014 Highlights: Denmark OECD Social Indicators, Denmark is found to be ranked second lowest of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) pertaining to rates of relative poverty with an estimated rate of relative poverty of 6% (OECD, 2014). Additionally, the country was determined to have the seventh highest employment rate of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The employment rate of Denmark was determined to be 72.8% (OECD, 2014). Notably, pertaining to the employed throughout the Kingdom of Denmark, a report published by the International Trade Union Confederation asserts the Kingdom of Denmark to be the foremost country throughout the world in regards to the rights of workers (International Trade Union Confederation, 2014).

As for the education system of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Ministry of Education is tasked with oversight. However, it is important to note that local municipalities throughout Denmark are largely tasked with the administration of the country's educational programs. When it comes to government spending relating to education, the government of the Kingdom of Denmark's education expenditure as a total

percentage of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated to be 7.6 percent in 2014 (World Bank, 2019). Furthermore, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the government of Denmark reports that 95% of Danes have completed secondary school and that 60% of Danes are either enrolled or have completed tertiary education (OECD, 2014). In addition, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2019 Human Development Report determines Denmark's overall expected years of schooling to be 19.1 and the country's mean years of schooling to be 12.6 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019). According to the UNESCO 2009 Global Education Digest, the Kingdom of Denmark ranked fourth out of all countries measured in regard to the number of Danes having tertiary degrees (UNESCO, 2009). It is important to note that within the Kingdom of Denmark, tuition for tertiary education is subsidized by tax dollars.

Concerning health related indicators of development of the Kingdom of Denmark, the country has a relatively advanced healthcare system. The World Health Organization (WHO) has previously ranked the healthcare system of the Kingdom of Denmark to be the thirty-fourth best healthcare system in the world (World Health Organization, 2000). Furthermore, concerning the healthcare system of Denmark, a government agency known as the Danish Ministry of Health is tasked with overseeing the country's healthcare system. The agency is also tasked with many policies related to healthcare. According to Society at a Glance 2014 Highlights: Denmark OECD Social Indicators, the Danish government's expenditure related to healthcare was higher than the average of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2014). Health spending of the Danish government has been estimated to be \$5,299 per capita in

2018, therefore, Denmark was the seventh highest spending country when it comes to health spending (OECD, 2019). Moreover, as of the year 2016, the life expectancy of Denmark for women was eighty-three and the life expectancy of men in Denmark was seventy-nine according to the World Health Organization (United Nations Development Programme, 2019). According to the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI), the Kingdom of Denmark is estimated to have an overall life expectancy of 80.8 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019). However, in 2014 the life expectancy of Danes was lower than the average life expectancy of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of 80.1 with an average life expectancy for Danes of 79.9 (OECD, 2014).

YEMEN OVERVIEW

The Republic of Yemen, commonly referred to simply as Yemen, is a Middle Eastern country which is located on the southwestern Arabian Peninsula. The country is the second-largest country on the Arabian Peninsula and the forty-ninth largest country in the world with an approximate land area of 203,850 square miles (527,970 square kilometers) (McLaughlin, 2008, p. 3). Yemen shares physical borders with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the north and the Sultanate of Oman to the east, as well as coastlines which border the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea. Apart from land located on the Arabian Peninsula, the Republic of Yemen has sovereignty over approximately two hundred islands. As of 2018, the population of Yemen was estimated to be 29,825,968 (United Nations, 2019). It is important to note that Yemen is a member state of organizations such as the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Yemen is also a member state of other organizations such as the United

Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement. Additionally, according to the Democracy Index, Yemen ranks one hundred and fifty-eight of all polities measured with a value of 1.95, and therefore, Denmark is categorized as an “authoritarian state (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019).” Also, according to the Fragile State Index, Yemen is considered to be a failed state (Fund for Peace, 2018).

It is important to note that the Republic of Yemen has been in a constant state of political turmoil known as the Yemeni crisis which began in 2011. More specifically, the Yemeni Crisis culminated from the Yemeni Revolution of Dignity, commonly referred to as the Yemeni Revolution. The revolution began as a revolution intended to address such ailments as political corruption, high rates of poverty, as well as high unemployment rates which have been plaguing the country for some time. Additionally, the Yemeni Revolution began as a reaction to former President of the Republic of Yemen’s, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, attempt to make himself president for life of the country by amending the Constitution of Yemen (Gelvin, 2012, p. 68). Due to the revolution, the Gulf Cooperation Council, a regional intergovernmental political and economic union between the Arab states of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, the Sultanate of Oman, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, decided to intervene. More specifically, the Gulf Cooperation Council made a proposal in which the presidency of the Republic of Yemen would be transferred from then President Saleh to then Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. On 23 November 2011, the proposal was signed by then President Saleh in the capital of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh. As a result, Saleh agreed to reside as president, but only as a figurehead, until new elections

would take place (BBC News, 2011). In February of 2011, as a result of a one-candidate election, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was elected president (Al Jazeera, 2011).

Throughout the transition period the central government of the Republic of Yemen was essentially absent. Therefore, conflicts such as the Houthi insurgency in Yemen and the al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen, which had already been underway throughout the country, began to intensify. Additionally, with the aid of former president Saleh, the Houthi movement ceased control of the city of Sana'a in September of 2014. Following a coup d'état, known as the Houthi takeover in Yemen or the September 21 Revolution, the Houthi movement proclaimed to be the national government of the Republic of Yemen (BBC News, 2015). It is important to note that former president Saleh died as a result of sniper fire after accusations of treason by the Houthi movement in December of 2017 (Al Jazeera, 2017). Such longstanding turmoil throughout Yemen generated the country's latest civil war in 2015 known as the Yemeni Civil War and also resulted in the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen which is intended to reinstall the national government of the Republic of Yemen with Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi as president (Aboueldahab, 2017). As reported by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), more than 100,000 people have died as a result of the Yemeni Civil War (ACLED, 2020).

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (POLITICAL CORRUPTION) IN YEMEN

Unfortunately, the Republic of Yemen appears to be heavily infected with the global pandemic known as political corruption. According to an article published by the World Bank Blog, the Republic of Yemen is stated to be, "the most corrupt country in the Arabian Gulf region (Ddwan, 2014)." Additionally, according to the Corruption

Perceptions Index 2018 published by Transparency International, the Republic of Yemen has a perceived corruption measurement of 14 (Transparency International e.V., 2018).

What is also unfortunate is that the pandemic known as political corruption appears to be worsening within the country as the result of ongoing political turmoil which began in the year 2011. Without a doubt, major reforms are necessary in order to combat extensive corruption throughout the country.

While laws which are intended to outlaw, combat, and penalize certain acts of corruption have been enacted by the Yemeni government, not all corrupt acts are covered by provisions within the perceived to be excessively corrupt country (GAN Integrity, 2016). For example, corrupt acts such as passive bribes as well as extortion are not specifically outlawed within the Republic of Yemen and corrupt practices such as bribes and the giving of gifts commonly occur. Furthermore, the existence of both patronage networks and omnipresent nepotism within Yemen greatly hinder investment and obstructs companies (GAN Integrity, 2016). Furthermore, concerning laws pertaining to corruption within the Republic of Yemen, the United States Department of State's Human Rights Practices Report – Yemen 2015 finds that laws within the Republic of Yemen intended to outlaw, combat, and punish corrupt acts have been enacted, however, the report also finds that the government, currently in exile, failed with the adequate implementation of such laws (U.S. Department of State, 2015).

Additionally, concerning legislation within Yemen intended to outlaw, combat, and penalize corrupt acts, most Yemeni public officials must adhere to laws pertaining to the disclosing of personal finances. However, certain public officials at the highest levels of government within Yemen have immunity from being prosecuted and will also not be

tried for crimes without two-thirds of the members of the Parliament of Yemen deciding that a criminal probe is necessary (GAN Integrity, 2016). According to the United States Department of State's Investment Climate Statement – Yemen 2014, no laws were found within Yemen which are intended to protect whistleblowers (U.S. Department of State, 2014). It is also important to note that the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) has been ratified by the Republic of Yemen. However, the Republic of Yemen is not currently one of the signatories of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

Pertaining to the independent variable (political corruption) in regard to the judicial system of the Republic of Yemen, the judicial system is perceived to be highly corrupt. According to the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015, corrupt acts such as bribery and also the occurrence of irregular payments frequently influence decisions which are rendered by courts within Yemen (World Economic Forum, n.d.). Additionally, according to the United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015, corruption within the judicial system of the country of Yemen flourishes as a result of the Yemeni government's inability and, in some instances, unwillingness to properly enforce orders which have been issued by courts within the country (U.S. Department of State, 2015). As a result of local elites often being heavily involved in disputes which occur throughout more rural regions of the county, corruption can easily flourish. In addition, according to the World Bank's Enterprise Survey – Yemen 2013, only 17.2% of firms operating within Yemen believe that "the court system is fair, impartial and uncorrupted (U.S. Department of State, 2015)." The country's judicial system is highly vulnerable to being interfered by the country's executive branch as well (U.S. Department of State, 2015).

When it comes to the Yemeni police, the independent variable (political corruption) appears to be highly prevalent throughout Yemeni police forces. The United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices of 2015 finds that both instances of members of Yemeni police forces abusing their offices as well as impunity to be highly common (U.S. Department of State, 2015). Furthermore, the United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices of 2015 also finds that the government of Yemen is not capable of investigating instances of corrupt activities occurring throughout Yemeni police efficiently (U.S. Department of State, 2015). Additionally, according to the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015, many companies operating within the Republic of Yemen believe that they cannot depend on Yemeni police forces for protection against criminal activities. The World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015 also finds that companies operating within the Republic of Yemen perceive that Yemeni police forces cannot be depended on to effectively enforce laws throughout the country (World Economic Forum, n.d.).

Concerning public services within the Republic of Yemen, the independent variable (political corruption) is heavily infectious. Once again, largely as a result of ongoing political turmoil, public service administration within the Republic of Yemen has substantially deteriorated. According to the United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices of 2015, petty corruption can be found to exist within all government offices throughout the Republic of Yemen (U.S. Department of State, 2015). The World Bank's Enterprise Surveys – Yemen 2013 finds that 61.6% of businesses “expected to give gifts to get an operating license” within Yemen (World

Bank, 2015). Additionally, the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys – Yemen 2013 finds that the acquisition of public utilities is highly difficult for businesses operating within Yemen due to the common occurrence of corrupt activities (World Bank, 2015).

As for the independent variable (political corruption) in relation to tax administration within the Republic of Yemen, corruption is permeating. The World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015 finds that the bribing of officials involved with tax administration and irregular payments being made to officials involved with tax administration regularly occurs within the country (World Bank, n.d.). According to the United States Department of State's Investment Climate Statement – Yemen 2014, officials involved with tax administration throughout the Republic of Yemen have been found to engage in bribery with businesses which are operating within Yemen (U.S. Department of State, 2014). Additionally, the United States Department of State's Investment Climate Statement – Yemen 2014 finds that the application of laws which are related to tax administration to not be consistent (U.S. Department of State, 2014). Furthermore, the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys – Yemen 2013 finds that 62.6% of firms within the Republic of Yemen “expected to give gifts in meetings with tax inspectors (World Bank, 2015).”

Customs administration within the Republic of Yemen unfortunately is perceived to be highly corrupt. According to the World Economic Forum's Global Enabling Trade Report 2014, corrupt acts such as bribery and also irregular payments frequently occurring during encounters with officials involved with customs administration within Yemen (World Economic Forum, 2014). Interestingly, the World Economic Forum's Global Trade Enabling Report 2014 also finds that corrupt activity relating to customs

administration within Yemen occurs more frequently during imports of goods and services rather than during exports of goods and services (World Economic Forum, 2014). Therefore, all businesses and individuals, whether foreign or domestic, should take great precautions as to avoid corruption relating to international commerce pertaining to the Republic of Yemen.

When it comes to public procurement within the Republic of Yemen, companies involved in business dealings throughout the country “face a very high risk of corruption (GAN Integrity).” According to the United States Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement – Yemen 2014, many public officials involved with public procurement perceive foreign investments within the country as a tool to be used for their own personal gains (U.S. Department of State, 2014). Also, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2014-2015 finds that public officials involved with public procurement within Yemen frequently favoring certain companies over other companies is a major issue plaguing the country (World Economic Forum, 2014). More specifically, public procurement contracts are often granted to certain companies with ties to the county’s elites. Furthermore, according to the United States Department of State’s Investment Climate Statement – Yemen 2014, contracts pertaining to public procurement within the Republic of Yemen are rarely tendered, and even when public procurement contracts are tendered, there is a lack of transparency during the process (U.S. Department of State, 2014).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE (DEVELOPMENT) IN YEMEN

Concerning the Dependent Variable (development), the respective country of Republic of Yemen is significant to the studying of development because the country is

considered to be highly underdeveloped in many regards. Moreover, Yemen is perceived to be among the most impoverished and underdeveloped countries in the Middle East and is even perceived to be among the most impoverished and underdeveloped countries in the entire world. According to the World Bank, the Yemeni economy is classified as “low-income (World Bank, n.d.)” Furthermore, underdevelopment of the respective country of Yemen pertains to human rights, the country’s education system, the country’s healthcare system, the country’s political and legal system, and the country’s overall economy. In addition, a large sum of Yemeni citizens have standards of living considered to be inadequate.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that in the year 2019 the total GDP (PPP) of Yemen to be \$72.171 billion (International Monetary Fund, 2019) and in 2020 Yemen’s GDP (PPP) per capita to be \$2,311.681 (International Monetary Fund, 2020). As for the total nominal GDP of Yemen, the country’s nominal GDP is estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to be \$29,855 billion (International Monetary Fund, 2019) and the GDP (nominal) per capita of Denmark is estimated to be \$943.343 in 2019 (International Monetary Fund, 2019). Additionally, concerning the human development of Yemen, the country is reported to rank one hundred and seventy-seven of one hundred and eighty-nine countries measured in terms of human development according to the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI) issued by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2019 Human Development Index (HDI), the Yemen has a human development measurement of 0.463 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019).

As for economic openness and economic freedom throughout the economy of the Republic of Yemen, similarly to most authoritarian states, the government of the Republic of Yemen is heavily involved in the country's economy largely through means of control of the country's financial sector (Heritage Foundation, 2020). Notably, the country of Yemen does not receive a ranking on the Index of Economic Freedom as a result of an inability to gather relevant statistics (Heritage Foundation, 2020). According to the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2018, the economy of the Republic of Yemen is ranked one hundred and thirty-ninth out of one hundred and forty countries measured with a value of 36.4 out of one hundred in terms of competitiveness (World Economic Forum, 2018). Additionally, pertaining to the economic openness of the economy of the Republic of Yemen, foreign investment is significantly deterred as a result of investors finding the economy of the Republic of Yemen difficult to maneuver (Heritage Foundation, 2020).

It is notable that the Yemeni economy has been struggling for some time, even prior to the currently ongoing Yemeni crisis, resulting in large sums of the country's population becoming impoverished, lack of economic progress, as well as Yemenis becoming unable to access even the most basic public goods and public services (Heritage Foundation, 2020). With that said, the currently waging Yemeni Civil War has largely exacerbated the Republic of Yemen's development conundrum by proving to be disastrous to both the economic development and the human development of the country. Additionally, much of the country's infrastructure has been destroyed and the delivery of many basic public good and public services has largely come to a halt. Moreover, foreign exchange and revenues of the government of Yemen have been sharply in decline as a

result of the country losing some recipients of Yemeni oil (World Bank, 2019).

Additionally, the Yemeni Civil War “coupled with the fragmentation of state institutions, including the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY), has interrupted supply of foreign exchange for essential imports and payment of public sector salaries, fueling inflation and exacerbating the humanitarian crisis (World Bank, 2019).” Furthermore, in 2018 and also in 2019 currency depreciations have resulted in inflationary pressure which has greatly negatively impacted the financial services of the Republic of Yemen as well as greatly negatively impacted Yemeni businesses (World Bank, 2019).

In addition, the Yemeni Civil War has been detrimental to the fiscal conditions of the country due to declines in revenues coming from fossil fuels such as gas and oil and also due to declines in tax revenues due to mass poverty. Approximately one quarter of the country’s total gross domestic product (GDP), along with approximately 63 percent of the revenue of the government of the Republic of Yemen is due to the production of petroleum (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). Moreover, it has been estimated that the overall tax burden of the Republic of Yemen is equivalent to more than 7 percent of the country’s gross domestic income (Heritage Foundation, 2020). Spending by the national government of the Republic of Yemen has been estimated to amount for “10.8 percent of the country’s output (GDP) over the past three years, and budget deficits have averaged 5.9 percent of GDP” and it has been estimated that the public debt of the Republic of Yemen “is equivalent to 63.2 percent of GDP (Heritage Foundation, 2020).” In 2019, inflation within the Republic of Yemen rose to more than 30 percent (Heritage Foundation, 2020). Throughout much of 2018, expeditious depreciation of the country’s currency resulted in the prices of the country’s major imports rising (Heritage

Foundation, 2020). Furthermore, “the total value of exports and imports of goods and services equals 47.1 percent of GDP” and “the average applied tariff rate is 5.0 percent (Heritage Foundation, 2020).” Overall, the Yemeni Civil War has been detrimental to the country’s involvement in international trade and has resulted in a loss of foreign investments for the country.

Apart from causing immense destruction to the country’s infrastructure and negatively impacting the country’s economy substantially, ongoing turmoil within the Republic of Yemen has resulted in numerous humanitarian crises. For example, the conflict has resulted in famine. According to the World Bank, “in 2019, the UN estimated that 24.1 million people – 80 percent of the population – were “at risk” of hunger and disease, of which roughly 14.3 million were in acute need of assistance (World Bank, 2019).” According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), an estimated 17 million people are being impacted by famine throughout the country (UNOCHA, 2017). Additionally, the World Bank claims that approximately 17.8 million Yemenis lack “safe water and sanitation” along with approximately 19.7 million Yemenis lacking “adequate healthcare (World Bank, 2019).” Furthermore, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), the Republic of Yemen is experiencing a major cholera outbreak. More specifically, concerning cholera within the Republic of Yemen, 224,444 cholera cases have been confirmed as of April of 2019 (World Health Organization, 2019). Tragically, the percentage of Yemenis living in poverty continues to increase throughout the country as well, especially for Yemeni women. Prior to the ongoing Yemeni crisis, approximately 50 percent of Yemenis were

estimated to live in poverty, however, as of 2019 between 71 percent and 78 percent of the country's population are living in poverty (World Bank, 2019).

Yet, toward the end of the year 2018, evidence suggests that the economy of the Republic of Yemen started to stabilize as a result of balance of payments assistance provided by the neighboring country of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia along with the productions of both oil and gas improving (World Bank, 2019). According to the World Bank, "available information suggests that GDP growth turned into positive territory in 2018, arresting a cumulative output contraction of over 40% during 2014-17 (World Bank, 2019)." However, it is important to note that even though the production of oil appears to be improving, oil production is notably lower than levels of oil production prior to the start of the Yemeni crisis (World Bank, 2019). Also according to the World Bank, "if reconciliation efforts in the south succeed, macroeconomic improvement can continue in the latter half of 2019, underpinned by the gradual increase in hydrocarbon production and continued salary payments to public sector employees (World Bank, 2019)."

In review of the 2019 Human Development Report, education within the Republic of Yemen needs improvement. More specifically, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2019 Human Development Report, Yemen's overall expected years of schooling is determined to be 8.7 (United Nations Development Report, 2019). Additionally, the report determines the country's mean years of schooling to be only 3.2 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019). However, the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training strives to facilitate both technical education as well as help facilitate vocational training throughout the country in order for

Yemenis to be able to succeed in the workforce (United Nations, 2020). Additionally, as for government spending relating to education, the government of the Republic of Yemen's education expenditure as a total percentage of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated to be 5.151 percent in 2008 by the World Bank (World Bank, 2019).

Concerning health related indicators of development of the Republic of Yemen, the country has a relatively underdeveloped healthcare system. The World Health Organization (WHO) has previously ranked the healthcare system of the Republic of Yemen to be one hundred and twentieth in terms of overall health system performance (World Health Organization, 2000). Furthermore, concerning healthcare within Yemen, a government agency known as the Ministry of Health is tasked with overseeing the country's healthcare system. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), health spending of the government of the Republic of Yemen has been estimated to be \$202 per capita and health spending of the government of the Republic of Yemen as a total percentage of the country's GDP has been estimated to be 5.6 percent in 2014 (World Health Organization, 2014). Furthermore, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), life expectancy for men was sixty-four and life expectancy for women was sixty-seven in 2014 (World Health Organization, 2014). Also, according to the 2019 Human Development Index (HDI), the overall life expectancy of the Republic of Yemen is 66.1 (United Nations Development Programme, 2019).

Overall, the future of the dependent variable (development) within Republic of Yemen largely remains opaque. Any improvements to the dependent variable (development) which may have taken place after the start of the ongoing Yemeni crisis

may be largely undone as a result of recent outbreaks of conflict throughout the city of Aden, the current interim capital city of the Republic of Yemen. Large scale improvements to development of the country can only occur alongside political stability culminating in the end of the crisis. Yet, even if the Yemeni Civil War was to end abruptly or sometime in the near future, much intervention and aid would likely be needed to lessen and correct the economic and humanitarian crises the war either created or exacerbated. Still, as of late, the unwillingness of the Houthis movement to engage in negotiations and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's willingness to intervene as a result of the Islamic Republic of Iran's support for the Houthis movement suggests that the war is not nearing its conclusion.

CHAPTER 10 ANTI-CORRUPTION PROPOSAL

There are numerous solutions which can be and should be exercised in order to prevent, combat, and eradicate the independent variable (political corruption). It is especially important for countries in which the independent variable (political corruption) is highly endemic, such as the respective country of the Republic of Yemen, to enact a multitude of anti-corruption reforms. As recognized through comparative analysis of the respective countries of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Republic of Yemen in regards to the independent variable (political corruption) and the dependent variable (development), each country is highly distinct from the other. However, when it comes to the combating, prevention, and the eradication of the independent variable (political corruption), much can be learned from the mechanisms employed by the Kingdom of Denmark, the perceived to be least politically corrupt country of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed throughout the thesis.

First, public officials, especially public officials holding positions at the highest levels of government, must be devoted to preventing, combating, and eradicating corruption. In order to ensure that public officials are devoted to preventing, combating, and eradicating the independent variable (political corruption), all countries throughout the world in which political corruption is highly endemic should democratize. Through

democratization, citizens would be able to vote for candidates they perceive to be uncorrupt or less likely to engage in corrupt dealings through free and fair elections. If most public officials, or at least public officials at the highest levels of government, were required to run for reelection after serving terms of fixed amounts of years, citizens would also have a chance to not reelect officials they perceive to be corrupt or not concerned with preventing, combating, or eradicating the independent variable (political corruption). Even though the control variable (state of democracy) was not found to be statistically significant to the first measurement of the dependent variable (development), the control variable (state of democracy) was found to be statistically significant to the second measurement of the dependent variable (development). Therefore, democratization may result in improvements to the human development of countries throughout the world.

Furthermore, concerning public officials, if a public official is accused of corruption, the public official must be investigated thoroughly. Additionally, if a public official is found guilty of a corrupt act, the official should be held accountable. For example, depending upon the corrupt action and the severity of the corrupt action, public officials convicted of corruption should be required to pay fines, possibly serve prison sentences, and should most certainly be removed from office. In the case of the Republic of Yemen, as previously mentioned, certain public officials have immunity from being prosecuted for crimes and will not be tried without two-thirds of the Parliament of Yemen being in favor of the official being investigated, which the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) opposes. No such provision exists within the Kingdom of Denmark. Therefore, the Republic of Yemen must do away with such a provision in order

to eradicate the independent variable (political corruption) at the highest levels of government.

Additionally, if countries suffering substantially from the pandemic known as political corruption are to be successful at preventing, combating, and eradicating the disease, an abundance of laws must be passed by the legislative bodies of the countries. All countries throughout the world could benefit from the passing of further legislation pertaining to corruption, however, further legislation pertaining to corruption is especially needed in countries throughout the world in which corruption is highly endemic. In the case of the Republic of Yemen, as previously mentioned, corrupt practices such as passive bribery and also certain forms of extortion are not specifically outlawed (GAN Integrity, 2016). Furthermore, laws must be enacted which protect those who expose corruption. Unlike Denmark, laws do not exist which are intended to protect whistleblowers within the Republic of Yemen (U.S. Department of State, 2014). Therefore, the Parliament of the Republic of Yemen should pass laws which outlaw forms of the independent variable (political corruption) which are currently not outlawed with Yemen and the Parliament of the Republic of Yemen should enact laws which are intended to protect whistleblowers.

When it comes to the investigation and prosecution of public officials who have engaged in corrupt activities, countries who are greatly suffering from the independent variable (political corruption) may even benefit from the creation of specialized agencies which exist solely to investigate and prosecute corruption. When it comes to the Republic of Yemen, as previously mentioned, corruption is perceived to be extensive throughout the Yemeni police. Moreover, it has been determined that the government of the Republic

of Yemen is not capable of properly investigating corruption which is occurring within the Yemeni police efficiently (U.S. Department of State, 2015). Therefore, when existing law enforcement agencies have been substantially corrupted, an agency solely devoted to combating corruption should be created. In order to ensure the newly created agencies does not become corrupted, the agency should receive constant oversight from the country's branches of government, however, the agency should remain independent. Additionally, the agency should be headed by an individual with an extensive background in criminal justice and law enforcement. The official which heads the agency should even be elected by the people.

CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSION

In summation, through linear regression analyses, the thesis concludes that a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable (political corruption) and the dependent variable (development) exists. Furthermore, the comparative analysis of the respective countries of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Republic of Yemen provide insight into two starkly different countries pertaining to political corruption and development. However, further research needs to be conducted in order to further determine the causes of corruption and the impacts corruption, political or otherwise, has on countries. If corruption is further understood, hopefully corruption in all its forms will become less prevalent and ultimately eradicated. Avenues of further research pertaining to the relationship between political corruption and development should continue to focus on corruption in both public and private sectors, however, focus on corruption entrenched within institutions related to components of the Human Development Index (HDI), such educational institutions and healthcare institutions also need be the focus of further research. Additionally, since political corruption within the Republic of Yemen has largely been exacerbated as a result of political turmoil, further research should focus on the relationship between political corruption and instances of political turmoil.

To reiterate, corruption is a pandemic which is found to exist in all countries throughout the world. The fact that no country has received a perfect score of one hundred on the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the allegations and instances of corruption pertaining to the Kingdom of Denmark, the perceived to be least corrupt country of the one hundred and fifty-six polities analyzed throughout the thesis, validates the aforementioned statement. Furthermore, social scientists, legislators, policy experts, and academics have conducted numerous studies in order to determine the causes of the independent variable (political corruption), the impacts the independent variable (political corruption) has on dependent variable (development), and in order to determine possible solutions to the independent variable (political corruption). Literature reviewed throughout the thesis provides examples of such studies. Overall, findings of the research imply that political corruption appears to fester as a result of a lack of political will to combat corruption, a lack of and inadequate laws pertaining to corruption, unjust legal protections for certain public officials in positions at high levels of government, as well as political upheaval.

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178%2C744%2C436%2C186%2C136%2C925%2C343%2C869%2C158
%2C746%2C439%2C926%2C916%2C466%2C664%2C112%2C826%2C
111%2C542%2C298%2C967%2C927%2C443%2C846%2C917%2C299
%2C544%2C582%2C941%2C474%2C446%2C754%2C666%2C698&s=
NGDPD&grp=0&a=

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134%2C524%2C652%2C361%2C174%2C362%2C328%2C364%2C258
&2C732%2C656%2C366%2C654%2C144%2C336%2C146%2C263%2C
463%2C268%2C528%2C532%2C923%2C944%2C738%2C176%2C578
&2C534%2C537%2C536%2C742%2C429%2C866%2C433%2C369%2C
178%2C744%2C436%2C186%2C136%2C925%2C343%2C869%2C158
&2C746%2C439%2C926%2C916%2C466%2C664%2C112%2C826%2C
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TABLE 1
Countries according to the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
(Transparency International e.V., 2018)

Country	(CPI) Ranking	(CPI) Measurement
Denmark	1	88
New Zealand	2	87
Finland	3	85
Singapore	3	85
Sweden	3	85
Switzerland	3	85
Norway	7	84
Netherlands	8	82
Canada	9	81
Luxembourg	9	81
Germany	11	80
United Kingdom	11	80
Australia	13	77
Austria	14	76
Hong Kong	14	76
Iceland	14	76
Belgium	17	75
Estonia	18	73
Ireland	18	73
Japan	18	73
France	21	72
United States of America	22	71
United Arab Emirates	23	70
Uruguay	23	70
Bhutan	25	68
Chile	27	67
Portugal	30	64
Qatar	33	62
Botswana	34	61
Israel	34	61
Poland	36	60
Slovenia	36	60
Cyprus	38	59
Czech Republic	38	59
Lithuania	38	59
Georgia	41	58
Latvia	41	58
Spain	41	58
Cape Verde	45	57
South Korea	45	57
Costa Rica	48	56
Rwanda	48	56
Malta	51	54
Namibia	52	53
Italy	53	52

Oman	53	52
Mauritius	56	51
Slovakia	57	50
Jordan	58	49
Saudi Arabia	58	49
Croatia	60	48
Malaysia	61	47
Romania	61	47
Hungary	64	46
Greece	67	45
Montenegro	67	45
Senegal	67	45
Belarus	70	44
Jamaica	70	44
Morocco	73	43
South Africa	73	43
Suriname	73	43
Tunisia	73	43
Bulgaria	77	42
Burkina Faso	78	41
Ghana	78	41
India	78	41
Kuwait	78	41
Lesotho	78	41
Trinidad and Tobago	78	41
Turkey	78	41
Argentina	85	40
Benin	85	40
China	87	39
Serbia	87	39
Bosnia and Herzegovina	89	38
Indonesia	89	38
Sri Lanka	89	38
Guyana	93	37
Macedonia	93	37
Mongolia	93	37
Panama	93	37
Albania	99	36
Bahrain	99	36
Columbia	99	36
Philippines	99	36
Tanzania	99	36
Thailand	99	36
Algeria	105	35
Armenia	105	35
Brazil	105	35
Egypt	105	35
El Salvador	105	35
Peru	105	35
Zambia	105	35
Ecuador	114	34
Ethiopia	114	34
Niger	114	34

Moldovia	117	33
Pakistan	117	33
Vietnam	117	33
Liberia	120	32
Malawi	120	32
Mali	120	32
Ukraine	120	32
Djibouti	124	31
Gabon	124	31
Kazakhstan	124	31
Nepal	124	31
Dominican Republic	129	30
Sierra Leone	129	30
Togo	129	30
Bolivia	132	29
Honduras	132	29
Kyrgyzstan	132	29
Laos	132	29
Myanmar	132	29
Paraguay	132	29
Guinea	138	28
Iran	138	28
Lebanon	138	28
Mexico	138	28
Papua New Guinea	138	28
Russia	138	28
Comoros	144	27
Guatemala	144	27
Kenya	144	27
Mauritania	144	27
Nigeria	144	27
Bangladesh	149	26
Central African Republic	149	26
Uganda	149	26
Azerbaijan	152	25
Cameroon	152	25
Madagascar	152	25
Nicaragua	152	25
Tajikistan	152	25
Eritrea	157	24
Mozambique	158	23
Uzbekistan	158	23
Zimbabwe	160	22
Cambodia	161	20
Democratic Republic of the Congo	161	20
Haiti	161	20
Turkmenistan	161	20
Angola	165	19
Chad	165	19
Iraq	168	18
Venezuela	168	18
Burundi	170	17
Libya	170	17

Afghanistan	172	16
Equatorial Guinea	172	16
Guinea Bissau	172	16
Sudan	172	16
Yemen	176	14

APPENDIX B

TABLE 2
GDP per capita according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2018
(International Monetary Fund, 2018)

	<u>IMF GDP per capita nominal</u>
Denmark	61,226.976
New Zealand	41,615.923
Finland	50,068.076
Singapore	61,230.153
Sweden	53,867.171
Switzerland	83,583.002
Norway	82,372.378
Netherlands	52,931.158
Canada	46,733.032
Luxembourg	113,954.417
Germany	48,669.628
United Kingdom	42,260.924
Australia	56,698.098
Austria	51,707.556
Hong Kong	48,231.330
Iceland	75,699.620
Belgium	46,978.654
Estonia	22,416.701
Ireland	75,192.292
Japan	40,105.780
France	42,930.768
United States of America	62,517.530
United Arab Emirates	41,476.301
Uruguay	17,379.655
Bhutan	3,211.326
Chile	16,143.419
Portugal	23,175.766
Qatar	67,818.328
Botswana	8,167.977
Israel	41,179.827
Poland	14,468.827
Slovenia	26,586.048
Cyprus	27,864.523
Czech Republic	23,085.190
Lithuania	18,856.852
Georgia	4,505.764
Latvia	17,634.365
Spain	31,059.508
Cape Verde	3,622.206
South Korea	32,046.001
Costa Rica	12,095.044
Rwanda	800.210
Malta	30,555.309
Namibia	5,923.495
Italy	34,349.219
Oman	19,170.363
Mauritius	11,014.942
Slovakia	

Jordan	19,642.098
Saudi Arabia	4,227.541
Croatia	23,186.743
Malaysia	14,637.462
Romania	10,703.606
Hungary	12,189.452
Greece	16,016.041
Montenegro	20,311.014
Senegal	8,644.307
Belarus	1,485.402
Jamaica	6,020.043
Morocco	5,393.382
South Africa	3,355.423
Suriname	6,560.041
Tunisia	6,506.041
Bulgaria	3,573.365
Burkina Faso	9,080.255
Ghana	734.033
India	1,786.652
Kuwait	2,016.152
Lesotho	31,915.515
Trinidad and Tobago	1,465.548
Turkey	16,930.881
Argentina	8,715.513
Benin	10,667.104
China	923.250
Serbia	9,633.099
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6,814.809
Indonesia	5,703.869
Sri Lanka	3,788.952
Guyana	4,265.287
Macedonia	4,648.722
Mongolia	5,953.262
Panama	4,097.756
Albania	15,877.484
Bahrain	5,260.901
Columbia	26,531.780
Philippines	6,761.223
Tanzania	3,099.260
Thailand	1,090.099
Algeria	7,084.471
Armenia	4,190.152
Brazil	9,126.864
Egypt	2,572.382
El Salvador	4,041.039
Peru	7,118.427
Zambia	1,450.409
Ecuador	6,301.074
Ethiopia	890.565
Niger	489.051
Moldovia	3,226.717
Pakistan	1,527.157
Vietnam	2,552.829

Liberia	663.029
Malawi	349.133
Mali	891.888
Ukraine	2,964.193
Djibouti	2,084.856
Gabon	8,384.735
Kazakhstan	9,977.414
Nepal	970.695
Dominican Republic	7,891.294
Sierra Leone	495.857
Togo	668.422
Bolivia	3,719.247
Honduras	2,829.030
Kyrgyzstan	1,254.135
Laos	2,690.187
Myanmar	1,354.164
Paraguay	5,933.842
Guinea	865.251
Iran	5,221.974
Lebanon	12,453.703
Mexico	9,614.276
Papua New Guinea	2,464.730
Russia	10,950.492
Comoros	877.193
Guatemala	4,582.654
Kenya	1,865.209
Mauritania	1,309.989
Nigeria	2,050.152
Bangladesh	1,736.290
Central African Republic	454.065
Uganda	717.496
Azerbaijan	4,586.771
Cameroon	1,544.959
Madagascar	474.784
Nicaragua	2,126.565
Tajikistan	807.050
Eritrea	1,111.561
Mozambique	481.248
Uzbekistan	1,326.002
Zimbabwe	1,268.932
Cambodia	1,485.327
Democratic Republic of the Congo	478.321
Haiti	874.043
Turkmenistan	7,411.877
Angola	3,924.347
Chad	889.647
Iraq	5,793.467
Venezuela	3,300.357
Burundi	306.966
Libya	6,638.601
Afghanistan	565.426
Equatorial Guinea	15,294.314
Guinea Bissau	851.536

Sudan	791.933
Yemen	925.618

APPENDIX C

TABLE 3
Countries according to the Human Development Index (HDI)
(United Nations Development Programme, 2019)

<u>Country</u>	<u>(HDI) Ranking</u>	<u>(HDI) Measurement</u>
Denmark	11	0.930
New Zealand	14	0.921
Finland	12	0.925
Singapore	9	0.935
Sweden	8	0.937
Switzerland	2	0.946
Norway	1	0.954
Netherlands	10	0.933
Canada	13	0.922
Luxembourg	21	0.909
Germany	4	0.939
United Kingdom	15	0.920
Australia	6	0.938
Austria	20	0.914
Hong Kong	4	0.939
Iceland	6	0.939
Belgium	17	0.910
Estonia	30	0.882
Ireland	3	0.942
Japan	19	0.915
France	26	0.891
United States of America	15	0.920
United Arab Emirates	35	0.866
Uruguay	57	0.808
Bhutan	134	0.617
Chile	42	0.847
Portugal	40	0.850
Qatar	41	0.848
Botswana	94	0.728
Israel	22	0.906
Poland	32	0.972
Slovenia	24	0.902
Cyprus	31	0.873
Czech Republic	26	0.891
Lithuania	34	0.869
Georgia	70	0.786
Latvia	39	0.854
Spain	25	0.893
Cape Verde	126	0.651
South Korea	22	0.906
Costa Rica	68	0.794
Rwanda	157	0.536
Malta	28	0.885
Namibia	130	0.645
Italy	29	0.883
Oman	47	0.834

Mauritius	66	0.796
Slovakia	36	0.857
Jordan	102	0.723
Saudi Arabia	36	0.857
Croatia	46	0.837
Malaysia	61	0.804
Romania	52	0.816
Hungary	43	0.845
Greece	32	0.872
Montenegro	52	0.816
Senegal	166	0.514
Belarus	50	0.817
Jamaica	96	0.726
Morocco	121	0.676
South Africa	113	0.705
Suriname	98	0.724
Tunisia	91	0.739
Bulgaria	52	0.816
Burkina Faso	182	0.434
Ghana	142	0.596
India	129	0.647
Kuwait	57	0.808
Lesotho	164	0.518
Trinidad and Tobago	63	0.799
Turkey	59	0.806
Argentina	48	0.830
Benin	163	0.520
China	85	0.758
Serbia	63	0.799
Bosnia and Herzegovina	75	0.769
Indonesia	111	0.707
Sri Lanka	71	0.780
Guyana	123	0.670
Macedonia	83	0.759
Mongolia	92	0.735
Panama	67	0.795
Albania	69	0.791
Bahrain	45	0.838
Columbia	79	0.761
Philippines	106	0.712
Tanzania	159	0.528
Thailand	77	0.765
Algeria	82	0.759
Armenia	81	0.760
Brazil	79	0.761
Egypt	116	0.700
El Salvador	124	0.667
Peru	82	0.759
Zambia	143	0.591
Ecuador	85	0.758
Ethiopia	173	0.470
Niger	189	0.377
Moldovia	107	0.711

Pakistan	152	0.560
Vietnam	118	0.693
Liberia	176	0.465
Malawi	172	0.485
Mali	184	0.427
Ukraine	88	0.750
Djibouti	171	0.495
Gabon	115	0.702
Kazakhstan	50	0.817
Nepal	147	0.579
Dominican Republic	89	0.745
Sierra Leone	181	0.438
Togo	167	0.513
Bolivia	114	0.703
Honduras	132	0.623
Kyrgyzstan	122	0.674
Laos	140	0.604
Myanmar	145	0.584
Paraguay	98	0.724
Guinea	174	0.466
Iran	65	0.797
Lebanon	93	0.730
Mexico	76	0.767
Papua New Guinea	155	0.543
Russia	49	0.824
Comoros	156	0.538
Guatemala	126	0.651
Kenya	147	0.579
Mauritania	161	0.527
Nigeria	158	0.534
Bangladesh	135	0.614
Central African Republic	188	0.381
Uganda	159	0.528
Azerbaijan	87	0.754
Cameroon	150	0.563
Madagascar	162	0.521
Nicaragua	126	0.651
Tajikistan	125	0.656
Eritrea	182	0.434
Mozambique	180	0.446
Uzbekistan	108	0.710
Zimbabwe	150	0.563
Cambodia	146	0.581
Democratic Republic of the Congo	179	0.459
Haiti	169	0.503
Turkmenistan	108	0.710
Angola	149	0.574
Chad	187	0.401
Iraq	120	0.689
Venezuela	96	0.726
Burundi	185	0.423
Libya	176	0.465
Afghanistan	170	0.496

Equatorial Guinea	144	0.588
Guinea Bissau	178	0.461
Sudan	168	0.507
Yemen	177	0.463

APPENDIX D

TABLE 4

Countries according to the Democracy Index (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019)

<u>Country</u>	<u>(DI) Ranking</u>	<u>(DI) Measurement</u>
Denmark	7	9.22
New Zealand	4	9.26
Finland	5	9.25
Singapore	75	6.02
Sweden	3	9.39
Switzerland	10	9.03
Norway	1	9.87
Netherlands	11	9.01
Canada	7	9.22
Luxembourg	12	8.81
Germany	13	8.68
United Kingdom	14	8.52
Australia	9	9.09
Austria	16	8.29
Hong Kong	75	6.02
Iceland	2	9.58
Belgium	33	7.64
Estonia	27	7.90
Ireland	6	9.24
Japan	24	7.99
France	20	8.12
United States of America	25	7.96
United Arab Emirates	145	2.76
Uruguay	15	8.38
Bhutan	91	5.30
Chile	21	8.08
Portugal	22	8.03
Qatar	128	3.19
Botswana	29	7.81
Israel	28	7.86
Poland	57	6.62
Slovenia	36	7.50
Cyprus	34	7.59
Czech Republic	32	7.69
Lithuania	36	7.50
Georgia	89	5.42
Latvia	38	7.49
Spain	16	8.29
Cape Verde	30	7.78
South Korea	23	8.00
Costa Rica	19	8.13
Rwanda	129	3.16
Malta	26	7.95
Namibia	65	6.43
Italy	35	7.25
Oman	137	3.06
Mauritius	18	8.22
Slovakia	42	7.17

Jordan	114	3.93
Saudi Arabia	159	1.93
Croatia	59	6.57
Malaysia	43	7.16
Romania	63	6.49
Hungary	55	6.63
Greece	39	7.43
Montenegro	84	5.65
Senegal	82	5.81
Belarus	150	2.48
Jamaica	50	6.96
Morocco	96	5.10
South Africa	40	7.24
Suriname	49	6.98
Tunisia	53	6.72
Bulgaria	49	7.03
Burkina Faso	112	4.04
Ghana	55	6.63
India	51	6.90
Kuwait	114	3.93
Lesotho	60	6.54
Trinidad and Tobago	43	7.16
Turkey	110	4.09
Argentina	48	7.02
Benin	97	5.09
China	153	2.26
Serbia	66	6.41
Bosnia and Herzegovina	102	4.86
Indonesia	64	6.48
Sri Lanka	69	6.27
Guyana	71	6.15
Macedonia	77	5.97
Mongolia	62	6.50
Panama	46	7.05
Albania	79	5.89
Bahrain	149	2.55
Columbia	45	7.13
Philippines	54	6.64
Tanzania	95	5.16
Thailand	68	6.32
Algeria	113	4.01
Armenia	86	5.54
Brazil	52	6.86
Egypt	137	3.06
El Salvador	71	6.15
Peru	58	6.60
Zambia	97	5.09
Ecuador	67	6.33
Ethiopia	125	3.44
Niger	127	3.29
Moldovia	83	5.75
Pakistan	108	4.25
Vietnam	136	3.08

Liberia	88	5.45
Malawi	87	5.50
Mali	100	4.92
Ukraine	78	5.90
Djibouti	144	2.77
Gabon	121	3.61
Kazakhstan	139	2.94
Nepal	92	5.28
Dominican Republic	60	6.54
Sierra Leone	102	4.86
Togo	126	3.30
Bolivia	104	4.84
Honduras	89	5.42
Kyrgyzstan	101	4.89
Laos	155	2.14
Myanmar	122	3.55
Paraguay	70	6.24
Guinea	132	3.14
Iran	151	2.38
Lebanon	106	4.36
Mexico	73	6.09
Papua New Guinea	74	6.03
Russia	134	3.11
Comoros	131	3.15
Guatemala	93	5.26
Kenya	94	5.18
Mauritania	116	3.92
Nigeria	109	4.12
Bangladesh	80	5.88
Central African Republic	165	1.32
Uganda	99	5.02
Azerbaijan	146	2.75
Cameroon	141	2.85
Madagascar	85	5.64
Nicaragua	122	3.55
Tajikistan	159	1.93
Eritrea	152	2.37
Mozambique	120	3.65
Uzbekistan	157	2.01
Zimbabwe	129	3.16
Cambodia	124	3.53
Democratic Republic of the Congo	166	1.13
Haiti	105	4.57
Turkmenistan	162	1.72
Angola	119	3.72
Chad	163	1.61
Iraq	118	3.74
Venezuela	140	2.88
Burundi	154	2.15
Libya	156	2.02
Afghanistan	141	2.85
Equatorial Guinea	161	1.92
Guinea Bissau	148	2.63

Sudan	147	2.70
Yemen	158	1.95

APPENDIX E
LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 1

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption ^b		Enter

a. Dependent Variable:

DependentVariable1_Development_GDP_nominal_per_capita

b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.814 ^a	.662	.660	12196.41186

a. Predictors: (Constant), IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption

b. Dependent Variable:

DependentVariable1_Development_GDP_nominal_per_capita

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	44923205159.452	1	44923205159.452	302.000	.000 ^b
	Residual	22907879195.266	154	148752462.307		
	Total	67831084354.718	155			

a. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable1_Development_GDP_nominal_per_capita

b. Predictors: (Constant), IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Coefficients		
1	(Constant)	-22952.981	2402.410		-9.554	.000
	IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption	881.705	50.736	.814	17.378	.000


a. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable1_Development_GDP_nominal_per_capita

Residuals Statistics^a


	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-10609.1143	54637.0430	15192.0556	17024.30997	156
Residual	-33791.62109	65489.30859	.00000	12157.00494	156
Std. Predicted Value	-1.516	2.317	.000	1.000	156
Std. Residual	-2.771	5.370	.000	.997	156

a. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable1_Development_GDP_nominal_per_capita

Histogram



Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual
Dependent Variable: DependentVariable1_Development_GDP_nominal_per_capita



APPENDIX F
LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 2

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption ^b		Enter

a. Dependent Variable:

DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment

b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.752 ^a	.565	.562	105.29209

a. Predictors: (Constant), IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption

b. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2219560.511	1	2219560.511	200.205	.000 ^b
	Residual	1707309.406	154	11086.425		
	Total	3926869.917	155			

a. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment

b. Predictors: (Constant), IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption

Coefficients^a


Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Coefficients Beta		
1	(Constant)	448.459	20.740		21.623	.000
	IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption	6.198	.438	.752	14.149	.000

a. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment


Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	535.2250	993.8451	716.5833	119.66514	156
Residual	-282.17636	202.00905	.00000	104.95189	156
Std. Predicted Value	-1.516	2.317	.000	1.000	156
Std. Residual	-2.680	1.919	.000	.997	156

a. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment



Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual
Dependent Variable: DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment



APPENDIX G

MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 1

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	InterveningVariable_State_Of_Democracy, IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption ^b	.	Enter

a. Dependent Variable:

DependentVariable1_Development_GDP_nominal_per_capita

b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.816 ^a	.666	.662	12160.81208

a. Predictors: (Constant), InterveningVariable_State_Of_Democracy,

IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption

b. Dependent Variable:

DependentVariable1_Development_GDP_nominal_per_capita

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	45204625750.952	2	22602312875.476	152.837	.000 ^b
	Residual	22626458603.766	153	147885350.351		
	Total	67831084354.718	155			

a. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable1_Development_GDP_nominal_per_capita

b. Predictors: (Constant), InterveningVariable_State_Of_Democracy,

IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Coefficients Beta		
1	(Constant)	-21278.246	2685.481		-7.923	.000
	IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption	960.988	76.566	.887	12.551	.000
	InterveningVariable_StateOf_Democracy	-924.352	670.073	-.097	-1.379	.170


a. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable1_Development_GDP_nominal_per_capita

Residuals Statistics^a


	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	-9626.9053	54841.1055	15192.0556	17077.55096	156
Residual	-35958.52344	65536.20313	.00000	12082.10049	156
Std. Predicted Value	-1.453	2.322	.000	1.000	156
Std. Residual	-2.957	5.389	.000	.994	156

a. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable1_Development_GDP_nominal_per_capita


Histogram




Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual
Dependent Variable: DependentVariable1_Development_GDP_nominal_per_capita



Partial Regression Plot
Dependent Variable: DependentVariable1_Development_GDP_nominal_per_capita





APPENDIX H
MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 2

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	InterveningVariable_State_Of_Democracy, IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption ^b		Enter

- a. Dependent Variable:
 DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment
- b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.763 ^a	.583	.577	103.51147

- a. Predictors: (Constant), InterveningVariable_State_Of_Democracy,
 IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption
- b. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2287532.468	2	1143766.234	106.748	.000 ^b
	Residual	1639337.448	153	10714.624		
	Total	3926869.917	155			

- a. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment
- b. Predictors: (Constant), InterveningVariable_State_Of_Democracy,
 IndependentVariable_PoliticalCorruption

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Coefficients		
1	(Constant)	422.431	22.859		18.480	.000
	IndependentVariable_PoliticalC orruption	4.965	.652	.602	7.619	.000
	InterveningVariable_State_Of_ Democracy	14.366	5.704	.199	2.519	.013

a. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment


Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	519.9602	991.8387	716.5833	121.48364	156
Residual	-261.51837	217.85991	.00000	102.84148	156
Std. Predicted Value	-1.619	2.266	.000	1.000	156
Std. Residual	-2.526	2.105	.000	.994	156


a. Dependent Variable: DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment

Histogram

Dependent Variable: DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment



Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual
Dependent Variable: DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment



Partial Regression Plot
Dependent Variable: DependentVariable2_HumanDevelopment

